TRAINING FOR DEPLOYMENT: SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING SYSTEM

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
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by

MIJATOV KLEMEN, CAPTAIN, SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 2002

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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# Training for Deployment: Slovenian Armed Forces and the Predeployment Training System

## Abstract

This thesis deals with the predeployment training system. In particular, the thesis examined how Slovenian Armed Forces structure and execute their predeployment training. The author chose this topic because it is a relevant issue in the contemporary environment, where the size and the level of training of the force is severely impacted by the available resources. The primary research question is “Is the current predeployment training system in use by Slovenian Armed Forces adequate to meet the needs of contemporary operating environment?”

The thesis looks at the current training system in use by Slovenian Armed Forces and compares it to the U.S. Army training system. The thesis outlines the similarities between the two systems, and outlines the differences with an attempt to explain the specifics of Slovenian Armed Forces and their predeployment training system. The conclusion outlines the shortfalls of the current predeployment system, while identifying potential reasons for the situation.

The thesis offers two suggestions how to improve the current predeployment training system, with intent to increase effectiveness of training and maximize the use of scarce resources available to Slovenian Armed Forces.

## Subject Terms

Predeployment training, mission essential task list, training management, training cycles, after action review, training evaluation
Name of Candidate: Captain Klemen Mijatov

Thesis Title: Training for Deployment: Slovenian Armed Forces and the Predeployment Training System

Approved by:

David P. Goebel, M.S.

Timothy R. Hentschel, Ph.D.

Jonathan M. Williams, M.S.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2013 by:

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

TRAINING FOR DEPLOYMENT: SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING SYSTEM, by Captain Klemen Mijatov, 87 pages.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) draw their lineage from the Territorial Defense Forces, structured similarly to the U.S. National Guard units. Formed as a response to Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the intention behind Territorial Forces was to augment the Yugoslav National Army (YNA) in case of any similar invasion from a foreign military force. Amongst the many benefits of such force, was the connection to the local communities. Units were composed of men and women who had regular jobs and functions in the local community. Republics of former Yugoslavia were responsible for manning, equipping and training of their Territorial Defense Forces. Slovenia played a major role in the overall defense strategy, and consequentially they placed a great role in equipping the force but even more importantly on training it. This became evident in the early 1990s, when the internal tensions in Yugoslavia became intolerable and two of the republics, Slovenia and Croatia, decided to secede. The YNA was considered a formidable military force and many doubted that Territorial forces would be able to pose a serious threat to this opposing force. However, the well-equipped and highly motivated force, properly trained, was critical in repelling all the advances of the YNA, and eventually winning the War for Independence, popularly known as the “Ten Day War.”

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With the newly gained independence, came the effort to integrate into European organizations, such as European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). One of the first military programs was the NATO sponsored Partnership for Peace, which served as a sort of a waiting room before full membership in NATO. It was within this framework, that Slovenia first deployed their military forces on May 14, 1997, on Operation Alba in Albania.\(^2\) This deployment while small in size was critical in the development of the SAF, since it proved to the skeptics that the soldiers were ready to take on further responsibilities in the struggle to establish security and stability in the region.

In the following years SAF continued to steadily increase both the rate and the intensity of deployments. Beginning with squad and platoon sized elements in Cyprus, and company size elements in Bosnia, they eventually progressed to a point where a battalion sized task force became responsible for their own area of operations in the western part of Kosovo in 2007.\(^3\) The intensity of deployments also progressed from relatively simple observer missions in Cyprus to full spectrum operations in complex operational environments of Afghanistan and Iraq.\(^4\) Regardless of the size of deployed unit, they all have one thing in common. With rare exemption the SAF forms its


\(^3\)Major General Alojz Steiner and Brigadier General Alan Geder, *Characteristics of the Participation of the Slovenian Armed Forces in International Military Operations and Missions to Date* (Ljubljana: General Staff of Slovenian Armed Forces, 2009), 191.


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contingents ad hoc and shapes them around a main element from an existing unit, augmented with SAF members from across the force.

In 2004 Slovenia became a member of NATO, and with this membership, the responsibilities and obligations for the military increased. The first operations aimed primarily on the Balkans, where the historical connections and the knowledge of the local environment proved valuable in Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) operations. Although the NATO missions represented the main effort for the military, Slovenia still maintained a presence in UN sponsored missions, primarily as UN observers in the Middle East. The nature of the operations changed with the expansion of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Consequentially, SAF deployed its first rotation to Afghanistan in 2004 and to Iraq in 2006.\(^5\) International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) rotations were foundational in the general training development on the battalion level and below and served as the basis for further training of ISAF contingents as well as the battalion task force training in the NATO affiliation process.

With the increased operational risk the importance of proper training became even more important than before. The first three rotations to ISAF were composed of standing units, but following contingents were not. Just like with other operations, SAF formed the contingents shortly prior to deployment from a broad array of soldiers drawn from across

the force. The non-homogeneous composition of contingents posed a problem, since time became the critical factor in the predeployment training process.\(^6\)

Integration into NATO forced the SAF to adapt their doctrine to fit the tasks that the SAF military now faced. In the years following the declaration of independence the United States became a trusted partner, which provided SAF with both training and advice in both tactical and doctrinal matters. With the experiences from operations and advice from allies, SAF developed their own doctrine, which includes a training process. This doctrine provides a guide for the units to follow and produce a training schedule, which supports the unit’s mission. Because of the good relationship developed with the U.S. much of the SAF doctrine and processes are similar to those of the U.S. military.

This study determined how SAF adapted to the new situation by researching whether the current predeployment training system in use by the SAF is adequate to meet the needs of the contemporary operating environment. To help determine this, the author followed a four step process. First, he examined how the SAF determine the current level of training. Next he discussed how the SAF determined the operational needs of the operation. Based on that he examined the method used to develop a training plan for the predeployment training, and lastly the author determined how SAF measures success of the predeployment training.

The research assumes that Slovenia will continue to fulfill its international obligations and, consequentially, SAF will continue to participate in the international military missions led by NATO, EU, UN or another international organization. Taking

into consideration the size and structure of SAF the research assumes that the current
trend will continue and that SAF will continue to deploy task force elements instead of
standing units.

It is imperative to define the following key terms which will help to clarify the study:

**Collective task**: “A unit of work or action requiring interaction between two or
more individuals for its accomplishment.”

**Full spectrum operations**: “The ability to simultaneously conduct offensive,
defensive and stability and reconstruction operations in joint campaigns overseas.”

**Hybrid threat**: “A threat that simultaneously employs regular and irregular forces,
including terrorist and criminal elements to achieve their objectives using an ever-
changing variety of conventional and unconventional tactics to create multiple
dilemmas.”

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**Hybrid warfare**: “Warfare that in addition to the employment of conventional tactics, also includes the use of terrorist, criminal and other irregular forms of warfare, information technologies and various economic resources.”

**Individual task**: “A unit of work or action accomplished by a single individual. It has identifiable start and end points, and results in measurable accomplishments or products.”

**Mission command**: “The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”

**Mission Essential Task List (METL)**: “A compilation of mission-essential tasks.”

**Mission Essential Task**: “A collective task in which an organization must be proficient to accomplish an appropriate portion of its wartime mission(s).”

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14. Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-1, 137
Missions: “The primary task assigned to an individual, unit, or force. It usually contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and the reasons therefore, but seldom specifies how.”

Operational Control (OPCON): “Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the loosing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the secretary of defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish the mission assigned to the command.”

Operational environment: “It is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.”

Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E): “Prescribes the required structure, manpower, and equipment for several organizational options for a particular type unit. It

15Ibid., 138.


also specifies the normal tasks the unit is designed to perform and the capabilities the unit has to accomplish its mission.”

**Tactical Control (TACON):** “Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish the mission or task assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task.”

**Task:** “A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. Tasks are specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of the encompassing missions of other requirements.”

**Training objective:** “A statement that describes the desired outcome of a training activity in the unit. It consists of the task, conditions, and standards.”

This research is limited to the use of unclassified doctrinal documents. Most of the work is available in Slovenian language only and English copies are not available. Another limitation is due to the operational structure of the SAF which, due to their size, can only deploy small tactical elements, notably platoons and companies. Although in

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18 Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-1, 139.

19 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-02, 1-182.

20 Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 350-70-1, 139.

21 U.S. Department of the Army, ADP 7-0, Glossary-2.
2007 SAF deployed a battalion sized task force such sizeable deployments are not likely to happen again in the near future. Consequentially, the focus of the study is on battalion size units and lower.

Currently the SAF have a training system for training their forces before they deploy to an operation. This study will attempt to determine whether the current system is appropriate and adequate to meet the needs of the contemporary operating environment. This study will serve as a base for potential modifications of the SAF training system, should it prove inadequate. Currently there are no studies of this topic either in Slovenian or in the English language. In addition to highlighting the advantages and shortfalls of SAF training model, this study will also highlight some of the challenges smaller multinational units face prior to their operational deployments.

This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 briefly describes the SAF involvement in the multinational operations and the role they played so far. It outlines the primary and secondary research questions, definitions of key terms, limitations of the study and its significance for the SAF and coalition partners dealing with multinational troop contributing nations. Chapter 2 examines the existing literature in this field, which will help answer the main research question. The focus is on the doctrinal documents, while at the same time incorporating other works. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology. Chapter 4 focuses on the synthesis and detailed analysis of sources and answers the research question in depth. Chapter 5 concludes the research and offers recommendations for further study of the topic.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

During the research the author examined relevant doctrinal documents. The emphasis was on the training literature, which deals with both the theory of training, and the development of the training schedule. The author first examined the relevant U.S. literature, followed by Slovenian literature and compared the two in chapter 4. As a part of this work the author also examined published works in U.S. and Slovenian professional publications. These articles provided insights in the modifications of the training models used by U.S. and Slovenian units prior to their deployments. The main reason for examining both U. S. and Slovenian doctrinal documents on training is that Slovenia often defaults to available U.S. literature when the Slovenian version is not available. Additionally, a significant amount of Slovenian Army Commissioned Officers and Non Commissioned Officers were trained in U.S. schools and are therefore familiar with U.S. doctrinal documents. The U.S. doctrine is a foundation for development of the new SAF doctrinal documents and officers often default back to U.S. documents when Slovenian sources are not available.

U.S. Doctrinal publications

The key U.S. doctrinal documents used in this work are Field Manual 1, *The Army*, Field Manual 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations*, which was replaced by the Army Doctrinal Publication 7-0 and Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 7-0 and Field Manual 7-15, *The Army Universal Task List*. They provide the general concept of how the U.S. Army plans, prepares, and
conducts its training. Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations* is also relevant when comparing U.S. and Slovenian documents. Due to their size Slovenian Armed Forces always deploy as a part of larger multinational units, therefore Joint Publication 3-16 is a foundational document for anyone wishing to understand how multinational units plan, prepare, and execute combined training. Additionally, this document sets the delineation of responsibilities for training between the multinational partners.

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM)-1, *The Army*, published in 2005, states that training the force is the sole purpose of the military. It also reiterates that in today’s pace the combat deployments became the norm for the Army and that the relevant training is necessary for its success on the battlefield. *The Army* also defines the three phases of unit readiness, which the author will use throughout this work. Both U.S. and SAF units use the reset/train, ready and available status. In addition *The Army* acknowledges the fact that time is a critical issue and that the “alert-train-deploy” model no longer fits and needs to be replaced with a “train-alert-deploy-employ” model.

FM-1 sets a framework on how the army forces are used and how they actually fight. It sets the foundations for joint operations as well as multinational operations, which are becoming the norm in the contemporary environment.

U.S. Army FM 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations* was published in February 2011. This FM establishes the basis for training the units and developing leaders on a rotational cycle. To achieve this rotational training, U.S. Army uses the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. FM 7-0 establishes the fundamentals for modular training and stresses the use of METL in support of
achieving the commanders’ intent. FM 7-0 also stresses flexibility and innovation in the training process as the keys to success in training small units and leaders.

The Army must be prepared to meet any challenge in the battlefield. The way to achieve this is through a meticulous and rigorous training program, which stresses the most important aspects of the mission. Through training, the soldiers will achieve the necessary skills and competence to meet the enemy on the field of battle and to emerge victorious. FM 7-0 establishes the principles of unit training.

Table 1. The Army’s principles of unit training

- Commanders and other leaders are responsible for training.
- Noncommissioned officers train individuals, crews, and small teams.
- Train to standard.
- Train as you will fight.
- Train while operating.
- Train fundamentals first.
- Train to develop operational adaptability.
- Understand the operational environment.
- Train to sustain.
- Train to maintain.
- Conduct multiechelon and concurrent training.


The FM 7-0 also establishes the Army training management model, which serves as the basis for all the Army training. This model is centered on a few essential tasks that the unit has to perform. Once these tasks are identified, they become known as the Mission Essential Task List or METL. When the unit identifies the METL, and the commander approves it, then the training unit can plan, prepare and execute the training.
to achieve their METL goals. Throughout the entire process the unit evaluates and assesses the training, and makes appropriate adjustments.

According to FM 7-0 the units in the ARFORGEN cycle develop long-range training plans that focus on the established aim points, such as manning, equipping and training levels. This training plan is largely dependent upon the time available to the unit; more time simply means a more detailed training plan. The ARFORGEN cycle identifies three pools of forces; reset, train/ready and available.

The reset pool of forces provides the soldier and his family time to recover and for the unit time to rebuild the METL proficiency. During this phase the unit focuses on the individual and his needs, both emotional and tactical. There is no collective training above team level during this phase, and training management is widely decentralized.

The train/ready pool of forces focuses on collective tasks and trains the soldiers in skills needed to achieve the unit’s proficiency in its core capabilities. The key for success during this phase is to select a few right tasks for the unit, which will reflect the appropriate operational environment that the unit will face in the future. Once the unit achieves the appropriate readiness level specified for a particular mission, they refocus on the contingency missions, which the unit may face during their operational engagements.

The available pool of forces provides units for deployments and contingency operations. These forces focus on mission accomplishment but at the same time try to maintain their level of proficiency. Training during this cycle is again decentralized and dependent upon available time. Training continues even after deployment and the units in the ARFORGEN cycle train to sustain their capabilities. During this phase the non-
deployed units may take part in the training center rotation or in the joint forces exercises. At the end of this cycle, the unit is reset and the cycle repeats from the beginning.

The FM 7-0 also indicates that the electronic version of the FM 7-0 and all the hyperlinks dealing with training are available at the Army Training Network (ATN), but the access to this network is restricted to U.S. military only and was therefore not a part of this study.

In 2012 the FM 7-0 was replaced with an Army Doctrinal Publication, ADP 7-0 Training Units and Developing Leaders. This document, combined with the Army Doctrine Reference Publication, ARDP 7-0 and web based unit training management on the Army Training Network (ATN) provides leaders with the revised concepts, practices and tools they need to manage the unit training and leader development. The ADP 7-0 additionally stresses the three training domains in use with the U.S. Army. Institutional training domain includes the Army’s training centers and schools that provide initial training and professional military education. It includes the centers of excellence and schools both inside and outside the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The operational training domain includes the training that the organizations undertake, while at home station, at maneuver combat training centers, during joint exercises, and while operationally deployed. The last domain is the Self-development training domain. It is a planned, goal oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth of the individual’s knowledge and situational awareness.

ADP 7-0 takes into account the reduced resources available to the force and indicates the solutions to overcome the anticipated shortages of funds and resources in general. Hence, it stresses the use of virtual environment, where the units can conduct
training. The ADP 7-0 refers to this as the Integrated Training Environment (ITE), where they mix the live, virtual, constructive and gaming enablers to enhance training, improve realism and save resources. The principles of training, the unit training management and the ARFORGEN cycle remain the same as described in the FM 7-0. Although a newer publication is available, the author used FM 7-0, since this publication was the basis for development of Slovenian Army training publications.

FM 7-15, *The Army Universal Task list* was published in February 2009. This FM describes the structure and content of the Army Universal Task List (AUTL), which is a comprehensive listing of basic Army tasks, missions and operations. This AUTL helps commanders develop and structure their METL, and serves as a cross reference of potential tasks. Trainers use FM 7-15 as the basis for mission analysis and use the AUTL as a catalog of war fighting function tasks when developing collective tasks for the unit. The AUTL does not include all the tasks, and units must not use it to prepare for joint or multinational operations. In these cases the forces use Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), which further defines the Army’s task in the joint operational environment. AUTL serves as a complement to UJTL by providing tactical and Army specific tasks.

The UJTL is updated quarterly and serves as menu of tasks in a common language from which units can derive their task lists. The UJTL is the foundation for capabilities based planning across the range of military operations and supports the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in joint planning, joint force development, readiness reporting, experimentation, joint training and education, and lessons learned.22

The following table represents a link between the Army Warfighting functions and UJTL task areas. Although there are different naming conventions, the Army Warfighting Functions directly relate to the Joint Functions. Consequentially the Universal Joint Task List areas closely correspond to the Army Warfighting Areas and Joint Functions.

<table>
<thead>
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Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, published 07 March 2007. This is the primary document providing U.S. forces with doctrinal guidance on how to operate as a part of multinational force. Current trends indicate that military operations in the future will include more multinational operations as they preserve the nation’s military forces and increase legitimacy of the operations. Wide spread coalitions and multinational forces are harder to manage than the pure national units, but they provide different national contributions and augment the shortages of certain military capabilities. Realizing that certain countries have different training doctrines, the U.S. units should
always refer to the multinational doctrine for reference. It serves as the basis for training the force as well as maintaining its proficiency. When the situation permits, multinational forces at all levels should seek opportunities to conduct combined training prior to the actual operation. This serves as the basis for developing relationships between the units and facilitates success of the operation. The nature of military operations, as described in JP 3-16 is based on respect, rapport, knowledge of the partners and most of all patience. DOD interacts with foreign defense structures through the Security Cooperation Plan, which is a primary strategic document designed to link the planned regional engagement activities to the national strategic objectives. Common to the forces participating in the multinational operations is that they always have two chains of command; National and operational. National chain of command is responsible for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning and protecting the military forces, while the multinational command authority is usually negotiated and can range from Operational Control (OPCON), to tactical control (TACON), to designated support relationship.

The decision to participate in the multinational force or coalition is always a political one. The nature of the political decision directly influences the command structure and contribution, which a nation will make to the multinational unit. The basic challenge of the multinational units is how will they effectively integrate the assets and achieve the common operational goal. A significant part of this integration and synchronization are the interoperability, and level of training that the contributing nations achieve prior to the operation. To reduce the discrepancies between the contributing forces, minimal capabilities standards are set up before the coalition is formed. These standards outline the potential shortcomings, such as incompatible Rules of Engagement.
(ROE), equipment and procedural issues. The identified issues are then further resolved either by national augmentation or on a bilateral level between contributing nations.

Figure 1. Factors affecting the military capabilities


Several different factors, affecting the national military capabilities, listed in JP 3-16 outline training as one of the priorities.

Slovenian Army doctrinal publications

*Military Doctrine*, published in 2006, defines the way that the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) are organized, employed and deployed on operations both at home and abroad. *Military Doctrine* defines the fundamentals by which the SAF guide their actions in the defense and security of the nation and the ways they contribute to the multinational alliances.
Military Doctrine also states that “The Slovenian Armed Forces will always accomplish their mission in support of the Slovenia’s national interests through cooperation with allied and coalition forces, if not involved in other short operations.”

This portion of the Military Doctrine is similar to the U.S. FM 1 The Army, which indicated the nature of the force and its basic mission and purpose. Military Doctrine further emphasizes that due to the size and the force structure, the SAF will always operate as a part of the multinational forces and it will fulfill the international obligations to both NATO and EU. The Military Doctrine also lays out the basis for effective cooperation between the allied or coalition forces. The foundations are the same as in the JP 3-16.

The Military Doctrine specifies the mission and task of the SAF to “deter military aggression against the Republic of Slovenia in cooperation with the Alliance and to contribute to international peace and stability within and outside the borders of the Alliance.” Based on the mission it outlines the Mission Essential Tasks for the SAF as “maintenance of readiness, activation and mobilization of forces, deployment of forces to the area of operation, conduct of defensive and offensive operations, and the sustainment of forces.”

The Military Doctrine defines the military education and training as a “process of acquiring and developing special and functional military knowledge abilities, skills and

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23Brigadier Branimir Furlan, Military Doctrine (Ljubljana: Defensor, 2006), 14.
24Ibid., 24.
25Ibid.
procedures required to perform tasks of military defense and other tasks of the SAF.”

The military education is not a self-sustaining process, but it is an augmentation to civilian educational process. If it is not rational, or if the training does not exist within Slovenia and the SAF, the individuals will be send abroad to foreign military educational and training institutions. The military training of individuals and units should directly support the operational capabilities of SAF, and it must provide individuals and units with the knowledge and skills to perform the Mission Essential Tasks. Various military institutions provide support for the training. They include, but are not limited to: national combat training center, multinational combat readiness training centers, centers of excellence both in Slovenia and abroad, simulation centers and others. Training itself should be realistic and battle focused, with the emphasis on tasks directly supporting the development of operational capabilities. Training should also be gradual and continuous and based on the lessons learned from the operations.

The Military Doctrine also specifies the pre-deployment activities for all crisis response operations conducted by SAF. “Prior to each mission, a special pre-deployment training has to be planned and carried out, based on the unit’s mission, the mission essential task list and mission-specific rules of engagements (ROE). The training program provides the candidates with general, and specialized military topics, and introduces them to the geographical, national, ethnic, religious, cultural and other aspects, typical of the given area of operation.” Based on this directive, SAF contingents devise their pre-deployment training, which usually includes additional topics, such as first aid, and force

\[26\text{Ibid., 35.}\]

\[27\text{Ibid., 79.}\]
protection measures and activities. This last portion can be compared to U.S. ADP 7-0 and ADRP 7-0, since it outlines how to plan, develop, and execute training prior to deployment.

“Directive for Staff Work,” published in 2007, serves as guidance on how to prepare and structure documents and orders in the SAF. This is the basic document which outlines duties and responsibilities of the commander, the staff, and staff sections in brigade and battalions. It specifies who is responsible for what process in the SAF and what should be the end state of each step and process. While this document deals primarily with tasks and organization of the staff and the unit’s operational issues, it also deals with the planning and preparation process that the units must adhere to, prior to any operations. The “Directive for Staff Work” prescribes the operational planning process, and outlines the goals: to standardize the planning process throughout the SAF and within the alliance, to provide guidance to subordinates, through the planning and preparation process, to facilitate cooperation and integration of the planning process at Strategic, operational and tactical levels, to facilitate the staff’s support for the commander in the operational process and execution of the tasks. This SAF document can be compared to U.S. FM 5-0, since they both cover the same topic.

“Manual for Unit Training in Slovenian Armed Forces” was published in 2011.28 This manual is the primary document for training in the SAF. It establishes the duties and responsibilities for unit trainers, and it delineates the duties of commissioned and noncommissioned officers in this process. It further establishes that the training process

must be realistic and combat focused, with the emphasis on fulfilling the mission, while preserving the resources that the unit has available. The “Manual for Unit Training in SAF” outlines the principles for training among which are the use of doctrine as guidance, use of common sense approach to training, use of progression and continuity in training, use of common standards in training and the emphasis on safety during the training execution. All the training should be combat focused, and based on the anticipated or assigned missions for the unit. The training is structured in three segments, individual training, collective training and unit training. Individual training is conducted in the units, during the initial stage of the training or as soon as the unit is formed, assembled and equipped. The individual training is further divided in five levels. Level I include the individual skills for all the members of the SAF. Level II includes the skills for team and section level leaders. Level III skills are for squad leaders, level IV skills include platoon sergeants and platoon leaders, while the level V skills are intended for higher level commanders only. Once the unit finishes the individual level training, they progress to the battle drill phase, where they focus on collective training and drill specific tasks as the unit. Battle drills are then combined with battle procedures and form the battle tasks, which the unit must conduct during their mission. When comparing to U.S. Army system, the battle procedures are translated into collective tasks, and battle tasks are equal to unit tasks in the U.S. Army training system.

The “Manual for Unit Training in the SAF” specifies four types of operations, offensive, defensive, special and transition operations. While the offensive, defensive, and special operations are similar to U.S. Army, the transition operations include

29Ibid., 17.
reconnaissance, protection, movement to contact, link up operations, breaking through encirclement, relief in place, displacement, movement and obstacle crossing.

According to the “Manual for Unit Training in the SAF,” prior to the start of the training the unit commander, with the support of the staff, should analyze the unit’s level of training. In addition to determining the current level of training, this phase should also answer the questions why, who, what, when, where and how. After the analysis, the unit should select the proper training for the mission and identify the location, where they will conduct the training. Should the unit leave the home station, they must make proper arrangements during this phase of the planning process. The end state of this phase is a detailed picture of the current level of training, and the draft of the training plan with locations and a list of resources needed for this training. Following the commander’s final approval and resources allocation, the detailed training plan then specifies who will train the unit, where and with what resources. Immediately following the execution of training, the unit will conduct an after action review, and an internal evaluation. Based on the results, the training will either progress to the next level, or the unit will retrain the necessary tasks, should the time allow for it.

An important factor in training is time management. The manual for unit training in the SAF establishes a threefold cycle of red, amber and green cycles. Green cycle represents the time for training of the mission specific tasks, derived from the unit’s mission. During this time, the unit has all the needed resources available to them. There should be no interruptions of the unit training at this time. Amber cycle focuses on the collective training at the team, squad and platoon level. During this phase the unit can

\[^{30}\text{Ibid., 21.}\]
perform other tasks, but the commanders should strive to minimize the training
distractions. Red cycle represents the time for individual training. The focus should be on
individual soldier skills and basic leadership skills for leaders. During this cycle, the unit
can perform various other tasks and use the block leave.\textsuperscript{31}

The “Manual for Unit Training in the SAF” also deals with the training of
purposely formed units. For the purpose of this work the author will refer to them as the
task forces, whoever they encompass much wider spectrum of units. Combining the
different units into task forces is a common approach within the militaries and the
coalitions. The manual states, that the unit can conduct the individual training of the task
force components at separate locations, while they must conduct collective training phase
at the single location and this training should be centralized. SAF usually contribute the
task force structured units to the allied operations, hence this is serves as guidance for the
training of SAF units and task forces deploying on NATO, UN or EU operations.

The “Manual for Unit Training of SAF,” published in 2011 establishes the
Mission Essential Task List training system, which in essence is identical to the U.S.
Army’s METL development and training concept. METL should support the unit’s
mission and it represents a few selected tasks, absolutely necessary for the mission
accomplishment. The “Manual for Unit Training of SAF” states that “The result of
success in combat is a direct result of the demanding training during the peace time.”\textsuperscript{32}

The “Manual for Unit Training of SAF” establishes the responsibilities for training of the
force, which is evenly distributed between the commissioned and noncommissioned

\textsuperscript{31}\textsuperscript{Ibid., 21.}

\textsuperscript{32}\textsuperscript{Ibid., 6.}
officers. The concept of military training in the SAF is based on multiple levels. Basic level serves as the foundation for all consecutive training and includes the basic level individual military skills. Second level represents collective tasks of a fire team, weapons crew, and squads. Second level incorporates individual skills and ties them together into collective tasks, to include battle drills. The third level further ties together collective tasks and battle drills at platoon level. Forth level is the company level, where the companies no longer focus on the individual and collective tasks, but rather on the battle drills and battle tasks needed to accomplish the mission. Following training levels focus on the battalion, battalion task force, and brigade tactical tasks.

SAF differentiate between four types of military operations. These are: offensive operations, defensive operations, transition operations and special operations. In order to properly train for all the different types of military operations, the training time and other resources must be carefully planned and executed. This can be achieved using a segmented training model, which specifies what the unit must do, when it is in a particular training cycle. SAF uses the Red-Amber-Green cycle and in some cases the Red-Green cycle. During the Red cycle the unit focuses on individual training. The purpose is to achieve proficiency on the individual level and to improve leadership skills of the leaders. During this time, the unit may perform various tasks, and use the block leave time. During the Amber cycle, the unit focuses on achieving the appropriate training levels on crew, squad and platoon levels. This time can be used for military schools and individual proficiency, which directly supports the squad and platoon performance. During the Green cycle the focus is on collective training, which supports

\[^{33}\text{Ibid., 21.}\]
the unit’s assigned mission. In this phase there should be no distraction of training and
the unit should have all available support for training.

ways, procedures and directions for planning, preparation, and execution of training by
the SAF in 2013 and 2014. It outlines that SAF are subjected to sequestration and that
regardless of reduced funding the tasks for the military remained the same. In order to
fulfill the army’s obligations, SAF must train and prepare for all spectrum operations.
“Directive for Unit Training in 2013 and 2014” stresses that training must be
meticulously planned and prepared to maximize the effect of the scarce resources
available. This directive further establishes the priorities for training in the SAF and the
standards, the units must achieve by the end of the training cycle.

“SOP No 1350, SAF Participation in Military Operations,” published in 2011
defines the responsibilities for preparing the unit for deployment. It specifies the tasks
of the various sectors within the force command and it establishes the command
responsibilities for the deployed contingent.

Articles Dealing with Predeployment Training

“Aligning Initial Entry Training with the Aim Point” is a strategy research project
by Colonel Jerry Cashion, U.S. Army, published in 2008. In this research project

34 Directive for Planning of Training in Slovenian Armed Forces in 2013 and
2014, 1.

35 Slovenian Armed Forces, “SOP No 1350, SAF Participation in Military
Operation” (Vrhnika, 2011), 1.

36 Colonel Jerry Cashion, “Aligning Initial Training with the Aim Point” (Strategy
Research Project, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2008), 7.
Colonel Cashion discusses the Initial Entry Training (IET) and the demands of current operating environment. He states, that the rapid adjustments in training became challenging as the focus turned from conventional operations to COIN. Training requirements emphasize COIN to an extent, where the soldiers spend all available time on this issue alone. Colonel Cashion argues that a proper analysis of the operational environment as well as the current threat that the soldiers are facing is a necessary prerequisite to training development. Without proper analysis the training may focus on issues which the deployed soldiers will not face.

The research project also talks about the Task Force (TF) Soldier, which was a group of forward thinking officers and noncommissioned officers, who applied a bottom up approach to training the individual soldiers at the IET level. They took a soldier and viewed him as a system. This enabled them to derive a set of “Warrior task and drills that became the new measure in basic Soldier training across the Army.” TF Soldier focused on the conduct of IET, which had not changed since the Cold War era. During the IET soldiers spent too much time focusing on time consuming topics which did not produce favorable effects on the battlefield, such as drill and ceremonies. Soldiers also trained in sterile environments with no added stress or fatigue, which are common in combat. TF Soldier changed all that and soldiers trained with body armor and weapons from the beginning. TF Soldier eliminated some of the outdated training and replaced it with more applicable skills used in the ongoing wars. This change in the IET had a significant effect on the cultural change in the basic training units. The Drill Sergeants were all combat

37Ibid., 3.
veterans and were able to transfer their experiences to the individual soldiers. This, combined with challenging exercises, produced a shift in the culture of the organization.

Colonel Cashion offered the analysis of the needs for the soldier skills needed in a contemporary operational environment. He based his analysis on the available Center for Army’s Lessons Learned (CALL) publications and the National Training Center recommendations. The skills on which the IET should focus are: negotiation skills, cultural understanding, language capability, escalation of force and rules of engagement, search/detain/prosecute, tactical questioning, counter sniper/improvised explosive device and every soldier a sensor/ambassador. These skills and drills should be trained and tested under conditions which reflect the current contemporary operating environment.

The necessity for training for full spectrum operations is still a critical function in the IET, and will continue to be one of the more important factors in the future. The hybrid threat increased since 2008 and will continue to be a predominant threat to both U.S. and other allied forces in the current operational environments. Proper analysis of the operational environment, combined with the optimal training structure is a solid foundation for soldier’s success on the contemporary operating environment.

In the July 2011 report “Army and Marine Corps Training, Metrics Needed to Assess Initiatives on Training Management Skills” the U.S. Government Accountability Office briefly outlines both the annual and predeployment training requirements for U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps forces. Predeployment training consist of both individual and collective training, progressing from individual level to the larger collective level.

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exercises, designed to build proficiency and competency of individuals and whole units. Requirements for this training come from the U.S. Central Command, with the intention to unify the predeployment training of the Army and Marine units. These requirements serve as a baseline for predeployment training and are augmented based on the specific mission, the unit will have to perform on deployment.

The report states, that with the current drawback of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army’s Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle will change. This change will not affect the “Available” phase, which will remain a 12 month phase, but rather the “Train/Ready” phase, which will lengthen from current 6 months to 18 months in length. Marine Corps four block Force Generation process should stay the same as it is at this point.

Combat Training Centers (CTC) remain crucial establishments for both Army and Marine forces. They provide realistic and stressful training, which includes live fire training for individuals and units. The opportunity to face a live and well trained opposing force enables the units and their leadership to refine their operational procedures and to develop overall proficiency under stressful and realistic conditions. Generally units are not required to complete specific training prior to CTC rotations, however both Army and Marine units prescribe the required level of training their units must reach before they deploy to the CTC.

According to the report, seven of thirteen Army and Marine units were not able to complete the desired individual and collective training prior to their CTC rotation.39 Units expressed that several factors prevented them from reaching the desired level of proficiency.

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39Ibid., 10.
training proficiency, but most of them dealt with extensive licensing and certification requirements for various vehicles used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Units had to waive certain training in order to accommodate the more demanding training activities; they were to face in the area of operations. Some of the units were not able to conduct all the training due to the lack of space and equipment. Units planned to delay certain training until their CTC rotation, as the mission specific resources were more readily available there, than at unit’s home station. Additionally some units were forced to use the initial time in the CTC’s to conduct basic level training for their soldiers, since they were not available when the unit was conducting it. All units reported though, that regardless of their level of training prior to the CTC deployment, they all left with a common level of training proficiency. After the rotation, the units are capable of platoon level operations in contemporary operating environment, with strong emphasis on COIN operations.

The past two wars severely decreased the level of unit training management knowledge and experiences. The ARFORGEN cycle and Marine Corps training system forced units into a condensed and directed training cycle, leaving very little maneuver space for the units to influence their own training. With the end of major conflicts and the reduction of force and resources, the importance of proper training management will increase throughout the force. Doctrinally the junior leaders bore the primary responsibility for training management, as they dealt with squads, platoons and companies. The contemporary operating environment reduced the available time that the unit had prior to deployment. This forced the senior leaders to step in and perform the training management instead of the junior leadership, denying them the opportunity to

40 Ibid., 11.
evolve in this field. Consequently junior leaders focused more on the execution, while the higher headquarters assumed the role of training manager. With the decrease in operational deployments, the units spend more time at home stations. The training resources available to these forces also decreased, leaving the units competing amongst each other's for everything from ranges to fuel. Army and Marine forces recognized the importance of proper training management in order to facilitate training and maximize the effects. Units began to use alternative training methods, such as on-line and simulation training to counter the lack of resources and place great importance on training management to meet the new Army's goal of reaching company level proficiency at home station. The Army in particular was proactive, when they established an on-line Army Training Network, which serves as a resource for junior leaders when developing METL, and managing training. Marine Corps Training Information Management System, once fully operational, will allow the Marines to do the same as their Army counterparts.

In his article “The Eight-Step Training Model,” Mathew R. Little introduces an eight step training model, and offers it as a solution for the training approach in the contemporary operating environment. The first step is to properly plan the training. This process starts with a METL development and unit assessment and evaluation. Second step serves to train and certify leaders. This enables the commanders to ensure 

41 Ibid., 12.
42 Ibid., 16.
that their subordinates are knowledgeable and qualified to perform the training. Third step is to conduct reconnaissance of locations, where the training will take place. Fourth step is to issue the order for the training. This order must include a clear task, conditions and standards for the unit, a concept of operations, a concept of sustainment, and most importantly a timeline. Step five is rehearsal. The four methods, described in this article are back brief, battle drill of SOP rehearsal, combined arms rehearsal and support rehearsal. These procedures also vary in the method of conduct. They can be performed over the network, on a map, over a sketch or a terrain model; they can be done with a reduced force or in full scale. The sixth step of this model is the execution. If time permits, commanders should allow their subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them. If resources allow, the execution should be as close to the real situation as possible. Step seven is the After Action Review (AAR). AARs can be formal or informal. The formal AARs are usually conducted at the company level and above, while informal AAR’s are reserved for platoon level and below. Step eight is retraining. Due to the lack of training time prior to deployment, units often ignore this step. However, this is the most important step, as it offers the unit an opportunity to correct the mistakes they identified during the training.

Primary benefit of the eight step training model is the overlap with the troop leading procedures (TLPs), which enables the leaders at a company level to develop effective training and at the same time implement the TLPs. This eight step model is not linear and the steps can be applied as needed.

In their article “Making the Eight-Step Training Model Work” the authors Jeffery L. Howard, John F. Blackenhorn and Douglas A. Keeler state that the eight step training
model is relatively new for the U.S. Army, but it effectively fills the gap between what field commanders expect and what the formal training provides. This article attempts to fill the gap between understanding and applying effective training methods and provides a detailed examination and explanation of the eight step model.

The eight step training model is based on three imperatives: planning for training is conducted on all leadership levels, planning is a continual process, and training time is precious and must be preserved. This last imperative is crucial in achieving the unit’s mission. Leaders must protect the time, set aside for training. They must use it to retrain the necessary tasks or to improve the unit’s skills. The retrain process is a never ending cycle, where units can build on their existing skills or learn new ones. Units must not view this phase as a punishment, but rather an opportunity to gain better level of training.44

In the SAMS monograph, “Training Balance: Full Spectrum Operations for 21st Century Challenges,” published in 2008, Colonel Jerome K. Hawkins evaluates the training balance in the United States Army at the brigade combat team level. Colonel Hawkins concludes that the training is not balanced, but rather COIN focused. In the time constrained environment, caused by a high operational tempo, units chose to neglect the traditional areas of offense and defense, and focused on the COIN, since this was the more likely threat they would face on their deployments.45


The monograph presents the concept of one army for all tasks, which builds on a common training foundation. The size and structure, combined with the operational tasks of the unit represent the challenges for this concept. An example of this is, when the brigade combat teams (BCTs) are supposed to train for the common core tasks. The author argues that the premiere time for this is in the reset/retrain pool of the ARFORGEN cycle. This does not give units enough time to properly prepare for a mission. While the strategic guidance remains, that the Army should prepare for the full spectrum operations, the training balance shifted heavily in favor of COIN. The role of the CTCs shifted from training conventional units for brigade level operations to training company level units for COIN. The monograph recommends that the CTCs should revert back to their original role of training battalions and brigades for future combat operations including traditional missions in high intensity conflict.

In the article “Characteristics of the Participation of Slovenian Armed Forces in International Military Operations and Missions to Date,” former Chief of Defense (CHOD), Major General (MG) Alojz Steiner and former forces commander, Major General (MG) Alan Geder suggest that participation in international military operations is the driving force behind integration of Slovenian Armed Forces in the multinational organizations. Consequentially, participation in the multinational military operations within the alliances is a top priority for SAF. Without this multinational contribution, SAF would still be entangled in the transitional phase of the territorial defense forces legacy. The authors mention that two of the SAF battalion task forces had to undergo specific full spectrum training as a part of integration process into the NATO structure. Additionally they had to conduct predeployment training each time before they deployed
their elements on KFOR and ISAF operations. Current tendencies are to focus on cheaper and more predominant predeployment training rather than spend time and precious resources on training for full spectrum operations.

SAF contribution to multinational operations increased drastically after Slovenia joined NATO. “Up to this point SAF participated in eighteen multinational military operations, of which twelve have already finished. These operations spanned on three continents and fifteen different countries.”46 The largest contingent the SAF deployed at one time was the battalion combat team, deployed to Kosovo in 2007. The authors differentiate three types of SAF contributions, from simple, complex, to special. While the simple contributions ranged from security operations, patrolling in a permissive environment, to logistical support to the operating force. In these operations SAF are usually attached to a larger coalition force and preparation time for such operations tends to be short. Units need three to four months to retrain on their basic tasks and can be composed from reserve component as well as from the professional force. Complex operations began in 2007 with battalion combat team deployment to Kosovo. While Kosovo is an example of a permissive operational environment, this operation was still complex, due to the size of the deployed force and the different modules attached to the main force. Special contributions are mainly in the form of small, specially formed units or elements, designed to perform a specific task. These contributions usually include members of the Special Forces (SF), reconnaissance forces, medical teams, helicopter pilots and various other specialists in the designated field. Training for complex and special contributions is resource and time demanding and can involve training that SAF

46Steiner and Geder, 191.
cannot conduct with its own resources. In such cases, members of the SAF were trained abroad, usually with the force they would later deploy with.

The authors conclude that the past twelve years of continuous contributions to the multinational military operations is a notable effort but in the future, instead of spreading out the force, SAF should focus on specific operational areas. This will in turn simplify the predeployment activities as well as allow the SAF to focus on less operational areas.

In the article “SAF in the International Operations and Missions–Results of Empirical Research from 2003 to 2008” Dr. Ljubica Jelusic, a former Minister of Defense briefly presents the study, conducted by the Defense Research Institute (DRI) from the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana. “The research consists of 3000 questionnaires and more than 200 individual interviews with the SAF members. The research team reached to almost every member of the SAF who was deployed between 2003 and 2008.” The article recognizes that the study identified a lot of important factors regarding the deployments and the SAF performance; however it indicates that there is not much will within the military to implement the necessary changes in order to improve the current situation.

In the article “Units on a Mission: Preparation for Mission and Horizontal and Vertical Unit Cohesion” Dr. Garb Maja presents her findings from the above mentioned research from DRI. This article outlines the research about the diversity and quality of the predeployment training in the designated time frame. The results of the research indicate that the preparations are different from one rotation to the other and that there is a great

difference between the trained tasks and the tasks actually performed on the operation.\textsuperscript{48} The article further outlines the differences in the opinions about the adequacy of training prior and after the mission. The research showed that the participants deemed the preparations as adequate prior to deployment, but valued them as inadequate after the operational rotation. While those responsible for training deem that they need to prepare for the most dangerous scenario, the soldiers are often disappointed as they do not get to use the skills they trained for. The research outlined that the language and cultural training does not fulfill the soldier’s expectations and often proved inadequate.

In the article “Soldier on a Mission in Service of Homeland: Final Conclusions,” last in the series of articles based on the DRI research, Juvan Jelena reports that there is a trend of poor data collection and that the SAF are failing to learn from their experiences. She states that there are grounds for serious concern, since their research indicated that there are six consecutive rotations, which show the same flaws in their preparation for the same mission. Additional source for concern is that the soldiers indicated the perception that the country forgot about them for the duration of their mission. The author proposes several solutions to change this perception and that SAF should treat their members in such way, that they would feel appreciated. The last important aspect, outlined by the study was the knowledge of language and the pristine connection with local population. Due to the historical ties to the Balkan area of operations, the older SAF members speak the regional languages. This fact often enabled them to establish and maintain a pristine relationship with the local population on operations in the Balkans. Due to this fact, SAF neglected to perform any language training for other operations, where the deployed SAF

\textsuperscript{48}Garb, “Units on a Mission,” 16.
members did not speak the local languages. Consequentially the contact with local population was reduced to minimal and the lack of language and cultural training increased the gap between the SAF and local population.

In the book *Peace Support Operations and the Role of Slovenia*, published in 2005, Dr. Jelusic gathered several articles, which deal with SAF participation in the multinational peace support operations. Staff members of the Faculty for Social Sciences in Ljubljana discuss the peace support operations in general, peace support operations lead by various international organizations from NATO to EU, and the role that SAF play in this process. As a part of this book, Juvan Jelena published an article “Slovenian Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations.” In this article Juvan discusses the participation of SAF in the peace support operations to the date and outlines the SAF contribution to each contingent in particular.

Both U.S. and Slovenian militaries use the theoretical work related to training. The primary doctrinal works are similar and in both nations is centered on deployment cycles. In the U.S. Army it is subjected to the ARFORGEN cycle, while in Slovenian military it is more arbitrary. The structure of the training remains the same though. First it focuses on the individual, then on collective tasks and on the end it focuses on the unit.

From the written works and documents a trend is evident, specifying that time and resources are limiting and shaping the predeployment training. The base of this argument is a constant shifting of the operational environment and the evolution of the hybrid threat. There is a significant amount of U.S. Army literature available on the topic, but

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only a few works from SAF. Based on this, the author used a wide variety of sources, realizing that the potential for research still remains.
This thesis intends to answer the primary question, whether the current predeployment training system in use by SAF is adequate to meet the needs of the contemporary operating environment. The previous chapter examined available literature to answer this question. This chapter will focus on the methods used to analyze available literature and other sources, and more importantly, it will clarify why the author used certain methods.

To answer the primary question, the author first had to provide the answers to the supporting secondary questions. In the thesis, the author first examined how the SAF determined the current level of training. Next he focused on how the SAF determines the operational needs of the operation. Following that, the author next focused on the methods SAF uses to develop a training plan for the predeployment training. After the analysis of these three questions, the author determined how SAF measures success of the predeployment training. To find the answers to these questions the author primarily used qualitative research to help understand the differences and similarities between the U.S. and Slovenian army training systems. The careful study of available documents and case studies provided the basis for comparison of the two systems, and allowed for a deeper understanding of how Slovenian Armed Forces design and conduct predeployment training, and how they prepare SAF soldiers for the challenges they will face in the multinational environment. Main reasons for this research method are the locally available documents, and relatively low cost of such research. The disadvantage of this method focused on the fact, that the study may be incomplete, either due to the limited
time and resources, or simply because locating proper documents was hard due to
distance in space. This lengthy analysis proved worthy, since it allowed for a good
description of the methods and procedures used by SAF and provided a solid basis for
further research on this topic.

The author also used historical research, as he used the information provided by
the extensive SAF study, performed by the Defense Research Institute (DRI) from the
Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana. In this research, the DRI members focused on the
SAF and their operational experiences, to include the predeployment training. This study
covered the SAF deployments from 2003 to 2008. The DRI research was institutional in
determining the state of the SAF and their predeployment training in the year, covered by
the study. To provide a more recent take on the issue, the author sent out several emails
to the SAF members with vast operational experiences, from Kosovo, to Afghanistan,
Iraq and Africa. They all responded with their observations about the SAF
predeployment activities. Based on their responses, the author was able to draw several
conclusions about how the SAF contingents are formed and how SAF conducted their
After Action Reviews. Based on the DRI’s study of previous deployments and the email
testimonials, the author was able to present a clear picture of the SAF predeployment
activities.

Realizing the challenges and limitations of the study, author attempted to
minimize the negative effects by focusing on doctrinal documents and official written


51 MAJ Vojko Sotlar, CPT Miha Rijavec, Master Sargent Aljosa, Cefarin, Master
Sargent Stanislav Komocar and others, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
publications both in the U.S. and in Slovenia. Where these sources proved scarce, he supplemented them with testimonials from SAF members with operational experiences. To avoid any potential bias, the author included both officers and noncommissioned officers, with various experiences from Kosovo to Afghanistan. The interviewed members had various lengths of service, ranging from two to fifteen years.\textsuperscript{52}

This chapter described the methodology used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. It outlined the fact that the author focused on existing literature and available research, and that he also used the primary sources in the attempt to close the gap between the previous research and the current state of the SAF. The author focused on the advantages of selected methods and explained the disadvantages that exist. The author placed great care to avoid potential bias and to minimize the negative effects of the qualitative research method. The next chapter will present the results of the research and the answers to the research questions. The focus will be on the design and execution of predeployment training in the Slovenian Armed Forces, while comparing it to the U.S. Army methods.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

The previous chapter outlined the methods used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. This chapter will provide the findings of the analysis of the predeployment training in the SAF, while at the same time it will compare it to the U.S. ARFORGEN cycle and the general training model. The organization of this chapter is based on the research questions. It starts with answering the secondary questions: How to determine the current level of training? How to determine the operational requirement for training? How does SAF develop a training plan for predeployment training? How SAF measures success in predeployment training? Answering the secondary questions will provide an answer to the primary research question: Is the current predeployment training system in use by SAF adequate to meet the needs of the operating environment?

First the research focused on how to determine the current level of unit training. In order to understand the complete process the research examines the training as a whole, from the initial entry into the system, to the complex unit training, SAF members undergo prior to deployments or as a part of their prescribed performance levels.

SAF conducts the initial entry level training in SAF Training Center in Vipava. There in the first three months, the candidates receive the basic knowledge they need to survive on the battlefield. This portion of soldiers training focuses on a mixture of

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53Slovenian Armed Forces, “Slovenian Armed Forces Center for Initial Entry Training in Vipava” [Center za usposabljanje Slovenske Vojske v Vipavi] (Ljubljana 2005).
infantry skills and drill and ceremony needed for basic soldiering. Following the initial entry training, the soldiers remain in the SAF Training Center in Vipava for their advanced training, which focuses on the skills necessary for their Military Operational Specialty (MOS). This phase lasts for nine weeks and in this time they receive the specific knowledge and skills which will allow them to perform their assigned MOS jobs. Upon completion of their MOS training the soldiers receive their first certificate, based on the official evaluation. This certificate enables them to serve in a battalion, where they can perform their MOS jobs as required.

Once the soldiers reach their assigned units, they start their collective training phase together with the rest of their platoon and company. Based on the unit’s Mission Essential Task List (METL) and depending upon the unit training cycle the soldier then further trains on the individual and collective tasks, which will enable the unit to perform their mission. Each training phase ends with a field problem or field exercise, where the observers evaluate the collective training level of the unit. The purpose of observation and evaluation is to determine the level of unit’s proficiency and to define the additional training requirements for this unit. Methods used in this process further define who is evaluated, what is the purpose of evaluation, in which way will the evaluation take place and who will be the evaluator. Analysis of the training and its results are usually performed immediately after the training, and serve as the benchmark that the unit has to

54Ibid., 2.
55Ibid., 4.
57Ibid.
reach before it can progress to the next level. Based on this analysis, each task, which was not performed to the prescribed standards, must be repeated until the performance is satisfactory.

Control of the training process serves as the evaluation tool for the commander. It enables the unit to determine the differences between the planned unit training level and the level they actually achieved. The actual difference in training levels, determined by this method, serves as the basis for follow on training. One of the primary elements of this control of the training is to determine whether the designed training will support the unit’s METL. This is evident if the training is adapted to the current level of individual training. Further on, the training must integrate all soldiers in a single unit, must be logically structured and focused on the tasks the unit must perform according to their METL. \textsuperscript{58}

According to the Slovenian Armed Forces, \textit{Manual for Unit Training} there are various ways to evaluate a unit. These methods include interviews, special training evaluations, based on written orders and training plans, actual field problems and field exercises. \textsuperscript{59} Evaluation can also be formal, informal, internal or external. Formal evaluation means that qualified observer controllers observe the unit’s training, and that the training event was planned in advance. Training standards are defined in the evaluation forms and tied to the unit’s mission and METL. Commanders and leaders at all levels constantly perform the informal evaluation of training. They are present with the unit and can determine on the spot, if the training level is satisfactory or if the unit

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid., 63.

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., 64.
needs to devote more time to the particular skill. Units perform internal evaluation on their own, while the higher commands perform external evaluation of the unit. External evaluations tend to value more, since the bias of the evaluator is minimal and all the evaluated skills are predetermined and planned. During the evaluation, observers prepare notes and upon completion of training, they publish a formal written evaluation report about the unit’s level of training. For the formal evaluation, SAF have a special dedicated unit named the Combat Training Center (CTC).⁶⁰ Among the core tasks of this CTC is the responsibility to organize and assess the skills of the SAF units. Upon completion of a certain training phase, the CTC performs the formal external evaluation of SAF units.⁶¹ Although the CTC can evaluate a battalion sized unit, they usually evaluate company sized elements. Higher echelons train in the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfelds, Germany, which offers better training conditions and a formal external evaluation which further reduces any potential biases. The commander of the SAF CTC is a major and if he would formally evaluate a battalion commander it may present a problem, since the battalion commander outranks him.

When the SAF units finish their prescribed training, they receive a formal external evaluation report. This report is then presented to the unit’s commanding officer, who is eventually responsible for the unit’s training. Depending on the unit’s training cycle they may progress to the next training level or, they retrain their personnel according to the

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evaluation report from SAF CTC or JMRC. These formal external evaluation reports are the basis for measuring the unit’s level of training in the SAF.

The U.S. Army defines their assessment process in ARDP 5-0. It states that assessment is a continuous process and that it precedes and guides every operations process activity. Assessment includes but is not limited to monitoring the current situation, evaluating progress and recommending improvements. U.S. doctrine further defines assessment in training in FM 7-0, where it states that “in the training context, assessment is the leader’s judgment of the organization’s ability to perform its mission-essential tasks and ultimately, its ability to accomplish its doctrinal or directed mission.”

Similarly to SAF, U.S. Army also includes formal and informal evaluations, performed internally with external resources. U.S. Army realizes that training evaluations are critical in measuring the unit’s readiness.

Unlike the U.S. Army, SAF do not deploy large units on operations. Usually the contingents are a platoon or company sized elements, with additional logistical support, which enables them to perform their assigned missions. When SAF form their contingents, they follow the National Security Strategy, the Strategy of participation of Republic of Slovenia in the multinational missions and operations, and other internal regulations and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). At the unit level, the primary SOP, which deals with forming of contingents, is the “SOP No 1350, SAF Participation in Military Operations.” This SOP regulates the responsibilities of various headquarters and units of the SAF, which participate in the preparation of contingents. The “SOP No

62 U.S. Department of the Army, ADP 7-0, 77.

63 Steiner and Geder, 193.
1350, SAF Participation in Military Operations)” also regulates the operation and training cycle of the contingent.64 First three months are dedicated to the individual training, and during this time, the members of the contingent must perform all the individual training, new equipment familiarization, all the administrative procedures, to include detailed medical examinations and vaccinations. Responsibility for training during this phase is on the generic unit, which is contributing the troops for the operation. The next three months are intended to form the contingent into a single coherent unit, and to perform the collective unit training. This training can be conducted both at home station, in the field or in the international training areas. The responsibility for training at this stage is on the force command level and the Contingent commander is ultimately responsible for the unit’s level of training. During the second phase, the unit undergoes a formal external evaluation, which serves as the basis upon which the SAF Force Commander eventually transfers the authority to the operational commander in the area of operations. Following the formal evaluation, the unit has approximately one month to retrain the necessary skills and to deploy in the area of operations.

While this model is logical and acceptable in theory, it poses a few issues. The first issue is that the SAF contingents are almost never homogenous units. The nucleus of the contingent is from one unit, but the augmenters and additional support troops come from different units throughout the SAF.65 Due to different training cycles, the generic units and organizations, to which these augmenters belong, are at a different level of

64Slovenian Armed Forces, “SOP No 1350,” Annex D.

training than the majority of the contingent. While these individuals are proficient at their MOS jobs, they did not train in the prescribed tasks for deployment, and hence they lack the proficiency in the necessary individual skills. When the augmenters join the contingent in the second phase, they often display a lower level of training proficiency than the main body, and due to the proximity of the formal evaluation, the unit tends not to devote additional time to retrain these troops. By doing this, the soldiers lose the critical skills, which often include small unit tactics, combat lifesaver courses and range time. While some of the missed training can be made up, the critical soldier skills dealing with mastering personal weapons usually do not get the needed attention.66

Consequentially, the risk for the deployed force increases and the protection aspect of the contingent decreases.

Another risk for the contingent is more technical, since if the augmenters are late, then they have to make up the administrative procedures as well. According to “SOP No 1350, SAF Participation in Military Operations” administrative issues, such as medical checks and vaccinations should be completed before the end of the first phase of training.67 If the troop contributing unit fails to identify the individuals early, or if they fail to follow the predeployment procedures prescribed in this SOP, then these soldiers will have to make up what they missed in the second phase of training. This is a significant training distraction, which will have direct effects on the training and overall performance of the deploying unit. Previous examples of the contingents deploying to Kosovo and Afghanistan had to allocate time and resources to train the individuals, who

66 Master Sargent Aljosa Cefarin, e-mail message to author, February 2013.

joined them later. In certain instances, the individuals that missed the bulk training never made it up, since the contingent had no time to provide additional training.

Once the commanders determine the current level of unit training, they must establish the operational requirements for training. Different military operations in different operational environments require different preparation. SAF participate in all the operational spectrums, from low intensity operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Lebanon to high intensity operations in Afghanistan. It is not feasible to expect a universal solution when preparing to meet the operational requirements in these operational areas; however, some common ground for training must be established. For this purpose SAF published the Annex D of the “SOP No 1350, SAF Participation in Military Operations.”

This annex prescribes the collective training for all the SAF contingents deploying on the operations. These tasks include: control point, medical and casualty evacuation procedures, cordon and search, search and rescue, Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED) procedures, area reconnaissance, battle drills, ambush, convoy operations, patrolling, force protection, quick reaction forces procedures, logistic operations, medical procedures, tactical movement, civil military cooperation procedures, base security, protection of property designated special status, route reconnaissance,

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68 Major Soltar Vojko, e-mail message to author, April 2013.

69 Captain Rijavec Miha, e-mail message to author, April 2013.

noncombatant evacuation procedures, relief in place, exfiltration, detainee operations, rules of engagements and other military tasks.71

However, prescribed tasks do not include any specific training, purposely designed for the area of operations. They do not include culture and language training and leader skills needed to perform the assigned mission. The three months, designated for this training also include an external evaluation, which by itself takes a good portion of the assigned training time. Consequentially, commanders are forced to make a decision, which of these tasks will they train on during the available time. Depending on the mission, some tasks will not be necessary; however, some of the tasks that the deploying unit needs to train on are not included in this list. The challenge that the commanders face is to create a proper METL for the specific unit in order to maximize the effectiveness of the available time and training resources. To make a sound decision about the METL, commanders must have a clear understanding of the unit’s current level of training, and the operational needs in the area they will deploy to. Formal and informal evaluations of the unit help the contingent commanders to determine the current level of training and to pick up the necessary tasks on which the unit still needs to train.

In the more complex operational environments the training is dictated by the higher headquarters, while in the more permissive environments such directed guidance is not the standard. Contingents often combine the official requirements with their own predictions and devise a specific training plan, which reflects the information available to the deploying unit.72 This was the case of more recent SAF deployment to ISAF


72Captain Rijavec Miha, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) mission in 2011. The planning team combined the formal requirements outlined in NATO OMLT Concept of Operations and their own predictions, based on a fact finding mission, to create a complex training plan, which included both formal and informal requirements for training. Using such methods to determine the training requirements is not new to the SAF, since they used them before, when preparing for ISAF operations. But when the contingents prepare for KFOR operations, the flexibility of adjusting training is reduced, due to the established routine by previous contingents. The common issue with both these operations is that the personal experiences of the involved members played an overwhelming role in the METL selection. Consequentially, the adequacy of selected tasks increased exponentially with experiences of the involved individuals. A common complaint of the interviewed SAF members is that there is a prevailing feeling of indifference by the responsible headquarters in training design and METL selection and that too much depends on the will and operational understanding of the contingent commanders.

Additional problems arise, when the contingent commanders are not assigned early on in the contingent forming process, or if they are the actual commanders of regular army units, without proper replacements at the time they are selected to command

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73Ibid.
74Captain Avsec Ales, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
75Lieutenant Obreht Ales, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
76Major Sotlar Vojko, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
77Major Sotlar Vojko, Captain Rijavec Miha, Captain Avsec Ales, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
the contingent. In such cases, SAF contingents often default to the previous METL’s used by their predecessors. This poses two additional risks to the contingent’s training level. One is that the current unit’s training level is different from the previous contingent, and the second one is that the operational needs in the area of operations have changed significantly with time. To mitigate the first risk, the contingent commander can look at the existing unit evaluation reports to determine what tasks still need additional training time. To mitigate the second one, the commander can submit a request to conduct a fact finding mission early on in the preparation process, and clearly communicate with the commander, currently on the operation. Based on these mitigations the previous commanders developed a sound METL, which helped the unit perform their mission.

For the U.S. Army, the “force size and capabilities are defined by the National Military Strategy, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and Combatant Commander’s Requirements.”\(^7^8\) The U.S. Army developed the ARFORGEN cycle as a response to meet these needs. ARFORGEN is a sequential process designed to build the unit’s capabilities to perform their assigned mission during the operational deployment. This process consists of three phased readiness cycles: reset, train/ready, and available. Through the ARFORGEN cycle the U.S. Army tailors the units to meet the specific operational requirements. ARFORGEN assures that all the components of the modular force are on the same training cycle and can therefore train to perform their assigned mission, once the unit assembles.

FM 7-0 describes in detail the process of METL development. In this process, mission focus is the essential element, since it assures that the unit trains to perform their core capabilities. If the unit is expected to perform other tasks, they should be specified as a Directed Mission and formally assigned to the particular unit. In this case, sufficient time should be allocated to train in the individual skills, which support the collective tasks. Another aspect, which helps in determining the training requirements, is the standardization of training tasks. To achieve this effect, U.S. Army developed the Core Mission Essential Task List (CMETL). This CMETL is a list of unit’s core capabilities and the general METL. CMETL enables the army to assemble random forces in the effective force package, with minimal additional training needed. “Proponents develop standard CMETLs for brigade sized and higher level units based on unit authorization document mission statements, core capabilities, and doctrine.”79 Once the unit is assigned their mission and they find out where they will deploy to, the unit develops a Directed Mission Essential Task List (DMETL). DMETL helps to determine which tasks are needed to perform the directed mission. Commanders personally analyze the assigned mission and based on this analysis, discussion and inputs from the staff and subordinate commanders, they develop the DMETL, which then further guides the training for the unit before it deploys. New U.S. Army doctrine published in 2011 eliminated the CMETL and DMETL, but SAF still use these concepts, therefore it is still pertinent for the author and this thesis.

Next the researcher examined the way SAF develop a training plan for predeployment. In essence this process is similar to the generic unit’s training plan

79Ibid., 48.
development, but there are a few distinct differences. Once the contingents determine the unit’s training requirements, they compare them to the unit’s current training level. Based on the discrepancies, they can develop a training plan for the deploying unit. Units in the SAF develop their training plans according to the “Directive for Planning of Training in Slovenian Armed Forces,” which is published annually.⁸⁰ This “Directive for Planning of Training in Slovenian Armed Forces” prescribes the procedures and training guidance for all planning, organization, execution evaluation and reporting about training in the SAF.⁸¹ According to this directive, units must determine the current level of training and based on that they develop their specific METL. Next, this directive establishes the priorities for training in SAF which is as follows:

- Training for deployments and multinational operations
- Training of the Light Battalion Battle Group (LBBG)
- Training of rapid reaction forces within the Republic of Slovenia
- Support of the military educational process conducted in the Center For Military Schools
- Training in support of affiliation to MNC-NE in NATO Rapid Deployment Corpus – Italy (NRDC-ITA)
- Training in support of prescribed operational capabilities
- Maintaining weapons proficiency of individuals
- Maintaining and increasing training level of units and commands, where financial sources do not have a direct influence
- Increase the level of proficiency of units and commands in prevention and reaction to natural disasters and other catastrophes
- Training of the reserve forces
- Mobilization training⁸²


⁸¹Ibid., 1.

⁸²Ibid., 3.
According to those priorities, the units are further divided into training categories. The battalions manage training time of companies by separating it in the Red, Amber or Green training cycle. At the end of the training cycle the units undergo a formal evaluation. Company size elements are evaluated at the SAF CTC, and larger echelons at JMRC in Hohenfelds, Germany. Priority of evaluation goes to the deploying units and the LBBG elements. SAF units devise a detailed training plan based on the commander’s evaluation and the prescribed unit’s mission. This plan follows the assigned mission and includes a time for formal evaluation. In addition, this plan serves as a foundation for resources allocation, which includes training area allocation and funding. In these circumstances the U.S. Army follows the ARFORGEN cycle, specified in FM 7-0, which provides detailed guidance which unit should train for what tasks, using what resources to reach the prescribed training objectives.

When SAF prepare for any deployment, they must adhere to a training cycle, specially designed for purposely formed Task Forces. In regular military operations combining forces in a Task Force maximizes desired effects and preserves valuable resources. Such purposely designed Task Forces often increase the basic capabilities of a specific unit, to a point, where they can perform more complex operations. SAF maximize the basic capabilities of their deployed forces, by forming Task Forces and deploying them on operations. The Task Force training cycle is composed from two specific and separate parts. First part of the training is the responsibility of the troop


84Ibid., 5.

85Ibid., 29.
contributing unit, and it encompasses the basic skills that the deployed soldiers will need on deployment. In the second part of the training the elements of the task force come together and perform the combined training. The commander of the troop contributing unit is responsible for the first part of the Task Force training cycle, while the Task Force commander is responsible for the second part. 86 This second portion of the Task Force training is the most important part of the unit integration. During this time, the Task Force starts performing as a single generic unit and its combined training maximizes the effects on the operation.

Force Command derives a tentative deployment cycle for the SAF units. Unlike ARFORGEN it does not include generic units, but it rather assigns the lead unit, responsible for providing the bulk of the forces. 87 Force Command also assigns the additional forces which will compose the deployed contingent. These soldiers come from various units across the force specially picked to augment the main force and to increase the capabilities of the deployed contingent. Force Command also assigns the commander of the Slovenian Contingent (SVNKON), and the Senior National Representative if this is needed. 88 SVNKON commander is ultimately responsible for proposing a METL to the Force Commander for approval. For a vast majority of operations, the METL is designed and assigned in the Annex D of the “SOP No 1350, SAF Participation in Military

86 Ibid., 30.

87 Slovenian Armed Forces, Forces Command, “Order for Preparation of SVNKON 15 ISAF.”

88 Slovenian Armed Forces, “SOP No 1350,” 5.
Operations”; however, as previously mentioned, this SOP does not include the additional training for a specific operational environment.

It is at this point where the human factor comes into play, and the available sources indicate, that the SVNKON commander usually relied on the other contingent members for knowledge and experience in selecting the proper tasks to include in the training. With an increased number of deployments, the operational knowledge of the contingent members increased through time.\(^8^9\) However, in the discussion with other SAF members they indicate that this is not an acceptable systematic solution. During the discussions with the SAF officers, they indicated that the selection of training tasks was sporadic and it often relied on the participant’s prior experiences.\(^9^0\) Another human factor is the selection and personal engagement of the SVNKON commander. Annex A of the “SOP No 1350, SAF Participation in Military Operations” dictates that the Forces Commander must assign the SVNKON commander at D-110.\(^9^1\) Based on the research the possibility exists, that if the assignment is delayed for any reason the METL approval and the actual predeployment training might be at risk. Besides the METL approval and communication with the Force Commander, one of the principle roles of the SVNKON commander is to ensure that all the troop contributing units are aware of the training requirements and the training standards their members must reach before the second part of the predeployment training begins. Based on the available sources the research

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\(^8^9\)Major Sotlar Vojko and Captain Rijavec Miha, e-mail message to author, February 2012.

\(^9^0\)Major Sotlar Vojko and Staff Sargent Mujcinovic Almir, e-mail message to author, February 2013.

\(^9^1\)Slovenian Armed Forces, “SOP No 1350,” Annex D, 2.
indicates that if the SVNKON commander does not take charge at an early time, then the possibility exists that some of the contingent members will not be equally or adequately trained in the individual skills prescribed for the mission.

During the second part of the predeployment training, the SVNKON trains on collective tasks necessary to perform the mission. These tasks are usually compiled from the prescribed task list for the operation, and the tasks identified after the fact finding mission in the area of operations. The training focuses on integration of different members into a single operating unit. Additionally it focuses on the tasks the unit will have to perform on the operation, and the equipment the SAF members will have to use while on the operation. The fusion of men, equipment and procedures culminates in the national evaluation, sometimes followed by a NATO evaluation prior to deployment. Based upon the formal evaluation report, the SVNKON commander determines which tasks, if any, need to be retrained, and eventually submits his report to the Force Commander.92

No action is worth anything unless properly assessed. All the resources and energy must be used for success of the mission and the only way to determine that is if we measure the effects of the performed activities. SAF periodically conducts analysis and evaluations of the training in order to determine the quality and the current level of training. Formal and informal evaluation serves the purpose of measuring the quality of training and most of all it is intended to advise how to better perform the training with the available means and resources. Continuous evaluation of training also provides up to date information about the unit’s progress and the adequacy to the training they performed in

the evaluated period. Analysis of training and achievements should be performed immediately after the completion of training. The result of this analysis could be progression of training or the retraining of certain tasks which were not performed to the prescribed standards. Commanders are responsible for providing additional time to retrain inadequately trained tasks.93

“Analysis is a structured process, which enables soldiers, commanders and units to determine what happened during the training for certain task, why it happened in such way, and how to improve the training of this task.”94 Analysis should include all participants of the training, and should not focus on the individual faults and mistakes. Instead it should focus on what happened, why it did happen like it did, and what should be done differently to improve for the next time. Analysis should not be a critique of the training, and should focus on the positive aspects instead. Basic characteristics of the analysis are:

- Analysis is conducted during or immediately after the training or exercise
- Analysis is focused on goals and purpose of training
- Analysis is focused on achievements of the individuals, commanders and the unit
- The discussion involves all the participants
- The interviewer uses open ended questions and honest discussion
- Analysis is tied to the standards of training
- Analysis determines the advantages and shortfalls of the training
- Analysis ties the training achievements to further training and tasks 95

The detailed and unbiased analysis is the basis for a report on the training. The purpose of reporting is to clearly and concisely convey a message to the superiors about

93Ibid., 62.
94Ibid., 65.
95Ibid., 66.
the performed activities. Such a report is then a basis for training progression or retraining. Therefore, it has to be accurate and detailed. The training evaluation reports are one of the most important forms of control, and the collected data serves as the foundation for unit grading and evaluation of success.

“With the analysis of textual and graphical reports one can form an answer to the question, if by proper planning, organization and execution of training, the unit reached their goals defined in the training documents, and if not, where are the reasons for failure, what are the corrective measures, and when will the unit reach its prescribed goals.”

Such training analysis must not be confused with the formal external evaluation. This is merely a textual collection of various data which include, but are not limited to, demographical data, overall comments about the reached training objectives, comments about the planning and METL selection, comments about the resources available for training and an overall assessment of the individual and unit training. Formal training records in the SAF include:

- Shooting log: basic document in which all individual and unit shooting events and exercises are recorded.
- Training log: Basic document in which all individual and unit training is recorded. It holds the information about the trained task, the training unit, the trainer, and the resources expended during the training.
- Individual check list: Basic document about the individual’s training and evaluations.
- Evaluation checklist: Basic document by which the higher command prescribes the training task and how must it be performed.

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96Ibid., 70.

Based upon these formal training records, the evaluator or the higher commander can determine whether the unit reached its goals and was therefore successful.

The highest form of unit’s performance measurement for U.S. forces is the formal external evaluation process. Formal evaluations are usually scheduled and involve evaluators from two echelons above the evaluated unit. Following the formal evaluation, the evaluated unit receives the written report, which indicates the unit’s performance level. “Evaluation measures the demonstrated ability of individuals, leaders, staffs, and units to perform against the Army or joint standard.” Evaluations usually focus on the unit’s METL and measure the unit’s performance in critical and collective tasks. The evaluations are not intended to serve as the basis for punishment, but are intended to outline the tasks and skills, which still need to be addressed. Another important factor in the way the U.S. Army measures success is the After Action Review (AAR). This is an effective method which provides valuable feedback to the unit. According to the FM 7-0, AAR is a structured process aimed at determining what should happen during training, what did happen and why it happened the way it did. Units perform AAR’s at all levels and should include all the participating members. AAR’s are performed during training, and most importantly after the completion of the training. The AAR process is aimed to develop leaders and determine how to improve training in the future.

The research showed that there is no formal requirement for the SVNKON commanders to perform an analysis of training prior to deployment. The first requirement for analysis is after the contingent returns to home station, and it is primarily focused on

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98U.S. Department of the Army, ADP 7-0, 78.
the unit’s performance during the operation. After a six month operational rotation very little knowledge remains about the training process. Hence, the final reports usually focus on operational aspects rather than on predeployment training. SAF has not yet lost a member in combat or on an operation. If there are no significant events during the operation, it is generally considered a success. This became even more evident during the recent ISAF operations where the SAF members defined success as not sustaining any casualties. It is not unusual to completely ignore the analysis portion of the final report, especially on operations which are considered to be low in intensity. A good example of this is the KFOR operation, where several members openly admitted that there was no formal analysis or After Action Reviews (AAR) that they were aware of. If the units did perform an AAR, then they did not pay much attention to it, since the general impression is that no one pays any particular attention to these reports. Without any formal AAR’s or proper analysis, it is impossible to objectively evaluate the SAF predeployment training.

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99 Slovenian Armed Forces, “SOP No 1350,” Annex D.
100 Sargent First Class Ahlin Janez, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
101 Major Sotlar Vojko, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
102 Staff Sargent Mujcinovic Almir, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
103 Captain Rijavec Miha and Captain Avsec Ales, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
104 Lieutenant Obreht Ales, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
105 Major Sotlar Vojko and Lieutenant Obreht Ales, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
The final question that remains to be answered is, does the current predeployment training system in use by SAF adequately meet the needs of the operating environment? The research of the available sources on the SAF predeployment training model revealed close ties between the U.S. and SAF literature. This is a consequence of the readily available literature and SAF officers training in the U.S. Army schools. The similarities between the two systems are most evident in the way the units evaluate the current level of training and in the way they formulate the training requirements. Both forces tend to use internal and external evaluators and formal and informal evaluations to determine the current level of training. While U.S. Army tends to include subjective unit evaluation, performed by the commander, SAF tend not to rely on it to such extent. The most important reason for this is the tendency to reduce any potential bias, due to the small size of the force. Both forces value most the formal external evaluation, which is performed in the various training centers. SAF use the SAF CTC to evaluate the company sized units, while all the higher echelons undergo the formal external evaluation in JMRC in Hohenfelds Germany. This decision has favorable effects since it reduces the bias of evaluating higher ranking battalion and brigade commanders, by the CTC commander.

The first major difference between the two systems is the way the two forces select and train the units and soldiers scheduled to deploy. While U.S. Army uses the ARFORGEN cycle, SAF regulate the annual training and deployment system with the annual orders for training in the SAF. “Directive for Planning of Training in SAF” determines the training priorities, but it fails to specify the units which will contribute their forces to deploying contingents. This is done based on the “CE list” determined in
the Forces Command order to the subordinate units. Based on this order, the troop contributing units select and prepare their members according to the manning requirements. According to the Annex A of the “SOP No 1350, SAF Participation in Military Operations” the warning order for SVNKON should be published at D-175, which means that 175 days prior to actual deployment the warning order is issued to the units to select and prepare their members for the actual deployment. The final order, defining the actual composition of the SVNKON, has to be published 110 days prior to deployment, which negates the “Manual for Unit Training,” where the predeployment training is separated in two phases, each lasting ninety days. This discrepancy precludes the troop contributing units from properly selecting, equipping and training the unit members, scheduled to deploy with the next SVNKON.

The second distinct difference between the two forces is the way they measure success. While U.S. forces use both formal evaluations and the AAR process, research indicates that SAF often tend to neglect the latter. When determining success of the predeployment training, SAF neglect to include the AAR, but rather depend heavily on the formal external evaluation of the unit. This form of evaluation does produce the evaluation of the unit’s training level, but fails to address the adequacy of the training. The study “SAF in the International Operations and Missions – Results of Empirical Research from 2003 to 2008” singled out this factor as a predominant element of

106 Slovenian Armed Forces, Forces Command: “Order for Preparation of SVNKON 15 ISAF.”
107 Slovenian Armed Forces, “SOP No 1350,” Annex A.
108 Ibid.
disconcert within the SAF. 109 Soldiers often complained that they could not contribute their input to the overall assessment and even if they could, there was no expressed interest of the higher echelons of the SAF. 110 The fact that the SAF are not using the AAR method may be precluding them from adjusting the training to the current situation in the area of operations. Consequentially, the deploying units do not use their training time to the best of their abilities.

Based on the last two observations, the author can likely conclude that the current predeployment model is not adequate to meet the requirements of the contemporary operating environment, since it does not provide enough time to properly train all the members of the deploying force, and it fails to take in effect the latest observations of the deployed members.

Through careful analysis of the available sources, this chapter has provided the answers to the research questions. The author provided answers on how SAF determines the level of training, how they determine the training requirements for operations, how the SAF develops a training model and how they measure success. This chapter also provided the answer to the main question and determined that the current predeployment training SAF uses is not adequate to meet the requirements of the contemporary operating environment. In the next chapter the author will propose a solution how to adjust the current predeployment training model in order to better prepare SAF members to meet the operational requirements and perform their mission.


110 Major Sotlar Vojko, e-mail message to author, February 2013.

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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The previous chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the SAF predeployment training system and all the benefits and shortfalls that affect the unit’s readiness. This chapter will expand on the findings and offer possible solutions for the existing situation along with recommendations for further study of the issues.

The careful analysis outlined two distinct issues which may prevent effective predeployment training of the SAF. First is the way SAF selects and trains units scheduled for deployment and the second issue is the way SAF conducts AAR’s and consequentially determines what to train as a part of the predeployment training for subsequent unit deployments. The assignment process in the SAF is currently set in a form of an annual training order which outlines the operational tasks of the units.\footnote{Slovenian Armed Forces, Forces Command: “Order for Preparation of SVN KON 15 ISAF.”} In accordance with this order, the units then prepare their members to form the contingents and to fill certain assigned spots on the operations. However, the reality is that the initial orders only cover the major troop contributing units, and that the smaller contributions are often set aside and in some cases even ignored.\footnote{Military Specialist Kovac Tomaz, Psychologist, e-mail message to author, March 2013.} While anecdotal, the research outlines that some SAF members found out late that they will be deploying, and were rarely incorporated in the predeployment training by the contingents.\footnote{Lieutenant Obreht Ales, e-mail message to author, February 2013.} On the other
hand, there were examples of when contingents would request that the augmenters join them early on but the unit commanders refused to send them since the higher headquarters did not provide their specific orders in due time. In both cases, such actions are not supporting the unity of command and the effectiveness of the contingent.

While considering that no one can predict the future and with the assumption that SAF will continue to participate in multinational operations, there is an increasing need to establish a regular rotation planning system which will assign and help prepare the available units for participation in existing operations. Such a system should enable SAF to allocate available troops and necessary equipment to the assigned tasks and would thus establish a broad battle rhythm for the SAF units in general. Such a system, which may or may not be similar to U.S. ARFORGEN system, would enable the SAF commanders to predict the training requirements for their units, and maximize the training efforts for the unit within the given constraints. Such a system would further enable the SAF unit commanders to arrange their own forces to meet all the operational requirements and, at the same time, provide the individuals with a broad guidance on their future assignments within the SAF. Based on such a system, the SAF units would know in advance when they have to be ready either for operational deployment or just to be available should any unforeseen situation arise.

Such a planned rotational system would enable responsible use of equipment as well as individuals. It would enable the commanders to use their resources and to know when they will be available, if they do not have them assigned permanently. Additionally, the creation of such training and assignments system would further enable a cognitive

114Captain Rijavec Miha, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
and educated approach to problem solving and to fulfillment of multinational and domestic assignments.

The second issue, identified by this study deals with the conduct of the AAR’s and the way SAF determines the training requirements for predeployment training. While this is a two part problem, it is interdependent on both issues for the deploying units to conduct a proper AAR after each training event, and even more importantly after each and every mission. Then they will enable the other deploying units to better use their time and training resources. These AAR’s must be properly collected and analyzed by experienced SAF individuals, who should pass these experiences to the next deploying unit. SAF are required to conduct the AAR after each operational deployment.115 These AAR’s are general in nature and conducted at the end of the operational tour.116 Hence, they focus primarily on the operational issues. While these aspects are important for future training development, anecdotally it appears they seldom focus on the training that the unit conducted prior to their deployment.117 Without a proper analysis of the past training commanders cannot determine whether their training was adequate and efficient. Consequently they cannot determine whether the preparations were successful or not. The official SVNKON AAR reports are usually broad and for undetermined reasons do not get disseminated to the next forming contingent or others, dealing with similar

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115 Slovenian Armed Forces, “SOP No 1350,” Annex A.

116 Major Sotlar Vojko, e-mail message to author, February 2013.

117 Major Sotlar Vojko, Captain Rijavec Miha, and Lieutenant Obreht Ales, e-mail message to author, March 2013.
operational requirements. The author attempted to determine the reason why this occurs but within the limits of this study this was not possible.

Another resource available to the U.S. Army is the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and their products. These centers accumulate data and disseminate pertinent information about current ongoing operations.\textsuperscript{118} The purpose of the CALL is to facilitate discussions and to share processes and practices which work effectively, or do not work well in a given theater of operations. SAF currently has a CALL set up under the Command for Doctrine, Research, Education and Training (Poveljstvo za Dokrtino, Razovj in Izobrazevanje in Usposabljanje-PDRIU).\textsuperscript{119} SAF CALL was established in 2006\textsuperscript{120} and was assigned five members, three officers and two noncommissioned officers.\textsuperscript{121} Due to the lack of manpower the SVN CALL has never included more than two officers and one noncommissioned officer who have to perform all the tasks assigned to the group.\textsuperscript{122} The SVN CALL tasks are similar to U.S. CALL tasks and among others include:

Enabling professional growth and progress of the lessons learned system within the SAF

Enabling tactical and information support to SAF by collecting, processing and disseminating experiences, recommendations and corrective measures for the SAF

\textsuperscript{118}Lieutenant Colonel Skubic Mateja, e-mail message to author, March 2013

\textsuperscript{119}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{120}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{122}Ibid.
Creation and maintenance of central database for lessons learned in SAF

Monitoring, study of, and dissemination of lessons learned in foreign militaries

Interoperability and information exchange of the lessons learned between SAF and other allied militaries

Although the SAF CALL members attempt to perform their tasks, they fall short due to several technical issues. First is the lack of manpower and experiences to properly interview the SAF members and to conduct an in-depth analysis. To overcome this issue, the SAF CALL has recruited individuals from the combat units who were additionally tasked to provide information and partial analysis to the SAF CALL and will be able to tap in the SVN CALL network as a part of their additional assignment. This practice then transferred to the Slovenian Contingents (SVNKON’s) and they assigned additional tasks to a deployed individual. Head of SVN CALL, Lieutenant Colonel Skubic assessed that this practice did not work well since the contingents often refused to fully commit to this with the excuse that the operational units and SAF contingents are too busy to do this additional task. Consequentially, crucial experiences were seldom recorded and future contingents were unaware of the issues that their predecessors faced and possibly solved. An additional issue was the placement of the SVN CALL in the command and control structure. The combat units and SVNKON’s were under the command of the Force Commander, while the SVN CALL was under the TRADOC operational structure. Since the deploying units were not specifically tasked to provide a copy of their report to the

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123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.
SVN CALL they would send their reports to the Force Command only. Normally Force Command failed to forward the reports to the SVN CALL and again the valuable information got lost.\textsuperscript{126} Several of the interviewed SAF members expressed that they never received any information from the SAF CALL during their preparation for deployment.\textsuperscript{127} The author attempted to determine the reasons why this occurred, but due to the limitation of the study this was not possible.

Without properly collected data and processed information about the current threats and good operational practices, the newly formed SVNKON cannot produce a sound training plan, which should include the most current information available. Forced to use the old and in some cases obsolete information, SVNKON’s are left to produce the best training plan they can. This is at best a haphazard process, and is not enabling the most effective use of scarce resources.

Based on the study the author can likely conclude that if the SAF wants to meet the operational needs of the contemporary operational environment then they need a system which will assign specific units specific tasks with sufficient time to prepare. Such a system would then enable the SAF units to develop a sound training plan to support the operational needs, and to fulfill the multinational obligations as well as effectively use training resources to sustain the multinational obligations to NATO and other allies.

\textsuperscript{126}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{127}Major Sotlar Vojko, Captain Rijavec Miha, and Lieutenant Obreht Ales, e-mail message to author, February 2013.
Additionally, the thesis outlined two specific fields which need further study to enable a sound conclusion. Both fields deal with the collection, processing and dissemination of pertinent information, which would enable new SAF contingents to learn from the actions and mistakes of predecessors. The first study should focus on the formal After Action Review process and on collection and analysis of these reports. The study found that the information is not passed to the next unit performing the same task, but it failed to provide the answer as to why this happens. The second area found for improvement expands on the role of the lessons learned process in the SAF. Currently SAF is undergoing a transformation that included the SVN CALL ceasing to exist. Instead the responsibility for the lessons learned passed to the J5 (plans), with an assumption that the functional commands will manage the collection and processing of data and information and the J5 managing the database for lessons learned.\textsuperscript{128} With such change it is highly likely that the learning process on the tactical level will remain the same as it has been to this point.\textsuperscript{129} Future changes should focus on the effectiveness of this system, especially in the field of data collection and information dissemination.

This research began by focusing on the current predeployment training in use by the SAF. The author wanted to determine, whether the existing system was adequate to meet the demands of the contemporary operating environment. The research focused on the units deploying to Kosovo, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Bosnia. Additionally it includes previous research, conducted by the Defense Research Institute from the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana. Based on the findings, the recommendation to SAF is to

\textsuperscript{128}Lieutenant Colonel Skubic Mateja, e-mail message to author, March 2013.

\textsuperscript{129}Ibid.
develop a new rotational based system which would allocate units and resources to the assigned tasks and develop a framework for the SAF units’ battle rhythm. Second recommendation to SAF would be to focus on developing their CALL capabilities, which would help prepare the deploying units to meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment. SAF should focus on an effective way to gather, process and disseminate pertinent information to units scheduled to deploy into certain operational areas.
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