# Breaking Barriers: A Case Study of UNITAF and NGO Cooperation During Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993

## Title and Subtitle
A case study focusing on Unified Task Force's (UNITAF) operation in Somalia offers important insights into the professional relationship between Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) and the Department of Defense (DoD). This study offers "lessons learned" that demonstrate how the two organizations combined their knowledge and capabilities to achieve success in Somalia. In 1992, at the time of US and UN intervention, Somalia factions were at war with each other. Somalia was virtually at war with itself. Moved to action by modern media, the US ordered the DoD to establish a secure environment in Somalia so that the relief effort could continue. History generally views UNITAF's operation in support of Operation Restore Hope as a humanitarian success. This thesis will demonstrate that the DoD and NGOs overcame multiple cultural barriers and leveraged each other's capabilities to have a profound impact on the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. By overcoming barriers and working together during Operation Restore Hope in 1992-1993, NGOs and the DoD saved the lives of tens of thousands of Somalis suffering from war, famine, and disease.

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## Abstract
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Executive Summary


Author: Major Geoffrey Gorsuch, United States Army

Thesis: A case study focusing on Unified Task Force’s (UNITAF) operation in Somalia offers important insights into the professional relationship between Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) and the Department of Defense (DoD). The study offers “lessons learned” that demonstrate how the two organizations combined their knowledge and capabilities to achieve success in an extremely complex environment.

Discussion: In 1992, at the time of US and UN intervention, Somalia factions were at war with each other. Somalia was virtually at war with itself. Following the fall of their government in 1991, Somali warlords fought to assert themselves in positions of power in the country. The brutal fighting between warlords and clans exacerbated an occurring famine in the country and left hundreds of thousands sick, starving, or dead. The United Nations and humanitarian relief organizations came to Somalia to help relieve the suffering of the people in Somalia. In the last few months of 1992 the relief effort had stalled. Most of the NGOs operating in Somalia had fled due to the deteriorating security situation and warlords and bandits stole the majority of relief supplies before they could reach the needy. Moved to action by modern media and images of starving children, the United States ordered the Department of Defense to establish a secure environment in Somalia so that the relief effort could continue. Unified Task Force (UNITAF) arrived in Somalia in December 1992 and quickly established a secure environment for humanitarian relief organizations. History generally views UNITAF’s operation in support of Operation Restore Hope as a humanitarian success. This thesis will demonstrate that the DoD and NGOs overcame multiple cultural barriers and leveraged each other’s capabilities to have a profound impact on the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. This study will highlight lessons learned by the Department of Defense and will demonstrate the importance of working together in the future.

Conclusion: By overcoming cultural barriers and working together during Operation Restore Hope in 1992-1993, NGOs and the Department of Defense saved the lives of tens of thousands of Somalis suffering from war, famine, and disease. UNITAF’s operation provides key lessons learned for future DoD operations.
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INTRODUCTION

A case study focusing on Unified Task Force’s (UNITAF) operation in Somalia offers important insights into the professional relationship between Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) and the Department of Defense (DoD). The study offers “lessons learned” that demonstrate how the two organizations combined their knowledge and capabilities to achieve success in an extremely complex environment. The relationship between NGOs and the United States’ DoD during Unified Task Force’s operations from December 9, 1992 through May 4, 1993 demonstrates that the two entities can achieve extraordinary success when working together towards a common goal.

Military leaders should not view this mission or partnership as unique. In August 2001, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.6 (Joint Tactics, techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance) stated that the United States Military forces must be prepared to effectively respond to humanitarian crises around the world.¹ The National Intelligence Council states that 42 million people around the world have a need for emergency assistance at any given moment.² Recent disaster relief operations in Haiti, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Japan are tragic reminders that the DoD’s participation in humanitarian missions is not uncommon.

The JP acknowledges that the US DoD’s capability to provide humanitarian assistance (HA) is limited and will usually supplement other governments’ and/or private organizations’ humanitarian assistance operations. The Department of Defense is uniquely “equipped and structured” to provide logistical support, medical aid, and security to HA missions.³ All humanitarian operations have a security requirement that is necessary in order to safeguard HA organizations and their assets. The importance of the security requirement was demonstrated to the watching world during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.
Military leaders increasingly find that they must partner with NGOs to achieve mission success. Likewise, NGOs find it increasingly difficult to operate in conflict zones without provisions for the security of their personnel and assets. An analysis of the cooperation between the United States DoD and NGOs during Unified Task Force’s operation offers important lessons learned that cannot be ignored when planning future combined operations. In 1992 UNITAF and the NGOs broke through cultural barriers and leveraged each other’s strengths to achieve success in an extremely complex environment.

This thesis will focus on UNITAF’s operations and interaction with the NGOs. The thesis does not focus on the tactical and operational employment of the US DoD assets but provides an overview of Restore Hope and focuses on the partnership between the DoD and NGOs operating in Somalia during UNITAFs mission.

The presented case study will provide a short overview of the strategic setting prior to US intervention. It will highlight key actors who influenced operations in the area and highlight the security issues that caused the NGOs to seek assistance from the international community. This thesis will then explore how NGOs and the military broke through cultural barriers to effectively work together. Finally it will address key lessons learned from the Department of Defense’s viewpoint and discuss the way forward when planning future operations.

BACKGROUND

With the end of the Cold War in late 1989 came a renewed sense of hope in the international community. For decades the United States’ and the Soviet Union’s political maneuvering against one another overshadowed all other activities in the global environment. Ironically, it was the end of the Cold War that brought ample opportunities for the international
community to exercise its newfound role in the world. The end of the Cold War meant the end of American and Soviet aid to small countries around the world. Slowly, countries either began to stand on their own, or they began to fail. Somalia began to fail.

Somalia was created in 1960 when Britain and Italy combined their colonies and created a unified and sovereign state. In 1969 a Somali, Said Barre, took power of the new country and aligned it with the Soviet Union. In 1977 the Soviet Union abandoned support and Barre looked elsewhere for backing. By 1980, enticed by Somalia’s strategic location on the horn of Africa at the entrance to the Red Sea the United States took advantage of the Soviet departure and became Somalia’s primary source of economic and military aid. Unfortunately, Said Barre was a ruthless and repressive leader and discontent grew among the Somali people. Said Barre’s unforgiving method of ruling Somalia greatly embarrassed the United States and frustrated the international community.

The United States government withdrew any and all support from the Somalia in late 1989. US Marines evacuated the American Embassy on January 5, 1991. The Marines also helped evacuate the Russian Embassy and took the Soviet Ambassador out of the country. United States Marine Corps Captain Chris Seiple, published by the Army’s Peacekeeping Institute Center for Strategic Leadership in 1996, said it best when he wrote, “In telling symbolism that the Cold War was over, Americans and Soviets together left behind a country that, at one time or another, they had both supported against the other.”

The Somali people ousted Said Barre in January 1991 and violence spread through the country as competing clans and political institutions wrestled for power. Decades of competing US and Soviet support to the Somali government ensured that all political factions were armed with a surplus of weapons and ammunition (including heavy weapons such as: recoilless rifles,
anti-aircraft weapons, and rocket propelled grenades). The fighting between the warring factions compounded an already occurring famine and left hundreds of thousands of Somalis without homes, food and medicine.\(^7\) As each warlord attempted to grow his power base, food quickly became wealth and power. As the famine grew the warlords began to raid each other’s food stores and logistical bases, further exacerbating the mass starvation and death that was spreading throughout the country.\(^8\)

There is no way to accurately portray the magnitude of human suffering experienced in Somalia. The UN estimated that by 1992 the famine had caused over three hundred thousand deaths. Additionally, they estimated that over two million people had fled their homes to neighboring countries or regions.\(^*\) In addition to those who had already perished, starvation threatened over four and a half million more Somalis.\(^9\) The combined effects of war and drought had completely devastated the local healthcare system, destroyed local livestock populations, and ruined crops.\(^10\) It was under these complex and horrific conditions that the NGOs and DoD would meet to work toward a common goal.

Images of Somalia’s war, disease, and famine were broadcast nightly into living rooms around the world. In September 1992, Audrey Hepburn traveled to Somalia and returned home to tell of the horrors she witnessed. President George H.W. Bush was greatly affected by intelligence and news reports, as well as the situation they witnessed in the media.\(^11\) It is widely agreed that the massive media coverage of the crisis urged the President to action and swayed public opinion to support the President’s decision to intervene.\(^12\)

THE ACTORS

SOMALI PEOPLE

“Me and Somalia against the world, me and my Clan against Somalia, Me and my family against my Clan, Me and my Brother against my Family, Me against my Brother.”

- Somali Proverb

Approximately 85% of the Somali population is comprised of ethnic Somalis; the other 15% is Bantu and other ethnicities (including around 30,000 Arabs). Approximately 40% of the people live in an urban population and the average Somali can expect to live to be around 50 years old. The people in the country of Somalia are primarily of the Sunni Muslim faith and share the common language of Somali. Somalia is a clan-based society where each clan traces its origin to a single ancestor. Many families are joined together under the headship of a clan but bear no loyalty to one another and may be explosively opposed to one another.

In 1992, at the time of US and UN intervention, Somalia factions were at war with each other. Somalia was virtually at war with itself. The US Army’s after-action review (AAR) relates a telling statistic that described the divisiveness of the Somali nation. At the time UNITAF operations began, eleven of the fourteen known political factions were actively fighting with one or more rival factions in Somalia. The most prominent of these factions were the competing militias of Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed. These same eleven factions were responsible for the majority of violence occurring in Somalia. There was no functioning government running basic human services in the country and the Somali warlords

† Translations of this proverb vary. For Example, another translation is: “My full brother and I against my father, my father's household against my uncle's household, our two households (my uncle's and mine) against the rest of the immediate kin, the immediate kin against non-immediate members of my clan, my clan against other clans, and my nation and I against the world.”
‡ See Appendix G: Somali Clans and Political Factions
§ See Appendix G: Somali Clans and Political Factions
controlled all food, weapons, lines of communication and legal issues.** Somalia experienced a complete breakdown of civic order as a result of the ruthless clans and warlords struggled for power in the country.**

**NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONs (NGOs)**††

Joint Publication 1-02 defines NGO as:

Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief).††

The term or phrase “nongovernmental organization” or “NGO” was coined after the creation of the United Nations in 1945. The United Nations Charter established the legitimacy of organizations that were not affiliated with any established state and recognized the important role they could play on the international stage. Although officially “recognized” and named by the international community in 1945, some NGOs recognized today existed long before 1800. Some of the most well known NGOs were established long before the United Nations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was founded in 1863, well over a hundred years ago. In truth, when the Catholic Church and the Islamic Mosque systems (among others) are rightly included, NGOs have been around for well over 2,000 years.

**The definition term “warlord” is debated in the academic anthropological circle. Generally this is because of the terms wide use (and abuse) in just about any situation where armed non-state actors have a role. The term has been used in Somalia, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Sierra Leone, etc. Scholars generally agree on the following key factors that truly define a warlord. A warlord is a non-state actor that: is able to operate because the state does not have the power to stop him. Furthermore, he generally benefits from the disorder of the state he is operating in; the warlord and his group fight for selfish reason and generally do not have a higher cause; a warlord must have full control over an armed force; and finally, the warlord uses violence and intimidation to build and maintain his power base. Source: Antonio Giustozzi, “The debate on Warlordism: The Importance of Military Legitimacy,” Crisis States Research Centre Discussion Paper No. 13 (October 2005): 5.

†† The number of NGOs operating in Somalia constantly waxed and waned throughout the humanitarian relief effort. At the height of humanitarian intervention in Somalia there were over 49 humanitarian relief organizations in Somalia. Prior to that, by the time the DoD arrived in Somalia, the security situation was so poor that only a few NGOs remained, the remaining were: The International Committee for the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders/France, International Medical Corps, World Concern, Save the Children (UK), and SOS. (Source: US Army AAR, pg 6. & Sieple, pg 131)
When operating in hostile environments it is important for Humanitarian Assistance NGOs to remain politically neutral. By remaining neutral they are able to operate between warring factions or governments and provide care and aid to those who need it the most. NGOs feel they pose little risk to governments as long if they can effectively demonstrate that they are not helping one side or the other during conflicts. In the past, remaining neutral is one of the primary issues that has hampered a strong relationship between NGOs and the military. The Red Cross’s handbook states:

We will never knowingly--or through negligence--allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments.

Because the US Department of Defense is an “instrument of US foreign policy” NGOs are extremely sensitive to accepting any support or assistance from the DoD. By ensuring that they are not aligned with a foreign policy, they have maintained their neutrality between any warring states. This is one of the primary ways NGOs maintain their security in hostile locations around the world.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

In 1991 the United States government and its military was coming off the high of their lopsided victory over Iraq in Operation Desert Storm. The military’s overwhelming success, coupled with the amazingly low casualties, bolstered President George H.W. Bush’s confidence in the Department of Defense. The war in the Persian Gulf validated new doctrine principles for the DoD, such as the Airland Battle Doctrine, and also reinvigorated the Special Operating Forces role in the Department of Defense.
The DoD was downsizing after the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War led many in Congress to openly question if the military should continue to cut its force structure. The war in the Gulf created two different views on future warfare and would impact on military decision-making when planning for operations in Somalia. One, the overwhelming success of the Air Forces’ operations in the War led some experts to argue for heavier reliance on air power in future wars; and two, the overwhelming success of Desert Storm demonstrated that military success could be virtually guaranteed by applying a massed, Joint US military force.

During initial planning for operations in Somalia many American Leaders (including President Bush) favored using a large American ground force to establish security in Somalia. The CENTCOM Commander at the time, General Hoar, favored using American command, lift, and logistical capabilities, but no ground forces. After much debate and discussion, and no doubt influenced by the recent victory over Iraq, President Bush decided to commit a Division (plus) sized element to Somalia. These forces included an American command and control structure, a brigade of US Marines, a brigade of US Soldiers, and an international brigade.

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

ON THE GROUND

The security situation in Somalia was so poor in the last few months of 1992 that the DoD would soon find itself providing security for the NGOs on the ground. Issues arose in Somalia when the relief organizations could not handle the massive amounts of supplies that were arriving in country. As the supplies arrived in country, the NGOs did not have the ability to secure themselves or the supplies. By 1992, the clans realized that raiding each other’s food stores was not producing results so they began raiding and looting from the relief effort supplies. In
some cases over 80% of the relief provisions were lost to banditry and thieves. NGOs realized that the security situation was so poor that they could not effectively conduct humanitarian relief operations.

“Technicals” were interesting players who are entirely unique to the humanitarian effort in Somalia. As the famine in Somalia widened and the people became more desperate, relief workers realized they needed to secure themselves and their supplies. In order to do this, relief organizations hired armed locals to guard and escort the NGOs as they moved the supplies and personnel around the country. These armed guards were hired as technical assistants, which eventually led to the nickname “technicals”. As the security situation in Somalia deteriorated, relief organizations realized the technicals were contributing to the hijacking of food and supplies. In essence, humanitarian relief and aid organizations were contributing to the problem because they hired local workers to protect them from the very people they hired as workers.

By 1991, the situation in Somalia was so desperate that President Bush and the United States Congress felt compelled to act and took steps to begin providing aid to Somalia. By 1992, the security situation had deteriorated even further and grown so dangerous that relief organizations began to flee the country. Because of the horrible security conditions, by the time UN and US relief efforts began in Somalia only a few of the original NGOs remained.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 751 was adopted on April 24, 1992. This resolution established United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I and sent 50 UN observers to monitor the cease-fire that was endorsed by all warring factions and Nongovernmental organizations working in Somalia. Unfortunately, by late 1992 it was clear

\[\text{\textsuperscript{‡‡ UNOSOM ran concurrently under separate leadership than UNITAF from Dec 1992 to March 1993. In all, UNOSOM I suffered six military fatalities during operations from April 1992 – March 1993.}}\]
that UNOSOM I’s mission was failing because the warring factions did not honor the cease-fire and UN forces as well as aid workers in the area continuously found themselves under fire from armed groups. Additionally, over 80% of the HA supplies were stolen or lost before reaching the suffering people in Somalia. Because of this, a NGO group, InterAction, that represented over 160 NGOs, sent a letter to President Bush requesting United States intervention in Somalia to establish a secure environment for the relief effort.\(^{34}\) This letter, coupled with the nightly graphic press being shown on television, helped convince President Bush to commit US military forces to the security effort.\(^{35}\)

UNITAF was the Bush Administrations military response to the crisis and arrived in Somalia almost immediately after President Bush announced the US military commitment. It was overseen by CENTCOM and consisted of forces from the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The total number of forces under UNITAF’s command reached approximately 37,000, with 25,000 of them being American forces. The first troops on the ground began to detangle the massive network of warring factions, relief organizations, technical and supplies flowing around the country.\(^ {36}\)

Absolutely no prior coordination had been completed between UNITAF and the aid organizations to prepare for the deployment of UNITAF to Somalia. Because of this the military had no idea where the NGOs and aid organizations were operating or who needed the most help.\(^ {37}\) US Army Special Forces and Marines conducted some reconnaissance missions prior to the arrival of UNITAF but these missions focused on finding usable runways and fields in Somalia.\(^ {38}\) There appears to have been no IPB completed on which areas of Somalia needed the most humanitarian assistance.

President Bush appointed Robert Oakley as a special Presidential Envoy to Somalia.
Ambassador Oakley negotiated a cease-fire between the factions fighting in Somalia prior to the arrival of the US Military in country. He insisted that this must happen before he would allow US forces to establish relief centers and security in the country. Essentially, Ambassador Oakley’s cease-fire stated that American military forces would remain a neutral party and would only support and secure the humanitarian relief effort. The military would not intervene in the warlords’ power struggles with each other. Ambassador Oakley’s negotiations paid off and the US Marines and Navy SEALs experienced no resistance when they landed on the Somali beaches and pushed inland on December 9, 1992.

The I Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) landed in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, on December 9th, 1992. I Marine Expeditionary Force’s (MEF) HQ made up the majority of the UNITAF HQs and directed the effort. UNITAF’s mission was deliberately crafted to specify that UNITAF’s forces were in a supporting role to the Humanitarian effort. Despite this, there was no coordination between the arriving military and the NGOs that were already in Somalia. Even though the NGOs working were in Somalia for a number of years, the only knowledge the first military units had on the NGOs operating in the area was a list of their organizational names.

The Somali warlords were unsure what to think about the American intervention and agreed to a cease-fire. This created a relatively secure environment for the UNITAF and NGO relief effort. The warlords moved their vehicles and heavy weapons into cantonment areas for storage prior to the end of the first month. All told, at the end of the month some 28,000 U.S. service members from the Army, Navy, and Marines arrived to aid in the security operations in

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§§ See Annex F: Seven Point Agreement that details specifics pertaining to Presidential Envoy Oakley’s negotiated cease-fire.

*** Although the US provided the majority of personnel, UNITAF was not solely an American endeavor. In total, UNITAF was comprised of almost forty-thousand personnel from the following nations: Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, And Zimbabwe. (Source: Ohls, Gary J. Naval War College Newport Papers. Vol. 34, Somalia...From the Sea. (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, July 2009). Appendix G.)
Somalia. The overwhelming firepower of the UNITAF and the willingness of the Somali warlords to temporarily cease hostilities quickly and successfully established a secure environment that allowed relief organizations to resume the distribution of Humanitarian Aid and supplies.\textsuperscript{44}

**COMMUNICATION**

Effective Communication between UNITAF and the NGOs was essential if the two organizations were going to effectively work together. Security quickly improved after the arrival of UNITAF. It improved so much, that aid organizations that fled the country earlier began returning to Somalia. As the number of NGOs increased it became even more important for effective coordination to take place between the agencies. Eventually there were over 47 NGOs and aid organizations operating throughout the country.\textsuperscript{45}

Prior to the arrival of the military the NGOs built an organizational structure to ensure relief efforts did not conflict with one another. They called this the Inter-NGO Coordinating Committee for Somalia (or INCS). The organizations involved crafted the following purpose statement for the INCS:

To establish open, clear and effective communication between Somali authorities and NGOs; to coordinate resources and programs of agencies working in the same areas of relief, to assure maximum effectiveness thereby eliminating conflicts of efforts and duplication of capital assets; to establish a forum through which all NGOs interested in involvement in Somalia can gain and share knowledge of existing and planned programs; and to promote donor confidence in a coordinated NGO effort toward Somalia through effective communication to attract maximum donor funding.\textsuperscript{46}

The NGOs organized themselves this way and created an effective cell that would be used throughout the Somali operation. Additionally, this organization provided a backbone for UNITAF to plug into when it arrived and established its operations.

There was no official established command relationship between UNITAF, USAID, the
State Department or the humanitarian organizations when UNITAF arrived in Somalia. The US Marines, under UNITAF, established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in order to facilitate the cross talk between the military and humanitarian organizations. Additionally, the CMOC served as an additional location for the multiple NGOs to coordinate efforts between one another.

Although no organization was officially in command, it was obvious to anyone who attended coordination meetings at the CMOC that the military was the lead organization in the country. Some have argued that the military held this position of power because they had the money, the weapons, and the security mission in Somalia – in essence, they were the biggest kid on the block and therefore held the most respect.

NGOs established Regional Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs) throughout Somalia prior to UNITAF’s arrival. They did this to organize their efforts to maximize relief coverage throughout the entire country. The CMOC was collocated with the largest HOC in Mogadishu, which streamlined information flow and support between the military and relief organizations. The regional HOCs (which each had a smaller CMOCs co-located with them) served two purposes:

1. The HOCs served as coordination centers between all relief organizations in the region.

2. The HOCs served as locations where Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs) could liaise with the CMOC.

Any request for support from the military would be validated and planned at the regional HOC level, then passed up through the CMOC and tasked to a supporting military unit for the humanitarian effort. On top of performing routine operations to establish security in the area, the NGOs most often requested support from the military was convoy security, on site security

for relief organizations, and weapons confiscation.\textsuperscript{51}

THE BARRIERS

The DoD and NGOs each had to overcome cultural barriers between the two organizations to effectively accomplish their specific mission (the bottom line of which was to end the famine in Somalia). The NGOs operating in Somalia and the military each had pre-conceived notions of the other organization. The missions of the NGOs and UNITAF would have to break through the cultural barriers to build a working relationship.

The relief organizations held more knowledge of the problem in Somalia than the newly arrived Marines and Soldiers because they had worked in Somalia for years prior to the arrival of UNITAF. NGOs had little experience working closely with the US Military prior to Operation Restore Hope and there was hesitation on the part of the relief workers to fully trust the military officers who had just arrived in country. Sources state that relief workers shared an opinion that the military officers in Somalia were stuffy, conservative bureaucrats with a “my way, or the highway” attitude.\textsuperscript{52} Relief workers also perceived military officers as arrogant and condescending towards civilian organizations and officials. Military liaisons at the CMOC realized this perception existed and went out of their way to disprove the stereotype and put the NGOs at ease in their relationship with the military.\textsuperscript{53}

The military arrived with its own views of the relief workers and NGOs in general. Many of the senior officers did not trust the NGOs because of the security decisions that NGOs made prior to the United State’s intervention. Most of the skepticism centered on the issue of the “technicals”. The US Army’s AAR passively blamed the deteriorating security situation on the NGO’s decision to hire local armed security guards.\textsuperscript{54}
Many military leaders assumed the NGOs civilians looked down on the military until the NGOs got themselves into a situation in which they desperately needed armed assistance. In his article for Joint Forces Quarterly on Operation Restore Hope, Jonathan Dworken best sums up the individual Soldier’s or Marine’s view of the relief workers. He writes:

“…they saw relief workers as young, liberal, anti-military, academic, self-righteous, incompetent, expatriate cowboys who came to an area for a short time to “do good” without fully considering the consequences. Officers simply did not see women in their late-twenties with Birkenstock sandals and “Save the Whales” T-Shirts as experts worthy of consultation.”

The rules of engagement widened the gap between the two organizations. Because of the restrictive nature of the rules of engagement, many relief workers saw the Soldiers and Marines as insensitive to the suffering of the Somalis when they would not intervene in Somali on Somali violence. The reason was that the Soldiers and Marines were under orders to provide security exclusively to the NGOs, not to the Somali people.

Although individual negative opinions did cause some distrust and reserved relationships between NGOs and UNITAF it did not have a large impact on combined operations. UNITAF’s mission was to provide security and support to the relief effort in Somalia. For their part, NGOs realized that they could not accomplish their goals without the security assistance from the military. There appears to have been some grumbling between the military service members over the fact that they were operating in a supporting relationship to the NGOs, but according to Seiple, it did not have a major impact on the security or support of the mission.

Capt. Seiple also noted that the military liaisons located at the CMOC went out of their way to ensure that NGOs understood that the military was in the background and wanted to be viewed as a supporting agency. UNITAF was in Somalia to support the humanitarian effort and would do whatever it could to provide support to the NGOs and other relief organizations in country.
SUCCESS

History holds a favorable view of UNITAF’s mission in Somalia and generally regards UNITAF as being a successful humanitarian assistance mission. All cited sources generally agree that cross-coordination completed in the CMOC and HOCs allowed the NGOs and the military to effectively communicate and ensure that operations did not conflict with one another. Disagreements between NGOs and the DoD were expected from the beginning but the two organizations overcame their issues and pushed towards mission success in an extremely short period of time.\(^{60}\)

The first 60 days of UNITAF’s deployment had a tremendous positive impact on relief operations in the country. By the end of February the number of hostile attacks on NGOs and UNITAF forces dropped off significantly and there was tangible evidence that mass starvation and famine had passed.\(^{61}\) Most of the warlords had voluntarily turned over their heavily armed vehicles (pick-up trucks with mounted heavy weapons) into cantonment areas for storage and there were almost no violent incidents between Somali clans and the DoD (or NGOs that the DoD was supporting).\(^{62}\) UNITAF’s operation in support of the NGOs is viewed at by history as a successful combined operation between the military and NGOs. Although history demonstrated that the success enjoyed by UNITAF and the NGOs in Somalia in early 1992 was short lived, the efforts undertaken by the two succeeded in saving the lives of tens of thousands of Somalis.\(^{\dagger\dagger\dagger}\)

\(^{\dagger\dagger\dagger}\) The exact number is debated but some sources estimate that UNITAF’s intervention may have saved the lives of between 25,000 and 100,000 Somalis. There is a large degree of error in this estimation because it is extremely difficult to estimate the impact of the increased security. For example, it is possible that the famine was ending or had ended by the time UNITAF arrived, but it is also possible that the increased security provided by UNITAF prevented another wave in famine. Source: Steven Hansch and others. *Lives Lost, Lives Saved: Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somalia Emergency.* (Refugee Policy Group, November 1994), pg. 32.
LESSONS LEARNED

WORDS MEAN THINGS

There are many lessons learned from operations in Somalia that are still relevant today. Department of Defense leaders live in a culture that places great value on delivering clear and concise orders that are understood at the lowest level. Military doctrinal terms and definitions are pounded into military leaders’ heads from the moment they receive their initial training. In an environment where military leaders find themselves working and coordinating directly with non-military organizations, it is important that the military realize that although other organizations may use the same words, they may mean different things. For example, had the military and the NGOs sat down during operations in Somalia and agreed on a definition of the word “secure” or “security” many problems would have been alleviated. This was an issue during Operation Restore Hope because the relief organizations had been working in Mogadishu and the surrounding areas long before the arrival of UNITAF. Their definition of security was less “rigid” than that of the military forces. Had the two organizations sat down and defined what they expected from security operations it probably would have alleviated a lot of confusion between the two organizations. Not only that, but the mere act of sitting down and discussing a simple issue like this would have aided the mission greatly, if only by encouraging cross talk on a peer-to-peer level.

RESPECT THE NEUTRALITY

Because the security of NGOs rests on the fact that they remain neutral, it is vitally important that it is not perceived that they are providing intelligence to military units. NGO and other relief organizations are intimately involved with the people and culture they are working in. They have valuable information to share about the local people, culture and area of operations.
Military commanders must be cautioned to never use the NGOs for intelligence gathering on enemy forces or the local population. If humanitarian organizations or NGO receive any hint that they are being used to provide intelligence they will shut down communication.66

In order for NGOs to be able to fully conduct their operation it is important for them to remain a neutral party. If they fail to remain neutral, or if the people they are working with perceive that the NGOs are working for a government, the NGO can lose the support of the people and the governments that are allowing them to operate in a given area. Without the support of the population, NGOs are usually not able to complete their missions.67 In most circumstances, if the NGO is willing to work with the military, they are perfectly happy to pass along information about the culture, people, and area of operation and general security issues in that area.

Additionally, it should be noted that referring to NGOs or civilian aid organizations as “force multipliers” can be degrading to the NGO. US Secretary of State Colin Powell famously referred to NGOs as “force multipliers” in a public speech. His comments raised outcries in the NGO Community.68 Most NGOs do not view themselves as force multipliers or subordinate to military operations in any way. When military officers refer to relief organizations as such it takes away the legitimacy of the NGO’s mission and is a clear step away from neutrality for the NGO. Therefore, a statement such as this could be perceived by the NGO as: “because the military is an extension of a states foreign policy, the NGO is an extension of that same policy.”69 The military must realize that this is not - and cannot be the case.

DAILY INTERACTION

The single most important factor in the success of UNITAF’s missions was the establishment of
UNITAF extended a hand to the NGOs when it established a CMOC that was collocated with the HOC in Mogadishu. The CMOC provided a location and a venue for the two organizations to break through cultural barriers and engage one another on a peer-to-peer level. This was especially important in Somalia because as stated before, UNITAF did not have prior contact with the NGOs until after UNITAF landed.

Establishing the CMOC was an important first step in relationship building between the military and the humanitarian assistance organizations. Additionally, whether it was intentional or not, co-locating the CMOC with the NGO’s HOC could also be viewed as a outward symbol of the military’s attempt to garner trust from the humanitarian community. The CMOC aided every organization operating in Somalia, not just the DoD and NGOs. The CMOC presented a meeting location where all organizations could share information on the security environment in Somalia. This provided the opportunity for smaller NGOs and humanitarian organizations to share the same knowledge as large, more established NGOs.

**PRIOR COORDINATION**

Communication must take place between NGOs and the Military prior to “actions on the objective”. In almost any imagined circumstance the NGOs will be in an area of operation prior to the arrival of the military. Military commanders must find a way to sit down with the NGOs prior to their arrival and establish ground rules between the two organizations. If NGOs can be brought into the planning process there are benefits for all organizations. Some NGOs still have aversion towards working with military organizations but there are many who do not. Those that do not are beginning to see the benefit of working with military in a mutually supportive manner.
JP 3-07.6 informs all DoD services that prior coordination with NGOs and IOs is essential for mission success in humanitarian assistance operations. In order for operations to be successful, relationships must be based on trust and mutual understanding of each other’s capabilities and limitations. The Joint Publication offers multiple points of contact the DoD may use to establish initial working relationships with NGOs.\textsuperscript{75}

**TAKE A BACK SEAT**

By taking the back seat in Somalia the military immediately settled some of the anxiety many NGOs had about US military involvement. This was perfectly demonstrated by the military’s approach during meetings in the CMOC or HOCs. By engaging the NGOs and relief organizations in a humble manner and on the same level as peers, the military seemed to break down initial barriers of mistrust.\textsuperscript{76} Because they assumed a supporting role in the relief operations, the military demonstrated by actions and words that they took a position in the back and allowed the NGOs to work in the foreground. Additionally, because the military held combined meetings about security and operations with the NGOs, it demonstrated to the NGOs that the DoD held the aid workers’ opinions in high regard. Mr. Carl Harris, a retired officer with the US State Department, holds vast knowledge of NGO/Military coordination that he gained by spending two decades working these same issues in Vietnam. He later stated that the coordination and communication that he witnessed in Somalia was the “best he had ever seen”\textsuperscript{77}

**CONCLUSION**

The current era of limited budgets and resources will cause NGOs and the DoD to share talents and capabilities and force them to rely on each other to complete their separate but mutually-

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supportive missions. NGOs are finding it difficult to remain secure in an increasingly polarized world and the military is finding that it lacks the knowledge, expertise and versatility to effectively conduct humanitarian missions. Operations conducted over the last 20 years demonstrate that future DoD operations will be intimately tied to Nongovernmental Organizations.

In 1995 the World Bank estimated that there was between 6,000 and 30,000 NGOs operating in developing countries around the world. These numbers have surely grown over the last decade. With so many organizations operating worldwide in troubled locations it is almost certain that any future operations conducted by the US Department of Defense will be alongside, or in conjunction with nongovernmental organizations. Building strong lasting relationships with NGOs is important if the military is going to successfully leverage the capabilities that NGOs provide. InterAction is just one of many groups that are committed to strengthening the relationship between NGOs and government organizations. InterAction has openly advertised its willingness to work with the DoD and educate commanders on NGO operations throughout the world.

The Department of Defense has embraced its newfound relationship with NGOs and is committed to making it stronger. Current commanders and military leaders have more resources available to them than ever before. Chapter II of the Joint Publication 3-07.6 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance) dedicates an entire chapter to coordination and relationships with NGOs and IOs. This publication offers advice on how the military should communicate with NGOs and how to incorporate NGOs into pre-deployment training and mission readiness exercises. It encourages contact during joint planning sessions, meetings, seminars, and stresses the importance of working with NGOs outside of deployments.
Furthermore, JP 3-07.6 details many of the same issues listed in this thesis and offers advice on how to interact with different types of NGOs. This publication will greatly reduce the learning curve of units who may have to work with NGOs in the future.

The world has changed in the past 20 years since Operation Restore Hope took place. There has been significant growth in the partnership between NGOs and the military. Officers in the military are now trained from the onset of their careers to work with NGOs and other non-military organizations. Recent counter-insurgency operations in the war on terror have forced Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines to become accustomed to working with NGOs. Additionally, current senior level officers commanding and working at the operational level are fully accustomed to communicating, trusting, and coordinating with NGOs who are working in their area of operations.

In 1992, US Marines arrived in Somalia with nothing more than a list of the NGOs in the country. Because of Operation Restore Hope and many other operations conducted over the last 20 years, commanders understand that the successful incorporation of NGOs into operations is critical to mission success. By building on lessons learned from UNITAF’s operations in Somalia, understanding the role NGOs have to play in the operating environment, and working alongside one another in training and execution, the historically troubled relationship has strengthened over the last decade and will continue to grow throughout future operations.

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Appendix A

Historical Timeline

1969
Soviet backed Somali, Mohammed Siad Barre, takes power in Somalia

1977
Siad Barre initiates war against Ethiopia

1991
January: Mohammed Siad Barre flees Somalia
5 January: Marines evacuate American Embassy in Somalia

1992
15 August: United States Launches Operation Provide Relief
3 December: UN approves Security Council Resolution 794 (this act endorsed the US led operation and gave it legitimacy)
8 December: United States Launches Operation Restore Hope
9 December: Marines Corps and Navy SPECOPs elements begin operations in Somalia.
11 December: Marines establish first CMOC

1993
26 March: UN passes Resolution 814 (this resolution broadens mandate to intervene in a country’s affairs)
May: UNOSOM II begins operations and conducts relief in place with UNITAF in Somalia.
Appendix B
Map 1: Somalia, 1993*

Appendix C
Map 2: Somalia, December 2011

Appendix D
Map 3: Africa, October 2011

* Source: United Nations, Somalia, Map No. 4045 Rev.6, (Department of Field Support Cartographic Section, October 2011) also available online at: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/africa.pdf
Appendix F

Seven Point Agreement*

The following points were agreed upon among clan leaders and the U.S. Presidential Envoy Robert B. Oakley in Mogadishu on December 11, 1992.

1. Immediate and total cessation of hostilities and restoration of unity of the U.S.C.

2. Immediate and total cessation of all negative propaganda.

3. To break the artificial lines in the capital city of Mogadishu.

4. All the forces and their technicals should report to their respective designated locations outside the city within the next 48 hours, and be controlled by the joint committee.

5. The already established reconciliation committee of the U.S.C. should convene their meetings within the next 24 hours.

6. We call upon all Somalis throughout the country to seriously engage on cessation of all hostilities and join with us for peace and unity of Somalia.

7. We express our deep appreciation to the international community for its efforts to assist Somalia and appeal to it to extend and expand its assistance including not only humanitarian relief aid but also reconstruction and rehabilitation as well as a national reconciliation conference.

*Source: Seven Points agreement as presented by: Ohls, Gary J. Naval War College Newport Papers. Vol. 34, Somalia...From the Sea. (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, July 2009). Appendix E.
Appendix G

Somali Clans and Political Factions*

1. The following are the principal clans and subordinate clans that were actively participating in the Somali Civil War:

   Hawiye clan
   - Abgal subclan—Ali Mahdi Mohamed
   - Habr Gidr subclan—Mohamed Farah Aideed

   Darod clan
   - Marehan subclan—Mohamed Siad Barre
   - Majerteen subclan—Omar Hagi Mohamed Hersi (Morgan)
   - Ogaden subclan—Ahmed Omar Jess

   Isaaq clan

   Dir clan
   - Northwestern Element
   - Southern Element

   Rahanwein clan

2. The Following are the major clan-based political and military organizations that were actively participating in the Somali Civil War:

   Somali Democratic Association (SDA)
   Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
   Somali National Alliance (SNA) (Mohamed Farah Aideed’s branch of the USC)
   Somali National Front (SNF)
   Somali National Movement (SNM)
   Somali Patriotic Front (SPF)
   Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
   Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) (Ali Mahdi Mohamed’s branch of the USC)
   Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
   Somali Salvation Front (SSF)
   Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)
   United Somali Congress (USC)

* Source: Clans and Factions as described by: Ohls, Gary J. Naval War College Newport Papers. Vol. 34, Somalia...From the Sea. (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, July 2009). Appendix F.
Appendix H

ACRONYMS

AAR: After Action Review
CMOC: Civil Military Operations Center
FHA: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
HA: Humanitarian Assistance
HOC: Humanitarian Operation Center
HRO: Humanitarian Relief Organization
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
INCS: Inter-NGO Coordinating Committee for Somalia
MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU: Marine Expeditionary Unit
NGO: Nongovernmental Organization
UN: United Nations
UNITAF: Unified Task Force
UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
Appendix I

Reported Somali Deaths for Bay and Bakool:

Figure 1. Excess deaths reported by families expressed in terms of deaths per 10,000 population per month.

Gathering reliable data on the Somalia famine proved to be extremely difficult. The Refugee Policy Group relied on interviews, survey results, NGO reports, local hospital records and clinical records to gather estimates for this data.