DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

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General Studies

by

JEREMY D. SMITH, MAJ, ARMY
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1999
M.A., Columbia University, New York, New York, 2007



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The thesis addresses the development of the current Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This topic was chosen because the international community, in consultation with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, has established 2014 as the time the ANSF will assume full responsibility for Afghanistan's security.

My primary research question is to determine whether the international community has synchronized its efforts and aligned the proper resources necessary to build capacity for the ANSF to adequately sustain their forces.

The international community expended tremendous resources to man, equip, and train the ANSF since its formation in 2002. In many ways, ANSF development is similar to the development of the Iraqi Security Forces and Army of the Republic of Vietnam. This study examines the development of these three nations within the Army's DOTMLPF framework to answer the research question.

In conclusion, the findings indicate that the international community has synchronized efforts and aligned resources to build ANSF capacity and the supporting institutions to sustain it by 2014; however, the Afghan government will require ongoing external financial support.

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Jeremy D. Smith

Thesis Title: Developing Sustainable Afghan National Security Forces

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Timothy H. Civils, M.S.

_____, Member
O. Shawn Cupp, Ph.D

_____, Member
Allan S. Boyce, M.S.

Accepted this 8th day of June 2012 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES, by Major Jeremy D. Smith, 150 pages.

The thesis addresses the development of the current Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This topic was chosen because the international community, in consultation with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, has established 2014 as the time the ANSF will assume full responsibility for Afghanistan's security.

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ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASFF	Afghan Security Forces Funds
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities
FSD	Forward Supply Depot
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
OMLT	Operational Mentor Liaison Team
POMLT	Police Operational Mentor Liaison Team
RLC	Regional Logistics Center
RSC-W	Regional Support Command-West
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> What's a trumpeter's job? To blow.
>
> —Afghan proverb meaning an advisor, teacher, or preacher can only instruct, it is up to the listener to act.

Background

In response to a deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, President Obama announced in a December 2009 address at West Point the deployment of 30,000 additional service members beginning in early 2010. "These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan."[1] In November 2010, approximately halfway through the Afghan surge, national leaders belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and leaders of non-NATO countries, including Afghan President Karzai, met in Lisbon to formally assess the situation and discuss the development of a transition timeline.

The Lisbon Summit affirmed NATO's commitment to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and concurred with President Karzai's assessment that Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) would not be ready to fully assume Afghanistan's security responsibilities until 2014. While the ANSF matures, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would continue fighting the insurgency, partner with existing ANSF formations, and resource the ANSF with equipment and training. These challenges are not unique to Afghanistan; all security forces, particularly the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Army of the Republic of Vietnam

(ARVN), faced similar issues as they developed into mature organizations. The following vignette highlights the complex challenges facing the international community as it seeks to transition Afghan security to the Afghans.

On 2 August 2010, General David H. Petraeus, then commander of ISAF, conducted a battlefield circulation to a remote location in Afghanistan. The combat outpost in the middle of the Moqur valley was the northern-most sector under government control in southern Baghdis province. Control of the valley is significant because the unimproved dirt road through it will one day be the Ring Road, the ground line of communication to connect the country politically and economically. Securing the route from Moqur to the town of Bala Murghab in northern Baghdis is therefore necessary to complete the Ring Road. Expanding the security perimeter is an operational priority for both the Afghan government and ISAF to establish rule of law.[2] Unlike other regions of Afghanistan, however, military operations in Baghdis are an economy of force mission. Figure 1 illustrates the location of Moqur relative to Regional Command-West and Afghanistan.



Figure 1. RC-West Area of Operations

Source: Created by author from a Contract Management Oversight Brief created by author in July 2010.

General Petraeus was there to assess the security situation. He inspected an Afghan National Army (ANA) unit of the 207th Corps and was shocked to discover all their vehicles were non-mission capable. Promising to look into the apparent maintenance issues, he continued his battlefield circulation. Two days later, Brigadier General John McGuiness, then Deputy Commander for Regional Support, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), ordered Colonel Bradley Booth, then commander of Regional Support Command-West (RSC-W), to surge maintenance assets to Moqur. Specifically, RSC-W was directed to assist the ANA by fixing their vehicles at their forward location

in the combat outpost. Additionally, RSC-W was to provide After-Action Review (AAR) comments upon completion of the mission to the NTM-A Command Group.

From 12 to 24 August 2010, RSC-W surged an ad-hoc maintenance contact team consisting of a Department of Defense civilian from Red River who was the RSC-W and NTM-A CJ-4 maintenance Contract Officer Representative, three contractors from RM Asia, and a small security escort team. The command interest in fixing the ANA's vehicles allowed prioritization of rotary wing assets from operational missions to transport personnel, tools, parts, and supplies from Camp Stone and Camp Zafar in Herat province to the remote combat outpost in Moqur. They conducted technical inspections and serviced all the ANA vehicles, repairing all eighteen non-mission capable vehicles. RM Asia provided CL IX on site consisting of 173 parts (filters, batteries, shocks, brake pads, glass/mirrors, tires, and various fluids and grease) to the maintenance team.

The team estimated 80 percent of the maintenance troubles experienced by the unit were the direct result from not performing operator-level preventive maintenance checks and services. Had operators checked and maintained fluid levels, routinely replaced air filters, and maintained tire pressures and had first-line supervisors enforced standards, the majority of the broken vehicles would have remained operational. The ensuing AAR examined the conditions leading to the problem, focusing on addressing any systemic issues involving the ANA's training, equipping, and manning.

The author was RSC-W's Senior Logistician during this period and conducted the internal AAR. There were two key observations gleaned from this experience that resulted in four major points which were briefed to the ANA leadership as well as ISAF units. First, the 207th Corps lacked the organic maintenance capability required to

maintain acceptable operational readiness rates. They lacked the training, manning, and equipment required to maintain their major end items. This observation was not unique to the 207th Corps or other ANA units in western Afghanistan; partner units and evaluation teams observed similar issues across the country. Second, the 207th Corps was fully dependent on NTM-A funded contracted maintenance support from international companies RM Asia and HEB. While some units performed better than others, this observation again was common to issues in other corps around Afghanistan.

These two observations provided context to focus on four major points. First, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) had existing maintenance standards. Similar to Army Regulations, Field Manuals, and Technical Manuals, MoD Decree 4.9 provides maintenance doctrine for the ANA. The issue was that units were not adhering to published standards and partnered units were not conducting combined "motor stables." Second, command emphasis from all echelons of the 207th Corps' leadership was required to implement Decree 4.9 and adhere to its standards. Third, maintenance personnel and equipment authorizations found the unit's tashkil, the ANSF equivalent to the U.S. Army's Mission Table of Organization and Equipment, were adequate. While authorized mechanics and equipment, the 207th Corps had no trained ANA mechanics, tool boxes, or spare parts at Moqur. This led to the final major point, correcting systemic issues of training, manning, and equipping the ANA to provide maintenance sustainment. The operational forces of the ANA required additional command focus on training, manning, equipping maintenance operations from the operator, supervisor, organizational, and direct support levels. Meanwhile, the institutional forces of the ANSF

should consider integrating additional vehicle maintenance instruction into ANA and ANP periods of instruction.

RSC-W briefed the results of this AAR at the national level to NTM-A and ISAF leadership and at the regional level to ANA and RC-W leadership. Annex A contains the complete slide brief RSC-W submitted to NTM-A. The storyboard below (figure 2) illustrates RSC-W's efforts to use the incident at Moqur as a learning experience for all parties involved.

Figure 2. RSC-W Maintenance After Action Review Storyboard

Source: Created by author from a Contract Management Oversight Brief created by author in July 2010; photo taken by author in April 2010.

Scope

While this event occurred in Afghanistan, the vignette highlights the myriad of challenges facing new security forces as they develop and mature. Successfully addressing these issues is essential to developing sustainable security forces. The development of the Iraq's ISF and South Vietnam's ARVN are comparable to the ANSF. ISF is a contemporary to the ANSF; therefore, time will ultimately determine whether it can sustain itself. A study of ARVN provides a historical example that was ultimately unsuccessful.

This vignette vividly illustrates the issues facing the ANSF and ISAF as security responsibility transitions to the Afghans. In January 2010, the Afghan government, in coordination with ISAF and the international community, made a strategic decision to dramatically increase the size of the ANSF from 192,000 soldiers and policemen in November 2009 to 272,200 by October 2010 with a final end strength of 305,600 by October 2011.[3] Fielding new infantry-centric kandaks, battalion-sized units, were priority; no new supporting organizations were fielded for a year. This decision resulted in numerous unintended consequences. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was responsible for developing, training, and equipping the ANSF prior to the creation of NTM-A in November 2009. CSTC-A and NTM-A managed the support systems and resources required to sustain the ANSF. Without increasing the number and capabilities of supporting organizations, the fledgling logistics and distribution systems faced monumental challenges. There was neither enough materiel to fully equip newly fielding units nor distribution assets to equip existing units and supply the numerous regional ANSF training centers. New units reported to their

brigades with all of their assigned weapons, either NATO or substitute Former Warsaw Pact weapons. Unfortunately, national depots could only fill percentages, between 50 and 75 percent, of their vehicles, radios, and other tashkil authorized items. NTM-A's efforts to increase the size and capabilities of the ANSF, especially in regard to training and equipping a quality, professional force capable of assuming the security responsibilities for Afghanistan were the subject of numerous news reports and blogs. Receiving significantly less attention, however, is an equally important mission–developing the systems that will allow a mature, sustainable ANSF.

Fielding and employing new fighting forces was the priority and the focus of the MoD and Ministry of Interior (MoI), ISAF, and NTM-A through late 2010. Sustaining these new formations to remain combat effective frequently was an afterthought. Partner units and logisticians sought to bring units to 100 percent authorization of personnel and equipment, but had limited means to do so.

There are a number of major challenges facing the development of a sustainable ANSF. Combating widespread illiteracy and promoting a domestic industrial base are general issues. GIRoA's capability to independently finance and resource the ANSF is arguably the most significant challenge. The development and implementation of logistics doctrine, especially with the ANP, is also a significant issue. Another is fielding functional and multifunctional logistics organizations throughout the ANSF formations. Additionally, manning and employment of low-density logistics specialties remains a concern. Construction of motor pools, maintenance bays, and warehouse facilities is another challenge. Finally, development of distribution systems is important to the timely resupply of units. All of these issues require a significant investment in intellectual

capital, training, systematic key leader engagements, and partnership with the ANSF. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, Commander, NTM-A and CSTC-A, brought attention to this issue in a memorandum signed in September 2010 to NTM-A staff, trainers, and instructors when he wrote "[i]n most elements of the ANSF there is still a shortage of leaders, no logistics or maintenance capacity, or even the most basic systems we take for granted in our own formations."[4] As the opening vignette illustrates, problems arise when overall emphasis lies elsewhere.

Primary Research Question

This thesis will attempt to answer the following research question: has the international community synchronized its efforts and aligned the proper resources necessary to build capacity for the ANSF to adequately sustain their forces?

Secondary Research Questions

Answering the primary research question requires a detailed examination of the complex sustainment challenges facing the ANSF. Many of these challenges are Afghan problems that require Afghan solutions; however, the international community may have the ways and means to assist GIRoA and the ANSF leadership address these issues. In addition to studying the primary research question, this thesis will attempt to answer a number of secondary research questions.

The decision to create infantry-centric formations was a combined decision made by GIRoA and the international community to combat a strengthening insurgency throughout the country. However, this decision further stressed an immature sustainment system designed to support a smaller force structure. This decision raises a few key

questions. What are the capability gaps that prohibit the ANSF from developing into a sustainable institution? Are there alternatives to supplement existing systems and are the alternatives feasible and acceptable? What expertise could the international community provide to maximize the effectiveness of the ANSF sustainment system as it continues to develop and mature? Answering these questions is important to identify and mitigate capability gaps.

High illiteracy rates also negatively impacts sustainment. Over a generation of conflict resulted destroyed Afghanistan's educational institutions; therefore, significantly high illiteracy rates exist throughout the country. Simply stated, it is difficult to conduct vehicle maintenance if the operator and direct supervisor cannot read. Having literate soldiers and policemen is essential for developing professional security forces and is critical in conducting logistics operations.

Initiatives such as Afghan First also impacts ANSF sustainment. Afghan First is an initiative to develop Afghan industrial production capability for the equipment needed by the ANSF. Combat boots were among the first items manufactured under Afghan First initiatives. Developing industrial capacity to produce items required by the ANSF promotes economic growth, strengthens government institutions, and is essential for ANSF long-term sustainability. Will these initiatives survive if the international community transfers financial execution from NTM-A to GIRoA?

Furthermore, infrastructure, or the lack thereof, affects sustainment. Maintenance units require facilities and special equipment to service and repair vehicles, weapons, and other equipment. Depots require secure facilities to receive, store, and issue supplies and

materiel. Units require facilities to secure equipment when not in use. Leaders and staffs require offices. Soldiers require billeting, dining facilities, and medical treatment centers.

Also required is an assessment on the initiatives being undertaken to address these challenges and their effectiveness. Understanding the ANSF's systemic sustainment challenges and evaluating the effectiveness of current initiatives will identify potential gaps which may result in recommendations for further discussion or possible implementation.

Limitations

There are few, if any, limitations. In the case of Afghanistan, nations from the international community that contribute military and civilian personnel to partner, train, and mentor the ANSF all use English as the common language to communicate. The international community also used English as the common language to communicate in Iraq. Aside from declassified documents from the Vietnam War, the highest classification level reviewed during the research for this study is For Official Use Only (FOUO). Although the author reviewed some documents classified For Official Use Only while conducting research, this study does not reference any For Official Use Only documents. All of the information used in this study is unclassified and most is available from open sources. While some of the primary source documents for South Vietnam were originally classified, all the documents used in this research were declassified and are freely available for research in digital archive collections.

Delimitations

This thesis will not focus on an in-depth analysis on pay and administrative personnel sustainment activities to ensure the scope of this study remains manageable. Automating the military pay systems of the ANSF is an important initiative to reduce corruption and improve morale. Likewise, personnel administrative reforms promise to reduce corruption. However, detailed discussion of personnel administrative and pay systems is best left for future research.

This thesis uses a qualitative analysis based on U.S. Department of Defense force management processes. Specifically, this study uses the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains in a case study comparison of ANSF development with the development of the ISF and ARVN to answer the primary and secondary research questions. Chapter 3 provides the detailed methodology for this study. Each DOTMLPF domain contains a number of general questions that seek to determine capability gaps that may then be applied toward answering the primary and secondary research questions. This study will not focus on an in-depth analysis of each of these questions; it will instead focus on the critical questions that impact the development of a sustainable ANSF.

The subject of developing a sustainable ANSF is subject to political and military changes. For example, then French President Sarkozy announced on 27 January 2012 the withdraw of all French combat forces from Afghanistan by 2013, approximately a year before the scheduled transition agreed upon during the Lisbon Summit.[5] Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta spoke on 1 February 2012 about transitioning ISAF's combat mission to Afghan-led during the second half of 2013.[6] Speaking after a meeting of

NATO defense ministers on 2 February, Defense Secretary Panetta said "we hope that the [Afghan] forces will be ready to take the combat lead in all of Afghanistan sometime in 2013. Obviously, we will have to continue consultation with our allies and our Afghan partners about the best way to accomplish that goal."[7] Transitioning to Afghan-led security operations involves a combination of meeting security conditions, which involves both ANSF capability and insurgent activity, and ongoing and future consultations between the international community regarding financial investments, trainers, and equipment. The subject of developing a sustainable ANSF is ongoing and will not be complete prior to the submission of this thesis; therefore, the author excludes events that occur after 1 March 2012 unless they are vital to this study.

Significance of the Study

An argument may be made that the United States efforts in Afghanistan is ten one year campaigns rather than one decade-long campaign; a similar argument may be made for other nations with different deployment timelines. The United States is again focused on Afghanistan following several years as an economy of force mission while the United States focused on Iraq. As the international community seeks to transition security responsibility to the Afghan government and the ANSF by 2014, the main effort must be in developing the ANSF and its capacity to sustain itself regardless national deployment timelines.

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[1]Barack Obama, Address to U.S. Corps of Cadets, 1 December 2009.

[2]US Marine Corps, "ANSF-ISAF Partnership Stabilizing Southern Badghis Province," http://www.marines.mil/unit/marsoc/Pages/2010/100518-Partnership.aspx (accessed 26 September 2011).

[3]International Security Assistance Force, "ANSF meets targets," http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/16 67-10_ANSF_LR_en2.pdf (accessed 25 September 2011).

[4]William B. Caldwell, IV, Memorandum, *Stewardship: Essential for an Enduring ANSF*, September 2010.

[5]Edward Cody and Karen DeYoung, "France will speed up troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by one year," http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/france-will-speed-up-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-by-one-year/2012/01/27/gIQAhc49VQ_story.html (accessed 1 February 2012).

[6]Karen Parrish, "Panetta: Afghanistan Tops NATO Conference Topics," http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67012 (accessed 2 February 2012).

[7]Karen Parrish, "Panetta: NATO Ministers Agree Afghan Transition on Track," http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67037 (accessed 2 February 2012).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to present a literature review consisting of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are original in that they are created by participants in the moment; therefore, they capture details and emotions. News articles and blogs are examples of primary sources. Other primary sources include official publications that establish policy. Secondary sources, meanwhile, typically provide broader context because they involve analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of primary sources. Both primary and secondary sources inform public opinion. In this study to evaluate whether the international community has synchronized the necessary resources to develop a sustainable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the majority of primary and secondary sources are unclassified because they involve active participation between U.S., coalition, and Afghan military and civilian personnel.

This literature review has two sections. The first section presents the common primary and secondary sources used in chapter 3 and chapter 4. These sources explain how the United States uses strategic policies to direct activities at the operational and tactical levels. Additionally, they provide an abstract doctrinal framework and do not specifically address Afghanistan, Iraq, or South Vietnam. These sources are useful nonetheless in analyzing policies, regulations, and procedures because the current organizational structure of these nation's security forces models the United States. The second section presents a narrative that introduces the development of security forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Vietnam using primary and secondary sources. External support in developing host nation security forces occurred in each case while fighting an

insurgency. In the case of South Vietnam, development occurred while facing a hybrid threat of an insurgency and a conventional enemy in the North Vietnamese army that was supported by Soviet and Chinese military aid. Although there are similarities between the developments of each nation's security forces, many unique challenges faced each nation.

Section 1: Policy and Doctrine

There are a number of primary and secondary sources that direct policy and establish regulations and procedures. Although these documents do not specifically address Afghanistan, Iraq, or South Vietnam, they provide a means to measure the effectiveness in the development of the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN because each country's security forces were, to varying degrees, modeled after the United States. Understanding how the United States develops its Armed Forces, therefore, is essential for this study.

The U.S. Department of Defense establishes priorities for the U.S. Armed Forces in accordance with the President's National Security Strategy. The National Security Strategy broadly discusses the current operational environment and the challenges within it. It also defines our national interests and establishes the nation's strategy and priorities. Among the nation's four enduring interests is an interest in "[a]n international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges."[1] Achieving this interest requires a thorough, comprehensive engagement to promote a just and sustainable international order. The National Security Strategy leads to the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy, both of which define in strategic terms how the Department of the Defense and the Armed Forces address challenges to uphold national interests. These strategic

documents directly influence global force management, global employment of forces, and Department of Defense Planning and Programming Guidance. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the formal Defense Department process to identify required capabilities needed to meet the goals outlined in these documents.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved JCIDS in 2003 as a solution to then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's concern that existing service-specific requirements generating systems were inadequate. JCIDS replaced each service's requirements generating system that focused on facing future threats. Previous service-specific systems identified deficiencies in current capabilities and provided solutions. These systems frequently resulted in inefficiencies as the government resourced redundant programs. It is Department of Defense policy to use JCIDS to identify, assess, validate, and prioritize capability requirements using Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) as an analytical framework in determining solutions to capability gaps.[2]

In addition to initiating JCIDS and the Capabilities-Based Assessment, the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy also drive policies that are found in Department of Defense Directives, Department of Defense Instructions, service-specific regulations and field manuals, and command policies. This study will specifically focus on official documents that discuss stability operations and development of host nation security forces.

Developing host nation security forces is an important part of conducting stability operations. The U.S. Department of Defense issues directives and instructions to establish department level policies. *DoDI 3000.05* establishes five policies governing stability

operations. The first policy directs that "stability operations are a core United States military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations,"[3] The second policy directs "the Department shall have the capability and capacity to conduct stability operations activities to fulfill DoD Component responsibilities under national and international law."[4] The third policy describes how "integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations."[5] The fourth policy directs the Department of Defense to "assist other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, and international governmental organizations in planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts."[6] Finally, the fifth policy directs that Department of Defense components "shall explicitly address and integrate stability operations-related concepts and capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and applicable exercises, strategies, and plans."[7]

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* establishes the general doctrine for counterinsurgency operations and addresses common insurgency characteristics throughout history. It further details unity of effort and integrating civilian and military activities. Its sixth chapter specifically addresses the development of host nation security forces. Developing effective host nation security forces is instrumental to establishing a legitimate government with popular support, establishing a rule of law, and providing essential services and security. It further acknowledges that "in some cases, U.S. Armed Forces might be actively engaged in fighting insurgents while simultaneously helping the host nation build its own security forces."[8] FM 3-24 also discusses the challenges, resources available, and establishing an end state where host nation security forces are

flexible in that they can accomplish different types of missions, tactically and technically proficient, self-sustained, well led, professional, and integrated into society.[9] Understanding and applying the principles found within this doctrine were essential during the troop surges in Iraq and Afghanistan.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* establishes doctrine for counterinsurgency operations tactically at the brigade level and below. It is the second most recent Field Manual that details U.S. Armed Forces support host nation security forces engaged in counterinsurgency. This manual outlines the operational environment, foundations of insurgencies, foundations of counterinsurgencies, and comprehensive tactical planning. It also outlines offensive, defensive, and stability considerations in counterinsurgency and supporting host nation security forces. Supporting host nation security forces involves efforts to "maximize the number, effectiveness, and use of [host nation] security forces to secure and control the population and to prevent the insurgent's freedom of movement"[10] and using host nation "security forces to increase combat power, expand the [area of operations], increase the number of villages secured, and increase the legitimacy of the operation."[11] FM 3-24.2 also explains the organization of United States Armed Forces into partnered units that share an area of operation with a host nation security forces unit or advisor teams. Additionally, "the mission to develop [host nation] security forces at all levels can be organized around seven tasks–measure (assess), organize, rebuild/build facilities, train, equip, advise, and mentor. . . . These tasks incorporate all doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements for developing [host nation] security forces."[12] FM 3-24.2 explains each task in detail,

providing commanders a comprehensive framework to organize and task the staff and subordinate units to integrate host nation security forces into combined arms maneuver and wide area security missions.

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* is the keystone publication that establishes Army doctrine for conducting Stability Operations at all echelons in any contemporary operating environment. FM 3-07 explains that the "complex, dynamic strategic environment of the 21st century"[13] creates conditions of "state fragility and instability that present a grave threat to national security."[14] The U.S. Army is not alone in conducting stability operations; inter-governmental organizations and non-government organizations conduct various stability operations as "part of broader efforts to reestablish enduring peace and stability following the cessation of open hostilities."[15] FM 3-07 describes both the "whole of government approach" to integrate efforts in order to achieve unity of effort towards shared goals. This approach is nested within a "comprehensive approach" that "integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal."[16] The strategy for conducting stability operations includes establishing a safe and secure environment, establishing rule of law, promoting social well-being, establishing stable governance, and developing a sustainable economy. The military accomplishes this strategy through the following stability tasks: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development.[17] Each stability task has subordinate tasks; developing host nation security forces is one of the essential subordinate tasks for

establishing civil security.[18] FM 3-07 also explains how lines of effort "links multiple tasks and missions to focus efforts toward establishing the conditions that define the desired end state."[19]

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* is the newest field manual that provides detailed instruction regarding the development of host nation security forces. It establishes doctrine and guidance for how the U.S. Armed Forces conduct Security Force Assistance. It does this by outlining the strategic context and discussing the various programs that directly or indirectly impacts Security Force Assistance: security cooperation, security assistance, international military education and training, foreign military sales, and foreign military financing program. The U.S. Armed Forces also supports Foreign Internal Defense through indirect support, direct support, and combat operations.[20] *FM 3-07.1* also outlines six imperatives when conducting Security Force Assistance. Sustain the effort, one of these imperatives, is decisive to understand when assessing the sustainability of a host nation's security forces.

> Sustainability consists of two major components: the ability to sustain [the Security Force Assistance] effort throughout the operation and the ability of the [host nation security forces] to sustain their operations independently. While each situation will vary, Army personnel conducting [Security Force Assistance] must avoid assisting [host nation security forces] in techniques and procedures beyond the [host nation security forces's] capability to sustain. U.S. tactics, techniques, and procedures must be modified to fit the culture, educational level, and technological capability of the [host nation security forces]. Those involved in [Security Force Assistance] must recognize the need for programs that are durable, consistent, and sustainable by both the U.S. and [host nation security forces]. They must not begin programs that are beyond the economic, technological, or cultural capabilities of the host nation to maintain without U.S. assistance. Such efforts are counterproductive.[21]

Advising, partnering, and augmenting are the three types of Security Forces Assistance discussed in FM 3-07.1. "They may be employed simultaneously,

sequentially, or in combination. The progression and types of SFA are determined by the operational environment, the assessment of the FSF, and by resources available. Each of these types requires decidedly different requirements, objectives, and legal considerations."[22]

FM 3-07.1 also establishes doctrine for U.S. Armed Forces assigned to conduct Security Force Assistance to first assess host nation security forces using the DOTMLPF framework. This assessment provides the unit conducting Security Force Assistance with a thorough understanding of how host nation forces fight, how they organize, how effectively they train, the composition and disposition of their equipment, the effectiveness of their leaders and staffs, the number of personnel assigned and available, and condition of their facilities. Commanders and their staffs continually update this assessment as an integral part of their Security Force Assistance mission.[23]

Section 2: Literature Review for Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Vietnam

The first section presented general policies and doctrinal frameworks without specifically addressing Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Vietnam. This second section presents a narrative that introduces the development of security forces in each of these countries using a combination of primary and secondary sources. The discussion for each country begins with a brief history focusing on key political and military developments, external military assistance and influence, and the current status of each country's security forces as of 1 March 2012.

Afghanistan

Despite over a generation of turmoil and near-constant conflict, Afghanistan has a long and rich tradition due to its location in central Asia along the ancient Silk Road. Afghans endured foreign invaders throughout its history. Alexander the Great's army conquered the western and southern portions of present-day Afghanistan, and he established a capital in present-day Balkh.[24] The citadel he built to control Herat still stands. Persian and Arab invaders also had a significant influence on Afghan culture. Afghans were part of Genghis Kahn and Tamerlane's empires. Present-day Afghanistan was divided into tribes until 1747 when Ahmad Shah Durrani became king and began unifying Pashtun tribes into one country. For the next 150 years, Afghanistan served as a buffer state between the expanding Russian empire in the north and British-controlled India in the south with Great Britain providing the Afghan army with equipment and training.[25] The Afghan army was infantry-centric with a few cavalry units during this period.

After three wars with Great Britain, Afghanistan gained its independence in 1919. Upon winning independence, Afghan leaders sought to end the country's traditional isolation and began reforms intended to modernize Afghanistan and its army. Afghan leaders, particularly Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Daoud, sought economic and military aid from both the United States and Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s.[26] The Soviet Union trained and equipped the Afghan army which consisted of tank, mechanized infantry, artillery, and commando units organized as corps, divisions, brigades and regiments. As the Afghan army developed a modern organization, it also increased in size.

King Zahir enacted liberal reforms in 1964 to modernize Afghan politics. "Although Zahir's 'experiment in democracy' produced few lasting reforms, it permitted the growth of unofficial extremist parties on both the left and the right. These included the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which had close ideological ties to the Soviet Union."[27] Afghanistan remained a monarchy until 1973 when former Prime Minister Daoud led a military coup and established a republic.

Daoud's economic and social reforms failed to resolve growing political instability. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan conducted a coup in April 1978, installed a communist government, and "brutally imposed a Marxist-style 'reform' program, which ran counter to deeply rooted Afghan traditions."[28] A nation-wide insurgency began in the summer of 1978 and the Afghan communist government looked externally to the Soviet Union for increased assistance as its army became increasingly ineffective due to desertion and political purges. "In December 1978, Moscow signed a new bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation with Afghanistan, and the Soviet military assistance program increased significantly. The regime's survival increasingly was dependent upon Soviet assistance as the insurgency spread and the Afghan army began to collapse."[29] The Soviet Union ultimately invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to protect its interests and promptly installed a new regime.

As the Afghan army sustained high losses to desertion and defection, the new communist government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan struggled to assert control throughout the country. The size of the Afghan army decreased from nearly 100,000 before the 1978 coup to between 35,000 and 40,000 by 1983 and the overall quality decreased as leaders and conscripts received less training.[30] The government also

created youth and tribal paramilitary forces to supplement the army; however, these forces proved less reliable and less effective than the army.[31] Indeed, the army and supplementary paramilitary forces proved to be a microcosm for Afghan institutions as a whole. "An overwhelming majority of Afghans opposed the communist regime, either actively or passively. Afghan fighters (mujahideen) made it almost impossible for the regime to maintain a system of local government outside major urban centers."[32] The deployment of 120,000 Soviet troops to supplement the Afghan army did little to extend the government's control throughout the country.

Popular mujahideen resistance, coupled with international pressure, led the Soviet Union to agree in Geneva in 1988 to withdraw its forces by February 1989. The toll of the Soviet Union occupation was significant; an estimated 14,500 Soviets and one million Afghans died between 1979 and 1989.[33] The psychological blow to the Soviet Union undoubtedly hastened its political collapse in 1992. Meanwhile, the Soviet withdraw created a power vacuum among competing interests and sowed the seeds for America's increasing involvement.

Understanding the complex and complicated situation of contemporary Afghanistan requires a study of primary and secondary sources that shape and define public opinion. Jane's, a secondary source, describes the current Afghan history as similar to when the Soviet Union began to withdraw its involvement a generation ago. The Soviet Union provided training and equipment to the Afghan army from the 1960s until the early 1990s, ending with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992. This Soviet influence was significant and persists; today's senior Afghan military leadership received training in the Soviet system as junior officers. Additionally, the Soviet Union

provided the unpopular communist Afghan government with billions of dollars worth of military equipment and supplies even as it withdrew the last of its forces in February 1989. This support allowed the Afghan government to temporarily disrupt the numerous opposition groups from taking control.[34] Military aid ceased completely in 1992 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Afghan army quickly fragmented tribally and regionally under the control of various warlords and ceased being a national force.

There are many reasons to account for this collapse. The communist Afghan government was widely viewed as corrupt, illegitimate, and heavily influenced by the Soviet Union. Afghanistan's central government had little authority over the majority of its rural population which is isolated by a combination of terrain and limited transportation infrastructure.[35] Additionally, numerous ethnic and tribal affiliations outweigh national identity.

The Taliban rose to power during this period, promising to restore order and provide stability. While initially accepted throughout much of the country because they achieved their promises, their brutal, repressive policies forged renewed resistance. A combination of Northern Alliance, other Afghan fighters, U.S. Armed Forces, and other U.S. Government agencies rapidly drove the Taliban from power following the attacks of 11 September 2001.

Anxious to avoid a repeat of the conditions which allowed Afghanistan to descend into anarchy before becoming a bastion for al Qaeda and Islamic extremism, the United Nations hosted the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn, Germany in December 2001. The Bonn Conference laid the foundations for the current ANSF and established both an interim transitional authority to create a new Afghan government

called the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The establishment of GIRoA has not been without controversy. According to Jane's, "ethnic divisions have polarised [sic] political allegiances and caused bitter feuding. This trend has continued to date, although the Afghan government includes all major ethnic groups, including the Pashtuns."[36]

The Bonn Conference also created a NATO-led military mission called ISAF. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 passed on 20 December 2001 authorized the creation of ISAF. ISAF's initial mandate was to provide security in Kabul and the immediate surrounding areas from warlords, al Qaeda, and Taliban influence. It was both a strategic and operational headquarters.[37] Meanwhile, coalition forces, led by the United States, constituted Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan and continued combat missions to defeat remnant Taliban forces and al Qaeda throughout the rest of the country. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1510, passed on 13 October 2003, expanded ISAF's mandate to include all of Afghanistan.[38] ISAF began to assume security missions from Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan. ISAF would assume responsibility for conducting Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan's combat missions upon its inactivation in 2006.

The current ANSF formed in early 2002. In May 2002, the United States established the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan to provide support to the new Afghan National Army (ANA). European nations initially provided support to the new Afghan National Police (ANP). The United States also established Task Force Phoenix in 2002 to train and mentor the ANSF. As the United States became more involved in supporting the ANP, the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan was renamed the

Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan. When priority for developing the ANA and ANP increased, the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan was renamed the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) in April 2006. CSTC-A oversaw ANSF training and development, executed by Task Force Phoenix, both in Kabul at the national level and throughout the regional commands. This organization lasted until the most recent reorganization of international forces in November 2009.

Meanwhile, the fledgling ANSF and ISAF faced a renewed and growing insurgency throughout Afghanistan. GIRoA and ISAF did not control large sections of the rural areas in the South, East, and Northwest. Upon taking command of ISAF in June 2009, General Stanley McChrystal sought to reorganize the international force structure into three subordinate commands to reflect "a significant evolution in ISAF's scope and scale of responsibilities."[39] NATO members supported the recommendation and ISAF reorganized in August 2009. The two largest subordinate commands under ISAF are the newly-created ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). The other subordinate command is Special Operations. Figure 3 illustrates ISAF's strategic and operational organization following this reorganization.



Figure 3. ISAF Upper Command Structure

Source: International Security Assistance Force, "ISAF Upper Command Structure," http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-command-structure.html (accessed 14 March 2012).

IJC's headquarters is at North Kabul International Airport. The mission of IJC is "in full partnership, the combined team of Afghan National Security Forces, ISAF Joint Command and relevant organizations conducts population-centric comprehensive operations to neutralize the insurgency in specified areas, and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable peace."[40] IJC thus conducts daily operational missions, allowing ISAF to focus on the strategic level issues. IJC coordinates and synchronizes combat and non-combat activities between the six regional commands (North, East, Capital, South, Southwest, and West). IJC is also responsible for partnering with

operational ANSF units. Additionally, IJC conducts periodic assessments on operational ANSF units.

NTM-A, as already stated, mentors senior GIRoA ministerial-level leaders, develops decrees and tashkils, manages institutional training, and facilitates procurement of equipment and supplies. The NTM-A commander is also the CSTC-A commander and is responsible for managing Afghan Security Forces Funds (ASFF). The commander of CSTC-A was and still is exclusively responsible for spending ASFF. In creating the ASFF, Congress authorized the CSTC-A commander to "provide assistance, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to the security forces of Afghanistan, including the provision of equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction."[41] ASFF is intended for the ANSF only, not for auxiliary purposes such as paying for U.S. pilot training on non-standard aircraft to prepare them to train Afghan Air Force pilots.[42]

NTM-A's first year focus was to increase the size of the ANSF, improve ANSF quality, and build a foundation that would professionalize the ANSF. Located in Camp Eggers in Kabul, NTM-A's organization initially reflected CSTC-A with the addition of the Combined Training Advisory Group-Police. Figure 4 illustrates the combined CSTC-A and NTM-A task organization in November 2009.



Figure 4. NTM-A/CSTC-A Initial Organization Structure

Source: Small Wars Journal, "NTM-A/CSTC-A Fed Forum Brief, 11 December 2009," http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/afghanistantrainingbrief1.pdf (accessed 12 May 2012).

NTM-A's second year focus was "continued growth, build support and enabling forces, develop self-sustainable security systems and enduring institutions, [and] begin the process to professionalize the force."[43] By January 2012, NTM-A reorganized itself to better support ANSF development and provide greater oversight to the international community. In addition to standard coordinating staffs (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, communications, and protocol) and special staffs (Staff Judge Advocate, Inspector General, equal opportunity, surgen, public affairs, chaplain, and

historian), NTM-A now has a Deputy Commanding Generals for Operations and a Deputy Commanding General for Support.

The NTM-A Deputy Commanding General for Operations directs deputy commanders for the army, special operations forces, support operations, air, and police in direct support of ANSF development. The Deputy Commander-Army oversees Training Advisory Groups to each regional military training center and assisting the MOD and ANA national-level leaders with force generation and leader development. The Deputy Commander-Special Operations Forces oversees Commando and Special Forces force generation and training. The Deputy Commander-Support Operations replaced the Deputy Commander-Regional Support and oversees the six Regional Support Commands. The Deputy Commander-Air assists the Afghan Air Force with force generation and training. Finally, the Deputy Commander-Police assists the MOI and national-level ANP leaders with force generation and leader development.[44]

Meanwhile, the NTM-A Deputy Commanding General for Support oversees procurement of ANSF equipment and fosters good stewardship over international resources directed towards the ANSF. Accomplishing these key tasks is deputy commander for international security cooperation, director of contract management and audit oversight, director of comptroller and programs, and the Security Assistance Office-Afghanistan. The Director, Contract Management and Audit Oversight fosters stewardship of resources by managing ASFF, NATO Trust Funds, and other international monetary donations. The Director, Comptroller and Programs develops and executes budgetary policies and decisions. The Deputy Commander-International Security Cooperation solicits equipment donations from the international community and advises

the MOD and MOI to assume these responsibilities. Finally, the Security Assistance Office-Afghanistan manages various security assistance programs, including Afghan First initiatives, that equip, supply, and support fit the ANSF.[45]

NTM-A assists the Afghan MoD and MoI in publishing doctrine; the MoD and MoI refer to doctrine as decrees or policies. Despite the creation of ISAF Joint Command in November 2009 and their charter to partner with operational ANSF already fielded, NTM-A retained CSTC-A's mentorship mission for the MoD and MoI. Located at Camp Eggers in downtown Kabul, NTM-A mentors work 'shona ba shona' (shoulder to shoulder) with key personnel in the MoD and MoI. In this mentorship role, NTM-A performs a vital role in assisting with the development of decrees, tashkils, and fielding schedules for the ANSF.

Senior-level mentors to the MoD and MoI assisted their Afghan counterparts in producing their decrees, using United States and NATO doctrine as guides. The MoD is further along in developing and publishing decrees over their MoI counterparts. The MoD published most of their current decrees in 2010 while the MoI decrees remain in draft form. There are many reasons that account for this discrepancy in decree development and implementation.

There are a number of unclassified, primary sources available involving English and Arabic translations of ANSF tashkils and decrees, particularly with the ANA. These are valuable to understanding actual requirements and authorizations. Tashkils explain how ANSF units are organized and equipped. Decrees explain how these units operate. Additionally, there is a document titled Annex K which dictates the fielding schedule of new units as the ANSF continues its expansion. Although specific unit fielding timelines

in Annex K are sensitive, access to such information is not essential for this research because it is more important to know that a unit has its authorized personnel and equipment than it is to know which date it receives its crew-served weapons and arrives at its assigned location.

The ANA held its first National Logistics Conference in October 2010 at the IJC Headquarters in Kabul. Attending the conference were mentors and members of the ANA GS/G4, NTM-A's Combined Joint Logistics staff, ISAF, IJC, ANA Corps G4s and their mentors, ANA Logistics Command leadership and their mentors, FSD commanders and their mentors, and Regional Support Command Senior Logisticians from Capital, South, Southwest, and West. The goal of this conference was to distribute and discuss ANA sustainment decrees, share best practices, and discuss common logistics issues.

Lieutenant General Caldwell brought attention to strengthening ANSF accountability in a memorandum to NTM-A's staff, trainers, and instructors. This memorandum, Annex 2, made stewardship a priority within NTM-A. Stewardship is the careful use of resources in a responsible manner. "We have been entrusted with the international community's money and equipment and the development of our Afghan counterparts into an effective security force. . . . All international elements, from the private partnered with a soldier or policeman to a commanding general advising the Minister of Defense [MoD] or Interior [MoI], are responsible for donated resources and supporting transparent and effective accountability by the ANSF."[46] Therefore, the effective and efficient use of resources is critical in maximizing the organization's efforts to build ANSF capacity, maintain legitimacy, and model good behaviors for the Afghans to emulate.

Iraq

Despite its location in Mesopotamia, the birthplace of civilization, Iraq is a modern country created after World War I. Three provinces from the Ottoman Empire, Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, became British protectorates with a mandate approved by the League of Nations to create a new nation. Iraq's military also traces its history to the nation's formation following World War I. The initial size and capability of the Iraqi army was limited because of differing opinions between Iraqi leaders and British officials. Deeply concerned that the army would dominate national politics, the army's size was initially set at 12,000 soldiers.[47] British and Indian soldiers provided security, but they proved too costly and were largely replaced by the Great Britain's new Royal Air Force.[48] Remaining British and Indian soldiers trained and advised the Iraqi army. Due to its small size and lack of capability, the Iraqi army also relied heavily upon the Royal Air Force to maintain order and exert power on behalf of the government.

The army was among the first institutions to symbolize Iraqi national pride. The Iraqi military indeed played a key role in national politics following Iraq's independence in 1932, culminating in its participation in several coups between 1958 and 1968.[49] Iraqi leaders required a strong and loyal military to consolidate and wield power, and they solicited military aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. Starting in 1958 the Soviet Union began to provide Iraq with military equipment and its military steadily grew in size and capability to respond to foreign and domestic security threats. The Soviet Union and Iraq formally signed a friendship and cooperation treaty in 1972. Iraq deployed its army to Syria to stop Israel's counteroffensive during the 1973 Yom Kippur

War. Afterwards, the army continued to grow and modernize. By the late 1970s, Iraq possessed one of the region's largest and most modern militaries.

Iraq and Iran fought an inconclusive war between 1980 and 1988 to resolve a long-standing border dispute and gain regional supremacy. Receiving military equipment from both the United States and the Soviet Union, the size of Iraq's army doubled while the war raged and Iraq possessed the region's largest military following the conflict.[50] The army was the fourth largest in the world when President Saddam Hussein decided to invade and occupy Kuwait in August 1990. The United States led a coalition that decisively defeated the Iraqi army and freed Kuwait. Although Operation Desert Storm significantly destroyed Iraq's military capacity, it maintained sufficient forces to defeat the internal rebellions that followed.

Recognizing Hussein's eagerness to use his military against Iraqis and Iraq's neighbors, the international community sought to limit his military's capabilities. The United States established and enforced no-fly zones in the north and south. Additionally, United Nations Security Resolution 687 placed several requirements on the Iraqi government to respect international borders and disarm itself of unconventional weapons. Michael Deaver describes these disarmament efforts between 1991 and 1998 in great detail in his book, *Disarming Iraq: Monitoring Power and Resistance.*[51]

Following a decade of refusing United Nations inspections, a United States-led coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003 to remove Hussein's regime. After the fall of Baghdad, the United States first installed the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance then the Coalition Provisional Authority to temporarily control Iraq. In one of

its first acts, the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded Hussein's military and police organizations as part of a larger effort of "de-Baathification."

Various coalition commanders, including then Major General Petraeus as the 101st Division Commander, exercised initiative by recruiting and training new Iraqi army and police forces in the months following the fall of Baghdad. By October 2003, the multinational force headquarters developed a plan to transfer security responsibilities to the new ISF and gradually decrease the size of U.S. military forces as overall security stabilized and the ISF matured. Executing this broad plan, however, proved difficult. "From the fall of 2003 through April 2006, [Multi-National Forces-Iraq] revised its security transition plan a number of times because the Iraqi government and its military and police forces proved incapable of assuming security responsibilities within the timeframes envisioned by the plans."[52] ISF development and operational capability was essential to establish the enduring security and stability necessary for broader political and economic development.

The United States spent over $5.8 billion on creating and developing the ISF by May 2005.[53] In 2004, Multi-National Forces-Iraq established a subordinate command, Multi-National Security and Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), with direct responsibility for developing the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and ISF capacity. Multi-National Forces-Iraq also established Multi-National Corps-Iraq to plan and conduct daily combat operations. Then Lieutenant General Petraeus was the first commander of MNSTC-I and established the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team to develop the army, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team to develop the police, and the Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team to develop ministries. General

Petraeus deployed to Iraq for a third time in February 2007 as the commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq. Lieutenant General James M. Dubik was the third commander for MNSTC-I and commanded during the surge. Now retired, he authored the report *Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer in* 2009 where he documents the organization's mission and accomplishments between 2007 and 2008.[54] Efforts to develop ISF capacity were synchronized with ongoing operations to stop sectarian violence, defeat various Iraqi insurgent elements, kill or capture foreign fighters, restore essential services, develop Iraqi institutions, and establish rule of law. Figure 6 illustrates Multi-National Forces-Iraq's task organization immediately before Lieutenant General Dubik assumed command of MNSTC-I from then Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey.



Figure 5. Command Relationships in Forming, Training, and Equipping ISF

Source: U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, "Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces," http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=2bfb0934-1745-4c80-8e21-205915e97cfb (accessed 12 May 2012), 14.

ISF currently consists of army, air force, police, and naval units. The Iraqi army consists of fourteen divisions with approximately 300,000 soldiers. There are also approximately 300,000 policemen, 3,000 air force personnel, and over 2,000 sailors. ISF is a manned, equipped, and trained to provide internal security and defend Iraq against conventional foreign threats. ISF has modern equipment, including M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and F16 Falcon fighters. ISF personnel and leaders received training from

U.S. and international forces. Although the departure of United States forces in December 2011 is too recent to accurately assess ISF's enduring capabilities and means to sustain itself, initial indicators are promising.

South Vietnam

Texas Tech's Vietnam Center and Archive provides over 400,000 items online available for research. There is a wealth of primary source materials including a freedom of information request into a declassified study on South Vietnam's internal security capabilities. This study occurred in May 1970 and concluded that South Vietnam's internal security capacity, specifically the national police and government management, was inadequate. The study recommends reducing United States involvement in South Vietnam government programs "in order to spur improvement in Vietnamese capacities."[55]

French Indochina consisted of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. French control over Indochina formally ended with the 1954 Geneva Accords. These Accords divided Vietnam into a communist north and anti-communist south[56] with elections to be held in July 1956 to combine the provisional governments in the north and south into one government.[57] According to leadership in the south, conditions throughout Vietnam would not support free elections and South Vietnam declared itself the Republic of Vietnam on 26 October 1955.[58] Remaining elements of the French-trained Vietnamese army reorganized and became ARVN on the same day. ARVN became the dominate service with the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) with the air force and navy providing support.

North Vietnam sought to reunify Vietnam and its army received military equipment from the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union provided the majority of aid consisting of air defense equipment and fighter aircraft. China's aid primarily supported North Vietnam's ground forces and enabled their capability to sustain operations in South Vietnam.[59]

RVNAF fought a hybrid enemy consisting of the North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong insurgents supported by North Vietnam and sympathizers. The United States assisted the South Vietnamese government in multiple ways including economic assistance, military advisors, training and equipment support in response to the growing threat. United States support, specifically military support, increased proportional to perceived enemy strength and deteriorating security situation.

The United States began to conduct military operations in Vietnam in 1965 following the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. American combat power in Vietnam increased dramatically from 23,000 troops at the beginning of 1965 to over 183,000 at the end of the year.[60] Troop levels continued to increase, numbering over 550,000 in 1969. The primary mission of United States forces was to defeat North Vietnam conventional forces in South Vietnam and disrupt North Vietnam's lines of communication and support to its forces and Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

United States involvement in Vietnam arguably prolonged the overall conflict by a decade[61] and potentially longer. The massive numbers of American forces and supplies enjoyed three advantages over the French a little more than ten years earlier: "greater use of heavy long-range weapons (naval shelling); increased use of air power (B-52 raids); and greater mobility."[62] The combination of personnel and American technological

advantages seriously hindered North Vietnam's efforts against South Vietnam, producing a stalemate and providing time to accomplish a key secondary mission to increase ARVN capacity.

Increasing ARVN capacity, which was on the verge of collapse by early 1965, with training and equipment was essential to ensure South Vietnam's enduring security.[63] This secondary mission predated the combat mission by over ten years.[64] Mr. Clarke describes the evolution, organization, and objectives of the U.S. advisory efforts in South Vietnam in *Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973*. The initial objectives of advisors prior to 1965 were to emphasize "technical proficiency and personal relationships."[65] General William Westmoreland, commander of United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam from 1964-1968, viewed "the foundation of the advisory effort was the personal relationship between the advisor and his counterpart, and both the quality of the advice and the receptivity of the individual being advised were measures of the adviser's worth."[66] Military necessity, however, caused the advisory role to expand beyond advice to serving "as combat air support coordinators, directing American fixed- and rotary-wing support in the field" and "gauging the performance of the South Vietnamese armed forces"[67] Mr. Clarke notes "selection, training, and placement of the advisers themselves received relatively little attention"[68] and that "preparation for advisory duty was minimal."[69]

Based on feedback regarding the advisory effort, the United States Army Staff determined in 1965 "that the entire advisory system needed to be strengthen by a unified chain of command, greater control over direct and indirect American military support, longer tours, and a comprehensive debriefing and evaluation program for departing

advisers."[70] The increase in troops in 1965 "meant a corresponding increase in the number of advisers. By early 1966, military advisory teams working in all of South Vietnam's 44 provinces and most of its 243 districts."[71] The influx of advisors and teams assisted with pacification efforts primarily executed by ARVN with support from various intergovernmental agencies.

The conduct of the war changed significantly in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive in 1968. Although Tet Offensive was a tactical and operational failure for North Vietnam, popular opinion, both in the United States and in South Vietnam, perceived Tet as a failure. In the months following Tet, President Johnson declared he would not seek re-election, General Creighton Abrams replaced General Westmoreland, and the United States implemented a new strategy. Ending America's involvement in Vietnam was a major issue in the 1968 presidential elections. Upon becoming president in 1969, President Nixon immediately sought to bring an end to the conflict. A description of the process that resulted in America's exit from Vietnam is found in *Vietnamization: An Incomplete Exit Strategy*.[72] The United States' strategy shifted towards Vietnamization, training and supplying the RVNAF to assume responsibility for South Vietnam's security while withdrawing United States forces.

While the United States shifted to Vietnamization, negotiators from the United States, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Provisional Revolutionary Government met in Paris beginning in 1968 to discuss an end to armed conflict. With the United States and North Vietnam serving as the lead nations in Paris, an agreement was reached in late 1972 and signed on 27 January 1973. The Paris Peace Accords established a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all American combat forces within sixty days. The United States

assured South Vietnam it would continue supplying them with materiel and supplies. Additionally, the United States assured South Vietnam it would supplement RVNAF capability with air power in the event North Vietnam violated the peace treaty. However, when the North Vietnamese Army began its Spring Offensive in 1975, the United States did not intervene. Although the RVNAF suffered poor morale and faced a superior enemy, "they continued to fight. In many engagements, in fact in most, they fought well, often gallantly." North Vietnamese forces ultimately captured Saigon on 30 April 1975.[73]

Conclusion

In summary, there are numerous news articles, blogs, and publications available on various military, government, and university websites that prioritize stability operations and developing host nation security forces. Many of the same types of sources discuss ANSF, ISF, or ARVN development. Examples of primary sources include unit blogs and news articles documenting current events. Other primary sources include Department of Defense Instructions, Field Manuals, policy letters, memoranda, articles, and standing operating procedures that provide contemporary context and implementation guidance. The majority of these primary sources are unclassified because they involve active participation between U.S., coalition, and Afghan military and civilian personnel. These sources are useful in capturing details and raw emotions, but typically lack broader context. The majority of the secondary sources available consist of mandatory reports to Congress in accordance with public law and studies from non-governmental organizations that inform public opinion.

In the case of the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN, developing capacity for host nation security forces require significant external support. Afghanistan lacks the institutional

resources to man, equip, and train its security forces itself. South Vietnam also lacked necessary resources while Iraq's military dissolved immediately after the United States toppled Hussein's regime. The United States played or, in the case of the ANSF, plays a seminal role in developing ANSF, ISF, and ARVN capacity. Interestingly, Afghanistan, Iraq, and North Vietnam also received substantial amounts of military equipment from the Soviet Union.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to answer the research question and determine whether the international community has synchronized its efforts and aligned the proper resources necessary to develop Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) sustainment capacity. Chapter 1 introduced the issue and its scope. Chapter 2 provided the literature review. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology used to make this assessment that will occur in chapter 4.

Developing a sustainable host nation security force is a complex problem that involves an unspecified number of complicated interactions between multitudes of organizations conducting interdependent activities over a period of time. Assessing the international community's efforts in this complex endeavor requires a qualitative analysis using case study comparisons rather than conducting a quantitative analysis. In executing a qualitative analysis, "the researcher aims for a holistic picture from historically unique situations, where idiosyncrasies are important for meaning. The researcher uses an inductive mode, letting the data speak."[1] Qualitative analyses seek to develop a complete depiction by examining the subject in a natural setting.[2]

The development of the ANSF, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) has three key similarities. First, the development of each occurred over a period of several years while engaged in armed conflict. Second, they each consumed significant resources and treasure from other nations. Third, the development of the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN involved thousands of people representing

numerous stakeholders. This study employs a simple framework to make these complex situations easier to understand.

By design, this study involves a qualitative analysis using U.S. Department of Defense force management processes to evaluate the international community's efforts in developing the ANSF. Using Department of Defense processes is appropriate because military advisors to the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN used the same processes to determine requirements. Specifically, this qualitative analysis uses the Joint Capability and Integration Development System (JCIDS) to identify, assess, validate and prioritize capability deficiencies and the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework to address capability gaps.

The U.S. Department of Defense adopted the DOTMLPF framework from the U.S. Army where Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leader Development, Materiel, and Soldiers were used to broadly define the Army's mission using specific terms.[3] Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leader Development, Materiel, and Soldiers evolved into DOTMLPF and a systematic method to study capabilities. The Department of Defense adopted this framework and implemented it throughout the department and across the military services. "Each DOTMLPF domain is an area providing focus for action officers to investigate solutions, products, and services to meet the required capabilities delineated in DoD directives."[4] It provides a balanced approach, providing "structured, rigorous integrated analysis [and] solutions to 'capability gaps'"[5] to determine thoroughness in planning and execution.

A capability gap occurs whenever an existing capability fails to accomplish specified tasks, conditions, and standards. DOTMLPF examines complex issues by

categorizing them into “discrete, manageable sets of tasks and deliverables.”[6] The goal of using this analysis methodology “is to develop a balanced and synchronized solution proposal that is affordable, militarily useful, supportable, and based on mature technology.”[7]

The DOTMLPF framework will be used to assess the development of ANSF sustainment capacity as a case study in comparison to case studies involving the development of sustainment capabilities of two other security forces. The first of these comparison case studies involves the development of the ISF and is contemporary to the ANSF. The second case study involves the development of the ARVN and provides a historical example. The DOTMLPF framework will be used to assess primary and secondary source literature from chapter 2 to determine whether the information from these sources is valid and suitable in answering the research question.

Studying the development of the ISF is relevant because it provides a contemporary comparison to the ANSF. Like the ANSF, the current ISF received significant foreign assistance in terms of training, organization, and resources. Like the ANSF, the current ISF endured many challenges as it developed and prepared to assume security responsibilities in Iraq. The ISF formally assumed full responsibility for Iraq’s security on 15 December 2011 when United States Forces-Iraq cased its colors during an official ceremony in Baghdad.

Studying the development of the ARVN is significant because it provides a historical comparison to the ANSF. Like the ANSF and ISF, ARVN received significant assistance from the United States in terms of training, organization, and resources. Like the ANSF and ISF, ARVN faced many difficult challenges as it developed during

"Vietnamization." ARVN was initially successful in this effort, stopping North Vietnam's Easter Offensive in 1972 with assistance from United States Air Force bombers. Although ARVN quickly dissolved in the face of North Vietnam's Spring Offensive of 1975, numerous ARVN units fought heroically against a hybrid enemy consisting of insurgent guerrilla forces and conventional units.

Doctrine

Examining doctrinal development is significant because doctrine codifies approved methods and techniques throughout an organization. "Doctrine is accepted corporate knowledge; it is authoritative. By definition, doctrine provides authoritative guidance on how the organization ought to operate with current capabilities. It therefore provides the basis for current education and training. Doctrine is subject to existing policy, treaty, and legal constraints."[8] Doctrine provides a common, uniform thought process which directly impacts all aspects of military life from mission command to training to conducting military operations. Doctrine encompasses publications, approved tactics, techniques, and procedures, standard operating procedures, regulations, checklists, and policies that direct military action.

Within a DOTMLPF analysis, several questions seek to determine if doctrine creates capabilities gaps. The first question seeks to answer if existing doctrine either addresses or relates to the issue. A similar question seeks to determine whether existing operating procedures are being followed. If the analysis finds no existing doctrine or procedures, the final question studies whether establishing new doctrine or new procedures addresses the capability gap.[9] Chapter 4 will qualitatively assess doctrine development for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN by analyzing these questions.

Organization

Studying organizational development is important because organizations are one of the key manifestations of doctrine. Individuals accomplish few tasks without additional support. Organizations are formal and informal collections of people working together to accomplish tasks. Army units are organized to accomplish military missions and police units are organized to provide security.

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the organization domain seeks to answer several questions to determine if organizations create capabilities gaps. The first question seeks to identify where this issue occurs and what organizations are affected. Analysis also explores whether organizational values and priorities have an adverse effect. Additionally, research seeks to determine if organizations are properly staffed and funded to address the issue. Meanwhile, another question tries to ascertain senior leader awareness of the issue. The final question seeks to answer if the issue is already on an organizational issue list.[10] Chapter 4 will qualitatively assess organizational development for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN by analyzing these questions.

Training

Training is significant because it prepares individuals and collective organizations to conduct assigned missions in combat. Beginning with the ancient Roman Empire, many cultures, including Afghanistan, believe that in order to achieve peace, one must prepare for war. Training instills confidence and hones the tactical and technical skills required to develop effective security forces.

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the training domain seeks to answer several questions to determine if training creates capabilities gaps. The first question aims to

answer if capability gaps were caused by either a lack of or inadequate training. Another question seeks to determine whether training exists that may address the issue. Additionally, if training is conducted, is it effective? Another area involves how training is monitored and being measured. Does a lack of competence and proficiency on existing equipment adversely affect training? Another question seeks to determine if personnel effected have access to training. Meanwhile, another area evaluates the degree in which senior leaders support and enforce training by examining whether training is adequately funded and staffed.[11] Chapter 4 will qualitatively assess training development for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN by analyzing these questions.

Materiel

Materiel development, determining types and quantities of equipment, acquisition strategies, and operations and support throughout the equipment's projected life cycle, is critical to ensuring organizations have the appropriate equipment to accomplish assigned missions. Developing materiel solutions is a deliberate action to meet the criteria of affordability, feasibility, and responsiveness.[12] Typically, non-materiel solutions are first considered. If non-materiel solutions do not address capability gaps, then materiel solutions are considered. The type and quantity of materiel may present a significant financial commitment throughout its estimated life cycle; therefore, proposed materiel solutions undergo additional scrutiny and approval.

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the materiel domain seeks to answer a number of questions to determine whether materiel or the lack thereof, creates capability gaps. Specifically, research seeks to identify if the issue was the result of inadequate systems or equipment. Another area examines if the issue involves a stand-alone piece of equipment

or is part of a system within a larger family-of-systems. Another question seeks to determine if potential replacement equipment possesses the functionality missing from current equipment. Another area explores whether increased operational performance can resolve the issue and determines the possibility for increasing performance in existing equipment. Similar to the training domain, another area explores whether the issue is a result of inadequate proficiency and competency on existing equipment.[13] Chapter 4 will qualitatively assess materiel development for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN by analyzing these questions.

Leadership

Leadership is essential in implementing needed changes identified during a DOTMLPF analysis. Unlike an automated assembly line, military and police organizations consist of people who desire and deserve great leadership. Leadership development is a systematic process to develop organizational leaders. For the United States Army, leadership development is an institutional endeavor to develop mature, capable, caring individual leaders worthy of the nation's most precious resource. The United States Army details its program for leader development in a series of regulations, field manuals, and pamphlets that are more than just artifacts; they provide the regulatory guidelines and doctrinal underpinnings that bring to life its espoused values and beliefs.

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the leadership domain seeks to answer the following questions: "Do [senior leaders] understand the scope of the problem? Does command have resources at its disposal to correct the issue? Has command properly assessed the level of criticality, threat, urgency, risk, etc. of the operational results of the issue? Is senior leadership aware of the drivers and barriers to resolving the issue within

[the] organization? Has senior leadership identified [external] cultural drivers and barriers which hinder issue resolution?"[14] Chapter 4 will qualitatively assess leadership development for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN by analyzing these questions.

Personnel

Personnel development involves identifying the skills and knowledge required by an individual to perform specific tasks and positions. Organizations then creating specialized occupational skills for each common task group and revise those specialties over time to best suit the changing requirements. Personnel development, therefore, is a difficult process because it takes time and resources to access, train, and develop people with the goal of ensuring "that qualified personnel are there to support a capability."[15]

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the personnel domain seeks to answer a number of questions to determine if personnel cause capability gaps. The first question seeks to determine whether the capability gap was the result of placing too few qualified and trained personnel into technical positions. Another question analyzes whether different occupational specialties are required if the organization receives new materiel. Meanwhile, another area examines the need to implement new training programs for new personnel[16] Chapter 4 will qualitatively assess personnel development for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN by analyzing these questions.

Facilities

Facilities development, like logistics, is significant for organizations to sustain themselves over time. Sustaining any force requires adequate facilities from which to operate. Depots require secure, weatherized facilities to protect, receive, store, and issue

supplies and equipment while maintenance units require weatherized facilities to service equipment. Personnel require adequate lodging to eat, sleep, and work. Leaders and staffs require offices.

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the facilities domain seeks to answer several questions to determine capability gaps are the result of facilities. The first area to examine is whether inadequate infrastructure caused the issue. Specifically, is the problem the result of aging infrastructure or new construction that fails to meet operational needs? Another area examines whether environmental controls, or the lack thereof, created the problem. Other areas focus on evaluating the ground network infrastructure, life support infrastructure, operation and maintenance requirements, hardening in response to vulnerability assessments, and field fortifications to assess and prioritize engineer and construction assets.[17] Chapter 4 will qualitatively assess facilities construction for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN by analyzing these questions

Conclusion

A leading critique of qualitative research, according to Oklahoma State University, is that "the very subjectivity of the inquiry leads to difficulties in establishing the reliability and validity of the approaches and information."[18] Using the DOTMLPF framework alleviates much of this concern due to its balanced approach to provide integrated analysis and solutions. Applying this framework to ANSF development and ISF and ARVN case studies will validate the reliability of the information.

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of chapter 4 is to analyze the primary and secondary sources discussed in chapter 2 using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains introduced in chapter 3. The previous chapter defined each domain, explained its significance, and provided a series of questions that seek to determine whether capability gaps exist. This chapter will analyze security force development in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Vietnam using each domain's questions.

Training and equipping Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) all involved significant foreign assistance. The United States bore the financial burden to develop ARVN. The United States also bore the majority of the financial cost to develop the ISF, spending 22 billion dollars between 2003 to March 2009.[1] Mr. Radin explains in "Funding the Afghan National Security Forces" that the development of the ANSF currently costs around 12 billion dollars per year; sustainment costs (salaries, subsistence, training and operations, fuel, maintenance, equipment, and supply parts) are projected to be approximately 6 billion dollars annually.[2] The United States pays the majority of the development costs using Afghan Security Forces Funds (ASFF). The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) lacks the financial capacity to pay for the ANSF it needs to provide security and will require financial support into the future as it continues to establish tax revenues.

Doctrine

Chapter 3 provided a number of questions to assess whether doctrine supports or hinders a host nation security force. Creating and implementing doctrine is vitally important because it not only defines what missions the organization executes, but also directly influences the other DOTMLPF domains in significant ways. Changes in doctrine effects the size, composition, and disposition of organizations, influences what and how those organizations train, its equipment requirements, required leader attributes and proficiencies, needed personnel proficiencies, and facilities requirements. The U.S. Joint Staff publishes joint doctrine to coordinate and integrate efforts between different services. Joint doctrine also "promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military operations."[3]

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the first question doctrine seeks to answer is to determine whether doctrine exists that addresses the issue. Specifically, does logistics doctrine exist and how thoroughly does it provide support to the organization? The United States Army, for example, published Field Manual 4.0, Sustainment, in 2009 to implement doctrinal and organizational changes made since the publication of previous doctrine.[4] The United States Army also has other field manuals focusing on specific logistics areas.

The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) publish doctrine as decrees and policies. Despite the creation of ISAF Joint Command in November 2009 and their charter to partner with operationally fielded ANSF units, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) retained the mentorship mission for the MoD and MoI that was held by Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

(CSTC-A). NTM-A mentors work with key personnel within the MoD and MoI in a mentorship role, assisting the ANSF with the development of decrees, tashkils, and fielding schedules for new Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units.

The MoD published a number of logistics decrees in 2009 and 2010. The first published decree, MoD Decree 4.0, Supported and Supporting Unity Logistics Policy and Support Procedures, incorporates responsiveness, flexibility, attainability, simplicity, economy, sustainability, integration, and survivability as fundamental characteristics of the ANA's supported and supporting relationship to transition ANA logistics from a centrally controlled push system to a unit controlled pull system. Decree 4.0 also establishes MoD and ANA logistics organizations. Additionally, the decree institutes supply and materiel management and accounting procedures at every level in the ANA and MoD.[5] This robust decree provides the general doctrinal framework to sustain the ANA and establishes the doctrinal environment for separate, specific logistics decrees.

MoD Decree 4.1, Transportation Management Policy and Procedures, establishes ground and air transportation doctrine for ANA units at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The decree delineates roles and responsibilities to plan and conduct transportation operations. The decree also institutes procedures to secure different types of cargo. It also provides direction to organize and manage logistics convoys.[6] MoD Decree 4.1provides the ANA with the doctrinal framework to transport soldiers, equipment, and supplies.

MoD Decree 4.2, Materiel Accountability Policy and Procedures, establishes property accountability procedures to requisition, receive, and sign for equipment and

supplies. It establishes procedures to direct lateral transfers of equipment between units. Additionally, it institutes turn in procedures for damaged or unserviceable equipment. It also directs inventory requirements and procedures as well as establishes investigation procedures.[7] Establishing leader responsibilities to account for and maintain serviceability of their unit's equipment is the hallmark of good stewardship and the sign of a mature organization.

MoD Decree 4.5, Ammunition and Explosive Operations Policy and Support Procedures, establishes responsibilities to plan, requisition, receive, store, distribute, and secure ammunition and explosives. The decree also institutes inspection requirements. Additionally, it establishes destruction protocols. The decree also identifies safety requirements.[8]

MoD Decree 4.6, Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL) Section Organization, Responsibilities and Procedures, is a comprehensive doctrine detailing all aspects of fuel management. It allows fuel officers to forecast requirements. Additionally, it standardizes requisition requests, distribution, storage and recirculation procedures, inventories, inspections, safety, and testing for all ground and aviation fuels, firewood, propane, and coal.[9]

Finally, MoD Decree 4.9, Maintenance Management Policy and Procedures, establishes the ANA maintenance system, institutes types and levels of support from the tactical level to strategic level, and establishes roles and responsibilities. The decree also establishes maintenance management procedures in garrison and in the field, repair parts supply operations, and recovery operations. It establishes policies and procedures to conduct controlled exchange of serviceable parts from non-mission capable equipment

and cannibalizing serviceable parts from destroyed equipment. Additionally, it establishes repair doctrine for communications equipment and weapons.[10]

All of these doctrinal publications apply to every military and civilian unit and organization within the MoD. Leaders at all levels are responsible for implementing these decrees and ensure their units adhere to the published standards. Additionally, MoD Decree 4.1 and MoD Decree 4.2 are punitive, stating that "violations may be subject to appropriate articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice."[11]

The Afghan MoI Advisor Guide explains it is the responsibility of advisors to the MoI and national level ANP organizations to assist Afghan leaders with developing and implementing procedures to sustain ANP units throughout the country. "As a basis for advisor activity in partnered police [headquarter] teams, the pillared police force chiefs should be considered to be responsible to design, man, equip, train, sustain, and develop the policies necessary to generate and regenerate forces for the [Deputy Minister] Security and the Zone to Precinct Commanders to employ."[12] Specifically, the MoI Deputy Minister Logistics develops the sustainment policies, "sustainment concepts, plans, and capabilities required to support" the ANP.[13]

MoI decrees and policies constitute the doctrinal approaches the ANP uses to provide Afghans law enforcement and sustain itself. The MoI, like the MoD, issued robust decrees that established its logistics management system policy, maintenance policy, and transportation policy.[14] The MoI sustainment system mirrors the MoD; MoI logistics forms are virtually identical to MoD forms. The MoI seeks, as does the MoD, to achieve force sustainment where the ANSF has "a logistics system that is independent of coalition support. Force sustainment focuses on refining and teaching the processes

required for the ANSF to procure, resupply, repair, maintain, and transport equipment and supplies to ANSF throughout the country."[15]

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) doctrine development reflects United States' military involvement from 2003 through 2011. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense has a major subordinate organization, Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, which established logistics doctrine to provide accountability of equipment and supplies, transportation, and maintenance for the Iraqi army.[16] The Iraqi Ministry of Interior developed a Logistic Handbook establishing support procedures and outlining how it would conduct "acquisition, distribution, accountability, and maintenance" for the Iraqi police.[17] Senior leaders representing the ISF, United States, and NATO Training Mission-Iraq held a joint military doctrine conference in 2010 to establish a hierarchy of doctrine and essential principles for Iraqi units and training institutions to implement."[18]

ARVN doctrine development also reflected United States' military involvement through 1973 and focused primarily on tasks associated with pacification. United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam published a handbook for military support of pacification to provide "an understanding of the pacification process, with particular emphasis on the doctrine for provision of territorial security and the conduct of [Revolutionary Develop] programs."[19] ARVN doctrine established offensive operations conducted by units up to battalion-strength to clear and secure areas. It relied on combined arms warfare in which infantry units received support from light armor, field artillery, and air power. At the tactical level, this doctrine was adequate for the military's pacification mission; unfortunately, the South Vietnamese government was unable to

consistently apply non-military elements to promote economic development and establish lasting stability.

After answering the first question of whether appropriate doctrine exists, the next question seeks to determine if there are operating procedures in place that are not being followed that, had they been followed, would either correct the issue or lessen its impact. The vignette in chapter 1 illustrates that ANA unit-level maintenance was not conducted in accordance with MoD Decree 4.9 that directs unit operators to perform preventative maintenance checks and services.[20] The ANP also has established operating procedures to validate unit requests and issue supplies and equipment; however, organizational, leadership, and equipment capability gaps inhibit the ANP sustainment system's overall performance. Meanwhile, a United States Congress report discusses some of the challenges experienced in Iraq by the ISF to receive and account for equipment and supplies, highlighting problems in adhering to policy and doctrines.[21] Meanwhile in South Vietnam, RVNAF plans relied heavily upon United States air power to support ARVN ground forces. While many factors contributed to the collapse of ARVN, the last American Defense Attaché in South Vietnam argued that an overall loss of morale was the greatest factor. As the North Vietnamese Army's 1975 Spring offensive violated the terms of the 1972 peace treaty, "RVNAF leadership believed that a continuation of this blatant and undisguised effrontery would not go unchallenged. . . . Finally, they realized that no such help would be forthcoming, on top of the obvious fact that no further materiel aid could be looked for. . . . [T]he RVNAF leadership recognized the handwriting on the wall. Although not discussed openly, I could see it in their eyes."[22]

In the event that there is no doctrine or procedures in place that pertain to the issue, the final question seeks to determine whether new doctrine or new procedures need to be developed and implemented. None of the organizations in this case study required the development of new doctrine and procedures; each organization's logistics doctrine is or was suitable. Instead, the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN only needed to revise their existing doctrine. Developing and implementing new logistics doctrine is not necessary for the ANSF; MoD and MoI decrees adequately address essential logistics requirements. All of the logistics decrees encourage users to improve logistics systems by sharing recommendations. Each of the logistics decrees state that recommendations will be consolidated and published annually in updated decrees. Logistics doctrine for the ISF and ARVN contain similar provisions to improve existing doctrine.

In summary, the international community played a vital role in developing doctrine for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN. In each case, host nation doctrine established key policies and procedures to supply and maintain operational capability. The only doctrine capability gap identified, which was common issue to all, was inconsistent application of logistics doctrine. Following doctrine is essential for host nation security forces to sustain themselves over time.

Organization

Chapter 3 provided a number of questions to assess whether the organizational structure supports or hinders a host nation security force to sustain itself. The United States Army, for example, organizes its operational forces into two general categories: combat units that conduct military operations and enabling units to support combat units like combat sustainment support battalions. Organizational planning culminates with the

approval of an authorized institutional unit's Table of Distributions and Allowances and an operational unit's Modification of Table of Organization and Equipment.

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the first question the organization domain seeks to answer is to determine where the problem is occurring. Chapter 2 discussed the creation and evolution of the international community's military involvement in Afghanistan since 2001. This evolution frequently resulted in military organizational changes to establish command and control relationships, expand operations, and improve coordination to enhance the overall unity of effort. Synchronizing unity of effort is difficult as fifty NATO and non-NATO nations contributed military forces to ISAF as of 1 March 2012.[23]

NTM-A is the international community's lead in developing a sustainable ANSF at the national level. Chapter 2 discussed NTM-A's origins, mission, and evolution of its task organization. At the regional level, responsibility for developing ANSF capability originally belonged to the Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands, brigade-level organizations located in each region to command and control coalition forces involved with training and mentoring the ANSF. Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands were subordinate organizations to Task Force Phoenix which itself was subordinate to CSTC-A. The overall number of personnel assigned to these ANSF training missions pale in comparison to the number of international forces conducting and sustaining stability operations; the shortage of personnel to train and equip the ANSF was major challenge to international efforts to develop the ANSF.[24] ISAF inactivated these organizations in the fall of 2009 as part of its overall reorganization of international forces. Regional Commands, originally responsible for only Provincial Reconstruction

Teams, gained increased responsibilities as part of the new ISAF Joint Command. Specifically, Operational Mentor Liaison Teams and Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams ceased reporting to Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands and began reporting to the Regional Commands.

NTM-A recognized an operational need to maintain control over its international forces conducting and supervising ANA and ANP training throughout the country. In November 2009, NTM-A established Regional Support Teams within each region. The nucleuses of forces for these Regional Support Teams were mobilized United States National Guard units originally assigned to the inactivated Afghan Regional Security Integration Commands. NTM-A's Regional Support Teams initially provided command and control for international forces assisting in ANSF regional training centers. Regional Support Teams also provided contract management oversight for contracts involving Afghan Security Forces Funds (ASFF). Initially less than a platoon-sized headquarters commanded by a United States Army colonel and task organized under NTM-A's Deputy Commander-Army, Regional Support Teams possessed unique capabilities and rapidly grew in importance.

Acknowledging their increased importance, NTM-A's commanding general reorganized the Regional Support Teams into Regional Support Commands in June 2010 to command NTM-A elements and ensure unity of effort within the Regional Commands. Regional Support Commands are joint brigade-level organizations commanded by United States Army and Marine Corps colonels. Additionally, several Regional Support Commands, beginning with Regional Support Command-North, have international officers and soldiers.

Afghanistan's strategic organization at the national level consists of the MoD staff sections and ANA general staff. Additionally, there are a number of other strategic level organizations. The Headquarters Support and Security Brigade provide military security to the Afghan president and GIRoA ministries in Kabul. ANA Training and Education Command develop Periods of Instruction for each course taught at the Kabul Military Training Center and the Regional Military Training Centers. ANA Recruiting Command seeks to recruit soldiers into the ANA that reflect Afghanistan's ethnic diversity. Medical Command coordinates and manages ANA hospitals throughout the country. There are also four sustaining institutions at the strategic level: communications support, military intelligence regional offices, acquisition agency, and installation management department. Finally, Logistics Command plays an especially important role in sustaining the ANA. Logistics Command processes supply requisitions for approval by the General Staff G4 and directs the various national depots to prepare items for movement. Logistics Command also plans and conducts logistics convoys from Kabul to the different Forward Supply Depots in each region.[25]

At the operational and tactical levels, the MoD organizes its conventional combat elements into corps, division, brigades, kandaks, coys, and platoons. Coys are company-sized units and kandaks are battalion-sized units. Except for Regional Command-Capital, where conventional ANA units are organized as a division, ANA units in the other regions are organized with a corps headquarters, three or four infantry brigades, a corps logistics battalion, route clearance companies, a military intelligence company, and a military police company. An infantry brigade is located with the corps headquarters and other corps-level units, the other infantry brigades are located throughout each region.

Each infantry brigade has garrison support unit to operate the installation, three infantry kandaks, a combat support kandak consisting of engineers and field artillery, a combat service support kandak consisting of maintenance, transportation, medical, and signal, and a specialized infantry kandak to provide security along the ring road. The ANA also has special operations forces consisting of commando and Special Forces kandaks, a military police guard brigade to operate detention facilities, and the Afghan Air Force.[26]

The MoD stationed conventional ANA units throughout Afghanistan. Regional Command-Capital contains Kabul and surrounding areas and is the smallest geographic region. It contains the 111th Division headquarters and two assigned brigades. Regional Command-East contains two corps: 201st and 203rd. The 201st Corps headquarters is located in Gamberi. Its three brigades are located at Kunar, Surobi, and Gamberi. Meanwhile, the 203rd Corps headquarters is in Gardez and its four brigades are located in Khowst, Logar, Gardez, and Paktika. The 209th Corps, with its headquarters in Mazar-E-Sharif, contains three brigades located throughout Regional Command-North in Meymanah, Mazar-E-Sharif, and Konduz. In Regional Command-West, the 207th Corps, with its headquarters at Camp Zafar outside of Herat, contains three brigades garrisoned in Farah and Camp Zafar. The 215th Corps is located in Lashkar Gah with three brigades located throughout Regional Command-Southwest in Delarom, Garmser, and Lashkar Gah. In Regional Command-South, the 205th Corps is located in Kandahar and its four brigades are located in Zhari, Kandahar, Tarin Kowt, and Qalat.

Although the ANA is an infantry-centric military organization, the tashkil does contain the necessary enablers to conduct and sustain offensive, defensive, and stability

operations. Staff sections as low as the kandak level contain the necessary authorizations to plan and manage logistics operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Authorizing units on the tashkil does not imply the unit suddenly exists; the new organization must be formed. When the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the international community agreed in 2009 to increase the size of the ANSF to combat a growing insurgency, infantry units were the first new authorized units created. The SY1389 tashkil authorized combat service support units; however, fielding new combat units were priority through late 2010. This decision this further stressed an immature sustainment system designed to support a smaller force structure. The stress on the sustainment system continued even after fielding the first of the new combat logistics battalions.

The MoI created four police organizations within the ANP. The Afghan Uniform Police is the largest organization. The Afghan Uniform Police provides law and order to Afghans and is organized into sub-districts, districts, provincial, and regional levels. The Afghan Uniform Police also contains specialty police forces including traffic police, fire and rescue, and United Nations Protective Force. The Afghan National Civil Order Police are consolidated in each region, organized into brigade headquarters and police kandaks The Afghan National Civil Order Police provide the ANP the ability to deploy anywhere within Afghanistan to serve alongside the ANA to reestablish law and order. Meanwhile, the Afghan Border Police provides law enforcement along the international borders and operates border crossing points from Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan. The Afghan Border Police is organized into zones with a brigade-level headquarters and subordinate border police kandaks. Finally, the Afghan Anti-Crime Police “facilitates to

the regions investigative and police intelligence capabilities from the MoI. This includes Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Narcotics, Police Intelligence, Criminal Investigations, Major Crimes Task Force, Police Special Units and Forensics."[27]

These organizations receive sustainment through internal and external means. Every Afghan Uniform Police regional headquarters, Afghan National Civil Order Police brigade, and Afghan Border Police zone headquarters possesses organic service and support capabilities on its tashkil. Additionally, the MoI has a network of logistics centers to supply units. The MoI operates both the National Logistics Center and Material Management Center in Kabul. It is from there that routine logistics convoys supply Regional Logistics Centers, the ANP equivalent to the ANA's Forward Supply Depots. Regional Logistics Centers supply Provincial Supply Points, Afghan Uniform Police regional headquarters, Afghan National Civil Order Police brigades, and Afghan Border Police headquarters. Provincial Supply Points supply district headquarters and other police units. As with the ANA, many of the ANP's support units, specifically Provincial Supply Points, have yet to be created.

With the assistance of mentors and advisors from Multinational Forces-Iraq, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense created a number of logistics organizations to supporting the Iraqi Army. The Director General for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Infrastructure, Joint Headquarters-M4, Support Command, Taji National Depot, and National Ammunition Depot are national level organizations that direct and manage all aspects of Iraqi Army logistics and sustainment. Meanwhile, Regional Support Units, Garrison Support Units, Logistic Battalions and Motorized Transportation Regiments, and Headquarters Support Units provide operational level supply and support to tactical sustainment units.[28] The

Iraqi police also have support organizations and rely on contracted support. A United States Congressional report notes the Iraqi Constitution grants provincial governments control over provincial police and that the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, which provides logistical support to the National Police, must coordinate logistics support to the provincial police with the provincial government.[29]

The United States advisory effort in South Vietnam "contributed directly and immeasurably to the development and modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces."[30] France initially provided logistical support to ARVN which was neither organized nor trained to support itself when the French army departed. The United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, established in 1950, also facilitated logistics support at the national-level. United States military advisors later assisted ARVN leadership in reorganizing its forces to defend South Vietnam. The Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam continued to advise and train ARVN following the establishment of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam in 1962 to command and control the growing number of United States ground forces. A reorganization of United States ground forces in South Vietnam in 1964 resulted in the inactivation of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam and the transfer of its functions to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The advisory effort expanded from the national level down to the battalion level and also included a number of mobile training teams.

Despite the importance of training ARVN to pacify South Vietnam, the advisory effort found itself an economy of force mission while United States Army and Marine Corps combat operations took priority. In 1969, advisors again became the priority effort with the announcement America's Vietnamese policy. At the national level, "the

Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics (MACJ4) was the principle adviser to RVNAF on materiel systems development, logistics operation, organization, and plans, and directed the advisory effort to RVNAF Central Logistics Command, the Technical Service Advisory Divisions, and the Area Logistics Commands advisory teams."[31] "Efforts at improving [ARVN] combat effectiveness and enabling them to replace US forces in all aspects of combat and service support had been undertaken at an accelerated pace under several programs since 1969. Most noteworthy among them were the combined operations programs initiated by US Field Forces such as the Dong Tien and Pair-Off campaigns, and the extensive on-the-job training programs conducted by the US 1st Logistical Command for the benefit of ARVN logistical and technical service units. It was during this period that [ARVN] really came of age, operationally as well as logistically."[32]

Ultimately, ARVN's problems occurred at the national and regional levels. At the national level, RVNAF and ARVN leadership had limited direct influence on events beyond Saigon. Meanwhile, coordinating activities between regions and with the national level was difficult without United States assistance. Specifically, "the inability of the in-country transportation system to move unserviceable assets in a timely manner to the overhaul bases" resulted in less equipment available to the ARVN organizations that needed it the most.[33]

After determining where the problem is occurring, the next DOTMLPF organizational issue is to determine which organization or organizations is the issue. There remains the possibility for friction between international forces despite ISAF's reorganization of forces in late 2009. Each region contains ISAF units subordinate to IJC

and NTM-A. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Operational Mentor Liaison Teams, Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams, and IJC units report to the various Regional Commands that report to IJC. Regional Support Commands oversees military trainers, police trainers, and logistics advisors and reports to NTM-A. Achieving unity of effort at the regional level requires close coordination between Regional Support Commands and Regional Commands.

Both the ANA and ANP have organizational issues. Within the ANA, Logistics Command has the only organizational issue that adversely affects the overall logistics capacity of the ANA. All of Afghanistan's national depots are located within and around Kabul. Transporting supplies and equipment from the national depots in and near Kabul to the Forward Supply Depots within each region involves either ground or air movement. Logistics Command has a security battalion to guard ground convoys; however, it only has a battalion with two light/medium truck companies, one medium transportation company, and one heavy transportation company to move supplies and equipment throughout the country.[34] The ANP has a similar challenge transporting supplies from national depots in and around Kabul to the Regional Logistics Centers. RLCs are authorized a company-sized transportation unit to distribute equipment and supplies from the RLC to Provincial Supply Points, police training centers, and headquarters for the Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan Border Police, and Afghan National Civil Order Police, but lack the equipment and personnel.

In Iraq, the primary organizational issue for the ISF logistics units involved their fielding. ISF dependence on the United States for logistics was one of several factors that hindered ISF development. As recently as 2008, the ISF relied heavily on the United

States for logistics support because their logistics units were still being formed, equipped, and trained.[35]

According to the final American Defense Attaché in South Vietnam, the RVNAF organization had capability gaps that contributed to the country's collapse. "Under the organizational concept, each Military Region Commander was in effect a warlord with his own army, navy, and air force. The assets within his geographic boundaries were his to use as he saw fit. . . . I believe that this manner of doing business materially contributed to the losses suffered by VNAF during the final two months in the life of the Republic of Vietnam."[36] The organizational issues at the national level led to a mistaken assumption that the United States would continue providing support following the withdrawal of its combat forces in 1973.

Once the organization is identified, the next task is to assess the organization's mission. Is its stated mission the correct one? IJC and NTM-A's stated missions assign responsibilities in a distinct and complementary manner. IJC's stated mission is to, "in full partnership, the combined team of Afghan National Security Forces, ISAF Joint Command and relevant organizations conducts population-centric comprehensive operations to neutralize the insurgency in specified areas, and supports improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable peace."[37] NTM-A's stated mission is to, "in coordination with NATO nations and partners, international organizations, donors and non-governmental organizations, supports the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in generating and sustaining the ANSF, develops leaders, and establishes enduring institutional capacity to enable accountable, Afghan-led security."[38]

Operationally, IJC and NTM-A's missions require close coordination at both the national and regional levels.

Meanwhile, the ANA's Logistics Command lacks the organizational capability to conduct multiple ground logistics convoys simultaneously. Its limited number of transportation units severely restricts the size and frequency of logistics convoys from national depots to the various Forward Supply Depots. Additionally, not all of the combat logistics battalions have been fielded despite authorization on the tashkil.

The ANP has similar challenges to the ANA. The ANP also has limited transportation units that restrict the size and frequency of logistics convoys from Kabul to the Regional Logistics Centers. Additionally, many of the Provincial Supply Points do not yet exist despite tashkil authorization.

ISF logistics organizations were adequately designed to support an army to defend Iraq from conventional external threats. ISF's organizational development was similar to the ANSF. Like the ANSF, the number of ISF dramatically increased from 142,000 in March 2005 to 327,000 by February 2007.[39] The organizational structure supporting the ISF reflects three supply models. These supply models are based on supporting legacy, pre-modular United States Army formations, current United States Army modular brigades, and decentralized police systems. The key difference between the organizational structure of the ISF and the United States Army is that the ISF lacks the expeditionary capabilities of the United States Army.[40] The Iraqi army's logistics units lack the capacity to sustain an expeditionary force operating beyond Iraq's borders. They are organized to operate using a hub-spoke method to supply army units from

national and regional depots. Organizations supporting Iraqi police are designed in a similar manner, supplying police units from national and provincial depots.

The next question aims to answer what are the organizational values and priorities. The lack of transportation units forces the ANA Logistics Command and the ANP to prioritize missions. This inevitably affects the size and frequency of logistics convoys. During the author's tenure with Regional Support Command-West (RSC-W), Logistics Command cancelled two scheduled monthly logistics convoys to the 3rd Forward Support Depot (FSD) in order to increase transportation assets supporting ANA missions in Kandahar and Hellman provinces.

For the ISF, fielding combat army units and additional police to stop increasing sectarian violence took priority over fielding support units. Typically, fielding new units without resourcing their sustainment creates a catastrophic capabilities gap; however, a surge of additional United States troops provided the fledgling ISF with required sustainment. This support would continue until the ISF was able to fully man and equip its logistics organizations.

In South Vietnam, the "reduced levels of United States' assistance coupled with increased enemy threat prompted [R]VNAF to adopt tactics based primarily on survivability rather than effectiveness."[41] Without a reliable transportation system to distribute needed supplies and equipment and back haul unserviceable equipment for repair, operational commanders were forced to make do with whatever equipment they controlled. Simply stated, RVNAF and ARVN stopped following established logistics procedures without instituting new procedures. Had the overall situation not been so dire,

this decision would inevitably lead to collapse. In the case of ARVN, however, this decision had little to no operational effect.

Next, is the organization properly staffed and funded to deal with the issue? With the exception of the ANA Logistics Command's one transportation battalion, a review of the SY1389 tashkil indicates adequate personnel and equipment authorizations to sustain the ANA. This is also the case with the ANP. Fully manning those authorizations is a challenge as the ANSF continues growing towards its authorized end strength. This was also a challenge with the ISF, but its logistics organizations are currently staffed to sustain the Iraqi army and police.

While the United States conducted combat missions to seek and destroy North Vietnamese Army units operating in South Vietnam, ARVN conducted pacification operations. ARVN's organizational structure at the corps level and below mirrored United States Army and was organized into divisions, regiments, and battalions. The Vietnamese process prepared existing units to fight against the North Vietnamese Army. However, the South Vietnamese air force lacked the full capabilities of the United States Air Force; RNVAF continued to rely on the United States bombers.

Next, are senior leaders aware of the issues? Operational requirements force senior leaders to establish priorities. ANA senior leaders are aware of the importance to field a corps logistics battalion to every corps, but must balance requirement against a multitude of equally important requirements. They also understand the current organizational limitations of Logistics Command to conduct multiple logistics convoys simultaneously throughout Afghanistan. MoI and ANP senior leaders are aware of the low personnel fills in the Regional Logistics Centers and are exploring compensation

options and other alternatives. Iraqi senior leaders were also aware of the organizational issue of not having adequate logistics units; however, they had limited opportunities to correct the issue before they did.

The final American Defense Attaché to South Vietnam accurately concluded that RNVAF and ARVN leadership did not fully appreciate their logistics issues. "The difficulties associated with obtaining and maintaining military equipment were never fully appreciated by the [ARVN] command element. The close association with the United States' logistical system prior to the departure of United States Forces had lulled ARVN commanders into a false sense of security. . . . They could never understand the need for conservation at a time when conservation of necessity had to be the law of the land. For the most part, they blamed the shortfall in assets on the logistical system."[42]

Finally, is the issue already in some type of organizational issue list? The remaining ANA corps logistics battalions will be fielded well before the 2014 transition. Discussions to increase the number of strategic level ground transportation units have are not yet resulted in increased tashkil authorizations. The remaining ANP Provincial Supply Points will also be established before the 2014 transition.

In summary, the establishment of Regional Support Commands provide NTM-A the organizational capability to provide effective command and control and contract management oversight of ASFF construction, supply, and service contracts. Both the ANA and the ANP have tashkil-authorized organizations to support their organizations with equipment, supplies, and necessary services to sustain themselves. The ISF also has the organizational capacity to sustain itself. ARVN also had organizational capacity to

sustain itself, but those organizations crumbled in the face of North Vietnam's 1975 offensive.

Training

Chapter 3 provided a number of questions to determine how training creates capabilities gaps. Preparing individuals and collective teams for the horrors of war requires tough, realistic training. Training instills confidence and hones the tactical and technical skills required to develop effective security forces. After years where coalition forces and contractors provided training to the ANSF, Afghan trainers are assuming greater training responsibility. NATO acknowledges the ANA conducts 85 percent of ANSF training and that "all training at the Kabul Military Training Center is completely led and taught by ANA personnel.[43] The ANA also recently assumed complete responsibility in planning and conducting training at the Regional Military Training Center located at Camp Zafar in Regional Command-West.[44]

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the first question the training domain seeks to answer is whether the issue was caused, at least in part, by a complete lack of or inadequate training. The vignette in chapter 1 vividly highlights inadequate training as one of the key findings during the maintenance After Action Review (AAR). Operators and first-line leaders lacked training to conduct and supervise preventative maintenance checks and services on their equipment. In fact, training was the first of three systematic issues RSC-W identified.[45]

Separate Combined Training Advisory Groups for the Army and Police were CSTC-A's lead subordinate organizations in working with the ANA Training and Education Command and the MoI, respectively. NTM-A reorganized the responsibilities

of Combined Training Advisory Group-Army to the NTM-A Deputy Commander-Army who directs regionally-aligned Training Advisory Groups, squad-sized advisor teams to the regional military training centers. These Training Advisory Groups ensure the regional military training centers conduct quality training in accordance with established Periods of Instruction. They also certify ANA instructors who demonstrate they are fully prepared to plan and execute training. Regional Support Commands, in concert with the NTM-A Deputy Command-Police and the Assistant Commanding General for Police Training, oversee ANP training at the regional training centers.

Institutional training conducted at the various ANSF training centers focuses on developing individual skills. Courses taught at ANA and ANP training centers include initial entry training for new soldiers, new Afghan Uniform Police, and new Afghan National Civil Order Police, non-commissioned officer training, and courses for low-density specialty occupations such as mechanics and armorers. NTM-A also oversees training at national-level military branch schools for infantry, artillery, engineers, logistics, and explosive ordnance.

Retired Lieutenant General Dubik, former commander of Multinational Security Transition Command- Iraq (MNSTC-I) during the Iraq surge, reorganized his organization from a flat structure where each subordinate organization reported directly to the commander to one with "six major functional areas which we believed would allow decisions to be made faster and actions coordinated more completely."[46] This restructuring allowed him and his organization to manage and supervise all aspects of ISF development. "Our six directorates, two helicopters, and a collaborative network allowed us to organize around the work we had to do. Now all we had to do was execute."[47]

Indeed, Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq altered how soldiers in the Iraqi army received training from an individual to a collective system known as Unit Set Fielding. “Before the Unit Set Fielding program began, Iraqi soldiers receive training and then joined their assigned Iraqi unit individually. . . . MNSTC-I, therefore, changed the training and assignment process so that entire Iraqi Army brigades formed and trained as an entire unit.”[48] Retired Lieutenant General Dubik also argued that iterative training was the most effective way to train the ISF. “Train forces iteratively to increase quality without compromising the availability of forces. Quality standards should be flexible. At first, a minimum standard is good enough, given the enemy and other key factors of the situation. Once a force, or part of it, meets that standard, it can be raised and continually improved–especially as part of a coherent partnership program.”[49]

Training Iraqi Security Forces logistics personnel was also challenging. A United States Congressional report notes “the literacy rate in Iraq is only 40 percent and it is difficult now to find Iraqi citizens who are qualified to be trained as logisticians.”[50] Also impeding training are limited numbers of manuals in Arabic.[51]

The last American Defense Attaché to South Vietnam noted the RVNAF and ARVN logisticians could plan and manage routine sustainment; however, “Vietnamization had not matured sufficiently to react to roadblocks. . . .Anything that could be done along established lines they could handle. But, when the going got tough and established lines did not cover an obvious solution, they bogged down.”[52]

In the event that no or inadequate training is a contributing issue, the next step is to determine if training exists that may address the issue. The AAR from the chapter 1 vignette acknowledged vehicle maintenance training occurred in the driver’s training and

mechanic's courses; however, the vast majority of soldiers attending Regional Basic Warrior Training and noncommissioned officers attending either 1U or the Team Leader Course received no vehicle maintenance training.

NTM-A awarded a new ANSF maintenance contract in the fall of 2010. This new maintenance contract is known as the Afghanistan Technical Equipment Maintenance Program. It combines the ANA and ANP contract maintenance support that was previously separated into two contracts and expands with the growth of the ANA and ANP. It also includes maintenance training for ANA and ANP mechanics. The contract provides general maintenance support to nine locations for the ANA and twenty-two locations for the ANP as well as provides contact teams. Additionally, it provides advisor mentor teams to each ANA combat service support kandak and integrates CL IX repair parts and fluids with established ANA supply chain management procedures overseen by the ANA Logistics Command.[53]

Another question seeks to determine if training is being delivered effectively and to evaluate how training results are measured and monitored. Determining training effectiveness is difficult to evaluate. Soldiers and policemen receive certificates upon course graduations; however, neither the ANSF nor ISAF have systems to track individual ANSF personnel qualifications. In the case of the Iraqi police, "neither the Department [of Defense] nor the Iraqi Government can tell how many of the 135,000 [Iraqi Police] personnel who have been trained by the Coalition are still serving in the [Iraqi Police Service]."[54]

Another question seeks to evaluate whether a lack of competence and proficiency on existing equipment adversely affects training? Logisticians execute technical tasks

requiring literacy and education. In a country where less than half of the male population over the age of fifteen is literate, recruiting qualified Afghans to be logisticians is a serious challenge.[55]

Another question seeks to determine if personnel effected have access to training. In the case of the ANSF, chapter 1's vignette illustrates that those expected to perform maintenance in Moqur had little or no access to training. ANA leadership at the 1-207th brigade level had consolidated its mechanics and their equipment with the combat service support kankak at Camp Zafar.

Meanwhile, another area evaluates the degree in which senior leaders support and enforce training by examining whether training is adequately funded and staffed. NTM-A internally reorganized itself to better accomplish its mission to train and equip the ANSF. As previously stated, the NTM-A commander is dual-hatted as the CSTC-A commander and can thus use ASFF to fund ANSF training. The United States Congress authorized over 338 million dollars to the ANA and over 417 million dollars to the ANP for training and operations in Fiscal Year 2010 alone.[56] Current training has the prerequisite support of ISAF, IJC, and NTM-A leadership as well as Afghan senior leaders in the MoD, MoI, ANA, and ANP. Current training is also appropriately funded and staffed; however, there are no guarantees that adequate funding and staffing will continue. Additionally, individuals receive certificates when they graduate from training; however, neither the ANSF nor the international community has systems that track individual qualifications. Meanwhile, Iraq's leadership supports training its forces; army and police training centers operate near or at capacity.[57]

In summary, quality institutional training opportunities exist in Afghanistan, as they do in Iraq, to train both the ANA and ANP in sufficient numbers to fill current vacancies in tashkil authorizations as well as account for personnel losses. The capability gap lies in allowing qualified, literate soldiers and police to attend training and employ them as logisticians upon graduation. The international community, led by NTM-A, has adequately resourced training for the ANSF.

Materiel

The previous chapter provided a number of questions to determine how materiel issues create capabilities gaps. Materiel development, determining types and quantities of equipment, acquisition strategies, and operations and support throughout the equipment's projected life cycle, is critical to ensuring organizations have the appropriate equipment to accomplish assigned missions. The type and quantity of materiel may present a significant financial commitment throughout its estimated life cycle. Consequently, leaders typically explore potential non-materiel solutions before committing to a materiel solution.

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the first issue the materiel domain seeks to address is to determine whether the issue was caused, at least in part, by inadequate systems or equipment. In Afghanistan, a combination of international donations and CSTC-A and NTM-A procurement projects equip the ANSF. Many of these projects involve Afghan First, a program that seeks to bolster economic activity through the procurement of goods and services for the ANSF using Afghan companies that employ Afghans. "Throughout all level[s] of the international community, Afghan First is designed to contribute directly to the long-term stability, security, and economic

development of Afghanistan."[58] Lieutenant General Caldwell, then commander of CSTC-A and NTM-A highlighted the benefits of Afghan First, saying that "all of our boots now, all of our uniforms, most of their equipment, all of their personal effects, bedding, linen, t-shirts, pillows, is all now 100 percent produced in factories inside of Afghanistan by Afghan workers."[59]

The international community funds the various Afghan First initiatives using ASFF and other international trust funds to promote industrial growth and economic development. Many Afghan companies rely on Afghan First to remain in business. Kabul's Milli Boot Factory was an Afghan First success story. Milli had the CSTC-A contract to produced boots for the ANA and ANP. Milli's adherence to strict quality control measures earned it international recognition.[60] However, as ISAF transitions security responsibility to GIRoA and the ANSF, GIRoA also gains increasing responsibility for ANSF procurement. While the transition of procurement responsibility is necessary, the decision had resulted in unintended consequences for Afghan companies that rely on Afghan First. GIRoA cancelled Milli's contract to produce boots for the ANSF, preferring to import less-expensive items. Once an Afghan First success story, Milli Boot Factory is now idle.[61]

ANSF tashkils provide equipment authorizations that allow units to conduct a variety of missions. Unfortunately, the growth of new ANA and ANP units created a need for more equipment than was available in the national depots and within the procurement process. This caused newly fielded units to receive percentages of their authorized equipment, degrading its operating capability. As new equipment becomes

available to fill the units to their authorizations, it is prioritized and distributed to the units most in need.

Equipping the ISF initially involved a combination of existing Saddam-era equipment, donations, and procurement.[62] Using this combination of methods allowed new Iraqi units to become operational faster than waiting on acquisition methods, but their operational effectiveness was diminished because they were under-equipped and the Iraqi government could not "reliably provide installation support [and] regular classes of supply (including fuel and ammunition). This initial system also created increased supply and maintenance issues.[63]

In South Vietnam, materiel issues were significant and created major capability gaps that led to ARVN's ultimate collapse. Some materiel issues proved relatively easy to resolve. For example, ARVN and the United States identified a communications gap with the Popular Force, trained militia that provided local security. The Popular Force could neither receive information regarding an impending attack nor notify others. Issuing field radios and training resolved this communications gap.[64] Other materiel issues, however, were more difficult to resolve. Reductions in the Fiscal Year 1975 appropriations to South Vietnam severely impacted funding for repair parts and decreased stockage levels to dangerously low levels. This "created a gigantic bubble in the Vietnamese Air Force supply pipeline" and resulted in significantly diminished operational capability on the eve of the 1975 North Vietnamese Army offensive.[65] As the United States withdrew its forces, it provided ARVN with M48 tanks to counter the T54 tanks used by the North Vietnamese Army; however, these tanks themselves had limited effect without the support of air power.

Another issue the materiel domain seeks to address is to determine what current systems are in the Family-of-Systems where the problem is occurring. The different methods of equipping the ANSF create sustainment issues. ANSF units initially used Former Warsaw Pact weapons. Although the ANA is replacing most of their Former Warsaw Pact weapons with NATO weapons, most ANP units still use Former Warsaw Pact weapons. This complicates weapons maintenance and armorer training as well as complicates supply parts and ammunition procurement and the supply system. As for other equipment systems, the ANSF does not have a serious capability gap. The ANSF uses Ford Rangers for light transport, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles for tactical movement, and International trucks to move supplies. The Afghan Air Force employs Russian helicopters and C-27 cargo aircraft.

As already stated, equipping the ISF involved different methods that created sustainment issues. Solving these issues required procurement of standard replacement systems of weapons, vehicles, and equipment. Therefore, the Iraqi government approved a new acquisition strategy that relied heavily upon foreign military sales.[66]

The issues experienced by the ANSF and ISF in equipping their forces did not occur in South Vietnam. ARVN instead received much of its equipment and repair parts from the United States. Therefore, any ARVN experiences with a Family-of-Systems issue should also occur within the U.S. Armed Forces. The research did not disclose any such issues with Family-of-Systems common to ARVN and the U.S. Armed Forces.

In summary, ANSF tashkils provide sufficient equipment authorizations to conduct their assigned missions. Materiel issues involve importing less expensive equipment and supplies rather than developing domestic industrial capability. Materiel

issues also involve filling units to their full authorization and replace damaged and destroyed equipment.

Leadership

Leadership is vital to implement needed changes identified during a DOTMLPF analysis. Leaders directly and indirectly influence the development of the other DOTMLPF domains. Solving DOTMLPF capability gaps may involve minor changes that are relatively simple to implement, or they may involve major institutional changes that are far more difficult to resource and implement. Large military institutions such as the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN value stability and predictability. Implementing major changes inherently cause instability and unpredictability; therefore, organizations tend to resist major change unless it becomes necessary. When a large organization needs to implement major changes, it looks to its organizational leaders.

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the leadership domain seeks to answer if senior leaders understand the scope of the problem. After nearly a decade of involvement in Afghanistan, the national leaders throughout NATO and non-NATO countries representing the international community recognized the deteriorating security situation required a dramatic change in strategy. GIRoA and ANSF leaders recognized their current force structure was inadequate to the situation and needed to expand. In Iraq, ISF leaders understood the United States would not provide Iraq's security indefinitely and that Iraqi army and police units would assume security responsibilities beginning in 2008. In South Vietnam, RVNAF understood the North Vietnamese Army threat, but erroneously assumed the United States would continue supplying military aid.

Next, does the command have the resources at its disposal to correct the issue? Thanks to its oil fields, the Iraqi government has the potential revenue to finance its army and police. In Afghanistan, national leaders representing the international community approved the plan to reorganize ISAF and commit needed resources to improve a deteriorating security situation and develop ANSF capability. The United States led the international effort by contributing 30,000 additional military personnel and appropriating additional ASFF to man, train, and equip the ANSF. GIRoA, meanwhile, lacks the internal resources to fund the ANSF at the size and capabilities it needs to provide Afghanistan's security and requires continued foreign financial assistance. Likewise, South Vietnam lacked the internal resources to sustain its RVNAF and continued to rely upon the United States after it withdrew its combat forces.

Another question seeks to answer whether the command has properly assessed the level of criticality, threat, urgency, risk, etc. of the operational results of the issue. In Afghanistan and Iraq, leaders correctly assessed the deteriorating security situation was critical required immediate, major changes. Consequently, NATO established NTM-A and IJC as major subordinate military organizations under ISAF and resourced the increased requirements with some of their best people rather than continue operations as usual. Meanwhile, the United States and the Iraqi government understood growing sectarian violence would lead to civil war without a surge of military forces; the Department of Defense deployed additional units and extended active duty unit deployments.

South Vietnam, however, was different from Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States assured South Vietnam that it would continue providing materiel support and

supplies after it withdrew its forces in 1973. The United States also assured South Vietnam it would conduct air strikes against North Vietnamese forces if the North Vietnamese Army violated the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. When the North Vietnamese Army began its Spring Offensive in 1975, South Vietnamese leadership believed the United States would provide air support as it did in 1972 during the Easter Offensive. America's decision to not intervene was a devastating blow to RVNAF morale.

Another question involves senior leadership awareness of the drivers and barriers to resolve the issue within the organization. Although Afghanistan was a de-facto economy of force operation to Iraq, United States Armed Forces serving in Afghanistan nonetheless did the best they could to establish security, defeat resurgent Taliban and other insurgents, and develop ANSF capacity. ISAF leadership understood the operational limitations of its existing force structure and advocated additional combat forces and trainers. ISAF also advocated a major reorganization of its forces and the creation of IJC and NTM-A. GIRoA and ANSF leadership recognized a temporary surge of international forces presented an opportunity to not only grow its forces, but also enhance its operational capabilities through increased partnership. This strategy has many parallels to the successful counterinsurgency strategy conducted in Iraq with a combination of ISF and a surge of United States Armed Forces. Meanwhile in South Vietnam, American advisors and RVNAF leaders were also aware the internal issues facing the RVNAF, but had limited means to resolve its issues internally.

Next, has senior leadership identified external cultural drivers and barriers which hinder issue resolution? In the case of Afghanistan, ISAF leadership had to overcome growing frustration by the international community with the war effort and the perception

that GIRoA was mired in corruption and incompetence to gain approval for additional forces and increased operational capability. Likewise, ANSF leadership needs to prove itself as a professional, capable army and police to gain Afghan confidence. In the case of Iraq, Multinational Forces-Iraq leadership also had to overcome growing American frustration that Iraq was inevitably destined to become another Vietnam when seeking additional forces to stop sectarian violence. Additionally, Iraqi army and police leadership needs to prove to all Iraqis that the ISF is a professional, capable organization worthy of their trust and confidence. In the case of South Vietnam, RVNAF leadership ultimately had to essentially fight alone against a superior enemy because American political leaders and the American public had long since moved on.

In summary, ANSF senior leadership fully appreciates the challenges they face and continuously strive to make the systems work. Despite their efforts and substantial foreign financial aid and reconstruction efforts, Afghanistan remains "one of the world's poorest countries and ranks near the bottom in virtually every development indicator, including life expectancy; literacy; nutrition; and infant, child, and maternal mortality. . . . Furthermore, Afghanistan's prospects for growth are severely limited by weak economic factors, such as low government revenue, high rates of inflation, and limited access to credit for most Afghan citizens."[67] The international community and GIRoA need to foster private sector economic development and improve tax revenue systems.

Personnel

Personnel development involves identifying the skills and knowledge required by an individual to perform specific tasks and positions. Organizations then create specialized occupational skills for each common task group and revise those specialties

over time to best suit the changing requirements. Personnel development, therefore, is a difficult process because it takes time and resources to access, train, and develop people to successfully perform and supervise military tasks.

The ANSF is on pace to reach the targeted personnel goals established by GIRoA and the international community in 2009. According to NATO, the ANA has 194,466 people and the ANP has 149,642 people; by October 2012, the ANA is to have 195,000 and the ANP is to have 157,000. Additionally, the Afghan Air Force has 5,671 people with a goal of 8,000 by 2016.[68] Achieving these goals provides the ANA and the ANP the personnel it needs to fully fill all their tashkil authorizations, including its logistics organizations.

The first area the personnel domain seeks to determine in a DOTMLPF analysis is whether the issue was caused, at least in part, by inability or decreased ability to place qualified and trained personnel in occupational specialties. There are two primary reasons that explain why units lack qualified people: absenteeism and inadequate training. Absenteeism adversely affects the ANSF and ISF and adversely affected ARVN. The current ANSF recruitment process involves an eight-step vetting process that "includes endorsement by local elders, biometric data checking, and medical (including drug) screening. The nation-wide program to screen and re-validate every ANSF member already in service is on track to be completed by spring 2012."[69]

While on pace to meet its overall personnel requirements, the ANSF still lacks sufficient soldiers and policemen specifically educated and trained to sustain the force. The AAR from chapter 1's vignette observed that inadequate numbers of ANA mechanics adversely effected vehicle maintenance due, in large part, to "inconsistent

ANA command emphasis to 'grow' mechanics by providing soldiers for training."[70] Specialty training in low density military occupational skill jobs requires literate students and time. According to NATO, only 14 percent of the ANSF could read at a first grade level in 2009[71]. Having literate policemen is also important for effective law enforcement. NTM-A recognizes the important role literacy plays in developing and sustaining the ANSF and established literacy programs for both the ANA and ANP. These programs have increased the number of soldiers and police who could read and write at the first grade level to 68 percent.[72] Additionally, specialty training can take months to complete. Explosive ordinance disposal and mechanics training, for example, each last six months to complete. Some tactical level leaders are hesitant to send their soldiers and policemen to attend these long courses.

In Iraq and South Vietnam, the ISF and AVRN relied heavily on the United States to support it because their logistics organizations lacked people and equipment. As the ISF recruited more people, it was able to fill personnel vacancies within these organizations. ISF logistics organizations became more capable and began assuming support responsibilities previously performed by the United States. Likewise, ARVN either recruited or conscripted personnel to fill required logistics vacancies, but lacked the parts and supplies to sustain the force.

Another question analyzes whether different occupational specialties are required if the organization receives new materiel. The fielding of new equipment to the ANSF has not led to a need to change occupational specialties. Instead, new equipment results in new maintenance training requirements. This also occurred with the ISF and ARVN.

In summary, the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN manning documents all authorize an appropriate number of logistics personnel to sustain its forces. Logistics personnel are needed to transport, store, and issue supplies and maintain equipment. They need to be literate and they need specialty training. ANSF leadership, with the full support of NTM-A and IJC, are working to develop these supply and support capabilities as ISF and ARVN did.

Facilities

As with the other domains already studied, chapter 3 provided several questions that seek to determine if facilities or the lack thereof, create capability gaps that adversely affect an organization's ability to sustain itself. Sustaining any force requires adequate facilities from which to operate. Depots require secure, weatherized facilities to protect, receive, store, and issue supplies and equipment while maintenance units require weatherized facilities to service equipment. Personnel require adequate lodging to eat, sleep, and work. Leaders and staffs require offices. Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the first issue the facilities domain seeks address is determining whether the logistics capability gap is caused by inadequate infrastructure.

Within the DOTMLPF analysis, the first issue the facilities domain seeks address is determining whether the logistics capability gap is caused by inadequate infrastructure. Another issues is to assess whether the issue was the result of aging facilities, new engineering that did not meet needs, battle damage or vulnerable to threats. Following proper environmental controls may be an issue; was the issue caused by lack of proper environmental controls? Finally, was the issue caused, at least in part, by inadequate

roads, main supply routes, force bed-down, facilities operation and maintenance, hardening, or field fortification support.

Over a generation of conflict in Afghanistan destroyed all functional military and police facilities. The international community had to refurbish existing buildings and construct new facilities for ANSF use. The following vignette illustrates some of the challenges facing the international community as it constructs permanent ANSF facilities.

The United States Army Corps of Engineers, working under the direction of CSTC-A and NTM-A, was supervising the construction a permanent base for an ANA kandak in Qual-e-Now, the provincial capital and economic center of Baghdis province. This base would accommodate over 600 soldiers of the 6-1-207th ANA kandak, a new unit scheduled to be fielded in early fall 2010. This kandak would provide security along the Ring Road from Herat province to Qual-e-Now in the south and northward along two routes, one leading towards Sangatesh along the Turkmenistan border and the other to Moqur.

Traveling to Qual-e-Now by ground is difficult. Although the Ring Road runs through Qual-e-Now, the road is currently little more than a compacted single-lane dirt trail beyond the city limits. Accessing Qual-e-Now by ground from the north is dangerous due to the lack of security; accessing it by ground from the south requires a difficult drive through Sabzak pass with several hundred-foot cliffs. Figure 7 shows the difficult terrain along the route to Qual-e-Now.

Figure 6. Traveling Along the Ring Road Between Qual-e-Now and Sabsak pass

Source: LCDR William T. Cook, RSC-West Senior Engineer, 2 May 2010.

The company hired to construct the base had to contend with these roads to get heavy construction equipment, materials, and workers to the job site. The engineers had to also contend with building facilities to accommodate a kandak-sized unit within an area that could accommodate a unit half that size. The engineers had to construct the buildings close together in order to provide space for the unit's vehicles.

The United States Army Corps of Engineers had the same difficulties getting to Qual-e-Now as the contractors did. Contract oversight, therefore, was intermittent throughout much of the construction. During a battlefield circulation to the construction site in April 2010, it was apparent the contractor would not finish the facilities by the required date and occupation by the 6-1-207th was in jeopardy.

Fearing the facilities would not be ready in time, IJC and NTM-A developed contingency plans to station the 6-1-207th at different locations while the contractor finished. IJC and NTM-A also prioritized the facilities at Qual-e-Now the contractor would finish first. Meanwhile, the logistics cell of RSC-W, in coordination with the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the Spanish Operational Mentor Liaison Team assigned to 6-1-207th, and Afghan leadership in 1-207th, contracted the delivery and installation of bed frames, mattresses, bedding, wall lockers, office furniture, and kitchenware necessary to furnish the facilities for 600 Afghans. As construction on the facilities power generation plant reached completion, the 3rd FSD coordinated routine fuel deliveries. As construction of the dining facility reached completion, the 3rd FSD also coordinated food deliveries based on the ANA population at Qual-e-Now.

As mentioned in chapter 1, NTM-A's engineering directorate oversees construction of permanent facilities for the ANSF using either the United States Army Corps of Engineers or Air Force Civil Engineers. The above vignette illustrates some of the major issues involving facilities construction in Afghanistan. The austere environment, coupled with a lack of educated and trained civil engineers and construction companies, makes facilities construction extremely challenging.

In Iraq, much of the military and police infrastructure was either severely damaged or destroyed during initial combat operations in 2003 or immediately afterwards. Therefore, reconstituting the ISF required significant refurbishment and new construction. The Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment and United States Army Corps of Engineers served as contract managers, overseeing refurbishment and new construction to support the ISF, obligating more than 3.5 billion dollars and

committing another 325 million dollars between 2004 and 2007. These construction projects were not without controversy; the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction noted that "in many instances, Iraqi recipients of projects have not properly carried out sustainment" and that "failure to perform proper operations and maintenance on transitioned facilities places the value of U.S. investment at risk, and could significantly shorten the useful life of the projects."[73]

In South Vietnam, ARVN had the necessary facilities to sustain itself. AVRN had adequate garrisons to operate, train, and perform maintenance on equipment. Logistics organizations had the depots to receive, store, and issue items. After the United States withdrew its combat forces, stockage levels within those depots decreased. By 1975, ARVN simply had too few resources to fund training and perform services on its equipment.

The facilities capability gap that contributed to ARVN's operational failure was location. The physical location of various ARVN facilities had two important impacts. First, ARVN soldiers and leaders who had family members living in the path of the North Vietnamese Army were understandably worried when the North Vietnamese attacked in force in 1975. "As the [North Vietnamese Army] invasion progressed and as avenues of escape were progressively interdicted, the attention of all levels within the RVNAF were drawn to the plight of their families. . . . The end result in every case was the pulling out of the line of all ranks to assist their families as the situation became critical. This resulted in added panic in a situation where panic was already the watchword."[74] Second, as ARVN evacuated as many of its people as possible to avoid capture by the North Vietnamese Army, evacuating equipment and supplies never progressed beyond the

planning stage. Evacuating supplies and equipment was impossible and had to be destroyed; however, the enemy captured abandoned ARVN military supplies and equipment. “In almost every case, the proper plans had been made; and the materiel was prepared for destruction. . . . What with the other problems besetting these senior officers as the time to destroy equipment became apparent, it is no wonder that they failed to give the order.”[75] Thus, ARVN facilities created a capabilities gap in which their locations relative to ARVN families and the North Vietnamese Army advances created a panic that hastened the deterioration of ARVN and allowed the capture of its equipment.

In summary, over a generation of conflict not only destroyed Afghanistan’s army and police facilities, it also destroyed the colleges where Afghans learned construction and engineering. This created a capability gap where local construction companies lack Afghan-trained engineers to design and supervise complicated construction projects. Military engineer officers and professional engineers from organizations like the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment partially filled this gap by developing engineering requirements and awarding contracts to construct permanent ANSF facilities.

The ANSF require permanent facilities that provide the necessary infrastructure to conduct warehouse and maintenance operations to sustain the force. ANSF facilities also require trained engineers who are resourced to perform routine operations and maintenance. As the international community continues to assist the ANSF in designing permanent facilities, attention must be given to ensure they are sustainable. ANSF engineers and support organizations need to have the prerequisite expertise and resources to adequately maintain the facilities throughout their projected life span. Likewise,

facility operations and maintenance cannot become an unsustainable expense to either the ANSF or GIRoA.

Conclusions

The DOTMLPF domains allow for a comprehensive study of security forces to determine whether capability gaps exist. Applying this framework to the development and evolution of ISAF and its major subordinate units, NTM-A and IJC, proves the international community has addressed its capability gaps and is better organized and equipped to synchronize its resources towards developing the ANSF.

Analyzing the ANSF using the DOTMLPF domains shows the ANSF is generally progressing towards being able to sustain itself. The United States led the international effort to train and equip the ANSF, spending approximately 18 billion dollars between 2002 and early 2009.[76] The ANA and ANP have adequate logistics doctrine, but issues of implementation and adherence remain. The ANSF has appropriate organizational capacity authorized, but needs to field its remaining logistics organizations. With the assistance of NTM-A, the ANSF has numerous individual and collective training opportunities, but leaders must be willing send qualified personnel to the various courses. Similar to organizational authorizations, materiel authorizations are adequate to support the ANSF; units must be filled to their authorizations and leaders must become responsible for the accountability and serviceability of their equipment. ANSF leadership needs to prove itself as a professional, capable army and police to gain Afghan confidence. Additionally, the tashkil authorizes the appropriate numbers of transportation, supply, and maintenance personnel; trained logistics personnel are needed to transport, store, and issue supplies and maintain equipment. Finally, permanent

facilities provide the necessary infrastructure to conduct warehouse and maintenance operations, but garrisons require trained engineers who are resourced to perform routine operations and maintenance.

The development of ANSF sustainment capability continues to grow and evolve. While many challenges remain, the international community has provided the ways and means for the ANSF to establish the solid doctrinal and organizational foundations necessary to further develop itself as a sustainable institution. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of ANSF development, it must be compared with the development of other security forces. Iraq's ISF is a contemporary example that experienced many similar challenges to the ANSF.

Analyzing the ISF using the DOTMLPF domains shows ISF has most of the capabilities needed to sustain itself. The Iraqi army and police also have adequate logistics doctrine and face the same challenges with implementation and adherence as the ANSF. The ISF has appropriate organizational capacity authorized, but its most of its logistics units were among the final organizations created and are still developing. The ISF has numerous individual and collective training opportunities available to its soldiers and police; leaders need to ensure qualified personnel attend these courses and properly utilize their new skills upon their return. The ISF must finish filling its units to their authorized equipment allocations, which are appropriate to conduct military operations; leaders must also be responsible for the accountability and serviceability of their equipment. Army and police leadership needs to prove to all Iraqis that the ISF is a professional, capable organization worthy of their trust and confidence. ISF organizations have appropriate authorizations of logistics personnel; again, leaders must ensure these

positions are filled with qualified personnel. The international community, led by the United States, refurbished existing facilities and constructed new ones for the ISF from which to operate; time will tell whether garrison units will maintain them.

ISF development has many similarities to ANSF development. The total rebuilding of these institutions following international military intervention and significant international community involvement were key similarities between the ISF and ANSF. Additionally, both grew and developed during insurgencies. Despite these similarities, however, Iraq has significantly greater resources to continue manning, equipping, and training its ISF. GIRoA does not have the resources to sustain the ANSF at the necessary size and capabilities required and needs ongoing assistance from the international community through 2014 and beyond.

Meanwhile, analyzing the ARVN using the DOTMLPF domains provides another case study comparison to the ANSF. This analysis shows the ARVN had most of the capabilities required to sustain itself. ARVN had an adequate logistics doctrine, but also experienced problems with adherence. Ultimately, its logistics doctrine was ineffective in sustaining individual unit combat capability; ARVN collapsed partially because of supply shortages and inadequate transportation assets. ARVN had the organizational structure to sustain itself; however, decreasing parts stockages crippled operational readiness and created a quagmire that few ARNV logisticians could resolve. The United States, like France before it, heavily supplemented RVNAF logistics. United States advisors successfully trained ARVN's combat arms units and were especially successful at the brigade and battalion levels. Few ARVN leaders accepted responsibility for their unit's sustainment, instead expecting external support that, in the end, never came.

Additionally, all the logistics personnel authorizations and all the filled positions meant little if there were not enough supplies to sustain ARVN forces. Finally, the physical location of various ARVN facilities impacted personnel who were concerned for the safety of their families who were in the path of the North Vietnamese Army as well as the ability to evacuate equipment and destroy supplies to avoid enemy capture. While ARVN had most of the capabilities needed to sustain it, it lacked critical materiel capabilities in the form of spare parts and supplies. ARVN also lacked a critical leadership capability in recognizing the dire situation it faced in early 1975 and the need to carefully manage its limited supplies in an attempt to by time for national leaders to secure emergency international intervention.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions of this study and provide recommendations for further research. Since driving the Taliban from power in late 2001, the international community's focus on rebuilding Afghanistan so it can never again become a terrorist sanctuary has been inconsistent. Neither the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nor the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) had the means to secure the entire country from a resurgent Taliban and other insurgent organizations. Finally in late 2009, approximately eight years after removing the Taliban from power, the international community committed the necessary resources and reorganized its military forces, synchronizing its efforts to develop Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) capacity.

Answering the primary research question required a detailed examination of the complex sustainment challenges facing the ANSF. The decision to create infantry-centric units to combat the growing insurgency was a combined decision made by GIRoA and the international community to combat a strengthening insurgency throughout the country. However, this decision further stressed an immature sustainment system designed to support a smaller force structure. This decision raised key secondary research questions involving capability gaps within the ANSF.

Applying the U.S. Department of Defense's Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework identified critical ANSF sustainment capabilities gaps. Studying the logistical development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) identified some

possible alternative solutions to supplement existing systems. However, these alternative solutions cannot replace the development of host nation security forces sustainment capabilities.

Additionally, high illiteracy rates negatively impact sustainment. It is impossible to expect soldiers or policemen to conduct vehicle maintenance if the operator and direct supervisor cannot read. Having literate soldiers and police is essential for developing a professional security force and is critical in conducting logistics operations. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) literacy programs seek to improve ANSF literacy rates. Literacy training, supported with command emphasis from ISAF and ISAF Joint Command, has improved ANSF literacy rates.

Initiatives such as Afghan First also impact ANSF sustainment. Afghan First is an international effort to develop Afghan industrial capacity to produce items required by the ANSF. Such efforts promote economic growth, strengthen government institutions, and are essential for ANSF long-term sustainability. However, the survival of Afghan First programs becomes less certain as GIRoA assumes responsibility for procuring equipment and services for the ANSF.

Finally, infrastructure affects sustainment. The international community has spent billions on renovating existing facilities and constructing new ones for the ANSF. These facilities will allow the ANSF to live, train, and work. However, GIRoA currently lacks the resources to maintain these facilities.

Chapter 1 opened with the President of the United States committing additional troops and resources in response to the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan while also developing Afghan capacity to assume security responsibilities. The discovery

of Afghan National Army (ANA) non-mission capable vehicles in Moqur in the opening vignette is a microcosm of the challenges facing the ANSF as it assumes security responsibilities from ISAF. The first section of the literature review described the policies and doctrinal publications that explain how the U.S. Armed Forces develops host nation security forces. Meanwhile, the second section of the literature review proved that developing capacity for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN required significant external support. Chapter 3 presented the research methodology and chapter 4 applied the DOTMLPF framework to identify any capability gaps that adversely impact the development of sustainable security forces.

The development of the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN all occurred over a period of several years while engaged in armed conflict, consumed significant resources and treasure from other nations, and involved thousands of people representing numerous stakeholders. Although distinct, there are numerous similarities in the development of the ISF and ANSF. The following paragraphs briefly summarize these three significant similarities.

The first similarity involves when the international community focused on host nation security development in South Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The initial United States military involvement in South Vietnam was to train ARVN. As the security situation deteriorated and the United States deployed more forces to fight the communist threat, the relative importance of training ARVN diminished. Focus returned as part of the broader Vietnamization effort. In Iraq, most of the discussion regarding ISF development occurred in during the American troop surge in 2007 and 2008. As the surge ended in July 2008, the United States military mission increasingly focused on ISF

development. Although an evolution of United States-led organizations focused on ANSF development since 2002, the primary missions of United States and coalition forces were to provide security and conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. The formation of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in November 2009 occurred in conjunction with a surge in American forces. As in the case of ARVN and ISF, ANSF development is increasingly the focus of international attention as ISAF transitions operational control to the ANSF. Developing host nation security forces should be an ongoing effort throughout Security Force Assistance operations and, as in the case of Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Vietnam, synchronized within a broader counterinsurgency campaign.

The next similarity among South Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan involves international materiel and financial support. The United States provided ARVN, ISF, and ANSF with substantial materiel and financial support. In the case of South Vietnam and Afghanistan, neither host nation government had the necessary resources to man, equip, and train its security forces without foreign support. The Iraqi government also needed foreign support. In each case, countries donated equipment and provided financial aid to hasten ARVN, ISF, and ANSF development.

The third significant similarity involves the use of mentors and advisors. The United States provided significant assistance in the form of advisors and mentors to ARVN, ISF, and ANSF at all levels. Advisors used their own Armed Forces as a guide in developing DOTMLPF capabilities solutions for ARVN, ISF, and ANSF.

Conclusions

Developing sustainable host nation security forces is a complex problem rather than a complicated one. Complicated problems are difficult to solve because they involve accomplishing a number of challenging tasks. Solving complicated problems require trained and experienced leaders who manage organizations through thorough planning and deliberate, systematic implementation. Complicated problems typically have a limited number of possible solutions.

Complex problems are also difficult to solve. Complex problems involve the complicated interaction of a multitude of organizations conducting interdependent activities over a period of time. This complex web of actors and variables is continuously active and cannot be solved in the same manner as complicated problems. The number of possible solutions to complex problems may be much greater than the number of solutions to complicated problems. Accurately predicting success of failure of is difficult because of the continuous evolution of forces involved.

Applying appropriate frameworks organizes complex problems in ways that are easier to study. This study employed a qualitative analysis using a case study methodology of primary and secondary sources involving the development of the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN to answer the primary research question. In this study, applying the U.S. Department of Defense's DOTMLPF framework is appropriate because it explains the important role the United States plays in the development of host nation security forces capabilities. The United States plays a vital role in developing the ANSF, similar to the essential role it played in developing the ISF and ARVN. The DOTMLPF framework

allows for an organized and comprehensive examination of events to determine whether capability gaps that may impair the development of a sustainable ANSF exist.

The United States and the international community played vital roles in developing doctrine for the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN. In each case, host nation doctrine established key policies and procedures to supply and maintain operational capability. ANSF logistics doctrine addresses the supply, distribution, fuel, and food requirements for the ANSF. MoD logistics decrees, the ANA's doctrine, is comprehensive and establishes the policies and procedures to sustain Afghan army units at all echelons in garrison, at expeditionary combat outposts, and during military operations. Likewise, MoI logistics decrees, the ANP's doctrine, establishes the policies and procedures to sustain the Afghan Uniform Police operating at the district, provincial, regional, and national level, the Afghan Border Police along the external borders, and the Afghan National Civil Order of Police operating throughout the nation. The only doctrine capability gap identified, which was common issue to all, was consistent implementing and adhering to established logistics doctrine. The ISF and ARVN faced similar issues in implementing and following their logistics doctrine.

The United States and international community were instrumental in developing ANSF, ISF, and ARVN organizations through its advisors to each country's ministries. ARVN had the organizational capacity to sustain itself. Likewise, ISF has the organizational capability to sustain itself. The approved tashkils give the ANSF the authorizations it will need to sustain itself; the international community must assist in fielding the remaining logistical units that will allow the ANSF to store equipment and supplies, distribute materiel, and maintain it.

The United States played an important role in training the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN. Advisors were America's face in training ARVN to assume security responsibilities. The training efforts were mixed as tactical level ARVN units typically fought well while higher level organizations typically performed poorly. Advisors, military transition teams, and advise and assist brigades all trained the ISF to assume security responsibilities and adhere to published policies. In Afghanistan, NTM-A developed institutional training requirements similar to the United States Army's Training and Doctrine Command while ISAF Joint Command partners with operational ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP) units. In this context, the international community has two major tasks. First, it must continue to mentor ANSF leadership on the importance of training low density logistics specialties to sustain the ANSF. Secondly, it needs to mentor ANSF leadership on the importance of maintaining accountability and serviceability of its equipment and to utilize existing processes to requisition shortages.

The international community in general and the United States in particular, provided significant amounts of materiel to the ANSF, ISF, and ARVN. In each case, the host nation security forces would have never become capable without military equipment and supplies. From an equipment perspective, ARVN was the largest military force in the region and one of the largest armies in the world when the United States withdrew the majority of its forces in 1973. Likewise, ISF received significant amounts of United States materiel via foreign military sales when the United States withdrew its forces in 2011. The ANSF also receives materiel from a combination of foreign military sales and donations. The ANSF must endeavor to fully fill tashkil equipment authorizations.

Additionally, it must enforce existing policies to establish a culture of accountability and responsibility.

The international community influences leadership development through culturally-aware senior level advisors who provide a continuous mentorship presence. Leadership development also occurs at the tactical and operational levels. Regardless the level where leadership development occurs, advisors can coach, teach, and mentor host nation security force leaders to understand their organization's drivers and obstacles and develop plans to improve organizational performance. Military and civilian government officials advised and mentored ARVN and South Vietnam ministry officials. Less affected by South Vietnam's corrupt political culture, American military advisors at the tactical and operational levels were generally more successful in ARVN leader development than their counterparts at the national level. At the national level in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States used a combination of senior military officers, civilian government officials, and contractors to advise and mentor ministerial level officials and ISF and ANSF leadership. The only capability gap identified is the need for NTM-A and IJC advisors to provide consistent mentorship focus towards developing ANSF support units and ensuring logistics personnel attend required training.

Developing effective security forces requires qualified personnel specifically trained and socialized into the military or police culture. The international community performs an important role in advising host nation personnel on unique skills required to sustain security forces. Host nation security force leaders, however, face the challenge of meeting present missions while developing personnel qualified to fill future technical positions; frequently, this becomes an impossible challenge that forces the leader to

assume risk either now or later. Faced with this dilemma, many, if not most, will risk future success to have people for today's mission. The ANSF, like the ISF and ARVN, prioritized filling combat military specialties over filling support military specialties. Support specialties in general, and logistics specialties in particular, require literate personnel and technical training. NTM-A and IJC leadership must continue their support of literacy programs to educate all soldiers and policemen to a third grade level. NTM-A and IJC must also continue their efforts in advising the ANSF to fill key logistics vacancies through recruitment and various incentives.

The international community plays a critical role in constructing ANSF facilities. Over a generation of persistent conflict destroyed college level education within Afghanistan, creating a capability gap where local construction companies lack Afghan-trained engineers to design and supervise complicated construction projects. Military engineer officers and professional engineers from organizations like the U.S. Corps of Engineers and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment partially filled this capability gap by developing engineering requirements and awarding contracts to construct permanent ANSF facilities. These organizations played a similar role in Iraq constructing new facilities and refurbishing old facilities for the ISF. As the international community continues to assist the ANSF in designing permanent facilities, attention must be given to ensure they are sustainable. ANSF engineers and support organizations need to have the prerequisite expertise and resources to adequately maintain the facilities throughout their projected life span. Likewise, facility operations and maintenance cannot become an unsustainable expense to either the ANSF or GIRoA.

Recommendations

As the international community transitions security responsibility to the Afghan government and the ANSF by 2014, developing the ANSF and its capacity to sustain itself is and must remain paramount regardless individual nation deployment timelines. After much effort and sacrifice, the international community synchronized its efforts and restructured its forces to combat a growing insurgency and to better partner with the ANSF. The international community also synchronized its efforts to ensure ANA and ANP institutional training centers provide quality training to the rapidly growing ANSF.

Despite this synchronization, a sustainable ANSF remains in doubt. The previous section contained the most significant issue or two facing the ANSF in each DOTMLPF domain. As the ANSF continues to grow to its authorized end strength and field tashkil-authorized equipment to existing units, it requires enduring external assistance. In order to provide internal and external security for Afghanistan, the ANSF must be large and robust. Unfortunately, sustaining the size and desired capabilities of the ANSF exceeds GIRoA's resources. The international community will need to provide financial and materiel support long after the 2014 security transition. Providing continued financial support, however, is becoming increasingly difficult as the international community face competing priorities and addresses the ongoing global financial crisis. The international community must maintain focus on its ongoing efforts and provide essential resources the Afghan government cannot.

GIRoA simply cannot afford the ANSF at the size and capabilities needed to provide security. The government does not generate enough tax revenue to fully fund the ANSF and requires external financial aid. Specifically, GIRoA cannot afford the cost to

power ANSF training centers and facilities. Further research is required to determine whether efficiency opportunities exist that may lessen the overall financial burden necessary for ANSF sustainment. Additional research is required to determine the most appropriate construction methods to use for future ANSF facilities. Likewise, additional research and experimentation is required to determine the feasibility of using alternative energy sources like solar and wind to lessen fuel costs. Using less expensive construction methods and utilizing alternative energy promise to lower financial requirements to sustain the ANSF, but does not solve problem. The ultimate solution lies in a whole of government approach where GIRoA establishes a mature tax revenue system.

The international community has acknowledged a need to assist the ANSF beyond the 2014 security transition. On 2 May 2012, President Obama signed a security agreement with Afghan President Karzai that allows the United States to remain in Afghanistan through 2024 to continue training the ANSF and coordinating with GIRoA to conduct counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda. Upcoming conferences in 2012 and 2013 will likely establish the international community's ongoing commitment in supporting and enabling roles to GIRoA and the ANSF.

Further research in organizational design is also required. DOTMLPF provides a comprehensive framework to identify capability gaps and determine additional requirements, but does not provide direction on how to optimize the effectiveness of a growing organization such as the ANSF. This study found a deliberate decision was made to prioritize the creation of new combat units over new support units. Without improving support units and systems, new and existing combat forces received less support. The organizational development of ISF and ARVN were similar in that combat units formed

before support units. Organizational development research is needed to balance the need to increase operational capability with the ability to support and sustain growth.

The international community recognized the need to actively support the growth and training of the ANSF following the fall of the Taliban regime. After nearly a decade of inconsistent focus, the international community has finally synchronized its efforts to develop a sustainable ANSF. Regardless, international cooperation between now and 2014 when the ANSF assumes full security responsibilities, the ultimate success or failure of the ANSF lies in the degree to which Afghan political, military, and police leaders cooperate with each other. To paraphrase the Afghan parable from chapter 1, the trumpeter, Afghan leadership, is ultimately responsible to act and blow air through the instrument.

GLOSSARY

Afghan National Army. The army component of the ANSF consisting of conventional forces, special operations forces, Afghan Air Force, institutional training centers, and support units.

Afghan National Police. The police component of the ANSF consisting of Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, Afghan Border Police, Afghan Anti-Corruption Police, institutional training centers, and support units.

Afghan National Security Forces. A collective term for GIRoA's army, police, and air forces.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam. South Vietnam's military force that existed from the country's independence from France in 1955 to the fall of Siagon in 1975.

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. A multinational, United States-led military organization responsible for ANSF training and development until the November 2009 activation of NTM-A. Its leadership is dual-hatted within NTM-A. It continues to exist as its commander is the only person authorized by Congress to spend Afghan Security Forces Funds.

Coy. An ANSF company-sized organization commanded by a captain and contains subordinate platoons. A United States Army company containing 80 to 200 soldiers is the organizational equivalent to a coy.

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities. A United States Department of Defense doctrinal framework to identify and study capability gaps.

Forward Supply Depot. A multi-class, national level ANA supply organization located in each region responsible for supporting operational forces and institutional training centers.

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The democratically elected government of Afghanistan following the adoption of the 2004 constitution.

International Stability Assistance Force. A multinational, NATO-led military organization established in December 2001 and responsible for assisting GIRoA establish security, support reconstruction and development, and foster good governance.

ISAF Joint Command. A multinational, subordinate military organization to ISAF established during the fall of 2009 with responsibilities to conduct stability operations throughout Afghanistan and partner with ANSF units at the corps level and below.

Iraqi Security Forces. A collective term for the Federal Government of Iraq's Army, Air Force, Navy, and Police.

Kandak. An ANSF battalion-sized organization commanded by a lieutenant colonel and contains subordinate coys and specialty platoons. A United States Army battalion containing 300 to 800 soldiers is the organizational equivalent to a kandak.

Ministry of Interior. GIRoA ministerial-level organization responsible for managing law enforcement in Afghanistan.

Ministry of Defense. GIRoA's organizational equivalent to the United States Department of Defense; responsible to the Afghan President for managing the ANA.

NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. A multinational, subordinate military organization to ISAF activated in November 2009 to train and develop the ANSF.

Operational Mentor Liaison Team. Squad-sized elements of military international trainers and advisers subordinate to IJC Regional Commands that mentor ANA leaders and staff officers at the kandak, brigade, and corps levels. United States' military transition teams and embedded training teams are the organizational equivalents to Operational Mentor Liaison Teams.

Police Operational Mentor Liaison Team. Squad-sized elements of international military and police trainers and advisers subordinate to IJC Regional Commands that mentor ANP leaders and staff officers at the brigade, provincial, regional, and zone levels. United States' military transition teams and embedded training teams are the organizational equivalents to Police Operational Mentor Liaison Teams.

Regional Logistics Center. A multi-class, national level ANP supply organization located in each region responsible for supporting operational forces and institutional training centers.

Regional Support Command-West. A subordinate military organization to NTM-A and one of six brigade-sized military headquarters located throughout Afghanistan responsible for providing command and control and synchronizing NTM-A efforts in Regional Command-West.

APPENDIX A

NTM-A After Action Review Slide Brief

The author, with assistance from Colonel Bradley Booth, then commander of RSC-W, developed and submitted the following slides to NTM-A leadership in order to brief General Petraeus on correcting the maintenance issues discovered at Moqur.

NTM-A / CSTC-A

CONTEXT

- **2 AUG:** The issue of NMC ANA vehicles was identified during General Petraeus BFC to Moqur Valley (Baghdis) ANA COP

- **04 Aug:** NTM-A Command "Taskers" to RSC West
  - RSC West directed to assist ANA to "fix" vehicles at ANA Moqur Valley COP
  - RSC West directed to provide AAR comments upon completion of Maintenance Mission to NTM-A CMD GRP

- **12 - 24 AUG:** RSC West "surged" contracted maintenance assets. 3x RM Asia contractors flown to Moqur Valley ANA COP
  - Conducted technical inspections and serviced all ANA vehicles
  - Repaired all 18 NMC vehicles in 12 days
  - RW Air provided Class IX on site (173 parts - filters, batteries, shocks, brake pads, glass/mirrors, tires, and various fluids and grease) to Contracted Maintenance TM

- **26 August – 10 Sept:** RSC West conducts internal Maintenance AAR

NTM-A / CSTC-A

BOTTOM LINE

➢ 207th Corps currently lacks organic maintenance capacity (Trained/Manned/Equipped) to maintain **"acceptable"** Operational Readiness Rates

➢ 207th Corps remains fully dependent on contracted maintenance support (RM Asia and HEB)

"TAKE AWAYs"

1. **MOD Standards for Maintenance Exist:** MoD decree 4.9 - Maintenance Policy and Procedure (Units not adhering to standard)
2. **Command Emphasis:** Required within 207th Corps (all echelons) to implement adherence to STANDARDS by the chain of command (Would have resolved 80% of reported faults)
3. **Tashkil:**
   - No recommended changes to authorizations for Maintenance Manning and Equipping
   - Increase priority "fill" for Manning / Equipping
4. **Correct Systemic Issues – Training, Manning, Equipping:**
   - **OPN FORCE:** ANA additional Command Focus on training, manning, equipping maintenance OPNs from Operator, Supervisor, Organizational and Direct Support Level.
   - **INSTITUTIONAL FORCE:** Consider integrating additional Vehicle Maintenance Instruction into ANA/ANP POIs.

TRAINING

- **Observation:** Operators and first line supervisors lack training to conduct vehicle maintenance
- **Analysis:**
  - Inconsistent ANA command emphasis throughout CoC to conduct "quality" PMCS
  - Current POIs lack adequate vehicle maintenance training
- **Recommendations:**
  - ANA: Consistent Command Emphasis on Daily Preventive Maintenance, Checks, and Services
  - CTAG-A/ANATAC: Evaluate adding vehicle maintenance training into POIs for RBWT, 1U, and TLC
  - NTM-A/MoD: Validate importance of trained mechanics through incentive/specialty pays and ADSOs
  - IJC: Utilize maintenance SMEs to provide additional mentorship to Corps and Bde Maintenance Officers
  - OMLT/MPRI/Partnered Unit Key Leaders: Immediate engagement with 207th Corps leadership on command maintenance
  - Unit (kandak) Level: Train operator responsibilities for daily PMCS; periodically check to see if leaders are conducting spot checks

MANNING

- **Observation:** Low fill of ANA mechanics directly impacts transition efforts; RM Asia (vehicles) & HEB (weapons) currently provides all maintenance support to 207th Corps
- **Analysis:**
  - Inconsistent ANA command emphasis to "grow" mechanics by providing soldiers for training
  - Current SY1389 tashkil authorizations are "right," but poor O/H numbers adversely impact capability
- **Recommendations:**
  - "Way Ahead:" prioritize increased "fill" of tashkil manning authorizations
  - MoD: Increase quality recruitment for vehicle mechanics (literacy/aptitude)
  - MoD: Authorize maintenance skill identifier badge for wear on uniform
  - NTM-A/MoD: Validate importance of trained mechanics through incentive/specialty pays and ADSOs
  - OMLT/MPRI/Partnered Unit Key Leaders: Immediate engagement with 207th Corps leadership to fill existing maintenance courses
  - Unit (brigade & kandak) Level: Provide students and allow them to train. training classes (size/frequency).

EQUIPPING

- **Observation:** Lack of equipment and non-existent ASL in CSSKs and FSDs directly impacts transition efforts: RM Asia & HEB currently provides all class IX to 207th Corps
- **Analysis:**
  - Excellent facilities at garrisons to perform vehicle and weapon maintenance
  - Current SY1389 tashkil authorizations are "right," but poor O/H numbers adversely impact capability
  - 207th laterally transferred equipment within the Corps
  - Accountability / Visibility: no national systems to track intra-Corps lateral transfers
- **Recommendations:**
  - "Way Ahead": prioritize 100% fill of tashkil equipment authorizations, especially for IN kandaks
  - NTM-A/MoD: Resource and fill 100% equipment authorizations
  - OMLT/MPRI/Partnered Unit Key Leaders: Immediate engagement with 207th Corps leadership on consistent command emphasis on equipment accountability and serviceability
  - Corps G4: Direct lateral transfer of equipment to priority kandaks

NTM-A / CSTC-A

BACKUP SLIDES

Way Ahead

- New 207th Corps CDR: Initial Guidance emphasizes Vehicle Operations:
  - Only tashkil Drivers and personnel with special requirements will be authorized to use military vehicles for official business
  - Speed limit on base is 10-20 KPH, no exceptions
  - **30% of ANA casualties are from military vehicle accidents**
  - Each vehicle will be given a weekly fuel allocation and drivers are required to maintain a movement log for their vehicle

MG Shahzada, 7SEP

Vehicle Safety and Accountability

- Engaging with 207th Corps LDSHP on importance of vehicle maintenance OPNs

- Addressing "Systemic" Issues ICW CJ4/CTAG-A

8

NTM-A / CSTC-A

NTM-A Contracted Vehicle Maintenance to 207th ANA Corps

1/207 RM Asia Facility: Camp Zafar

2/207 RM Asia Facility: Camp Sayar

NTM-A / CSTC-A

28 June 2010: HEB International Logistics, RSC-W, and 207th Corps worked together to improve weapons maintenance and classroom facilities to conduct armorer and weapons maintenance training (NATO and FWP) at Camp Zafar. The facility ribbon cutting ceremony and class graduation was attended by the deputy 207th Corps G4, 1/207 G4, MPRI logisitics mentors, and HEB regional officials.

Pictures (clockwise): HEB supervisor delivers opening remarks, MAJ Smith (RSC-W Senior Logistician) thanks the collaborative effort to improve weapons maintenance, Mr. O'Neal (NTM-A HEB COR) presents a certificate, ANA graduates with HEB trainers, 207th logisticians listen to remarks, senior ranking NCO student demonstrates M240B disassembly, reassembly, and functions check.

APPENDIX B

NTM-A COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE PROMOTING STEWARDSHIP

Lieutenant General Caldwell IV, then commander of NTM-A, distributed the following memorandum to emphasize the importance of stewardship in developing the ANSF.

NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CG September 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR Staff, Trainers, Instructors of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan/ Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan

SUBJECT: Stewardship: Essential for an Enduring ANSF

1. The words advisor, mentor, and partner are used frequently to describe our missions here in Afghanistan: advisor to the Chief of General Staff, mentor to a nascent boot manufacturer, partner to an ANCOP *kandak*. While we each have a different focus on how we support the mission to develop the Afghan National Security Force, we must all understand that, no matter our role, we must provide stewardship.

2. Stewardship is defined as the careful and responsible management of something entrusted to one's care. In this case we have been entrusted with the international community's money and equipment, and the development of our Afghan counterparts into an effective security force. For many, this concept requires a change in their mindset. Many deployed here to conduct operations, to develop a specific ministerial system or to train an Afghan soldier or policeman. The concept of stewardship would not, at face value, seem consistent with these other missions; however, no word better embodies the full commitment to these missions. All international elements, from the private partnered with a soldier or policeman to a commanding general advising the Minister of Defense or Interior, are responsible for donated resources and supporting transparent and effective accountability by the ANSF.

3. The international community continues to provide vital resources to develop and equip the ANSF. From donation to distribution, and every step in between, we must account for the resources we are given. Our systems must be clear and transparent to ensure accountability of equipment and money and to provide an example for our Afghan partners.

4. Even more important, we must provide attentive and responsive stewardship of our Afghan brethren. In most elements of the ANSF there is still a shortage of leaders, no logistics or maintenance capability, or even the most basic systems we take for granted in our own formations. Whether we have been here for years, or just beginning our mission in Afghanistan, we must recognize these areas of weakness and build up ANSF capability. This includes their preconceived paradigms toward individual and unit accountability, as well as the attendant systems. The greatest change that we can make is to instill in each of our Afghan partners the importance accountability and maintenance contributes to their mission to serve and protect the Afghan people. Through our actions and our words we demonstrate something they can, in turn, emulate.

5. In this stewardship mission, our task is to insure that as we begin the process of transitioning responsibility of the systems developed with our Afghan partners, the will to generate and sustain a professional, accountable Afghan National Security Force endures over time. We have a responsibility to be a good example, showing our partners "what right looks like." We owe our Afghan partners nothing less than our best, so let's see it through, *shohna ba shohna*.

W B Caldwell IV

WILLIAM B. CALDWELL, IV
Lieutenant General, US Army
Commanding

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Mr. Timothy H. Civils
DLRO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Dr. O. Shawn Cupp
DLRO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Allan S. Boyce
DLRO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301