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**FRIENDS WITH BENEFITS: OPTIMIZING CIVIL
AFFAIRS FOR FUTURE ENGAGEMENTS**

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June 2014

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ABSTRACT

In the wake of American involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to reevaluate Civil Affairs (CA), including the education and training of its personnel for future missions and conflicts. What role can CA play as an influencing force to mitigate conflict in phase 0 “shaping” operations? Can CA have a greater role at the operational and strategic levels? More importantly, does the force have the right training and education to meet these future challenges?

This capstone argues that the notion of a solely post-conflict reconstruction mission of CA is outdated and needs to be adapted to meet modern, pre-conflict, shaping requirements. Specifically, 1) CA is better suited to acting as an influencing force, 2) an educated, experienced, and credentialed force is necessary to maximize effectiveness and influence, and 3) a new career path for CA officers is required to maximize the influence and skills of CA’s most talented officers. To reach these goals, this capstone charts a course for CA to break out of the tactical realm and creates a path that will link CA knowledge and expertise to policy, strategy, and operations.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	area of responsibility
ASCC	Army service component command
CA	civil affairs
CAAS	civil affairs assessment and selection
CAO	civil affairs operations
CAQC	civil affairs qualification course
CIM	civil information management
CMO	civil military operations
COCOM	combatant command
COIN	counterinsurgency
CORDS	civil operations and revolutionary development support
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSL	centralized selection list
DA PAM	Department of the Army pamphlet
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
GCC	geographic combatant command
IGO	international governmental organization
IPI	indigenous populations and institutions
KD	key developmental
KLE	key leader engagement
MAAWS	money as a weapons system
MG	military government
MI	military intelligence
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MOS	military occupational specialty
NA	nation assistance
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NGO	non-governmental organization
NLF	National Liberation Front
OGA	other government agency

PME	professional military education
PRC	populace and resource control
SCA	support to civil administration
SF	special forces
SOF	special operations forces
SSDCO	stability, security and development in complex operations
SWAATC	special warfare advanced analysis and targeting course
SWODC	special warfare operational design course
TSOC	theater special operations command
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VC	Viet Cong

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I. INTRODUCTION

Civil Affairs (CA) is the youngest active duty branch in the United States (U.S.) Army, officially receiving this designation in 2006. However, the mission and its soldiers have existed for decades. The traditional mission of CA is as a “clean-up crew” after large-scale conflicts. For example, in World War II, CA soldiers laid the groundwork for the robust Marshall Plan, and the equally impressive reconstruction effort in Japan.¹ While this is an important legacy, some distinct differences exist between post-World War II efforts and operations today. First, the WWII allies achieved total victory both militarily and politically. Second, both Germany and Japan were receptive to the plans and were mostly willing participants in the efforts. Third, both countries were mature nations with functioning institutions prior to their defeat, which made restoration easier than having to establish and gain acceptance for new political, economic, and social systems.²

According to Grimes, over the last 10-plus years, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have eroded CA effectiveness as other governmental agencies participated in typical CA missions under the “whole of government approach,” and thus, confused the perceived role and proper employment of CA.³ Instead of including CA in the planning and execution of the long term stability, development and influence programs, much of the active CA focus was limited to the tactical level crisis response and stabilization efforts. As modern conflicts continue, it is important to reevaluate the role of CA, its education and training, and its personnel for future missions and conflicts; specifically, expanding the role of CA beyond that of a phase 4 “cleanup crew.” What role can CA play as an influencing force to mitigate conflict in phase 0 “shaping” operations? Can CA

¹ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1945–1952,” November 15, 2013, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/japan-reconstruction>.

² Rolf Wagner, “*Virtual Victory*” *The Influence of “Post” Modern Warfare on Post Conflict Operations: Is Defeat Necessary to Start “Phase IV* (Fort Leavenworth: KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2004).

³ Gregory Grimes, “Civil Affairs: Gathering the Reins,” *Small Wars Journal*, March 23, 2009. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/03/civil-affairs-gathering-the-re/>.

have a greater role at the operational and strategic levels? More importantly, does the force have the right training and education to meet these future challenges?

This capstone argues that the notion of a solely post-conflict reconstruction⁴ mission of CA is outdated and needs to be adapted to meet modern, pre-conflict, shaping requirements. Specifically, 1) CA is better leveraged as an influencing force in phase 0, as well as a synchronizing and facilitating force during the whole of government stability efforts in phase 4 and phase 5, transition to civil authority, 2) an educated, experienced, and credentialed force is necessary to maximize effectiveness and influence, 3) the current career path for active duty officers focuses only on the tactical level and does not take advantage of experience and knowledge to develop officers at the operational and strategic level, and 4) the path to the rank of colonel is limited, which can curtail the capability to maximizing the influence and skills of CA's most talented officers. To reach these goals, this capstone charts a course for CA to break out of the tactical realm and creates a path that will link CA knowledge and expertise to policy, strategy, and operations.

The purpose of this capstone is to increase the capability of CA officers and to examine an alternate path to senior ranks that capitalizes on the knowledge and expertise of CA. The proposed alternate career path would allow CA officers to gain additional education, skills, experience, and authority to better influence foreign populations and inform U.S. military strategy at the strategic level. This approach will better realize Special Operations Forces (SOF) truths.

SOF Truth One: Humans are more important than hardware. People—not equipment—make the critical difference. The right people, highly trained and working as a team, will accomplish the mission with the equipment

⁴ “Post-conflict reconstruction is broadly understood as a complex, holistic and multidimensional process encompassing effort to simultaneously improve military (restoration of law and order), political (governance), economic (rehabilitation and development) and social conditions (justice and reconciliation).” Nikolaos Tzifakis “Post Conflict Economic Reconstruction,” *Encyclopedia Princetoniensis, The Princeton Encyclopedia of Self-Determination*, accessed June 11, 2014, <http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/260>.

available. On the other hand, the best equipment in the world cannot compensate for a lack of the right people.⁵

This capstone will demonstrate that selecting the right people, with advanced education, credentials, higher-level military professional education, and added training will exponentially increase the capability of CA. This proposed approach focuses on an investment in human capital from which the Army, USSOCOM and the U.S. government will see future returns.

SOF Truth Two: Quality is better than quantity. A small number of people, carefully selected, well trained, and well led, are preferable to larger numbers of troops, some of whom may not be up to the task.⁶

Officers selected to be CA specialists will undergo multiple screenings and educational hurdles to acquire the appropriate level of education and credentials. These individuals cannot be produced in mass but rather with a focus of quality.

SOF Truth Three: Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced. It takes years to train operational units to the level of proficiency needed to accomplish difficult and specialized SOF missions. Intense training – both in SOF schools and units – is required to integrate competent individuals into fully capable units. This process cannot be hastened without degrading ultimate capability.⁷

The training and education proposed for an alternate CA career path requires 10 to 15 years to reach the ultimate capability and maximize the influence of those positions. An alternate path focusing on a blend of education and operational experience will better integrate CA operations with operational and strategic objectives.

SOF Truth Four: Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. Creation of competent, fully mission capable units takes time. Employment of fully capable special operations capability on short notice requires highly trained and constantly available SOF units in peacetime.⁸

⁵ United States Special Operations Command, “SOF Truths,” accessed April 17, 2014, <http://www.socom.mil/Pages/SOFTruths.aspx>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

The investment of this capstone proposes is for a capable force within five years and a functioning influencing force in 10 years.

This project examines the history of CA from WWII to the present, and specifically focuses on the training and education of these forces in relation to their assigned mission in Chapter II. Chapter III argues that the future of CA lies within influence operations; the chapter therefore provides a brief overview of influence and how CA can work as an influencing force. Chapter IV aligns with ARSOF 2022, which asserts that a force with “the ability to assess and understand a situation from multiple points of view and to intuitively adapt operations as necessary requires mature soldiers who have the ability to combine their education and experience to solve a problem.”⁹ Specifically, the chapter contends that, through education and experience, CA officers would be better prepared to fulfill their role not just as an influencing force at the tactical level but also at operational and strategic commands. Chapter V proposes an alternative career path that allows for education, experience, and credentialing—necessary ingredients for building a more capable CA officer. Chapter VI offers concluding thoughts. Additionally, the Appendix provides a curriculum designed to educate CA captains better. This proposed curriculum is currently under review at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the schoolhouse responsible for training CA soldiers.

⁹ United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Office of Strategic Communication, *ARSOF 2022* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2013), 9.

II. CIVIL AFFAIRS FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT

A. INTRODUCTION

From westward expansion of the United States and the Mexican-American War to the Civil War to current operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has conducted civil-military operations as a means toward achieving military ends. However, it was not until the mid-20th century that the Army identified and attempted to mend the capability gap of dedicated and trained personnel for civil-military operations.

This chapter outlines the advent of CA as an occupational specialty, beginning with World War II, and offers a brief overview of the varied uses of CA forces in military conflicts. Overall, this chapter finds that the U.S. Government and military have employed CA in an ad hoc fashion ranging from a post-conflict stabilization force to shaping and influencing early conflict environments. This chapter demonstrates that the U.S. Government and military need to develop a forward thinking strategy of how to employ CA in a range of environments to better utilize this unique force.

B. WORLD WAR II AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

Three months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a U.S. Army lawyer from the Judge Advocate General Division, Colonel Harry Auer, proposed advanced governance training for select military officers in a letter to the Army G-1's office.

American forces are now serving in a number of bases in foreign countries, which service involves difficult and delicate questions arising from relations with the local government; and there is a possibility of future service involving the administration of military government by the United States Army. These facts indicate the need of competent personnel for such duties. Their detail from combatant units will deplete the officer strength of such units, and officers so detailed will in most cases be inexperienced and untrained in such duties.¹⁰

By early 1942, the Army's Provost Marshal General had been assigned the responsibility of training military officers in CA and military government (MG), as well

¹⁰ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 8.

as establishing a School of Military Government.¹¹ For the first time, the U.S. military made a decided effort to train military officers effectively for the purpose of CA. Wanting to keep the school near the Army War College and the national capital region, the Provost Marshal General accepted an offer to house the school at the University of Virginia. The first MG/CA course, of 60 students, ran from May–August of 1942 and included classes, such as international law, political theory, public administration, and America’s history in MG.¹²

The government’s use of just one school, however, limited the ability to train a sufficient number of military officers to assist in post-World War II governance. Therefore, the government recruited other universities to serve as CA training schools, including Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, the University of Michigan, the University of Chicago, Boston University, the University of Wisconsin, Western Reserve College, and the University of Pittsburgh.¹³ As with the initial course at the University of Virginia, these programs were destined to educate officers in governance and cultural facets for stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁴

Despite the increased number of programs available to the fledgling CA community, commanders were reluctant to send top-performers for risk of losing them from their ranks.¹⁵ To mitigate this concern, the Army directly commissioned educated and experienced civilians for the purpose of reconstruction and stabilization, in addition to incorporating civilian agencies to help with the reconstruction and governance efforts in post-World War II Germany.¹⁶ As reports from the field provided feedback to the

¹¹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, 10.

¹² *Ibid.*, 12.

¹³ Charles S. Hyneman, “The Army’s Civil Affairs Training Program,” *The American Political Science Review* 38, no. 2 (1944): 343.

¹⁴ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, 17.

¹⁵ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944–1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 14.

¹⁶ Rebecca Patterson, *Revisiting a School of Military Government: How Reanimating a World War II-Era Institution Could Professionalize Military Nation Building* (Kansas City, MO: Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2011), 9.

program, the curriculum of the MG courses evolved, specifically with the addition of intense language training.¹⁷

U.S. Operations in North Africa in 1942 served as the initial test of a civilian-led stability and reconstruction effort in militarily controlled areas. This effort was conducted parallel to military operations; however, they lacked coordination, and ultimately, proved insufficient. Tucker and Lamb note, “By November 1943, the president had changed his mind and acknowledged that if civil affairs, particularly the distribution of relief supplies, were to be handled efficiently and effectively, the military would have to do it.”¹⁸

Following the lessons in North Africa, efforts to stabilize Europe began in 1943 when officers in Europe, including CA officers, assumed the duties of local or regional civic administrators. The officers were first educated in various aspects of governance stateside and then grouped into detachments according to the specific area’s population and civic needs.¹⁹ In liberated areas, the ability of the local authorities to function as a government determined the degree of military control. In enemy territory, however, military governors administered the whole spectrum of governmental affairs.²⁰

The term “military government” was a source of discomfort for both the military and civilian authorities from the beginning. Military leadership believed governance was outside their purview and the civilian leaders in the U.S. Government thought the term evoked proconsuls and imperialism.²¹ Ziemke notes, “Although the Army Schools turned out over 6,000 trained civil affairs officers and the MG in Germany alone required 15,000 trained soldiers in the first months after V-E day, the concept of CA as a predominantly civil function persisted.”²² After multiple rounds of contentious talks between military

¹⁷ Joseph P. Harris, “Selection and Training of Civil Affairs Officers,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 7, no. 4, The Occupation of Enemy Territory (Winter 1943): 700.

¹⁸ David Tucker and Christopher Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 76.

¹⁹ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944–1946*, 63.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 70.

²¹ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 168.

²² Earl F. Ziemke, “Civil Affairs Reaches Thirty,” *Military Affairs* 36, no. 4 (1972): 133.

and civilian leaders throughout the executive branch, Sandler states, “President Roosevelt informed the War Department that the Army would have to assume the initial burden of CA/MG, but added significantly that civilian agencies would carry out the long range program.”²³ The Office of Military Government continuously reiterated its efforts as secondary to a civilian-led post-war reconstruction, and insisted that military governors serve as administrators and not statesman.²⁴

By mid-1945, nearly all German government units below the national level were staffed and run by German officials.²⁵ The efforts of American CA/MG officers undoubtedly assisted in setting the stage for the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) following the conflict. Despite their successes, the CA and MG staff positions in the Army were dissolved in 1949. The CA force was largely relegated to the reserves in which practitioners would cultivate their specialties with experience from civilian life. Only a small number of active CA units remained; one of which, the 95th CA Group, was reactivated at Fort Bragg, NC on October 29, 1948. This unit provided the Army with a rapidly deployable civil affairs unit, if and when, the need arose.²⁶

C. THE KOREAN WAR

The American occupation of South Korea from 1945–1948 presented new challenges for the U.S. Army’s MG and CA forces. After being ruled by Japan from 1910–1945, the Allies questioned Korea’s ability to self-govern after the surrender of Japan. Korea was freed of the Japanese only to be divided by the Allies after World War II; the United States occupied the south and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) occupied the north.²⁷ The previous Japanese occupation left very few Koreans

²³ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991*, 174.

²⁴ Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944–1946*, 21; Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991*, 172.

²⁵ Harold Zink, “American Military Government Organization in Germany,” *The Journal of Politics* 8, no. 3 (1946): 346.

²⁶ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991*, 337.

²⁷ Jürgen Kleiner, *Korea: A Century of Change* (River Edge, NJ: World Scientific, 2001), 49.

with the skills to govern or lead industry. Due to the shortage of qualified Koreans and U.S. MG-trained officers, the United States initially left many former Japanese administrators in power, a decision that infuriated the population.²⁸ In 1945, the U.S. Government established the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea as an initial step toward empowering the Korean government toward self-rule.²⁹ To expedite the removal of Japanese influence from Korea, U.S. MG leaders eliminated the Japanese-led Bureau of Police and replaced it with a Korean police agency.³⁰ Similar steps were taken throughout the Korean government during the American occupation to slowly enable the Koreans to self-govern. However, despite the efforts of U.S. Army Forces in Korea, post-World War II CA efforts were largely neglected in Korea, while the main efforts at reconstruction and democratization focused on Europe and Japan. Kleiner summarizes, “when the Americans arrived at Inchon, they had no knowledge about Korea, not to mention plans and ideas on how to govern the country.”³¹

In the months following the 1950 invasion by North Korea, the requirements for the U.S. Army’s MG functions shifted to conducting CA in support of an internationally recognized Korean government rather than the establishment of a MG.³² The American occupation of South Korea from 1945–1948 initially hindered the United Nations (UN) command’s efforts to conduct CA and humanitarian assistance during the early stages of the conflict with North Korea.³³ The difficult transition to civilian rule after the end of World War II made any mention of MG or similar assistance by outside forces difficult for the Koreans to accept.

²⁸ James Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 19.

²⁹ James Matray, “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945–1948,” *Korean Studies*, 19 (1995): 22.

³⁰ Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 8.

³¹ Kleiner, *Korea: A Century of Change*, 51.

³² Stanley Sandler, *The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 197.

³³ Matray, “Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945–1948.”

Once engaged, the most notable accomplishment of CA forces in Korea during the conflict was their contribution to relocating refugees and internally displaced people fleeing the conflict-affected areas.³⁴ In addition, U.S. headquarters positioned CA forces to provide civil relief to the population as the command realized civil unrest might adversely affect military operations.³⁵ A 1952 report, “CA in Korea,” by Johns Hopkins University identified that the quality of officers assigned for CA in Korea was not commensurate with the importance of the task.³⁶ Sandler further notes, “Whatever its failings, Civil Affairs/Civic Assistance programs did make it possible for the U.S. Army and the UN command, after the first months of the war, to conduct operations with minimal interference from the Korean civilian population. In some significant ways it left the Republic actually in better condition than it was before the war.”³⁷

Two years after U.S. direct involvement in the Korean War, General Order No. 37 established the Office of the Chief, Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff in April 1953.³⁸ At the end of the war in 1955, the Department of the Army established the U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs/Military Government (officer) branch.³⁹ By October 2, 1959, the Army had dropped the term MG and redesignated the occupational specialty as the Civil Affairs Branch.⁴⁰ The name change reflected the growing political sensitivities of MG, and the intent not to become

³⁴ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991*, 329.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 334.

³⁶ C. Darwin Stolzenbach and Henry A. Kissinger, *Civil Affairs in Korea 1950–1951* (Chevy Chase, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1952), 49.

³⁷ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991*, 336.

³⁸ National Archives, “Record 319.5, Records of the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs 1945–1965,” accessed January 16, 2014, <http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/319.html#319>, 5.

³⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *General Order No. 51* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August 17, 1955).

⁴⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *General Order No. 36* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2, 1959).

embroiled in large-scale nation building under Eisenhower's New Look policy (containment of Soviet influence and strategic nuclear deterrence).⁴¹

D. CIVIL AFFAIRS IN VIETNAM

Army CA first deployed to the Republic of Vietnam in 1960 in response to the ongoing insurgency. President Kennedy's interest in counterinsurgency revived the CA role, and by 1961, the U.S. Military Assistance Program formally included civic action as one of its tasks.⁴² For a short time, civic action and CA enjoyed a brief renaissance as military and civilian theorists followed the direction of the Kennedy administration.⁴³ CA missions in Vietnam had three primary objectives: one, eliminate the Viet Cong (VC) Insurgency in South Vietnam; two, end the VC's ability to recruit in Southern Vietnam, and three, recruit indigenous tribes to take up arms against the VC and the National Liberation Front (NLF).⁴⁴ Beginning in 1967, Robert Komer coordinated these actions under the civil operations and revolutionary development support (CORDS) program, an interagency undertaking.⁴⁵ The CORDS program coordinated military and civilian personnel towards the pacification of the population in the south through provincial, district, and village-level advisory teams.⁴⁶

In Vietnam, CA met opposition similar to that experienced in World War II over the stigma of MG. Sandler notes:

⁴¹ Gregory D. Cleva, *Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1989), 137.

⁴² Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991*, 354.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 355.

⁴⁴ Jeremy Patrick White, *Civil Affairs in Vietnam* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008).

⁴⁵ White House, National Security Action Memorandum 362, "Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development)," May 9, 1967, accessed January 28, 2014, <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/nsams/nsam362.asp>.

⁴⁶ Dale Andrade and James H. Wilbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review* (March–April 2006): 19.

When, for example, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Special Operations, LTG Ray Peers, proposed the introduction of CA teams to assist in pacification at the province level, the U.S. Ambassador, Retired General Maxwell Taylor, successfully protested to the White House these “plans to impose U.S. military government,” wanting to know why the civilian agency personnel would be replaced with the “Army civil affairs types operating on a pattern of military occupation?” According to General Peers later, here was lost a “golden opportunity” to cause “a critical review of the organization for pacification in South Vietnam.”⁴⁷

In 1965, General Westmoreland decreed Army CA involvement would be limited to tactical operations.⁴⁸ Lack of understanding of the mission and capabilities of CA forces led to their misuse and limited success. Many tactical commanders viewed the CA platoons as what they termed “goody passers,” and they lacked the knowledge or training to leverage CA operations, actions, and activities toward operational objectives.⁴⁹

After Vietnam, the Civil Affairs School was moved to Fort Bragg as part of the Institute for Military Assistance in 1972, later to become part of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The Nunn Cohen amendment of 1986 (Public Law 99–661) specifies CA among other specialties as a special operations function. These policies, in other words, moved CA from the conventional force and nested these activities with other irregular and unconventional forces.⁵⁰

E. PANAMA AND GRENADA

The 1983 Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada and 1989 Operation Just Cause in Panama began to frame the modern paradigm of CA as a force that could create a bridge from conflict to stability. Although no formal CA plan was written for Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada⁵¹, reserve CA officers drafted a plan for post-conflict stability entitled

⁴⁷ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991*, 356.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 360.

⁵⁰ Susan Lynn Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), 126.

⁵¹ Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government, 1775–1991*, 373.

BLIND LOGIC in support of Operation Just Cause. BLIND LOGIC outlined actions the planners estimated would be necessary to restore order, although it was not written in conjunction with the ad hoc operational plan. The civilian-like stability tasks written in BLIND LOGIC kept the staff from sending it through the proper authorization channels to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and according to Donnelly et al., led the combatant commander to focus solely on the tactical plan⁵² until combat operations were largely complete.⁵³ As such, the CA planning and preparation in BLIND LOGIC were not integrated with the combat operations of the joint task force.

In both Panama and Grenada, the active and reserve CA forces were called upon, during and after combat operations, to stabilize the afflicted areas and restore daily life to a functional level within the government and society. In these military actions, although CA sought to synchronize efforts with the State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and international organizations, the coordination did not adequately occur before the conflict and rather occurred ad hoc in the aftermath of the operation. These operations illustrate the lack of CA inclusion in prior planning, the desire of commanders not to become involved in a civilian reconstruction function, and the lack of military preparation for post-conflict activities.

F. OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom were large-scale wars that illustrated the need for pre-planning for civil-military operations and stabilization. Within a few short weeks, coalition forces controlled Kabul⁵⁴ and Baghdad.⁵⁵ However, despite taking the capitals, these conflicts were far from over and quickly transitioned from conventional war to irregular conflict that required greater

⁵² Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama* (New York: Lexington-MacMillan, 1991), 25.

⁵³ John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 36.

⁵⁴ Center for Military History, *Operation Enduring Freedom: The U.S. Army in Afghanistan*, Pub. 70-83-1 (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2006), 15.

⁵⁵ David Zucchino, *Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad* (New York: Grove Press, 2004).

attention to the population as part of the overall strategy. In 2005, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05 identified stability operations as a core mission for the U.S. military and directed the military to train for stabilization activities with equal importance as combat operations.⁵⁶ This stance was a significant policy shift toward the legitimization of CA and the professionalization of civil-military operations.

Throughout his time in office, President Bush maintained that, “conditions on the ground will dictate our troop levels,”⁵⁷ and ultimately, U.S. commitment. For senior military commanders, demonstrating the necessity of the troop levels to Congress required measured and quantitative indicators of progress, what General Petraeus referred to as “battlefield geometry.”⁵⁸ The onus was on military units to demonstrate quantitative progress and overall effectiveness from the strategic to the tactical levels; as a result, these metrics eventually dominated reporting and progress of the war.⁵⁹

Until 2007, only one active duty CA battalion existed to support missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. To mitigate this capability gap, the military dedicated additional assets to stabilization; in some cases, entire units were directed to operate in support of civil-military operations.⁶⁰ The lack of professionals, military or otherwise,⁶¹ with the capability of planning and executing these types of operations led to simple metrics that, in most cases, did not account for the complexity of the irregular environment.⁶² Measures of performance, such as the number of security forces trained, number of

⁵⁶ Department of Defense, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 28, 2005), 2.

⁵⁷ U.S. Government Printing Office, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush, Book I-January 1 to June 30, 2006* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), 2.

⁵⁸ Charles Key, “Petraeus, Crocker Criticize Iran, Call for Halt to Troop Pullout,” *CNN*, April 8, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/04/08/iraq.hearing/index.html>.

⁵⁹ Karen Guttieri, “Metrics in Iraq’s Complex Conflict Environment,” in *The Three Circles of War: Understanding the Dynamics of Conflict in Iraq*, ed. Heather Gregg et al. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2010), 137.

⁶⁰ John Landry, “Artillery Unit Becomes Civil Affairs in New Iraq,” *Armed Forces Press Service*, July 27, 2009.

⁶¹ Leslie Macmillan, “Taming the Failed States,” *Tufts Journal*, April 1, 2009.

⁶² Nora Bensahel, “Preventing Insurgencies After Major Combat Operations,” *Defence Studies* 6, no. 3 (September 2006).

schools built, or miles of road improved, were used to represent significant steps toward a stable state. Similarly, the number of dollars spent represented an easy metric and led the Army Center for Lessons Learned to publish “The Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS).” MAAWS explains, “Money is one of the primary weapons used by warfighters to achieve successful mission results in COIN and humanitarian operations.”⁶³ The handbook provides a broad overview for satisfying various legal and staffing requirements for the use of funds in the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it does not provide instruction in developing targeted and sustainable programs toward strategic ends where effectiveness can only be measured over time.

Furthermore, civil-military efforts of maneuver units were seldom linked to CA elements in the area or the civilian stabilization strategy of the region.⁶⁴ Units were responsible and rewarded for the amount of money spent or projects implemented in their assigned area of responsibility (AOR), not in the effects they achieved. These conditions led to multiple U.S. Government Accountability Office reports indicating U.S. stabilization efforts lack, “clear purpose, scope, roles and performance measures.”⁶⁵

In 2006, the Department of the Army General Order Number 12 reassigned reserve CA as a conventional force under U.S. Army Reserve Command while keeping active duty CA as a special operations force under U.S. Army Special Operations Command.⁶⁶ Despite the fact that CA were the most deployed force in U.S. Special

⁶³ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System*, Handbook No. 09-27 (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2009), 1.

⁶⁴ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2009), 34.

⁶⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: GAO Audits and Key Oversight Issues*, statement of Joseph A. Christoff, director, International Affairs and trade, testimony before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on State, Foreign, Operations, and Related Programs, U.S. House of Representatives (2007).

⁶⁶ Department of the Army, *Reassignment of United States Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Organizations from the United States Army Special Operations Command to the United States Army Reserve Command*, General Orders No. 12 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 25, 2006).

Operations Command,⁶⁷ the reassignment left a single CA battalion on active duty.⁶⁸ Additionally, splitting the force created a cultural schism between the two bodies of the branch.⁶⁹ Reserve CA units, who were once special operations forces with access to the requisite SOF funding, Major Force Program 11 funds, were now subject solely to Army Reserve funding and force projection processes.⁷⁰ This reallocation left the reserve forces with significantly fewer resources toward specialized training than their active duty counterparts.

In response to the increased importance of CA in stability operations, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade activated in 2007, along with the sequential activation of five additional active duty CA battalions over the next five years.⁷¹ Three active duty CA battalions were activated and available for the Iraq surge in 2008, but by and large, these additional units were created too late to significantly affect the stabilization efforts in Iraq.

The recognized need for a military CA capability prompted the House Armed Services Committee to direct the Secretary of Defense to study and report on the roles and requirements of CA throughout the spectrum of operations.⁷² The Office of Secretary of Defense contracted the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to examine the future of U.S. CA forces.⁷³ CSIS concluded the need for the DOD to recognize CA and civil military operations (CMO) as vital to the success of military operations through well-trained and resourced CA professionals at all levels of the

⁶⁷ Andres Feickert, *U.S. Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress* CRS Report RS21048 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 2008).

⁶⁸ Kathleen H. Hicks, Christine E. Wormuth, and Eric Ridge, *The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2009), 36.

⁶⁹ Grimes, "Civil Affairs: Gathering the Reins."

⁷⁰ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, *The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces*, 37.

⁷¹ U.S. Army Center of Military History, "Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade," April 12, 2007, <http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/lineages/branches/civaf/0095cabde.htm>.

⁷² House of Representatives, *Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 Report of the Committee on Armed Services*, U.S. House Armed Services Committee Report (House Report 110-652), House of Representatives on H.R. 5658, May 16, 2008, 421.

⁷³ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, *The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces*.

Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Government.⁷⁴ Additionally, the report highlights the absence of CA senior officers and advocates at the highest levels of the DOD.⁷⁵

G. CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE STRUCTURE

Prior to 2006, CA in the active force was a functional area. In other words, officers after eight years of service in their basic branch could apply to transfer into the career field, while non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in a CA unit came primarily from Special Forces (SF) units. In the reserve force, soldiers had the ability to select CA as their accessions branch, or their initial military occupational specialty (MOS). In October 2006, CA became an active duty Army branch, which allowed active duty officers in the grade of captain or specialist for the enlisted ranks to apply for selection as a CA soldier.

Alongside these changes, the U.S. military created a more robust definition of CA. Joint Publication 3-57, Civil Military Operations, defines CA operations as activities performed or supported by CA that did the following.

- Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas in which military forces are present
- Require coordination with other government agencies (OGAs), international governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), indigenous populations and institutions (IPIs), and the private sector
- Involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance conduct of CMO. Use of dedicated CA and the conduct of Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) will enhance planned CMO by helping to ensure civil or indigenous understanding of, and compliance with, controls, regulations, directives, or other measures taken by commanders to accomplish the military mission and attain U.S. objectives.

⁷⁴ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, *The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces*, 45.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 46.

- CAO are distinguishable [sic] from CMO insofar as the former are characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority. CMO may extend to the assumption of governmental functions required in an occupied territory during, or immediately subsequent, to hostilities.⁷⁶

The development of the mission and capabilities of U.S. Army CA forces led to the five CA core tasks as outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57 Civil Affairs Operations.

Populace and Resources Control

Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents.

Resources controls regulate the movement or consumption of material resources, mobilize materiel resources, and deny materiel to the enemy.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

FHA are programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions, such as human pain, disease, hunger, or need that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.

Civil Information Management

CIM is the process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher HQ, and other USG and DOD agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. This process ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO.

Nation Assistance

NA is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. NA operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.

⁷⁶ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-57: Civil Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), II-12.

Support to Civil Administration

SCA are military operations that help to stabilize or to continue the operations of the governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population.⁷⁷

To execute these missions, the CA force was divided into two active duty CA brigades in 2011 led by Army colonels, the 85th and 95th CA brigades, and one CA command in the Army Reserve led by a major general, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. In addition to these units, two USAR brigades exist under operational control of U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Pacific, the 361st and 322nd CA brigades, respectively, each commanded by reserve Army colonels. See Figure 1.




Figure 1. CA Force Structure⁷⁸

⁷⁷ U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011).

⁷⁸ John Ferry and Benny Romero, "The Evolution of Civil Affairs" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 59.

CA is a rarity among Army MOS because a preponderance of the force and a vast majority of the senior leaders are in the reserve component. All but one general officer, an active brigadier general, are reserve officers. Furthermore, CA consists of three distinct command structures: the 95th CA BDE (A) that supports U.S. Army Special Operations Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, USACAPOC (A) that supports U.S. Army Reserve Command, and the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade assigned as a direct reporting unit to U.S. Army Forces Command. See Figure 1.

In addition to the varied supported commands, CA has different training requirements and expectations for active and reserve officers, as well as for soldiers and NCOs. Active duty officers and NCOs complete a 42-week course of instruction at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.⁷⁹ This training includes language instruction, as well as cultural training in support of future regional alignment. Reserve officers attend a 29-day resident course preceded by online training. The reserve CA officers' course does not include language or regionally focused training.⁸⁰ Reserve NCOs complete part of their professional military education under the Army Reserve at Fort Dix, NJ or Fort Hunter-Liggett, CA.⁸¹ In sum, these parallel institutions within CA have, in effect, created three distinct forces.

Furthermore, the table of organization and equipment for the reserve CA unit differs drastically from the active CA units. A reserve unit consists of six broad categories of CA functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.⁸² The expertise for these specialties is to be obtained and cultivated in the reserve CA soldier's civilian occupation. The locations of the various reserve CA elements across the United States, Europe, and Puerto Rico allow these units to draw upon the varied professional experience, education, and cultural nuances found throughout a diverse cross section of

⁷⁹ U.S. Army, *U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Academic Handbook* (Fort Bragg: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 18.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ferry and Romero, "The Evolution of Civil Affairs," 55.

⁸² Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-57: Civil Military Operations*, xiv.

American society. See Figures 2 and 3. In effect, reserve CA have the ability to deploy temporarily individuals or elements with unique capabilities not found in the active force.




Figure 2. U.S. Army Reserve CA Functional Specialties⁸³

⁸³ U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations*, 2–18.




Figure 3. U.S. Army Reserve CA Units and Locations⁸⁴

H. CONCLUSION

This chapter has asserted that, instead of proactively setting the agenda for CA employment, CA has not been executed based on the recommendations of trained CA planners but rather in reaction to or as an afterthought of military operations. The sentiment of CA as “goody-passers” seems to permeate American conflict planning and execution from the official advent of CA in 1942 to Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, although the expectations and role of the force have evolved with each conflict. During World War II, CA soldiers served in a variety of roles, including government administrators, responsible for the day-to-day operations of national, regional, and local levels of governance. In the Korean War, CA was used to evacuate refugees and fleeing

⁸⁴ U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs, *Briefing Slides* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2012).

civilians, stabilize afflicted areas, and begin the reconstruction process for the Republic of Korea. In Vietnam, CA, in conjunction with other SOF, acted as a force of influence in the defense of the south, in addition to performing the role of a stabilizing and reconstruction force.

Despite the varying roles that CA has played, common through each military action, however, was the reticence of military commanders to plan for and properly employ CA forces, while the civilian leaders objected to the use of soldiers in what they view as clearly a civilian function. The demand for and expectations of CA forces have increased in the contemporary operating environment, although the parallel command structures have hindered the ability to identify needs and requirements, develop a branch identity, and advertise the capabilities of CA forces efficiently.

The next chapter discusses the role that CA can play as an influencing force by outlining different types of influence and how CA can move beyond a post-conflict force to one that shapes environments, influences populations, and prevents conflicts through civil military engagement.

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III. INFLUENCE AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

A. INTRODUCTION

As Chapter II described, CA has been employed largely in an ad hoc fashion, and mostly, as a post-conflict stabilization force. However, FM 3-57, the Civil Affairs Field Manual, defines CA core tasks as those that “promote U.S. policy objectives before, during, and after combat operations by influencing the civil component of the operational area.”⁸⁵ This definition suggests that CA require a much wider range of skills and mission sets, particularly in the realm of pre-conflict influence. To understand this underutilized aspect of CA better, this chapter discusses the direct and indirect influence of CA operations within Cialdini’s and Watkins’ frameworks for creating influence. Specifically, it examines types of CA influence, how CA operates within the circle of influence, and the importance of professionalism, specialties, and credibility needed for CA soldiers to effectively influence in the tactical, operational, and strategic realms.

This chapter asserts that CA is an underutilized force for creating influence, and should play a critical role in multi-dimensional, hybrid operating environments, in which building influence is paramount. These types of operations will most likely be the kinds of engagements that U.S. SOF will conduct after forces draw down from Afghanistan in 2014.⁸⁶ Therefore, CA, the wider SOF community, the Army, and non-DOD entities should better understand and utilize CA as an influence building force.

B. THEORIES OF INFLUENCE

1. Cialdini

For the purpose of this chapter, influence is distilled down to the capacity or power to affect the behaviors and perceptions of individuals or groups of people, while persuasion is an act to change behaviors. Ultimately, the leading question then becomes how to develop the capability and power to truly influence. The answer can greatly help

⁸⁵ U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations*, 3–1.

⁸⁶ United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Office of Strategic Communication, *ARSOF 2022*, 4.

understand and enhance military and full spectrum operations in the proposed seventh function of warfighting, the human domain. The seventh warfighting function focuses specifically on “the related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of a people, security forces, and governments.”⁸⁷

In *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, Robert B. Cialdini, a professor of psychology, divides influence into six principles: reciprocity, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity. He suggests these are “governed by a psychological principle that directs human behavior,” which makes people susceptible to influence.⁸⁸ While no one principle is more powerful than the other, with a combination of these weapons, he asserts that people are more likely to be influenced.

One weapon of influence, reciprocity, suggests that, “we should try to repay, in-kind, what another person has provided us.”⁸⁹ A simple example is, if someone buys another person a cup of coffee, the person who receives the free cup of coffee would likely return the favor and buy the first person a cup coffee. This weapon creates an obligation to repay an act, even if the request was not made. Alvin Gouldner, a renowned sociologist suggests, “There is no human society that does not subscribe to the rule [of reciprocity].”⁹⁰ Cialdini even states, “A favor is to be met with another favor; it is not to be met with neglect, and certainly not with attack.”⁹¹ These factors make reciprocity an effective influencing technique if executed properly as is discussed later in this chapter.

Another important weapon is commitment and consistency. Many psychologists agree that, “the desire for consistency is a central motivator of our behavior.”⁹² Humans by nature are creatures of habit, which makes consistency an important social influencing

⁸⁷ U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs, *7th Warfighting Function Definition, Briefing Slides* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, March 2013).

⁸⁸ Robert B. Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, rev. ed. (New York: Harper Business, 2006), xiii.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 59.

tool. Cialdini suggests that consistency can even cause people to act in ways clearly contrary to their own best interest.⁹³ While it may not be the desired intent when influencing, it is important to know that this capability exists. For example, consistency can be applied to individuals simply by getting them to agree to a request. They may even assume personal risk to honor the commitment rather than appear inconsistent.

Social proof is a third tool of influence. Walter Lippmann describes social proof simply as, “Where all think alike, no one thinks very much.”⁹⁴ People act and think like the others around them. Social proof is, in other words, a form of peer pressure. This type of influence is prevalent in cults and often in radical groups with very strong beliefs in a cause. Furthermore, Cialdini notes that the strongest forms of social proof occur when peoples’ confidence is shaken.⁹⁵ This perception is important as these types of environments, particularly undergoverned areas, or those with a low intensity conflict, are the places in which SOF units will likely operate; SOF should, therefore, have an influencing capability that can leverage social proof to its advantage.

Liking is another way to achieve influence. “Few people would be surprised to learn that, as a rule, we prefer to say yes to the requests of someone we know and like.”⁹⁶ Cialdini suggests traits such as physical attractiveness, similarity, as well as behaviors like complements and cooperation, affect whether or not someone is liked.⁹⁷ Many hours of training are spent developing rapport building as a means of leveraging liking in CA operations utilizing Cialdini’s traits. For example, soldiers conduct exercises in liking with robust scenarios with diverse and dynamic professional role players specifically focused on building communication and rapport building.

Authority is yet another tool of influence. Cialdini states, “people are trained from birth to obey proper authority, and submission to such authority is right while

⁹³ Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, 59.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 114.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 129.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 167.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 171–204.

disobedience is wrong and usually followed with some type of punishment.”⁹⁸ This socializing can trigger natural responses to obey without questioning if the authority is accepted as right.⁹⁹ The advertising industry uses this type of authority to market products with professional athletes, scientists, and doctors. Cialdini suggests that titles “are simultaneously the most difficult and easiest symbols of authority to acquire; one can either take years of work and achievement to acquire while the other is merely adopting a label.”¹⁰⁰ He also provides evidence that even clothes can trigger mechanical compliance, such as uniforms or business suits.¹⁰¹ These factors help create the persona of authority that allows the influencer to be more effective.

Finally, there is scarcity. “People seem to be more motivated by the thought of losing something than the thought of gaining something of equal value.”¹⁰² This type of influence is exerted at auctions, during the first minutes of a store opening on Black Friday, or when only one model of the hottest car is left on the lot. When items are perceived to be important but scarce, their value increases.¹⁰³ Scarcity is a potentially useful tool for CA, especially with limited resources and time; CA soldiers can be selective and conduct targeted assistance leveraging naturally scarce resources and services. Cialdini’s six principles are summarized in Figure 4.

⁹⁸ Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, 216.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 220.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 222.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 226.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 238.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 251.




Figure 4. Cialdini's Weapons of Influence¹⁰⁴

2. Watkins

Michael Watkins, an associate professor of management at the Harvard Business School, presents another useful theory of influence. In his article, "In Practice: Principles of Persuasion," he argues that, to influence a target audience effectively, the actor must first map the "influence landscape."¹⁰⁵ It is necessary to identify which groups are supportive and which groups are not. He also suggests that ultimately coalitions must be built to secure support for their initiatives, and prevent or neutralize any blocking coalitions.¹⁰⁶ This process involves identifying the key players within the population,

¹⁰⁴ Dinis Guarda, "Psychology of Influence and the Social Media Graph—Part 4: Proof, Consistency," December 19, 2012, <http://www.intelligenthq.com/education/psychology-of-influence-and-the-social-media-graph-part-4-proof-consistency/>.

¹⁰⁵ Michael Watkins, "In Practice: Principles of Persuasion," *Negotiation Journal* 17, no. 2 (April 2001): 116.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 117.

their interests, and motivations.¹⁰⁷ This process is similar to that of “mapping the human terrain,” which is collecting and mapping information about the population in an area of operation. Overall, it is more beneficial to know who and what people are dealing with, and if they have a certain agenda or group they desire to influence. The practice of influence landscaping helps to identify the individuals or groups necessary or most beneficial to influence.

Watkins outlines additional steps necessary for persuading and influencing people and groups, such as shaping perceptions of interest, and perceptions of alternatives.¹⁰⁸ He believes it is important to shape these perceptions to gain the desired outcome. Being able to shape perceptions sets the groundwork for successful negotiations, which will inevitably occur. Watkins further contends that the actor must gain the audience’s support for tough decisions,¹⁰⁹ which often involves gaining acceptance from those opposed to the actor’s decisions and motivate them to be able to accept these choices. He suggests that creating a fair process, engaging in shared diagnosis, consulting before deciding, and giving what is asked for will lead to better acceptance amongst those affected.¹¹⁰ Although it is not always possible to give everything asked for, people are more likely to accept the outcomes knowing that the process was fair in coming to the ultimate decision.

Watkins further argues it is crucial to persuade from a distance because it is impossible to communicate one-to-one with everyone who needs to be influenced.¹¹¹ His examples include constructing reliable communication channels and matching the medium to the message.¹¹² Reliable communication channels are critical to disseminating the message, but just as important, is how the message is conveyed. In addition, Watkins suggests that focus and repetition be incorporated into communications.¹¹³ In other

¹⁰⁷ Watkins, “In Practice: Principles of Persuasion,” 118.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 122, 128.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 130.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 130–131.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 131.

¹¹² Ibid., 131–132.

¹¹³ Ibid., 132.

words, the message to be understood is sent out repeatedly until it is determined that the message has successfully been received and understood. Finally, one of the most important points Watkins makes, which is similar to Cialdini's liking and authority, is that it is critical to build personal credibility to influence and persuade. "Leaders with a reputation for integrity are better able to shape people's perceptions of their interest in alternatives because they are respected, considered trustworthy, and perceived to possess the experience to make good judgments."¹¹⁴ Building personal credibility takes time, effort, and the integrity and willpower to do so; it is an investment in human capital.

Combining Cialdini's weapons of influence and Watkins' principles of persuasion with the CA core tasks reveals an effective influencing mechanism. CA's missions, by nature, require CA soldiers to engage in influencing. Reciprocation, liking, commitment, and consistency are standard operating procedures for CA soldiers when engaging with the local population. Without these weapons of influence, CA missions become difficult, they lose focus, and policy objectives often become unattainable. Additionally, the principles of persuasion allow CA soldiers a better understanding of the human domain, an area in which they are tasked to be experts.

C. CIVIL AFFAIRS AS AN INFLUENCE FORCE

Building off this discussion on what influence is and how to influence a target audience, CA has several tactics and skill sets that make it an ideal influencing force. First, CA is a unique force, in which regular interaction with the populace is a requirement for mission success. In fact, FM 3-57 states that CA forces must personally communicate and liaison with civilians, civil authorities, civilian institutions and governments.¹¹⁵ Second, CA soldiers are educated and trained in engagement strategies that aim to maximize influence, identifying civil vulnerabilities, and synchronizing efforts with other U.S. and host nation entities.¹¹⁶ Third, CA soldiers are also trained in

¹¹⁴ Watkins, "In Practice: Principles of Persuasion," 134.

¹¹⁵ U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations*, 1-3.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1-8.

program and project management to leverage aid as a means of influence.¹¹⁷ Finally, CA soldiers are educated in governance to shape continuing development and stability within their target area. These skill sets are beneficial to an influence campaign. Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, authors of *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence in the Struggle Against Terrorism*, define an influence campaign as “planned operations—covert and/or overt—to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences. Such campaigns attempt to influence the perceptions, cognitions, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.”¹¹⁸

While the article focuses primarily on psychological operations, many of the same principles apply to CA operations reinforcing CA’s role in influence.

The CA five-core tasks, as discussed in Chapter II, are populace and resource control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil information management (CIM), nation assistance (NA), and support to civil administration (SCA). These tasks are all means of influence. Focusing on these aspects brings expertise necessary to influence authority. Additionally, the core tasks “provide expertise in civil-sector functions, normally the responsibility of the civilian authorities, applied to implement U.S. policy and advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civil-sector functions.”¹¹⁹ These capabilities establish credibility amongst the local populace, military, and government agencies, and, coupled with Cialdini’s and Watkins’ frameworks, can become a significant influencing capability across all three operational levels. Figure 5 depicts a common environment in which different entities commonly exert their specific expertise.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations*, 1–8.

¹¹⁸ Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, *Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 14.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations*, 3–2.




Figure 5. Map of Expertise Needed for Successful Stability Operations¹²⁰

D. INTERACTION AND FAMILIARITY WITH THE POPULACE

CA forces conduct regular face-to-face encounters, scheduled meetings, telephone conversations, or other audio/visual mediums that all contain some type of influencing activity.¹²¹ One of the most basic tasks for CA is key leader engagements or KLEs. CA soldiers engage with local civilians in a venue, which is most natural to civilians, such as their town hall or other meeting places. Meetings occur on a regular basis and subjects discussed are related to tools of influence, such as development projects, aid, or assistance. These conform to Cialdini's principles of liking, commitment and consistency, and eventually, reciprocation.

¹²⁰ Michael J. Meese and Sean M. Morgan, "New Requirements for Army Expert Knowledge: Afghanistan and Iraq," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 2005), 359.

¹²¹ U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-13, Inform and Influence Activities* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Army, January 25, 2013), 8–1.

This direct access to the population often provides significant information and understanding of what is motivating the people, which often can enhance further influence. CA soldiers are trained to view the environment through the lens of the civilian populace naturally creating similarity, which is essential for the principle “liking.” Cialdini suggests relationships based off liking are often the strongest.¹²² Additionally, CA soldiers are trained to inject themselves into the local populace and assimilate by understanding and becoming comfortable with the language, customs, and culture.¹²³ Building this similarity increases trust and cooperation with the local populace. This training is specific to CA and necessary to influence successfully as an alternative means to direct force.

E. CIVIL AFFAIRS ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

CA missions have the potential for direct or indirect influence. Informal meetings and merely conversing with village leaders begins to build the trust essential for influence operations. However, all CA missions should be tied to a desired effect that contributes to the overall goals of the operational and strategic missions.¹²⁴ While military information support operations (MISO) influence through messages, CA influences through actions.¹²⁵ CA actions range from basic civil engagements to complex civil development programs. CA’s specific niche, its access to the populace, allows for significant influencing. These engagements are critical for building trust, which allows for further influence of the target group.

It is important to note that engagement, by nature, influences regardless if planned or not. CA soldiers plan their engagement strategy by utilizing the circle of influence, which may include, but are not limited to, families, tribes, friends, religious leaders, and

¹²² Cialdini, *Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion*, 168.

¹²³ U.S. Army, *U.S. Army Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations*, 1–8.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1–9.

¹²⁵ Steve Lewis, “An Unconventional Role for Civil Affairs,” *Special Warfare* 26, no. 3 (July to September 2013): 35.

government officials.¹²⁶ For example, a CA meeting could be with the local Minister of Health. The minister holds a government position; however, he may be the head of a tribe and/or a religious leader with an extended family. A simple meeting with a person of such stature can penetrate many levels of the circle of influence. CA soldiers are educated and trained to find such people to maximize influence. While much of the influence occurs through direct contact and personal engagements, influence can also be indirect. Not interacting with a select populace can be just as effective at influencing.

F. PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS AS A MEANS FOR INFLUENCE

CA forces use different funding streams to maximize influence through projects and programs. After identifying the need or critical civil vulnerabilities, CA soldiers develop programs to reduce, mitigate, or eliminate civil vulnerabilities through the construction of physical infrastructure, assistance with planning or training, and subject matter expert exchanges. The focus of these programs is to develop the capacity and capability of indigenous groups, foreign militaries, or local governments to adopt or champion these efforts in the future. Ideally, these engagements will also affect the population in a positive manner and deny the opportunity for violent extremist groups to root themselves in the population. The U.S. Institute for Peace recommends a similar approach to stability through core service delivery.

¹²⁶ Bill Putnam, "Information Wars: Are the Iraqis Getting the Message," *Strategic Insights* 3, no. 12 (2004).




Figure 6. U.S. Institute for Peace, Core Service Delivery¹²⁷

In the midst of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army identified the utility of development programs and projects as a means to influence populations. The military went to great lengths to develop this capability and created a manual to address this issue, the U.S. Army's *Money as a Weapons System Handbook*. The handbook states, "Warfighters with timely access to the right types of money and in the appropriate amount can influence the outcome of operations with both temporary and, hopefully, permanent results."¹²⁸ The employment of money occurs when "warfighters at brigade, battalion, and company level in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment employ money as a weapons system to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate defeating the insurgents. Money is one of the primary weapons used by warfighters to achieve successful mission results in COIN and humanitarian operations." General David Petraeus, when in command of the 101st Airborne Division in 2004, even

¹²⁷ United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 8–101.

¹²⁸ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Handbook 09-27 Commander's Guide to Money As a Weapons System* (Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned), April 2009, 1.

went so far as to say, “Money is my most important ammunition in this war.”¹²⁹ In most cases, units and individuals identified to employ money as a weapons system did so to achieve immediate and tactical-level effects for their AOR. Although not the only force to have access to development funds, CA operators are defined by their core tasks, training, and experience to achieve broader goals and objectives through the employment of programs and projects.

An example of CA as a force that provides unique access to the population for the purpose of influence comes from the desert in Trans-Sahara Africa. A CA sponsored solar-powered well was constructed to influence a small nomadic populace and act as a meeting place to conduct targeted influence operations. Like the Apaches, the convenience of the well attracted the nomadic people to visit and congregate near the fresh water source. The project was also effective in influencing the local populace with water, which they desperately needed, and was nested within a larger government sponsored irrigation program. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, the authors of *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* agree, “the military brings a much needed alternative perspective to development and easily grasp the need for state-building doctrine.”¹³⁰ When done correctly, such projects can have a significant impact in shaping the environment and influencing a target audience; just one example of influencing through action in which the how and why were carefully planned and tied to the overall mission.

Too often, these projects are undertaken randomly, however, without a greater purpose of influence for a wider effect. Many CA units fall victim to the “aid complex” trap and will conduct what is commonly referred to as “random acts of kindness.” In other words, units execute an expedient and mediocre assessment of an area and randomly decide to do a project tied to effects unrelated to the success of the overall mission. Additionally, with programs such as “Money As a Weapons System,” Ghani and Lockhart point out, “It is assumed that money is the key to success for influence. Many

¹²⁹ Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Handbook 09-27 Commander’s Guide to Money As a Weapons System*, 1.

¹³⁰ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2009), 105–106.

involved with counterinsurgency to development would agree. Recently, though, the core activity of aid systems is the stewardship of very large funds.”¹³¹ Along with these large funds, focus is lost, and often, the expenditure of funds as a quantitative measurement for performance and success replaces influence.

This type of behavior amongst CA forces has come to be known as “CA’s body count.” Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) become confused and replaced with measures of performance (MOPs). This trend is similar to one that Hy Rothstein identifies in his article “Less is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of Collapsing States.” He suggests that the United States has a habit of conducting wars in which irregular threats are handled quantitatively, based on a subjective scale of importance or threat posed to U.S. interests, even when a quantitative approach undermines strategic outcomes.¹³² This quantitative approach was obvious in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which the numbers of projects were more important than the projects themselves or the outcome achieved. Karen Guttieri, who studied the metrics used by the U.S. military in Iraq, points out, “the complexity of stability operations exhausts the capacity of analytical tools developed for conventional war, including the combat centric metrics dominating the literature on military effectiveness.”¹³³ Therefore, with the lack of solid metrics, the common practice in Iraq and Afghanistan was to have greater expenditure of funds and higher rates than other efforts in different parts of the country. Operational and strategic outcomes were lesser considerations; the focus was clearly on spending through tactical operations. Ghani and Lockhart point out that, “Many quick-impact projects neither meet the criteria of economic feasibility and financial viability nor address the fundamental issue of sustainable paths out of poverty.”¹³⁴

¹³¹ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 91.

¹³² Hy S. Rothstein, “Less Is More: The Problematic Future of Irregular Warfare in an Era of Collapsing States,” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (2007): 276.

¹³³ Guttieri, “Metrics in Iraq’s Complex Conflict Environment,” 140.

¹³⁴ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 106–107.

Furthermore, Ghani and Lockhart coin the term “the aid complex,” which describes the business and industry that has grown from the aid community.¹³⁵ CA is part of this community; however, the kind of influence CA wants is not found through random projects. “Good intentions are wasted without positive effects.”¹³⁶ As Ghani and Lockhart state, “Without an approach based on a clear analysis of the state’s core functions, it continues to deal with the symptoms rather than the cause of the problem.”¹³⁷ CA training and experience emphasize these concepts; however, additional education could further the professionalization of the force and increase its ability to influence a populace to maximize effectiveness.

An area ripe for CA education, and which is currently underemphasized, is governance. The current training exhibits a lack of governance training especially within the active CA component. This training could focus specifically on issues within governance, such as rule of law. Ghani and Lockhart discuss the influence rule of law has on a society.

When rule of law takes hold, it creates a reinforcing loop of stability, predictability, trust and empowerment. First, rule of law stabilizes government and holds it accountable. Second, it sets a predictable environment to allow long term planning. Third, it creates confidence in the public. And fourth, it empowers those in civil society and the economy to take initiatives, form associations, create companies, and work within the confines of the state more broadly.¹³⁸

CA strives for this is the type of influence. It is difficult to realize solely at the tactical level; however, if implemented and coordinated at the operational and strategic levels, and with an educated force, such effects are achievable. Including educated and experienced senior CA soldiers in strategic and operational planning to include shaping operations in phase zero, as well as support to stability operations, and the reconstruction and development phases of engagement will allow the Army to receive maximum utility from the investment in CA soldiers.

¹³⁵ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*, 107.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 126.

Finally, Echevarria contends that when looking at how the United States has fought wars historically, “The concept of war rarely extended beyond winning battles and campaigns –therefore, the American way of war was more of a way of battle rather than a way of war.”¹³⁹ A new indirect approach of influence, speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise will be more effective than “the traditional dependence on overwhelming force, mass and concentration.”¹⁴⁰ As senior commanders and policy makers review these concepts, the importance of such operations reveals the need for forces, such as CA, and the influence they exert.

The next chapter outlines what is currently taught to CA officers in the qualification course. It shows that, despite the tremendous potential as an influencing force, the current education lacks critical areas of education and training, such as understanding what influence is and how and why it is necessary. A lack of training and understanding exists of the strategic influence necessary to permeate throughout all three levels of operations. The next chapter also lays out a proposed operational level course that currently does not exist, which focuses on leveraging influence.

¹³⁹ Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Transforming the Army’s Way of Battle: Revising Our Abstract Knowledge,” in *The Future of the Army Profession* ed. Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 2005), 368.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 369.

IV. CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING

This chapter discusses current CA requirements and training for active duty CA run through the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, NC. The chapter begins by discussing DOD requirements for CA. Building off Chapter III on influence, the chapter then discusses the shortfalls of the current training in preparing CA soldiers for influence operations. The chapter also discusses the missed opportunity for advanced training and education for CA soldiers.

This chapter demonstrates that U.S. Army Special Operations Command does not optimally prepare active duty CA for employment as an influencing force, but rather continues to prepare them more for stability operations. As the U.S. government pulls its forces out of Afghanistan and moves towards smaller engagements, CA training needs to change to prepare CA soldiers better for influence and shaping operations, as well as large-scale stability operations.

A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPECIFIED TASKS FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

The DOD, through directives to the uniformed services, specify the requirements for the armed services to maintain the capability for providing, building, and supporting governance in conjunction with, or in the absence of, civil authorities. In 2005, and again in 2009, DODD 3000.05 identified stability operations as a core military mission, one that the military will be prepared to conduct with parity of combat operations.¹⁴¹ In addition, this directive ordered the services to maintain a capability for the following.

Lead stability operations activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Directive 3000.05,” September 2009, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>, 2.

¹⁴² Ibid.

All branches of the military play a role in stability operations; however, the Army, due to its size and mission scope, has a particularly large role in stability operations.

In addition to the CA core tasks discussed in Chapter II, the 2014 DOD Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs, identifies the requirement to maintain a CA force capable of providing support to stability operations. Two requirements are identified.

Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that normally are the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement DOD policies to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions...Establish and conduct military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.¹⁴³

The Army has the largest professional CA force and, therefore, will bear the largest share of the military burden in a full-scale or protracted stability operation mission. The bulk of the skills for civilian sector expertise reside within the Army reserve CA functional specialties.¹⁴⁴ Finally, the 2008 DOD Directive 3000.07 identifies the follow requirements for irregular warfare.

Through direct or indirect means, and on a large scale when required, support a foreign government or population threatened by irregular adversaries...Create a safe, secure environment in fragile states and, if required, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure restoration, and humanitarian relief.¹⁴⁵

These various directives demonstrate that requirements for CA support, specifically, CA support to governance crosses multiple military missions and skill sets. The number of tasks that Army CA is expected to cover creates considerable challenges for training and education. The remainder of the chapter examines CA training, identifies areas for improvement, and proposes a way forward for a professional CA force.

¹⁴³ Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Directive 2000.13," March 2014, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/200013_2014_correction_b.pdf, 2.

¹⁴⁴ Hicks, Wormuth, and Ridge, *The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs Forces*, 32.

¹⁴⁵ Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Directive 3000.07," December 2008, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf>, 2.

B. CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING

To prepare civil affairs soldiers properly, a balance of training and education is necessary. Military training is the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks, while military education is the systematic instruction of individuals and subjects that will enhance their knowledge in the art and science of war.¹⁴⁶ The complex environments in which CA soldiers operate require education and training beyond the scope of the professional military education system.

Currently, training and education for a CA officer is limited to the tactical level. The civil affairs qualification course (CAQC) is the only formal and required CA training or education officers will receive in their career; no CA advanced courses exist beyond the initial training. CA training during the CAQC is limited to only 13 weeks; the remaining 29 weeks of 42 total weeks is devoted to language training and regional studies. The majority of the time in training is spent on language, the skill that is most perishable, seldom used, and difficult to maintain. See Figure 7, Active Duty Civil Affairs Pipeline.

¹⁴⁶ Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, unrevised (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010).

Active Duty Civil Affairs Pipeline




Figure 7. CA Training Pipeline¹⁴⁷

The 13 weeks of CA training can be further broken down by phase. Phase One is a one-week introduction to CA. This portion of the training defines CA and CA operations, in addition to administratively preparing the students for the remainder of the course. The bulk of CA training occurs in the eight weeks of Phase Three. This training consists of five modules: Module A, Civil Affairs Core Tasks; Module B, Civil Affairs Engagements; Module C, Civil Affairs Information Management; Module D, Civil Affairs Methodology; and Survivability. The remaining four weeks are experiential learning and application during Operation SLUSS-TILLER, the culmination exercise for the CAQC. Upon completion of the CAQC, captains are able to operate at the tactical level with a common knowledge foundation. See Figure 8.

¹⁴⁷ United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *Civil Affairs Qualification Course Command Brief*, briefing slides (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy, Special Warfare Center and School, 2014), slide 3.

Active Duty Civil Affairs Pipeline




Figure 8. CA Training Pipeline by Module¹⁴⁸

C. SHORT FALLS OF CURRENT CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING

The Civil Affairs Qualification Course is limited to the tactical level by several factors. First, the course is designed for captains and their role as a CA team leader; in that sense, the course may seem to be tailored appropriately for the audience. Alternatively, CA captains are expected to tie their operations and effects to operational and strategic level objectives, for which, however, they are not specifically educated. A study of the National Defense Strategy and blocks of instruction on operational planning and systems analysis are taught in the beginning of phase three. However, aside from this one block of courses, no real link exists to operational planning and operational orders

¹⁴⁸ United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *Civil Affairs Qualification Course Command Brief*, slide 4.

production, which makes it difficult for many CA soldiers to plan, operate, and influence effectively at the operational and strategic levels.

Second, senior CA captains, without much training or experience at the operational level, instruct the CAQC. Their only CA experience has likely been as team leader or battalion staff officer. By this measure, the model of using captains as instructors in the course limits the subject matter to the tactical level with little ties to overarching military goals or U.S. objectives.

CA works in complex and unstable environments, which makes training challenging and requires a range of skills spanning weapons proficiency to knowledge in governance. To best prepare for complicated environments, and to conduct CA operations more effectively, additional education outside of the professional military education system is required.¹⁴⁹ Department of the Army pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3 describes skills unique to the CA officer.

They must have the ability to solve complex political-military problems and to develop and employ conventional and unconventional solutions. They also must be able to devise and execute nonstandard and non-doctrinal methods and techniques, when applicable, to remedy unforeseen circumstances. They also must be capable of decisive action in missions for which no doctrine exists.¹⁵⁰

Reserve CA includes six functional specialties: rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, public health and welfare, and public education and information. A fundamental knowledge of these areas, not currently found in the CAQC, may better prepare active CA operators to identify, reduce, mitigate, or eliminate critical civil vulnerabilities in the contemporary and future operating environments. See Figure 9.

¹⁴⁹ Mark L. Kimmey, "Transforming Civil Affairs," *Army Magazine*, 2005, http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2005/3/Documents/FC_Kimmey_0305.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 186.

Education Proposal #1




Figure 9. Educational Proposal #1

Furthermore, CA soldiers often face “wicked problems.” According to Rittel and Webber, wicked problems have 10 characteristics: 1) no definitive formulation exists, 2) wicked problems have no stopping rule, 3) solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but good or bad, 4) no immediate or final test of a solution to a wicked problem is available, 5) every solution to a wicked problem is a “one-shot operation” because no opportunity exists to learn by trial and error, every attempt counts significantly, 6) wicked problems do not have an enumerable set of potential solutions nor does a well described set of permissible operations exists that can be incorporated into the plan, 7) every wicked problem is essentially unique, 8) every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem, 9) an observer’s world view is the strongest factor explaining which solutions to favor and promote, and 10) the problem solver has no right to be wrong.¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in General Theory of Planning,” *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973): 161–166.

This definition is powerful in the fact that little to no training is available to solve wicked problems. Education and experience are necessary for CA soldiers just to begin working on wicked problems. For example, in developing nations, an identifiable symptom in an unstable state may be a smaller piece to a maladjusted or disequilibrated system. As Nancy Roberts describes in “A Design Approach to Wicked Problems,” addressing a symptom may further intensify the problem or it may lead to taming the problem. Taming the problem refers to addressing only parts of the problem that are understandable while not addressing the problem as a whole.¹⁵² The limited education received during the CAQC leads CA soldiers most likely to tame problems rather than address the whole of the system.

D. THE NEED FOR A CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVEL EDUCATION

The soon-to-be implemented special warfare advanced analysis and targeting course (SWAATC) will help bridge the gap between tactical and operational arenas. The SWAATC is designed to enhance the operator’s ability to research, analyze, target, and plan activities to build, degrade, mitigate, or exploit critical factors of state, counter state, and neutral actors. The course will also enhance the operator’s ability to utilize and employ analytical and targeting frameworks to the human domain across the full spectrum of special warfare.

Upon completion of this course, a CA senior captain or major would be able to plan effectively at the embassy or JSOTF level. Furthermore, officers would be able to understand and more effectively influence the populace while tying strategic and operational goals and objectives to these influencing operations. This course is not the total solution to the lack of training currently being offered CA soldiers, but one of several steps towards investing in human capital and educating the force. See the SWAATC course curriculum in the Appendix.

¹⁵² Jeff Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,” in *Dialogue Mapping: Building Shared Understanding of Wicked Problems*, ed. Jeff Conklin (New York: Wiley, October 2005), 11.

Finally, as described, a common and coordinating theme among the CA functional specialties and the mission of Army CA is training and education in governance. Specializing in governance at all levels local—district and state—would prepare CA professionals for common areas of concern in developing countries or states affected by conflict or instability. Additionally, focusing on governance would fulfill requirements outlined in DODDs for CA,¹⁵³ stability operations,¹⁵⁴ and irregular warfare.¹⁵⁵

E. CREDENTIALING AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN CIVIL AFFAIRS

The education and credentialing of Army CA are paramount to the ability to conduct credible CA operations in complex and unstable environments. Graduate-level education would provide a common credential for CA in the international community. This requirement corresponds to Cialdini's principles of influence, discussed in Chapter II, specifically the ideas of authority and titling. Whether the Army finds itself in a peacetime phase zero environment conducting shaping operations, engaged in hybrid wars¹⁵⁶ or stability operations, CA operations will be necessary. Most likely, any deployment of CA personnel would be working in conjunction with members of the U.S. interagency, the international community and NGOs, all of which place great value in and require graduate education in their own organizations.¹⁵⁷ Credentialing would better prepare CA for engaging the complex environments of modern warfare and provide

¹⁵³ Department of Defense, *DODD 2000.13, Civil Affairs* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014).

¹⁵⁴ Department of Defense, *DODD 3000.05, Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009).

¹⁵⁵ Department of Defense, *DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008).

¹⁵⁶ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 28.

¹⁵⁷ United Nations Fact Sheet, "Employment Opportunities," accessed April 24, 2014, http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/visitors/shared/documents/pdfs/FS_Employment.pdf; New York University School of Law Public Interest Law Center, "Jobs with the UN and International Organizations," accessed April 24, 2014, <http://www.northeastern.edu/law/pdfs/career-services/jobs%20with%20the%20un%20and%20international%20organizations.pdf>; University of Oxford, The Career Services, "International Organizations," accessed April 24, 2014, <http://www.careers.ox.ac.uk/options-and-occupations/sectors-and-occupations/international-organisations/>.

legitimacy to CA officers to better collaborate with the multitude of actors present in these conflicts.

Examples of similar professions exist within other agencies. The UN, for example, has a CA career field that conducts a range of tasks, which parallel Army CA in tactics and techniques, for the purposes of peace building and peacekeeping. The UN Civil Affairs Handbook describes the following as fundamental to the core success of civil affairs.

Building relationships with local actors at the community level; listening to, liaising with and supporting local efforts at stabilization, conflict resolution and peace building; and supporting and building local capacity at the community level in order to strengthen the reach and authority of the state.¹⁵⁸

A career in UN CA requires an, “advanced university degree (master’s degree or equivalent) in social sciences, political science, international relations, public administration, anthropology, law, economics, or related area.”¹⁵⁹ These requirements for the UN CA career field offer useful suggestions for building similar requirements for U.S. Army CA.

Currently, to qualify for the U.S. Army CA branch, an officer in a certain year of service must possess a baccalaureate degree, be eligible for a top-secret clearance, possess the aptitude to learn a foreign language, and be willing to volunteer for airborne training.¹⁶⁰ Upon passing the Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection (CAAS), the officer will complete the Civil Affairs Qualification Course with a new career field designation and a handshake, but with no specific credentials. To maximize the U.S. Army CA’ participation in the planning for and execution of unified land operations, shaping operations, or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, a graduate degree for CA officers is necessary to advance the profession.

¹⁵⁸ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, ed. Joanna Harvey, Cedric de Coning, and Lillah Fearnley (New York: United Nations, 2012), 4.

¹⁵⁹ United Nations, “Careers,” accessed April 24, 2014, <https://careers.un.org>.

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Army Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, “Civil Affairs Officer Qualifications,” accessed April 24, 2014 http://www.sorbrecruiting.com/CA_officerquals.htm.

Moreover, if CA are to bridge the link between the military and civilian agencies and organizations, the education of CA soldiers should be equivalent and complementary to their civilian contemporaries. A master's degree from the National Defense University, for example, will expose soldiers to similar concepts but it lacks the recognition and credibility that a degree from the Harvard Kennedy School or University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill's School of Government will evoke from the civilian sector.

The initial introduction to education is vital to the ability of the branch to prepare future CA officers who will not have the benefit of coming of age in the Global War on Terror; but the effort cannot end at that point. To be a specialist or an expert, the role of education for CA officers must continue throughout their career. As Samuel Huntington describes, "expertise is acquired through prolonged education and experience."¹⁶¹ To engage in the tactical and operational levels, CA officers equipped with a graduate education, experiential training, and developing experience will suffice. To expand the breadth of CA to addressing regional or theater level conditions of instability, additional education and experience is required.

A recent *Military Affairs* article argues that the traditional career model and professional military education system lacks the ability to train military officers for operational and strategic level operations and planning.¹⁶² This observation is particularly true of CA. Operational and strategic CA operators and planners require a broad knowledge of economics, governments in the region, and a historical context of the theater of operation. These requirements demand a master's degree, and in some cases, a doctoral level education. The School of Advanced Military Studies justifies the need for a PhD program by stating, "A military strategic planner must be able to inform strategic debate through coherent analysis and dialogue with influential thinkers within and outside government."¹⁶³ The same argument holds true for CA.

¹⁶¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1972), 8.

¹⁶² Gordon B. Davis Jr., Thomas C. Graves, and Christopher N. Prigge, "The Strategic Planning 'Problem,'" *Military Review*, 2013.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 13.

In hazardous environments, unlike Foreign Service officers or aid workers, CA soldiers have the ability to provide their own security. The tactical and survivability training of CA forces allows them the ability to work in semi- and non-permissive environments in which civilian aid and development workers cannot. In these instances, CA forces, trained in governance, would be best positioned to build, support, or augment governments until that task can be transitioned to a civilian agency or the local government is again capable of normal operation.¹⁶⁴

Given these many requirements, the goal for a regionally specialized, CA senior leader and advisor at the geographic combatant commands (GCCs) should be a CA colonel with a relevant PhD, coupled with experience studying and working in his assigned theater of responsibility. A regionally specialized and educated colonel is best equipped to advise, synchronize, and direct theater-wide CA activities in support of the GCC commander and U.S. government objectives.

1. Education Proposal #1

A number of education options are available to meet these CA-specific requirements. The addition of a variety of social science classes, with a focus on governance at the graduate education level in the CAQC, could provide a bridge toward higher education and allow junior CA officers a baseline of knowledge from which to draw upon in their missions abroad. Such a program could produce CA officers, governance specialists, and broad-spectrum social scientists prepared to identify, reduce, eliminate, or mitigate critical civil vulnerabilities in foreign populations in support of military goals and U.S. government objectives.

Experienced CA officers, who have completed a graduate-level program through the comprehensive exams required to become a doctoral candidate, would be an ideal co-instructor at the CAQC, and more importantly, future advanced CA courses, while completing their dissertation. The candidate would be responsible for the inclusion of social science principles, theories, and case studies alongside senior CA captains who

¹⁶⁴ Nadia Schadlow, Charles Barry, and Richard Lacquement, “A Return to the Army’s Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction,” in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 2005), 254.

have recently returned from the operational force to instruct students in the most current tactics, techniques, and procedures; this configuration would better prepare CA soldiers in training for the complex realities of CA operations.

Partnership with a major university should be sought so that the military instructors, and PhD candidates, act as an adjunct professor to a nearby institution. Such an arrangement may allow the ability to confer a master's degree from the partnered institution upon the completion of the CA qualification course. This partnership would lend credibility to the branch through the standard credential of a master's degree for new CA captains while allowing more senior CA officers the opportunity to complete their doctoral dissertation before returning to the operational force. Additionally, conferring a degree from an established university eliminates the need to seek academic accreditation of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

The phases of the CA course, proposed in this project, lend themselves to brief but intensive graduate education blocks. For example, the four-week regional studies phase may easily translate into graduate courses in regional specific politics, economics, history, culture, and religion. Following the eight-week CA phase would be an ideal time to add a four-week course in the fundamental principles of rule of law, economics, public policy, and authorities, as well as an introduction to design thinking and wicked problems in support of the CA core tasks and influence operations. An additional four-week phase in the study of government would provide each CA officer a common knowledge in governance. Keeping the graduate instruction compartmentalized in four-week blocks allows reserve CA officers the opportunity to return to the Special Warfare Center and School on 29-day orders for graduate certificates in regional studies, government, or social science.

This course of action would extend the CAQC by eight weeks but would more aptly prepare burgeoning CA practitioners for the complex and unstable environment they will face in addition to providing a civilian master's degree credential.

2. Education Proposal #2

As an alternative to graduate education in the CAQC, the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and Clemson University, among others, offer online programs in a Master's of Public Administration. Additionally, schools, such as Johns Hopkins University, offer a Master of Arts in Government that is entirely online. Such programs could be offered over a multi-year period beginning with the CAQC, to be completed at the convenience of the service member, and would enhance the capacity and capability of CA teams in their missions. Capitalizing on online education options will require a significant time investment from the service member, as well as the unit, although the academic foundation for CA forces and credentialing can still be obtained while soldiers are at their units.

This course of action, while successful in exposing CA operators to graduate education, may occur too late in the officer's career. In many cases, CA officers have one opportunity as a CA team leader, and the team leader position often directly follows completion of the CA qualification course. In this instance, an online master's degree option may come too late in the officer's professional timeline to benefit the team, the unit, and the area to which the CA team may have deployed.

3. Education Proposal #3

Modifying the Naval Postgraduate School's Stability, Security and Development in Complex Operations (SSDCO) curriculum could provide another option for the educational foundation of CA. The SSDCO course consists of three to four weeks of distributed learning followed by four weeks of in-residence coursework.¹⁶⁵ In its current state, the SSDCO is a graduate certificate-producing program with a follow on educational opportunity focusing on rule of law. The opportunity exists to develop a version of this program with educational certificates corresponding to the CA functional

¹⁶⁵ Naval Postgraduate School, Global Public Policy Academic Group, "Certificate Programs," last updated August 31, 2012, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/AcademicGroups/GPPAG/Research/certificate_programs.html.

specialties¹⁶⁶ through a blend of distant and in-residence instruction. If each segment is treated as a graduate certificate program; completing all the segments could result in a master's degree for CA soldiers, active and reserve alike.

Week 3						
SSDCO Spring 2014						
	MONDAY 2 June	TUESDAY 3 June	WEDNESDAY 4 June	THURSDAY 5 June	FRIDAY 6 June	
0800	GP3300 Prof Hurst IN-280	GP3100 Prof Pineda IN-280	GP3300 Prof Hurst IN-280	Prep Work	NWC Borneo Exercise Prof Moore Reed Hall Bldg 310, Rm 203	0800
0830						0830
0900						0900
0930						0930
1000						1000
1030						1030
1100						1100
1130	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	1130
1200						1200
1230						1230
1300	GP3100 Prof Pineda IN-280	GP3200 Prof Philbin IN-280	Prep Work	GP3200 Prof Philbin IN-280	NWC Borneo Exercise Prof Moore Reed Hall Bldg 310, Rm 203	1300
1330						1330
1400						1400
1430						1430
1500						1500
1530						1530
1600	Free Time	Free Time	Free Time	Free Time	Free Time	1600
1630						1630

Figure 10. Example week of SSDCO; week 3 of 4¹⁶⁷

4. Challenges to Implementing Certificate Programs

The limiting factors to implementing a robust and continuing education system in the CA career path are time and money. Making the Civil Affairs Pipeline a graduate degree-producing program would add an additional eight weeks to the training timeline. This eight-week investment in CA officers will provide the joint force a more capable asset to align policy, strategy, and operations. The Army and USASOC should consider the increased investment in CA human capital in line with the Chairman's Strategic Guidance to the Joint Force to, "enhance the dialogue in operational theaters and across

¹⁶⁶ CA functional specialties: rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public education and information.

¹⁶⁷ Naval Postgraduate School, "Stability, Security, and Development in Complex Operations Course," Syllabus, Spring 2014.

U.S. interagency decision-making processes.”¹⁶⁸ Additional cost will be incurred by adding a master’s program from a civilian university. The Army expects officers, particularly SOF officers, to complete a master’s program during their career or in concurrence with intermediate level education.¹⁶⁹ CA teams, the initial entry point, are the unit of action for CA operations. Injecting education with the qualification course allows the military to reap the greatest reward for an education they are likely to pay for anyway.¹⁷⁰ As the Chairman identifies, “education will serve as a hedge against surprise, much as it has during previous interwar periods.” SOCOM 2020 identifies the SOF operator of 2020 as an, “expert warrior, regionally grounded, well-educated, diplomatically astute and a master of SOF tradecraft.”¹⁷¹ This educational program will posture the CA branch to fulfill its role in the SOCOM 2020 strategy.

F. CONCLUSION

Whether the CA educational program provides the broad underpinnings of CA concepts or a deep dive in a particular subject, such as governance, CA soldiers require education, training, and experience to thrive in complex and unstable environments. CA training and continued education are the foundation for progressing the capability and capacity of the branch. The next chapter proposes an alternate career path that emphasizes additional education and regional specialization as a means to progress to senior ranks.

¹⁶⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *18th Chairman’s 2nd Term Strategic Direction to the Joint Force*, 4.

¹⁶⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 189.

¹⁷⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 189.

¹⁷¹ United States Special Operations Command, *SOCOM 2020* (MacDill AFB, FL: United States Special Operations Command, Public Affairs Office, 2012), 8.

V. CIVIL AFFAIRS CAREER TRACK

This chapter discusses alternate career paths focusing on education and broadening opportunities to influence decision makers and populations better. Using the education model developed in Chapter IV, the chapter explores potential alternate career paths that would maximize the use of senior CA officers in a variety of missions, ranging from phase zero shaping and influence operations to post-conflict stabilization.

The chapter begins by describing the existing career path and milestones to the rank of colonel. It then proposes an alternative career path that allows time for specialized education and more experience in an officer's area of expertise. The chapter then demonstrates how this added education and experience would better serve strategic level thinking at the geographic and functional combatant command (COCOM) levels.

This chapter argues that the current career path for active duty CA officers does not capitalize on the experience gained by CA officers in their deployments, nor does it offer sufficient training and education to prepare field grade officers and above for the broad spectrum of CA missions. CA requires education and broadening opportunities outside of the professional military education system and conventional command track to better position this force for employment in future military operations. Specifically, CA can evolve to embrace and shape persistent engagements in areas of interest to the United States while continuing to prepare for future, large-scale stability operations.

A. CURRENT CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER CAREER PATH

The current career path for CA officers, outlined in DA PAM 600-3, is based upon the career model for Army maneuver branches for selection to command a battalion, and eventually, a brigade. DA PAM 600-3 identifies unique attributes of the CA officer.

The human dimension is the differentiating factor that separates CA forces from all other military organizations. CA forces are people-centric...CA forces do not operate in an environment of black and white, with clearly

delineated boundaries...The unique operational area of CA forces is people; the human dimension, the human sensor, force multiplication, and ground truth.¹⁷²

Currently, the CA operations previously described, only consistently occur at the rank of captain in the existing career path, which is the lowest ranking active duty CA officer. As CA captains, officers usually have the opportunity to deploy once, sometimes twice, in the role of CA team leader; that occurrence is often the full extent of practical CA experience for an officer. In CA, like all SOF branches, majors serve as company commanders, leading five CA teams with captains serving as team leaders and a CMO cell led by another major. Following company command, a CA major, on track for promotion, will seek a second key developmental (KD) job as a battalion operation's officer or battalion executive officer. Upon completing one or both of these positions, the major is on track for promotion as an Army lieutenant colonel. A board is then convened to determine which officers should be considered for a battalion command. Successfully completing battalion command is the proven and reliable method to reaching the rank of colonel under the current promotion system. CA battalion commanders, in the two active duty CA brigades, serve primarily as force providers with the responsibility to man, train, and equip CA soldiers for CA operations in support of GCC commanders and the joint force. On average, an officer's timeline allows approximately seven years at the rank of major and five years at the rank of lieutenant colonel before promotion to colonel. See Figure 11.

The CA career track to colonel has multiple implications for the conduct of CA at the operational and strategic level. First, most officers have not conducted CA operations since the rank of captain; instead, they have been consumed with the duties and responsibilities of the force provider. Second, to ensure promotion, the officers have little time to pursue additional civilian education outside of professional military education or develop foreign language fluency. Third, despite having studied a geographic area of

¹⁷² Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 186.

specialty, the opportunity for CA officers to spend time in their foreign area of expertise through a broadening assignment, conflicts with the timeline for professional advancement.




Figure 11. CA Career Model from DA PAM 600-3¹⁷³

¹⁷³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*.




Figure 12. Proposed CA Career Model for future DA PAM 600-3¹⁷⁴

Snider argues that the CA officer's career path is emblematic of a wider problem within the U.S. Army, specifically that the Army's human resources practices have created an incentive structure in which Army officers are rewarded for following the traditional, force provider career path instead of mastering their assigned occupational specialty.¹⁷⁵ A force provider trains and equips the operating core of the military in support of the mission of the branch. However, for CA professionals to engage and operate in their military specialty, additional education, enhanced language abilities, and professional experience would greatly increase the capacity of these soldiers to plan, lead, and conduct strategic level operations. Furthermore, no incentive exists for soldiers to complete advanced degrees. For officers, a master's degree is expected at the senior ranks; however, the quality of that degree is not scrutinized; an online degree is largely equal to a degree from a top tier institution. Potentially, officers who took time out of

¹⁷⁴ U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Civil Affairs Proponency, *CA Career Model for Future DA PAM 600-3* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2014).

¹⁷⁵ Don M. Snider, "The U.S. Army a Profession," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews, 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 2005), 24.

their career to complete a degree may be at a disadvantage to officers who conducted their education online while completing key and developmental jobs towards career advancement.

The traditional career track produces proficient military officers familiar with traditional Army tasks; however, the current system places smaller or more specialized career fields at a disadvantage when compared to the larger and more traditional Army branches. Additionally, it does not foster regional or occupational expertise that could be leveraged at the lieutenant colonel or colonel grades to serve effectively as CA advisors to Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) or GCC commanders.

B. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROMOTION

CA branch has a similar number of total authorized billets to SF branch.¹⁷⁶ According to the Army's 2014 *Updated Authorization Document*, CA has 26 more authorizations at the rank of captain and one more authorization at the rank of major than does the SF branch. These authorizations correspond largely to fulfilling the requirement for tactical level CA. At the operational and strategic level, SF have 100 more lieutenant colonel and 50 more colonel authorizations than does CA.¹⁷⁷ The limited number of lieutenant colonel and colonel billets reduces the inclusion of senior CA officers at the divisions and corps, the ASCCs, the theater special operations commands (TSOCs) and the GCCs. For example, six reserve CA coded billets are located at United States Pacific Command (USPACOM); one colonel and two lieutenant colonels in the J91, the interagency staff section, and one major and two sergeants first class in the J564, the theater security cooperation management section.¹⁷⁸ No active duty CA coded billets are located at USPACOM.¹⁷⁹ See Figure 13.

¹⁷⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff G-1, Directorate of Military Personnel Management, *Updated Authorization Document* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2014).

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ USPACOM J113, Personnel Management Branch, *Briefing Slides* (Honolulu, HI: USPACOM J113, Personnel Management Branch, 2014).

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

	SF	CA
CPT	549	575
MAJ	271	272
LTC	184	84
COL	65	14




Figure 13. Comparison of Special Forces and Civil Affairs Authorizations

Other Army branches use limited authorizations at the lieutenant colonel and colonel ranks to justify filling branch immaterial or operations branch immaterial positions, O1A and O2A coded billets, respectively.¹⁸⁰ However, for SOF branches, like CA, the Department of the Army issued Executive Order 042-11, which allows Army Human Resources Command not to assign SOF personnel to O1A and O2A jobs due to the increase in SOF demand worldwide.¹⁸¹ For CA, these relatively small numbers result in an underrepresentation at the operational and strategic level of operations and planning, a diminished opportunity to attend the senior service colleges, and ultimately, a limited career path for CA officers.

C. AN ALTERNATE CIVIL AFFAIRS CAREER MODEL

A CA officer, capable of persistent engagement and long-term operations, with a functional specialty, can be developed within active CA through education and experience.¹⁸² Individuals electing to follow such a path would be similar in concept to the CA governance specialist concept, introduced in Chapter IV, beginning as an active

¹⁸⁰ Anonymous phone interview with the author, May 12, 2014.

¹⁸¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Executive Order 041-11, Fencing ARSOF Soldiers from HQDA Taskings* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010).

¹⁸² Kimmey, "Transforming Civil Affairs."

duty CA generalist, and then, specializing in a particular AOR and functional area corresponding with the CA functional specialties.¹⁸³ After promotion to major, and potentially after company command, a CA officer would pursue additional education or credentialing to be considered a specialist in the field. For governance specialists, it could mean a master's degree in public administration; for an engineer specializing in infrastructure, it could result in a master's degree in civil engineering or a professional engineers license. This career path allows officers to build upon their undergraduate degrees or self-interest, within the CA functional specialties, to determine a field of study and specialization that could result in greater expertise and the ability to advise at the strategic level and better support military engagement as part of wider U.S. foreign policy objectives.

In addition to pursuing higher education specific to CA expertise, this knowledge could be further bolstered by a 12-month internship that provides practical experience in the profession, as well as a geographical area of specialization. For example, a governance specialist could seek a position with the USAID Regional Development Mission in a specific geographic area, while an engineer could seek a position with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or Naval Facilities Engineer Command in the assigned AOR. Alternatively, a CA officer could temporarily augment an Office of Defense Cooperation, Security Assistance or Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group; these experiences would provide developing CA specialists an opportunity to blend their civilian expertise and military profession. Furthermore, these assignments would allow CA officers the opportunity to gain additional experience in their specialty professions and build a professional network of peers while enhancing their cultural understanding and foreign language proficiency in their area of focus. Additional options for internships exist at international organizations, such as the regional UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination offices, the Hague Academy of Local Governance, attendance at foreign command and general staff colleges or a tour with the Ministry of Defense Advisors

¹⁸³ Scot N. Storey, *Rebalancing Army Civil Affairs: The Key to Military Governance* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012).

Program. Following education and a practical internship, officers would be assigned to ASCCs, the TSOCs or the GCCs.

Finally, the trained, educated, and experienced CA officers at strategic level commands would assist leaders in synchronizing theater, regional, and country objectives through operations, planning, and exercises. The CA specialists could further work in conjunction with the foreign area officers who shape the country-level military relationships. CA officers also could tailor engagements and objectives to influence or shape targeted populations, local governments, or empower indigenous military units to support and assist local civil authorities. This course of action creates a corps of regional specialists with functional skills, operating as staff members in theater-level elements, who are available to support CA operations and achieve military objectives in the theater.

Implementing this new career path faces several important challenges. First, in the current professional model, additional education and internships outside the force negatively affect an officer's professional timeline. To address this issue and to maintain a regional specialization, key and developmental jobs for CA specialists would have to be adopted by the Army in DA PAM 600-3, "Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management," to reflect professional development in regionally-specific CA positions within theater-level operations, planning, and exercise staff sections.

Second, the primary staff functions at the GCC and ASCC could be added to the centralized selection list or CSL. Ensuring qualified and experienced regional specialists were correctly assigned to these senior positions would demonstrate professional parity with the command-tracked CA officers while certifying the appropriate officers are assigned to these critical billets. Military intelligence (MI) branch specifies a similar career track, which designates a number of intelligence jobs as key and developmental at the major level. At the rank of lieutenant colonel, MI assigns two positions from a CSL, a MI battalion command, as well as the division intelligence officer (G-2).¹⁸⁴ The MI track sets a precedence from which CA could designate the GCC and ASCC CA positions as

¹⁸⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 244.

CSL colonel billets while the senior CA officer at the TSOC could be a CSL lieutenant colonel. Furthermore, professional development credit could be given to officers selected for doctoral-level degrees to return and teach at the CAQC as part of their utilization to the branch. This career path culminates with an experienced, educated, and effective CA colonel serving as the primary advisory to the GCC commander and his staff while synchronizing CA operations across the theater. See Figure 14.

Civil Affairs Specialist Career Model




Figure 14. Sample Career Models for CA Specialists

D. OPTIONS OUTSIDE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

Based on current authorizations, CA has a limited trajectory of advancement for a majority of officers. According to the 2014 personnel authorizations for CA, the authorizations are for 575 captains, 272 majors, 84 lieutenant colonels, and only 14 colonels.¹⁸⁵ To increase opportunities for CA further, another career path could be developed that employs qualified and experienced officers in other Army functional

¹⁸⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff G-1, Directorate of Military Personnel Management, *Updated Authorization Document*.

areas, such as foreign area officer or strategist; both these career fields have larger authorizations at the lieutenant colonel and colonel grade than CA.

E. CONCLUSION

The current career progression model does not appropriately prepare CA officers to plan, lead, and conduct CA operations at the operational and strategic level. An atmosphere, within the branch, of lifelong learning, additional education, and greater experience is required to bridge the cognitive strata between tactical, operational, and strategic level thought. Using the CA functional specialties to focus the active duty CA officer's education would empower CA officers to tailor their interests to professional endeavors for employment at the theater and regional level combatant commands. CA officers assigned in the operations, plans, and exercise directorates at the GCC, TSOC and ASCC would be best positioned to focus military engagements, large-scale exercises, and joint combined exchange trainings to best affect targeted populations, military units, organizations or groups, as well as local government units in support of U.S. and military objectives.

VI. CONCLUSION

Despite CA's significant achievements in stabilizing conflict settings from World War II to the present, CA has experienced intermittent support in preparing the force for future conflicts. After the Korean War, the DOD hired the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University to study CA in Korea. The authors of the study provided recommendations that are as true today as they were in 1951.

The Army should take steps to find adequate numbers of qualified officers and teach them the substance of Civil Affairs. This recommendation involves consideration of the development of criteria for the selection of CA officers, of the establishment of a career pattern, training in both military and political subjects, and of training both in the close support of tactical operations and rear area support of the operations of large units and commands.¹⁸⁶

This capstone has outlined the historical training and employment of CA forces, examined methods of influence, summarized current CA training, and proposed a new career progression track for the CA officer. Based on the contemporary and future missions of CA, this project proposes additional education and advanced training as the foundation for more effective CA officers. Finally, this capstone proposes a further evolution of CA in line with U.S. Army Special Operations Command's ARSOF 2022 strategy, specifically developing capabilities to influence target groups in phase zero shaping operations.

The capstone concludes with the following observations and recommendations. First, maximizing the influence and effectiveness of CA forces requires an investment in human capital. As stated in ARSOF 2022, empowering the force through enhanced education and training, as well as developing new approaches to immersive education and professional experiences culturally, will enhance the capability to conduct effective and nuanced influence activities.¹⁸⁷ These steps will lead toward optimizing the relationship between special operations and conventional forces with joint, interagency,

¹⁸⁶ Stolzenbach and Kissinger, *Civil Affairs in Korea 1950–1951*, Johns Hopkins University, 2.

¹⁸⁷ United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Office of Strategic Communication, *ARSOF 2022*, 18.

intergovernmental, and multinational actors through habitual interdependence. By assigning qualified and culturally educated officers to regional combatant commands, CA will be positioned to nest the efforts of SOF, Army regionally-aligned forces, and the interagency, while providing options for policy makers.¹⁸⁸

Second, regionally astute CA officers at the operational and strategic levels will best provide continuous and proactive support to deployed forces poised to provide tailored capabilities in support of national-level influence operations and strategy.¹⁸⁹ To achieve these ends, this capstone proposes an alternate career model for CA officers to receive additional education and advanced military planning courses to integrate CA operations into operations and planning at the operational and strategic-level commands. Assigning CA officers to joint, Army, interagency and SOF operational headquarters will enhance the campaign planning capability of the staff while providing these commands with the Army's stability and CMO experts focused on the human domain.¹⁹⁰ Through education, experience, and proper employment, future CA officers will contribute directly and develop positions of influence in critical nexuses of U.S. policy, determination, and force projection.

Finally, education at the CA qualification course needs to include a greater emphasis on influence building and critical thinking skills to supplement the existing training. Graduate-level courses on the fundamentals of rule of law, economics, and social sciences with a focus on governance would better prepare CA officers for the complex and unstable environment to which they will deploy. In addition to the foundational education and training at the CAQC, advanced CA courses are required to develop tactical CA operators into special operations campaign planners and ARSOF operational artists. A curriculum that embodies this approach is included in the Appendix.

¹⁸⁸ United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Office of Strategic Communication, *ARSOF 2022*, 21.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.

A. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING THE NEW WAY AHEAD AND ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

The proposed alternate career path emphasizing additional education and experience does not come without obstacles to implementation. Such challenges include time, money, and the natural resistance to change. A significant amount of time will be required in the new officer career model to allow for educational growth and opportunities for additional experience. Rather than considered as time outside of the operational force, time spent on education and experience should be understood as an investment in CA operators to gain experience and expertise in their geographic region. Additionally, time spent for education and professional internships will incur additional duty service obligations to ensure that the U.S. Army and the branch receive an adequate return on investment.

As the Army enters an ever more fiscally constrained environment, securing funding for additional education will be increasingly difficult. Therefore, only a limited number of officers will be able to benefit from advanced education and experience. A DOD Program Objective Memorandum, along with the programming, budgeting, and execution process, would be required to institutionalize these requirements as a multi-year program for CA officers. In other words, the process of making this new career trajectory the standard path for CA officers will require a long-term financial commitment on the part of the U.S. Army, the DOD, and U.S. Congress; securing this support is no small challenge.

Additionally, an alternate career path will not come without risk to promotion and career progression. The regional specialization career track will need to be carefully mapped out, in the DA PAM 600-3, to ensure officers do not get punished for missing the traditional milestones for promotion and the new markers are recognized as necessary. Establishing career progression milestones like those proposed in this capstone most likely will require a transition period during which both the new and old milestones are recognized; undoubtedly, it will be a messy process.

Finally, this capstone would like to conclude with suggested areas for additional research. First, a thorough study of an alternate career path within the Army's Human

Resources Command infrastructure, including incentives and qualifications, is necessary to implement these proposed changes. An in-depth analysis would be required to maximize the return on investment in education and experience toward professional goals and influence. Alongside this study, a thorough review and fast-track revision of the DA PAM 600–3 is necessary to ensure alternate career path milestones are given full professional development credit for promotion and potential and career progression.

Second, a study of potential CA billets at the COCOM level would help identify existing positions for CA officers to advise at the strategic level, and areas that need CA but do not have the prescribed billets. Creating new billets in a fiscally austere environment is unlikely; therefore, CA positions at the COCOM level would most likely need to be taken from other billets. This process can be controversial but well worth the investment in reallocation.

APPENDIX. SPECIAL WARFARE ADVANCED ANALYSIS AND TARGETING COURSE

The SWAATC is designed to enhance ARSOF operators' abilities to research, analyze, target, and plan activities to build, degrade, mitigate, influence, or exploit critical factors of state, counter-state, and neutral actors. The course is a collaborative effort of instruction between CA, SF, and MI for ARSOF regiments. The intent of the course is to teach operational planning for TSOC Level II strategic special warfare campaign plans in support of GCC and U.S. embassy country plans through CA, SF, and Psychological Operations inputs with an emphasis on human targeting at the macro level. See Figure 16. SWAATC trains senior ARSOF captains, as well as serving as a prerequisite for the special warfare operational design course (SWODC). Figure 15 shows where the SWAATC fits into the professional military education (PME) for a Civil CA officer. This course does not replace the need for additional education, but serves as part of the advanced training necessary to inject CA operations into operational and strategic level military planning.




Figure 15. ARSOF Professional Education Model¹⁹¹

The course consists of four specific modules: joint planning, ID management, advanced special operations training, and CA targeting framework. See Figure 16.

¹⁹¹ United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *Special Warfare Advanced Analysis and Targeting Decision Brief*, briefing slides (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2014), Slide 5.




Figure 16. SWAATC by Module

A detailed outline of the course requirements is displayed in Figure 17.

Day 1-2	Day 3-4	Day 5	Day 6-7	Day 8-9	Day 10
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intro & Admin • Intro to JOPP • JIPOE • Strategic Direction • NSS/TSOC Guidance • Issue SOTF OPORD • 3D Approach Exercise • Interagency Collaboration (ADWG) • D3A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Boolean Logic & Data Mining • Data Mining Exercise • Operational Variables • AWOG Vulnerability Assessment Method • Center of Gravity and Critical Factors Analysis & PE • CATF: CR/Link Analysis & SIP PE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identity Management • Cyber awareness • Safeguarding information (spillage) • Use of social media • Advanced OSINT search techniques 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ASOT 101 Overview to include Laws, Directives, and Oversight • Overt/Clandestine overview • Placement/Access / Motivations • The ASOT Operations Cycle Overview • TSOC OCE and CMD ASOT Requirements • Clandestine networks overview 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CA Targeting Framework (CATF) • PKSOI • Conflict Assessment Framework -CAF 2.0 PE • Center of Gravity and Critical Factors Analysis & PEZ • CATF: CR/Link Analysis & SIP PE • CATF: Develop & Detect PE • Targeting Board PE • CARVER analysis on applicable nodes • Final Product generation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Completion of final product • Presentation of final product • Graduation • Out Processing

Figure 17. Proposed SWAATC Course Schedule¹⁹²

¹⁹² United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *Special Warfare Advanced Analysis and Targeting Decision Brief*, Slide 7.

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