

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PRACTICE AMIDST
ETHICAL HETEROGENEITY

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Conflict, Security, and Development

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PRACTICE AMIDST ETHICAL HETEROGENEITY,
by Major Phillip Breton, 83 pages.

How does ethical heterogeneity complicate multinational operations? The U.S. military is increasingly reliant on cooperation with interagency, interorganizational and international military forces. Multinational operations bring together actors who possess varying ethical foundations, training, and conceptions that inform their rules of engagement and ethical conduct on the battlefield. I explore the effects of these contrasting ethical narratives between international and American officers, drawing upon the survey results and findings of the Military Health Advisory Team IV. I propose a theory to interpret the ethically constituted stories of heterogeneous groups. This theory serves to improve individual understanding of one's deep ethical beliefs with the result that: (1) a soldier is better able to link her own deeply-held beliefs to the officially-held professional and international codes, and (2) more space for a dialogue amongst joint, multinational and interagency partners appears in which to improve ethical practices.

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ACRONYMS

| | |
|-------|--|
| AMSC | Advanced Military Studies Course |
| CAF | Canadian Armed Forces |
| CFC | Canadian Forces College |
| CGSC | Command and General Staff College |
| CGSOC | Command and General Staff Officer Course |
| DEP | Defence Ethics Programme |
| DND | Department of National Defence |
| IDF | Israel Defence Force |
| IRB | Institutional Review Board |
| JCSP | Joint Command and Staff Programme |
| MHAT | Military Health Advisory Team |
| NCM | Non-commissioned Members |
| NSSC | National Security Studies Course |
| OPME | Officer Professional Military Education |
| PMEE | Professional Military Ethics Education |
| RMC | Royal Military College |

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Conduct your war in the presence of noncombatants on the other side with the same care as if your citizens were the noncombatants....By wearing the uniform, you take on yourself a risk that is borne only by those who have been trained to injure others (and to protect themselves). You should not shift this risk onto those who haven't been trained, who lack the capacity to injure; whether they are brothers or others. The moral justification for this requirement lies in the idea that violence is evil, and that we should limit the scope of violence as much as is realistically possible. As a soldier, you are asked to take an extra risk for the sake of limiting the scope of war. Combatants are the Davids and Goliaths of their communities. You are our David.

— Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer,
Israel: Civilians & Combatants

Background

The concept of multinational forces has been in existence for thousands of years. Political entities, including governments, have relied on the use of mercenaries, have employed armed forces from multiracial states, have recruited colonial troops, and have worked to form various military alliances (Elron, Shamir, and Ben-Ari 1999, 73). Over the past two decades, the U.S. has become increasingly reliant on building alliances for a plethora of reasons, the most common of which includes the appearance of burden sharing among the allies, as a means to provide legitimacy in the use of force (Tago 2005, 588). Such forces are exemplified by the Multinational Force and Observers, the Gulf War's coalition warfare, assorted UN missions, and U.S. participation in NATO led operations. Europe itself has been the scene of intense activity aimed at building joint forces, as with Eurocorps, whose formation is intended to support a spectrum of operations, including: disaster relief, humanitarian aid, security assistance, low intensity

conflicts, peace keeping, medium intensity conflicts, peace restoring, and enforcing up to high intensity conflicts (Eurocorps 2011). Other European examples include the multinational division in Rheindalen (Dutch, British, German, and Belgian) and the First German-Dutch Army Corps.

If we consider that American and Canadian soldiers come from “varying socio-economic strata within the political communities they serve” (Wilson 2008, 31), it is easy to see how those differences may be intensely magnified when one introduces the heterogeneity of military ethical conceptions from around the globe. An extensive amount of scholarly work has been conducted on multinational frameworks, both in corporate and military environments. Much of this work has focused on investigations of international relations or international law, normative essays prescribing ideal military structures, sociological and social-psychological inquiries focused on professionalism, and personal reminiscences and journalistic accounts (Elron, Shamir, and Ben-Ari 1999, 74). However, despite the fact that such studies provide hints at the moral and ethical tensions that may exist within such coalitions, there have been no previous attempts to offer an explicit, systematically developed formulation of the ethical problems encountered as a result of these heterogeneous organizations.

Generating binding ethical principles has long been the charge of “philosophers, business ethicists, and human rights specialists concerned with instilling universal goods or values” (Gergen 2009). Gergen (2009) argues that despite the great work conducted by these individuals and groups, they have yet to come to a consensus on “matters of the good” in Western culture, let alone across the great number of distinctive global cultures, many with differing views of what constitutes the good. Many militaries around the

world build their ethical guidelines based on the ethically constituted stories of the environments in which they are established. Military leaders form a “monologic rationality and ethical sensibility. . . [and thus] becomes an alien intruder that functions primarily to fortify (and justify) its own hegemonic ends” (Gergen 2009).

Research Question

How does ethical heterogeneity complicate multinational operations? The U.S. military is increasingly reliant on coalitions of joint, interagency and international military forces, including Canada. Multinational operations bring together groups with various ethnic, cultural, and religious views, resulting in varying ethical conceptions that inform their rules of engagement and ethical conduct on the battlefield. These various ideologies and viewpoints can present challenges when trying to establish common ethical concepts that transcend the differences of the group. I argue that an enhanced understanding of ethics in multinational operations is beneficial to collaboratively arriving at judgments about the appropriateness or inappropriateness of attitudes, actions, and behaviors that touch on the lives of the members of the force and the lives of indigenous others. In this thesis, I explore the effects of the contrasting distinctions between international and American officers drawing upon survey results and the findings of the Military Health Advisory Team IV¹ (Department of the Army 2006).

¹The MHAT IV was established by the Office of the U.S. Army Surgeon General at the request of the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). The mission of MHAT IV was to (a) assess soldier and marine mental health and well-being, (b) examine the delivery of behavioral health care in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and (c) provide recommendations for sustainment and improved command. Battlefield ethics was surveyed as part of the overall study.

Limitations and Delimitations

The report of the Military Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV (Department of the Army 2006) was used to develop the survey employed at Annex A. The original instrument was unavailable, as were the demographics of the respondent groups; therefore, it was not possible to extrapolate and isolate the captains, majors and lieutenant-colonels of the MHAT IV respondent group. Thus, this limited a more comprehensive comparative analysis against comparable groups of respondents of captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels amongst the international students of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC), classes 13-02 and 14-01.

For the purpose of this study, the survey population was limited to international officers attending CGSC in classes 13-02 and 14-01. It is understood that their views may not necessarily be representative of their nation's population as a whole, or that of their armed forces; however, the aggregate data is deemed to be sufficient to compare against the results of the MHAT IV.

Summary and Conclusions

Understanding how ethical heterogeneity complicates multinational operations is the focus of this thesis. Chapter 2 is a review of the available literature, providing brief descriptions of scholarly work relevant to the teaching of moral and ethical decision making to military professionals, and ethical decision making in a military context. In addition, existing models of ethical training are reviewed of key allies to the U.S. Army, including the armies of Canada, Britain, Germany, Israel, and The Netherlands.

Chapter 3 describes the research methodology and design used to gather the data used in the analysis of the ethical heterogeneity of the international officers.

In chapter 4, I analyze the data and draw linkages between the results of that analysis and the results MHAT IV.

Finally, in chapter 5 I provide the interpretation of the findings described in chapter 4, highlighting the meaning and implications for those findings. I conclude with recommendations for further study and action.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

It is paltry philosophy if in the old-fashioned way one lays down rules and principles in total disregard of moral values. As soon as these appear one regards them as exceptions, which gives them a certain scientific status, and thus makes them into rules. Or again one may appeal to genius, which is above all rules; which amounts to admitting that rules are not only made for idiots, but are idiotic in themselves.

— Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to understand if ethical heterogeneity complicates multinational operations. Chapter 1 establishes the foundation for why this research is important and specifically framed the research question. Chapter 2 explores the literature relevant to the moral and ethical decision making process of military professionals. The literature is first examined for the purpose of teaching ethics to professionals and defining the key assumptions therein. Next, the literature relevant to moral and ethical decision making in the military context is reviewed, including multinational coalitions. Finally, the existing models of ethical training in use in the militaries of the Canadian Armed Forces, the British Army, the German Army, the Israel Defence Force, and the Royal Netherlands Army are examined.

Professional Ethics

Over the past decade, many corporations have exhibited ethical breaches of trust, which have resulted in great harm to individual careers, companies, stakeholders, and society (McCraw, Moffeit, and O'Malley 2009; Han, Park, and Jeong 2013). These

breaches of trust raised alarm in the United States Congress, prompting them to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (107th Congress 2002) on July 29, 2002. This act requires organizations to adopt a code of ethics applicable to, at a minimum, principal executive officers, principal financial officers, and principal accounting officers (McCraw, Moffeit, and O'Malley 2009, 3). Regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, companies are mandated to develop a code of ethics that is designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote: “(1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships; (2) Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure in periodic reports; and (3) Compliance with applicable rules and regulations” (Banks and Banks 2013). In this sense, ethics are so important to professions that Gabriel argues, “what distinguishes a profession from mere occupations is its special sense of ethics” (Gabriel 1982, 57).

Andrew Abbott contends that there are two levels of obligation within ethical codes, corporate and individual (Abbott 1983). While corporate ethics may be addressed by an organization's espoused values through a written code, individual ethics are often internalized and difficult to reconcile with those of the organization. Professional ethics are concerned with occupations that have traditionally been attributed to a specific occupational activity, such as medicine or law, “and in which individual professionals have a high degree of autonomy in their practice” (Chadwick 2000, 715). A formal code of ethics, or ethical code, of the profession often forms the basis for professional self-regulation.

Professional ethics thus helps determine extra- and intraprofessional status by measuring, in effect, the purity of motives—the motives of profession toward society and of professional toward profession. It defines the relation of the

profession to society as being important without expectation of undue return. It defines the relation of individual to profession as one of allegiance and collegiality. Taken together these status aspects of professional ethics account for the universal claims of disinterested service, the positive correlations of ethicality with intraprofessional status and of enforcement with visibility, the preponderance of intraprofessional regulation, and the individualistic level of ethical injunctions. (Abbott 1983, 872)

The *Profession of Arms* manual states that, “professionals are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work” (Department of National Defence 2003, 6). Professional ethical practices offer long-term benefits to business enterprises, including corporate profits and proper management of conflict of interest (Nichols, Nichols, and Nichols 2007).

Nichols et al assert that professional ethics plays a crucial role in achieving business success as well as in promoting employee morale. They contend that “if professionals act with fairness, impartiality, candor and fidelity to trust, then they are more likely to select the correct course of action” (Nichols, Nichols, and Nichols 2007, 38). Although many organizations espouse a set of ethical norms, and many more possess a code of ethics that their employees are expected to operate within, the expectation is that new professionals will learn ethics on the job and are equipped to deal with ethical dilemmas (Nichols, Nichols, and Nichols 2007). McCraw et al note that this is often not the case, and that new professionals have been expected to receive ethics training on the job, and that they are not in fact prepared to deal with ethical dilemmas as they arise. As a result, many academic institutions have intervened, mandating students of professional programs to undertake ethics training as a part of their academic curriculum (McCraw, Moffeit, and O’Malley 2009; Nichols, Nichols, and Nichols 2007).

Military Ethics in a Multinational Environment

The future operating environment will require the United States Military to be increasingly reliant on multinational coalitions. Within such a context, the cultural diversity comprising the decision making teams will pose several challenges from the operational approach to the decision making process (Thomson, Adams, and Sartori 2005, 63). The importance of the multicultural environment cannot be understated, and the ethical make-up, moral philosophy, and cultural relativism (Robertson and Crittenden 2003, 286) of the organization must be considered throughout the decision making process. Although coalitions may be comprised of nations with similar values, including Canada and Great Britain, many international militaries will come from backgrounds with potentially significant differences in cultural competency, professional military values and professional conduct in combat.

Some scholars contend that the inclusivity of diverse ideas and backgrounds of personnel making up multinational forces has demonstrated significant benefits in the post-modern era by “increasing the cognitive resources and task-relevant abilities and skills available in an organization” (Elron, Shamir, and Ben-Ari 1999, 75). Such a construct can also work against multinational coalitions, when contributing nations are challenged as a result of differing legal systems, resulting in opposing views on the use of force in combat and variations in what constitutes soldier discipline (Elron, Shamir, and Ben-Ari 1999, 82). The popular opinions of the citizens of contributing armed forces may be sufficient enough to place significant pressure on their governments, thus straining relationships between the leadership of the contributing nations. However, it may also put

the soldiers into conflict with those that they are expected to serve with in the coalition force.

International Models of Military Ethics Training

Faced with the confusion and ambiguity of the contemporary battlefield, democratic countries have demanded uncompromising ethical standards of their armed forces. To this end, many militaries, Western militaries in particular, have taken upon themselves the task of developing comprehensive ethical standards and ethos to educate their soldier in ethical conduct on and off the battlefield. The following sub-sections provide a broad overview of the ethics programs of three Western armies, including: Canada, Great Britain, and Israel.

Canada

Facing new obligations and challenges in the post-Cold War period, the Canadian Defence Ethics Program (DEP) was established in December 1997 in order to assist Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel in making moral and ethical decisions (Thomson, Adams, and Waldherr 2007; Desjardins 2008). The DEP recognizes five ideological foundations for ethical decision-making, which are based on rules, care, consequences, virtue, and self-interest. The DEP creates uniformity throughout the institutions, and its primary objective is to “promote the values shared by the majority of Canadians” (Desjardins 2008, 67). The behaviour of CAF personnel is governed by the three core ethical principles of the DEP: respect the dignity of all persons; serve Canada before self; and obey and support lawful authority. These principles are supported by six obligations related to professional behaviour (in order of

priority): integrity, loyalty, courage, honesty, fairness, and responsibility (Desjardins 2008, 69-70).

Desjardins posits that in a stressful environment such as the modern battlefield, soldiers will fall back on “training, experience, education, good judgment, and values” (2008, 70), rather than relying on a set of rules. It is for this reason that the DEP was developed, providing a set of values that relies on an individual’s ability to rationalize and prioritize between their personal values and the values of the CAF. Soldiers who are incapable of rationalizing their core values with those of the institution are deemed unfit for service.

The DEP mandates that ethics training be incorporated throughout the careers of all military members. All officers must undertake leadership and ethics training, either through their attendance at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC), or through the Officer Professional Military Education Programme (OPME), if they attended a civilian university. Officers attending the Canadian Forces College (CFC), Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP), Advanced Military Studies Course (AMSC), and the National Security Studies Course (NSSC) all undertake ethics modules covering various ethical models and theories, and examine the influence of ethics and morals on decision making and decision making processes (Desjardins 2008, 71-74). Non-commissioned members (NCM) also receive training throughout their careers, from modules delivered during basic training, to the incorporation of ethical dilemmas into field training exercises or formal trades training. As NCMs progress through the ranks, intermediate and advanced leadership courses offer more formal ethics training opportunities and group discussions.

Great Britain

Unlike the ethical military programmes of other nation states, Great Britain's study of military ethical behavior is in its infancy when compared to the militaries of the United States, Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands (Mileham 2008, 44). However, the British Army has not experienced an ethical breakdown, or failure, such as the aforementioned armies have experienced over the past fifty years (Deakin 2008, 25-26). The lack of ethical breakdown is arguably due in large part to: the exemplary performance of British forces on operational deployments, an anti-intellectual military culture, and the fact that ongoing discussions on how to "articulate and codify" the morals and ethics that were believed to be intuitively known amongst the soldiers and leadership (Mileham 2008, 44). British army values are rooted in Christian ethics, but since the 1960s have been subject to the influence of British society and the rise and influence of secularism. Despite that fact, British army values continue to be passed down organically through the Regimental system. Ethics and values are passed down using the army ethos as its basis, and inculcated via training based on the vast combat experiences of its leaders. Informally, corporate memory and wisdom are passed down in the officers and sergeants messes, through what Mileham (2008) describes as subliminal learning. Indeed, a great deal of character development occurs tacitly through these institutions, instilling officers and NCO with the ethos of moral thinking inherent of the British soldier (Deakin 2008).

Lacking in pedagogical refinement, the British Armed Forces began to develop and refine their core ethical principles and moral philosophy in the early 1990s. Turning to the senior leadership and military academic institutions, including the Defence

Academy and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (Sandhurst), the Army worked to cultivate British military values. The result of this pedagogy was a military document titled *Values and Standards of the British Army* (2008), in which ‘values’ define the character and spirit of the army, and ‘standards’ define the actions and behaviours which soldiers are expected to abide by (Ministry of Defence 2008). It was through this process that the British Army adopted ‘ethos’ rather than ‘ethics’ as the basis of its moral thinking (Deakin 2008, 20). The premise behind this decision was to bring the army in line with the post-Christian movement within British Society, as well as to avoid the practice of abstract and applied thought often associated with the study of ethics (Deakin 2008, 20). Focusing on the ethos captured the essence of how the British Army had always trained and operated, including how officers were educated at Sandhurst by learning “right and wrong not by study of academic, philosophical, ethics, but by a process of absorbing practical and applied ethics” (Deakin 2008, 21).

Analogous to the British Army as a whole, Sandhurst does not conduct formal lectures on ethics. Its aim is “to develop students’ ethical and moral strength so that they can cope with the incredibly demanding circumstances of leading soldiers in battle” (Deakin 2008, 15). The ethical inculcation is achieved not through a study of great philosophers or teaching on topics such as: utilitarianism, determinism, moral relativism. Rather, the development of students’ ethical and moral strength is achieved by engaging in learning opportunities during training events and through practical discussions on ethical dilemmas. Stephen Deakin posits, “The ideal of ethos is very appropriate here since this is an education in the characteristic spirit of the British Army community and

particularly in that of its officer corps. Some of this is clear and unambiguous: some of it is intuitive and intangible: some is caught and some is taught” (2008, 22).

Israel Defence Force

The Israel Defence Force (IDF) developed their military ethics program out of necessity, derived from elements such as Israel’s unique history, missions, national vision, and their particular national circumstances. This includes the fact that “every career officer and NCO has participated in intensive military activity during war, an ongoing conflict or an operation, as have numerous conscripts and most reservists” (Hauser 1997; Jewish Virtual Library n.d.; Kasher 2008). The IDF drafted their military ethics on the *Ruach Tzahal*, ‘Spirit of the IDF’, established in December 1994. The *Rauch Tzahal* represents the IDF code of ethics and stands as the foundations for the responsibilities of Israel’s army (Hauser 1997; Jewish Virtual Library n.d.). The IDF view military ethics as a conception of the proper behavior of it’s members. This conception is realized through three subconceptions, including being a professional organization, having a certain identity, and finally the conception of operating within a society of a democratic state (Kasher 2008, 133-134).

Asa Kasher acknowledges that heterogeneity has a role in shaping the identity of the IDF. He provides elements for a heterogeneous military and provides brief explanations on what that means in terms of teaching ethics, however he falls short of identifying how heterogeneity impacts the ethics of the IDF during operations (2008, 134-135). Kasher breaks the heterogeneity of personnel in the IDF into six different categories: (1) formal status; (2) personal status; (3) academic education; (4) mission; (5) attitude towards military ethics; and (6) attitude towards democracy (2008, 134).

Although his focus is on ethics training, these categories do provide for a comprehensive foundation for defining the heterogeneity of a military force. As such, this list provides a baseline from which to start in determining the connection between ethical heterogeneity in pluralist organizations, including the mix of forces on multinational operations.

Ethics training in the IDF takes place in different forms. During basic training, all soldiers are provided with a copy of the *IDF Ethical Code Pamphlet* and provided guidance by their leadership in the chain of command (Jewish Virtual Library n.d.). As the career of a soldier progresses, they begin to receive academic levels of ethical training in a classroom environment. In the post-Zionist era there have been significant efforts to separate religion from ethics training, therefore recognizing the heterogeneity of the Jewish state and distinguishing between the non-Jewish soldiers serving in the IDF (Hauser 1997, 59). Identifying with military professionals and their desire to continually self-improve, the IDF opted to embed much of the formal ethics training into professional development training. This was based on the acknowledgment that in their professional capacity, officers and NCOs choose to better understand themselves. Therefore, to engage them in discussions on military ethics, Kasher proposes:

[It is first necessary] to discuss with them their being members of certain military professions; second, to inform them that they are expected to know much more about their own professions than what meets the eye or is already known to them; third, convince them that each of them is expected to develop their professional identity; and finally, show them that military ethics is directly related to their professional identities. (2008, 138)

Ethics and Liberal Democracy

I will now contrast the views presented by John Rawls in his most recent publication, *Political Liberalism* (2005), with those of Chantal Mouffe through her book, *The Democratic Paradox* (2009).

In *Political Liberalism*, Rawls's overarching premise contends that reasonable persons, citizens, of a just or well-ordered society follow an established list of rules, values and morals, which he terms as "comprehensive doctrines."² Rawls has removed these comprehensive doctrines from the political sphere, and relegated them to the nonpolitical (or private lives) of those citizens, thereby removing potential divisiveness in a pluralist society. Indeed, a well-ordered society according to Rawls is one in which all members affirm the same doctrine (2005, 489). This separation is necessary for Rawls, due to his belief that it is impossible to come to an agreement between comprehensive moral religious and philosophical doctrines, whereas such an agreement can be reached in the political domain (Mouffe 2009, 28). Rawls argues:

The political conception of justice that enables those who differ so profoundly to coexist peacefully must result from the citizens' public reason and that the theory of justice is the focus of an overlapping consensus, consistent with—and somehow (it is less clear exactly how) related to—the citizens' various reasonable comprehensive doctrines. (Okin 1993, 1010)

Although Rawls does not advocate for the suppression of free speech regarding citizens of a just society, he does, however, disallow free speech as part of the political agenda.

While agreeing with some of Rawls' (2005) opinions, Chantal Mouffe argues that his theory of the overlapping consensus is lacking in that Rawls' well-ordered society "is

²“A moral conception is general if it applies to a wide range of subjects, and in the limit to all subjects universally. It is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conducts, and in the limit to our life as a whole. A conception is fully comprehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system; whereas a conception is only comprehensive when it comprise a number of, but by no means all, nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated. Many religious and philosophical doctrines aspire to be both general and comprehensive” (Rawls 2005, 13).

a society in which politics has been eliminated” (Mouffe 2009, 29). In Rawls’ *Political Liberalism* there is little room for rational argument, and antagonism, violence, power, and repression have all but disappeared. Mouffe contends that a lack of discourse results not in an agonistic struggle between political adversaries, but rather in an antagonistic war between enemies (2009). She therefore argues for an agonistic model of democracy where we do not perceive our opponents as enemies to be destroyed, but as opponents with whom we engage in discourse with a view to mobilizing passions in the public and political sphere and not relegating them to the private and non-political sphere (Mouffe 2009, 102-103).

Although both Mouffe and Rawls present opposing views for political and non-political discourse, neither has applied their theories to heterogenous populations in a clear and comprehensive manner. Mouffe’s acknowledgment of “contradictory tendencies set to work by social exchange and the fragility of the democratic order,” however, contains important implications for ethics in the pluralistic military environment.

Conclusion and Chapter Summary

This chapter provided a review of the literature focused on topics relevant to moral and ethical decision making in the military context, including multinational coalitions. Next, I explore models of ethical training in use in the militaries of Canadian Armed Forces, the British Army, and the Israel Defence Force. I conclude with a review of the ethics of democracy as argued by John Rawls and Chantal Mouffe.

Through this review a gap is identified where there is little or no consideration for the impact that ethical heterogeneity has on pluralist organizations and forces as experienced during multinational operations.

Chapter 3 provides the research methodology and design used to gather the data necessary to carry out this inquiry.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

As free persons, citizens recognize one another as having the moral power to have a conception of the good. This means that they do not view themselves as inevitably tied to the pursuit of the particular conception of the good and its final ends which they espouse at any given time.

— John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*

Introduction

The focus of this chapter is on the processes involved in capturing the data and experiences of a sample population within the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The central question for this study is: How does ethical heterogeneity complicate multinational operations?

The formal scope of my project involved gathering and analyzing the data, and presenting recommendations based on the findings. As identified in chapter 2, I have identified a gap in the literature where little attention has been paid to the impact of ethical heterogeneity within pluralist organizations. As a result, I am conducting my own research in order to address this deficiency. Chapter 3 will provide the details of the research strategy adopted to address the research issues identified above, together with the means of collecting data for analysis.

Study Sample

The focus of this study was to gain an understanding of ethical heterogeneity amongst the international officers attending the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) at CGSC, and to contrast the results with the report of the *Military*

Health Advisory Team IV (Department of the Army 2006). Consequently, the research was conducted with sample populations within CGSG, including members of the ethics curriculum staff. The population of interest for this study are the international officers attending CGSOC classes 13-02 and 14-01, representing 87 different countries (Appendix D); therefore, I employed the convenience sampling technique to obtain the appropriate sample group.

Invitations were sent via email to three select members of the ethics curriculum staff to participate in a group interview with myself and a research partner who is conducting a similar study with a sample of American officers attending CGSC. The international officers were invited via mail merge email at Appendix C to complete the Battlefield Ethics survey attached at Appendix A.

Data Collection Techniques

The following sub-sections detail the data collection techniques I employed in this research project. In brief, I use a mixed method approach that combines both quantitative and qualitative research methods. “Such work can help develop rich insights into various phenomena of interest that cannot be fully understood using only a quantitative or a qualitative method” (Venkatesh, Brown, and Bala 2013, 21). For the purpose of this research, the methods employed included interviews and surveys.

Interview

An interview is the exchange of information from the interviewee to the researcher, normally characterized as an informal conversation designed to grasp the point of view of an individual or small groups (Glesne 2011; Palys and Atchison 2008;

Stringer 2007). The type of interview conducted was a semistandardized interview, organized with a series of predetermined questions, yet allowing for unanticipated responses through the use of open-ended questions (Ryan, Coughlan, and Cronin 2009, 210). The strength in conducting the interviews in this manner was the opportunity to allow the participants to expand on their thoughts, while also presenting an opportunity to probe deeper with the participant in search of richer insights (Glesne 2011; Palys and Atchison 2008). Conducting interviews allows the researcher to observe facial reactions that may not be evident while in a group setting that will either corroborate or contradict what they are saying. The interview is recorded for two reasons: to ensure that the analysis of data is based upon an accurate record (e.g. transcript), and to allow the interviewer to concentrate on the interview.

Survey

A survey is “a method of collecting standardized information by interviewing a sample representative of some population” (Hackett 1981, 600). For the purpose of this study, the questionnaire method was employed to gather as much data as possible from the sample group in a short period of time. Hackett posits that there are many data techniques available; however, regardless of the study design, strict attention must be paid to the questionnaire development phase if the data collected are to be useful (1981, 603). Conducting the survey electronically also allowed the members of the sample group to remain anonymous, only identifying themselves if they desired to do so of their own accord. As a method toward drawing conclusions at the end of this paper I will theorize by drawing upon the survey results, and readings including Rawls, Mouffe and Connolly toward develop a comprehensive theory of ethical cultivation.

Theorization

A theory “is a map or model or model of society, a model that distinguishes and name the parts of a social system. In thinking of theorizing, one often distinguishes institutions that are more or less equivalent with those with talk about in everyday life: the family, the state, the educational system, religion, and so on” (Alasuutari 1996, 381). In this study, I later propose a theory to improve individual understanding of one's deep ethical beliefs. Swedberg posits that definitive solutions in theorizing do not exist, only repeated attempts to “approach difficult problems with a combination of thinking and facts” (2010, 8).

Research Strategy

The survey employed for this study is designed using the MHAT IV instrument as the model. This is an important aspect of survey design, given that the intent of the study is to compare and contrast the results of this survey with those of the MHAT IV in order to gain an understanding of how varying ethical conceptions inform rules of engagement and ethical conduct on the battlefield. In this thesis, I explore the effects of these contrasting distinctions between international and American officers, drawing upon survey results and the findings of the Military Health Advisory Team IV.

Framework for Data Analysis

“The purpose of analysis is to identify data (information) that is pertinent to the issues and questions” (Stringer 2007, 100) posed by the researcher of facilitator. Data analysis should link one story to another, eventually allowing the researcher to develop a

hypothesis that in turn will lead to conclusions and recommendations in response to the inquiry being conducted (Glesne 2011, 184).

Ethical Issues

It is essential to have the trust of the participants, to ensure humanistic and scientific ethical obligations, and to protect and treat people with dignity. CGSC requires all research involving human subjects to undergo a full ethical review by the CGSC Institutional Review Board (IRB) (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 2010, 1). *The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research* (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1978) outlines three core principles of ethical research, including the respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. These principles were strictly adhered to throughout the study in order to maintain the trust of the study participants.

“Failing to respect the dignity of the research subject will diminish the moral status of the researcher even if the researcher does not realize it because it is a violation of a basic moral duty” (Burns 2008, 199). All efforts were made to ensure the respect for human dignity through the process of seeking informed consent prior to taking part in any data gathering processes.

Throughout the research process the ethical considerations of the participants are addressed through to conclusion. Information that may seem innocuous and innocent to the researcher, may have significant relevance to one or more participants (Palys and Atchison 2008, 76-77). In order to safeguard the identities of the international officers participating in the survey, the names of the subjects are separated from the results by the

CGSC Quality Assurance Office prior to my receiving them. This process of data management thereby guarantees anonymity to the participants from the outset.

All participants were informed of the nature of the research being conducted through the email invitation (Appendices C and D), and were given the opportunity to access me, as the researcher, to seek clarification if necessary. Participants were afforded the ability to withdraw from the research without fear of reprisal, and were informed of this right via the informed consent form (Appendix D) and the informed consent presented on the opening page of the survey (Appendix A).

This study is deliberately designed such that the benefits outweigh the risks to any participant involved. Antonacopoulou and Gabriel argue, “Existing knowledge, assumptions and interpretations may lead to positive or negative emotions that would result in a different response” (2001, 441). Due to the nature of the questions presented in the survey, some individuals may reflect negatively on past experiences. In close collaboration with CGSC Quality Assurance Office, all efforts were made to develop a study weighted to maximize the benefits of the study over any potential risks.

Conclusion and Summary

This chapter has provided the rationale and operational details of the research strategy and methods used in this study. The data collection tools used for this research project were a semistandardized interview and the survey questionnaire. There were 61 participants total for this study. Two participants responsible for the ethics curriculum at CGSC took part in the semistandardized interview and 59 international officers completed the survey. The next chapter, “Empirical Research Findings,” discusses and analyses the results of the interview and the survey.

CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS

“To be or not to be” is not the question. “How to be and how not to be,” that is the essential question.

— Rabbi Heschel

Introduction

This chapter reveals the results of the survey described in chapter 3, Research Methodology, through a two-step analysis that comprises an analysis of survey research, followed by a theorization of PMEE in light of my findings and the work of William Connolly. The purpose of this study is to determine if ethical heterogeneity complicates multinational operations. I find that with the respondents (U.S. demographic group) in the report of the MHAT IV and Ellis’s (2013) study, the results demonstrate an appreciation of ethical conduct on the battlefield by the majority of respondents; however, the findings also reveal shortcomings in the attitudes regarding the treatment of insurgents and non-combatants, and also shortcomings in the views of some international officers pertaining to the use of torture. In general, I find that my study of international officers attending CGSC exhibits many parallels with Ellis’s (2013) study of mid-career majors attending CGSC. When necessary, I will identify when results disagree significantly.

This chapter is presented in four sections: training, ethical actions, behaviors and attitudes regarding the treatment of insurgents and non-combatants, and a presentation of William Connolly’s theory of ethical cultivation as a means of understanding how PMEE can be improved.

Training

The training questions of the survey were presented to gain an appreciation for what the international officers believed was their own understanding of battlefield ethics training. Respondents were assessed using four questions as presented in table 1, with a scale of five potential responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Overall 93 percent of respondents reported having received training that made it clear how they should behave toward non-combatants, and 90 percent reported they had received proper training in the proper treatment of non-combatants. Even with those high percentages, 35 percent still reported not knowing how to respond to certain ethical situations.

| Table 1. Battlefield ethics training | | | | | |
|---|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| | Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| Members of my unit received training that made it clear how they should behave toward non-combatants. | 38 | 23 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| | 58% | 35% | 5% | 3% | 0% |
| Members of my unit received training in the proper treatment of non-combatants. | 36 | 21 | 4 | 2 | 0 |
| | 57% | 33% | 6% | 3% | 0% |
| Training in proper treatment of non-combatants was adequate. | 29 | 20 | 8 | 6 | 0 |
| | 46% | 32% | 13% | 10% | 0% |
| I encountered ethical situations on operations in which I did not know how to respond. | 1 | 21 | 12 | 19 | 11 |
| | 2% | 33% | 19% | 30% | 17% |

Source: Created by author.

The figures presented in table 1 do not deviate significantly from the MHAT IV results presented in table 2, or from Ellis’s (2013) results. Data from both studies indicates that 86 percent of respondents reporting their training made it clear how they were to treat non-combatants, and 28 percent and 27 percent respectively identifying they had encountered ethical situations in which they did not know how to respond.

| Table 2. MHAT IV battlefield ethics training | |
|---|--|
| | Percent Agree or Strongly Agree |
| Received training that made it clear how I should behave toward non-combatants. | 86% |
| Received training in the proper treatment of non-combatants. | 82% |
| Training in proper treatment of non-combatants was adequate. | 78% |
| Encountered ethical situations in Iraq in which I did not know how to respond. | 28% |

Source: Department of the Army, *MHAT IV* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 37.

Asking similar questions in table 3 as were asked in table 1 with a dichotomous variable emphasizing pre-deployment training yields similar results that are not comparatively different with the other studies.

| Table 3. Pre-deployment ethical training | | |
|--|-----|-----|
| | Yes | No |
| My unit received training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat. | 60 | 4 |
| | 94% | 6% |
| My unit received training in the proper (ethical) treatment of non-combatants. | 57 | 6 |
| | 90% | 10% |

Source: Created by author.

When asked if the ethics training they received in their unit changed the way they made decisions (see figure 1), 52 percent indicated in the affirmative, whereas 17 percent remain undecided. This question was not asked in the MHAT IV (2006) and is insignificant as it relates to Ellis's (2013) study.




Figure 1. Training influence on decision making

Source: Created by author.

The results presented in figure 2 do differ from those of Ellis’s (2006) study. 76 percent of international officers attending CGSC believe their unit could have benefited from more training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct, whereas only 52 percent of U.S. students attending CGSC felt the same.




Figure 2. Additional training desires

Source: Created by author.

To gain further insight from the international officers attending CGSC, respondents were asked to provide a short answer to the question “at what level should training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat be delivered” (Breton 2013). A majority 68 percent reported the above indicted instruction should be delivered at all levels of training and rank throughout one’s

career. One respondent replied that development of one's ethics begins from birth and is continually learned throughout life.

Although there was agreement on the level at which training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct should be conducted, when asked to comment on what kind of training respondents would like to see delivered at CGSC, there was little consensus. Of the 43 international officers who chose to leave a comment, there was only agreement between nine individuals (21 percent), who indicated there should be greater emphasis on critical thinking and the use of case studies on current and relevant events involving both positive and negative outcomes from ethical dilemmas. There was little agreement amongst the remaining respondents. Of note, a small number of respondents indicated they would like to see greater emphasis on religiosity, with one international officer responding that they hoped to see the ten Islamic rules of the first Muslim Caliph, Abu Bakr as-Şiddīq (Aboul-Enein and Zuhur 2004, 22) incorporated into the training (Breton 2013). A small number of international officers stated that they did not believe there was a need for ethics training to be instructed at CGSC, the one stating, "the average student at CGSOC is an Army Major with at least 15 years of professional experience. Ethics training must be delivered early in our profession and then it must be left to self-development" (Breton 2013). Given there is no consensus on what training should be delivered at CGSC, and there is little consensus on at what stage training should be delivered, I had prepared an additional question to help understand the pluralistic nature of the responses.

Given the heterogeneity of the international officers attending CGSC, I presented them with the question, "As an international officer attending CGSC, please share what,

if any, ethics training is conducted by your nation's military" (Breton 2013). 45 international officers responded to the question with a majority 80 percent indicating their nation's military requires soldiers and officers to undertake some form of ethics training at one or more points in their career. Much like the inconsistency amongst the responses provided in the paragraph above, responses ranged from militaries having very formal and structured ethics programs similar to those discussed in chapter 2, including the Canadian Defence Ethics Programme to no formal ethics programs. In one response where the international officer indicated that their military did not have a formal program, the officer stated that "training is tailored to more simply what is right or wrong, not how to think and the theories linked to them. It is training, not academic thought that is conducted" (Breton 2013). This arguably indicates that although there is no formalized training, soldiers and officers still appear to be bound by ethical principles that may be representative to a set of values and standards similar to that of the British Army previously discussed in chapter 2.

Ethical Actions and Behaviors

This section is concerned with the ethical actions and behaviors both acted upon, and witnessed, by CGSC international officers during operational deployments. Respondents were asked, "During your deployments did you ever observe or experience the following" and presented a series of questions found in table 4, representative of those found in the MHAT IV (Department of the Army 2006) with a scale of four potential responses including: never, once, a few times (2-4), or several times (5 or more).

| Table 4. Battlefield ethical actions and decisions | | | | | | |
|---|-----|------|-------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|------|
| | | Once | A Few Times (2-4) | Several Times (5 or more) | Total Responses | Mean |
| Military personnel verbally abusing non-combatants. | 36 | 8 | 12 | 5 | 61 | 0.77 |
| | 59% | 13% | 20% | 8% | | |
| Military personnel damaging private property when it was not necessary. | 47 | 1 | 12 | 1 | 61 | 0.46 |
| | 77% | 2% | 20% | 2% | | |
| Military personnel physically abuse a non-combatant when it was not necessary. | 51 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 61 | 0.28 |
| | 84% | 8% | 5% | 3% | | |
| Witnessed the mistreatment of a non-combatant by a unit member. | 54 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 61 | 0.23 |
| | 89% | 2% | 8% | 2% | | |
| Know of a military member who stopped a fellow military member from mistreating a non-combatant. | 39 | 12 | 7 | 3 | 61 | 0.57 |
| | 64% | 20% | 11% | 5% | | |
| Know of members of your unit who 'modified' the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission. | 44 | 6 | 10 | 1 | 61 | 0.48 |
| | 72% | 10% | 16% | 2% | | |
| Know of members of your unit who 'ignored' the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission. | 46 | 8 | 7 | 0 | 61 | 0.36 |
| | 75% | 13% | 11% | 0% | | |

Source: Created by author.

Similar to the results observed in Ellis’s (2013) study, I find that international officers reporting to have participated in or observed poor behavior is a minority occurrence. Contrary to Ellis’s (2013) findings where “nearly one-fifth [of the respondents] personally knew of someone who intervened in preventing non-combatant mistreatment,” I find that 17 percent more—over one-third—of international officers

report the same occurrence. This may mean that although the officers in the responding sample did not know of or witness ethical breaches of behavior in their soldiers, the result provides anecdotal evidence that ethical breaches are indeed occurring.

Comparing my results with those of the MHAT IV (table 5) bears a large statistical discrepancy. The differences in values may be the result of several factors and although they appear to be alarmingly significant, there are plausible explanations for the discrepancy. The demographics of the sample group for this study are predominantly mid-career to senior majors, whereas the median respondent of the MHAT IV had three years of minimum service, of which 57 percent were junior enlisted members. The MHAT IV was focused solely on Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2006, whereas the focus of this study encompassed all deployments the respondent has participated on up to this point. Finally, in order to meet the ethical requirements to conduct this study, the MHAT IV questions were modified to reduce the potential for culpability in any questions where it might be possible for respondents to implicate themselves in an unethical act.

| Table 5. MHAT IV soldier battlefield ethical behaviors | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| | Percent Reporting One or More Times |
| Insulted/cursed at non-combatants in their presence. | 28% |
| Damaged/destroyed Iraqi property when it was not necessary. | 9% |
| Members of unit modify ROEs in order to accomplish the mission. | 8% |
| Members of unit ignore ROEs in order to accomplish the mission | 5% |

Source: Department of the Army, *MHAT IV* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 36.

Attitudes Regarding the Treatment of Insurgents
and Non-Combatants

Table 6 displays the attitudes of the international officers attending CGSC towards the treatment of non-combatants and insurgents. The attitudes of the international officers were assessed using the questions presented in table 6, whereby respondents were asked to select their level of agreement or disagreement with five potential responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

| Table 6. Attitudes regarding the treatment of insurgents and non-combatants | | | | | |
|--|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| | Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
| Non-combatants should be treated as insurgents. | 1 | 3 | 5 | 26 | 30 |
| | 2% | 5% | 8% | 40% | 46% |
| I can distinguish non-combatants from insurgents. | 6 | 19 | 24 | 11 | 4 |
| | 9% | 30% | 38% | 17% | 6% |
| Torture is permissible if it will save the life of a Soldier/Marine. | 2 | 10 | 12 | 20 | 20 |
| | 3% | 16% | 19% | 31% | 31% |
| Torture is permissible in order to gather intelligence about insurgents. | 0 | 10 | 9 | 23 | 22 |
| | 0% | 16% | 14% | 36% | 34% |
| Non-combatants should be treated with dignity / respect. | 38 | 20 | 5 | 0 | 1 |
| | 59% | 31% | 8% | 0% | 2% |
| I would risk my own safety to help a non-combatant in danger. | 16 | 28 | 15 | 4 | 1 |
| | 25% | 44% | 23% | 6% | 2% |
| The leadership in my unit made it clear that non-combatants must not be mistreated. | 30 | 29 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| | 47% | 45% | 8% | 0% | 0% |
| Mistreatment of a non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported. | 38 | 22 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| | 59% | 34% | 5% | 2% | 0% |
| Injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported. | 50 | 13 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| | 78% | 20% | 0% | 2% | 0% |
| Unnecessarily destroying private property by a member of my unit should be reported. | 46 | 14 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| | 72% | 22% | 5% | 2% | 0% |
| Stealing from a non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported. | 53 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| | 83% | 14% | 2% | 2% | 0% |
| A member of my unit who violates the Rules of Engagement my unit should be reported. | 40 | 21 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| | 63% | 33% | 3% | 2% | 0% |
| A unit member who doesn't follow General Orders should be reported. | 33 | 22 | 7 | 1 | 0 |
| | 52% | 35% | 11% | 2% | 0% |

Source: Created by author.

The differences in the results presented in table 6 are—with some exceptions as will be discussed below—insignificant from Ellis’s (2013) findings; however, a significant variance (≈ 50 percent in many cases) is observed from the data reported in the MHAT IV (2006). The variations are encouraging in that they reflect positively on

the attitudes of the international officers towards the treatment of insurgents and non-combatants. 90 percent of international officers and 97 percent of U.S. mid-career officers (Ellis 2013) indicate non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect whereas only 47 percent of respondents of the MHAT IV indicated the same. The international, U.S mid-career officers and MHAT IV respondents agree that non-combatants should not be treated as insurgents (86 percent, 97 percent and 83 percent respectively), with U.S. mid-career officers reporting a slightly higher occurrence. The higher occurrence amongst U.S. mid-career majors may be related to enhancements in ethics training in the U.S. Army following the recommendations articulated in the final report of the MHAT IV (Department of the Army 2006, 42).

| Table 7. MHAT IV Attitudes | |
|--|--|
| | Percent Reporting Agree/Strongly Agree |
| All non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect | 47% |
| All non-combatants should be treated as insurgents | 17% |
| Torture should be allowed if it will save the life of a soldier | 41% |
| Torture should be allowed in order to gather important info about insurgents | 36% |
| I would risk my own safety to help a non-combatant in danger | 25% |

Source: Department of the Army, *MHAT IV* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 36.

Another encouraging outcome reported in the data relates to the number of international officers identifying they would risk their own safety to help a non-combatant in danger. 69 percent of international officers indicated they strongly agree and agree with this statement (table 6), whereas only 42 percent of U.S. mid-career officers (Ellis 2013) and 25 percent of MHAT IV (Department of the Army 2006) respondents indicated the same. Distilling the numbers down further between the international officer and U.S. mid-career officers I find that 47 percent and 8 percent, respectively, agree with the statement, indicating that the international officers are six times more likely to risk their own safety to help a non-combatant in danger.

Although the outcome of the survey appears encouraging overall, the results reporting that torture should be allowed if it will save the life of a soldier or to gather important information about insurgents still appears problematic. Like the MHAT IV, the survey completed by the international officers did not provide a definition of torture; therefore the meaning is left to the interpretation of the respondent. Omitting the definition of torture from this survey was intended by design in an effort to remain true to the original MHAT IV instrument and maintain the external validity of the results.

In the MHAT IV 41 percent of respondents reported that torture is permissible if it will save the life of a soldier and 36 percent reported that torture is permissible in order to gather intelligence about insurgents (table 7). While the survey of international officers attending CGSC reveals that 19 percent and 16 percent, respectively, agree with the aforementioned statements, those results are concerning still. Furthermore, of the international officers, 19 percent and 14 percent responded “neutral” to the abovementioned questions, leaving true views open to interpretation. 94 percent of the

international officers responded that they had received training on military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat, rendering the “neutral” responses even more perplexing. The U.S. mid-career officers in Ellis’s (2013) study reported that they are twice as likely to remain neutral in their position where torture is concerned.

Comparing the data in table 6 with Ellis’s (2013) survey results reveals that international officers attending CGSC take much stronger positions on torture than those of their U.S counterparts. In both instances, whether using torture to save a life or to gather intelligence, the international officers are almost twice as likely to strongly disagree than are the U.S. mid-career officers. Conversely, the data reveals the international officers are twice as likely than their U.S. counterparts to agree with the use of torture in order to gather intelligence.

Seeking to gain a broader understanding of the attitudes of the international officers toward non-combatants respondents were presented with the following quote by Avishai Margalit and Michael Walzer:

Conduct your war in the presence of noncombatants on the other side with the same care as if your citizens were the noncombatants....By wearing the uniform, you take on yourself a risk that is borne only by those who have been trained to injure others (and to protect themselves). You should not shift this risk onto those who haven't been trained, who lack the capacity to injure; whether they are brothers or others. The moral justification for this requirement lies in the idea that violence is evil, and that we should limit the scope of violence as much as is realistically possible. As a soldier, you are asked to take an extra risk for the sake of limiting the scope of war. Combatants are the Davids and Goliaths of their communities. You are our David. (2009, 22)

Respondents were asked, “What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the following quote,” and they were presented with five responses ranging from strongly

agree to strongly disagree. Of the 66 international officers who replied to the question, 89 percent agree or strongly agree with the statement (see figure 3).




Figure 3. David and Goliath

Source: Created by author.

In an addition to the quantitative measure provided by the multiple choice responses, the international officers were provided with the opportunity to offer their thoughts on the abovementioned quote, allowing for qualitative analysis. The majority of respondents expressed agreement with Margalit and Walzer (2009), with one respondent echoing the statement: “With rights come responsibilities, as defender[s] of our citizens we need to extend that umbrella to all. This gives moral fiber to our actions. Military and use of violence is an instrument of power and is used as a last resort. We are also ambassador[s] for peace, building bridges or relationship[s] in the stability/reconstruction phase. So keeping this in mind from the start will go a long way and will facilitate our

moral standing in later phases” (Breton 2013). This individual’s position echoes some of the other comments and demonstrates *jus in bello* concern for international laws of armed conflict and the need to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Brian Orend asserts, “All non-harming persons, or institutions, are thus ethically and legally immune from direct and intentional attack by soldiers and their weapons systems . . . Civilians not engaged in the military effort of their nation may not be targeted with lethal force” (2006, 107).

Seemingly adopting a realist position, the only true outlier to those who responded wrote, “[t]he quote is on theory. Actually there are little regards for comforts of non-combatant[s]” (Breton 2013). This quote is troubling given that 94 percent and 90 percent of the international officers replied that they have received training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat and in the proper (ethical) treatment of non-combatants. One could surmise that this officer was one of the 6 percent or 10 percent who did not receive such training, or worse, whose values do not align with those of the organization.

Similar to what Ellis (2013) identified in his study, there was little mention in the responses of the laws of armed conflict or rules governing the treatment of non-combatants; however, one international officer did raise the issue of Rules of Engagement (ROE). The respondent stated:

Despite ROEs and other legislative measures that limit the use of force in [the] presence of noncombatants, I believe the priorities for [] military units deployed abroad are: 1) accomplish the mission; 2) get everybody safe back home; 3) protect civilian[s]. This does not mean that that we must be ‘trigger happy’ or disregard civilian consideration while performing operations. On the other hand, if I had to choose between the risk for one of my fellow and a civilian casualty, I would go for the second one. A second thought is that the affirmation ‘violence is

evil' is too universal to be realistic. If violence is applied to achieve a mission, why should it be evil? Last, as a soldier I'm asked to take all the risks I can mitigate (or prudent risk): politicians should make some extra effort for the sake of limiting the scope of war! (Breton 2013)

One respondent indicated that they base their ethics on a "universal ethical system . . . treat the civilians of [the] adversary as you treat your own civilians or maybe even better" (Breton 2013). Another international officer argued, "Life is the most important thing we have got from the God, and as such, we must do our best, whatever is in our power in order to save it" (Breton 2013). The differing points of view in these last few quotes clearly identify the heterogeneity of the sample group and demonstrate that there are differences in how individuals cultivate their ethic.

In summary, the data demonstrates that the international and U.S. mid-career officers attending CGSC share many similarities in their ethical views with only subtle variances between the two groups. One of the greatest variances occurs in the data pertaining to ethics training and those who would report witnessing ethical misconduct. In both instances the aggregate number of international officers who strongly agree with statements in both categories outweigh their U.S. counterparts by an average of two to one. A similar trend is observed in the findings on torture, where the international officers are 50 percent more likely to strongly disagree with torture than are their U.S. Army counterparts who either only disagree or remain neutral in their position. These findings pose interesting implications for PMEE. In the following section I present William Connolly's theory of ethical cultivation in order to theorize how PMEE may be improved to gain deeper insights and understanding of ethical heterogeneity amongst scholars attending military academic institutions such as CGSC, West Point Academy, the Royal Military College of Canada, and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

A Theory for Ethical Cultivation

William Connolly's writings on immanent naturalism and ethical cultivation present an opportunity to theorize and understand ethical differences both in ourselves and those with whom we interact. Such a theory creates space for a deep dialogue in CGSC whereby students—U.S. military, international, and interagency—share their beliefs with each other, enriching growth and learning opportunities.

For Connolly, immanent naturalism seeks to find meaning in the world as it is experienced by mortals, demonstrating a care in the diversity of the world; it does not seek ultimate explanations, ahistorical forces, or transcendental frameworks to give meaning to the world. "Immanent naturalists," Connolly writes,

Such as, variously, Epicurus, Lucretius, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze ground ethic in the first instance in an attachment of the world or a gratitude for being that includes and exceeds the identities infused into them. We do not ask, in the first instance *why* we should be moral. We ask, in the first instance, *how* to enliven and cultivate care for an abundance of life over identity that already infuses us to some degree. (Chambers and Carver 2008, 305)

Connolly argues that everyone has their own metaphysics and their own grounded beliefs of the world that we are unable to articulate, this is true of both religious and non-religious people alike; we all have fundamental beliefs that cannot be proven. Connolly posits that we should understand our creed, that everyone has, and that we do not need to believe one another's creeds; however, we should try to understand what we all believe in. The term creed refers to the statement of shared beliefs, be they religious, political or social (*Oxford Concise Dictionary*); there are many different creeds among the officers attending CGSC, some shared between officers with a common religion, or ethnic group, whether theist or nontheist. Connolly suggests that we all have our own creed that we are

unable to articulate such that everyone will be able to understand. Faith is intrinsic to all persons with or without religious views (Connolly 2012, 39-42).

Although two people may share the same faith/creed, they lead their lives differently, therefore resulting in a different ontology of which is also infused with its own sensibility of the world; what is experienced through life affects ones sensibility.

Connolly argues,

We are not entirely in charge of the sensibilities that inhabit and move us. And a sensibility is not separable from other dimensions as one part is from others in a car. Rather, a sensibility bathes the entire complex, as it finds expression through specific sensual tonalities, vocabularies or articulation, and predispositions to action. (Chambers and Carver 2008, 304)

Connolly posits that we can mine our own creed, cultivate our work, and perhaps change how we cope with it so that we can deal with the minoritization of the world without *ressentiment*.³ He argues for more serious ethical reflection presenting opportunities to understand our deepest beliefs, our own philosophy of life and how we may embrace the world becoming.

Existential faith, therefore, “is a creed or philosophy with a distinctive sensibility infused into it” (Chambers and Carver 2008, 305); conducting your own interior reflection of your deepest beliefs, while engaging others to better understand their own changes our sensibility of the world, influencing change in our existential faith. Engaging in direct intellectual dialogue brings beliefs, sensibilities, and existential beliefs into regular communication as systems, or as Connolly terms them, “force fields.” (2011).

³Connolly defines the Nietzschean term of “ressentiment” as resentment of the most fundamental terms of human existence as you yourself understand them. It is an animosity of the agency surrounding you and pervades into the pores of cultural life, inhabiting diverse creeds and institutions.

Both Connolly and Mouffe maintain that an ethic for care of the world necessitates the requirement to engage in agonistic dialogue about our deepest beliefs, learning how each of these force fields interacts with the other. In order for this to occur there must be deep, respectful introspection between military professionals to include any unified action partners.

In CGSC the importance of the aforementioned interactions cannot be understated. In his study Ellis identified that “[w]e do not have an understanding of the ethical start point for students entering the Command and General Staff Officers College, [nor do we] know how mid-career U.S. military professionals are postured ethically to think about non-combatants given pervasive ethical heterogeneity” (2013). This is certainly true of the international students whose ethics are derived and influenced by different sources. Representing 87 different nationalities, many international officers may share the same creed upon which their belief system is established. Factors such as: political culture, ethnicity, age, first language, gender practice, and sensual affiliation influence their sensibilities, defining their existential faith. In order for individual officers to understand why they make certain ethical decisions it is necessary for them to conduct a deep reflection of their creed, cultivating their understanding of how their ethics are grounded. Are they grounded by a philosophy of immanence set in a sensibility for care of the world, or are they driven by a morality of transcendence with an Augustinian sense of the will divided? Connolly emphasizes that “[o]ne advantage of an ethic of cultivation . . . is that it can bring this care to bear on new and unexpected situations, combining refined sensitivity with critical reflection on a new situation to revise or adjust old norms whose mode of operation is now up for consideration” (Connolly 2011, 79).

Application of a Theory for Ethical Cultivation

Having analyzed the data in the previous sections I now apply Connolly's theory for ethical cultivation in an effort to further interpret the results. To demonstrate this theory I have produce a simple table of results (table 8) based on the data in the subsection, Attitudes Regarding the Treatment of Insurgents and Non-Combatants. More specifically, I focus in on the attitudes regarding the dignified treatment of non-combatants and whether torture should be allowed if it would save the life of a non-combatant.

| Table 8. Torture, Dignity and Respect | | | |
|---|-------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | MHAT IV (2006) | U.S. Army Ellis (2013) | International Breton (2013) |
| All non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect | 47% | 97% | 90% |
| Torture should be allowed if it will save the life of a soldier | 41% | 14% | 19% |

Sources: Department of the Army, *Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006), 35; Christopher Ellis, "Where are We? Finding a Start Point on the Eithcal Map" (Draft, Master's thesis, U.S. Army, Command and General Staff College, 2013); Phillip Breton, Electronic Survey, Fort Leavenworth, KS, November 8, 2013.

As previously mentioned, the data identifies a positive trend from the figures presented in the MHAT IV, but without further reflection it is impossible to determine how the international officers come to ethical decisions. It is equally as difficult to determine how to address the outliers who believe that torture should be used, or who do not believe that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Connolly would argue that individuals need to struggle within themselves, churning between their

creed, sensibilities and existential faith to cultivate an ethic of caring for the world. This is particularly important within military academies delivering PMEE. How can Christians, Jews, humanists, Muslims, Hindus, and nontheists represented in these institutions participate toward a common end, thus narrowing the gap between those who prescribe to the common ethic and those who do not? Connolly and Mouffe advocate for an open discourse with the constant exchange of ideas.

PMEE must therefore incorporate the opportunity for these open discussions, allowing military professionals, U.S. and international alike, as well as those interagency students attending these institutions, to engage accordingly. This could be achieved in the academic environment by creating a structure whereby officers are asked to reflect on their deepest beliefs, trying to gain an understanding of what drives them to make certain ethical decisions. Part of this process could involve journaling to capture the essence of their thoughts. In the classroom environment, and with the aid of a skilled facilitator, the officers could be asked to openly and collaboratively discuss what they learned about themselves. Everyone would be accountable to participate in the discussions with no option for nonfeasance. These are important conversations that must take place. There is of course potential for conflict to emerge as a result of differing standpoints; however, if properly and ethically facilitated, these activities could present a significant opportunity for individual and group growth.

It is through this mechanism that military professionals can harness their cognitive energies and curiosity, facilitating reflection on their deepest beliefs. Engaging in a deep discourse on ethics and interior reflection paves the way for an introspective piece of the PMEE puzzle that is currently lacking in the various military academies.

Implementing this practice as part of PMEE could serve to broaden each officer's deep understanding of his or her own ethics. Hearing the personal ethics of others in a safe environment, free of reprisal, could serve to expand the view and perspectives of each participant. Greater understanding of the ethics of others presents the opportunity to dialogue and learn, creating space for individuals to understand how their own beliefs impact their own behavior, which may in turn facilitate individuals to adjust their personal points of view and ethics.

Conclusion and Summary

This chapter reported on the findings of the interview and the survey as they were compared and contrasted with the results of the MHAT IV (Department of the Army 2006) and by Ellis's (2013) study of U.S mid-career majors attending CGSC. Overall the results appear positive when compared against the MHAT IV results. With few exceptions the views of the international officers who participated in the study are representative of their U.S. Army counterparts.

In the first section the results related to training are analyzed, revealing over 90 percent of international officers attending CGSC received proper training on the proper treatment of non-combatants. 76 percent revealed they believed their unit could have benefited by more training and slightly more than a third of the respondents indicated they had encountered ethical dilemmas during operations to which they did not know how to respond. The analysis further determined that most of the international officers agree there is a requirement to conduct ethics training throughout ones professional military career; however, there is little agreement on how that training should be

delivered. This is arguably due to the various creeds, sensibilities and existential faiths inherent to the ethnically diverse sample group drawn from 87 nationalities.

The second section analyzed the ethical actions and behaviors of the international officers. This section shows that poor behavior is a minority occurrence; however, since over one third of international officers know of someone who intervened in preventing the mistreatment of a non-combatant, ethical breaches are occurring in those forces. With greater training and understanding of ones ethical responsibilities, it is possible to significantly reduce breaches of ethical conduct.

In the section on attitudes regarding the treatment of insurgents and non-combatants, the matter of torture is raised to the fore along with the treatment of non-combatants. Overall the results are encouraging, with a 50 percent improvement over the MHAT IV (Department of the Army 2006), yet demonstrating that there is still a requirement for international officers cultivate their personal ethics. Surprisingly, when presented with the opportunity to comment on the treatment of non-combatants, there was no mention of the laws of armed conflict or rules governing the treatment of non-combatants. Without further investigation, it is difficult to determine if the results are indicative of the fact that during operations the behavior of the international officers is regulated by the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Convention, or based on their own ethically constituted stories based on their creed, sensibilities, and existential faith.

Finally, a theory of ethical cultivation based on the writings of William Connolly is developed to theorize and understand ethical differences both in ourselves and those with whom we come into contact. An understanding and application of Connolly's theory presents an opportunity to improve the PMEE within military academic institutions by

encouraging military professionals to actively engage in personal reflection and analysis in order to cultivate their personal ethic. Connolly's theory advocates not only for introspection, but also for an open discourse with the constant exchange of ideas and demonstrating sensibility and a care for the world. The application of Connolly's theory creates opportunities for deeper learning and understanding not only of one's personal ethics, but also of an understanding of the ethics of those around us and within a pluralist context. In the following chapter, I present my interpretation of the data, conclusions, and recommendations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Laws and principles are not for the times when there is no temptation: they are for such moments as this, when body and soul rise in mutiny against their rigour . . .
If at my convenience I might break them, what would be their worth?

— Charlotte Brontë, *Jane Eyre*

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explore if ethical heterogeneity complicates multinational operations. Focused on three sets of survey results: MHAT IV (Department of the Army 2006), battlefield ethics of U.S. CGSC officers (Ellis 2013), and the battlefield ethics of international officers attending CGSC, this study identifies that ethical heterogeneity complicates not only multinational operations, but operations in general. Although it was anticipated there would be a significant ethical delta between international officers and their U.S Army counterparts, I find that ethical heterogeneity is a fact of pluralism and is pervasive among multinational partners.

Summary of Findings and Conclusions

In preparing to undertake this study I anticipated finding a delta between the ethics of the international and the U.S. Army mid-career officers. In contrast I find more commonalities than differences in their responses.

Although the respondents had all completed the Ethics 100 (E100) curriculum of CGSOC there were still outliers to critical questions of the survey, namely related to the topic of torture. Although torture was not defined at the outset of this study for reasons discussed in chapter 4, these figures are still concerning. It is clear from my research that

PMEE is not influencing the outliers. What is the best way to reach these individuals if formal lectures on classical studies and the theory of ethics are unable to change their opinions on ethical conduct in battle? I proffer that William Connolly's theory of ethical cultivation serves as a mechanism to encourage individuals to gain a deep understanding of their personal ethics, and in defining what drives them to make certain ethical decisions. Likewise, the resulting dialogue with other officers of differing ethical standpoints would likely present a learning opportunity for all participants. As Connolly suggests, the opportunity to "combine refined sensitivity with critical reflection on a new situation" (Connolly 2011, 79), raising the possibility of educating those officers who are the outliers, bringing them up to the level of knowledge, understanding, and agreement of the majority.

Recommendations

The findings of this study pose important benefits and opportunities to improve PMEE not only for international officers, but also for all officers, including interagency students attending CGSC. I recommend the modification of the CGSOC PMEE curriculum to incorporate the theory of ethical cultivation as described in chapter 4. Furthermore, I recommend a select number of instructors at CGSC undertake specific training as facilitators providing them with the knowledge and understanding to help officers understand how to apply Connolly's theory to themselves and to gain value by collaboratively discussing and learning from the various ethical perspectives.

I recommend promulgating the findings of this paper to other professional military academies both in the U.S. and to international partners with a view to enhancing

their PMEE programs through development and implementation of a theory of ethical cultivation.

Opportunity for Future Research

In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the influence of PMEE on the ethical sensibilities of international officers attending CGSOC I recommend deploying a survey at the beginning and the end of the course. This could be conducted as a pilot with two sample groups: one following the current PMEE curriculum and another with a modified curriculum adapted to include a theory of ethical cultivation.

Further studies could be conducted with students attending other professional military academic institutions. Expanding the study in the U.S. as well as with multinational partners, including but not limited to those included in chapter 2: Canada, Great Britain, and Israel could provide useful data in further refining the analysis and understanding of ethical heterogeneity across a broader spectrum.

GLOSSARY

ethics. Relates to the moral principles that should guide us.

ethos. Describes the characteristic spirit of a community; it is concerned with the way in which a community actually lives.

extraprofessional. The status of particular professions in the eyes of the general public.

intraprofessional. The status of an individual professional or professional subgroup in the eyes of other members of the same profession.

APPENDIX A

SURVEY

Breton Battlefield Ethics

Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey on Battlefield Ethics. I am Major Phillip Breton of the Canadian Armed Forces. I am an International Military Student attending the US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course. I am conducting this survey as a portion of my research toward the completion of my Master of Military Arts and Science Degree.

The survey should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

This survey will allow me to compare the views on ethics of the international officers attending the US Army Command and General Staff Officer Course with the results of the findings of the Military Health Advisory Team IV, conducted in Iraq in 2006. The purpose is to identify similarities and differences between the two sets of responses. The comparison will be used to make recommendations and identify opportunities for future research.

Your participation is voluntary and your responses are confidential. Only aggregate data will be reported.

Should you have any questions regarding the content of this survey, please contact me at phillipb72@gmail.com. If you have technical questions about the survey, contact Ralph P. Reed, CGSC QAO, ralph.p.reed.civ@mail.mil.

This survey has been reviewed by CGSC Institutional Research.
The Survey Control Number is 14-10-017.

What is your rank?

| |
|-------------------------|
| Major (O4) |
| Lieutenant-Colonel (O5) |
| Other [] |

What is your highest level of civilian education?

| |
|-------------------|
| Bachelor's Degree |
| Master's Degree |
| Doctorate Degree |

Demographics

Class

| |
|--------|
| AY1302 |
| AY1401 |

How many times did you deploy for more than 30 days to any of the following?

Iraq (OIF)

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|
| Never | Once | Twice | Three Times or More |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|

Kuwait or Qatar (OIF)

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|
| Never | Once | Twice | Three Times or More |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|

Afghanistan (OEF)

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|
| Never | Once | Twice | Three Times or More |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|

Bosnia/Kosovo (Peacekeeping)

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|
| Never | Once | Twice | Three Times or More |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|

Korea

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|
| Never | Once | Twice | Three Times or More |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|

Training (JRTC, NTC, CMTC)

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|
| Never | Once | Twice | Three Times or More |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|

Other

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|
| Never | Once | Twice | Three Times or More |
|-------|------|-------|---------------------|

Please identify the location(s) of your deployment(s).

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

What is your LEVEL of agreement or disagreement with the following quote:

"Conduct your war in the presence of noncombatants on the other side with the same care as if your citizens were the noncombatants....By wearing the uniform, you take on yourself a risk that is borne only by those who have been trained to injure others (and to protect themselves). You should not shift this risk onto those who haven't been trained, who lack the capacity to injure; whether they are brothers or others. The moral justification for this requirement lies in the idea that violence is evil, and that we should limit the scope of violence as much as is realistically possible. As a soldier, you are asked to take an extra risk for the sake of limiting the scope of war. Combatants are the Davids and Goliaths of their communities." ~ Avishai Margalit & Michael Walzer, 2009

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|

What are your thoughts on the above quote?

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

Please select your LEVEL of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Members of my unit received training that made it clear how they should behave toward non-combatants

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|

Members of my unit received training in the proper treatment of non-combatants.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

Training in proper treatment of non-combatants was adequate.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

I encountered ethical situations on operations in which I did not know how to respond.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

Non-combatants should be treated as insurgents.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

I can distinguish non-combatants from insurgents.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

Torture is permissible if it will save the life of a Soldier/Marine.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

Torture is permissible in order to gather intelligence about insurgents.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

Non-combatants should be be treated with dignity / respect.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

I would risk my own safety to help a non-combatant in danger.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

The leadership in my unit made it clear that non-combatants must not be mistreated.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

Mistreatment of a non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

Injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

Unnecessarily destroying private property by a member of my unit should be reported.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

Stealing from a non-combatant by a member of my unit should be reported.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

A member of my unit who violates the Rules of Engagement my unit should be reported.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

A unit member who doesn't follow General Orders should be reported.

| | | | | |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|-------------------|-------|---------|----------|----------------------|

During your deployments did you ever observe or experience the following?

Military personnel verbally abusing non-combatants.

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Never | Once | A Few Times (2-4) | Several Times (5 or more) |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|

Military personnel damaging private property when it was not necessary.

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Never | Once | A Few Times (2-4) | Several Times (5 or more) |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|

Military personnel physically abuse a non-combatant when it was not necessary.

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Never | Once | A Few Times (2-4) | Several Times (5 or more) |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|

Witnessed the mistreatment of a non-combatant by a unit member.

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Never | Once | A Few Times (2-4) | Several Times (5 or more) |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|

Know of a military member who stopped a fellow military member from mistreating a non-combatant.

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Never | Once | A Few Times (2-4) | Several Times (5 or more) |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|

Know of members of your unit who 'modified' the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission.

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Never | Once | A Few Times (2-4) | Several Times (5 or more) |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|

Know of members of your unit who 'ignored' the Rules of Engagement in order to accomplish the mission.

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Never | Once | A Few Times (2-4) | Several Times (5 or more) |
|-------|------|-------------------|---------------------------|

Please indicate if you have participated in the following activities:

My unit received training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat.

| |
|-----|
| Yes |
| No |

My unit received training in the proper (ethical) treatment of non-combatants.

| |
|-----|
| Yes |
| No |

Please indicate the level of your agreement or disagreement with the following statements.

The ethics training that my unit received was useful during my deployment.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|

The ethics training that my unit received changed the way I made decisions.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|

My unit could have benefited from more training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat.

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|

In your opinion, at what level should training on professional military values and the importance of disciplined, professional conduct in combat be delivered?

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

Please provide any additional comments (voluntary).

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

What kind of ethics training would you like to see delivered at CGSC?

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

As an International Officer attending CGSC, please share what, if any, ethics training is conducted by your nation's military.

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

How often did you experience any of the following?

Being attacked or ambushed (including IEDs)

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Seeing destroyed homes and villages

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Handling or uncovering human remains

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Seeing dead or seriously injured Americans/Coalition

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Knowing someone seriously injured or killed

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Having hostile reactions from civilians

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Disarming civilians

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Being in threatening situations where you were unable to respond because of rules of engagement

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Shooting or directing fire at the enemy

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Clearing/Searching homes, buildings, caves, or bunkers

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Witnessing brutality/mistreatment toward non-combatants

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Being wounded/injured

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Seeing ill/injured women or children who you were unable to help

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Receiving incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Being directly responsible for the death of an enemy combatant

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Observing abuse of Laws of War/Geneva Convention

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Had a close call, was shot or hit but protective gear saved you

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Had a buddy shot or hit who was near you

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Informed unit members/friends of a Service Member's death

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Successfully engaged the enemy

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Encountered grateful civilians

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Provided aid to the wounded

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Saved the life of a Service Member or civilian

| | | | |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Never | Once | Two to Four Times | Five Times or More |
|-------|------|-------------------|--------------------|

Thank you for taking the time to complete the survey on Battlefield Ethics. In order to ensure that your results are registered, please select the "FINISH" button at the bottom of the survey page.

As a reminder, the results of the survey will only be used to inform my Master of Military Arts and Science Thesis, and are not authorized to be used for other research purposes.

Should you have any questions regarding the content of this survey, please contact me at phillipb72@gmail.com. If you have technical questions about the survey, contact Ralph P. Reed, CGSC QAO, ralph.p.reed.civ@mail.mil.

If you would like a copy of the study once it has been completed, please feel free contact me at the above email address.

Thank you.

You may now close your browser.

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What is the current feedback from students and instructors on the ethics curriculum?
2. Why did CGSC add a dedicated ethics curriculum to the course?
3. What was the background, who directed it, when and what was the purpose?
4. What guidance did you receive?
5. What obstacles did you face?
6. How was the ethics curriculum changed for the academic year?
7. What is the role of the CGSC Ethics Chair?
8. What books are currently being utilized to teach ethics to professionals?
9. What professional journal articles should I review as part of our Literature Review?
10. What Army articles/entities should I review to understand the main arguments regarding ethical instruction?

APPENDIX C

SURVEY INVITATION EMAIL

Hello, MAJ *****

You are invited to participate in a survey on Battlefield Ethics. This survey supports the research component for my MMAS Research at CGSOC.

Your participation in this survey is voluntary and your responses are confidential.

This survey will take approximately 5 to 10 minutes to complete.

If the link below does not work, please copy the entire URL and paste it into the address bar of your browser. This will allow you to access the survey.

Point of contact for this survey, MAJ Phillip Breton, phillipb72@gmail.com.

If you cannot access this survey, please reply to this email.

NOTE: This URL will take you to a secure server outside the .mil domain.

/*****/ URL Start /*****/

<https://cgsc.allegiancetech.com/cgi-bin/qwebcorporate.dll?idx=JPSKMQ&rk=9K2UTK>

/*****/ URL End /*****/

Thank you

This email was sent to ***** at *****@us.army.mil

APPENDIX D
BATTLEFIELD ETHICS INTERVIEW INFORMED CONSENT

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: MAJ Phil Breton. Associate: MAJ Chris Ellis.

CONTACT AND PHONE FOR ANY PROBLEMS/QUESTIONS: MAJ Phil Breton.
913-775-1864

POINT OF CONTACT FOR QUESTIONS ON THE ETHICS OR LEGITIMACY OF
THE SURVEY:

SPONSOR OF PROJECT: The Command and General Staff College, US Army

PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH: The purpose is to compare aggregate answers of the Military Health Advisory Team IV and V results with answers from current students attending the CGSC to inform on a subset of average ethical beliefs. Additionally, we will look at current ethical instruction at the Command and General Staff College. This is being done for the fulfillment of a Masters in Military Science degree or scholarly research.

WHAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TO DO: You are being asked to participate in this survey because of your position in developing and implementing the ethical instruction at the Command and General Staff College.

LENGTH OF STUDY: The interview is anticipated to take 30-60 minutes. The study will end no later than October, 2013.

RISKS ANTICIPATED: All questions ask about your judgments and views rather than information that could be considered personal in nature.

BENEFITS ANTICIPATED: Your responses may be used to create a better understanding of the ethical views of mid-grade US Army Officers in order to inform the school on strengths and weaknesses of current ethical instruction. There might be a direct benefit to you as an individual for participating if you utilize the results of the rest of the research to modify the ethical instruction at CGSC.

EXTENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY: Your identity may be hidden upon your request. Only the principal investigators will know your identity. You will be referred to utilizing a pseudonym upon request.

COMPENSATION: There is no compensation provided for your participation.

TERMS OF PARTICIPATION: I understand this project is research, and that my participation is completely voluntary. I also understand that if I decide to participate in this study, I may withdraw my consent at any time, and stop participating at any time

without explanation, penalty, or loss of benefits, or academic standing to which I may otherwise be entitled. I verify that my signature below indicates that I have read and understand this consent form, and willingly agree to participate in this study under the terms described, and that my signature acknowledges that I have received a signed and dated copy of this consent form.

Participant Name: _____

Participant Signature: _____

APPENDIX E

LIST OF NATIONALITIES

| | | |
|--------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| Afghanistan | Honduras | Oman |
| Albania | India | Pakistan |
| Armenia | Indonesia | Papua New Guinea |
| Australia | Iraq | Paraguay |
| Austria | Israel | Peru |
| Azerbaijan | Italy | Philippines |
| Bahrain | Jamaica | Poland |
| Bangladesh | Japan | Romania |
| Belgium | Jordan | Saudi Arabia |
| Belize | Kazakhstan | Senegal |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | Kenya | Serbia |
| Botswana | Republic of Korea | Singapore |
| Brazil | Kosovo | Slovak Republic |
| Bulgaria | Kuwait | Slovenia |
| Burkina Faso | Kyrgyzstan | Spain |
| Burundi | Latvia | Sri Lanka |
| Cambodia | Lithuania | Sweden |
| Canada | Macedonia | Switzerland |
| Columbia | Malawi | Taiwan |
| Czech Republic | Malaysia | Thailand |
| Djibouti | Maldives | Togo |
| Egypt | Mexico | Turkey |
| El Salvador | Moldova | Uganda |
| Estonia | Mongolia | Ukraine |
| France | Montenegro | United Arab Emirates |
| Georgia | Morocco | United Kingdom |
| Germany | Netherlands | Vietnam |
| Ghana | Nigeria | Yemen |
| Guyana | Norway | Zambia |

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