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14. ABSTRACT In 2008, two Marine Corps infantry battalions (Battalion Landing Team 1/6 and Task Force 2/7) operated in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Each battalion operated in a different sized battlespace in rural areas and each battalion met with a different degree of success. Both battalions found that in rural counterinsurgency operations a unit's Area of Influence ebbs and flows over time and is driven by physical and moral factors that must be taken into consideration when designing a unit's campaign plan and formulating a realistic desired endstate. The analysis concludes that a unit's area of influence needs to be studied, evaluated, and constantly reevaluated during operations to enable commanders to nimbly adapt to the ever evolving situation in a counterinsurgency campaign. Incorporating the discourse on a unit's Area of Influence into Problem Framing provides a compatible venue for detailed analysis.					
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**INFLUENCING HELMAND: UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
OPERATIONS IN HELMAND PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN IN 2008**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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Executive Summary

Title: Influencing Helmand: United States Marine Corps Operations in Helmand Province, Afghanistan in 2008

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Thesis:: A unit conducting counterinsurgency must incorporate into its planning a realistic assessment of its Area of Influence prior to operations, focus its efforts on morally and physically influencing the enemy and population during operations, and adjust its operations over time to maintain and expand that influence.

Discussion: In 2008, two Marine Corps infantry battalions (Battalion Landing Team 1/6 and Task Force 2/7) operated in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Each battalion was assigned a different sized battlespace in rural areas and each battalion met with a different degree of success. In rural counterinsurgency operations a unit's Area of Influence ebbs and flows over time and is driven by physical and moral factors that must be taken into consideration when designing a unit's campaign plan and formulating a realistic desired endstate. Lessons learned and observations made by these units should be taken into account when future battalions operate in rural Helmand Province.

Conclusion: A unit's Area of Influence needs to be studied, evaluated, and constantly reevaluated during operations to enable commanders to nimbly adapt to the ever evolving situation in a counterinsurgency campaign. Incorporating the discourse on a unit's area of influence into Problem Framing provides a compatible venue for detailed analysis.

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Preface

This paper is written about a fairly novel concept based on the experiences of two fabled battalions. This paper is not an opus, a crowning achievement to a PME education, or anything worthy of influence in its own right. But I did love writing it. While the United States maintained its undivided attention on an improving Iraq, two battalions were in the fight of their lives in Afghanistan. Their actions would be the harbinger of future deployments to the sun-baked earth of Helmand province. In the past, I have heard references to one or the other battalion in conversations about Afghanistan, but never both. Marines tend to focus on the unit with the better story, or the most action, or the most killed...which is unfortunate. Both of these Battalions have experiences of great value to offer.

Special thanks to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, who provided invaluable support for this paper. Thank you to my wife for her ability to handle our infant twin daughters while I completed this project. And most importantly thank you to the warrior poets of 1/6 and 2/7 who made this a paper worth writing.

Area of Influence (JP 1-02, NATO) — A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. (Army) — It includes both organic and supporting combat power, to include joint, multinational, or interagency assets.¹

Area of Operations (AO) (JP 1-02) — An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (Army) — A geographical area, including the airspace above, usually defined by lateral, forward, and rear boundaries assigned to a commander, by a higher commander, in which he has responsibility and the authority to conduct military operations.²

in·flu·ence [in-flū-ən(t)s] *noun* - **1** : an emanation of spiritual or moral force, **2** : the act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command, **3** : the power or capacity of causing an effect in indirect or intangible ways.³

INTRODUCTION

In 2008, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines operated in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Both units operated concurrently; however, the mission and circumstances each battalion faced were vastly different. Similarities between the units were limited to the province they operated in and the time in which they operated. Additionally, units that previously conducted sustained operations in their Area of Operation (AO) had met with only limited success.⁴ Perspectives of the experiences vary between the battalions. Some media and commentators on Afghanistan have argued that both battalions failed in their separate missions.⁵ Marine's from Task Force 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (TF 2/7) have voiced "disgust"⁶ over the situation the battalion was placed in. However, Marines from Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (BLT 1/6) tend to view the unit's experience in Helmand as a success.⁷

Regardless of perspective, the dissimilar use of two similar organizations in the same place and time begs study. TF 2/7 is the story of a unit hampered in controlling its AO. Specifically, external influences from higher echelons of command retarded the unit's ability to dominate their AO. While, BLT 1/6 is a study in a unit's influence that was only limited by the

size of its battlespace. In both cases defining the unit's Area of Influence is an essential factor requiring analysis. Each unit's ability to gain or lose influence over time provides a measure of their campaign design and their overall success. Study of both deployments proves that a unit conducting counterinsurgency operations must conduct a realistic assessment of its Area of Influence prior to operations. The unit must focus its efforts on morally and physically influencing the enemy and population during operations and adjust its operations over time to maintain and expand that influence.

FRAMING

The unit's Area of Influence is doctrinally viewed as an area that the unit can physically affect. Yet, in counterinsurgency, the importance of influence is not confined to fire support assets or the fuel capacity of an aircraft. Physical considerations do remain relevant, but in a contest that directly targets the support of the people, moral factors are equally important. In counterinsurgency the ability to physically and morally influence the enemy, the local populace, the local government, and the employment of one's own force is paramount to success. Past counterinsurgent conflicts directly addressed the need for a moral focus, terming the phrase "hearts and minds."

When a military force is physically and morally attempting to influence the hearts and minds of a population countless variables are at play affecting progress. Human interaction in counterinsurgent warfare is a non-linear system where both tangibles and intangibles allow friendly and enemy influence on the population to ebb and flow over time. With limitations on the use of force laid out in a unit's rules of engagement, long range weapon systems are nullified. Artillery fire is replaced by the weapon of perception. In C.E. Callwell's words, "There is one very important point in which the hostile forces met with in small wars differ from those met

with in great campaigns. They swell and contract according to the moral effect which is produced, and quite apart from losses in action or from the exigencies of the conflict.”⁸

Essentially, moral perception impacts the acquiescence of the population to the force and quells the passions of those supporting the insurgency. Altering perception and gaining the support of the populace equates to the weakening of the insurgent force.

Achieving the desired moral effects requires an understanding of what influences drive the population coupled with a focused campaign to gain control of those influences. The ability of a counterinsurgency force to assert control over those influences is often hindered by the necessity to conduct economy of force operations. Due to the size of the country’s land or population, units become disbursed amongst a sea of people and terrain. A commander attempting to conduct counterinsurgency operations may find his unit working in a vast AO that is larger than the unit’s Area of Influence. Rather than the conventional depiction of an Area of Influence that extends beyond a unit’s operational boundaries, a unit may find that it is marooned on small islands of influence within its own AO.

Commanders must recognize that their unit may encounter possible dispersed pockets of influence inside their AO. Acknowledgement of a unit’s limited influence must be a driving factor in the concept of operations and deployment of a force. Lack of understanding on the part of leaders may result in a campaign design that improperly deploys, supports, and employs a unit. This severely limits the expansion of an Area of Influence. Likewise, units may find a proper campaign design in concert with focused actions and interactions results in the extension of the unit’s Area of Influence beyond the borders of the AO. As a result, the unit’s boundary becomes restrictive, limiting the unit’s ability to continually expand its Area of Influence.

Expansion of an Area of Influence beyond the borders of a unit AO may be used to the benefit of an adjacent unit. However, AO's in rural counterinsurgency are at times arbitrarily assigned, based on terrain features instead of an accurate depiction of operational possibilities or within proximity of an adjacent unit. These restrictive boundaries, absent of additional friendly forces beyond their confines, enable the enemy to halt the growth of a unit's influence. In effect, enemy forces are free to chip away in areas that cannot be physically impacted by a unit's maneuver. The result of this confinement is a bubble that is surrounded by an enemy who maintains freedom of movement outside the AO.

The factors that can play on an Area of Influence are vast. It is relatively easy to find exact solutions that can be used to predict future behavior within the system if it is linear. For nonlinear systems, one would be lucky to find any solution.⁹ However, a unit's influence is not immeasurable. A commander must understand the factors that interact and in doing so maintain a reading on the pulse of those factors. Whether conducting a population or enemy focused strategy, a commander cannot disregard the interaction between the two. Commanders should view an Area of Influence in relation to the local governance, the enemy, and the local population.

RURAL INSURGENCY

The physical terrain must also be taken into account when factoring in a unit's ability to exert influence. Operating against an insurgency in rural terrain provides substantial challenges. The countryside itself can be considered an obstacle. "Under such conditions the country will be more cut up...the roads poorer if more numerous; the billeting of troops will prove infinitely more difficult, and, above all, the characteristic feature of insurgency in general will be

constantly repeated in miniature: the elements of resistance will exist everywhere and nowhere.”¹⁰

The social structure and dispersed nature of the populace require units to extend in order to expand their influence. “The more scattered the population, the better for the insurgent...A high ratio of rural to urban population gives an advantage to the insurgent...the control of a town, which is extremely dependent on outside supplies, requires smaller forces than the control of the same number of people spread over the countryside.”¹¹ The challenge that a commander faces in designing his campaign, is how to influence people spread over large areas of terrain without weakening his force to the point of ineffectiveness. Clausewitz warns that,

The people who have not yet been conquered by the enemy will be the most eager to arm against him; they will set an example that will gradually be followed by their neighbors. The flames will spread like a brush fire, until they reach the area on which the enemy is based, threatening his lines of communication and his very existence.¹²

These specific factors of the rural terrain, the dispersed population, and the enemy that enjoyed freedom of movement within both are the challenges that faced the two battalions operating in Helmand Province in 2008.

2ND BATTALION, 7TH MARINES

When 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines (TF 2/7) entered into its AO they were immediately put on the defensive. The scope of their tasks and poor operational design of their mission limited offensive capability:

The battalion entered their operational area in southern Afghanistan in April 2008, and immediately commenced operations to occupy a 28,700 square kilometer area [refer to Appendix A] with a reinforced infantry battalion (approximately 1300 Marines). Their AO was part of battlespace owned by two regional commands (RC): RC South, a NATO (Canadian) command, which included the areas of Helmand Province where TF 2/7 operated; and RC West, a NATO (Spanish and Italian) command, which included the areas of Farah Province. Their mission was to create the necessary security and other conditions that would allow the mentoring and training of Afghan National Police (ANP) via programs called Focused District Development (FDD) and In District Reform (IDR). The Battalion Commander stated that the two most significant issues that affected TF 2/7's deployment were the ambiguous mission, and the added mission of In District Reform.¹³

TF 2/7 did not enter into its AO with a defensive mindset. The Commander of TF 2/7 prescribed to Callwell's assertion that when a counterinsurgent force becomes defensive "It is most unfortunate...because it puts the disciplined army in a thoroughly false position. The enemy gathers courage, many who have held aloof then flock to join the hostile standard, the longer the circumstance lasts, the more formidable...(the enemy) forces."¹⁴ Nevertheless, TF 2/7 was bound by constraints and restraints placed on them by higher echelons of command.

TF 2/7 established numerous Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) with the intent of fulfilling the specific orders (refer to Appendix B) they were assigned. The challenges the battalion faced grew exponentially as they occupied more of their AO. These challenges were the result of higher headquarters poor assessment of the realities facing a disaggregated battalion disbursed throughout a territory that, in some parts, had previously been unoccupied¹⁵. The unit's method of deployment resulted in small pockets of influence throughout an enormous AO. Comments made by the officers of TF 2/7 reveal that the unit's relatively small Area of Influence, was rooted in poor operational design by higher echelons of command. The inability of TF 2/7's parent command to realistically judge the unit's Area of Influence resulted in an overly optimistic view of TF 2/7's ability to control their AO. This misjudgment affected the internal operations of TF 2/7 that consequently impacted their ability to succeed in gaining

influence within the AO. The details surrounding this misjudgment are best couched in terms of the Principles of War.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR: OBJECTIVE

The availability of TF 2/7 was viewed as an opportunity to increase Afghan National Police (ANP) recruitment and employment in a previously untapped area of Afghanistan. TF 2/7's presence filled a gap created by ANP as they attended formal schooling:

In District Reform (IDR) was designed specifically to take advantage of the added security that was provided by the presence of TF 2/7. This added security would eliminate the need for the [newly recruited] ANP to be backfilled by the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) while they attended training which is standard for Focused District Development (FDD) and also the limiting factor with the FDD program.¹⁶

TF 2/7 was essentially tasked to recruit, train, and employ potential ANP candidates while simultaneously sending those same candidates out of the AO for formal training. The intent behind TF 2/7's employment was further confused by the mission assigned. The mission statement read "provide security for ANP mentors and assist in training, within capabilities, conduct training and mentoring of Afghan National Forces in order to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority and influence over security, stability, and regional development." Considering TF 2/7 was both the security and mentoring force and that no ANP force yet existed in the assigned AO, the mission statement essentially ordered TF 2/7 to secure itself while mentoring an ANP force that did not exist. Furthermore, recruited ANP were ordered to immediately report to school at the provincial or national level. TF 2/7 was essentially denied the ability to employ the majority of the ANP they had recruited.

The underlying assumption, which would exponentially increase the difficulty of TF 2/7's mission, was that spreading the 1300 Marines throughout the large AO would have an immediate positive influence on the security situation and bear fruit in terms of ANP

recruitment. This assertion is based on an employment constraint placed on TF 2/7 by higher headquarters. "Because TF 2/7 was initially sourced as a one-time deployment of forces, the IDR program was designed to take place completely within their deployment timeline which required TF 2/7 to occupy their eight districts simultaneously vice sequentially as initially planned."¹⁷ Overall, the difficult mission of growing a police force while insurgent activity was increasing throughout RC South and West was further complicated by the limitations placed on TF 2/7 by higher echelons of command:

(1) The need to establish and occupy nine FOBs spread over an area of approximately 28,700 square kilometers, while (2) simultaneously maintaining a level of security that (3) permitted the identification of suitable candidates for police and training them, since a police force did not exist yet in the areas in which TF 2/7 operated and (4) accomplish this without any established support network.¹⁸

PRINCIPLES OF WAR: UNITY OF COMMAND

When crafting TF 2/7's mission, one of the most appalling oversights of TF 2/7's parent command was the inability to apply a suitable command structure to support TF 2/7's operations. A lack of unity of command ensured that the battalion's ability to project influence in their AO was hampered by a lack of critical supplies and support. Without proper support or supplies internal issues overwhelmed the battalion, negating the unit's ability to externally focus on expanding the Area of Influence.

The mentoring mission placed them under "Afghan Regional Security Integration Command (ARSIC) who is under TF Phoenix which reported to Combined Security Transitions Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), who in turn reported to CENTCOM (refer to Appendix D)."¹⁹ Belonging to a separate chain of command outside of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) created problems for a unit tasked with both a mentoring and security mission. The majority of logistical support and warfighting capabilities in Afghanistan belonged

to ISAF.²⁰ ISAF oversaw the two regional command's battlespace, RC West and RC South, which TF 2/7 operated in. Moreover, assignment to CSTC-A meant filling primarily a mentoring role, which brought along with it, preconceived notions that limited willingness to support logistical requests. In the words of TF 2/7's logistics officer:

ISAF has the ability to source equipment. ISAF has the priority for all the capabilities whether it is air support, air assets in particular, ISR assets; they are the operational arm. CSTC-A is ...a train and mentor organization and there is a mindset – because of how they've operated in the last few years – that CSTC-A will go to established FOBs. They will benefit from the battle space manager's generosity to host them at their FOBs and then they will take the mission of training that Army and police force. That hasn't been TF 2/7's experience ...We went to the most austere location of the country...and established a footprint where there wasn't one previously. That puts us in kind of a problem there because...the equipment, the air support, the war fighting capability – exist in ISAF and we were not an ISAF unit, we were a CSTC-A unit. A lot of people in the beginning felt 'You're just training and mentoring Army and police. Why do you need close air support? Why do you need Predator feeds? Why do you need ISR capabilities? Why do you need all this ammo? This doesn't make sense. This isn't how CSTC-A has operated...We turned to our higher headquarters and said 'I need you to be a source of supply for me for ammunition, for more equipment, for better force protection measures...' ²¹

Desperate for the support needed to ensure operations continue unimpeded, TF 2/7 sought other avenues for support. TF 2/7's logistics officer queried MARCENT to fill shortfalls in supply. MARCENT's response to the request was, "They are supporting Marine units in Iraq not Afghanistan." ²²

Additional means were sought to circumvent shortfalls as TF 2/7 attempted to build more than a dozen new FOBs. Local contract support was levied, but due to the battalion's lack of support to help secure surrounding areas "many of those contractors failed in their mission due to kidnapping, failure to arrive with the proper equipment or inability to complete the job." ²³ The use of contractors was problematic because an "increased coalition force presence and contractor presence had a subsequent increase in enemy activity that created new problems with regards to that infrastructure development." ²⁴ Eventually, support was provided to TF 2/7 by the U.S.

Army Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB) 189 located on Kandahar Air Base. CSSB 189 belonged in the ISAF chain of command and provided TF 2/7 with “common item support such as water, fuel, construction materials, ammunition, and medical supplies... [However], USMC unique items...had to be ordered from Continental United States (CONUS).”²⁵ Effort focused on fixing the internal functionality of the chain of command had a detrimental effect on the battalion’s ability to gain momentum in their AO and rapidly expand the unit’s Area of Influence.

Lack of unity of command further eroded the unity of effort in TF 2/7’s AO. Since TF 2/7’s mission was defined under the purview of mentoring, the battalion did not have full command and control of the battlespace it occupied. The battlespace was officially controlled by RC West and RC South to whom the battalion did not directly report.²⁶ TF 2/7 was considered an enabling force that aided ISAF missions and was subsequently left outside the planning and coordinating processes of units that conducted missions in TF 2/7’s AO. TF 2/7 was often “not consulted by Special Forces units and other coalition partners who traversed the area or conducted civil affairs and information operations activities without coordination.”²⁷

Lack of inclusion in ISAF mission planning was detrimental to TF 2/7s overall mission and was potentially fatal. With units introducing their own influence into TF 2/7s AO, the population was faced with incoherent and disparate interaction with alliance forces. Multiple friendly units unknowingly operating in the same area also posed the potential for blue on blue contact. In order to remedy the situation, TF 2/7, “in conjunction with TF Helmand, RC South and RC West established an operational box (OpBox)...requiring all units wishing to enter or depart the box to coordinate fires with TF 2/7. (Also) TF 2/7 retained control of fires and the

effects of fires that originated and terminated within the confines of the OpBox.”²⁸

Unfortunately, the OpBox was not established until August, five months into TF 2/7 operations.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR: MASS, ECONOMY OF FORCE, MANEUVER, AND SECURITY

Due to constraints and restraints placed on TF 2/7, the battalion did not conduct large clearing operations in their AO. “Elements of the battalion were dispersed throughout nine different districts, two Provinces, two Regional Commands and occupied 14 fixed site FOBs and combat outposts (COPs).”²⁹ With such a wide dispersion of battalion assets and personnel, the company and platoon became the largest maneuver elements. The majority of maneuver was conducted with the battalion command cell operating in an “observation and coordination role rather than a controlling one.”³⁰

From a command and control perspective, the vast AO was overwhelming for all unit commanders. Company commanders found that “each warfighting function consumes your day. Take intelligence...mapping of all these different, unique AOs and then trying to ‘divine’ what the enemy intent is, what coalition forces’ agendas are, and what the people’s needs are, and try to work magic of all that together into some kind of strategy.”³¹ Dispersion of companies across thousands of square kilometers³² resulted in a level of autonomy and a need for prolonged self-sustainment. In essence, “Captains functioned like battalion commanders and lieutenants functioned like company commanders.”³³

The battalion set prudent requirements that, at the least, a patrolling unit must be comprised of “nine men, with the capability to self-recover, maintain long range communications, man a medium machine gun or larger, and operate a Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) system.”³⁴ A limitation of squad sized patrols meant that most likely only one squad patrolled at a time from platoon FOBs and at

the most six squads could surge on patrol at a company FOB.³⁵ A limited ability to mass restrained the battalion and emboldened the enemy, effectively denying units the capability to clear enemy infested areas. Without the ability to clear nests of enemy, TF 2/7's Area of Influence was overtly contested. To counter the challenges associated with an extreme economy of force, the unit focused on building additional capabilities.

As a main tenet of their mission TF 2/7 did recruit, train, and operate with ANP at several of their positions. ANP that did not immediately matriculate to formal schooling were husbanded by TF 2/7 for employment and training. The infant force of ANP increased the size of pro-ISAF forces available, but was significantly limited in capability. As an untrained force, the ANP were not considered a sustainable independent maneuver element, and as a result, were used to augment existing TF 2/7 units during operations.³⁶ With limited capability and training, the benefit of Afghan forces provided a measure of moral influence, but did not provide the necessary physical influence to force the enemy away from the populace. Furthermore, CSTC-A's ANP employment plan limited the added measure of moral influence. ANP deployed to areas away from their home district as per CSTC-A's guidance. Non-native ANP lacked the benefit of an advanced understanding of local terrain and people.

Despite significant internal and external hardships throughout their deployment, TF 2/7 worked to extend their Areas of Influence. Beginning with small pockets of influence in numerous FOBs throughout a large AO (refer to Appendix A and B), a unit assigned to conduct police mentoring found itself just as much a security force as an ISAF maneuver battalion. The dispersed nature of the battalion was pushed to such an extreme that mutual support within companies was not an option. Hobbled by lack of support and disregard for basic operational needs, and competing against other alliance units within its own AO hindered the battalion's

ability to achieve anything beyond a modicum of success. Overextended lines of logistics left convoy trains to the mercy of the IED. TF 2/7's frustration is best summed up in the words of their battalion commander:

It's like doing Fallujah before Al Fajr. We're in the midst of it and trying to fight Taliban while doing civil-military operations (CMO) and while trying to train police and mentor them, because they're learning as they go. You're doing everything concurrently. The mantra is 'clear, hold, build.' We're trying to do it all at the same time...We should be clearing...certainly to a point of creating a stable, more secured environment. When you bring in a police force, that's the building piece. When you're doing CMO, that's building, but you've got to hold your ground. We don't really hold much ground outside of our FOB. *We go out there and influence it.* We disrupt, but we don't hold it. And the reason we don't hold it is because we haven't cleared it, and by providing that security buffer through clearing and then establishing the security footprint to hold it, you're more able to effectively build. However, during that transition piece, you're going to get the willing assistance of the people themselves. ...I use the term, 'turning four into forty', and a four-man fire team now become 40 local citizens in addition to them, that's now enabling security and taking an interest in their own prosperity.³⁷

The reality that TF 2/7 faced is echoed in David Galula's observation that, "Political, social, economic, and other reforms, however much they ought to be wanted and popular, are inoperative when offered while the insurgent still controls the population."³⁸

1ST BATTALION, 6TH MARINES

In April 2008, Battalion Landing Team 1/6 attacked to destroy insurgent forces in the Garmsir District of Helmand Province, Afghanistan in order to clear a route through the area for 24 MEU forces. The Garmsir battle-space had been under the occupation and control of Taliban forces for two years. The area was a series of Taliban strongholds anchored in and around a canal system. The enemy had previously repelled two separate coalition battalion-size attacks attempting to regain the area. The insurgents numbered from 200 to 600 fighters in a given period. These fighters included local Afghan Taliban and foreign Pakistan, Baluch, and Wagiristan tribal fighters supported by financiers and facilitators, with weapons crossing the

border from Pakistan and Iran.³⁹ The operation was initially expected to last 7-10 days. The Marines of BLT 1/6 remained in Garmsir for over four months.

Unlike TF 2/7's circumstances, BLT 1/6 was provided all of the necessary capabilities to succeed in its assigned AO. As a battalion landing team the battalion had a dedicated artillery battery, engineer platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, and all of the enabling supporters provided by a combat logistics battalion, a composite Marine squadron, and the Marine Expeditionary Unit Headquarters (MEU HQ) element. The chain of command was clearly defined with BLT 1/6 reporting directly to the MEU HQ element and the MEU reporting to ISAF. All coordination with the British led TF Helmand and Canadian led RC South was conducted by the MEU HQ. The operational box allotted to BLT 1/6 was a small 10km x 10km box (refer to Appendix C). The size of the AO was based on the initial mission parameters, which were to clear a route through Garmsir. The mission changed based on the assessment that "the enemy threat encountered in Garmsir was more significant than initial intelligence indicated it would be"⁴⁰ and that "it also became apparent that Garmsir was a significant asset to the enemy."⁴¹ When the mission was altered from route clearance to clearance of Garmsir, BLT 1/6's AO was not altered.

The initial establishment of the unit's footprint in Garmsir was methodical; "the MEU planned a sequential operation due to the extremely difficult terrain, which greatly limited possible routes for MEU equipment required for the mission."⁴² Once a logistical and Command and Control (C2) node was established west of the AO, BLT 1/6 attacked. The insertion of the entire battalion on the night of April 29th, 2008 met Callwell's maxim that: "It is an established canon of the art of war that the seizure of the initiative at the outset and its maintenance thenceforward, is one of the best assured means of commanding success."⁴³ For the next 35 days the Marines of BLT 1/6 were engaged in a bitter fight with the Taliban. The 35 days of fighting

culminated in a battalion attack on key enemy command nodes. The Taliban fled south toward Pakistan immediately following BLT 1/6's consolidation of Garmsir. The result of the fighting gained the Marines prestige in the eyes of both the locals and the Taliban (refer to Appendix E, K, M, and N). BLT 1/6 had met Galula's adage that "The counterinsurgent needs a convincing success as early as possible in order to demonstrate that he has the will, the means, and the ability to win."⁴⁴

From the completion of the clearance phase on June 3rd until the battalion departed from Garmsir in September, the battalion was not involved in a single small arms engagement. "Operations in Garmsir became a counter-insurgency fight, with the enemy adopting an asymmetric approach and increased employment of IEDs. These changes were attributed to the MEU's ability to mass on the objective and drive the enemy off the terrain."⁴⁵ During the operation, the Marines gained and maintained influence in and around its AO (refer to Appendix E, G, and H). The Area of Influence was slowly extended by individual and small unit interaction with the local populace (refer to Appendix L). The "catastrophic success"⁴⁶ that BLT 1/6 achieved against the enemy during the clearance phase had an immense moral impact on the Taliban resistance (refer to Appendix F, J, K, and M). The Taliban in Garmsir fell victim to Callwell's corollary that "No matter how brave a people is, how warlike its traditions, how great its hatred for the enemy, how favorable the ground on which it fights: the fact remains that a national uprising cannot maintain itself where the atmosphere is too full of danger."⁴⁷ The Taliban's massive retreat south, in the wake of BLT 1/6's onslaught, mirrors Callwell's assertion.

For the better part of two months Taliban units ceased all aggressive activity in Garmsir, to include the laying of IEDs. Only when the Taliban were certain that BLT 1/6 would not

advance further south did they begin to encroach on the battalion's AO. In BLT 1/6's final month of counterinsurgency operations, the Taliban significantly reduced any influence the Marines had earned that extended outside their AO. In some areas within the AO the enemy was either able to assert his influence on the populace by violent means or was invited back (refer to Appendix I), allowing him to operate freely within the battalion's AO. Although the Marines enjoyed freedom of movement in an almost permissive environment, the battalion's inability to extend further south confined their operations and morally emboldened the enemy to restart his operations in Garmsir proper. Additionally, lack of local Afghan forces in the AO denied BLT 1/6 the ability to increase moral influence. Almost all operations lacked Afghan participation.

The last month of BLT 1/6's operations was closer to what is considered the norm for an on-going counterinsurgency struggle, where two adversaries openly vie for the support or acquiescence of the populace. BLT 1/6's moral and physical superiority allowed the battalion to dominate, but the sense that time was on the side of the enemy became an overarching concern. The question for BLT 1/6 was who would replace the unit once it departed and would that unit be enough to maintain momentum.

CONTEST OF INFLUENCE IN GARMSIR

Throughout BLT 1/6's operation in Garmsir the battalion's Area of Influence was in a constant state of flux. The battalion's influence was at the mercy of individual and small unit interaction, chance, the limitation of battlespace, and changing perceptions of the enemy and local populace. Micro level events had repercussions that impacted relations and perceptions AO wide. The vignettes in the Appendix E-N are examples of BLT 1/6's constant struggle to gain, maintain, and expand its influence in and around its AO. Given the wide array of variables that impact this non-linear system, these narratives are neither comprehensive nor completely

objective, considering that they are told from the perspective of the author. The vignettes are based on the author's experiences as an infantry company commander during BLT 1/6's operations in Garmsir.

AFTERMATH

TF 2/7 and BLT 1/6 both redeployed back to CONUS during the last three months of 2008. Prior to the end of their deployment ISAF and CENTCOM made the decision that their "one-time deployments" would be followed by additional troops provided by the American and British militaries. TF 2/7 would be replaced by an American Marine force, Special Marine Air Ground Task Force – A (SPMAGTF-A) and BLT 1/6 would be replaced by a British Army Infantry Battalion of 450 men and Afghan Army Battalion (Kandak) of 300 men. Both incoming units would benefit from the work the two forces had accomplished. In essence, both TF 2/7 and BLT 1/6 would act as Galula's "test unit"⁴⁸ for the follow-on increase in American troops in Helmand Province.

Galula asserts that, "Mistakes are bound to happen, but it would be inexcusable not to learn from them. This is why the first area selected must be considered a test area. The value of the operations conducted there lies much in what they teach as in their intrinsic results."⁴⁹ The operational results for TF 2/7 and BLT 1/6 were as different as their missions and support structures. TF 2/7 fought from their first foray into the AO until their last day of their relief-in-place. BLT 1/6 fought a highly kinetic clearance phase, reminiscent of conventional warfare, followed by three months of moderate hold and build phases of counterinsurgency operations. Both units made gains, but BLT 1/6 enjoyed a greater level of influence and control over the assigned AO. TF 2/7's immense AO, lack of initial support, convoluted mission statement, task

saturation, and overall friction created by higher echelons of command, exponentially increased the difficulty of expanding influence in areas contested by a growing insurgency.

LASTING INFLUENCE: TF 2/7

TF 2/7's relief-in-place was conducted with SPMAGTF-A's Ground Combat Element (GCE), Task Force 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines (TF 3/8). TF 3/8 benefited greatly from some of TF 2/7's hard lessons learned. The incoming battalion, as part of a MAGTF, had a support structure closer to that of BLT 1/6.⁵⁰ TF 3/8 was also placed in the ISAF chain-of-command. TF 3/8 consolidated some of the positions established by TF 2/7, providing units a greater reserve of combat power in hotly contested areas. However, TF 3/8 served as a "bridging force in maintaining a Marine presence in the Regional Commands – South and West areas of operation,"⁵¹ and as a result assumed several of 2/7's "wicked" problems. TF 3/8 assumed the majority of TF 2/7's vast AO, remained in a split command relationship with two parent units requiring the battalion to be beholden to both ISAF and CSTC-A, and had to juggle competing mission interests between mentoring and security. The bridging force was meant to prepare for the follow-on Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

TF 2/7 small pockets of influence would serve TF 3/8's ability to further expand the ISAF Area of Influence in Helmand and Farah provinces. However, both forces suffered from being placed in a situation counter to Galula's Fourth Law of Counterinsurgency—"Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential." Galula injects that in order to win in counterinsurgency a force requires a "large concentration of efforts, resources, and personnel. This means that the efforts cannot be diluted all over the country but must be applied successively by area."⁵² In the end, TF 2/7 was not able to meet all of the expectations of an unrealistic mission, but they were able to create the necessary conditions for future units to

expand influence within the AO. By bravely punching small holes of influence in austere locations, Afghan forces recruited and operated in areas previously untouched by the Afghanistan provincial and central government. Yet, TF 3/8 was plagued by the same issue TF 2/7 faced, that “Without...regular troops to provide encouragement, the local inhabitants will usually lack the confidence to take to arms.”⁵³ The influence TF 2/7 left behind was in the form of “sun-baked outposts, veteran Afghan security forces, more secure district centers, and a more encouraged people with enhanced prosperity.”⁵⁴

LASTING INFLUENCE: BLT 1/6

BLT 1/6's influence would be at the mercy of those who would follow. BLT 1/6 conducted a relief-in-place with a mix of British and Afghan forces. Due to perceptions of British forces (refer to Appendix N), and the smaller size of their footprint, ISAF influence in Garmsir shifted. The British company commander reported that:

From mid-Oct (2008) it appeared that the enemy had got fed-up with failing to hit us with IEDs and with the corn pretty high the remainder of our tour (until early Nov) saw almost daily gun battles with our patrols or attacks on the Patrol Bases. We fired a lot of ammo including 107mm Arty but never quite enough to really scare the locals, so most of the civilians (though worried by the increase in fighting) did remain in the area. Haji Mohammad [a local elder] was in fine form throughout the tour and I left him safe and well when I departed. He continued to speak highly of the US Marines as did all the pro-ISAF locals.⁵⁵

British presence in Garmsir remained until 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) relieved them in July 2009. The British experienced an ebb and flow of influence throughout their time in Garmsir. When the 2d MEB arrived in Garmsir, David Wood, a reporter who had been embedded with BLT 1/6 during the clearance phase, published an article calling into question BLT 1/6's ability to influence Garmsir. He reported that:

A reinforced battalion of Marines was struggling just a year ago to find the right strategy and resources to defeat the Taliban. They failed. The men of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment fought valiantly here last year and took casualties. But they never found the right mix of killing bad guys, providing security for local Afghans and jump-starting local development. There just weren't enough Marines to hold the ground they took. Hardly any Afghan soldiers and police showed up to serve alongside them. When the Marines left last fall, they left a vacuum. The Taliban moved back in and, according to U.S. officials, killed the locals who had worked with the Marines.⁵⁶

Galula established that victory in counterinsurgency warfare “is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization...it is that and the permanent isolation of the insurgents from the population.”⁵⁷ Based on Wood’s article it seems that BLT 1/6, due to their actions and ISAF’s inability to backfill with additional forces, did in fact fail. However, a recent retort from a police mentor in Garmsir provides illumination to the question of success:

With all I can muster on this subject sir, screw Dave Wood and his...analysis. We lived at the ANP police station... From there we watched as the locals welcomed the arrival of the Marines and the departure of the British. They welcomed us with open arms. I participated in more VIP patrols than I care to admit, because everyone wanted to show off Garmsir as the success story of Helmand Province...The bazaar which your Marines worked so hard to clear and hold is thriving, with well over 150 individual shops. The main concerns in the northern half of the Snake's Head are now clean water, speed bumps in the bazaar, and power; one could consider that day to day worries of a town back home...Despite our aggressive nature as Marines, we did not have a single engagement the entire time we patrolled the Snake's Head, the locals came to the ANP, not us, to alert about IED's in the area (we found 8 the entire summer and all were confirmed by locals to the ANP). I participated in more Shuras than I ever dreamed of, my Marines were known in the bazaar and villages by name/face by the locals, drank more tea than I could in 3 lifetimes, and not once ever felt threatened. We called the "snake's head," wine country. The locals absolutely loved the Marines, despised the British, and if we got into heavy conversation, would receive nothing but praise from the elders about the honorable (their word) actions of the Marines who came a year ago (BLT 1/6)...Your Marines set the conditions for our successes in Garmsir, plain and simple. I left Lejeune thinking I was going to have a slugfest in Afghanistan, and instead found myself not even needing a weapon half the time. Governor Abdullah Jan is still around, as is his staff..⁵⁸

1st Battalion, 6th Marines redeployed to Afghanistan in December 2009. At time of writing, BLT 1/6 is operating in Helmand Province, Afghanistan and dealing first-hand with whatever rewards, notoriety, or consequences remain from their first deployment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TF 2/7 and BLT 1/6's experiences demonstrate that there is value in studying a unit's Area of Influence in irregular warfare. In order to allow for an increased discussion concerning the Area of Influence by commanders and planners several doctrinal changes must occur. In order to begin a larger discussion on the importance of influence the definition of Area of Influence needs to change. The doctrinal definition does not allow a commander to deviate from concrete and measurable factors. Based on the analysis provided, the author recommends the following definition of Area of Influence:

A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations over human or physical terrain through sustained physical or moral dominance over the enemy, populace, or government by maneuver, fire support systems, command and other resources under the commander's command or control.⁵⁹

The added definition is broad enough to invite discussion, but restrictive enough to allow for focused analysis. The discussion and analysis of a unit's Area of Influence should be a part of a unit's planning process when designing a counterinsurgency campaign or operation plan.

PROBLEM FRAMING

The Marine Corps has recently adopted 'Problem Framing' into its lexicon. Also referred to as 'Problem Setting', the terms are defined as "The act of establishing the context of a situation from multiple perspectives."⁶⁰ Having identified a deficiency in operational design conducted by commanders and their staff in counterinsurgency operations (as in the case of

CSTC-A's mission for TF 2/7), the Marine Corps has affixed 'Problem Framing' to the Marine Corps Planning Process, adding to the originally prescriptive step of mission analysis.

In John Schmitt's pamphlet entitled "*Systemic Concept for Operational Design*", Schmitt identifies that at the heart of Problem Framing is "conversational discourse" between the commander and several key stakeholders.⁶¹ The discourse itself is described as "an ongoing process of inquiry and argumentation that leverages the collective intelligence of the design group. The specific structure of the discourse is less important than that it is structured."⁶² Optimally the discourse results in a common understanding of the wicked problems associated with the operation and allow the group to intuitively resolve a course of action. The question begged is how to offer a semblance of structure as commanders begin implementing Problem Framing, without arresting the intent behind the process. One possible solution is to view the problem in terms of influence; specifically, focusing on the Area of Influence in and around a unit's AO.

EVALUATING THE AREA OF INFLUENCE

The synopsis of the Area of Influence is historically part of the Commander's Battlespace Area Evaluation (CBAE). Under the provided definition, and as shown in TF 2/7 and BLT 1/6's experience, the complexity of counterinsurgency operations requires input from multiple sources and should not be solely shouldered by one commander. Using a discourse on the unit's perceived Area of Influence as a structure for Problem Framing provides issues for consideration that require detailed analysis amongst unit stakeholders.

With the broader definition provided the recommended structure of the discourse should include moral and physical factors with respect to the people. The unit's staff members should

not limit themselves to strictly their own influence, but also an assessment of the enemy and local government's influence as well.

As demonstrated in Appendix E-N, the effects that multiple factors have on a population require that commanders view influence as a force in itself. Metaphorically, influence is a Hydra staring down individuals and groups of locals. The Hydra's multiple heads are competing to be the focus of the local's attention. The key is to ensure that a force gains and maintains that attention as a result of physical presence, credibility, relevant actions, or moral stature. In order to gain the advantage on the other 'heads' a unit is best served by studying competing and collaborative forces and learning from them. Approaching the problem from multiple perspectives may provide an appreciation of the terrain (human and geographic) that is controlled by friendly or enemy forces and identify what or who is contested.


FRAMING THE AREA OF INFLUENCE

The discourse should begin with an in-depth analysis of the friendly and enemy situation provided in the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). Prior to understanding what influence a unit has on the local population it is essential that a commander understands the capabilities, assets, personnel, and methods available to him and to the enemy commander that can be used to apply influence. Placing friendly and enemy capabilities in the context of their ability to influence the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) spheres may answer the question: 'what physical and moral factors can be leveraged by friendly and enemy forces?' Discussion should range from the physical and specific to the moral and ambiguous. The desired product is not a list of friendly and enemy capabilities, but a greater understanding of how friendly and enemy capabilities may be implemented to extend their respective Areas of Influence.

Following the discourse of enemy and friendly force capabilities it is necessary to conduct a realistic assessment of governance and government forces. TF 2/7's experience offers two possible points for discussion: (1) what is the functionality of the infrastructure and (2) is the populace's perception of the local government based on reality. Local and national security forces entail a separate discussion concerning credibility, functionality, and practices, but in most cases are tied to the overall synopsis of the people's perception of the government. The overarching theme when discussing local government focuses on the positive or negative influence government and government representatives have on the perception and reality of the people. The unit should seek to achieve an understanding of how its deployment and employment can best support and positively influence the actions of the government.

The subsequent conversation concerning the unit, government, and enemy's influence on the populace should be comprehensive. Considerable focus should be placed on evaluating the needs of the population and how those needs interact with perception and loyalty. A possible template for the discussion is a study of the local populace through the prism of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. Basically, a unit's Design Team defines each of the population's needs and how the unit, government, and enemy satisfy or neglect those needs. Defining specific needs based on a proven template of priorities provides the unit with future non-kinetic targets and objectives that can be addressed to extend the Area of Influence. A study of those needs identifies 'need-gaps' that may be exploited and highlights enemy activities that must be circumvented. The author provides one basic example from BLT 1/6's experience in Figure 4:⁶³

Figure 4



Working within the offered Problem Framing construct will provide details and ideas that staffs can implement into course of action development. The breadth of the discourse on the Area of Influence enables planners to understand the nature of the problem before them. Simply put, the unit would understand the crux of the fight; whether it is a struggle against a social movement, political corruption, economic hardship, military adventurism, or even their own previous mishandling of the situation. Identifying the source of the problem and the enablers that allow it to ferment provides insight into how best to employ the force, the methods necessary to expand the Area of Influence, and directly aid the commander in his/her analysis of the enemy's critical vulnerability and center of gravity.

A discourse focused on the Area of Influence facilitates a greater understanding of the conditions in which the operation begins. Ideally an in-depth study of the Area of Influence further enables a unit's Design Team to capture a realistic endstate. By defining the moral and physical areas in which the unit aims to exert influence, the unit gains an appreciation for the

initial limitations of the campaign and begins applying methods to circumvent those limitations. Those methods further evolve into logical lines of operation that focus the unit's efforts on extending the Area of Influence and achieve its endstate.

The ability to understand the Area of Influence, the factors that impact it, and honestly assessing what effects the unit is achieving on those factors provides relevant measures of effectiveness for the campaign. As demonstrated in Appendix E-N, two possible factors used for assessment are (1) the behavior of the populace, with respect to the enemy, government, or unit and (2) the behavior and actions of the enemy. Measures of effectiveness are based on the ebb and flow of the Area of Influence. Therefore, the unit's assessment of its Area of Influence is constant throughout the campaign and ensures measures of effectiveness are placed in the context of the situation. Both tangible and intangible, the measures of success may be a mixture of reportable events and intuitive assessments made by the commander.

A detailed analysis of the Area of Influence in Problem Framing forces a commander and his stakeholders to view the problem holistically. A genuine analysis of the Area of Influence must include multiple perspectives as well as moral and physical factors that are not readily apparent at first glance. The inability to transpose the unit's Area of Influence onto a map in perfect clarity may create discomfort. Nevertheless, the clarity derived from the assessment will enable understanding of the problem. It will also help define the endstate of the campaign, establish logical lines of operation, and provide relevant measures of effectiveness. Focus on the unit's Area of Influence fulfills Schmitt's assertion that, "The way to deal with a complex operational situation is to carry out a heuristic operational design to provide a logical foundation for all planning and execution, and continuously to assess and revise the design over time in response to changes in the situation."⁶⁴

CONCLUSION


Currently the typical briefing of a unit's Area of Influence is encapsulated in a PowerPoint slide briefed by the unit Intelligence Officer. The slide sandwiched between the AO and Area of Interest slides is typically glossed over with little critical analysis. The intellectual capital put toward understanding and calculating a unit's Area of Influence before, during, and after an operation is significantly lacking. As demonstrated by TF 2/7's experience, a campaign design that does not consider influence will handicap a unit throughout its operation.

First, units must consistently measure moral and physical influence in relation to the enemy and local populace throughout an operation and campaign. Second, as noted in BLT 1/6's experience, assessment ranges from the micro level of small unit and individual interaction to events that reverberate throughout an entire AO. Time and terrain are limiting factors that need to be addressed in a commander's concept of operation and desired endstate. Third, predicting the lasting or fleeting effects of a unit's influence, as demonstrated by the aftermath of BLT 1/6's operations, must be taken into account by parent commands when forming a template for future force employment. Fourth, units conducting counterinsurgency operations need to recognize the paradigm that analyzing and consistently reevaluating its Area of Influence provides the necessary feedback to steer the unit toward success. Finally, the advent of Problem Framing into the Marine Corps Planning Process provides an opportunity for the Marine Corps to reevaluate the doctrinal definition and relevance of the Area of Influence. The experiences of TF 2/7 and BLT 1/6 provide extensive proof as to the primacy of moral and physical influence in counterinsurgency warfare. Sun Tzu asserts "Know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."⁶⁵ In a rural counterinsurgency the adage can be

altered to read "Know how to influence the local populace and your enemy; in a hundred villages
you will never be in peril."

APPENDICES


APPENDIX A. FIGURE 1: TF 2/7's AREA OF OPERATION




Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan


2/7 Marines Force Lay Down

In District Reform



APPENDIX C, FIGURE 3
BLT 1/6 AREA OF OPERATION IN GARMSIR, AFGHANISTAN






TF 2/7 Command Relationships (MAY 08)



TACON - - - - -
OPCON - - - - -
Coord Auth ······

- US TACON to CSTC-A
- OPCON to USMARCENT
- NATO TACON to RC(S) & RC(W)

CSTC-A Comb Security Transition Cmd-A
ARSIC - Afghan Regional Security
Integration Command
RPAC - Regional Police Asst Cmd



* Other forces in AO: SOF, ANA, PRTs

"Ready for All, Yielding to None"

2d Battalion, 7th Marines

APPENDIX E: THE INFLUENCE OF HONOR

Within several days of beginning operations in Garmsir, companies had begun interacting with local leaders. As a precaution, the majority of Garmsir's civilian population fled to the desert when BLT 1/6 arrived in zone. Impromptu small scale Shuras were held in the desert to ascertain the needs of the people. For each Shura the American commanders prepared and brought with them humanitarian packs of food and water to aid the people. In every instance the charity was denied by the locals out of fear of being labeled American collaborators by the Taliban. As the clearance phase wore on the situation became more desperate for the people in the desert, but the elders still refused aid.

In the second week of fighting the Taliban informed the elders that on May 12th, 2008 the Taliban would cease fire and allow the locals to return to their homes to gather supplies. Events showed the duplicitous nature of the Taliban's cease fire 'agreement.' On 11 May local elders wisely chose to approach the Americans and ask if the cease fire was in fact agreed upon. When the Americans made it clear that no communication had occurred between them and the Taliban, the elders panicked. They stated that many families were making arrangements for means to transport family goods. This search for resources had spread families throughout the desert and Helmand River valley making the timely passing of warnings uncertain. Realizing the certainty of civilian encroachment on the battlefield, the Marines agreed that if locals did not carry weapons and used alternate routes away from the immediate battlefield, they could minimize the risk of civilian casualties. Understanding the predicament that the Taliban had placed them in, the elders agreed and were comforted in understanding that danger to civilians would be partially mitigated.

On May 12th, BLT 1/6 tightened its requirements for recognition of positive identification. What had been recognized as a free fire zone since the exodus of the civilian populace now became severely restricted. Beginning in the morning of the 12th and throughout the day, small Taliban elements harassed Marine positions in an attempt to get the companies to respond. With the exception of sniper fire, the companies remained silent. In several instances when civilians moved in vicinity of the American or Taliban lines, Taliban fired in vicinity of the locals to frighten them.

On May 13th, the local elders asked for a Shura with Marine commanders. The elders simply wanted to inform the Americans that they recognized the Taliban's scheme to draw the Marines into a fight that would result in casualties to locals. The elders thanked the Marines for their restraint. Upon completion of the Shura, the elders asked if they could take the humanitarian meals and water offered by the Marines. For the first time in Garmsir, the Marines had gained influence with the local elders.

APPENDIX F: THE INFLUENCE OF PRIDE

During the clearance phase, commanders of BLT 1/6 became familiar with the enemy commanders they were facing. One commander was identified as a provincial level tactical commander who had been an ISAF target for over two years. Lal Mohammad, as he was known, was a well respected and influential Taliban commander amongst the Taliban in Helmand. During the course of the clearance phase it became clear that when enemy morale faltered it was Lal Mohammad who held the force together.

While many lower level tactical commanders had been killed during the fighting, Lal Mohammad remained alive by moving his position on the battlefield daily. In the final days of the clearance phase Lal Mohammad moved to the forward edge of the battlefield. A platoon of Marines had occupied a position where a prestige weapon (an anti-aircraft gun) was buried. Intelligence reports indicated that Lal Mohammad was so concerned over reclaiming the weapon that he had aborted his movement pattern and remained entrenched across from the compound in the nearest Taliban position. Lal Mohammad's actions reinforced Callwell's assertion that;

Fanatics prize their standards highly and look on them as sacred; their loss is regarded as a disaster and as prophetic of ultimate overthrow. There is of course no material benefit to be gained by capturing them, but the moral effect of securing them is great....It must never be forgotten that in small wars moral effect ranks almost before material gain.⁶⁶

Seizing the opportunity to hobble the enemy's command structure, the Marines employed a direct action force that subsequently killed Lal Mohammad. Within a week the Taliban evacuated Garmsir.

In an interesting postscript, the Taliban employ a scheme termed by the Marines as the 'Dread Pirate Roberts method,' named for a character in the movie the Princess Bride. The Taliban recognize that the loss of a popular commander has an affect on morale. They also recognize that most Taliban fighters have never seen these commanders. In order to mitigate the

affect when a commander is lost, Taliban leaders recycle those popular commanders by renaming other commanders who assume the deceased's position. Three months after his death, Lal Mohammad was again operating in Helmand Province.

APPENDIX G: THE INFLUENCE OF PERSONAL INTERACTION

Immediately following the enemy's rout, Garmsir became a ghost town. The civilian populace remained in the desert uncertain of the Marine's intentions. As a means to articulate the Marine's purpose and intent, the battalion commander called for a Shura of tribal elders. News of the Shura was passed to the locals in the desert. Due to Taliban control of Garmsir for the past two years, the large Shura was the first of its kind in a long time. Tribal elders that had been in exile returned from as far as Kabul, Iran, and Pakistan to attend. On June 2nd over a hundred tribal elders attended the Shura. The district governor and police chief attended. While conducting operations in Garmsir the battalion commander remarked that the initial Shura set the tone for key leader engagement for the remainder of the operation:

I opened up that Shura and introduced all the company commanders who were there and then I let the company commanders lead it and speak and discuss with the tribal leaders the situation on the ground, our purpose. From there, I have limited my engagement with tribal leaders. I tell the company commanders to use me more as a 'carrot and stick' type of engagement with tribal leaders. If they are supportive and cooperative, I engage them and provide whatever appropriate reward or award that the company commander deems appropriate. If they're not cooperative, on one or two occasions I've shown up and I made it very clear that I was not pleased with their lack of support and their continued support of the Taliban, and 'don't make me come back here again.' The persons I really engage with are the Garmsir governor and the Afghan National Police chief. I engage with them to ensure that we are doing things in the battle space that are supportive of their efforts and that they are leading in the stability, reconstruction and development of the area and not us. It's not about putting an Afghan face on things...It's more [about] trying to support them in their role as redeveloping the area.⁶⁷

During the Shura the company commanders took the lead and echoed the battalion commander's sentiment, opening their remarks, saying:

I know that myself and my Marines are just another face after 30 years of different people coming through this area. But what I have told my Marines is that the question that they have to answer to you all is: how are we different? I know that you all just want to live your lives and that you don't want us to interfere with what you're doing on a daily basis and it is our intention to help and to protect you.⁶⁸

Over the course of several hours the Marines explained how they would integrate into Garmsir life. Many of the elders requested that the Marines visit them at their compounds. Follow-on meetings with elders were planned and an open dialogue was established. The result of the Shura was the return of thousands of civilians into the area the following day and the establishment of an accepted venue for dialogue between locals and the Marines. Conditions had been created that would allow the Marines to gain influence with local leaders.

APPENDIX H: THE INFLUENCE OF GOOD WILL

A significant amount of damage was incurred on local homes during the clearance phase. During the Shura, the battalion commander stated that all verifiable damage would be paid for by ISAF and facilitated by the Marines of BLT 1/6. "Just two days after the main Taliban force was routed, a [Marine Lieutenant] put aside his weapons and opened what amounts to a wartime complaints desk in a mud-brick hut. The lieutenant and his men spend their time cataloging the destruction and issuing vouchers to compensate villagers for their losses, whether caused by U.S. missiles or Taliban grenades."⁶⁹ The hope of reparations drove hundreds of Afghans to make direct contact with the Marines. As observed by Michael Phillips of the *Wall Street Journal*:

More than 200 villagers have applied for compensation already, and a vendor has set up shop outside the coiled razor-wire barrier selling cigarettes and soda to the petitioners... Taliban infiltrators have threatened to kill villagers who accept American money, according to U.S. intelligence reports. Still, petitioners keep coming... testing the Marines' ability to shift gears on the fly, from combat to the struggle for popular allegiance. Winning over the locals has always been a goal; now, it's happening in double-quick time.⁷⁰

As the majority of the populace sought US reparations, the Marines in the 'complaint shop' catalogued names, homes, and tribes.

When Afghan's filed for reparations they were given a sheet of paper cataloging the reported damage to the home in English and Pashtu. The Afghan was told to present the sheet of paper to any Marine foot patrol moving in vicinity of his home. The Marine patrol would enter the Afghan's home at his invitation, search it for security purposes, collect census data on the family (to include names, tribe, and pictures), and finally verify the damage. Afghans were then told to report to the district center with the receipt, which had been signed by the Marine, to receive money. When the Afghan arrived at the district center, he was given half of the amount owed to him for damages and told that once he had begun repairs a Marine patrol would have to

verify that progress was being made and sign his sheet a second time. Once signed a second time the man could return to the district center to receive the remainder of his payment.

The second and third order effects of this system exceeded all expectations. Marine patrols were actively sought out by local Afghan's in an effort to get their vouchers signed. Based on Karzai's Twelve Rules, US forces were not allowed into an Afghan home unless invited. The request for Marines to inspect their homes gave Marines almost unimpeded access into every compound in their unit's AO – for at least two visits.

Although Marines patrolled almost constantly, impatient locals would seek out patrols kilometers away from their home. It became routine to see Afghans walking with, talking to, and leading Marine patrols to their home. Both the patrol visits and the 'complaint desk' became venues for interaction with leadership and human intelligence reporting. The steady flow of money to residences homes, the constant presence of Marine patrols in and around homes, and the open and accepted dialogue that took shape between the Marines and locals, greatly enhanced BLT 1/6's influence amongst the populace and was a key factor in denying the Taliban an open door to immediately return to Garmsir.

APPENDIX I: THE INFLUENCE OF TRAGEDY

As a means to harass the enemy and to mask intentions, companies practiced the tactic of launching artillery and mortar illumination on random nights and at random times. This tactic was used extensively during the clearance phase and continued to be employed, with less frequency, during the hold and build phase.

In July a local national approached a squad security patrol claiming that his ten-year old son had been killed by ‘the lights in the sky.’ An investigation was immediately conducted into the man’s claim. The Marines were initially skeptical, but as the investigation unfolded it became obvious that the man’s assertion that the American’s had killed his son with an illumination round was possibly true. The illumination itself would not have killed his son; however, the 40 pound canister that releases upon ignition of the artillery illumination round when it reaches its point of burst, could have. Condolence funds accompanied with profuse apologies were given to the man; however, dialogue with that specific village ceased. The use of artillery illumination was halted by the company in that sector. Additionally, Marine commanders made an effort to assure all village elders that the Marines in the future would only employ mortar illumination rounds, which were relatively safe. Nevertheless, the damage was done. In time the father’s village became a safe-haven for Taliban scouts. One of those scouts became a neighbor to the father. That enemy scout’s name was Wali Jan.

APPENDIX J: THE INFLUENCE OF CHANCE

Upon completion of the battalion's clearance operation several enemy remained behind as the Taliban 'eyes and ears.' Through intelligence sources, one particular insurgent was identified; Wali Jan. Wali Jan was left behind with the capability to rapidly report back to Taliban leadership on the state of American operations in Garmsir. Reports indicated that Wali Jan was paranoid and emotionally overwhelmed by his task. Reports to Taliban leadership were hampered by his fear.

When the battalion actively sought the capture of Wali Jan, patrols would query locals on his whereabouts. With no picture of Wali Jan the Americans were completely reliant on local intelligence. At best, the battalion was able to ascertain a very general location. As the search for Wali Jan intensified, Taliban leaders recognized the effort being put forth by the Americans. In an attempt to counter the battalion's efforts, Taliban south of the unit's Area of Operation instructed local men moving north to introduce themselves as Wali Jan at American checkpoints. Within a week over a hundred instances of men named Wali Jan passing through were reported by one company's entry control point. After a two week effort, active pursuit of Wali Jan was ceased. Emboldened, Wali Jan began sending accurate and frequent reports to Taliban leadership.

As the unit continued its intense patrolling effort chance worked in favor of the Marines. During a squad security patrol an interpreter was attacked by an Afghan family's dog. The dog was shot by the Marines in defense of the interpreter. That evening intelligence reports indicated that Wali Jan had complained to Taliban leaders that the Americans had shot his dog. Within 48 hours the Marine squad returned to the house where the dog was shot. Under the guise of paying reparation for killing the animal the Marines were able gain audience with all of the males living

in the compound. In an effort to protect Wali Jan, his brothers provided a false name for the absent brother. The attempt was foiled, however, when Wali Jan's elderly father entered the conversation and simply stated "Mohammed Jan, Mohammed Jan...who is Mohammed Jan? My sons name is Wali Jan?"

Realizing the limitations of the Marine's ability to clandestinely capture Wali Jan the Marine Company attempted to influence Wali Jan by other means. Over the course of a week the Marine Company launched 81mm illumination missions over top of Wali Jan's house. By the end of the week Wali Jan sent a final communiqué to his superiors stating that he was departing for Pakistan and that he no longer had the mental capacity to fight.

APPENDIX K: THE INFLUENCE OF SUCCESS

The southern most company in the battalion's area of operation had zero instances of enemy contact for two months following the completion of the clearance phase of the operation. The southern company had been the most engaged during the clearance phase and caused significant damage to the Taliban's ability to operate in Garmsir. Alone, snipers attached to the company had accumulated 86 confirmed enemy KIA and 14 enemy WIA. Intelligence reports noted that the enemy had gained a respect for the Marines and were fearful of coming in contact with them. Fear coupled with the company's intensive patrolling effort kept Taliban activity at bay for two months.

The Taliban attempted to become active during the company's fourth month in Garmsir. Taliban elements attempted to achieve momentum by placing IEDs at key road intersections. Although minor in its overall physical damage to the company, an IED strike on an American unit or vehicle was perceived to have a substantial moral impact for the Taliban—hopefully emboldening others to seek action against the Marines. The Taliban chose two specific positions to emplace the IEDs. Both positions were at least two kilometers away from the nearest Marine patrol base.

On two occasions IED emplacements were either run-off or caught attempting to emplace an IED at the southern chokepoint. On the third occasion an IED was emplaced, but discovered before it could be activated. In response, the company shifted a platoon to a patrol base overlooking the chokepoint. As a result, the Taliban attempted to emplace IEDs two kilometers south of the chokepoint on the southern edge of the unit's Area of Operation. The IEDs placed at the edge of the Area of Operation were neither a threat nor tactically relevant since no ISAF units were south of the Company in Helmand province. The enemy act of emplacing the IEDs in

a remote and unimportant location only served to provide the Marines an active target to prosecute.

The attempt to emplace an IED in the northern chokepoint was foiled by chance. The IED emplacer prematurely detonated the IED while emplacing it, killing himself and his team. The locals began a rumor that the IED emplacements were killed by an air attack. The company's refusal to neither confirm nor deny the rumor added to the mystique that the Marines had eyes everywhere. The Taliban made no further attempt to emplace an IED at the northern chokepoint.

For the Marine Company, the most startling aspect of the failed IED attempts was the Taliban's refusal to lay an IED closer than two kilometers from the nearest patrol base. Although, from the perspective of the Marines, other more vulnerable points were available for IED emplacement, the enemy did not pursue the use of these locations. To a certain extent it seemed that the enemy had established an almost debilitating respect for the Marines. Physical influence had transformed into a moral advantage that made the Taliban act and believe that they were inferior to their adversary.

APPENDIX L: THE INFLUENCE OF UNDERSTANDING

Prior to their deployment, Marines of BLT 1/6 were given in-depth classes on Afghan culture. One of the main concepts covered was the code of Pashtunwali. When the Marines arrived in Garmsir and began interacting with locals, it became clear that the practice of Pashtunwali was as important as the practice of Islam.

The code of Pashtunwali sets the honorable conditions that every male Pashtun is expected to live by. Pashtunwali addresses the treatment of guests and women, and the importance of honor in the handling of money, land, women, and revenge. The code itself is understood by the youngest Pashtun and practiced by all. The concept of Pashtunwali is a source of great pride for all Pashtuns and has often been the cause of incredible acts of compassion and hundreds of years of feuding amongst tribes. Village elders often would sit with Marines and go into great detail concerning the code.

During a visit to a local elder, a platoon commander made a point of discussing Pashtunwali. During the conversation the platoon commander stated that Marines observed a form of Pashtunwali, but by a different name. The platoon commander then went into great detail explaining the Marine Corps core values of honor, courage, and commitment.

The end of the conversation was interrupted by another village elder joining the small Jhirga. The village elder asked what the Marines and Afghan had been discussing. A short discussion ensued in Pashtu, in which the newcomer displayed shock. As the conversation wore on the newcomer expression became pensive. He eventually moved to the side of the gathering deep in-thought. The platoon commander asked his interpreter what had just passed. The interpreter replied that the elder had just told the newcomer that, "We have just found out that the

Marines live by Pashtunwali.” Following the discussion, the elders established the habit of calling the Platoon Commander “brother.”

APPENDIX M: THE INFLUENCE OF FRUSTRATION

The commanders of BLT 1/6 made a concerted effort to identify and circumvent the enemy OODA (observe, orient, decide and act) loop throughout their operations in Garmsir. During the clearance phase it was identified that the enemy had a 24-hour decision cycle. Marine commanders surmised that in the evening Taliban commanders would meet and discuss tactical actions for the following day. The purpose of the meeting was not only to cement plans, but also ensure that radio silence could be maintained throughout attacks and maneuvers, denying the Americans a means of early warning. Upon recognition of this decision cycle, Company Commanders altered their company battle rhythm. Nightly, Marine units would move and defensive positions would be altered. The purpose of these maneuvers was to frustrate enemy attacks the following day in order to force the Taliban to break radio silence. Once the Taliban panicked and began talking on their primitive hand held radios, US interpreters would pick up the communication on similar bought hand held radios and report the enemy traffic to the platoon or company commander. The timely intelligence reports allowed the Marine units to circumvent the enemy's attack and successfully counterattack.

The focus on defeating the enemy OODA loop led to an exhaustive cycle of action – reaction – counteraction that drained both forces. The ability to measure the affects of Marine battle rhythm were difficult to ascertain and there was constant concern of exhausting the Marine units for little gain. One company commander stated that he did not realize that his company was gaining an advantage on the battlefield until one of his interpreters picked up a transmission from a Taliban defensive post that stated “We are exhausted and hungry. We are awake all day because that is when we fight and we are awake all night because that is when the Americans move.”⁷¹ The company had not lost an engagement with the Taliban, but until the

communication had been intercepted the commander did not know what affects his operations were having on Taliban morale.

During the hold and build phase of BLT 1/6's operation, the enemy OODA loop was again identified and circumvented. It was identified that the enemy had a seven-day Boyd cycle. The timing of the cycle was based on gathered human intelligence. It was surmised that Taliban operatives, like Wali Jan, would observe an American tactic, technique or procedure that they deemed vulnerable and physically report the opportunity to attack to Taliban superiors south of Garmsir. This process took at least a day. Upon the blessing of Taliban operational commanders, the tactical commander would be given the necessary funds, equipment, and personnel to conduct the attack. This process would again take at least a day. Upon receiving the funds the tactical commander would drive south to Pakistan to purchase the necessary supplies. This process would take at least four days. Finally the tactical commander would move back into Garmsir with his supplies and personnel and wait for the final order of the Taliban operational commander. This final step again, took at least one day.

To circumvent the enemy's decision-action cycle the companies of BLT 1/6 altered tactics, techniques, and procedures on a weekly basis. As a rule, squads altered routes and methods of movement daily, platoons altered size, composition, and focus of patrols weekly, and the company changed its disposition every thirty days. The result of these efforts was to constantly frustrate the enemy. On numerous occasions intelligence reports indicated that an enemy attack, suicide attack, or IED attack had failed prior to implementation due to tactical changes implemented by units. Over time, due to the stockpiling of unused supplies, the enemy OODA loop did increase and changes were made to continue to defeat it. In the final month of BLT 1/6's operation in Garmsir, intelligence reports indicated that Taliban leaders had

significantly lowered expectations for grand tactical success against the Marines of BLT 1/6, deciding on employing only disruptive IED attacks and essentially waiting out the Marine battalion's occupation.

APPENDIX N: THE INFLUENCE OF REPUTATION AND PERCEPTION

Prior to BLT 1/6's operation in Garmsir, the British Army had operated in and around the area for two years. Situated in a corner of the district center, a British infantry company of 130 men held a small Area of Influence that spanned in a one kilometer arc around their forward outposts. The British, short of men and support, had made little progress in two years of fighting. The Taliban had established defensive positions, trenches, and bunkers encircling the British positions. For two years the British and Taliban exchanged fire and casualties, creating a barren no-man's land, reminiscent of World War I, between their lines.

When the Marines of BLT 1/6 expelled the Taliban, the locals expressed gratitude for the speed in which the Americans had defeated the insurgents. Comments were often made to the Marines about how cowardly the British were, remaining in the district center for two years. The locals gave no consideration to the obvious size difference between the 1300-man American force and the 130-man British force.

As BLT 1/6 prepared to transition Garmsir back to the British, the locals took great interest in who would follow the Marines. Concerns were specifically voiced about the possibility of British troops replacing the Americans. The Marines began a pro-British information operation prior to and during the relief-in-place. The Marine's of BLT 1/6 learned first hand Galula's Third Law of Counterinsurgency that, "support from the population is conditional."⁷² Some locals were convinced to continue to work with ISAF, but the majority remained skeptical. Several of the village elders specifically requested that the British Commander not be introduced to them.

Based off of the actions of previous British units, the in-coming British infantry company had a significant strategic communications problem. Although conditions in Garmsir were

significantly better for the incoming unit, the British company replacing BLT 1/6 had to fight (figuratively and literally) to gain influence with the locals. Both the outgoing Americans and incoming British learned first hand Galula's adage that; "When a man's life is at stake, it takes more than propaganda to budge him." ⁷³

Endnotes

¹ Headquarters United States Marine Corps, *FMFM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 1997), pg 1-10.

² *Operational Terms and Graphics*.

³ Meriam Webster's Online Dictionary, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/influence> (accessed 21 February 2010).

⁴ Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II, An Anthology of reports and Lessons and Observations from 2007-2009*, (15 April 2009) <http://www.mcccl.usmc.mil> (accessed October 3, 2009).

⁵ David Wood, "New Offensive in Afghanistan Hampered by Shortages", *Politics Daily*, <http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/07/06/new-offensive-in-afghanistan-hampered-by-shortages/> (accessed September 7, 2009)

⁶ Capt Osborne, William, Intelligence Officer, 2/7, to Major Sean Dynan, e-mail entitled "Masters Paper-Part 3," 9 March 2010. Full comment made by Capt Osborne: "As time passes, I grow even more disgusted with many of our senior leaders' (both USMC and USA) utter failure to comprehend what they were sending us to do."

⁷ The assertion of how the Marines of BLT 1/6 view their experience in Helmand is based off of the author's time in the unit and his interaction with all ranks within the unit.

⁸ C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3rd ed. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1906; Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 76. Citations are to the Nebraska edition.

⁹ "Linear vs. Non-Linear Systems," *Mathematics Illuminated*, <http://www.learner.org/courses/mathilluminated/units/13/textbook/02.php> (accessed January 10, 2010).

¹⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Meichael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 480.

¹¹ David Gallula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 1964), 24.

¹² Clausewitz, 481.

¹³ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 25.

¹⁴ Callwell, 77.

¹⁵ Major Nichols, Rory, Operations Officer, 2/7, to Major Sean Dynan, e-mail entitled "Masters Paper-Part 1," 16 March 2010. Statement concerning positions established in Helmand: "The Brits, Danish, and Estonians were conducting sustained operations in Gareshk, Sangin, Now Zad, and Musa Qala when we arrived and throughout much of our time in Helmand. To a far lesser extent, the Italians and Spanish also conducted operations in Delaram and Bela Baluk. Calling them sustained could be debated. They had far less influence and left almost immediately upon our arrival. In Helmand, each of our positions initially was an existing or expanded ISAF position, Estonian in Now Zad, Danish in Gereshk, British in Sangin and Musa Qala. In Farah this statement is probably more accurate. Some we built from the ground up, others were expanded ANP/ANA locations from which Police Mentor Teams previously operated from."

¹⁶ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*.

¹⁷ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*.

¹⁸ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 17.

¹⁹ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 26.

²⁰ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*.

²¹ Captain Michael Vincent, S-4 Officer, TF 2/7, interview with LtCol Carl Friedrich, MCCLL, 20 August 2008.

²² Capt Michael Vincent, S-4 Officer. Full comment made by Capt Vincent was: "MARCENT in Tampa is also in Iraq – the Marine Corps is in Iraq and MARCENT is in Iraq and Kuwait. It's the largest supply management unit [outside of Continental United States] in the Marine Corps. There are 13,000 national stock numbers (NSNs) on hand in Iraq. As a logistics officer in Afghanistan, I'm not very far away from Iraq and whenever I need something I can look up Taqaddam's stock of what is on hand. But we were unable to draw items from Iraq. MARCENT's response to that was, 'They are supporting Marine units in Iraq not Afghanistan.'"

²³ Capt Michael Vincent.

²⁴ Capt Michael Vincent.

²⁵ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 26.

²⁶ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 27.

²⁷ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 28.

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- ²⁸ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*.
- ²⁹ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 18.
- ³⁰ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 17.
- ³¹ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 31.
- ³² Major Nichols, Rory. E-mail. Comment was made in reference to a statement in Draft 2 of this paper. Major Nichols recommended: "You state dispersion of companies across hundreds of sq km [in draft 2]. Thousands of sq km would be a more accurate statement."
- ³³ LtCol Richard Hall, USMC, Commanding Officer, TF 2/7, interview with LtCol Carl Friedrich, MCCLL, 8 September 2008.
- ³⁴ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 27-28.
- ³⁵ Col Richard Hall, USMC, to Major Sean Dynan, e-mail entitled "Masters Paper-Part 3," 29 March 2010.
- ³⁶ LtCol Richard Hall interview.
- ³⁷ LtCol Richard Hall interview.
- ³⁸ Galula, 55.
- ³⁹ Bronze Star Summary of Action for 1stSgt Scott Hamm, written in August, 2008 by Capt Sean Dynan. Presented on 2 November 2009.
- ⁴⁰ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 43.
- ⁴¹ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*.
- ⁴² *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*.
- ⁴³ Callwell, 71.
- ⁴⁴ Galula, 55.
- ⁴⁵ *Operations in Afghanistan – Volume II*, 43.
- ⁴⁶ Col Peter Petronzio, USMC, Commanding Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, interview with LtCol Joseph Dennison, MCCLL, 27 August 2008.
- ⁴⁷ Clausewitz, 482.
- ⁴⁸ Gulula, 73.
- ⁴⁹ Gulula.
- ⁵⁰ Marine Corps Center For Lessons Learned, *Special Purpose MAGTF – Afghanistan Operations, Summary of Observations from Support of International Security Assistance Force November 2007 through February 2009*, (19 August 2009) <http://mccll.usmc.mil> (accessed October 25, 2009), 8.
- ⁵¹ *Special Purpose MAGTF*, 2.
- ⁵² Galula, 55.
- ⁵³ Clausewitz, 482.
- ⁵⁴ Col Richard Hall e-mail.
- ⁵⁵ Major James Driscoll, CO Company B, 1st Battalion, 2nd Princess of Wales Royal Regiment, British Army to Major Sean Dynan, e-mail entitled, "Cheers!," 18 December 2008.
- ⁵⁶ Wood.
- ⁵⁷ Galula, 54.
- ⁵⁸ 1st Lt Justin L. Grieco, member of the Police Training Team, Garmsir, Afghanistan from June 2009 to November 2009 to Major Sean Dynan, e-mail entitled, "Garmsir," 10 December 2009.
- ⁵⁹ LtCol Anthony Henderson, USMC, to Major Sean Dynan, e-mail entitled "PAPER FEEDBACK," 27 March 2010. LtCol Henderson recommended additional changes to the definition of Area of Influence that were incorporated. The final definition is collaboration between the author and LtCol Henderson.
- ⁶⁰ Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design, Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Pamphlet 525-5-500* (Fort Monroe, VA, 28 January 2008), 4-5.
- ⁶¹ Schmitt, John, *A Systemic Concept for Operational Design* (Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Concept and Plans Division, Marine Corps Warfighting concept paper, August 2006).
- ⁶² Schmitt, 18.
- ⁶³ Google, *Personality: Applying Theories and Understanding Human Behavior. The PsychoAnalytic Approach*, <http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~mlyount/MySites/Pictures/hierarchy.JPG&imgrefurl=http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~mlyount/MySites/ForensicPsychology/Theories.htm> (accessed 24 February 2010).
- ⁶⁴ Schmitt, 15.
- ⁶⁵ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.
- ⁶⁶ Callwell, 158.

⁶⁷ Lt Col Anthony M. Henderson, USMC, interview with LtCol Joseph Dennison, MCCLL, 21 August 2008.

⁶⁸ Bill Gentile, Transcript: "Afghanistan the Forgotten War," *PBS, NOW*, Broadcast July 17, 2008, <http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/428/transcript.html> (accessed January 17, 2010).

⁶⁹ Michael M. Phillips, "After Battle in Afghanistan Villages, Marines Open Complaint Shop", *Wall Street Journal* June 18, 2008, <http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2008/june/jun182008.html> (accessed on January 18, 2010).

⁷⁰ Phillips.

⁷¹ Capt Sean Dynan, CO Company A, BLT 1/6, interview with Capt Patrick E. Kinser, USMC, MCCLL, 22 August 2008.

⁷² Galula, 54.

⁷³ Galula, 55.

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