

Strategy Research Project

Mitigating the Cultural Challenges of SOF / Conventional Force Interdependence

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Mitigating the Cultural Challenges of SOF / Conventional Force Interdependence

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Abstract

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This paper supports efforts by Strategic Land Force leaders to emphasize greater Conventional Forces / Special Operations Forces (CF/SOF) integration. However, it argues what is missing in that effort is a focus on the cultural challenges inherent in increased interaction, integration and interdependence of these distinct groups of warriors. SOF have a different mission than CF. This has led to a different, but for them equally appropriate, sub-culture. These cultural differences lead SOF and CF to respond to the idea of increased integration differently. With a growing acceptance in the military that counterinsurgency operations will play a larger role in Land Force's future mission sets, military leaders must mitigate the clash of cultures to facilitate closer CF and SOF interaction. To bridge the culture gap this paper recommends Strategic Land Force leaders establish the proposed Office of Strategic Landpower as a means of providing this CF/SOF interdependence initiative the needed emphasis on leadership, building trust, training, doctrine, and implementing structures and processes required to bridge the CF/SOF cultural divide.

Mitigating the Cultural Challenges of SOF / Conventional Force Interdependence

“What I came to learn was that the SEALs were locked in deadly combat, often on a daily basis, and often with some of the most dedicated and vicious of the enemy insurgents. Hard as it was, they were not only holding their own but also making a grim harvest of insurgent fighters. And we were making progress.”¹ This 2008 assessment of the results of Naval Special Operations Forces serving in Iraq, as part of a larger Conventional Forces (CF) led effort, was very different than the conventional wisdom of the day and a marker for a different way of thinking about how Special Operations Forces (SOF) could be employed in areas controlled by CF to achieve common goals.

During a 2010 Warfighting Function Baseline Briefing, Chief of Staff of the Army General George William Casey Jr. asked, what have we learned about General Purpose Forces and Special Operations integration after nine years of war?² A study group was formed to respond to this question with participants from the Combined Arms Center, the United States Army Special Operations Command, and the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. The group returned with the following observations: 1) a thorough understanding of each other’s capabilities and limitations enhances integration and interoperability which could be facilitated by exchanging operational liaisons and establishing control elements when sharing battle space; and 2) options must be considered to integrate SOF and CF for full spectrum operations.³ While accurate, these findings could be applied to the integration of any two military units.⁴ This study did not address that which most divides SOF and CF: culturally based biases, stereotypes and a lack of trust. As an institution, the U.S. military has become much more aware of the importance of culture when dealing with

foreign militaries, governments, and populations. Application of some of these lessons to the initiative to increase CF/SOF interdependence could facilitate wider acceptance across the force.

This paper first argues that while Land Force leaders from the U.S. Army and the Special Operations Forces are trying to increase CF/SOF interdependence, what is missing from these efforts is a focus on the cultural challenges inherent in increased interaction, integration and interdependence of these distinct groups of warriors. This paper discusses the importance of culture and CF/SOF, particularly Army/Army Special Forces, cultural differences to provide context for a discussion of how Land Force leaders can overcome cultural resistance to increased CF/SOF interdependence. In this respect, it reinforces the decision by Land Force leaders to pursue greater integration and interoperability. The paper then addresses the critical role of senior Land Force leaders in institutionalizing this change. These leaders must: 1) communicate the need for change; 2) build trust between these organizations; 3) integrate the need for cultural change into each organization's training efforts; 4) ensure that cultural awareness and bridging techniques are also integrated into the U.S. military's doctrine; and 5) encourage assignment opportunities for CF and SOF officers and senior NCOs that allow them to work more closely with their respective SOF and CF counterparts. Lastly, this paper advocates for the creation of an Office of Strategic Landpower in the Pentagon, as has been proposed, as an executive agent for senior Land Force leaders to ensure the recommendations of this and other integration studies, such as the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, are further developed and implemented.⁵ Because the business community faces similar concerns during

mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures, this paper uses a number of business examples to show how they have addressed cultural challenges.

Culture Matters

Culture has been described as being like an iceberg. The largest, deepest and most impactful portion, basic assumptions, is hidden. The smallest and most visible portion is attributes. Between them, and just below the surface, lie values. The cultural attributes of CF and SOF discussed in this paper are only some of the most visible aspects of these distinct military cultures. Culture runs deep and most of it is observed only after significant time and critical examination. This paper is not an in-depth examination of the CF and SOF cultures, but warns the reader that the greatest challenge to CF/SOF integration is overcoming the culturally-based assumptions that impact their distinct worldviews. These assumptions while not easily observed can lead to resistance in the force to this initiative.

A culture is neither good nor bad. It simply is, and it evolves to fit its entity.⁶ CF have a culture appropriate for traditional force on force missions. SOF have a different mission set that has led to a different and equally appropriate sub-culture. While the two entities share many values and attributes, there remains a CF and SOF culture gap that must be bridged. This need exists at the organizational and individual level.

Culture guides one's behavior as it acts upon learned assumptions that one usually does not even recognize. These assumptions provide the framework for how one thinks about the world and what is important. It also impacts one's sense of identity.⁷

Culture as a set of basic assumptions defines for us what to pay attention to, what things mean, how to react emotionally to what is going on, and what actions to take in various kinds of situations. Once we have

developed an integrated set of such assumptions, which might be called a thought world or mental map, we will be maximally comfortable with others who share the same set of assumptions and very uncomfortable and vulnerable in situations where different assumptions operate either because we will not understand what is going on, or, worse, misperceive and misinterpret the actions of others.⁸

Culture becomes part of the institutional DNA and takes a focused, long-term effort to change. An example of this comes from the story of an aerospace company that instituted important changes in one of its key divisions that led to significantly improved results. However, within two years of the departure of the executive that instituted the changes, the company reverted to the ways of the past, and profits fell as a result. An outside observer noted that some of the “central precepts in the division’s culture were incompatible with all the changes that had been made.”⁹ As long as the manager who instituted the change was in place, he was able to fight through the cultural resistance. But without his influence, the original culture reasserted itself. Land Force leaders face this same challenge with the integration of SOF and CF forces unless an effort is made to make their cultures more compatible and/or to establish cultural bridges.

A number of scholars have addressed the importance of culture. “Successful companies have developed something special that supersedes corporate strategy, market presence, or technological advantages.”¹⁰ The key is a strong, unique culture that will help to reduce uncertainty in the group, make clear to members what is expected, perpetuate key values and norms, create a collective identity and commitment, and create a motivational vision of the future.¹¹

The conventional military culture is by its nature hierarchal and bureaucratic.¹² It is characterized by a desire for stability and control; formal rules and policies;

extensive coordination and efficiency; and hard-driving competitiveness.”¹³ The mission of CF is to employ large numbers of Service Members (SM) in pursuit of a common strategic goal. Traditionally, that goal has been focused on the total defeat of another conventional armed force. CF are composed of various types of SM trained in distinct mission areas, such as logistics or fire support. Their most basic assumption is that each member of the team will do all they can to accomplish their portion of that common strategic goal, and respond in a disciplined manner to orders. CF consist of several combat, combat support and sustainment specialties. But collectively, they promote the mantra, “One Team, One Fight.”

There is within CF a well-documented resistance to “elite” or “special” units that work outside traditional military norms.¹⁴ SOF do not fit the mold of the “American Way of War”¹⁵ with its overwhelming firepower and logistics, as demonstrated in World War II. Many CF officers mistrust SOF because of previous bad experiences or reports of problems caused by clandestine or uncoordinated SOF operations within a CF Area of Responsibility (AOR). Some CF perceive SOF as “Prima Donnas” or “Rambos.”¹⁶ Some CF officers report a perception that SOF are not team players and attribute this to arrogance or hubris in many SOF officers.¹⁷ Some CF report resentment of the additional attention SOF receive in the media, while others resent losing promising young officers and NCOs who leave the CF and join the SOF from which they do not return. Others simply resent the additional resources SOF enjoy. Some CF officers have reported that having SOF within their compounds hurts morale, especially when they dress differently and display less attention to outward displays of conventional military discipline.¹⁸ Others in the CF resent having to supply a SOF element that they

do not believe supports their mission.¹⁹ MG (Ret) Hugh L.Cox III, former Deputy Commander of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), in an interview given in 1991 spoke of “anti-SOF emotionalism [that] permeates all levels of the military” which he attributed to “cultural roots.”²⁰

The SOF culture by its nature is much less hierarchal and bureaucratic.²¹ It is characterized by a desire for independent operations, effectiveness and like CF, hard-driving competitiveness. Its rules and policies are generally less formal and adapted to local conditions. The mission of SOF is to employ small numbers of highly trained, self-reliant SM in pursuit of a specific mission that may or may not be coordinated with CF operations.²² Traditionally, its missions have been focused on limited objectives and are selected from a wide range of SOF operational capabilities.²³ SOF are primarily composed of “operators” who conduct surgical strike and “nation-builders” who conduct unconventional warfare.²⁴ Both types of SOF are organized into small teams with each member of the team trained in an area of expertise but also cross trained to do all aspects of the mission. Their most basic assumption is that every member of the team will do whatever is needed to accomplish the assigned tactical objectives. These SOF tactical objectives often have operational and even strategic impact. But when they involve direct action, they can be perceived by some as counter-productive to CF who will have to deal with any negative consequences after the SOF have left the area. SOF officers, NCOs and junior enlisted are trained to work very closely together. As a consequence, they may demonstrate few outward displays of rank and position. Additionally, rather than rely on overwhelming force, SOF operators focus on stealth and surprise and seek to exit the area before larger enemy forces can react. With an

equally small footprint, SOF nation-builders rely on the host population and host armed forces to help accomplish their missions.

SOF are a very close-knit and insular group.²⁵ They know and are known by their own. But this insular nature leads some Army SOF officers to perceive that “Big Army” does not recognize and promote them in appropriate numbers. This is particularly true of “nation-builders” who even within the SOF community often do not get the attention given to the operators or “door kickers.” Even Army SOF use of the phrase “Big Army” is an indicator of the separation they perceive between themselves and the larger Army structure. This separation is intensified by SOF operational security (OPSEC) requirements for sensitive or clandestine operations that often make them distrustful of those perceived as outsiders.²⁶

Because SOF operate in small units they are more responsive to national emergencies. They can, and do, deploy rapidly with everything they need for short-term missions often with limited guidance and into complex operating environments. Even as Field Grade Officers, SOF are encouraged to stay close to the “troops.” SOF officers are encouraged to avoid broadening assignments at higher headquarters or in resource management, personnel, or other non-SOF specific activities.²⁷ While this may be appropriate for building senior SOF leaders, it does little to facilitate a greater understanding of how the larger military force operates. Others have attributed a siege mentality to SOF because of their concern that the very idea of SOF has at times been questioned by CF.²⁸ These past attempts to limit or eliminate SOF engenders institutional SOF distrust of CF.

The differences between CF and SOF discussed above each place a wedge between these distinct groups.²⁹ Combined, these differences have caused a cultural rift. One of the manifestations of this cultural rift is their different interpretations of how to implement CF/SOF integration or interdependence.

It is in the CF's culture to seek clear lines of command. Its worldview promotes the control of everything within the AOR in order to maximize effects and avoid fratricide. While understanding the need to work with CF, SOF seek autonomy to maximize mission effectiveness. Culture shapes SOF's belief that if they are controlled by CF, then they will be improperly utilized or lose operational agility. These competing cultural values and differences have led to a "we" versus "they" mentality between SOF and CF.³⁰ Their cultures, while appropriate for their distinct missions, make integration of these forces challenging. Evidence of a continuing integration problem was presented in the 2010 study referenced earlier. "Nine years of observations, insights and lessons and the distribution of those OILs [Observations, Insights, Lessons Learned] to the Army through publications and other venues and media have done little to improve the level of GPF-ARSO [General Purpose Forces-Army Special Operations] integration across the force."³¹

However, the U.S. military has proven that it is capable of change. The last decade of war has demonstrated the U.S. military can learn and adapt. The rising generation of leaders may be even more adaptable. Because of their wartime experiences, many CF and SOF junior officers and NCOs have overcome challenges for which no one could have prepared them before they arrived in theater. They had to learn and adapt their training to fit the environment. "New equipment, new tactics,

different training – our soldiers know they have to adapt both to win and to stay alive.”³²

With sufficient effort and time, SM can overcome the culturally based biases and trust deficit between CF and SOF to achieve the greater integration sought by Land Force leaders. The next section of this paper addresses how this can be done. However, such actions will require sustained effort.

Changing Culture

Changing culture is an attack on the most basic assumptions that drive how organizations, and the people in them, view the world. Cultural change may be viewed by some as a threat to the foundation of one’s sense of stability and meaning. Consequently, an attack on deeply held assumptions is likely to provoke high anxiety which then leads to greater resistance to change. For this reason, it can be very difficult to institute cultural change without a significant threat to the organization resulting from a change in the strategic environment. One’s recognition of the need for change must be greater than one’s fear of change.

Crises are especially significant in culture creation and transmission because the heightened emotional involvement during such periods increases the intensity of learning. Crises heighten anxiety, and anxiety reduction is a powerful motivator of new learning. If people share intense emotional experiences and collectively learn how to reduce anxiety, they are more likely to remember what they have learned.³³

Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the sense of crisis that prompted the initiative to institutionalize the unconventional warfare / COIN lessons learned over the past 11 years about the importance of integration and interdependence of CF and SOF. With those conflicts ending, there may be a temptation in many units to go back to business as usual — to revert to working only on those tasks and with those individuals

and units that make them feel most comfortable.³⁴ Both CF and SOF must fight this temptation to turn back to what was comfortable.³⁵

This paper has addressed how culture impacts the way CF and SOF SMs perceive the world around them and, in turn, causes each to respond differently to the idea of increased integration. It has also addressed some of the cultural differences between SOF and CF that are inhibiting Land Force efforts to increase interdependence despite years of promotion through promulgation of procedural and doctrinal changes. Additionally, this paper has argued that because culture is so deeply engrained, simply announcing an initiative and publishing new procedures is insufficient to effect lasting change. This paper now reviews lessons learned from the business community which, if applied to Land Forces over a sustained period of time, might help to bridge the culture gap. This effort starts with sustained senior leader attention on the issue.

Change must be encouraged from the top until it is realized. Organizational leadership and organizational culture are inseparable. Organizational leaders “are in positions of power relative to other members of the group. Therefore, any suggestions or prescriptions they offer in response to, or anticipation of, problems faced by the group are likely to be viewed as more appropriate or legitimate than are the suggestions offered by other group members.”³⁶ Senior Land Force leaders are best positioned to champion the needed cultural changes and bridge-building between SOF and CF. Former SOF Battalion Commander LTC Roy Douglas stated, “Concern for culture requires a broad organizational perspective that few other than the top-level managers in an organization are likely to have.”³⁷ Their experiences and responsibilities cross CF/SOF cultural boundaries. Their positions enable them to view and understand how

the strategic environment is changing, the demands these environmental changes place on the military, and how to best address those challenges.

To facilitate CF/SOF interdependence, both CF and SOF senior leaders must: 1) seek to understand their own (CF or SOF) organizational culture; 2) seek to understand the other group's organizational culture; 3) understand and articulate to the force the strengths and weaknesses of each organization and how increased CF/SOF integration serves all involved; and 4) convince subordinate leaders in both CF and SOF to support this effort.³⁸ It is not enough to change procedures; each must also direct change in their respective group's values through the articulation, implementation, and integration of this new vision.³⁹

The following provides an illustrative example of this need from the business community. "Most companies today are trying to speed up the process of designing, manufacturing, and delivering new products to customers. They are increasingly discovering that the coordination of the marketing, engineering, manufacturing, distribution, and sales groups will require more than goodwill."⁴⁰ The author of this passage goes on to explain that even within a single company, sub-cultures develop in specialized departments. To increase productivity in this instance, leaders had to recognize and then help these groups overcome their resistance to greater integration with outside groups that did not share their sub-culture. This is equally true of the effort to bring together CF and SOF. Effective integration requires an understanding of the cultures involved in addition to cross-organizational processes that allow collaboration across strong cultural boundaries.

Land Force leaders need to reshape how CF view their missions and their relations to SOF. Likewise, SOF will also need to change how it thinks about this relationship. Both CF and SOF must not only understand how each organization is different, but openly value each other for their respective unique strengths and talents. New thinking must be visibly embraced by Land Force leadership to ensure both communities know that this shift in thinking is not only acceptable, but desirable and required. If Land Force senior leadership does not speak with one voice on this subject, subordinates in both organizations and at all levels will feel free to make their own decisions as to the wisdom of promoting greater interdependence and/or integration within their units.

Land Force leadership must communicate the importance of CF/SOF interdependence over and over again in many different ways and circumstances to help each SM better understand why change is needed and what is expected of them individually.⁴¹ The leader is the expert, the visionary, the coach, and the primary transformer for the organization.⁴² Leaders communicate changes in organizational values by “the way they spend their time, what they ask questions about, and what they include on their agenda.”⁴³ What they do, and do not, focus on signals to the force what matters. A clear and consistent message may, over time, influence the culture.

Change always comes with a cost to some part of the organization. Leadership must take the time to build consensus in the belief that the benefits of increased interdependence, which may not be immediately clear to subordinates, outweigh the perceived loss of organizational culture and identity.⁴⁴ Additionally, leaders must also emphasize to the force that CF/SOF interdependence is a long-term requirement. They

must also instill a sense of urgency so that each group uses the upcoming potential period of relative peace to ensure it has dedicated sufficient focus to institutionalizing this change.

Land Force leaders must also have the emotional strength “to absorb much of the anxiety that change brings with it and the ability to remain supportive to the organization through the transition phase even if group members become angry and obstructive.”⁴⁵ Leadership can become the target of anger and criticism as cultural changes challenge the group’s assumptions and require subordinates to take the risk inherent in any behavioral change. There will be individuals, to include senior officers, who may try to derail the CF/SOF interdependence initiative. Senior Land Force leaders must demonstrate the emotional strength to move forward in the face of such challenges.⁴⁶

The business community deals with resistance anytime two companies merge or one is acquired by another. In the case of two companies merging a new blended culture often develops. In the case of an acquisition, the culture of the acquired firm is often supplanted with the culture of the acquiring firm. Because there is no history of shared culture and there is often a sense of cultural loss by at least one party, employees will generally react with fear, anger or defensiveness.⁴⁷ The issue becomes how should the groups relate to each other? Should one culture impose itself upon the other? Should they be allowed to coexist independently or should they be blended together?⁴⁸ Current initiatives allow CF and SOF cultures to remain largely intact and seek only to build a procedural bridge between them. However, small cultural changes that enable this bridge may be negatively perceived and portrayed by those, in both

SOF and CF camps, resistant to change. Land Force leaders must, therefore, more fully address the questions posed and provide short-term goals to bring about needed change.

Achievable short-term goals to shore-up support for positive change are an important change element. Because culture is hard to change, the time required can lead to disillusionment. This loss of faith in turn often leads to efforts to derail what may be perceived as a failed initiative. Land Forces Leaders must be ready for this as every significant change has detractors. Leaders that are most likely to bring about successful transformative change are those that can point to specific achievements along the path towards reaching their vision when naysayers step in to stop them.⁴⁹ Even the greatest supporters of CF/SOF interdependence need to see progress. Furthermore, leaders demonstrate what is important in the Land Force culture by what they measure and reward.⁵⁰ Therefore, Land Force leaders must support the call for greater CF/SOF interdependence by rewarding and promoting those junior leaders who risk breaking their own perceived norms to reach across the CF/SOF cultural divide.⁵¹

This paper has thus far advocated that the primary factor necessary for institutionalizing cultural change across the CF/SOF divide is senior leader involvement. To aid these leaders in this effort, an Office of Strategic Landpower (OSL) should be established in the Pentagon. If created, this office could provide our senior Land Force leaders the needed advocate to execute the long-term effort this paper has outlined. An OSL could more deeply examine and more clearly identify those aspects of SOF and CF cultures that are most divisive and then determine whether those aspects should be changed or mitigated.⁵² Through this deeper understanding, an OSL could not only

provide the leadership, support and legitimacy needed; but it could also develop mitigation strategies to build trust, establish doctrine to inculcate these changes, and implement training to make them part of the new culture.

Trust is fundamental to bridging the CF/SOF culture gap. Trust is needed in two areas. First, both CF and SOF must have trust in their leaders. They must trust that they have the professional expertise needed to correctly assess the future environment, develop a vision, and then execute that vision. If the force believes their leaders do not grasp the nature of future wars or have developed the wrong vision to address that future, or if they think their leaders are incapable of leading the needed changes, then they will not be motivated to support change.

Building trust is both a critical step and an enduring requirement. It must be reinforced in multiple ways. And while building trust takes a long time, efforts can be undermined by a single significant mistake. SM immediately put their trust in senior leaders due to trust in the military institution to promote the best leaders available. However, SM also trust their own experiences and the opinions of their peers. If senior leaders attempt to make changes that their subordinates do not understand, or believe to be poor decisions, there will be significant resistance.

Second, leaders must also promote greater trust between the two groups.⁵³ Building trust between cultures begins with learning to understand each other's culture and to value each as of equal worth. "The most successful warfighters are those who work together in an atmosphere of shared appreciation for the others capabilities and missions along with a shared sense of responsibility for each other's success."⁵⁴

The cultural divide is not insurmountable. SOF and CF have a shared military culture, and both understand the importance of teamwork on the battlefield. Leaders at all levels must ensure SM from both organizations recognize the benefits (e.g. unique capabilities) as well as the challenges that come from increased interdependence / integration. Professional military education and training should play an important part in this effort.

Both individual and group training is needed.⁵⁵ Another example from the business community tells the story of an organization that instituted changes to flatten their organizational structure and empower their employees. These initiatives seemed to have worked in the beginning, but later stumbled. One of the employees observed that the company tried to take 200 people at all levels of the organization and put them into a new environment without proper preparation. Even though most of these individuals wanted the new initiatives to work, they did not have the needed skills to implement them. “Because most of us wanted very much to make the new plant successful, we worked exceptionally hard during start-up. In a way, we used sheer effort to make up for lack of skills. But that is not a long-term solution. We got tired, and then frustrated.”⁵⁶

Land Forces are incorporating new tactics, techniques and procedures into training to facilitate CF/SOF interdependence. However, Land Forces must also address the CF/SOF cultural divide as part of the training program to increase interdependence. The CF and SOF Integration and Interoperability Handbook (hereafter referred to as the I&I Handbook) acknowledges the need for training and, even more importantly, the need to forge stronger relationships between CF and SOF.

Successful CF and SOF integration begins during peacetime. Practicing CF and SOF integration procedures and addressing interoperability challenges during training and exercises provides the best means of reducing the number of missed opportunities, unnecessary delays, and the potential for fratricide during conflict. Additionally, trustworthy personal relationships, forged during peacetime or conflict, prove vital to the success of integrated CF and SOF operations. Poor relationships tend to drive poor integration.⁵⁷

People learn in different ways, and new concepts need constant reinforcement. Land Forces will need to find ways to address the CF/SOF culture gap at all levels of instruction, in multiple forms, and reiterate its importance through courses to help SM internalize the lessons. Through concerted training, Land Forces can change not just clearly visible attributes, but deeply buried attitudes and cultural assumptions. The format of this instruction will also matter.

Culture change comes from a change in attitudes, not from rote learning of new material. Simply showing SM briefing slides that promote the importance of culture and the need to respect different cultures will not change attitudes instilled over years of experience. Even those who understand the new concepts will not change their attitudes unless they are intellectually and emotionally engaged. They must believe the material is not only correct, but relevant to them and important enough to internalize.⁵⁸

Role models and examples can help SM to understand how interdependence works and why it is important. Stories help define an organization's identity and culture. Positive stories can help overcome competing negative stories or even past negative personal experiences.⁵⁹ As Land Force schools develop lesson plans, they need to draw from experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to provide real world examples that students can understand. This approach will likely lead to an increased retention and comprehension of the lessons

learned on the importance of interdependence. Dick Couch's *The Sheriff of Ramadi* provides OIF examples that could be used for this purpose.

The soldiers and SEALs portrayed in Couch's book share their views of the positive impact of Navy SEALs integrating their operations with those of the U.S. Army and USMC in the Iraqi city of Ramadi. These leaders demonstrated how the cultural divide between SOF and CF can be overcome to better address the 21st Century threat. They show how determined leadership, with a desire to work together to achieve common goals, can overcome initial biases. They also demonstrate how distinct organizational cultures can learn to respect and value each other's strengths while compensating for each other's weaknesses.

Captain Mike Bajema, an Army Company Commander working with Naval Special Operators in his battlespace, identified mutual respect as a key to successful integration. "I was never treated as anything less than an equal and always given the respect of being a different type of warrior on the battlefield." He goes on to explain how this surprised him based on previous experience with U.S. Army Special Forces. He also identifies the need to work as a team. "I was concerned that the SEALs would be rogue operators. I thought that they might refuse to work within our parameters or just leave me in the dark - go off on their own and do their own thing." But the SEALs kept him informed of their activities and each was able to support the other's activities.

Colonel Sean McFarland, commander of Area of Operations Topeka, which included Ramadi, also had initial concerns about the SEALs based on previous experience with Army Special Forces who seemed to him, "were intent on pursuing an independent agenda." Speaking of his experience with the SEALs, he reported, "They

were very interested in working as a part of a team, as well as being incredibly good at what they do.”

Captain Bajema’s SEAL counter-part, Lieutenant Lars Beamon, spoke highly of the Army forces he supported. He built a relationship with them and knew that, “if we needed a QRF [Quick Reaction Force] or a CASEVAC [Casualty Evacuation] . . . Mike and his guys would come for us.” He credits much of their success in Ramadi to “SEAL-Army fusion.”

It is clear from the words of these combat leaders that each came to the fight with preconceived ideas. These cultural assumptions were developed over time and had to be overcome. As they overcame these assumptions, they were able to develop a grass roots initiative to increase CF/SOF interdependence in their AOR. Integration and interdependence worked because the leaders wanted it to work and the Soldiers, Marines, and SEALs involved made it work.⁶⁰ They learned and adapted under fire. Land Force leaders need to ensure training incorporates these types of positive stories to bridge the culture gap even without the pressures of war forcing integration.⁶¹

In Edgar Shein’s Model of Transformative Change he speaks of the need for education and training as a source of disconfirmation.⁶² Changing organizational culture often requires unlearning comfortable behaviors and processes. Unlearning is often much more difficult than learning something completely new. It is not enough for leaders to have and articulate a clear vision of their desired cultural changes. CF and SOF must unlearn assumptions of the environment and each other that are no longer appropriate before they are ready to learn new assumptions that are more appropriate for the battlefield Land Force leaders envision for the future. Military schools must not

only teach interdependence, but they must first disconfirm assumptions that have traditionally led to limited SOF and CF interaction.

Land Forces should also look at ways to bring these communities together for training, both to promote understanding of each other's capabilities and to build cross-cultural relationships.⁶³ For example, CF leaders could send some officers, particularly those identified to serve as liaison officers, to courses at the Joint Special Operations University. Combat Training Center rotations focused on integrated operations involving CF and SOF would also help to educate SM and encourage acceptance of greater interdependence. The initiative to create Regional Aligned Forces may facilitate habitual relationships that support building a stronger CF/SOF team.⁶⁴

Related to training is the need to insert information on mitigating the cultural divide into the publications being developed to address how Land Forces will pursue CF/SOF interdependence. SOCOM Pub 3-33 v.3 / FM 6-03.05, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability (Multi-Service Publication Dated: 17 MAR 2010) addressing the challenges of interdependence states on its first page, "Issues surface due to . . . lack of adequate liaison procedures . . . The lack of standardized procedures; compatible systems; and lack of knowledge of CF/SOF capabilities, limitations, and culture create friction that impacts mission accomplishment."⁶⁵ However, the statement that, "culture create[s] friction," is the only reference to the challenge of the CF/SOF cultural divide in the entire document. Furthermore, nothing is provided in the publication on how to address that source of friction.

Interdependence will also require more detailed planning by Land Force staffs now than what was required when SOF and CF were working separately. Additionally, CF and SOF staffs will be required to increase their understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of both organizations. Putting a SOF billet in CF Brigade Combat Team staffs and a CF billet in comparable SOF staffs is one way to promote understanding.⁶⁶ Because of the time required to shift attitudes, cross organizational assignments of CF and SOF leaders will have the most significant long term impact.⁶⁷

An OSL could also seek out ways to reward this new way of thinking and working. If either group is rewarded for working separately— withholding information, developing their own intelligence networks, and executing missions that complicate the missions of the other group—it will reinforce old thinking about how CF and SOF interact. Land Forces must have a system that rewards cooperative behavior and the integrated approach and promotes those who work well in this framework.

This examination of lessons learned from the business community, OIF, and OEF aids in the understanding of how Land Forces can institute the change required to enhance CF/SOF interdependence. Land Forces Leaders must communicate their vision clearly and ensure the force understands why the change is needed in order to build consensus across the force. CF/SOF integration success stories should be inculcated into organizational training programs. CF/SOF trust issues must be addressed over time through cross cultural assignments and joint training. Lastly, organizational resistance to change must also be addressed and mitigated.

Resistance to Change

Some have argued that culture cannot be “managed,” and there is significant evidence that most cultural change efforts fail.⁶⁸ However, there is also a

preponderance of evidence that it can be done if significant effort is expended to ensure that the need for change is fully understood and desired by the people who make up the culture. Therein lies the leadership's challenge. Leaders must do more than just tell people to change. They must articulate a coherent vision, ensure structures are put in place to educate Land Forces, and reward adoption of this new CF/SOF integration and interoperability.

A CF/SOF integration action officer from the Mission Command Community of Excellence (COE) believes that ideas of "ownership" are the source of conflict between CF and SOF.⁶⁹ However, this desire for ownership is a reflection of one of the differences in CF and SOF culture. The concept of owning the battlespace and the CF J3 being able to task/control any forces operating within "his/her" battlespace is a long standing CF cultural value. This belief is based on the assumption that if one does not control everything in the assigned battlespace, then one cannot prevent coordination problems and fratricide.

SOF has traditionally had less of a concern for these issues because their missions are much smaller and usually self-contained. According to the I&I Handbook, SOF seek to maintain "SOF freedom of action to conduct operations"⁷⁰ and recommend a supported/supporting relationship rather than the traditional CF command and control structure. The I&I Handbook acknowledges that, "support relationships work best when there is a high degree of trust and confidence between the affected commanders."⁷¹ So again, this concept underscores leadership's role to breakdown cultural barriers and build trust to operationalize this guidance. The Mission Command COE action officer introduced earlier also recommends that this paper emphasize a focus on instruction at

senior service schools because SOF forces are often rotating in and out of theater quickly and working on a reverse schedule from CF and, therefore, just “rubbing shoulders won’t fix it.”⁷²

Some might also argue that CF/SOF interdependence is not needed. These individuals assert that the Army should continue to separate CF and SOF on the battlefield by assigning them mutually exclusive AORs. However, this approach would fail to allow each to benefit from the strengths of the other. Speaking on the need for the U.S. military to build partner nation capacity, Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta said, “Those security cooperation capabilities and skill sets once considered the exclusive province of the special operations community will need to be built up and retained across the force.”⁷³ Land Force leaders need to be willing to address the cultural challenge that has hindered CF/SOF interdependence for the past decade to facilitate the sharing of the skills to which Mr. Panetta refers.

One might argue that the CF/SOF cultural divide simply does not matter. The U.S. military is conducting integrated operations now and many leaders are working through the inherent challenge.⁷⁴ There is in fact evidence of individual CF/SOF leaders building trust and working together. However, this is not always the case.⁷⁵ There is a cadre of SOF who oppose the idea of working under CF control in many situations. There is also a cadre of CF who oppose the idea of working under SOF in most situations.⁷⁶ This paper seeks to help leaders reduce the cultural divide so that the U.S. military might address challenges in the future together. This paper also seeks to help CF and SOF officers eliminate or mitigate some of the negative assumptions about each other before they must rely on one another in combat.

Conclusion

Despite early integration mistakes over the past decade of combat, Land Forces have learned some very important lessons that must now be reinforced so this hard-earned knowledge is not soon forgotten. One of the most important lessons learned is that CF must develop some of the attributes of their SOF brethren. Increased CF/SOF interdependence is integral to adapting U.S. Land Forces to be more adequately prepared to deal with a complex world where conflict more closely resembles Vietnam than World War II.

However, increased interdependence comes at a cost and will continue to be resisted at multiple organizational levels and in multiple ways if senior leaders do not focus on the need to mitigate cultural resistance to change. Thus, senior Land Force leaders are critical in institutionalizing CF/SOF interdependence. Leaders must: 1) communicate the need for change; 2) build trust between these organizations; 3) use success stories to help SM understand the need for cultural change as part of interdependence training efforts; 4) ensure that cultural awareness and bridging techniques are integrated into the U.S. military's doctrine; and 5) encourage assignment opportunities for CF and SOF officers and senior NCOs to work more closely with their respective SOF and CF counterparts. Additionally, an Office of Strategic Landpower in the Pentagon should be established to serve as an executive agent for senior Land Force leaders to ensure the recommendations of this, and other integration studies, are further developed and implemented. Finally, it bears reiterating that culture change is a challenge, not a roadblock, to the greater CF/SOF interdependence required to meet the demands of an increasingly complex environment.

Endnotes

¹ Dick Couch, *The Sheriff of Ramadi* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), xviii.

² Daniel French, "Integration of General Purpose Forces and Army Special Operations," Information Paper (Carlisle, PA: PK-SOI, November, 11, 2010), 1.

³ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴ This paper uses both the terms "interdependence" and "integration" to describe cooperative efforts between CF and SOF. The term interdependence is important to reinforce understanding that integration of CF and SOF is necessary due to their need for mutual support in the types of conflicts we expect to see in the 21st Century. It also is a better description of CF and SOF relationships below the Joint Task Force (JTF). While the Army is still developing this concept, in a briefing given on 1 November, 2012 to U.S. Army War College faculty and students writing on this topic by senior Army leaders it was stated that integration would happen at the JTF level. Units below the JTF would have a supported / supporting relationship or interdependence vs. integration.

⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2012) also addresses need for greater CF/SOF integration as follows. "Maintain and enhance general purpose force and special operating force integration. The high levels of effective integration of general purpose forces and special operating forces achieved over the past decade, as well as the similar integration of operations and intelligence has provided a synergy enabling the Joint Force to dominate adversaries in today's conflicts. This level of integration must be maintained and enhanced where possible in order to meet future challenges.

⁶ Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn, *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1998), 4-10.

⁷ Jessica Glicken Turnley, *Cross-Cultural Competence: Why SOF are the way SOF are* (MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2011), 17.

⁸ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1992), 22-23.

⁹ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 146.

¹⁰ Cameron and Quinn, *Diagnosing and Changing*, 4.

¹¹ Cameron and Quinn, *Diagnosing and Changing*, 4.

¹² Peter H. Wilson, "Defining Military Culture," *The Journal of Military History* 72 no.1 (2008) 11, 15, and 17, in ProQuest (accessed December 13, 2012). A number of cultural evaluation models attribute these characteristics to the historic development of standing armies. Standing armies were needed to fight for the state, but needed to be kept under control to prevent them from becoming a threat to the state. Hence large bureaucratic structures were built up around

the fighting forces with control given to aristocrats. As armies grew in size the need for additional structure and written regulations also increased. The need to quickly replace soldiers lost in battle led to very narrow and specialized training in particular aspects of warfare. This history, related warfighting mission, and training led to a centuries old culture that recognizes and honors senior leaders, encourages centralized decision making and control, and makes bottom up reform and nonconformist behavior difficult.

¹³ James G. Pierce, "Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of its Senior Level Officer Corps?," *The Letort Papers* (2010), 3, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1015> (accessed October 16, 2010).

¹⁴ LtCol J. Darren Duke, USMC, former MARSOC Battalion Commander, telephone interview by author, January 15, 2013. LtCol Duke commented that in the Marine Corps this same resistance to "special" units exists with his fellow officers asking "why should they get better gear, better intel, ... why are they [MARSOC] so special." LtCol Duke reported that GEN(R) Zinni, former USCENTCOM CDR, announced at a symposium looking at the future of the USMC that was attended by LtCol Duke within the past month that MARSOC is "dead in the water." He further reported that multiple USMC three star generals took the position that MARSOC is a "distraction from their primary mission" and should be eliminated.

¹⁵ This is a reference to the book *American Way of War* written by Russell Weigley in 1960 that described firepower and sheer weight of numbers and logistics as the key to how the United States military has won wars in the past. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 describes a "future security environment likely to be more unpredictable, complex, and potentially dangerous than today" and calls for a more adaptable force to meet the challenge. The focus across all Services on Mission Command vs. Command and Control is also an effort to transform the culture of the U.S. Armed Forces to be more trusting of subordinates to act appropriately in situations that will require creative solutions.

¹⁶ Andrew J. Harris, Ph.D., *Presidents, Generals, and Green Berets: Explaining cyclical support of U.S. Special Operations Forces* (College Park, MD: The University of Maryland College Park, 1993), 27-28.

¹⁷ COL Frederick Mark O'Donnell, USA, former Ranger Regiment Battalion Commander, interview by author, January 17, 2013.

¹⁸ Jeffery Ortoli, MAJ, USA, *Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces in Irregular Warfare*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), 36-39. Following are quotes used by MAJ Ortoli in the above reference. They come from various CF leaders speaking of SOF culture. They select "people who do things in an unconventional manner." "Leadership and discipline is more informal... protocol is more relaxed." One senior CF leader described SOF as "fugitives from responsibility" who "tended to be nonconformists [that] couldn't quite get along in a straight military system;" J. Darren Duke, LtCol, "USMC, Embracing MarSOC: The future of the Marine Corps," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (24 SEP 2010), <http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/embracing-marsoc-future-marine-corps> (accessed January 15, 2013).

¹⁹ LTC Douglas Vincent, class discussion, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, January 8, 2013, cited with permission of LTC Vincent. During class discussions, LTC Douglas

Vincent, who served as a Battalion Executive Officer at a Forward Operating Base in Afghanistan (2005-2006), made the following comment. "They [SOF] sat on my FOB, ate my chow, and basically did nothing for four months waiting for a strategic target." LTC Vincent, interview by author, January 9, 2013. In the follow up interview, LTC Vincent clarified that "the previous ODB [Operational Detachment – Bravo] worked out very well and had conducted several combined missions, but when the ODBs swapped out, the new group appeared to have no desire to work with conventional forces, stating they were there to focus on "strategic targets" and in effect, did nothing for four months except sit on the FOB waiting for a target and eating chow."

²⁰ Harris, *Presidents, Generals, and Green Berets*, 31.

²¹ COL Randel Binford, U.S. Army Special Forces Officer and former SF Group Commander, interview by author, January 11, 2013. COL Binford expressed great concern that this part of SOF culture has been negatively impacted by a growing tendency to put SOF under greater CF control since approximately 2006-2008. It is his observation that increased SOF/CF interaction has cost SOF their autonomy and therefore their agility and ability to implement creative solutions as they have been subjected to a risk adverse CF culture that forces them to seek layers of permissions to do what they have traditionally done on their own authority. This leads to lost time and opportunities. He compared CF and SOF cultures to games of football and basketball. CF are like football players with a set assignment on an offensive team, a defensive team or the special teams with a set number of plays they execute based on the situation. SOF are like basketball players who play offense and defense in a quick paced game that requires the players to move quickly from one action to another and respond rapidly to the actions of individual players on the other team.

²² U.S. Department of the Army, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration and interoperability*, FM 6-03.05/MCWP 3-36.1/NTTP 3-05.19/AFTTP 3-2.73/USSOCOM Pub 3-33 v.3, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, March 17, 2010), 1-1.

²³ Sheila N.Kirby et.al., "Why Don't Minorities Join Special Forces?", *Armed Forces and Society* 26 no. 4 (2000), 523.

²⁴ Harris, *Presidents, Generals, and Green Berets*, 34.

²⁵ LTC Roy Douglas, former SOF BN Commander, interview by author, January 16, 2013.

²⁶ COL Frederick Mark O'Donnell, USA, former Ranger Regiment Battalion Commander, interview by author, January 17, 2013.

²⁷ LTC Roy Douglas, USA, former SOF BN Commander, interview by author, January 16, 2013.

²⁸ Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 10.

²⁹ LtCol J. Darren Duke, USMC, former MARSOC Battalion Commander, e-mail correspondence to author, January 15, 2013. In response to the question, "Is there anything in the CF or SOF doctrine, structure, or culture that inhibits their integration?" LtCol Duke

responded, “Yes, ego. But this will never ever change. CF frequently hates SOF for the S-word [Special]. SOF often derides the CF for their C-ality [Conventionality]. Both stereotypes are sufficiently true to undermine the relationship.”

³⁰ LTC Roy Douglas, USA, former SOF BN Commander, interview by author, January 16, 2013.

³¹ Daniel French , “Integration of General Purpose Forces and Army Special Operations,” 1.

³² Edward L. Cardon, “Recognizing the Army’s Cultural Changes,” *Army* 57 no. 7 (2010), in ProQuest (accessed December 13, 2012).

³³ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 237.

³⁴ Jim Garamone, “Gates Challenges Cadets to Change Army Culture,” *U.S. Department of Defense Information*, (2011), in ProQuest (accessed December 13, 2012).

³⁵ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Environment 2010, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 21, http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf (accessed December 13, 2012). The 2008, JOE states the following. “If we are to maintain a shock absorber in our forces to fight different forms of war across a range of conflicts, the joint community must introduce multi-purpose, multi-role, and flexible systems that can provide adequate performance against a broad array of challenges.” CF/SOF interdependence can be part of the solution called for by the JOE.

³⁶ Harris, *Changing Organizational Culture*, 57.

³⁷ Harris, *Changing Organizational Culture*, 82.

³⁸ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 384; LTC Roy Douglas, former SOF BN Commander, interview by author January 16, 2013. LTC Douglas also emphasized the importance of leadership within the organizations coming together to also seek to understand the other culture and credited his ability to overcome the cultural divide to 1) know your stuff; 2) study their [CF] culture, doctrine, TTP; 3) volunteer to do things for them to build the relationship; and 4) pop in to the [CF] TOC and ask for nothing sometimes. COL O’Donnell in his January 17, 2013 interview expressed a similar opinion. You must “know both organization’s capabilities and their view of you.”

³⁹ William A. Wines and J.B. Hamilton III, “On Changing Organizational Cultures by Injecting New Ideologies: The Power of Stories,” *Journal of Business Ethics* 89, (2008), 434.

⁴⁰ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, xii.

⁴¹ After Whirlpool instituted major changes employees expressed a number of concerns related to leadership’s communication of the changes. One described their efforts as “a lot of noise and words, but little communication. Poor emphasis on how an individual fits into the vision.” Another stated “words and objectives, but poor backup explanation” When asked for solutions the employees’ responses could be summarized into four recommendations: 1) improve phrasing of vision; 2) more leadership visibility; 3) more emphasis on communicating

successes and examples; 4) be more specific. Taken from Stanley G. Harris's book referenced above; pages 323-324.

⁴² John Baldoni, *Great Communication Secrets of Great Leaders* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 9, and 15-19.

⁴³ Thomas J. Peters, *Management Systems: The Language of Organizational Character and Competence*, *Organizational Dynamics*, p. 23

⁴⁴ Reference comments by COL "Rand" Bindford in endnote 23 above.

⁴⁵ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 388.

⁴⁶ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 104-105.

⁴⁷ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 268.

⁴⁸ Edgar H. Schein, *The Corporate Culture Survival Guide* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc. 1999), 119.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁵⁰ Laurie Larson, A New Attitude: "Changing Organizational Culture," *Trustee* 55 no. 4 (2002), in ProQuest, (accessed December 13, 2012), 8.

⁵¹ Steven M. Jones, *Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate: A Strategic Imperative* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 19.

⁵² Jim Hardee, Senior Intelligence Action Officer for CF/SOF Integration and Interoperability at USSOCOM, e-mail correspondence to author, January 14, 2013. Mr. Hardee warned that efforts to change culture "may not be a good idea" because both CF and SOF "cultures may be their strengths."

⁵³ ADML James G. Stravidis, USN, "Strengthening the Bridge: Building Partner Capacity", *Military Review* (Jan-Feb 2010) http://www.army.mil/article/35028/Strengthening_the_Bridge_Building_Partnership_Capacity/ (accessed January 16, 2013). ADML Stravidis quotes Mike Mullen, ADML, USN, as saying "Developing a relationship on the battlefield in the midst of a crisis with someone I've never met before can be very challenging . . . Trust has to be built up over time. You can't surge trust." This is as true for CF and SOF as it is for U.S. and coalition military partners.

⁵⁴ GEN (Ret) Gary Luck and COL (Ret) Mike Findlay, "Special Operations and Convention Force Integration," Focus Paper, (Norfolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 2008), 1.

⁵⁵ LtCol Dave Odom, former Marine Battalion Commander, email communication with the author, February 6, 2013. "Over 10 years of working together in Iraq / Afghanistan has accelerated both integration, interoperability, and shared awareness / mutual respect for both CF / SOF. This education must continue to be incorporated into our joint / service professional education schools; training courses; and pre-deployment work-ups / certifications where feasible. Current service manpower assignments in the joint arena continue to enable

immersive and mutually beneficial education / experience for both CF / SOF personnel. Joint / Service training opportunities must continuously look for way to incorporate all of the stakeholders (CF / SOF / IA / NGOs / KPNs / HNs / etc) into the pre-deployment training cycles – operationalizing the education process through sustained / persistent training venues to continue to enhance the relationships and the synergy of combined action.”

⁵⁶ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 107-108.

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration and interoperability*, 1-1.

⁵⁸ David Tannenbaum, “Army Culture Training: What Works, What Doesn’t, by the Numbers,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 37 no. 1, in ProQuest, (accessed December 13, 2012).

⁵⁹ Dorian LaGuardia, “Organizational Culture,” *T&D Magazine* 62 no. 3, in ProQuest (accessed December 13, 2012).

⁶⁰ LtCol Dave Odom, email communication with the author, February 6, 2013. “I think the KEY to overall success with any of these structures is a SHARED understanding of each other's PURPOSE in the battlespace and LEADERSHIP that is always looking for opportunities to MAXIMIZE bridges / commonalities while MINIMIZING gaps / differences. It is the LEADERSHIP (starting with the CDR and going down through the younger officers / SNCOs / NCOs) who set the tone for solid stakeholder relationships for mutual success within a shared battlespace. The key in all three of these leadership structures laid out in these questions is to conduct the appropriate METT-T and determine what is the optimal structure for overall mission success and the achievement of purpose / objectives for being there.”

⁶¹ Leigh Neville, *Special Operations Forces in Iraq*, (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, Botley, 2008). This book is another excellent source of real world examples of SOF operations. It is a quick read that could be used in our school houses to help teach CF about SOF missions and capabilities.

⁶² Schein, *The Corporate Culture Survival Guide*, 117.

⁶³ COL Frederick Mark O'Donnell, USA, former Ranger Regiment Battalion Commander, interview by author January 17, 2013.

⁶⁴ LTC Roy Douglas, former SOF BN Commander, interview by author, January 16, 2013.

⁶⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration and interoperability*, 1-1.

⁶⁶ LTC Roy Douglas, former SOF BN Commander, interview by author, January 16, 2013. LTC Douglas also recommended that SOF officers get broader assignments to expose them to the greater JIIM [Joint, Interagency, International, Multinational] environment. He recommended that Army SF CW4 and CW5 be used to fill some of the staff positions being held today by SF Field Grades so they would be available for broader assignments. He argued that this would give them the broader experience and perspective needed by senior leaders and better enable them to lead organizations with both SOF and CF.

⁶⁷ COL Frederick Mark O'Donnell, USA, former Ranger Regiment Battalion Commander, interview by author, January 17, 2013. COL O'Donnell commented that he believed one of the differences between NCOs and officers who serve in Ranger units as opposed to NCOs and officers who serve in SOF units is that those who serve in the Rangers know they will return to the CF. This prevents some of the arrogance and "us" vs. "them" attitudes that many CF see in their SOF counterparts. The paper's author, who is not a special operations SM, spent five years working with multi-service SOF in both garrison and in theater. That experience greatly expanded this staff officer's understanding of SOF missions, skills and institutional concerns and attitudes.

⁶⁸ William G. Ouchi and Alan L. Wilkins, "Organizational Culture," *Annual Review of Sociology* (1985) 11, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2083303> (accessed December, 13 2012), 476.

⁶⁹ Aaron Brown, Mission Command Center of Excellence action officer working on DOTMILPF CF/SOF integration issues, telephone interview by author, January 4, 2013. Mr. Brown served several years with ARSOF at Ft. Bragg prior to retirement from the military.

⁷⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability*, 1-1.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 1-1.

⁷² Aaron Brown, Mission Command Center of Excellence action officer working on DOTMILPF CF/SOF integration issues, telephone interview with author January 4, 2013. Mr. Brown served several years with ARSOF at Ft. Bragg prior to retirement from the military.

⁷³ Leon E. Panetta, Dean Acheson Lecture: "Building Partnership in the 21st Century," June 28 2012, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1691> (accessed December 9, 2012).

⁷⁴ Michael L. Findlay, Joint Staff J7 action officer for CF/SOF integration, e-mail correspondence with author January 8 and 12, 2013.

⁷⁵ LTC Vincent Douglas, USA, in his interview also took the position that good officers fight their way through the cultural divide. He told the story of how a coalition CF General Officer called him a "cowboy" and told him to "get the @#\$! out of here" when he introduced himself as a SOF officer. He explained that he had to work very hard to eventually overcome the assumptions of this GO as a result of his experience with the previous US Army SOF officer.

⁷⁶ Evidence of this was found by the author in a number of discussions held between January 4, 2013 and January 17, 2013 with both SOF and CF officers at the USAWC, USCENTCOM, USSOCOM, and MarSOC.

