

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 20-MARCH-2013	2. REPORT TYPE STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) N/A
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Mexican Marine Corps in the Struggle for Scalable Security and its Potential as a Guarantor of the Mexican Safety	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER N/A
	5b. GRANT NUMBER N/A
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER N/A

6. AUTHOR(S) Tarin Vazquez , Salvador	5d. PROJECT NUMBER N/A
	5e. TASK NUMBER N/A
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER N/A

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 2076 SOUTH STREET, MCCDC, QUANTICO, VA 22134-5068	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER NONE
---	--

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SAME AS # 7.	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) N/A
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	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) NONE
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12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
NO RESTRICTIONS

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
NONE

14. ABSTRACT
The main aim of this study is to demonstrate the suitability, acceptability and feasibility of reorganization of the Mexican Marine Corps under the direct command of Secretary of the Mexican Navy can be a force in readiness with the purpose to be ready when the nation is less prepare to face any threat, in any time and in anywhere; the Mexican Marine Corps can do better the job if and when it reorganizes more efficiently and effectively. With the means and resources currently available to the Marines Corps of the Mexican Navy, it is possible to meet the expectations of both the Supreme Commander of the Mexican Armed Forces and the society by reorganizing the Mexican Marine Corps in units of the size of a reinforced Marine Brigade. This will allow the Mexican Marine Corps to contribute better to the safety and security of the government of Mexico and the Mexican people until the civilian police is able to do so.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
MAGTF Concept;Mexican Marines Corps;Organized Crime; Combined Arms;Prepositioning

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: UNCLASSIFIED			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT N/A	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 70	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON N/A
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) N/A

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

MEXICAN MARINE CORPS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR SCALABLE SECURITY AND ITS
POTENTIAL AS A GUARANTOR OF THE MEXICAN SAFETY

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Lt Col Salvador Tarin Vázquez

March 6th, 2013

AY 12-13

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Pauletta Otis

Approved: *Pauletta Otis*

Date: 20 March 2013

Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Edward J. Erickson

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Executive Summary

Title: MEXICAN MARINE CORPS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR SCALABLE SECURITY AND ITS POTENTIAL AS A GUARANTOR OF THE MEXICAN SAFETY

Author: Lt Col Salvador Tarin Vázquez, Mexican Marine Corps

Thesis: The main aim of this study is to demonstrate the suitability, acceptability and feasibility of reorganization of the Mexican Marine Corps under the direct command of Secretary of the Mexican Navy can be a force in readiness with the purpose to be ready when the nation is less prepared to face any threat, in any time and in anywhere; the Mexican Marine Corps can do better the job if and when it reorganizes more efficiently and effectively. With the means and resources currently available to the Marines Corps of the Mexican Navy, it is possible to meet the expectations of both the Supreme Commander of the Mexican Armed Forces and the society by reorganizing the Mexican Marine Corps in units of the size of a reinforced Marine Brigade. This will allow the Mexican Marine Corps to contribute better to the safety and security of the government of Mexico and the Mexican people until the civilian police is able to do so.

Discussion: With the exponential increase in the tactical capabilities of organized crime in Mexico, it is necessary for the Armed Forces to lead the fight until the civilian police force is capable of successfully countering the criminal groups that threaten the citizens, institutions and viability of the Mexican nation. The Armed Forces must protect the basic functions of the state to ensure the stable and secure governance and bring the criminal organizations down to levels that allow civilian police to handle them.

The Mexican Marine Corps, as terrestrial component of the Mexican Navy and as head of Naval power projection Federation inland, is the operational force that is entrusted with the mission. The Supreme Commander's orders are to defeat or to destroy the criminal gangs that constitute a real danger to the survival of the civilian population and government institutions by using tactics, weapons and military equipment.

Conclusion: With the pressures of limited resources and with time running out, it is important to obtain specific results that will ensure that the Mexican people have domestic security. A proposal using the United States' Marine Corps' MAGTF Concept is suggested to optimize material, financial and human resources in order to increase combat capabilities, efficiency and effectiveness. This will benefit Marines Personnel, the Mexican Navy, the Mexican people and the entire nation.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

The defense of the legitimate interests of the people of Mexico, as their right to life and peace, progress and security are violated by those with no right to claim itself as "territories" portions of the country. These criminals, who are shielded by causing terror both in the population and in civil authorities, enforce the empire of fear.

Mexico is trembling in a fight for its own existence as a nation state against these criminals, who in many occasion, used not only weapons, but also they employ the same legal framework to tie the hands of those who are determined to fight crime by means of criminalizing and delegitimizing them. This is done through the national and international public opinion against the will of the government to fight against crime. Consequently, conditions are created for them to continue operating with impunity, protected by silence, corruption and fear (since they intend to face down the authorities into a "*laissez faire*" "let them do as they will" condition in the best of the cases).

The Mexican Armed Forces are taking the battle facing the enemy without giving or asking for mercy, with no other reward than giving by the sacred duty to resist up to the last bullet, the last breathe or the last man.

Given the scarcity of financial resources, the legal onslaught, media and political interests, the Armed Forces cannot longer perform showy operational troops moving from one point to another one inside the nation, without waking up in fear, suspicion, rumor and the malicious misinformation that criminal networks involve the people.

It is time to restore the good name of the Armed Forces, worn during the fight. It is time to restore social peace and public trust, but not with spectacular operations or advertising campaigns, only employing the truth, honesty, hard work and constancy day to day.

Therefore, it is necessary to reorganize the forces so that regionally they have all what it is needed to ensure the protection of citizens, the superiority of the military force against the capabilities of the enemy and the protection of the force itself, but mostly to ensure that every Mexican, every man, woman or child is safe enough to work, study and progress.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been possible without the support of the Mexican Navy, which sent me to increase my humble abilities; as well as of the University of the United States Marine Corps, which allowed me to have access to their vast academic resources. Similarly, I give thanks to my faculty advisors, who spent hours making sure that I learn enough and in the right way enhancing to think critically. I am grateful with the help and support of my thesis advisor, who spent nights reading, orienting me to give coherence to the sum of scattered thoughts and ideas to finish this paper. I also thanks to my wife for her unconditional support and understanding.

My greatest acknowledgement also goes to those brave comrades who fought along with me, and whom I have the honor to call my friends, those who are still living and those who died heroically in the line of duty and whom I had the honor to shake their hands, to all those who sweat and bleed every day to ensure that our country achieves what it wants most...

PEACE

Avanti!

If you fall down ten times, get up
another ten, other
hundred, five hundred, others ...
It must be your falls as violent
nor by law, they must be so.

With great hunger that plants
assimilate greedy humus
swallowing the bitterness of the affronts
the saints and the holy were formed

Obsession almost asinine to be strong
nothing else needs the creature.
and I reckon any unhappy
breaking the grip of the fate ...

All incurable are curable
five seconds before death!

Strong Soul

You only will be defeated, when you stop fighting.

1. INTRODUCTION

With the means and resources currently available to the Marines Corps of the Mexican Navy, it is possible to meet the expectations of both the Supreme Mexican Commander and the Mexican people by reorganizing them in units of the size of a reinforced Marine Brigade.

The situation in Mexico is becoming more complex, mainly due to the very nature of drug trafficking operations and its diversification into other crimes. Although, historically, there has always been smuggling to and from the United States of America, former criminal gangs were composed mainly of groups of people who saw the illegal trade as an acceptable and accepted way of living for lacking of other sources of income in the mountain regions of Chihuahua, Sonora, Sinaloa, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit and Guerrero. For instance, in the coastal plain of the Gulf of Mexico, there was a group of people known as the Gulf Cartel. This group emerged around 1920, having networks with Al Capone. Chicago was their historical connection with the American Union, but they did not engage in drug trafficking until the 1970s. As a result of the failed war in Vietnam, the drug market in the United States became attractive since there were veterans who had become addicted to those substances¹.

Owing to the increased demand for narcotics and number of exports, criminal organizations expanded their territories. They overlap each other trying to evade the increasingly effective border patrol and border protection system and customs of the United States. As a result, there was a clash of interests among the Pacific Cartel (also known as the Sinaloa), Gulf Cartel (CDG) and the South Pacific Cartel (the Beltran Leyva)². The need to keep the territories along with the operations of the tobacco office; firearms of the United States and the end of civil war in

¹ Langton, Jerry. *Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels from El Paso to Vancouver*. Canada: Wiley, 2012.

² Hernández, Anabel. *Los Señores del Narco*. México: Grijalbo, 2012.

Guatemala developed the demand and supply of increasingly sophisticated weapons. Besides, it initiated the need for specialists in the techniques, tactics and combat procedures in order to deny areas to rival cartels. Consequently, the “drug war” began.

In order to pay the mercenary groups, which would begin to be known as "sicario" and keep the cartels as a financially viable organization. The criminal activities are diversified into: fuel theft, human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and all variety of illegal activities including the control of a given population "Criminal Square".

In the early 1990's, a group of elite military was recruited (Special Forces of Mexican Army) many of whom had received some training in counterinsurgency operations in Fort Benning by the Army of the United States. This group became the most efficient of the narco assassin groups, made cartels recruit other former police officers, former military to provide military training to their mercenary forces. Criminal groups had incredible advantages in technique, tactics and logistics. Similarly, they had better technology and units greater in numbers than local police which operate without sufficient resources and training. Therefore, local police gave the impression to be corrupted by payments and threats. Those who refused to receive payment were threatened with executions.

Thus, the Mexican State was in need to use the Armed Forces, but until 2009 it is when the Mexican Navy started combating drug cartels. It is a military force aimed at protecting outer the nation, but during the drug war has taken on civilian police' functions in an environment where the civilian police was not only effective, but it became a risk to itself and the people it protects, basically due to the asymmetric struggle, where criminals have better training, tactical skills, equipment, weapons and units greater in numbers than the police. Based on this situation,

Mexican Government decided to use military units both to dismantle these gangs of mercenaries and to bring the conflict to a manageable level by civil authorities.

The concept of "sufficient victory" means, in terms of the Military Mexican Forces, to bring the conflict to a manageable level by the civil police. It leads the Armed Forces stay within the margins of action considered by the Mexican Constitution and by Federal Homeland Security. This is also carried out in the context of stabilization of the regions where governance is weak or lost. This is always done if the civil authorities asked Armed Forces to intervene because they are not forced to lose their authorities and Marines do not replace the civilian police. On the contrary, Marines help them operate for lack of capability, for the infiltration of organized crime structures and when it is necessary to carry out military operations to preserve the physical integrity and property of citizens against the actions of criminal groups.

The basic functions of the state such as: tax collection, the use of institutionalized violence to preserve the peace and security of the republic, and the protection of citizens are being taken illegally by these criminal groups. These groups operate in areas where local or federal authorities are too weak or they lack of personnel and weapons. Some of them do not have the will to confront the criminals and bring them to justice. That's why, the Federal Government, through the Mexican Armed Forces, the Federal Police, the National Gendarmerie and other elements of national power are combating in order to preserve the governance and citizen security.

Regarding the impel of Marine Mexican Corps to be a responsive force and to cope with its mission to preserve governance and Mexican security, the Marine Unit of the Mexican Navy must be scaled down to brigade level and existing brigades must be unified. These units will

have tactical, logistic and controlling advantages that will enable the rapid deployment of the force; effective and fast replenishment; increased controls and supervision to help reduce the collateral damage, coordination of operations with other Marine Corps, and centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations at the regional level. These capabilities ensure effective control through mobility, flexibility and concentration of force in place and time that allow for the elimination of the threat of organized crime in the area of responsibility.

There have been several attempts to get the capability to operate at brigade level but it has only been authorized as a unit of work in the areas where the fighting power of organized crime represents danger to units of battalion size, area where the target characteristics required effective control of a particular theater and there are activities limited in time and space. There are only five such units now in existence as the rest of the Corps is broken up into individual battalions. However, brigades have not been authorized because of political power of naval sectors and zones that needs to maintain control of the infantry forces (individual battalions) to have naval presence in their jurisdiction.

Without a permanent organization, the efforts of individual units have minimal effects and results. Taking into consideration the tactical situation, the political situation, and the history of Mexico, it is necessary to create and maintain a force with sufficient capacities to put pressure on criminal groups and conflict areas to deny those criminals the opportunity to commit crimes against the citizens of Mexico.

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the suitability, acceptability and feasibility of reorganization of the Mexican Marine Corps under the direct command of Secretary of the Mexican Navy can be a force in readiness with the purpose to be ready when the nation is less

prepare to face any threat, in any time and in anywhere; the Mexican Marine Corps can do better the job if and when it reorganizes more efficiently and effectively. The methodology used was based on analysis of documents, transcripts from interviews, and a review of specialized literature. The reorganizational structure suggested was founded on the MAGTF concept of the U.S. Marine Corps. (See appendix B: Proposal).

The research questions were as follows:

1. Considering the current budget of the Mexican Navy and the size and danger of the current threats against Mexican National Security, how can the Mexican Marines be significantly more efficient and effective without increasing operating costs?
2. How can both the reaction speed and the combat power of Marine Corps increase with minimum investment on unscheduled resource?
3. How can personnel of Marine Corps' performance be armoured against corruption and the power of organized crime?
4. How can a task unit (capable of action on land and air with combined arms) be efficiently integrated taking into account existing resources and procurement programs?

The paper is divided into five sections contextualizing, supporting and illustrating the rationale of Mexican Marines Corps as a guarantor for Mexican safety; showing evidence of analysis and insights which founded a proposal of reorganization of Mexican Marine Corps as Brigade level.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Mexico and the Drug War

Mexico has experienced the phenomenon known abroad as the "Drug War"³ since 2006. Although the phenomenon is not new, there is an increasing level of local violence and international insecurity stemming from a struggle to control narcotics routes to the United States. Federal, state and municipal police forces have been overwhelmed by criminals. Some police have ended up working with criminals as a result of personal weakness or threats of retaliation against their families. Another result was the creation of a group of criminal gunmen who had been trained as professional police or military personnel⁴.

The growing number of people involved in organized crime forced the cartels to diversify their activities, not only controlling the production, but managing transportation and marketing of the drug. They further expanded their operations to include human trafficking, prostitution, kidnapping, assault, robbery, extortion and other forms of illegal activity. This was called the "Criminal Square"⁵ which means that they control physical space and asking people for money, called "Dues" for the right to establish even legal businesses⁶.

Both the growing threat of life, liberty and property of Mexican citizens and the increase of murders and kidnappings, forced the Mexican government to take actions that initially had limited objectives in specific areas. Later, at the request of state authorities, where the crime and violence surpassed all state agency capability to confront, the federal police were called to

³ Hernández, Anabel. *Los Señores del Narco*. México: Grijalbo, 2012. Gibler, John. *To die in Mexico: Dispatches from the Drug War*. City Lights Publishers, 2011.

⁴ Langton, Jerry. *Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels from El Paso to Vancouver*. Canada: Wiley, 2012.

⁵ Criminal Square. "Falconer," in which criminal groups pay lookouts -- "halcones," or falcons -- to alert them about the operations of the security forces. See O'Neill, 2012.

⁶ A due is money to pay for selling, a way of extortion for organized crime to civilian. See Osorio, Diego. Enrique. *La guerra de los Zetas: Viaje por la frontera de la narcopolítica*. México: Grijalbo, 2012

intervene. Later, military units were assigned to these areas as combat missions. By 2010 crime units were formed that were similar to the regular Army Units⁷.

With the increasing modernization, technology and the use of support weapons by criminal groups, the federal government mobilized the Mexican Marine Corps to conduct operations to restore stability and governance in areas violated by criminals (2009). Criminal capabilities to organize, assemble, and conduct tactical operations have diminished with increasing pressure from the federal authorities, joint police-military operations, and joint operations. However, in reaction to federal pressure, the criminal groups became more resilient and were increasingly supplied with arms, ammunition and equipment from the United States of America. Both organized crime in the United States and some individuals who emigrated to the United States were guilty of these illegal activities.⁸

Thus, as the fight continues with the same intensity, more spaces to organized crime will be denied progressively, at least in its violent form, to restore peace and security to civil society in order to ensure stability and economic progress, social political and necessary for the survival and development of the nation.

Mission of the Mexican Armed Forces

The National Security Policy, led by the Mexican United States President, is framed by efforts of regionalization in five core regions: northwest, northeast, southwest, southeast and center. This simplifies and facilitates coordination among authorities of the different units of the three levels of government involved in the fight against organized crime. It also allows for the

⁷ See Osorio, Diego Enrique. *El cartel de Sinaloa: Una historia del uso político del narco..* México: Random House Mondadori, 2009. Langton, Jerry. *Rise of the Mexican drug cartels from El Paso to Vancouver.* Canada: Wiley, 2012.

⁸ US Arms are sold to criminals. Hernández, Anabel. *Los Señores del Narco.* México: Grijalbo, 2012.

cooperation and coordinated actions of different civilian and military agencies in the area of security, social reconstruction, law and justice. Governmentally, it includes the following Secretaries: Marine, Defense, Government, State Public Safety as well as Judges, Magistrates and Prosecutors both the Federal Courts and the Common Law courts.

The mission of the Mexican Armed Forces is in the spirit of both Articles 31 and 89 of the Political Constitution of the Mexican United States. This is the charter that sources all national law (See appendix A). Summarizing the articles 31 and 89, the overall mission of the Mexican Armed Forces is the defense of the independence, the territory, the honor, the rights and the interests of the country as well as the peace and internal order against foreign or local enemies.

Also summarizing the Constitutional Mission for the Armed Forces, each armed service integrates its organic law, which is a required law, from Article 89, in the specific case of the Mexican Navy (See appendix A). Specifically, the Mexican Navy develops in an environment where three national physical elements converge: coastal waters, lakes and rivers; the area of land adjacent to them (Maritime Zone) and the air space. The Navy must organize and equip for combat on land, in the air and at sea.

The Mexican Marine Corps, as a force land component of the Mexican Navy, has as a mission the projection of naval power from the federal sea to landmass. This in order to perform the operations leading to the formation and protection of advanced naval stations, naval bases, support for the civilian population in case of disaster zones, combat operations to capture the beachhead, subsequent operations inland or which are ordered for the preservation of internal order and external defense of the federation. All of these operations based on the techniques,

tactics, rules and procedures implemented in the doctrine, manuals, directives and orders from the High Command⁹.

Restrictions on Use of Force

The performance of the Mexican Marine Corps adheres strictly to treaties and conventions signed and ratified by Mexico. This includes the treatment of wounded and prisoners (Geneva Conventions¹⁰), means of combat (Hague Treaties) and respect for human rights. The latter are of special consideration because the enemy is not considered a belligerent. The “enemy” does not meet the required parameters in Geneva, although in many cases he has the organizational structure, openly carries weapons, and employs distinctive tactics, nor does he respect laws of war (the main target of attack is the civilian population). The status of the conflict is not “war” but “public order disturbance” or internal disorder¹¹.

For this reason, tactical operations are conducted within the framework of the law of peacetime. Although police and military employ techniques, tactics, personnel and military equipment, the operations are considered to be in the nature of police operations or “high impact operations.” Collateral damage is not acceptable (It is considered murder) nor is “property damage, accidental, negligent or intentional, as applicable, and the excluding of responsibility or aggravating under the Federal Criminal Code (Civil Law).

In the fight against organized crime, the actions of the Mexican Marine Corps take the role of intervener of the judiciary of the federation. Actions, such as planning, testing,

⁹ For documents, See <http://www.semar.gob.mx/s/normateca/dh-marina.html>

¹⁰ For Geneva and Hague Conventions. See Tomuschat, Christian. *Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

¹¹ See Geneva Conventions, 1949. IV Hague Conventions (1907) Laws and Rules for Land War and Uses and Customs. Article 2. Enciclopedia Juridica. www.encyclopedia-juridica.biz. the combatants. Article 193 of Federal Law Code. Federal Law against Organized Crime. www.diputados.gob.mx .

development, implementation and operation of the success, are made by the Marines. In all cases where there are detained, killed, wounded people or insured material, the prosecutor must be informed immediately to the Public Ministry Agent giving detainees, weapons, drugs and / or illegal substances. To prevent naval personnel from incurring responsibility for the commission of crimes, the Marine Commandant has issued specific directives¹².

Organization of the Mexican Marine Corps

The Mexican Marine Corps of the Mexican Navy (along with the Fleet and the Naval Air Force), it is one of three components of the Mexican Navy and is organized in small and large units; the larger size is the Marine Brigades and smaller, fire teams. These are the organic units of tertiary characteristics¹³ with balanced weapons that allow both direct fires and in defilade¹⁴ and even in squadrons. This combination of organizing, arming and training gives the Marine units mobility, firepower and maneuverability. This is different from the Army that has binary organization at squad level and it is meant to ensure that they have positive results even if outnumbered. Mexican Marines are organized in 30 battalions which are scattered in the country. There are also five brigades of diverse composition located in strategically important points¹⁵.

During the development of specific operations, the Marine brigades may be integrated into task forces supported by other units such naval aviation¹⁶; legal and intelligence units;

¹² For documents, see <http://www.semar.gob.mx/s/normateca/dh-marina.html>. The Marine staff acts on offenders only in cases of flagrant crime and in proportion to the extent of aggression against it or when this materializes or it is imminent to ensure the protection of his own life, the physical integrity of the unit and the lives of civilians who could be involved at the time of contact.

¹³ Tertiary characteristics means that each tactical unit has three maneuver elements.

¹⁴ Defilade is also used to refer to a position on the reverse slope of a hill or within a depression in level or rolling terrain. Defiladed positions on hilltops are advantageous because "dead space" – a space that cannot be engaged with direct fire – will be created in front of the position. Chris Bellamy. *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge, 1990.

¹⁵ See [http://www.semar.gob.mx.es.wikipedia.or/infanter%C3%Ada_de_Marina_\(M%C3%A9xico\)](http://www.semar.gob.mx.es.wikipedia.or/infanter%C3%Ada_de_Marina_(M%C3%A9xico))

counterintelligence and electronic warfare¹⁷; special operations; weapons, equipment and specialized vehicles that belong to other units of marines or navy fleets concentrated in direct support of the operation. Although these are tasks similar to the U.S. Marine MAGTF concept,¹⁸ these tasks units are only temporary that make difficult integration and readiness; responsiveness is sacrificed at the expense of sufficient time.

Morale

Marine's morale is particularly high when compared to other corps of troop and armed services; and it could even be considered the highest in the Mexican Armed Forces. This is large a result of *Esprit de Corps*--a strong sense of belonging and pride for the Marine Corps.¹⁹ Since the small number of elements that make up the Corp, most of the Marines are permanently deployed in the areas of high incidence and high-impact crimes. There are few who have not been forged in the rigor of the service, or do not feel in fellowship with their comrades for having survived a lethal threat together. The special situation of the Marine Corps, the hardness of the service and the risky service involved have shaped the character of the members of the Corps They are hardened by limited resources, the long deployments, and the heat of battle.

Training

The training of the Marine Corps includes five levels: individual basic training, advanced individual training, basic unit training, and advanced unit training and training for joint operations in the development of conventional operations. The training includes the following: spread order tactics; urban combat; close combat indoors; use of organic weapons; use of accompanying and

¹⁷ For documents, see <http://www.semar.gob.mx/s/normateca/dh-marina.html>.

¹⁸ For further reading MAGTF. See Wade M. Norman. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) SMARTBook. 2012.

¹⁹ See Wade M. Norman. The Leader's SMARTBook, 3rd Revised Edition. 2009 MCWP 3-02.3 maritime prepositioning force 3-32

support weapons; airmobile, airborne and amphibious operations; immediate reaction exercises, and human rights courses. Training is given in the Marine battalions and in each of the regional offices. Specific training is developed and reinforced in the Center of Training and Specialization of Marines (Marine School) in Champoton to train specialists and classes (NCO's) on tactical doctrine.

Officers are trained in the Heroic Naval Military School where they are taught the practical and theoretical knowledge needed to serve as section commanders.²⁰ At the same time, upon graduation they can get both a degree in civil engineering and the rank of corvette lieutenants. They also receive training courses in different friendly nations on tactical fields depending on the tactical necessity of the units. Training can be given through school taught courses, training in different national and international centers or by means of mobile training teams. It also depends on the type, duration, and time of implementation or the urgency of training.

Even though Marine Corps typically works on a company or battalion (except when they operate as Special Forces), units are ready for combat at platoon level and even at squadrons in order to develop in commanders skills and initiative to operate with small units that allow them to succeed even in combat conditions that require temporary isolation of its upper echelon.

Equipment

The Marine Standard equipment can be classified as follows: basic combat, camping, and special equipment. The basic combat equipment consists of vest and helmet ballistic protection; harness with pouches; hydration pack; fatigues; combat boots stockings; kitchen ranch (glasses,

²⁰ Heroic Naval Military School, See <http://www.semar.gob.mx>

plates and cutlery pan); bell backpack; poncho; balaclavas and gloves. The camping equipment is made of tents, mobile toilets and everything required to establish bases of operations for periods greater than 24 hours. The special equipment involves all the additional equipment required for specific missions (mountaineering, parachuting, and diving, among others).

The equipment is provided entirely by the Mexican Navy, primarily in camouflage colors (with the specific pattern of the Mexican Marines, the color depending on the area of operations, jungle, desert and urban) and black, to differentiate the elements of Marine units from other Mexican Armed Forces (such as: the Army, State Security Forces like the Federal Police and Gendarmerie).

Mobility

Mexico is large and has diverse geographical and social characteristics. The enemy is dispersed over the entire country so the Marines must also be dispersed to meet the threat. This means that the force must have reliable, strong, and fast vehicles to withstand the rigors of off road, reach and sustained speeds while fully loaded.

Although the Mexican Navy has equipped the Marine Corps with several types of vehicles, the numbers of vehicles needed for surveillance patrol functions as well as combat missions outweigh often the number of drivers that come with the units.

Similarly, it goes beyond the financial capacity of the battalions because the Marine Corps was originally intended to be a conventional force – not a motorized force. The current combat situation demands speed, depth, and concentration mass and which can only be achieved with vehicles with reliable features and vehicle specifications necessary for this type of work. A way to provide Marine Units the vehicles, drivers, resources and maintenance facilities for is by

integrating them organically to combat units, wherein each squad, each platoon, each company and each battalion has the required number of vehicles and drivers to mobilize immediately.

Using Combined Arms

The concept of combined arms implies that the amphibious brigade level would assign task forces that include different technical units and tactics suitable for a particular mission. An example of combined arms is the amphibious brigade since it includes among its component forces the following: two battalions of Marines, an amphibious command battalion, a service battalion, a special forced unit (at the company level), an artillery battalion and a battalion of light reconnaissance armored vehicles.

Marine brigades make use of resources that they have, borrow from other units, or request from the High Command. This includes human and material resources in order to develop units with mixed capacities: firepower, shield, maneuverability, speed and depth in combat. This ensures that Marines are not overcome by the enemy, have the ability to deny cover, and provide an advantage of shield and numerical superiority. Under these conditions, Marines would be able to, not only prevail, but cut off retreat of the enemy. The tactical units of Marines, although their organization is based on infantry units, are never composed only of infantry personnel, but are closely integrated to armored vehicles and support weapons.

Interoperability

Due to the complexity of the Marine environment, the shortage of budget, resources and the wide range of types of operations, the Marine Corps often operates using the direct support of

the other Naval units for reconnaissance missions, support for fire, transportation, casualty evacuation, preclinical, evacuation of corpses, supply on-site, among others²¹.

The interrelationship, with naval and afloat units, is known in the Mexican Navy as “interoperability” because it involves two or more different units with mutual support operations within the framework of naval operations. The Marine Corps does not have its own fixed wing aircraft or helicopters the Naval Air Force provides these when required. Similarly, the Marine Corps does not own ships, fire support platforms afloat or interceptors but it relies on the Mexican Navy operations that require these elements.

In reciprocity, for those services, which do not have units to that enable them to cope with dangerous situations on the ground, are integrated responsive forces embarked both mobile wing aircrafts and aboard ships, when it is needed.

Operational Doctrine

The operational doctrine of the Marines Corps is based on the doctrine of the Mexican Navy. The procedures, techniques and tactics are approved and disseminated by the General Staff of the Navy through the General Coordinator of Marines²².

²¹ Interoperability is a concept referring to interdependence.

²² Isolate: the opponent, physically demarcating the theater in order to avoid the "cockroach phenomenon" is simply to prevent the enemy moves out of place, or receive reinforcements or supplies during the Campaign. This is achieved through the establishment of bases in spots where they can have control of the avenues of approach, continuous patrolling and establishing these positions naval security (formerly known as checkpoints). If indeed the area is isolated, the enemy is unlikely to mobilize its units, key personnel, weapons, prohibited drugs and therefore should be counted in addition to the ground forces with air and surface units that allow the effective materialization fence, depending on the geographic area where this is done. Search: Search hitmen units, shipments of weapons and prohibited materials must not violate the rights of citizens, so they must prioritize the use of noninvasive methods to determine flagrant crime or positive identification target based on the warrant that is available, this requires that the Marine unit in question has the support of civilian agencies responsible for law enforcement at the federal or agency State intelligence. Fix: Freeze the target, through the siege of proximity, through monitoring or if necessary, by the fire, so that is not able to escape the course of justice. Capture / destroy: the capture should be favored over the destruction and elimination of the target, eliminating the threat only when it is actually constituted against military

It is critical that every detail be planned and specified at the operational level due to the large geographical area, the characteristics of the mimetic enemy, and the constant manipulation of information in the mass media. The same planning of the operation from the theater commander and his personnel is required to avoid loose ends that would harm the prestige and good name of the Navy or result in responsibilities and corporal punishment (trial and prison) for unit commanders and subordinates. Commanders must take into account that both Yamashita and Medina criteria apply--ignorance benefits no one.²³

Tactical Doctrine

The operating units of the Mexican Navy and their actions are based on manuals, directives, orders, standard procedures for small units. These are authorized by the General Staff of the Navy through the Coordinator of Marine Corps and the Naval General Department Education. The doctrine establishes the following common basic principles: unity of command; economy of force; flexibility; security; surprise; mutual support; maneuver; mobility; ease of planning; centralized planning and decentralized execution. This provides commanders of tactical units with guides and the superior commander's intentions in order to make tactical planning flexible and for active and efficient execution. Tactical unit commanders have special responsibility for the legitimate use of force, respect for constitutional guarantees, and respect for fundamental human rights.

personnel or civilians, acting in self-defense against aggression involving actual or imminent risk of serious injury or death (self-defense legal principle).

²³ Yamashita and Medina criteria are based on a doctrine for war crime. See <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/> and Rockwood, P. Lawrence. See *Walking Away from Nuremberg: Just War and the Doctrine of Command Responsibility*. Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press. 2007.

Human Rights

Marine personnel are permanently aware of “zero tolerance” for those who would abuse civil rights. This is supported through lectures, classes and the leadership of exemplary officers.

When violations are detected, the Marines Corps acts in accordance with law by restoring the damage, administrative sanctions, and/ or criminal prosecution of those involved. In all cases, the sanction is imposed by civil authorities. These procedures include the treatment of captured enemy personnel. The following violations are specifically prohibited: torture (not valid as a means of interrogation), cruel and degrading treatment, the use of force when it is not justified, illegal deprivation of liberty, robbery, rape, kidnapping, forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions²⁴.

Current Missions

The Marine Corps of the Mexican Navy has four types of missions: (1) the protection of strategic facilities for Mexico, (2) support for the civilian population in case disaster areas, (3) support for other federal agencies for the performance of their duties (providing security) and (4) high impact operations (tactical operations against organized crime).

Naval Forces are tasked to equip, train, and be in readiness to defend Mexico’s territorial integrity against an external enemy. These forces, up to surface units, naval and Marine have the capabilities and resources-- tactical, technical and human -- to cope with any possible threat.

The Navy has two major forces, deployed on each coast, that are permanently organized for defense. Meanwhile the Secretary of National Defense (Army and Air Force) also has

²⁴ For Human Rights. See Christian Tomuschat, *Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

National Defense against foreign aggression (DN I²⁵) plans for defense. The details of execution are set in the plan and are found in the publications of the secretary.²⁶

Potential Enemies

Mexico itself has no external enemies. Nevertheless, as a result of the extensive trade, military and commercial agreements, the complicated social and political interdependence, and a 3,000 kilometer common border, every enemy of the United States is a potential threat to Mexico. This includes international terrorism, trafficking weapons of mass destruction, (nuclear and biological), as well as organized crime, among the threats to Mexican national security. This is reflected in Article 5th²⁷ the current federal law of national security.

Preservation of Internal Order

Operations preservation of internal order are intended to recover the governance of the states and the integral parts of the country where there have been serious disturbances of the public peace that threaten the lives of citizens and the internal security of Mexico. In such operations, Marines act, along with other federal agencies, in order to contain a situation. This is done first through tactical actions by the Marines but the management of damage and reconstruction of the social fabric is the responsibility of the Government Secretary²⁸.

²⁵ www.es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuerzas_Armadas_de_Mexico

²⁶ Campaign Operations Handbook, volume I and II. See <http://www.semar.gob.mx/s/normateca/dh-marina.html>

²⁷ Article 5 <http://info4.juridicas.unam.mx/ijure/tcfed/80.htm?s=> Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la Universidad Autónoma de México.

²⁸ It is the equivalent to the ministry of the interior.

In these operations, the Marine Corps acts only to subdue and disrupt enemy forces and, if possible, capture or abate, bands of criminals until the public peace is restored, local government operations are stabilized, and there is an initial economic and social recovery.²⁹

Current Enemy

Criminal gangs in Mexico are basically grouped into seven major cartels, further organized into two opposing alliances. One is led by Joaquin Guzman Loera, "El Chapo Guzman"³⁰, of the Sinaloa cartel and the second one was under the command of Heriberto Lazcano "the Lazca"³¹. Both organizations have a strong presence The United States, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia and Argentina, and maintain links with drug traffickers in Africa, Asia and Europe³².

Capabilities of the Enemy

The criminals' intelligence networks range from co-opted officials who provide information about the execution of federal operations (topos³³); guards of city access (road guards) and informants (falcons) who provide real-time information through an intricate network and various communications equipment. Information is provided on the movement and activities of law enforcement, critical information in the vicinity of the "points" where activities are performed, the locations of safe houses, and other armed criminal units.

²⁹ The Sixth Report of the President Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, 2012. <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/>

³⁰ The Chapo Guzmán. See Hernández, Anabel. *Los Señores del Narco*. México: Grijalbo, 2012. Osorio, Diego Enrique. *El cartel de Sinaloa: Una historia del uso político del narco*. México: Random House Mondadori, 2009.

³¹ (The Zetas bloodiest leader, killed in action on November 2012, the latter has visible signs of fracture in their commanders, splitting Miguel Trevino Morales "40".) Osorio, Diego Enrique. *La guerra de los Zetas: Viaje por la frontera de la narcopolítica*. México: Grijalbo, 2012

³² The Telegraph. "Mexican drug cartels 'operating in the UK, France and Netherlands'". www.telegraph.co.uk/news February, 2013.

³³ Topos, See Hernández, Anabel. *Los Señores del Narco*. México: Grijalbo, 2012. Gibler, John. *To die in Mexico: Dispatches from the Drug War*. City Lights Publishers, 2011.

The enemy's armed units are tactically organized in a way that resembles a military organization, where 4 or 5 men form a "stake"³⁴ which is the minimal cell work and fire from gunmen, armed with rifles usually, 40mm grenade launchers and fragmentation grenades. They are equipped as "war people" wearing tactical military uniforms similar to those of the U.S. Armed Forces including: helmet, ballistic vests, harnesses with pouches, leg holsters, tactical boots and secondary weapons.

The staff normally has an armored vehicle "hard" and three or four vehicles "soft". Each *stake* of 20 to 25 gunmen is enhanced by simply adding more "stakes" as required for the operation. In a one case, 100 stakes under the leadership of a single Commander, fought together against federal forces. Stakes are located on the edges of urban areas, in conflict areas, and rural areas. The "guards of the square" are similarly armed and organized and wear civilian clothes to mingle with the people. Their vehicles are usually less observable to prevent opposition groups from entering the square.

Enemy Logistics

Criminal operators are responsible for affairs that range from the collection of "dues" kidnapping, drug trafficking and money laundering. Operators and accountants maintain the logistical cohesion for a particular criminal Square. There is no meeting point for payroll; each square is self-sustaining. They normally use three weeks of earnings to support the square and one week of earnings devoted to the sustainment of the cartel. There is no standardization in terms of equipment, weapons and ammunition, but the most common weapon is the U.S. "rook" (M16A2/R15A1) with the "horn" (AK47/AKM56) as secondary weapon. Generally, leaders use

³⁴ Stake is called Estaca a group for four criminals. Randy Kreider and Mark Schone, "New Zetas Cartel Leader Violent 'To the Point of Sadism,'" ABC News, October 12, 2012.

the GOVERNMENT 1911 A1 model that is a status symbol and customize it with metal handles and jewelry. The rations also depends on the area, the cartel group, and logistic skills of the operator. It ranges from those who only eat noodles; to those who have meals ready to eat (MREs) to those who consume hot meals every day three times a day.

The Intentions of the Enemy

The original intention of the enemy was to have the total control of the country and submit Mexico to drug service³⁵. They partially succeeded in the early stages of the conflict³⁶. In 2013, they fight each other for survival by means of reporting each other to Mexican and American authorities. Each cartel seems to fight each other for expanding its territory, but they have been dividing from their original groups to organize themselves into new small groups. If authorities do not keep combating them, they can find allied groups and become strongest.

The courses of action taken by the enemy differ from cartel to cartel. For example, the Sinaloa Cartel is characterized by trying to present a low profile, efficiency and effectiveness in tactical actions and tries to manipulate public opinion partly through a policy of winning hearts and minds by distributing aid to needy people. Other cartels such as: The Familia Michoacana, the Caballeros Templarios and Jalisco New Generation, raise the “messianic flag” purporting to liberate Mexico from the Zetas and to protect citizens. Although they use mediocre military practices, they are very effective in psychological warfare as they are known to behead and flay their victims. They look for spectacularity and try to be on the first page of every newspaper and at the forefront of every radio news program. They often leave written messages on the victims.

³⁵ Intention of the enemy. See Hernández, Anabel. *Los Señores del Narco*. México: Grijalbo, 2012. Randy Kreider and Mark Schone, “New Zetas Cartel Leader Violent ‘To the Point of Sadism,’” ABC News, October 12, 2012.

³⁶ Osorio, Diego Enrique. *La guerra de los Zetas: Viaje por la frontera de la narcopolítica*. México: Grijalbo, 2012.

Los Zetas commit acts of terrorism, vandalism and destruction in the areas where they are located. It is the most violent group and continuously tries to buy officials or assassinate those to enforce the law³⁷. They often kidnap, ransom, and murder to meet their payroll. Additionally, they try to show signs of supremacy with other cartels by directly confronting the Armed Forces. The Zetas Cartel has developed a subculture characterized by their religious worship of "Death Saint" (Santa Muerte) in which they ask for the death of their enemies. They also make extensive use of Santeria³⁸, drugs for stimulate courage during combat and psychological warfare, including the music of apology for crime.³⁹

Other cartels, including the remnants of the Beltran Leyva Cartel, the Independent Cartel of Acapulco, the Tijuana Cartel and the Juarez Cartel are aligned only as necessary. They are basically reactive and try to ensure their own survival⁴⁰.

Consequences of Enemy Activities in Mexico

There are political, economic and social consequences of the activities of drug cartels in Mexico. Most evident is the mass migration of tens of thousands people from the rural and suburban areas. In the northern region, there is an abatement of 60% of agricultural production in areas of high crime; disarticulation of families and abandoned communities (ghost towns such Ciudad Mier, Tamaulipas)⁴¹.

The statistics on casualties and missing people change every minute. Official figures in the early part of 2013 report approximately 60,402 dead, 150,000 displaced and 10,000 missing

³⁷ Langton, Jerry. Rise of the Mexican drug cartels from El Paso to Vancouver. Canada: Wiley, 2012.

³⁸ Zetas devoted to Death Saint. See Universal Newspaper 25 de enero de 2012. www.todopormexico.comt7228-

³⁹ This is very common among criminals, but particularly marked in this group.

⁴⁰ Cartels. Hernández, Anabel, *Los Señores del Narco*. México: Grijalbo, 2012. Osorio. Diego Enrique. *La guerra de los Zetas: Viaje por la frontera de la narcopolítica*. México: Grijalbo, 2012.

⁴¹ Hernández, Anabel. *México en Llamas: El Legado del Calderón*. México: Grijalbo, 2012.

people. (Many of the dead are criminals, but are counted as civilians because they are not belligerent). Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Peace and Justice Movement, We Are All, and 132 as well as the public media including Proceso magazine, Contralinea magazine, and the Milenio newspaper) estimate that there are about 80,000 missing people, and 20,000 displaced. It is estimated by the relevant NGOs that there are more than 300.000 orphans, some as yet unidentified.

One of the main consequences is a high percentage⁴² of damage to the physical integrity and property of the people. These are direct results of criminals' actions in their struggle to control specific areas and aspects of criminal activity. It is a way to force citizens to accept being extorted and to pay dues. Likewise, they force citizens to stop complaining against them⁴³.

The Armed Forces have killed about 2,321 criminals; 356 have been injured and 41,023 have been captured, and there are 19 leaders of crime organizations in prison as a result of military operations.

Aid to the Civil Population

Marine Mexican Corps aids the civilian population in humanitarian service by coordinating with the following Secretaries: The Government Secretary, The National Civil Protection System and the Secretary of National Defense. Mexican people who are victims of natural disasters are helped through the implementation of relief, rescue, and emergency plans to support and overcome the emergency. These are codified by the Secretary of National Defense

⁴² According to data collected by the Secretary of Government in December 2012, the percentage of dead people is about 100,000, only 70,000 had been identified, 27,000 disappeared people, about 1,000, 000 of displace people around 50,000 orphanage kids, and the fall of 40 % economy in the north regions of Mexico. General Guillermo Galvan 2008 www.grandesproblemas.org.mx

(Mexican Army) in a plan known as National Defense (DN) III E⁴⁴ and by the Mexican Navy in “Plan Marina” (Navy Plan).

In some regions of Mexico, where hurricanes, tropical storms and floods yearly impact them, the level of rivers and lake areas are monitored to be able to evacuate citizens effectively and avoid civilian casualties. Similarly, at nuclear sites and surrounding areas, drills are conducted with the participation and coordination with the civilian population. This is part of the External Radiological Emergency Plan (PERE). Another example is in areas where earthquakes occur regularly. Drills are performed by civilians, security forces and federal agencies ensure timely response and thereby mitigate consequences. The Mexican Marine Corps is pre-positioned both tactical units and teams to reduce the response time in order to support the civilian population.

Image Promotion

Through television spots about the results of tactical operations in support of the safety of Mexico in the mass media such as the following: civic action, advocacy campaigns, social work and demonstrations force (military parades on September 16th, November 20th and May 5th)⁴⁵ The Mexican Navy not only shows the types of tactical units, equipment, weapons, vehicles, service uniforms, but touts the institution through the mass media, interaction with the population, and demonstrates the results of the Mexican Navy civic actions. Although there is no specifically designed promotional campaign as such, the activities of the Marines and Navy are well known by the public to contribute to the protection of Mexicans and Mexico.

⁴⁴ DN III E <http://www.sedena.gob.mx/>

⁴⁵ See <http://www.semar.gob.mx/s/normateca/dh-marina.html>

Perception of Mexican Society about Mexican Marine Corps

There are different perceptions about Marines from Mexican Society. According to national surveys conducted by the company MITOFSKY, the acceptance of Marines Corps is 82.5% as a result of successes in fighting against crime organization.⁴⁶ However, some sectors of society, about 15% of the population, criticize the actions of the Armed Forces as a trigger of violence in Mexico rather than as a guarantor of Mexican safety.

Current Problems

The Mexican Marine Corps is over tasked in relationship to its numbers. Units are deployed most of the time and do not have sufficient time for adequate rest and training; the equipment and systems do not have preventive and corrective maintenance. The over-deployment of Marines, along with a high and constant turnover of personnel, means that the elements do not have enough time in quantity and quality for the proper care of their personal and family needs.

Logistics

The current deployment of Marine Units, in some cases far from the points of storage and distribution of more importance supplies, makes the Mexican Navy have delays to provide in time, form, quality and quantity adequate supplies. Consequently, along with the duration and frequency of operations, the delay of supplies causes excessive wear of uniforms, equipment, facilities and vehicles (all the functional logistic elements). This situation is aggravated by the battalions that are not framed within large units (brigades). Since brigades for their greater mass, they have greater amounts of human and material resources that enable better management for

⁴⁶ MYTOFSKY an enterprise in charge of surveys. <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/>

marines' homecoming, reinforcements, reinstatements and highlights of personnel and equipment for rest and maintenance.

The isolated battalion, short on human and material resources, then needs the support of other deployed units in specific geographical areas to fulfill their duties successfully. The Marine brigades have the financial resources, materials and specialists needed to integrate multidisciplinary task forces, while the independent battalions must ask naval commanders for technical support. The problems that affect the Mexican Marine Corps are its small size in relationship to the area of operations, operational deployment patterns and the logistical effort required.

Problems Related to Operations

The problems related to operations are the dispersion and over-deployment of Marine Units and the enormous burden of services not related to their main mission and functions. The percentage of organic effectively covered causes exhaustion of the force - men, vehicles and equipment. If they operation in minimal conditions, it is hard to focus on the mission as morale is low and training capacity limited. In addition, they are often deployed for months without access to their families. This affects reenlistment which results in a higher turnover of staff.

Excessive worn-out of vehicles, equipment and systems along with limited maintenance shortens the life of equipment. It is necessary to replace and repair equipment too often putting more pressure on the staff. In cases of emergencies, the ability to respond effectively is also affected. This is known as "Roman Empire Effect" -- detachments of company size or less are established in dispersed locations that they do not have sufficient means to respond to a major

emergency. The ability of the battalion is reduced: the ability to train, maintains an appropriate work tempo, and cannot give proper maintenance to vehicles, equipment and related systems.

The combination of factors forces local commanders to rely on other battalions to deal with enemies. The commanders should be able to concentrate on place and time, be strong enough to deal with risky situations from organized crime and to ensure security of citizens. They must, however, solve the problems locally without shifting responsibility to other units thereby significantly weakening other units.

The Marines are also tasked to support different political commitments which are not directly related to the operation of Marine Units. This includes support to external agencies such as SAGARPA, PEMEX, CFE, Port Authorities and Administration, and Civil Protection. This distracts Marine personnel and uses resources to assist the other executive agencies so that they cannot perform their basic assigned functions. This means that there is a significant impact on the ability to fight organized crime and civil insecurity.

Risk Factors for Marine Personnel

One of the risk factors for Marine Personnel is training. The fatigue caused by continuous operation results in the loss of physical and mental readiness⁴⁷. These factors are directly related to accidents and training fatalities. Another consequence is the high turnover of permanent personnel on duty which requires the Marine Corps to implement plans and express training programs – with the associated risk that the pressure to put individuals through the training cycle means they may not clearly understand the techniques and tactics. This would indicate the potential for fatal accidents while on duty.

⁴⁷ Wellness requires continuous attention before, during and after deployment to sustain maximum readiness and Warfighting capability. 1-3. Health Service Support Operations.

Another problem is the shortage of housing units inside protected naval facilities. The absence of trade centers inside a secure facility requires families of naval personnel to live in the same areas where the criminals live; Marines can become targets of extortion.

The dispersion of the units in the jurisdictions of the different Naval Commands make them use encrypted communication equipment with various different features or equipment that is not compatible with each other. Therefore, command and control is carried out by other means with less tactical security or by using equipment of guest unit, consequently resulting in excessive worn-out equipment ignoring maintenance programs for the needs of the service.

In summary, the Marine Corps of the Mexican Navy is a valuable asset to Mexico and its citizens. The strengths of the Marines are incontestable. The mission is clear. Nevertheless, problems have emerged that require a more efficient and effective organization. The Mexican Marine Corps must be consolidated in order to be the readiness force for which it was created. The following sections provide information and analysis supporting reorganization and consolidation so that the Marine Corps can be the force in readiness for Mexico.

The following sections illustrate the steps used to carry out this research and the findings which led to a proposal for reorganization of the Marine Corps.

3. Research Methodology

The key question of this thesis is: *“Is it possible to meet the expectations of both the Supreme Mexican Commander and the Mexican people by reorganizing the Mexican Marine Corps into*

units of the size of a reinforced Marine Brigade with the means and resources currently available to the Marines of the Mexican Navy?

The methodology used for analysis was based on qualitative method using a semi-structured interview to administer with Mexican Marines to elicit their views, experience and insights about specific matter related to the reorganization of Mexican Marine Corps.⁴⁸ The four Mexican Marines who participated in this interview were chosen because of ranks, experience, and leadership in the Mexican Marine Corps. (November-December 2012) For privacy purposes, the names are omitted and they are referred to as “Participant A, B, C, and D.”

In addition, this research provides an analysis of pertinent documents that include the directives of the Commandant of the Mexican Navy, the analysis of the newsletters and media statement by The Secretary of Mexican Navy related to Criminal Organizations, official Speeches of Mexican President related to combat issues, handbooks related to law, and US Marine Corps MAGTF publications.

4. Analysis and Interpretation of Data

The information gathered was categorized, coded, and transcribed from Spanish to English. The data was then triangulated with an analysis of content, the key concepts were: *suitability*, *acceptability*, *feasibility*, *prepositioning*, *combat power*, *logistics* and *MAGTF concept*. For the purposes of the interpretation and analysis of data, each concept is defined as follows:

Suitability: An appropriate requirement to reorganize the Marine Mexican Corps.

⁴⁸ “The purpose of research interview is to explore the views, experiences, beliefs and/or motivation of individuals of specific matters”. See Gill, Peter et al. 2008. See for further Reading Martínez, M. La investigación cualitativa etnográfica en educación. México: Trillas. 1998. Flick, Uwe. *Introducción a la investigación cualitativa*. España: Ediciones Morata, 2004.

Acceptability: The reorganization of the Marine Mexican Corps is worthy of being recognized as a need.

Feasibility: The reorganization of Marine Mexican Corps is able and possible to be accomplished successfully as a medium and long term goal.

Prepositioning: placing units, battalions and brigades in geographical and strategic settings.

Combat power: Combat power is created by combining the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership⁴⁹.

Logistics: As the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces⁵⁰.

MAGTF concept: The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a concept used by the United States Marine Corps to describe the principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations. MAGTFs are a balanced air-ground, combined arms task organization of Marine Corps forces under a single commander that is structured to accomplish a specific mission⁵¹.

Suitability of Reorganization

According to Benitez Raúl⁵², the Secretary of the Mexican Navy with about 50,000 members has had an outstanding image because of Marine Corps' success against main leaders

⁴⁹ The dynamics of Combat Power. U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, 1994 (Unclassified)
<http://www.pvv.ntnu.no/~madsb/home/war/fm1005/combatapower.php>

⁵⁰ Logistics. US Marine Corps. MCDP 4. Salgado Alba Jesús. Logística General y Naval Operativa. CALM. Escuela de Guerra Naval, 1950.

⁵¹ Wade M. Norman. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) SMARTBook. 2012. Simmons, Edwin H. The United States Marines: A History, Fourth Edition. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

⁵² Benítez Manaut, Raúl. Los retos de los militares del gabinete de Peña. www.adnpolitico.com

of organized crime. Regarding Mexican Marine Corps' actions and Enrique Peña Nieto, the new President of Mexico (2013-2019), as the Supreme Commander asked the Armed Forces to guarantee Mexican safety, respect human rights, work within the law and act with honor.⁵³ These expectations can be met because the Mexican Marine Corps already incorporates these concepts in the Laws and Mission documents. (See appendix A: Laws and missions).

Reorganization would help the Marine Corps address problems, maximizes capabilities, confronts the capabilities of the enemy, and has positive consequences for civil society. It would do so by: (1) scaling units of Marines of Mexico Navy (2) relocate in proximity to critical areas, (3) provide the necessary resources to accomplish the mission (human power, firepower, mobility, maneuverability, fire close air support, legal support, logistics infrastructure, facilities, systems support, the function of command and control)

Reorganization would help ensure the successful performance of the Marines Force in terms of responsiveness and readiness by reducing setup time and building local capacity for employment of combined arms. It would contribute to higher standards and quality in training. Morale would improve as a result of better preservation and maintenance of the weapons, equipment and vehicles. There would be an improvement in *esprit de corps* and sense of belonging resulting in improved control and supervision of operations. It would also contribute to the quantity and quality of times that Marines have with their families. (See Table 1: participants' insights about suitability (See appendix D: Analysis of the interview).

⁵³ G. Elena. Presidente Peña pide a militares a participar en la transformación de México. 1 de Diciembre 2012. www.spanish.peopledaily.com.cn Pueblo en línea.

Suitability			
Participant A	Participant B	Participant C	Participant D
The maximum size would probably be Brigade with full battalions.	A unit must be allowed to move from war to operations to other kind of operations without requiring significant changes.	That could be the initial idea for Marine dispersion force to become a militarized police force.	Perhaps not all units should be scaled, but why not do it with the main units.

Table 1: participants' views about the suitability of reorganization

Even though participants' have different views about how to achieve reorganization three of them considered it suitable but suggest that it is a process that should be accomplished incrementally with minor changes in the early stages of the proposal. Participant C believes that by reorganizing the Marines Corps could lead to it to become a Police Force⁵⁴.

Feasibility

Brigades will be prepositioned within the area of responsibility of former independent battalions. These are areas with a high incidence of crime or those requiring greater attention given the physical, tactical importance, or social policy of the area. The Marines must maintain presence through reconnaissance and surveillance patrols, naval stations and provide mobile security detachments at points that are tactically critical such as high crime spots and strategic installations) Units can make efficient use of battalion resources and thereby improve the effectiveness of operations.

Additional financial resources may be required for the construction of facilities in order to have a place where the Marines can live, train, rest and prepare. To minimize the impact on the population, it is possible to position the brigades in the vicinity of cities so the localities can

⁵⁴ Stewart, Scott. President Peña's policy about the New National Gendarmerie or Paramilitary Force to use in place of the Mexican Army and Marine troops currently deployed to combat the heavily armed criminal cartels. www.stratfor.com April 19, 2012

absorb the effect of the proximity of a Marine brigade without causing resource shortages to citizens or economic dependence on trade with naval personnel.

The mutual dependence mainly includes coordination with other agencies at the three levels of government within the area of responsibility of the naval unit. The purpose is to share resources, intelligence or other property that may be needed for a specific operation but the Marine units do not have them because of budgetary aspect the acquisition cost or the cost in human, material or financial do not justify the expected results. However, there are essential for the tactical success in time and place, rather than make expensive the organization of the Mexican Marine Corps, using coordination with other Government Agencies, nongovernmental organizations or who, at that time and for that particular operation, are involved.

It is possible to create a light organization, flexible, cheap, but very effective and efficient. For example, the commander of the Marine brigade is a tactical commander, in meetings with local government representatives might be in a position which may be vulnerable to compromise or accept priority operation for the local authority in detriment of priority for the nation such as ongoing operations to support the interests of groups not linked to the government.

This can be solved by making these units to depend on tactical, technical, administrative and disciplinary and military to General Staff of the Navy, through the General Coordinator of Marines or the naval region controls, but not subordinated to naval zones. Likewise, it can control all requirement of the local government or non- government through the General Staff of the Navy to avoid conflict between overload operations or services that put the Brigades in the same condition of existing battalions. Most people, more services and less readiness force.

Regarding financial resources, given the current budget conditions, depends on the support of the Congress of the Union to the Navy for this specific project, considering it as an investment to be implemented in the medium term goal but with benefits in the medium and long term goal. Now, table 2 shows participants' insight about feasibility of the reorganization of Marine Corps:

Feasibility			
Participant A	Participant B	Participant C	Participant D
Battalions need to be completed in order to allow rotation and training personnel. The ammunition supply is required and must continue according to the needs of the units.	I think that to prevent the problem that regions take over Marines Units; orders must be given from the Marine Commandant, then to Brigades and later Battalions. It is necessary to be clear about command relationships.	It is not possible without capital investment, and this will be in the new six-year project of the national gendarmerie, this project should be used as a platform to purchase equipment.	It would be an immediate great readiness force; the brigade must be positioned in the strategic area.

Table 2: participants' views about the feasibility of reorganization

The respondents were aware of the feasibility of the reorganization, but suggested that it would require some capital investment. Participant D suggested that prepositioning would enhance readiness. Participant B was concerned about command relationships and believed that reorganization was the responsibility of the Marine Commandant.

Acceptability

Reorganization was considered acceptable based on the reputation of the Mexican Navy with the civilian population, the positive results of operations, and disaster response capabilities, scaling capabilities, and current types and levels of expertise now resident in the current battalions. There is a cost-benefit balance that supports reorganization. Table 3 shows the participants' comments about the acceptability of the reorganization.

Acceptability			
Participant A	Participant B	Participant C	Participant D
Responds to a tactical aspect as mobility and versatility of a brigade or a battalion that allow them multitask in the same theater or conflict scenario.	A better solution would be to create armored battalions with a complete organic detachment of these vehicles to the areas of operations, thus, provided by the vehicle maintenance and training of personnel.	According to the structural changes that are forthcoming and the plan to take armed forces out of fighting against organized crime to let civilians themselves provide solutions to security problems, it is not considered to be necessary.	brigade or battalion should be distributed according to the tactical and strategic necessity, now with the development areas of responsibility

Table 2: participants' views about the acceptability of reorganization

Three participants A, B, D considered the proposal of reorganization acceptable and pointed out the benefits of multitasking related to armored battalions with vehicles to operate, and changing areas of responsibility. Participant C did not consider reorganization acceptable because he believed that the Gendarmerie might replace Armed Forces. (See Appendix B)

In summary, reorganizing the current Marines Units into divisional brigades would provide sufficient troops, equipment and means for combat operations in order to support both the civilian population and other federal agencies. Marines would have enough troops, means and equipment to conduct the training according to the times, conditions and directives ordered by the Marine commandant. Likewise, the Marines would be able to provide Naval Personnel the necessary time to rest and to maintain high morale. Naval Personnel would also have time to concentrate the equipment, facilities and systems for inspection and maintenance, both preventive and corrective.

PROPOSAL FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE MEXICAN MARINE CORPS

The following discussion provides ideas about how the Mexican Marine Corps can be reorganized based on a MAGTF concept “The MAGTF is a balanced, air-ground combined arm task organization of Marine Corps forces under a single commander, structured to accomplish a specific mission or a number of missions across range of military operations (ROMO).”⁵⁵

The reorganization would accomplish economies of scale and efficiency and while working within the financial constraints of the present governmental system. Reorganization will achieve efficiency and effectiveness while recognizing the austerity required while achieving the larger national goals. The President of Mexico has said that “the national territory will be divided in five regions to attend specific problems regarding security [...] also it will be made the restructuration and consolidation of the law enforcement.”⁵⁶ Therefore, regarding the Mexican Navy, and specifically the Marines Corps, the sufficient concentration of force, time, and location that ensure tactical victory will strengthen public confidence in the Secretary of the Mexican Navy and the Federal Government. Success in tactical operation victories will work to demoralize and deter the enemy. Public confidence can be restored.

Concentration of Combat Power and Economy of Effort

Large units created at the Marine brigade level would concentrate the force into the same regions decided on by the Supreme Commander with the National Security Council. Brigades would be balanced in weapons, personnel, skills, and reinforced with the necessary services to enable them to sustain the living conditions both in the barracks and in operations. Brigades

⁵⁵ See Wade M. Norman. *The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) SMARTBook*. 2012.

⁵⁶ It was agreed among the Presidents, the governors of the States, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy. *Despertar del Sur. Regionalización estrategia de seguridad de Peña Nieto*. February 2013.

would have the technical personnel necessary for operations, repair and maintenance of equipment, weapons, vehicles and systems. This could be accomplished without the need for additional manpower that the Mexican Navy already has.

The creation of these units in one physical location will standardize the training; ensure their implementation in accordance with the timing and content order or regional issues that can emerge. The troops can have adequate rest and greater control and supervision of operations. It can avoid the harmful effect of the dispersion of the units, replacing the permanent presence and surveillance patrols and increasing results in fighting for operations through greater security in time and hot spots, obtained by analyzing the intelligence data generated by search, evaluation and dissemination whose creation attend the reorganization of the units.

Relative combat power against dispersion

The greater willingness of personnel, transportation, weapons, ammunition, support and command and control means result from the concentration of resources at the regional level, it is more readiness to increase substantially the size of the force available and immediate reaction to able to isolate specific areas (whole populations) within the region corresponding to the brigade (area of responsibility) and successfully confront organized criminal formations, improving the measure of success not only deterrence or displacement of criminal activity to other areas (cockroach effect) but also to capture or destruction of enemy units. Letting enemy level be manageable to local authorities.

Prepositioning

In order to maximize combat power in the shortest time over a target area or within the area of responsibility, it is necessary to place the new barracks in geographical location. It allows access

to all points of their area of responsibility in the shortest time possible. It is the positioning of the units in relation to operations instead of the position in relation to the proximity of large populations (for logistical and political reasons) which reduces response times, with more resources and troops of a battalion that usually is isolated. Both in combat roles as support to civilians and in case of disasters, Marines can bring the resources, means and personnel in sufficient amount to face the emergency. To achieve this, initial investment is required that allow housing units, barracks, and trading posts in proximity to locations that allow or to sustain the supply of force, but not within these.

Logistical Considerations

Having five major units instead of thirty scattered battalions will help standardize and schedule shipments of logistical supplies in a timely fashion. They may have general stores that would sustain operations, the living conditions and operation of combat units and even those of their dependents, with fees recovery through the exchange posts. Integrated service battalions allows for maintenance for vehicles, equipment, weapons and systems to cover at least the second and third echelon maintenance.

The concentration of tactical units under one command allows administrative simplification because the brigade through the S4, the liaison officer of the brigade and the retail focus of the administrative functions of the units, allowing these lead controls to focus on the information to the brigade but freeing them from the development of the paperwork refer to supplies, maintenance and repairs.

Tactical Considerations / Principle of Combined Arms / MAGTF

Bringing together current tactical units brigades, may be complemented with the need specialist to ensure that each brigade will have the elements of maneuver and fire support necessary for the successful and safe performance in operations. This may include the cost reloading equipment and retraining units whose roles change significantly. The economic cost is largely compensated for by having vehicles, weapons and personnel in time and place, without waiting for the shipment from the capital of Mexico or the territorial command. Even in the worst safety emergency, to have armor and support weapons could save the life of naval personnel. Armored vehicles currently integral to the Navy are suitable for the struggle in but not available to every unit.

Establishing a battalion of such vehicles in each brigade and positioning them so that they can reach all part of their area of responsibility, requires dividing these regions to coincide with the Area of Responsibility of the brigades. This would enlarge the scope of Marine units without the costly transfer of men and equipment from other areas of the country.

Similarly, other combat specialties that require support weapons, communication systems, and communication interception, logistics and services for second echelon maintenance need to be available for the successful operations. That is why, these must be integrated in the Marine brigades to create a ground force with the means and resources to deal with threats to national security at the regional level. This will provide a robust logistics train and allow efficient receiving assets of classes I supplies to the class X⁵⁷, storage, and distribution according

⁵⁷ Logistics. US Marine Corps. MCDP 4. Salgado Alba Jesús. Logística General y Naval Operativa. CALM. Escuela de Guerra Naval. Military Logistics. [www. en.wikipedia.org](http://www.en.wikipedia.org)

to schedule or according to needs, without expecting to receive them from inside each time (change the logistics of urgency for planned logistics and pre-positioned).

Maintenance and operation ensures prolongation of the useful life of vehicles, equipment and systems by means of a suitable and efficient preventive and corrective maintenance. Adequate facilities, residential areas, and warehouses can provide the minimum conditions necessary to position and highlight permanently rotary wing units to perform functions of reconnaissance, transport, close air support and medical evacuation aircraft. Integrating Marine Brigade (land component) services personnel (logistics component) and air units outstanding (air component, at least squadron level) will allow carrying out the integration of these three components under a single commander (MAGTF concept). Even though it is currently implemented as task force operating in various Operation theaters (operation Tamaulipas, crab, Veracruz safe, Guerrero safe), it is still an exception, not the rule in the operations of the Mexican Navy, given the dispersion of resources in operations and the need to move them from one theater to another, with the consequent attrition of personnel and material.

Units that are permanently integrated, pre-positioned near areas of operations, with adequate logistical support, including naval intelligence units, allows a capable, credible, reliable, flexible and ready force. Reorganization of the Corps units in amphibious brigades, brigades type and concentrated in one naval polygon, this with the purpose of obtaining command unity so that both the planning and execution of operations are no longer dependent on the goodwill or relationships between commanders and the various battalions, but of the order of the commander of the greater elemental unit. By having their own brigade staff, it also reduces the possibility of misinterpretation of orders that cause legal and criminal responsibility for

commanders of battalions. This lets us accomplish with fundamental principles of successful operations such as the following:

Unity of Effort: the component units join forces to achieve the goals and fulfill the mission of the higher commander.

Supervision: to be a brigade staff, in addition to existing controls of the battalions, increasing the supervision of the planned action, particularly in the details of execution, minimizing the risk of intentional deviations from the original orders.

Tactical stress concentration: Having one location with units that allow the rapid deployment of organization and task forces integrated under the concept of combined arms, depending on the task at hand.

Concentration logistical effort: to have sufficient resources to meet all of the functional elements logistics, be capable of receiving, storing and distribution of supplies, equipment and materials of war in sufficient quantity and quality to ensure the supply of units in operations; in addition, it facilitates the logistical effort of the Mexican Navy to reduce distribution points and unify the delivery criteria (similar units have similar catalogs).

Concentration of training: to be more concentrated units, intended programs for training are added that allow greater complexity, depth and allocate more resources to training (more availability of instructors, as many specialists, possibility of training stations and specialization by instructors) in addition, it allows for standardization of common procedures to the units.

Morale: healthy competition among units fosters a sense of belonging, *Esprit de Corps* and increase the morale of the Personnel.

Human rights: the coexistence of different units within the same facility, but in different areas of the same, with different majors, and different roles in operations, facilitates mutual surveillance and helps not to have intentional violations of human rights. Similarly, It can increase personnel numbers, although it may increase training and esprit de corps, it becomes less likely that there are ties of complicity, mainly by the coexistence of different units and additional supervision, both in barracks and in operations.

5. CONCLUSION

To conclude, the four research questions are answered based on the interpretation of data analyzed.

1. Considering the current budget of the Mexican Navy and the size and danger of the current threats against Mexican National Security, how can the Mexican Marines be significantly more efficient and effective without increasing operating costs?

Reorganizing the Mexican Marines will result in increased efficiency and effectiveness without increasing operating costs. Reorganizing existing units, repositioning, improving systems of command and control and procedures and improving conditions for interoperability with other services of the Mexican Navy would improve operational efficiency and reduce logistics response time to a security incident. Furthermore, it would positively impact *esprit de corps* and pride and a sense of belonging by increasing the length and quality of training, rest, and activities that strengthen the morale.

The initial costs of retraining and retooling would be offset by reduced costs related to the mobilization of troops to their concentration before each operation and the further centralization of the distribution of supplies from the Navy.

2. How can both the reaction speed and the combat power of Marine Corps increase with minimum investment on unscheduled resource?

Reorganizing the units of the Marine Corps will allow the use of combined arms, increase interoperability with naval air and surface units, and locate Marine units in such positions that allow access to any point their area of responsibility in a minimum of time.

3. How can personnel of Marine Corps' performance be armoured against corruption and the power of organized crime?

Increasing the level of education of officers, noncommissioned officers, and the training of all personnel of the Corps would help prevented corruption. Establishing housing units and

trading posts on military bases would further reduce the number of attempts of extortion, kidnapping and other forms of violence committed by criminal elements in the area of operation.

4. How can a task unit (capable of action on land and air with combined arms) be efficiently integrated taking into account existing resources and procurement programs?

By integrating land components, considering the grouping of existing battalions in functional brigades physically located in the same base.

Besides, integrating the logistics component by means of organizing services companies of the battalions that integrate the brigade and it will be complemented with intelligence specialists, civil affairs, combat camera, canine binomials and others. Having this logistic component, mentioned above, allows the brigade carry out operations in independent way without requiring support of other units for the most essential requirements of living and operations.

The air component can be coordinated by means of the General Coordinator of Marines and the General Command of the Naval Air Force Squadrons to designate the necessary direct support to units of the Corps in areas of operations.

5. Is it possible to meet the expectations of both the Supreme Mexican Commander and the Mexican people by reorganizing them in units of the size of a reinforced Marine Brigade?

Using existing resources and an initial investment in re-equipment, retraining, improvement of equipment and command and control systems, as well as the construction and / or adaptation of barracks it is possible to have a force of Marines ready for immediate deployment. This rapid reaction force will act to ensure the protection of Mexican citizens and the institutions of government against the dangers of organized crime, natural disasters. It will also contribute and improve external defense of the country.

Appendix A: Law and Mission

Article 31. The obligations of the Mexicans: III. Enlist and serve in the National Guard, under the organic law to secure and to defend the independence, the territory, the honor, the rights and interests of the motherland and the tranquility and order.

Article 89. The powers and duties of the President are:

Vi. Preserve national security, in terms of the relevant law, and dispose of all permanent Armed forces or the Army, Navy and Air Force for internal security and external defense of the federation.

VII. Having the National Guard to the same objects, in the terms that prevent Section IV of Article 76.

Article 1. The Mexican Navy is a national military establishment, permanent, whose mission is to employ the naval power of the federation for the exterior defense and cooperate on interior security of the country. Navy functions related to the safety of the nation, based on the organic law of the federal public administration and national security laws are:

Article 2. The duties of the Mexican Navy are the following:

I. Organize, train, recruit, equip and operate the forces that are to comply its mission and performance of their duties;

II. Cooperate in the maintenance of constitutional order of the Mexican state;

III. Take action to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity, defend national, the territorial sea, maritime zone, islands, islets, reefs, and continental shelf sockets, so as in inland lakes and navigable rivers in parts, including the airspace. Corresponding and monitor sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone;

IV. Protect maritime traffic, river and lake, in the area of federal jurisdiction and where the Supreme Commander ordered and, in coordination with other competent authorities through agreements set by instruction of the Supreme Commander control areas at the same, including the respective Airspaces;

V. Safeguard human life at sea and on inland waters, through operations. Search and rescue in the national and international marine waters and in all in which the Supreme Command ordered;


VI. protecting the country's strategic installations in its area of jurisdiction and where the Supreme Commander ordered

VII. Assistant to the population in case of disaster or emergency areas, implementing the plans. Institutional civil protection, in coordination with other authorities;


IX. Ensuring legal compliance in Mexican marine zones alone or contributing to the competent authorities in the fight against terrorism, smuggling, piracy at sea, theft of fishing vessels, fishing gear or products thereof, human trafficking, weapons, narcotics and psychotropic substances, under the terms of the applicable legislation

APPENDIX B: PROPOSAL


General organization of the proposed Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT"




Proposal for Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT", Command & Staff



Proposal for Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT", Ground Component




Proposal for Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT", detail of the Rifle Company




It includes a section support weapon in each company as usually during operations under their tactical control, ensuring that each company to be deployed has the fire support organically.

Proposal for Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT", Support Fires Battalion




The battalion fire support consists of weapons that are currently used in the fight against organized crime, in a way, it preserves the brigade firepower and time organic such weapons and their personnel, ensuring optimal operation and proper maintenance.

Proposal for Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT", Armored Vehicles Battalion




Due to the changing environment of the operations, the Armored Battalion needs to be flexible, fast, and capable to subsist and keep the combat power in hostile conditions. For that reason, the needed specialization in the mobile means this unit need their own service company, the type of armored units that the Mexican Navy has (Carat Wolverine) that can be used as a personal carrier also as very robust fire platform, with minimal adjusts to fix perfectly to the real needs.

Proposal for Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT", Armored Battalion, and Company.




Proposal for Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT", Armored Battalion, and platoon.




The use of the turrets allow fix all NATO heavy machineguns in the current armored vehicles, the addition of the cannons of 20mm make the platoon able to attack the current enemy armored vehicles without dismount of the Armored units for use the RPG, and the cannon 75mm provides the capacity of neutralize threats in organized ground or under cover (enemy armored hunters).

Additionally, it is the same caliber currently in use on board of the fleet units (the Mexican Navy is currently logistically capable to provide the ammo)

Proposal for Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT", Air Component.



Proposal Marine Brigade reinforced as Aero Ground Task Unit Standing "MAGTF CONCEPT",
 Logistic Component.



Appendix C: Interview

INTERVIEW

1. What is your point of view about scaling the Marine Units from a battalion to a brigade?
2. Based on The National Security Policy, the strategy of the Federal Government and the capacity to combat, is it more helpful to have individual battalions or brigades? Why?
3. What could it be the best way to prevent Marines from drug dealers' cooptation as they did with some members of Police and the Army in order to be a trusty shield to Mexican people?
4. Is it appropriate to continue with the current armoured vehicles (Rhino and Scorpion) to standardize armoured units which have been proposed for brigades? What would you propose (based on transport capacity, autonomy, resistance, shield, mobility in urban and rural areas, speed, and weapons platform)
5. Do you consider necessary to make an investment to standardize arms with National Secretary of Defense, given the approach of the National Security Strategy (related to the five regions and regional commands, interagency and coordinated operations) ordered by the Supreme Commander? Why?
6. Is it helpful to consider fx-05 as a common weapon with SEDENA or such Secretary of Defense migrate M-16? Considering the age of weapons, use, condition, recurrent failure and need to replace them in the near future.
7. Do you consider communication equipment is adequate in quantity, quality and type? Why? What would you propose?
8. Considering naval squadrons, should they be made as three squadrons' identical three aircraft each plus the flagship of the squadron? What do you think/
9. Should Marine Corps change? Should the Corps just cover vacancies in battalions and units? What do you think? Why?
10. Is there anything that I didn't ask you about and you would like to comment?

APPENDIX D: ANALIZING DATA FROM THE INTERVIEW: Codes: suitability, feasibility, acceptability, MAGTF, prepositioning, training, supply, equipment, logistics, responsibility of commander, deployment, mission, leadership,

Thesis	Objective	Research questions	Participant A	Participant B	Participant C	Participant D
<p>With the means and resources currently available to the Marines Corps of the Mexican Navy, is it possible to meet the expectations of both the Supreme Mexican Commander and the Mexican people by reorganizing them in units of the size of a reinforced Marine Brigade?</p>	<p>To demonstrate the suitability, acceptability and feasibility of reorganization of the Mexican Marine Corps, under the direct command of the General Staff of the Mexican Navy to cope with the mission for it was created as a fast and efficient force.</p>	<p>1. Considering the current budget of the Mexican Navy and the size and danger of the current threats against Mexican National Security, could the Mexican Marines be significantly more efficient, more effective without increasing operating costs?</p>	<p>The battalion is the ideal unit to solve the problems of internal security or maintenance of the rule of law: the maximum size would probably Brigade with full battalions.</p>	<p>A unit must be allowed to move from war to operations to other kind of operations without requiring significant changes. Through the Warfighting functions: maneuver, fires, logistics, etc. I believe that the geographical distribution of our units involves many problems, including the dispersion of efforts and a sort of naval feudalism, where each zone or regional commander does what he considers it is right. Unfortunately, this distribution is due to the large number of institutional powers other than war, such as assisting for the rule of law.</p>	<p>Considers that could be the initial idea for Marine dispersion force to become a militarized police force</p>	<p>Perhaps not all units should be scaled, but why not do it with the main units. Obvious that for various reasons the Parachutes and FES in the center of the country; according to the strategic location and the battalions of the Pacific and the Gulf, leaving a planning and means that if necessary (I do not think that it may happen by at least in this administration) to climb as quickly as possible, either regrouping battalions and brigades according to the tactical situation consider reinforcement (at least organic at 90%)</p>
		<p>2. How can both the reaction speed and the combat power of Marine Corps increase with minimum investment on unscheduled resource?</p>	<p>Responds to a tactical aspect as mobility and versatility of a brigade or a battalion that allow them multitask in the same theater or conflict scenario.</p>	<p>I think that to prevent the problem that regions take over Marines Units; orders must be given from the Marine Commandant, then to Brigades and later Battalions. It is necessary to be clear about command relationships between Marines commandant, battalions and Regions.</p>	<p>It is not possible without capital investment, and this will be in the new six-year project of the national gendarmerie, this project should be used as a platform to purchase equipment.</p>	<p>It would be an immediate great readiness force, the brigade must be positioned in the strategic area not politic or geographic was appointed before the war started, you should see that the operating capacity at least double at first from the early stages of needs until it could be consolidated.</p>
		<p>3. How can personnel of Marine Corps' performance be armoured against corruption and power of organized crime?</p>	<p>This aspect is covered by adequate training and that has to do with the sense of belonging, commitment to service, and respect for the organization Corps, acceptance of obligations and responsibilities and</p>	<p>The dispersion of our units is an invitation to be corrupted, but I think that can be avoided in several ways: a. Strengthening counterintelligence unit; tracking randomly personnel to avoid possible illicit enrichment</p>	<p>According to the structural changes that are forthcoming and the plan to take armed forces out of fighting against organized crime to let</p>	<p>Develop programs such psychological, social, education, coaching and training with a high sense of belonging (brain wash) not only for personnel already in service, but also for their families.</p>

			<p>human development.</p>	<p>b. Periodic rotation of personnel and cross operating units. Those who are in Matamoros send them to operate at Sinaloa, Sinaloa to Guerrero, etc.</p> <p>c. Establish mechanisms for control of operations that allow them to actually see where the personnel is and what they are doing; something like as a Command and Control System that displays in real time where the units are to keep informed and prevent that they are doing something else.</p> <p>d. But in my opinion the most important thing is to create cohesive units that will be loyal to his teammates and to the institution, sociologically speaking, units must become primary groups where members are united by bonds of affection. How to achieve this? A home is the daily interaction so it is important that the units do functional activities, remember what the Romans called "conspiracy" which was the group of 10 soldiers (DECURIA) that lived, ate and fought together.</p>	<p>civilians themselves provide solutions to security problems, it is not considered to be necessary.</p>	
		<p>4. How can a task unit (capable of action on land and air with combined arms) be efficiently integrated taking into account existing resources and procurement programs?</p>	<p>Units must regroup and respond to issues with intelligence and cunning. I think that regionalization meets the requirements, and then you should put the resources in place. Move units to the strategic points of the regions and concentrate power, consolidating efforts, local and regional and finally national level. Battalions need to be completed in order to allow rotation and training personnel. The ammunition</p>	<p>The organic battalion should include their endowments and logistics personnel, mechanics, etc. a better solution would be to create armored battalions with a complete organic detachment of these vehicles to the areas of operations, thus, provided by the vehicle maintenance and training of personnel. However, why not thinking of a time in military specification vehicles and amphibious capability that could be used in case of conflict? Capable of carrying a Marine squad and tire</p>	<p>It is not convenient to move the units from their current locations, as these provide logistical and maintenance supplies</p>	<p>brigade or battalion should be distributed according to the tactical and strategic necessity, now with the development areas of responsibility</p>

			<p>supply is required and must continue according to the needs of the units.</p>	<p>traction (caterpillars require more costly maintenance besides that I think we need to move vehicles in urban areas). Ideally in the desirability unify the individual armament changing our M-16 by fire stick FX-05 because that would free us from international pressure as is the case of what is currently happening with HK and G-36 , where there are people in Germany who want to deny the sale of arms to several Mexican states, for human rights violations. To realize the units need support weapons in the infantry and create specialty in mortar and gunner.</p>	
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Glossary

ASJUR	Attorney Assessor
ARM	Air Arms
AYDTIA	Personal Commandant Office
CAS	Close Air Support
CFE	Federal Electricity Department
DETAL	Logistic and Administrative Department
DN I	National Defense Plan I
DN III E	National Defense Plan III E
EW	Electronic Warfare
ELECT	Technician in air electronic
JEM	Chief of Staff
JSPL	Personnel and Logistic Section Department
JUR	Attorney
INTEL	Intelligence
MAGTF	Marine Air Ground Task Force
MANDO	Commander
MEC	Air Mechanic
MED	Naval Hospital
METEOR	Meteorology
MITOFSKY	Institution dedicated to research
NGOs	Non-Government Organization
NATO	Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty
NCO's	Non-commissioned Officer
PEMEX	Mexican Oil
PN	Naval Police
RECON	Reconnaissance
SAGARPA	Agriculture, Cattle and Fishing Department
SEDENA	The Secretary of National Defense
S1	First section (Personnel)
S2	Second Section (Intelligence)
S3	Third Section (Operations)
S4	Fourth Section (Logistics)
S TEC	Special Technical Services
SVS	Services
TPT	Transportation
UIN	Naval Intelligence Unit

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