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To remain the force of choice against future threats, the Marine Corps must increase its irregular warfare capabilities. Key to this is developing a group of foreign security force advisors who can provide persistent engagement in trouble areas to prevent future conflicts. Currently the Marine Corps builds advisor teams in an ad hoc manner, paying little attention to the unique skills required for advisory duty. To prepare Marine foreign security force advisors the Marine Corps must apply lessons learned from the past and develop the means to implement policy and doctrine to help other nations fight future threats.

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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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Executive Summary

Title: RETURNING TO OUR SMALL WARS ROOTS: PREPARING MARINE ADVISORS TO HELP OTHER LANDS MEET FUTURE THREATS

Author: Major Matt Van Echo, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: To remain the force of choice against future threats, the Marine Corps must increase its irregular warfare capabilities. Key to this is developing a group of foreign security force advisors who can provide persistent engagement in trouble areas to prevent future conflicts. Currently the Marine Corps builds advisor teams in an ad hoc manner, paying little attention to the unique skills required for advisory duty. To prepare Marine foreign security force advisors the Marine Corps must apply lessons learned from the past and develop the means to implement policy and doctrine to help other nations fight future threats.

Discussion: The U.S. military's involvement in developing indigenous forces can be traced back to its beginnings in 1898. In the early years the Marine Corps played a prominent role in these actions as a stabilizing force in the Caribbean, often in close connection to U.S. Department of State goals. In other conflicts this development role differed in that the conflict shifted to reconstruction, in which a country's entire military structure required resurrection. Reviewing Haiti, Nicaragua, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and Afghanistan we can make compare current and past practices for sourcing the advisory missions.

Policy, service concepts, and doctrine all provide compelling reasons for the Marine Corps to evolve with the changing character of warfare. Policy being prescriptive provides the most direct impetus for change. Service concepts explain the way in which the Marine Corps intends to operate in the future. In an effort to provide the means to achieve policy, service concepts, and doctrine, the Marine Corps must develop a group of foreign security force advisors to prevent irregular threats from requiring large scale contingency operations.

To develop the capability for persistent and meaningful engagement with foreign militaries, the Marine Corps must establish a secondary foreign security force advisor specialty. This will ensure those Marines called on for advisor duty during contingency operations have been screened and trained to advise foreign security forces. During peacetime, these advisors, when not fulfilling duties in their primary specialty will plan and execute advisory missions with U.S. partners around the globe.

Conclusion: Failure to act will destine the Marine Corps to experience many of the challenges recently faced since the 9/11 attacks. Believing that conventionally trained and organized units can best prepare foreign security forces for uncertainty against irregular threats underestimates the benefits of long term relationships and trust developed by culturally attentive advisors. Furthermore, actions in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the need to have quality advisors properly screened and trained before commencing contingency operations. The scope and scale of these missions is too large for Special Forces alone.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER……………………………………………………………………………………..i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY……………………………………………………………………….ii

PREFACE……………………………………………………………………………………...iv

INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………...1

HISTORIC PRECIDENCE ...………………………………………………………….……3

POLICY AND DOCTRINE..…………………………………………………………………16

RECOMMENDATIONS.....…………………………………………………………………..19

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………..…………21

ENDNOTES…………………………………………………………………..……………22

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………..………25

Preface

In writing this paper, I began by focusing only on advising Afghan National Security Forces. As my research broadened, I realized that the requirement for professionalizing Marine foreign security force advisors was much larger than for just one country. Following years spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marine Corps faces an uncertain future and is working to define its role in defending future American interests. Without capitalizing on the existing institutional knowledge advising foreign security forces, the Marine Corps will be destined to re-learn many of the lessons realized over the past ten year. I contend that our Corps' current approach to assigning Marines to advisory duty is insufficient and must be improved.

I extend to Colonel Larry Lamborn, USAR(retired), and Major Monty Fontenot, USMC my appreciation for their assistance in writing this paper and keeping me on track. I am indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Haji Mohammed, Afghan National Army, for his friendship and professionalism while working with the Marines and Sailors of Task Force Shocker bringing peace to the people of Marjeh, Afghanistan. He showed me how to look at things differently, taught me his country's history, and inspired me by his dedication. With partners like him, anything is possible.

INTRODUCTION

Irregular threats are recognized and expected by the Marines. In the "Commandant's Planning Guidance", published in 2010, General Amos describes the future security environment, "Failed states or those that cannot adequately govern their territory can become safe havens for terrorists, insurgent and criminal groups that threaten the U.S. and our allies." The past decade provides ample evidence of the threats posed by failed states. This environment is not new to the Marine Corps.

Acknowledging the need to combat irregular threats in weak states, the Marine Corps wrote the Small Wars Manual in 1940 to codify lessons learned from past experiences. It defines "small wars" as "…operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation."[1] Reviewing recent conflicts, this definition appears as applicable now as it did seventy years ago.

Today, the Joint Force recognizes irregular warfare as a way to fight increasingly complex adversaries. Its definition articulates irregular warfare as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will."[2]

The Correlates of War Project poses a similar definition for intra-state wars. These are defined as "civil wars involve the government of the state against a non-state entity; regional internal wars involve the government of a regional subunit against a non-state entity; and intercommunal wars involve combat between/among two or more non-state entities within the

state."[3] Using the project's database highlights the disproportionate amount of time the U.S. spends in small wars combating irregular threats. Since 1945 the U.S. has been engaged in conventional state versus state war only 35 percent of the time total time spent in conflict.[4]

These definitions, despite seventy years of separation, each acknowledge situations that require the combination of military action with other sources of national power to achieve strategic ends. Regardless of the favored definition, success depends on the military's application of precise power with coalition and host nation forces to prevent and deter threats from escalating to a level that requires large scale intervention. To avoid major conflicts, foreign security force advisors are required to build partner capacity to a level in which internal and external threats are manageable by the host nation's security forces.

The experiences captured in the Small Wars Manual were often forgotten and only revisited when attempting to shoehorn conventionally organized and trained forces against irregular threats. For over 100 years, Marines have trained host nation security forces to shape conditions favorable to U.S. policy goals. This mission should not be viewed as an anomaly. Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has a bad habit of preparing to fight the last conventional war. If innovation occurs, it is often put away, only to be relearned again during the next conflict. It is like touching a hot stove. One either decides never to do it again, wear an oven mitt, or turn it off to cool it before touching it. The Marine Corps is repeatedly surprised each time it touches the stove. To avoid forgetting the lessons of the past, the Marine Corps must develop the means to combat irregular threats and evolve to help other countries fight mutual insecurity.

The Marine Corps has taken some appropriate steps to institutionalize its irregular warfare functions. To this end, The Department of Defense is charging each service with institutionalizing lessons learned while fighting irregular wars over the past decade. The creation

of the Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence within the Marine Corps Combat Development Command has given irregular warfare proponents a voice in the development of the Marine Corps. Other institutions have also sprung up but seem less permanent. The Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group presumably will consolidate all Marine advisory missions, but its future is uncertain.

To remain the force of choice against future threats, the Marine Corps must increase its irregular warfare capabilities. Key to this is developing a group of foreign security force advisors who can provide persistent engagement in troubled areas to prevent future conflicts. Currently the Marine Corps builds advisor teams in an ad hoc manner, paying little attention to the unique skills required for advisory duty. To prepare Marine foreign security force advisors the Marine Corps must apply lessons learned from the past and develop the means to implement policy and doctrine to help other nations fight future threats.

HISTORIC PRECEDENCE

Knowledge of history will aid in understanding irregular threats and the Marine foreign security force advisor's role in deterring and defeating them. The U.S. military's involvement in developing indigenous forces can be traced back to its beginnings in 1898. In the early years the Marine Corps played a prominent role in these actions as a stabilizing force in the Caribbean, often in close connection to U.S. Department of State goals. In other conflicts this development role differed in that the conflict shifted to reconstruction, in which a country's entire military structure required resurrection. Reviewing Haiti, Nicaragua, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iraq War, and Afghanistan we can make compare current and past practices for sourcing the advisory missions.

Haiti

Beginning in the early part of the 20th Century, Haiti became increasingly unstable. *Cacos*, northern peasants, were routinely compelled to support political opposition through violent means by overthrowing the president. During a period of time equaling two presidential terms, Haiti experienced nine presidents.[5] In 1915, Marines landed to restore order and establish security sufficient for America to implement reforms. Despite ambiguous goals from the onset, Marines expanded their areas of control.

An early treaty legitimizing the American occupation called for the creation of a constabulary force to maintain security. Implementing a plan that would be used in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, the Marines filled the gap in qualified native leadership with junior officers and non-commissioned officers. Marines serving in this capacity drew pay from both the Marine Corps and the Haitian government, making volunteers easy to recruit. By 1918, most of the *cacos* had been subdued by the constabulary, but growing resentment over the U.S. occupation sparked additional unrest.[6] Throughout the 1920s the situation calmed, allowing the Marines to focus on improving training for officers and enlisted members of the force. By 1928, half of the military sub-districts were led entirely by Haitian officers.[7] Accelerated Haitianization occurred enabling a smooth transfer of authority in 1932.

Marines left Haiti in 1934 following the election of President Roosevelt and a series of investigations into their inappropriate use of force. They left behind a professional armed force capable of maintaining a level of security not previously enjoyed in Haiti. Beyond the reach of the Marines was the ability to change the social fabric of the society that was manifested in polarized wealth and dysfunctional civil-military affairs. These ills continue to plague Haiti today.

The Haitian experience offers several lessons. First, the Marines were not prepared to train and lead indigenous forces. Chesty Puller indicated the lack of preparation for those assigned to duty in Haiti when recalling his first day. He was merely shown his quarters and told to observe drill the following day. That night he received his first lesson in Creole.[8] The Marines lacked the necessary law enforcement experience, and few had any French language skills.[9] America's entry into World War One coincided with the 1918 uprising. Not surprisingly, the best qualified Marines like Smedley Butler were sent to France, adding to these challenges. When confronted with a similar situation in Nicaragua, the Marines applied the same approach as in Haiti to re-establish stability.

Nicaragua

In 1912, turmoil in Nicaragua compelled Marines to land to guard the American legation and exercise Washington's refusal to allow armed revolutions in the hemisphere. This began a 20 year experience that significantly influenced the character of the Marine Corps. The initial period of stability operations ended in 1925 when the U.S. Department of State hired retired U.S. Army Major Calvin B. Carter and four assistants to train a Nicaraguan constabulary. Shortly after his arrival, political tensions between the Conservatives and Liberals escalated when the Liberals began armed insurrection. The Marines returned in 1927 to protect foreign lives and property.

This second time, the Marines undertook an extensive training and advising mission by organizing a new *Guardia Nacional.*[10] This involved a handful of Marine officers and non-commissioned officers developing and leading a force from scratch in the middle of a civil war. Not all were cut out for it. During one six month period, thirty-one Marines were removed from duty as ineffective.[11] In addition to low manpower resources due to commitments in China and

Haiti, other challenges included the limited education and poor language skills of those assigned to *Guardia* duty. Marines typically excelled in combat but lacked the ability to train and inculcate the force with military ethics.[12]

By 1932, the Marines were able to relinquish command of the *Guardia*. Despite the challenges of building a native constabulary while fighting a civil war, the Marines succeeded in establishing a level of security that allowed for their departure. The *Guardia* was left more technically capable and less politically influenced than ever before. Petty corruption was almost completely eliminated.[13] The Nicaraguan government was left with an effective tool for maintaining security.

Through this experience, the Marine Corps proved that not all are suited for duty with indigenous forces. The removal of 31 Marines in a six month period demonstrates this. Additionally, poor treatment by Marines in the first year of the *Guardia* resulted in 159 desertions, three killed in mutinies, and only six killed in action.[14] These numbers reflect not only poor leadership, but abuse of power likely manifested by the racist sentiments of the time. These extreme examples may have informed elements of the Small Wars Manual like: "…the application of the principles of psychology in small wars is quite different from their normal application in major warfare or even in troop leadership."[15] Not everyone possesses the traits needed to succeed when relying on foreign forces to accomplish the mission.

Both these examples show how a limited number of Marines, in conjunction with native forces, can achieve U.S. policy goals. The next two present a different set of circumstances yet reiterate the requirement to develop foreign forces to protect U.S. interests.

<u>Korea</u>

Korea presents an interesting case for studying the "modern" military advisor. Unlike working with indigenous forces during the small wars, American advisors in Korea had no command authority. Additionally, the advisory effort was started during the reconstruction mission following WWII as opposed to in response to threatened U.S. interests. Some argue that the Korean War was a success, citing the significant economic advancements made by Korea since 1953[16]. The counter to that argument references the cost and commitment made by the U.S. for Korean security. The year following the 1953 Armistice, 225,590 U.S. troops remained on the Korean Peninsula.[17] That number has since been reduced to 25,000[18]. When considering the current economic power of South Korea and advancements with its military, one should question whether the U.S. should continue making such a large commitment. Could not a group of skilled "enablers" to include military advisors achieve the same level of stability?

The U.S. advisory effort during the Korean War provides an example of a struggling U.S. approach and demonstrates practices that have yet to be corrected. This effort began in 1948 and helped build the Republic of Korea Army. The Provisional Military Advisory Group initially headed up efforts to professionalize the Korean Army following the transition of authority to President Syngman Rhee from the U.S. Army Military Government. The Korean Army began as a constabulary force designed to defend primarily against internal threats. In 1949, the Provisional Military Advisory Group was replaced by the United States Military Advisory Group of the Republic of Korea. It faced enormous challenges when communist forces from the north, later supported by Chinese Communist Forces attacked south in June 1950. A month later, President Rhee put Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Eight U.S. Army Commander in charge of Korean forces. This move also shifted the advisors under the operational control of the

Eight U.S. Army[19]. Between 1949 and 1953, advisor strength grew from 500 personnel to 2,866.[20]

As the Korean Army expanded to meet wartime requirements, the advisor group never grew proportionally. Consequently, the advisor mission was perpetually shorthanded.[21] In addition to understaffing, KMAG competed with U.S. combat units for scarce personnel resources and came up short. As a result, assignment to KMAG was made with no more regard than for one's military occupational specialty, rank, and need for an overseas tour.[22] Training for advisors received equally little attention and thought. During the war, a newly assigned advisor was lucky to get an orientation brief from his immediate supervisor before joining his ROKA unit.[23]

By 1953 procedures had improved to the point where a new advisor could expect a more detailed orientation brief and an *Advisor's Procedure Guide*. Regardless of this improvement, many combat unit advisors felt they were not adequately prepared to execute their mission.[24] Between the "anyone will do" approach to assigning advisors and their lack of training, it is clear that the advising mission took a back seat to the combat operations of U.S. units. In a 1969 interview, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of EUSA from December 1950 to March 1951, commented, "officers in an advisory capacity, unit advisors…really had a much tougher job than fellows in regular units, a much tougher job."[25]

While the results of the Korean Conflict may preclude one from critically studying poorly executed facets of the operation, the advisor mission is one that provides valuable lessons to consider. The challenges faced by advisors in Korea were multiplied by low manpower commitments to the mission, unrealistic expectations by U.S. combat commanders, and few incentives for attracting talented leaders to volunteer for advisor duty.

Advisors in Korea had to balance the difficult mission of advising and working with their counterparts with meeting expectations of U.S. combat commanders. Once Korean units organizationally fell under the Eight U.S. Army, the challenge for advisors grew. Their relationship with their counterparts did not change. They still maintained an "advise and assist, do not command"[26] restraint with the added pressure from U.S. commanders to "stand or fall"[27] with their counterparts. In essence, they were held responsible for the performance of their counterpart unit with none of a commander's authority.

Advisor duty in Korea remained an undesirable assignment and therefore did not attract talented volunteers. From its beginning, it was not a desirable billet for U.S. Army soldiers.[28] Availability rather than qualifications was the driving force to assign one to advisor duty in Korea. This routinely resulted in American officers several ranks junior to their Korean counterparts.[29] As the war began and combat actions increased, U.S. units became the priority for manning, leaving the advisor group behind. Furthermore, those who served as advisors did not get the same job opportunities as their peers who had served in U.S. combat units. A positive move occurred in 1953. Some former battalion and regimental commanders, after Korean command tours, were assigned as regimental and divisional advisors.[30] While this was a positive change, it was implemented too late and was not universally applied.

The Korean experience occurred 60 years ago, yet some valuable lessons were captured that resonate today. In 1957, *The KMAG Advisor: Role and Problems of the Military Advisor in Developing an Indigenous Army for Combat Operations in Korea* was published.[31] The most interesting observations captured in this report will sound familiar to anyone who has studied U.S. military advising missions. The U.S. Army identified the following lessons from advising the Korean Army that need to be considered today, as the Marine Corps looks to the future.

First, "advisory duty in a tactical unit of a local national army, particularly under combat conditions, is exceedingly difficult and frequently frustrating and personnel selected for such duty must be temperamentally and physically able to withstand these stresses, in addition to being professionally competent."[32] This justifies the need to screen potential advisors to select those who possess the necessary traits to increase their chances of success. "Qualities needed include tact, patience, emotional stability, self-sufficiency, self-discipline"[33] are not traits currently tracked by the Marine Corps personnel evaluation system. A new method is needed to screen potential advisors.

Vietnam

The American advisory mission in Vietnam reflects similar shortcomings of the Korean advisory mission and provides plenty of valuable lessons learned that continue to be overlooked by the Marine Corps today. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam began in 1950 with the Military Advisory and Assist Group – Indochina. This organization gave logistical support to the French against Viet Minh communists.

Following the departure of France in 1955, the Military Advisory and Assist Group – Vietnam was established. It worked with President Ngo Dinh Diem in building the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. Similar to the Korean experience, the South Vietnamese military's primary mission was to defend against a conventional invasion from North Vietnam. Other non-military U.S. agencies trained and equipped the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps to handle internal security matters. In 1959, the advisor mission was significantly tested by a growing insurgency supported by North Vietnam.

The Marine Corps' role with the advisory mission focused on developing the South Vietnamese Marine Corps. This began in 1955 with two Marines within the Navy section of

Military Advisory and Assist Group. At its height, the Marine Advisory Unit grew to 67 personnel. The role of Marine advisors expanded proportional to the growth of the South Vietnamese Marine Corps. In 1972, the South Vietnamese Marine Corps consisted of one division with three brigades totaling over 15,000 personnel.[34] Advisors supported at each level of command down to battalion.

From 1961 to 1964, the U.S. advisory effort steadily grew. In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara authorized advisors for each province and advisory teams for each combat battalion. In addition to the increased role advisors played in the escalating conflict, Special Forces teams rotated in military training teams to train conventional units as well as work with Montagnards through the covert Central Intelligence Agency led Civilian Irregular Defense Group program.

With the expansion of the South Vietnamese military, the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam was created in 1962. Following the 1963 assassination of President Diem, insurgent attacks in the south became more frequent and successful. In response to this deteriorating situation, the U.S. established district advisory teams under each of the 44 province advisors.

Between 1965 and 1968, the U.S. military buildup and assumption of major combat operations turned the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam more into and operational headquarters. Instead of commanding South Vietnamese units like the Eight U.S. Army did in Korea, the U.S. and Vietnamese chains of command remained separate. This relationship added challenges to the already difficult task the advisors faced.

In 1967 the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support was created under the civilian deputy of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam. This program consolidated province and district advisors with the Office of Civil Operations. In addition to greater unity,

this organizational change provided greater attention to the local force development plans. Over 350 mobile advisory teams were established to work with local units under the province and district advisors.

In late 1968, MAC-V began planning the withdrawal of U.S. forces following the Tet Offensive and the substantial popular uprising that followed. This shifted the focus back on the advisory mission in 1969 as the newly inaugurated President Nixon announced the "Viet Namization" of the war. Division advisor teams were converted to combat assistance teams in 1969 shifting from an advisory role to a combat support coordination role. Despite proven incompetence by South Vietnamese units during in 1971, advisors continued to be reduced. By June 1971, all battalion advisors were gone. Regimental advisors were the next to phase out, and by the end of the year local force advisors were reduced from 487 to 66.

The remaining 3,888 U.S. advisors and their counterpart units were tested in 1972 when the North Viet Nam Army launched the Easter Offensive. After months of continuous fighting, the South Vietnamese forces with advisors providing access to U.S. air delivered fires forced the North to consolidate its fairly substantial gains. During this offensive, the Marine Advisory Unit fully deployed all 52 of its remaining advisors, contributing to the Vietnamese Marines victory in Quang Tri City.[35] In January 1973 a cease fire was agreed to resulting in the withdrawal of all remaining U.S. personnel sixty days later. In 1975, Northern conventional forces caused the final demonstration of the South Vietnamese military's ineptitude, ending the war and consolidating north and south under one communist government.

From 1955 to 1973, 397 Marines, sailors, and soldiers served in the Marine Advisory Unit. Compared to other advising missions, the Marines enjoyed the advantage of size, specifically small size. The Vietnamese Marine Corps grew slowly, never getting beyond the

advisor's ability to influence.[36] Additionally, the small size of the Marine Advisory Unit enabled leaders to identify those advisors who did not possess the right disposition for the job and could therefore remove them before irreparable damage occurred. Generally, Headquarters Marine Corps was careful in selecting officers for advisor duty. However, just like in Haiti and Korea, the "conventional" war became the priority and the advisory effort failed to maintain a high level of performance from 1965 to 1969.[37]

Iraq

Advising experiences in Iraq provide more recent examples for consideration. Following the disbandment of the 300,000 man Iraqi Army with Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2 in May 2003, the U.S. military was faced with the daunting task of building from the ground up a new Iraqi Army.[38] In June 2003, the Vinnell Corporation was contracted to train the first newly formed Iraqi Army battalions. After unfavorable news reports about the capabilities of the new forces, the Jordanian military began supporting the advisory mission.

During the first Battle of Fallujah in April 2004, an Iraqi Army battalion refused to fight. This provided the catalyst to change the manner in which the new Iraqi Army was formed and trained. As a result, Major General David Petraeus assumed command of the newly created Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq.[39] The Vinnell contract was allowed to expire so Coalition Forces could begin training the Iraqi Army.

The Transition Command built advisor support teams to provide initial training and equipment for Iraqi Forces. These teams were sourced "out of hide" from units already in country. In 2005, Multi-National Corps- Iraq assumed operational control of the training mission through its Iraq Assistance Group.[40] Multi National Coprs-Iraq initially drew its advisors from the reserves. As the mission requirements grew, this approach was insufficient to

meet the demand, so force requests were sent through U.S. Central Command for sourcing. [41] Typically these advisors were sourced from the active components of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps with augments from the National Guard and Reserves. The Iraq Assistance Group embedded these teams in Iraqi units from division down to the battalions. As early as 2006, the Army's Vice Chief of Staff, General Richard A. Cody, recognized that the advisors' mission in support of Iraqi Security Forces was the most important in the Army and that the mission needed to be resourced properly.[42]

Afghanistan

Following the Soviet withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989; the country spiraled into chaos as rival mujahideen groups vied for power. Emerging in 1994, the Taliban offered an alternative to civil war, and eventually took control of the much of the country after seizing the capital, Kabul in 1999. After the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban government refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaida, prompting U.S. intervention in October 2001.

Along with destroying Al Qaida and removing the Taliban government, the mission evolved to reconstruction. A key component to this was building the Afghan National Army. By mid-2003, little progress had been made because the task was not effectively supported.[43] The invasion of Iraq syphoned combat power and counterinsurgency expertise. During this time the Marine Corps supported the Afghan National Army training mission with an assortment of globally sourced embedded training teams. As with previous training missions, Marines were selected more for their availability than their advisor skills.

The Afghan "surge" of 2010 saw changes to the Marine Corps' approach to Afghan security force development. With more Marine units deployed and the growth of the Afghan National Army, partnering became primary method by which security was provided. In areas

Marines operated, every unit down to the squad lived and executed missions with a counterpart Afghan National Army unit. To facilitate this, advisor teams were built into the Marine unit's structure from battalion up to Marine Expeditionary Force before deploying. The size of this commitment outpaced the ability to prepare them for the task as Afghan brigade level advisors received the same exact training as company and battalion level advisors. The advisor requirement continues growing as more and more Afghan units assume the lead security role. General John Allen, USMC, the current commander of all coalition forces in Afghanistan is asking for an additional 1,700 troops to form hundreds of new advisor teams. He recognizes the importance of getting this mission right for the long term security of the region. He envisions small teams, led by combat experience mid-level officers and staff non-commissioned officers, specifically selected and trained for the mission. [44]

Reviewing history shows that working by, with, and through security forces from other nations is vital to achieving U.S. goals. Despite this, the mission routinely seems to take a back seat to other operations and suffers due to ineffective manning and training. Brigadier General Thomas Draude, USMC, reflecting on his experiences as a Marine advisor in Vietnam explained that "a bad advisor can wreak havoc on a unit for the long term."[45] Yet history has taught little. Advisors still receive little language training, are not selected for their skills or aptitude, and rapidly rotate through units.[46]

POLICY AND DOCTRINE

Policy, service concepts and doctrine all provide compelling reasons for the Marine Corps to evolve with the changing character of warfare. Policy being prescriptive provides the most direct impetus for change. Service concepts explain the way in which the Marine Corps intends to operate in the future. In an effort to provide the means to achieve policy, service

concepts, and doctrine, the Marine Corps must develop a group of foreign security force advisors to prevent irregular threats from requiring large scale contingency operations.

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* listed the Department's priorities. Counter terrorism and irregular warfare top the list indicating their importance. Furthermore, he stressed that "…U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." [47] Key to both counterinsurgency and stability operations is advising foreign security forces. To this end, the Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group has been "operationalized" by merging with the Security Cooperation Education Training Cell to form the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group, but this unit's future is uncertain given the Corps' eventual reduction. Assuming that the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group is cut, then establishing a secondary advisor specialty will be a low impact way to professionalize Marine foreign security force advisors and prevent returning to the ad hoc manner in which the advising mission is currently.

In the *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force,* General Martin E. Dempsey, USA, explains his intent for the Joint Force to remain strong by innovating to respond to future threats. He affirms the importance of persistent presence in troubled areas by arguing that "only by remaining alert to the weak signals of change can we preserve the initiative and provide options for our civilian leaders."[48] The kind of presence need to detect these changes will require advisors capable of developing strong relationships with their counterparts and understanding the cultural nuances of the host nation. Recognizing the advantage of deterring aggression, he calls for "promoting multilateral security approaches".[49] This will require more than simply offering

training to foreign forces. Compelling a partner nation's security forces to behave in a manner conducive to U.S. policy goals demands skilled advisors. Finally, he echoes the Secretary's call to "institutionalize the lessons of war."[50] The previous section highlighted many of the lessons learned about past and current advising. The Chairman expects the Marine Corps to innovate so that these do not become lessons relearned in the future.

In *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, the three sea service chiefs outline their unified maritime strategy. Concepts contained within promote situations ideally suited for the work of Marine foreign security force advisors. In the introduction, they stress "preventing wars is as important as winning wars."[51] There is a connection between this and the *Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare*. It states, "Prevention is the primary focus of effort" for combating irregular threats. Marine foreign security force advisors working closely in partnership with nations in troubled parts of the world will be ideally positioned to offer advice and support to developing militaries facing internal and external threats to their country's stability.

While not specifying the means to achieve security goals through indirect approaches, this strategy recognizes the importance of "Foster[ing] and sustain[ing] cooperative relationships with more international partners."[52] It is better for a small group of advisors to build partner capacity patiently over time than to rely on a conventionally organized Marine Air Ground Task Force providing crisis response coverage or "drive by" security cooperation. A key component to achieving this is persistent engagement by advisors who can build the trust and cooperation necessary to assure effective partnered operations.

Recognizing the importance of international partnerships, The Small Wars Manual dedicated an entire chapter to armed native organizations. Failing to take this requirement

seriously would deny our history and destine the Marine Corps to repeating the mistakes of the past. To avoid lengthy interventions like the ones in Haiti and Nicaragua (both of which informed the Small Wars Manual), the Marine Corps needs to ensure that from the beginning, transitioning security to the host nation's security forces remains a key component of any contingency plan. The Small Wars Manual explains that "…it is not the policy of the United States Government to accept permanent responsibility for the preservation of governmental stability by stationing its armed forces indefinitely…"[53] To avoid this, Marine foreign security force advisors can shape situations to avoid U.S. intervention by building partner capacity. If intervention is inevitable, advisors can surge to develop and execute plans that strengthen the host nation's security forces to assume the lead for security operations.

Chapter 6 of *Counterinsurgency* also addresses the need to develop host-nation security forces as part of a counterinsurgency campaign. In addition to describing the ways this should be done, it explains some of the means as well. When special operations forces alone are insufficient, general purpose ground forces will be needed to support the host nation security force development mission. When this is the case, it champions the need for highly qualified Marines and soldiers for this mission.[54] Since its publication in 2006, the Marine Corps continues to source its advisor teams in an ad hoc manner with little consideration for the qualities needed by advisors.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To develop the capability for persistent and meaningful engagement with foreign militaries, the Marine Corps must establish a secondary foreign security force advisor specialty. This will ensure those Marines called on for advisor duty during contingency operations have been screened and trained to advise foreign security forces. During peacetime, these advisors,

when not fulfilling duties in their primary specialty will plan and execute advisory missions with U.S. partners around the globe.

Primary specialties best suited for advising fall under the combat arms and selected support specialties. Marines with primary specialties in infantry, reconnaissance, artillery, tanks, and amphibious assault vehicles will fill combat advisor roles. Those Marines with primary specialties in logistics, engineering, intelligence, military police, communications, and administration will provide advisors for support functions. This range of primary specialties will create the breadth necessary to work with a variety of foreign security forces.

Advisors require professional credibility, maturity, and time to develop advisor specific skills. Eligible rank limitations will facilitate this. Enlisted Marines from sergeant to sergeant major or master gunnery sergeant should be eligible. Officers from captain to colonel should also be eligible. Marines below these ranks should not be eligible so that they can focus on developing professional credibility and maturity.

Selection for the secondary advisor specialty will be conducted by a board. Volunteers meeting the primary specialty and rank requirements listed above will be eligible to submit packages to the board. Marines who have previously served as advisors will automatically be screened for suitability for the secondary specialty, but simply serving as an advisor will not give one the new specialty. Language proficiency or aptitude will be required. Those Marines with unique cultural experiences like extended periods of travel to particular regions, college degrees relating to designated regions, or family history will also weigh on the selection decision.

Advisors must maintain a regional focus that aligns with existing regional divisions. At the very least, advisors must be pooled together in areas that correspond with geographic combatant commands. As the program grows and more Marines qualify for the foreign security

force advisor secondary specialty, their primary geographic focus will be further refined to include sub-regions within each combatant command to coincide with boundaries associated with the regional area officer program. This refinement will reduce the need to create new area training and language courses. Instead, the current foreign and regional area officer courses will be used.

Advanced cultural and regional education will take place while attending Marine Corps schools. Captains with the advisor specialty attending The Expeditionary Warfare School will hone their cultural skills during the occupational field expansion course. This training will be provided by The Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning co-located with The Expeditionary Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia. Majors attending The Marine Corps Command and Staff College will be required to take a regionally focused elective that will combine cultural and political instruction. The Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning will teach the cultural component while the Department of State and Department of Defense will offer instruction on current security cooperation goals for specific regions and countries of focus. Officers attending other service schools, foreign military schools, or who are not selected for resident school will be required to attend these courses in a temporary assigned duty status in order to maintain their advisor specialty.

Languages will be taught through the same course as for foreign area officers. To evaluate proficiency tests will be administered semi-annually at local base education centers to prevent foreign language atrophy. Additionally, advisors will receive advanced negotiation training and human psychological training during an advisor course.

Officers with the secondary advisor specialty will not be locked into a specific career track, but some assignments outside of primary specialty ones are more beneficial for advisors

than others. Consideration for this should be given when assigning Marines to billets outside their primary specialty. Training unit assignments and foreign area officer tours are ideal. For field grade officers, training assignments are also ideal as well as Department of State exchanges and regional area officer tours.

CONCLUSION

Creating a Marine foreign security force advisor secondary specialty advances the requirements of MARADMIN 710/11 (Activation of Irregular Warfare Manpower Skills Tracking Capability) by acting on the acknowledgement that the Marine Corps needs to develop "an enduring capability in IW [irregular warfare] skills."[55] Furthermore, these advisors will realize the goals outlined in *Reshaping America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness* by supporting the five regionally focused Marine Expeditionary Brigades in training, advising, and assistance operations with partner nations.[56]

Failure to act will destine the Marine Corps to experience many of the challenges recently faced since the 9/11 attacks. Believing that conventionally trained and organized units can best prepare foreign security forces for uncertainty against irregular threats underestimates the benefits of long term relationships and trust developed by culturally attentive advisors. Furthermore, actions in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the need to have quality advisors properly screened and trained before commencing contingency operations. The scope and scale of these missions is too large for Special Forces alone.

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