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THESIS

**MAXIMIZING INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITHIN
THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT**

by

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September 2013

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**MAXIMIZING INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITHIN
THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

After the terrorists' attacks in New York, law enforcement agencies at all levels find themselves grappling with their additional responsibilities now that homeland security is tantamount, along with the war on drugs and gangs still being a constant struggle. From the time of the attacks to the present day, most agencies are doing more work with less people; there is no funding, equipment, or new officers to replace the ones retiring. Officers everywhere are not only overwhelmed, but, more critically, they are underestimated and under-trained. As a result of the attacks, officers are adding homeland security strategies into their existing crime prevention measures. This thesis will suggest ways in which one agency, the Los Angeles Police Department, can maximize its resources, training and equipment, thus capitalizing on the intelligence needed to be a leader in the identification of, prevention of and response to a terrorist attack.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ATF	Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
BGF	Black Guerilla Family
BPS	Black Pea Stones
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMPSTAT	Comparative Statistics
CT	Counter Terrorism
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DUI	Driving Under the Influence
ELN	National Liberation Army
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDR	Franklin Delano Roosevelt
GE	General Electric
HQ	Head Quarters
ID	Identification Card
INP	Israeli National Police
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Space
IR	Investigative Report
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
JIS	Jam'yyat Al-Islam Al Saheeh
LA	Los Angeles
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LAX	Los Angeles International Airport
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MS 13	Mara Salvatrucha
NYPD	New York Police Department
OCB	Operation-Central Bureau
OSB	Operation-South Bureau
OVB	Operation-Valley Bureau

OWB	Operation-West Bureau
PIE	Preparation of the Investigation Environment
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
RHD	Robbery Homicide Division
RICO	Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
SAR	Suspicious Activity Report
TC	Traffic Collision
TLO	Terrorism Liaison Officer

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I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, state, local and federal agencies have struggled to collaborate, thus interrupting, slowing or even preventing the sharing of intelligence between them. According to Newman and Clarke, “It has been said that 9/11 changed everything; this is certainly true for local police agencies and their chiefs” (Newman & Clarke, 2008, p. 1). Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) directed the various agencies across this nation, at all levels, to collaborate (National Commission of the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission], 2004, p. 263). Twelve years later intelligence collection in the United States is still organized around the needs and goals of individual agencies versus the nation’s goal or the joint mission (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 263). This is true, despite the fact that both the intelligence and law enforcement communities acknowledge that one agency does not hold all of the relevant information and cannot possibly “connect the dots” without opening the lines of communication, both horizontally and vertically.

The 9/11 Commission stated that the threats of the September 11 attacks fell into an abyss between the foreign and domestic threats (2004, p. 263). The foreign intelligence agencies were focused overseas, watching for threats against U.S. interests and the domestic intelligence agencies were watching for evidence of domestic threat within the U.S. Neither of them was looking for the foreign threat against U.S. targets in the homeland (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 263). According to the report, “The threat that was coming was not from sleeper cells. It was foreign but from foreigners who had infiltrated into the United States” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 263).

Today, law enforcement agencies world-wide face an increasingly complicated and sophisticated set of problems with the “emergence of globally coordinated criminal networks and national security threats” (Downing, 2009, p. 1). One such example is the unrelenting violent groups warring in Mexico. These are groups whose savagery and barbarism has spilled over into U.S. cities. These groups are members of drug cartels, criminal street gangs and terrorist groups who are intertwined or come in close proximity

to one another. These groups work together¹ and the level of violence and the sadistic ways in which the violent acts are carried out are beyond horrific. All of these groups represent a pernicious threat to global security and civil society.

Washington's Attorney General, Eric Holder called the Mexican cartels and street gangs a threat to national security adding, "They are lucrative, they are violent, and they operate with stunning planning and precision" (Holder, 2009). A more recent source stated, "Mexican drug cartels are increasing their operational presence in the United States, are responsible for violent crimes on U.S. soil and pose a threat to our national security. The latter point was most recently underscored by Iran's thwarted plot to contract with a drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S." (McCaul, 2001, p. 1) The Sinaloa cartel sent some of their own assassins to train on weapons and explosives with Islamic radicals in Iran (McCaul, 2011, p. 1).

These organized criminal groups, street gangs and terrorists have been moving in the same circle for hundreds of years and have long been a security concern for law enforcement. Some terrorist groups commit crimes as a way to fund their enterprise and some organized crime groups use terrorist tactics to achieve their goals. Experts admit that these groups are similar in structure, in the violence tactics they utilize, as well as the crimes they commit in order to support their criminal enterprises. Other experts say although they have similarities they will, in most cases, remain separate threats. Whatever the belief, with the changes in military and political affairs there is a blurring of distinction between war, crime, terrorism and gangs (Wilson & Sullivan, 2008, pp. 20–22). As the aforementioned groups converge and evolve they are changing the face of crime and terrorism. As a result, law enforcement is experiencing difficulty in distinguishing which type of criminal it is dealing with. The most effective tool in determining which type of criminal law enforcement is dealing with, and/or for crime

¹ The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), the Zetas and the notorious Maras are all engaged in internal conflict, political violence and terrorist attacks, some which have crossed over into the U.S. (Wasler, 2008, p. 2). Intelligence received from federal authorities suggests that the Los Zetas have hired members of various gangs including the Mexican Mafia, Texas Syndicate, MS, and Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos to further their endeavors (Applied Marine Technology Inc., 2007, p. 10).

prevention and counterterrorism is the gathering or collection, analysis and sharing of intelligence. According to Loyka, Faggiani & Krachmer:

In the fight against terrorism, as in the fight against crime in our communities, success depends on building a foundation of shared understanding, shared expectations, and shared goals. This challenge of intra-governmental intelligence cooperation is certainly formidable, but it is a challenge that must be met collectively because, as Americans and as law enforcement practitioners, we face together the consequences of this threat. (2005, p. 43)

This thesis discusses the importance of maximizing intelligence sharing within the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). It recommends realigning the organization, maximizing the use of its diminishing resources, equipment and funding. It provides arguments both for and against such a change, taking into consideration internal strengths, weaknesses, and the external opportunities and threats the department faces. It is not criticizing the hard work done by its officers and detectives every day or how the department is currently operated. Much of what is discussed will be the basis for future debate and research.

LAPD has previously made statements defending its efforts to collaborate by stating that New York Police Department (NYPD) will not share information (Miller, 2007, pp. 1–11). The NYPD is probably one of the most sought after agencies for its intelligence, considering it is the nation's leader in counterterrorism at the local level. Other agencies have made the same statement (i.e., that NYPD has allegedly refused to give other law enforcement agencies “access to the intelligence that has been so doggedly gathered”) (Miller, 2007, pp. 1–11). The NYPD responds to such criticism by stating, “There is no such thing as intelligence sharing; there is only intelligence trading” (Miller, 2007, pp. 111). The NYPD admits that it prefers to work with agencies that are serious about gathering intelligence on specific threats, run informants and “collect real information, rather than just circulated watered-down, non-specific threat information provided by DHS” (Miller, 2007, pp. 1–11).

The NYPD² can afford to conduct such activities and be selective in who it shares the information with, as it has a massive police force and is responsible for a policing a city that has been attacked more than once by terrorists. On the other hand, according to one LAPD official, the city of Los Angeles, although a target, has never been attacked, thus the interest in counterterrorism and the support for LAPD's Counterterrorism Unit has waned due to the amount of time that has passed since the September 11, 2001 attacks (LAPD official, personal communication, August 13, 2009).

Additionally, the financial crisis the city is currently experiencing has had major implications for most city employees, including the city's public safety employees. LAPD has had to "down-size" most of its specialized units, including the Counterterrorism Unit, leaving some of these units with only two detectives for the entire city. As a result, more and more specialized investigations are now the responsibility of the department's divisional detectives and police officers. With no money to spend and some city employees either losing their jobs or taking a pay cut, there is little interest to continue to invest money in to a fully staffed Counterterrorism Unit (LAPD official, personal communication, August 13, 2009). As supporting evidence of the financial suffering the City of Los Angeles is experiencing, it was announced on September 7, 2012, that all outside training was cancelled until further notice. Additionally, in October 2012 some of the training required of the city's law enforcement officers will be done on-line on a site that was specifically set up to save some of the costs of training associated with law enforcement. The site will be called The On-Line Training Academy (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012).

² The NYPD has 76 precincts or stations. In comparison, the LAPD has only 21 stations, and it polices a much larger geographical area. The NYPD also has 36,000 sworn officers and 14,000 civilian positions (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012). LAPD has 9,700 officers and recently its civilian staff has greatly diminished due to the poor financial status the city is in and the requirement that all civilians employees must take furlough days which makes for a 10 percent cut in pay (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012). The NYPD is considered "one of the world's largest law enforcement agencies in the world" (Miller, 2007, pp. 1-11).

The criticism and competition³ between NYPD and LAPD is only one example of the struggle law enforcement and the intelligence community still has with open communication with each other. An agency's strength is due in part to its relationship/partnerships with allied agencies (Christano, 2008, p. 5). Furthermore, effective relationships between agencies are really the relationships and trust built between the people working the various agencies (Christano, 2008, p. 5). These types of relationships can be nurtured and encouraged through joint agency training sessions, field operations and networking (Christano, 2008, p. 5). If the collaborative culture and intelligence sharing within the LAPD is under-developed, LAPD's relationship with outside agencies could suffer (like NYPD not wanting to share intelligence), as could its efforts to prevent crime and counter terrorism.

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

There is a bifurcation of intelligence collection and analysis, an emphasis on specialization or a centralized alignment versus an emphasis on the "backbone" of the department, patrol officers and divisional detectives; herein lies the problem.

Created in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the LAPD's Counterterrorism Unit is responsible for investigations involving terrorist activity and the analysis and integration of intelligence received regarding suspected activity. The Counterterrorism Unit was intended to build upon existing intelligence sharing systems and promote an increased sharing of intelligence through the creation of a collaborative culture. Based in downtown Los Angeles, the investigators assigned to this unit are responsible for the entire city of 451 square miles and over four million documented residents, as well as the countless undocumented residents.

The LAPD Counterterrorism Unit's efforts to meet the goal of intelligence analysis are stymied, in part, by how the department as a whole is configured. In the current configuration, for example, specialized units, such as the 21 gang and narcotic

³ According to Miller, "Three time zones, 3,000 miles, and a cultural galaxy apart, New York and Los Angeles face a common threat: along with Washington, D.C., they are the chief American targets of Islamic terror. And both cities boast top cops, sometimes rivals-the cities are fiercely competitive-who knew that ensuring a dog doesn't bark will determine their legacies" (Miller, 2007, p. 1).

units contained within each one of the 21 LAPD stations, are responsible for the specific and/or specialized criminal investigations assigned to them despite such obvious “cross-over, (e.g., gang members sell drugs).

LAPD gang and narcotic units are an example of two units that could be realigned. Realigning these units would cause the least disruption to the personnel assigned to those units and to the cases they have to investigate. The reason being is that gangs and narcotics units at the divisional level already report to the same supervisor (a lieutenant II). Having the two units report to the same supervisor was done several years ago because of the cross-over; gang members use and sell drugs, and to encourage the flow of communication and sharing of information. Organized criminal groups, street gangs and terrorist groups intersect, work together, have developed relationships, both long-term and short, and are a security concern for law enforcement and the community alike. In fact, if one pick up any newspaper, magazine or other correspondence one will find that despite whatever group (i.e., gang or terrorist group) has committed a bombing, assassination, extortion, kidnapping, etc., the crime(s) it committed is labeled as terrorism (Hoffman, 2006, p. 1). The intersection and alliances between these groups are changing the ability to clearly distinguish the threat, making sharing intelligence within the law enforcement and intelligence communities that more crucial.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

Will a realignment of the LAPD’s specialized units that deal specifically with organized criminal and terrorist investigations improve intelligence sharing and effective action against criminal and terrorist groups? If so, should these units be realigned?

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This research will be of interest to homeland security, law enforcement and intelligence communities by proposing a realignment of LAPD’s current organized crime, gang, narcotic and counterterrorism units to maximize intelligence sharing and improve operations against criminal and terrorist groups. The immediate consumer of this research is the LAPD however, other law enforcement agencies could benefit from it as well. Furthermore, this research will form the basis for future debate and research.

D. METHODOLOGY

The primary method used to gather information for this thesis was research and personal interviews with key law enforcement officials who possess the institutional knowledge and expertise to weigh and compare the current configuration with the proposed ones. These individuals were chosen because they are in command of, have been in command of, or have litigated cases involving criminal and terrorist groups. They have experience working with the aforementioned investigative entities, as well as the issues that complicate or otherwise restrict their investigative activities. The interviewees addressed factors that both supported and opposed the proposed configuration.

Ranking members of the LAPD were selected because of their knowledge and experience as police officers and the fact that they had been promoted to a managerial position, giving them the ability to affect the agency's policies and procedures. Most of the interviewees had 17 or more years with LAPD, thus, allowing a historical perspective of the agency to be brought to the interviews. The other individuals from the public safety community who were interviewed work closely with law enforcement and were able to provide the positive and negative aspects of working with specialized units versus investigators who possess a more generalized work history.

Prior to conducting any interviews, the researcher prepared a list of questions to ask of each interviewee. However, after the first few interviews were conducted, it became clear that prearranged questions sometimes did not invite a free flow of conversation between the interviewer and interviewee. In addition, following the prearranged questions seemed to stifle the interviewees' answers, eliminating the historical perspective and/or an elaboration of a particular answer. At a certain point, all of the interviews started sounding the same and provided little detail. As a result, how the interviews were conducted changed to allow for the interviewee to do most, if not all of the talking.

The interviews started out with the interviewer asking two, open ended questions. The first was "Based on the interviewee's training, knowledge and experience, what were

their views, including the historical perspective, on a more decentralized approach to countering terrorism and combating crime versus LAPD's current configuration, which is more specialized?" As a follow up to that question, the interviewees were asked about their views surrounding each division having their own organized crime units. The interviewer explained that these units would be made up of already existing personnel from the respected division's gang/narcotics units with the addition of a counterterrorism component. The organized crime units would be responsible for investigating the crimes they are already assigned to investigate, as well as any proposed links the crimes and/or criminals committing them may have to terrorism. The second approach taken when conducting the interviews proved to be much more effective and as the interviews progressed, certain themes began to emerge.

II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

It would be a mistake to redefine counterterrorism as a task of dealing with catastrophic, grand or super terrorism, when in fact these labels do not represent most of the terrorism that the United States is likely to face or most of the costs that terrorism imposes on U.S. interests.

–9/11 Commission, 2004

A. BACKGROUND

Los Angeles is one of the nation’s largest cities, consisting of 451 square miles and approximately four million documented people (Los Angeles Police Department, 2008). Often referred to as America’s “melting pot,” Los Angeles (LA) has numerous communities representative of 140 different countries, with its residents speaking 224 various languages (Los Angeles Police Department, 2008). This city also has the distinction of being the media capital of the world and is home to many of the rich and famous. With all its wealth and glamour, Los Angeles has a dark side too. LA, or the “City of Angels” as it is often referred to is home to some of the most violent criminal street gangs and organized groups in the country. For example, an estimated 450 active gangs and an estimated combined membership of over 45,000 members (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012). Many of these gangs have been in existence for over 50 years and have contributed to the county and city of Los Angeles being titled the nation’s “gang capitol” (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012).

The LAPD is the fifth largest police agency in America with 9,953 sworn officers and 13, 014 civilians (Los Angeles Police Department, 2012). However, due to a history of under-staffing and under-funding, Los Angeles actually has the lowest ratio of police personnel to population served nationwide. In fact, it is estimated that there is one officer for every 426 residents (Los Angeles Police Department, 2008). For comparison purposes, New York has an estimated one officer for every 288 residents. LAPD would have to hire 17,000 officers in order share the NYPD’s ratio (Los Angeles Police Department, 2008).

According to Shelly et al;

No responsibility of the United States Government is more urgent than combating the networks of Islamic extremists who have embraced terrorism as a weapon without limits against secular government. The country's ability to detect and deter acts of terror is a crucial policy concern to all Americans (Shelley et. al, 2005, p. 9)

However, the threat that organized criminal groups pose cannot be underestimated, or the lethality if the two groups joined forces and waged an attack against the homeland. America's front line of defense against terrorists and organized criminal groups is its law enforcement officers. With only one officer for every 426 residents, a depleting civilian work force and a shortage of funds and equipment, detecting and preventing violent criminal and terrorist acts is a daunting task. This task is further complicated by the intelligence gap that currently exists within the LAPD.

LAPD has 21 area stations divided into four geographical bureaus. Operation Valley Bureau (OVB), Operation West Bureau (OWB), Operation Central Bureau (OCB) and Operation South Bureau (OSB). The 21 stations are divided up and assigned to the following bureaus:

Table 1. Los Angeles Police Department Bureaus and Divisions

<u>OVB</u>	<u>OCB</u>	<u>OWB</u>	<u>OSB</u>
West Valley	Central	Wilshire	Southwest
Van Nuys	Newton	Hollywood	Southeast
Topanga	Hollenbeck	Pacific	77 th
North Hollywood	Rampart	West Los Angeles	Harbor
Mission	Northeast	Olympic	
Foothill			
Devonshire			

In addition to the 21 area stations, LAPD has several specialized units under various other commands.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Although criminals and terrorists have been moving in the same circles for hundreds of years (Dishman, 2005, p. 237), traditionally law enforcement has investigated them as completely separate groups. In the wake of the September 11 attacks and the ever growing terrorist threats with potential links to traditional crime, the literature has increasingly shown that the two groups are interacting, thus blurring the line of distinction (motives which were purely profit or politically driven) that normally kept them separate. The evaporating distinction is one of the reoccurring themes in the literature reviewed for this thesis. Another common theme found is that law enforcement is experiencing difficulty in distinguishing what type of criminal it is dealing with. The third issue frequently discussed is how certain environmental factors encourage the interaction of the two groups.

1. Terrorist and Criminal Groups: An Evaporating Distinction

A common factor or theme that emerged in the literature on the links between organized criminal and terrorist groups is the line that always separated the two is becoming less distinct and the groups are establishing mutually beneficial relationships. In a research project conducted by Shelly et al., the researchers emphasized that what used to be a discernible distinction between the two groups has become blurred (2005, p. 4). Chris Dishman states that the proliferation of criminal and terrorist groups pose new threats to the stability of our country (2005, p. 244). Clarke and Lee suggest that the characteristics, which were once unique to organized crime and terrorism, are quickly evaporating (2008, p. 378). Terrorists are becoming more involved in organized crime in order to fund their operations and organized criminals are using terrorist tactics in an effort to intimidate authorities when they put pressure on the group. The literature provided examples that clearly show the two groups converging.

Some writers have explored case studies that exhibit the cooperation and or alliance between terrorists and organized crime. For example, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) has been involved in narcotics, at first to fund its operation, but now it is dominant and in control of direct distribution all over the world. According

to Clark and Lee, “Profits obtained from trafficking have allowed the FARC to obtain sophisticated weaponry, communications equipment, and has greatly assisted them in gaining control over 40 percent of Columbian territory” (2008, p. 378). In January 2002, members of Hezbollah⁴ were arrested for smuggling pseudoephedrine, a chemical used in the processing of methamphetamines, from Canada to Mexican criminal street gangs in the Midwest (Dishman, 2005, pp. 246–247). In 1986, the El Rukn Gang, a splinter group of the Black P Stones,⁵ plotted terrorist attacks against the U.S. on behalf of the Libyan government. The plot involved purchasing machine guns, silencers, hand grenades and M-72 Series light anti-tank weapons to destroy federal properties and to shoot down a passenger plane (Sperry, 2008, pp. 1–5). Pablo Escobar, the head of a Columbian drug cartel, hired National Liberation Army (ELN) terrorists to wage a bombing campaign against the government on his behalf (Shelley et al, 2005, pp. 36–39).

Furthermore, Latin American transnational criminal gangs have used terrorist groups to protect their drug manufacturing plants and in Northern Ireland, and terrorists have provided protection for the Chinese Triads in their human smuggling operations (Shelley et al, 2005, pp. 36-39). These examples are relevant to Los Angeles, or any major city in America, as gang violence is a nationwide problem. As previously mentioned, Los Angeles is home to approximately 450 violent street gangs; the Black P Stones and Chinese Triads are only two of them. Some of these gangs have international connections,⁶ have learned from one another and solicit one another for goods and services. These gangs examine history and study not only their successes and failures, but the successes and failures of their rivals and/or competitors. It is said in gang culture that once someone is a gang member, he or she is one for life. Gang members live by

⁴ United States and Canadian authorities arrested members of Hezbollah in “Operation Mountain Express.” “The Hezbollah operatives had established a long standing criminal alliance with the Mexican drug dealers from which they netted millions of dollars that were laundered to terrorists in the Middle East.” (Dishman, 2005, pp. 246–247).

⁵ Black P Stones (BPS) is a black street gang that formed on the south side of Chicago in the 1950s.

⁶ Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13, for example has a membership of approximately 70,000 worldwide with 60,000 members spread out between El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico and Canada. There are roughly 10,000 members in the United States alone (Uranga, R., 2009, p. 31).

one set of rules the gangs' rules, and their loyalty is usually first and foremost to the group itself, not the city or country in which they live.⁷

In the examples provided, gangs, organized criminal groups and terrorist groups move in the same circles and solicit the services of one another (Dishman, 2005, p. 237). It is easy to see the difficulty for the nation's law enforcement officers to distinguish between a terrorist and an organized criminal group. The literature did not explain or otherwise discuss at what point a group like the Black P Stones is defined as a terrorist group, or FARC as an organized criminal group. Defining a street gang as a terrorist organization or vice versa would most likely results in restrictions in the way the groups are investigated and prosecuted.

2. Law Enforcement Response

A second theme that emerged from the literature is that law enforcement members are experiencing some difficulty in distinguishing which type of criminal they are dealing with as a result of the evaporating distinctions between the groups as the following compelling example demonstrates. Diana Dean, a U.S. Customs Inspector working Port Angeles Washington, sent a lone male, who had entered her post, over to her co-workers for a secondary inspection. A few minutes later, the man attempted to flee the location but was pursued by three agents. The customs officials thought they were dealing with a drug smuggler. However, the lone male's car was actually packed with explosives. Dean and her colleagues uncovered an Al Qaeda plot to bomb Los Angeles International airport (Shelley et al., 2005, p.10). The subsequent investigation revealed that warnings made by European police, along with vital evidence about the perpetrators' involvement in organized crime, had been disregarded by law enforcement on this side of the Atlantic (Shelley et al., 2005, p. 10). If the authorities had made the connections based on what they already knew about the criminal activity, this terrorist plot would never have progressed so far (Shelley et al., 2005, p. 10).

⁷ Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), said, "criminal enterprises are...frequently involved in, allied with, or otherwise rely on smuggling operations. Alien smugglers frequently use the same routes used by drug and contraband smugglers and do not limit their smuggling to aliens, smuggling anything or anyone at the right price" (Kimery, 2009b, pp. 32-33). These criminal and terrorist groups have no loyalty to the U.S.

Research done by Chris Dishman supports the Dean example provided by Shelley et al. by pointing out the fact that a lead in a criminal investigation can lead investigators to a terrorist (2005, p. 249). In other research conducted by Loyka et al, researchers stated that terrorism can and does manifest itself in traditional criminal activity (terrorists are committing crimes), thus the prevention of a terrorist attack starts at the local level or more specifically, the street level (2005, pp. 3–8).

According to Wasler (2008, p. 2), the murderous activity at the U.S. and Mexican border between indigenous organizations causes further confusion for the police in their efforts to properly identify and distinguish which type of criminal they are dealing with. The FARC, the Zetas⁸ and the notorious Maras are all engaged in internal conflict,⁹ political violence and terrorist attacks, some which have crossed over into the U.S. (2008, p. 2). Intelligence received from federal authorities suggests that the Los Zetas have hired members of various gangs, including the Mexican Mafia, Texas Syndicate, MS, and Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos, to further their endeavors (Applied Marine Technology Inc., 2007, p. 10).

Despite the evidence of the two groups interacting, there are still those who feel that the relationship is only a matter of business and therefore insignificant. For example, Hutchinson, Steven and O'Malley believe that such relationships as the ones described above are simply a matter of business and will not be long-standing or significant (2007, p. 1096). In a threat assessment done by the DHS, 2008-2013, entitled *One Team, One Mission, Securing the Homeland*, it stated that alien and drug smuggling organizations have little to no incentive to derail their lucrative operations by facilitating terrorists; and terrorists would unlikely want to develop relationships with such criminal organizations for operational security reasons (Kimery, 2009b, p. 32).

⁸ Los Zetas are the most significant enforcement group associated with any drug cartel. Its members made conscious decisions to leave military careers and use their skills for criminal purposes.

⁹ Starting in 1989 and continuing today, Mexico's one party system has been eliminated, thus the cartels have deployed greater autonomy from political power (Schroeder, 2009, pp. 27–28). As a result, they negotiate with all levels of government and they promote drug consumption. According to Schroeder, "Drug trafficking groups now fight among themselves to compete for a hegemonic position, with resulting escalation in rivalry-based violence" (2009, p. 28).

Criminal groups are parasitic. This often results in terrorists being forced to intersect with a particular criminal group, because that criminal group has control over a relevant illegal market. Shelley et al disagree with this view and describe the relationships between organized criminal groups and terrorist as significant and suggested that such relationships are underestimated and not much attention has been given to them (2005). A potential negative consequence of this is that information that could lead to early detection of some terrorist groups and their operations has not been properly or thoroughly analyzed and integrated by counterterrorist investigators (Shelley, et al., 2005, p. 9). Furthermore, Chris Dishman agrees with Shelley et al. and states that separating criminal investigations from terrorist investigations can interfere with the identification and apprehension of terrorists (2005, p. 249).

The literature appeared to be divided regarding the relevance of the relationships between criminal and terrorist groups. Additionally, there was little discussion as to how law enforcement officials should investigate or respond to such relationships. Shelley et al, created a methodology for analysts and investigators “to overcome the complexity, identify crime-terror interactions more quickly and to assess their importance with confidence” (2005, p. 4). Their methodology is based on the military’s intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB).¹⁰ They named it preparation of the investigation environment (PIE)¹¹ (Shelley et al., 2005, p. 22). PIE identifies areas where the two entities are most likely to meet and provides indicators that suggest whether the interaction has already occurred. Most of what Shelley et al. suggested investigators should do, they are already doing. The problem is that it is being done by different specialized investigative entities that do not work together or openly communicate and share information. Their jobs are bifurcated, thus so is critical intelligence. Chris Dishman (2005) warns about the bifurcation of criminal and terrorist intelligence in his work and comes up with a solution that is very simple and does not involve methodology

¹⁰ IPB examines threat, terrain and doctrine in order to make their predictions about what will occur on the battlefield and the course of action they intend to take as a result.

¹¹ PIE examines criminal and terrorist networks, environment and behavior in order to identify the watch points and areas of interaction.

or in depth analysis. Terrorism-only units should not be created within an agency, as it will create an institutional barrier between criminal and terrorism analysts (2005, p. 249). Instead these units should be integrated creating immediate accessibility to criminal and terrorist intelligence.

3. Environmental Factors Influencing Interaction

Certain environments encourage interaction between the two groups more readily than others. Shelley et. al defines such environments as weak or loosely controlled states, states with security gaps like Iraq and Afghanistan, areas of intense conflict with no respect for the law like the Tri-Border and Chechnya, and the American prison system (2005, p. 5). In addition, Walser agreed with this definition and stated that the security of the Western hemisphere is in danger because of porous borders, weak institutions, ungoverned regimes and widespread corruption (2008, p. 2). Moreover, Oehme and Chester state in their research that investigators should not be so focused on methods and motives, but on the structural conditions that promote closer interaction between the two groups (2008, pp. 81–82). Furthermore, they agree with Walser and add that porous and poorly guarded borders, weak, post conflict states and states experiencing widespread and systematic corruption encourage lucrative criminal opportunities (Oehme & Chester, 2008). In an article written by Congressman Michael McCaul, he referenced statements made by two retired U.S. Army generals who testified during a Homeland Security oversight hearing regarding the Mexican drug cartels (2011). The Congressman stated that the plot that was thwarted involving Iran trying to hire a cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. was “the threat that we have been warning about for years. This makes it that much more imperative that the border is secure” (McCaul, 2011, p. 1).

The biggest gap in the literature has to do with the inability of law enforcement to deal with poorly governed or weakened states, or how it fails to manage poorly guarded borders. Law enforcement officers respond to the effects of such conditions, which often manifest themselves in narcotic, gang and other violent criminal activity in American cities and neighborhoods, rather than to the causes. According to Congressman McCaul, “It is hard to imagine us protecting America from a terrorism threat if we don’t have a

unified federal law enforcement strategy to protect America's borders" (2011, p. 1). Law enforcement has a long standing tradition of being more reactive to crime versus proactive. The problem with terrorism and organized criminal groups is that they require more proactive policing.

The Department of Justice believes that the threat of terrorism exists wherever criminals exploit weaknesses in law enforcement and homeland security (Olson & Lee, 2012, p. 10). It is not inconceivable that terrorists would attempt to enter and/or smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the U.S. using the same routes that drug and alien smugglers use (Olson & Lee, 2012, p. 10). Some analysts say that the spillover violence from Mexico is a very serious threat to America. Two retired U.S. generals stated the following:

Living and conducting business in a Texas border county is tantamount to living in a war zone in which civil authorities, law enforcement agencies as well as citizens are under attack around the clock. The Rio Grande River offers little solace to the echoes of gunshots and explosions. News of shootings, murders and kidnappings, beheadings, mass graves and other acts of violence coming across the border go far beyond any definition of "spillover violence." (Olson & Lee, 2012, p. 11).

Other analysts say that the data is insufficient and therefore inconclusive. Also according to Olsen and Lee:

Isolated instances of crimes such as kidnappings and home invasion robberies directed against those involved in drug trafficking are reported in U.S. border communities. However, the available data is insufficient to support trend analysis—particularly an analysis of whether such crime is increasing (Olson & Lee 2012, p. 11).

The literature was full of information regarding the connection between criminal and terrorist groups, but not on exactly what local law enforcement needs to do to improve on identifying such a connection. Some experts say that law enforcement officers are already using the tools (i.e., preventative patrol, investigations and surveillance) that combat terrorism; the way in which they use them just needs to be tweaked. The one thing that the literature indicated as being the most effective counterterrorism tool is intelligence.

The reoccurring themes in the literature-convergence of criminality and terrorism, environmental factors that invite or attract such a convergence and law enforcement's response-all point out the incredible responsibility and role America's first responders play in counterterrorism. However, as important as the first responders are, they are significantly under-utilized and their value under estimated. The literature did not address this issue except to reinforce the need for open communication and intelligence sharing between all those in the fight against terror.

III. CRIME, TERRORISTS AND FRONT LINE PERSONNEL

U.S. law enforcement officers routinely deal with terrorism; they call it something else. Even the FBI labels the majority of domestic terrorist activities under the common titles of crime in the Uniform Crime Report, an annual standard of measure of criminal activity in the United States.

–Jonathan White, 2006

With the increase of terrorist threats and their potential ties to traditional street crimes law enforcement agencies must continue to work closely with the communities they serve in order to detect, prevent and respond to a terrorist threat or attack. According to Newman and Clarke, “Terrorists are criminals too...the behaviors that comprise terrorism-even suicide terrorism-are a little different from those that conventional criminals displays” (2008, p. 21). If LAPD is going to be a leader in counterterrorism and demonstrate the effectiveness of solid and robust intelligence it has to better utilize and maximize the potential of existing resources. They also state, “Counterterrorism has to be woven into the everyday workings of every department” (Newman & Clarke, 2008, p. 2). Furthermore, Christano explains, “The continued safety and security of America relies largely on the sustained vigilance of front line officers coupled with their abilities to recognize and respond to terrorist pre-operational activities” (2008, p.1). He also states, “Arguably this is the most critical facet in terms of deterring, disrupting or preventing future attacks within this country” (Christano 2008, p. 1). All law enforcement agencies must resist any disproportionate focus on Islamic extremism and stop viewing street gangs and other organized criminal groups as insignificant or as having no nexus to terrorists. Many terrorists, especially those in this country illegally, have to live the life of fugitives - that is they have to commit crimes, not just to fund and carry out their attack, but to live (Kelling & Bratton 2006, p. 18). They maintain themselves with legal documents, committing burglaries and robberies, dealing drugs, committing fraud etc. White explains:

Counterterrorism is not a mystical operation. It uses many of the skills already employed in preventive patrol, criminal investigation, and surveillance. With a few tweaks, police intelligence operations and drug

enforcement units can add counterterrorism to their agendas, and patrol and investigative units can be trained to look for terrorist activities in the course of their normal duties. (2006, p. 279)

The following case studies demonstrate the nexus between criminals and terrorist, the crucial role patrol officers play in making the connection between the two groups and disrupting their illegal activities.

A. THE BLACK RIDER CASE

Two LAPD counterterrorism officials identified the Black Rider case as representative of criminal and terrorist organizations moving in the same circles, and the critical role front line personnel are playing in identifying such connections. On an undisclosed date, an LAPD's 77th station officer was having lunch at an un-named diner in the area. Prior to leaving, he was approached by the waitress who informed him that her son was a member of an organization called the Black Rider Liberation Party and was discussing plans to blow up several LAPD stations. The officer took the information, which included the waitress's son's name and address and he (the officer) turned it over to counterterrorism investigators (LAPD official, personal communication, May 5, 2009).

Counterterrorism investigators identified five primary suspects in this plot. Needing more evidence, they approached the mother (waitress) of the primary suspect who agreed to cooperate with the investigation. She allowed the investigators to clandestinely wire her house and she engaged her son (primary suspect) in conversation about his destructive plans (LAPD officials, personal communication, May 5, 2009). In the conversations between mother and son, the suspect revealed that he wanted to be a martyr. He discussed the attire the suspects would wear during the attacks, which consisted of all black clothing with berets (LAPD officials, personal communication, May 5, 2009). The counterterrorism investigators eventually were able to identify some of the other members involved in this terrorist plot.

Armed with the aforementioned information, counterterrorism investigators inserted an undercover officer of Middle Eastern descent. The non-suspecting suspects believed the officer was one of them and provided him with a "wish list" (LAPD

officials, personal communication, May 5, 2009). The “wish list” consisted of a request for surveillance on several LAPD stations and the LAPD headquarters. The LAPD stations that were targeted for a bombing included 77th, Hollywood, Southwest and headquarters¹² (LAPD officials, personal communication, May 5, 2009). Subsequently, search warrants were served at the identified suspects’ residences in which several weapons were recovered.

The Black Riders are a spin-off of the Black Panther Party,¹³ and its members are members of the Crips and the Bloods. Their goal was to shoot and kill as many police officers as possible in furtherance of their anti-government and black separatist views. In interviews with some of the members arrested, they told investigators they did not recognize LAPD, or any other government agency as legitimate organization representative of law and order. When interviewed by the media, the members claim not to be gang members from gangs outside of the Black Riders and deny that the Black Riders are a gang at all (LAPD officials, personal communication, May 5, 2009). They claim instead that LAPD is a gang and the Black Riders are simply out to unite members of rival gangs and to bring about reform. The members of the Black Riders have yet to offer an explanation as to why, if they are an organization wishing to end violence by uniting rival gangs, they were in possession of large caliber automatic and semi-automatic weapons; a military handbook on intelligence and interrogation; night vision goggles; bulletproof vests; knives; a crossbow; police scanner, and manuals on police field operations, sniper procedures and bioterrorism. The Black Riders are considered a domestic terrorist group by the FBI and the LAPD (LAPD officials, personal communication, May 5, 2009). Their trial for the criminal charges described has yet to be concluded.

¹² These LAPD stations were targeted because officers from those areas had arrested various members of the group. Included in writings and recorded conversations, members had intimate details of the inside of LAPD headquarters (Parker Center at the time of the investigation) (LAPD officials, personal communication, May 5, 2009).

¹³ The Black Panther Party was an African American organization active in the U.S. from 1966 until 1982. It was started primarily to protect black people from police brutality.

In a recent bulletin disseminated by the Los Angeles County Sheriffs, The Black Riders Liberation Party consider themselves “The New Generation Black Panthers (Los Angeles County Sheriffs, 2012). Members of the group request that all Bloods and Crips unite to fight white people and police. They claim these same enemies push crack cocaine, HIV and AIDS, guns and unemployment (Los Angeles County Sheriffs, 2012). The Black Riders have posted recruitment posters and letters have been found in prison where the groups claims they have a nation-wide prison chapter and a fund they call “Kill a Pig Fund” where the funds are used to commit acts of violence against police (Los Angeles County Sheriffs, 2012). The Black Rider Party and their objectives are eerily familiar to the Black P Stones.

B. THE BLACK P STONES

The Black P Stones is a black street gang which formed in the Southside of Chicago, Woodlawn neighborhood, in the late 1950s. Its founders, Jeff Fort and Eugene Hairston formed the group in the Saint Charles Institution for troubled youth in order to fight against the white street gangs. The “youth group” as it was referred to then, was originally called the Blackstone Rangers. Jeff Fort, the groups’ charismatic leader, united the leaders of approximately 21 area street gangs into a single organization, the Black P Stone Nation (Florida Department of Corrections, 2008). The main objective of the organization in the 1970s was to empower the black people. They held parades and picnics on Sundays and handed out candy and money to families with small children. Jeff Fort even started a Martin Luther King Movement to fight against Neo Nazis. Since their inception, the Black P Stones had a black power agenda. They were anti-white and anti-government. However, they were also into drug dealing, intimidation, robbery, extortion and money laundering. Most people, when they hear Black P Stones mentioned, think “gang bangers,” not civil rights organization, as Fort liked to portray the group.

According to the Florida Department of Corrections, “The Black P Stone Nation was controlled by a 21-man commission, self-titled the Main 21. The leaders projected the group as socially conscious, self-help organization that would help uplift themselves

and their community” (2008). However, the money raised was used to fund the P Stones illegal activities. Once these crimes were discovered by law enforcement, Jeff Fort was indicted by a grand jury and sent to federal prison. Fort was released in the early 1980s only to return to prison for drug related charges. It was during his time in prison that Fort was introduced to Islam.

Once out of prison Jeff Fort changed his name to Abdullah-Malik (Florida Department of Corrections, 2008). He called a meeting of the Black P Stones and announced that he was taking over the leadership of the organization. The organization split with most of its members staying loyal to Fort (at the time Fort was calling himself Caliph Malik), and the rest following Eugene Hairston. The split resulted in significant in-fighting over the control of the drug sales. The in-fighting caused Fort and Hairston to become bitter enemies and Hairston made several attempts to end Fort’s life. Hairston, addicted to heroin, met with failed attempt after attempt and was ultimately murdered during a drug deal gone awry. By this time, the Black P Stones were starting to splinter and becoming disorganized. Fort, becoming more religious than political, changed the name of the organization from Black P Stones to El Rukns.

El Rukns embraced Islam and were influenced by Black Muslim groups such as Nation of Islam and Five Percenters. However, not all of the Black P Stones adopted Islamic principles and more splintering occurred. The P Stones in the south did not acknowledge Islam but those in the east did. Moreover, the Black P Stones in California paid very little attention to Islam.

Although Fort and the El Rukns were more religious than political at this point, Fort still had influential political connections. The group was connected with the Black Panthers and there was some discussion about the two groups joining forces. Louis Farrakhan was the person who was rumored to have introduced Fort to members of the international community who were involved in Black Nationalism and terrorist activity (Williams, 2002, pp. 1–7). In 1986, Fort plotted terrorist attacks against the United States on behalf of the Libyan government. According to Sperry, “The scheme involved buying machine guns, silencers, hand grenades and M-72 Series Light Anti-Tank Weapons, known as LAW rockets, to destroy federal vehicles and buildings and even shoot down a

commercial jetliner” (2008, pp. 1–5). During one visit to Libya, members of El Rukn were provided a ground to air rocket launcher to smuggle into the United States. Fortunately, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intercepted the package and placed a tracking device inside. As a result, the package was tracked to the El Rukns headquarters and members of the gang, along with Jeff Fort were arrested, charged and convicted for conspiring to commit terrorist actions against the United States (Sperry, 2008, pp. 1–5). Fort was sentenced to 80 years in prison.

The arrest of Fort and members of El Rukn caused further fragmentation of the Black Stones. Currently, there is rampant in-fighting as there is no real organization or chain of command. Many of the Black P Stones sets¹⁴ are known today for their extreme violence against rival street gangs and occasionally against each other. This violence is usually in response to the defense of territory (a neighborhood) and or control over narcotics sales. The Black Power agenda that was the organization’s focus in the 70s is not a priority today. Today, the Black P Stones work in groups committing organized robberies accompanied by distraction teams. For example, groups of four will be sent out to rob several convenience stores in carefully selected neighborhoods simultaneously. The groups of four will be accompanied by a separate group that will intercept police and delay their response allowing a clean get away. Some common distraction techniques are blatant traffic violations, stopping officers with a story regarding a crime that never occurred, etc. Although Black Power has taken a backseat to making money, members of the Black P Stones are aligned¹⁵ with the Black Guerilla Family (BGF) whose main goals are to eradicate racism and overthrow the United States government.

Assessment: after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Black P Stones who are influenced by Islam aligned with the BGF, which had ties to domestic and international terrorism. This brought negative attention to the organization by the federal

¹⁴ “In the 1980s, within prison walls, gangs began separating into alliances. “Sets” is a term used in the black gang culture to describe the various gangs that are aligned with one of the two Chicago alliances (for example), People Nation Sets and Folk Nation Sets. The Black P Stones are aligned with People Nation Sets” (Florida Department of Corrections, 2008). In California, the various black gangs align themselves with either the Bloods or the Crips. Essentially,” sets” is another word for gangs.

¹⁵ When the gangs are “aligned” it means they are allies and work together, or one gang will work for another.

government and local law enforcement authorities. They have been declared a threat to homeland security, but they have are not considered a terrorist group (Williams, 2002).

C. JAM'YYAT AL-ISLAM AL SAHEEH

In 1997, a prison inmate, Kevin James, who had multiple aliases formed a radical Islamic organization known Jam'yyat Al-Islam Al Saheeh (JIS) (Mrozek, 2007, pp. 1–4). James created this organization based on his interpretation of Islam. He declared that any member of JIS was to target for violent attack “any enemies of Islam or infidels, including the United States Government, Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel” (United States District Court for the Central District of California, 2004, pp. 13–17). While in prison, James recruited fellow prison inmates to join JIS. One such recruit was Levar Washington (Mrozek, 2007, pp. 1–4). James required all perspective members to take an oath of obedience and non-disclosure of the JIS Organization (United States Court for the Central District of California, 2004, pp. 13–17). James’ recruitment efforts extended outside prison walls as he sought to establish “cells” of JIS members who would carry out the previously described violent attacks (United States Court for the Central District of California, 2004, pp. 13–17).

Upon being released from prison, Washington recruited others into the plot: Gregory Patterson and Hammad Samana. After Patterson and Samana were recruited and took their oath of obedience they, along with Washington, “conducted about a dozen armed robberies of gas stations to obtain money for the groups planned attacks in the Los Angeles area” (Department of Justice, 2008, pp. 1–3). It was reported that Samana surveilled the following targets: Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Consulate of Zion, Military Targets, Army Recruiting Centers, a Military Base in Manhattan Beach and Campsite of Zion (Department of Justice, 2008, pp. 1–3), and prepared a document called “Modes of Attack.” The group was caught after Patterson dropped a mobile telephone after one of the gas station robberies and officers recovered it (Pipes, 2005, p. 1). The officers’ discovery of the mobile phone initiated an investigation that involved 25 agencies and 500 investigators (Pipes, 2005, p. 1).

A search warrant was served on Levar Washington's apartment in which officers recovered bullet proof vests, knives, jihad literature¹⁶ and the addresses of the above described targets (Pipes, 2005, p. 1). In a statement made by Salvador Hernandez, Assistant Director of the FBI, James and the JIS "reminds us of the evolving terror threat we face..." (Mrozek, T., 2009, p. 1). The JIS was dismantled with the arrest of James and the other members.

D. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES (DMV) CASE

The Counterterrorism Bureau received information from a police officer who made an arrest of an un-named person for driving under the influence (DUI) and causing a traffic collision (TC). The officer had discovered that the un-named driver was of Middle Eastern descent with a Hispanic identification card (ID). An investigation initiated by LAPD's counterterrorism investigators revealed that a woman of Pakistani descent owned a private registration company¹⁷ and for a \$1,000 was providing illegal Middle Eastern aliens with a Hispanic identity (LAPD official, personal communication, May 5, 2009). Due to the magnitude of the case and the far reaching tentacles of the suspect, LAPD counterterrorism investigators solicited the assistance of various agencies, including the FBI (LAPD official, personal communication, May 5, 2009). This case is an example of a crime, embedded in a trusted governmental institution that provides support for lower level crimes all the way up to potential terrorism-related cases. Upon this case's conclusion, 18 search warrants were served and 15 arrests were made, which included three state employees (LAPD official, personal communication, May 5, 2009).

A technology correspondent for MSNBC asked the following question: in a world where 10 million people a year can have their identity stolen, where pretending to be someone else is as easy as stealing a wallet, what

¹⁶ In the documents seized during the service of the search warrant at Washington's apartment the members of JIS discussed the end result of their attacks "was to kill as many people possible who were present at the locations they were targeting" (Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation (NEFA), 2008, p. 4).

¹⁷ Section 1685 of the Vehicle Code states that in order to improve the quality of products its provides to customers, DMV may establish contracts for electronic programs that allow qualified private industry partners to join the department in providing services that include processing payment programs for vehicle registration, titling transactions and license renewal without testing.

good are traveler databases and terrorist watch lists; after all, they are easily foiled by impersonation? (Sullivan, 2004, p. 1)

The terrorists that attacked America on September 11, 2001 boarded the planes they hijacked using their real names. However, during the planning phase of the attack “the hijackers had liberally used document fraud, some to ease entrance into the United States, others to move around once they were here and to obtain driver’s licenses they needed to board the airplanes” (Sullivan, 2004, p.1).

Some experts say that terrorism and identity theft go hand in hand. Judith Collins, an identity theft expert and professor at Michigan State University said, “The Al-Qaeda training manual includes provisions for trainees to leave camp with five fake personas. Terrorists are regularly schooled in the art of subsisting off credit card fraud while living in the United States” (Sullivan, 2004, p.1). In the *9/11 Commission*, it acknowledges that:

...travel documents are as important as weapons and fraud is no longer just a problem of theft. At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are. (9/11 Commission, 2004, pp. 393–398).

E. CITIZEN X

Two LAPD counterterrorism investigators received a suspicious activity report (SAR)¹⁸ from a detective working Pacific Station. For confidentiality purposes, the counterterrorism investigators could not provide the name of the “suspicious” individual. Therefore, the suspicious person will hereinafter be referred to as Citizen X.

In summary, the Pacific detective had received an investigative report (IR)¹⁹ involving an embezzled car. A car rental company had reported that Citizen X rented one

¹⁸ A Suspicious Activity Report, or SAR is a LAPD report used to document suspicious activity with potential connections to terrorist activity. All SARs are sent to the Counterterrorism Bureau for investigation and confirmation if in fact the activity reported is connected to terrorist activity. No SARs are kept at any of the 21 area stations for confidentiality purposes. Any SAR found to be benign, the information on the SAR is deleted and the report is destroyed.

¹⁹ An IR is an Investigative Report is a report used to document the details of a preliminary investigation. It is most commonly completed by uniformed patrol officers, the first to arrive at the scene of a crime.

of their cars with an “out of country” ID, but had not returned it on the agreed upon date. Remembering the clandestine tactics of the hijackers from the September 11 attacks, the Pacific station detective felt this case should be reviewed by counterterrorism investigators. The counterterrorism investigators contacted federal authorities who checked Citizen X’s name against various data bases and confirmed that he was in fact a person of interest to the United States and a threat to the security thereof. Citizen X was ultimately arrested and linked to terrorist activity, more specifically bomb and explosives manufacturing (LAPD official, personal communication, May 5, 2009). Due to the fact that the investigation involving Citizen X is ongoing and a matter of national security no further details of the case could be provided.

Citizen X and the other cases discussed herein demonstrate terrorists engaging in “ordinary” or otherwise traditional criminal activity and the criticality of front line personnel in detecting this. Due to the fact that Citizen X’s identity could not be revealed, the charges filed and any prosecutorial conclusion could not be reported. However, this case, as do the others, demonstrates “the opportunities for terrorist exploitation must be identified at the local level where actions can be taken to reduce these opportunities” (Newman and Clarke, 2008, p. 23). Here are some more examples of local law enforcement officers thwarting, or otherwise preventing terrorist attacks on the homeland.

F. THE PORTLAND SEVEN CASE

In September, 2001, a deputy in Skamania County, Washington responded to a radio call of a noise complaint (Ashcroft, 2002). Upon his arrival he discovered men in turbans having target practice with several guns, including an assault rifle. The land they were on was private and they were uninvited (trespassing) (Ashcroft, 2002). In December of the same year, another Skamania sheriff contacted Portland law enforcement after seeing the news regarding a possible terrorist case. The sheriff recognized one of the men in the report as one of the men having target practice described above (Ashcroft, 2002). After that sheriff’s call, the FBI and local police started watching the men in question.

In October 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice charged six people, five of whom are American citizens for conspiring to join Al Qaeda and allied soldiers in Afghanistan to fight the U.S. (Ashcroft, 2002). According to U.S. v. Battle, Indictment filed October 2, 2003:

In detailing the defendants' plans to join the Taliban, the indictment noted: on or about September 29, 2001, in Washougal, Washington, defendants...shot various firearms...all of which were used by members of the conspiracy to engage in weapons training to prepare the conspirators to assist the forces in the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, including those associated with Al Qaeda, against the United States and its allies.

During the announcement of the indictment, Attorney General Ashcroft stated:

...today's case is a textbook example of the central role that cooperation among local, state and federal law enforcement plays in the prevention of terrorist attacks...The information provided by Deputy Sheriffs Bryan and Mercer helped lead Oregon authorities to the individuals arrested today (2002).

G. CHARLOTTE HEZBOLLAH CIGARETTE SMUGGLING CASE

Eighteen people were arrested after being connected with a Hezbollah cell that was involved in financing terrorism via the money earned through illegal cigarette sales (Department of Justice, 2003). The U.S. Treasury Department released this statement regarding the case:

The case began when local law enforcement in North Carolina observed activity that led them to suspect inter-state cigarette smuggling and shared this information with federal law enforcement officers. Thereafter, the FBI, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) with continuing close cooperation from local and Canadian law enforcement conducted an investigation that revealed a massive cigarette smuggling and tax evasion scheme. (U.S. v. Hammound, Superseding Bill of Indictment, 2001).

According to a U.S. News and World Report in 2003:

The defendants bought large amounts of cigarettes in North Carolina, where the tax of cigarettes was five cents a pack. They transported the cigarettes to Michigan, where the tax was 75 cents a pack. The money designated for Hezbollah was sent to the cell members in Canada, who

used the funds to purchase such items as night vision devices, global positioning systems, mine and metal detection equipment, stun guns, nitrogen cutters, laser range finders, camera equipment, advanced aircraft analysis and design software, mining, drilling and blasting equipment, and military style compasses. Other funds were passed on directly to Hezbollah. By the time of their arrests, the smugglers had earned close to \$8 million.

On February 28, 2002, the leader of the ring, Mohammad Hammoud was sentenced to 155 years in prison (Department of Justice, 2003).

H. RANDALL ROYER AND THE VIRGINIA PAINTBALL JIHAD CASE

Once again, during a traffic stop by an Alexandria, Virginia police officer, Randall Royer was found with an AK-47, 219 rounds of ammunition and a collapsible stock (U.S. v. Royer, 2003). This information was passed on to the federal government and proved to be valuable in not only proving a case against Royer, but it resulted in eleven other men being indicted on 41 counts for conspiracy to train for and participate in violent jihad (U.S. v. Royer, 2003). The indictment read, in part:

It was part of the conspiracy that the defendants and their conspirators prepared to become mujahedeen and die “shaheed”- that is, as martyrs in further of violent jihad...The purpose of the conspiracy was to prepare for and engage in violent jihad on behalf of Muslims in Kashmire, Chechnya, the Philippines, and countries and territories...believed to be the enemies of Islam. (U.S. v. Royer, 2003)

I. YU KIKUMURA, JAPANESE RED ARMY

In April 1988, a New Jersey State Trooper noticed a man acting suspiciously at a rest stop and decided to pull him over. When he did, the trooper observed gunpowder canisters and a box containing three powerful homemade pipe bombs in the back seat (Hanley, 1989). Later on, media reports indicated that Kikumura may have been planning to bomb a Navy recruiting office or target in the garment district to mark the second anniversary of the U.S. bombing of Libya (Tumulty, 1989).

All of the cases cited in this chapter are demonstrative of the fact that organized criminal groups, street gangs and terrorists move in the same circles. Some terrorists commit crimes as a way to fund their enterprises and some organized crime groups use

terrorist tactics as a way to achieve their goals. It also shows the difficulty law enforcement is experiencing in distinguishing which type of criminal it is dealing with. For example, the Black P Stones are identified and documented as a criminal street gang in many large U.S. cities. They used to be known for their religious beliefs, as many of them embraced Islam: however, today, they are more known for their extreme violence. Members of the Black P Stones have been described as a threat to our nation's security, but they are not classified as terrorists. This is also true for MS 13 another large, violent criminal street gang. Although the U.S. defines MS 13 as a gang, other countries, like Honduras and El Salvador, have declared MS 13 a terrorist group.

Another point this chapter emphasizes is how critical the roll the patrol officer plays in homeland security. The cases summarized in Chapter III are some of the most significant examples of how local law enforcement officers, patrol officers, interrupted, identified or discovered a terrorist plot before an attack was realized. It also shows that like traditional criminals, terrorists do not recognize jurisdictional or geographical boundaries. They live, gather intelligence and train in our communities. The patrol officer that drives a patrol car; is assigned to ride a bike, or community relations officer; is the best resource as far as recognizing and reporting something that "just doesn't fit" or "seem right."

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IV. DE-CENTRALIZED, CENTRALIZED, OR HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS

The harder you fight a decentralized opponent, the stronger it gets.

–Brafman and Beckstrom, 2006

This chapter discusses the behavioral characteristics of de-centralized, centralized and hybrid organizations. It also provides a comparative analysis of LAPD and the Israeli National Police (INP), with implications for LAPD's current and proposed alignment. The Mexican drug cartels are used as an example of how each agency would respond if such violence was to cross their respected borders. Kidnap for the purposes of obtaining money (for ransom) or to commit murder is the crime chosen as the example.

A. DE-CENTRALIZED

Neuroscientists were attempting to answer what seemed to be a simple question, where do memories come from? They knew we all have memories, whether it is our first love or our favorite vacation, “but where the scientists asked, do these memories reside” (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 3)? According to Brackman and Beckstrom, “Little did they know that they were about to arrive at a conclusion that would have surprising implications, not only for biology, but also for every industry in the world, for international terrorism, and a host of far-flung communities” (2006, p. 3).

At first our brains were thought to have a hierarchy, “a top-down structure,” otherwise, how else would our memories be stored and later recalled (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 4)? However, in test after test scientists found that the hippocampus was not in charge and no one neuron was responsible for a particular memory. According to Brackman and Beckstrom, “An MIT scientist by the name of Jerry Lettvin proposed a solution: the notion that a given memory lives within one cell was just plain wrong. As much as scientists wanted to find hierarchy in the brain, Lettvin argued, it just wasn't there” (2006, pp. 4–5).

Lettvin's theory was that instead of particular neurons housing certain memories and reporting them to the hippocampus, memories were spread throughout the various parts of the brain (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 5). Brackman and Beckstrom explain, "The picture Lettvin painted of the brain at first appears primitive and disorganized. Why would such a complex thinking machine evolve in such an odd way" (2006, p. 5)? They go on to state, "Counterintuitive as it may be, this distribute structure actually makes the brain more resilient" (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 5). For example, if we wanted to find the neuron that held the memory of our first love and eliminate it, it wouldn't be that simple. We would have to eliminate a series of neurons, but which ones? The world, its people are much like these neuroscientists, we want order and we seek that order. We look for hierarchy all around us; our reaction is to ask, "Who is in charge" (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 5)? When we think of nobody being in charge; of there being no traditional hierarchy; we think of disorder and chaos. However, the lack of leadership is giving rise to powerful groups "that are turning the industry and society upside down" (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 5). The following paragraph contains examples of de-centralized organizations and how resilient and successful they are.

In 1999, Shawn Fanning, a freshman at Northeastern University, while sitting in his dorm room, wondered what it would be like if any person, anywhere could share music files with someone else; anybody else, in the world. As a result of his curiosity, he created Napster, a creation that "delivered a crushing blow to the music industry" (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 5-7). However, Fanning was not the "head of" or the "leader" of this company. He did not lead the "attack" on anyone in the music industry; the entire "battle," as it was, was being waged by an army of music sharing teens, college students and iPod carrying businessmen" (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 5-7).

On the other side of the world, Osama bin Laden left Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan and swore to destroy Western modernity. Several years later, he became the most wanted man in the world. At the time, his power seemed limited. After all, how much damage or power can a man have while hiding in a cave (Brackman & Beckstrom,

2006, pp. 5–6)? According to Brackman and Beckstrom, “But Al Qaeda became powerful because bin Laden never took a traditional leadership role” (2006, pp. 5–6).

MS 13 and the Mexican drug cartels are two examples of a de-centralized groups or organizations. The “shot caller” of MS 13 or the “leader” of a cartel, like Osama bin Laden, built their organizations, no longer having to give the orders. The activities go on without them.

The blows to the recording industry, the attacks of 9/11, MS 13, and the Black P Stones were all driven by the same hidden force. The harder one fights this force, the stronger it gets-the more chaotic it seems, the more resilient it is and the more one tries to control it, the more unpredictable it becomes. Brackman and Beckstrom stated, “Decentralization has been lying dormant for thousands of years, but the advent of the Internet has unleashed this force, knocking down traditional businesses, altering entire industries, affecting how we relate to one another, and influencing world politics” (2006, pp. 6–7). The absence of structure, leadership, and formal organization, once considered a weakness, has become a major asset. Seemingly chaotic groups have challenged and defeated established institutions; “the rules of the game have changed” (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 6–7).

B. CENTRALIZED

A centralized organization is easy to figure out or understand. Much like a spider, it has a head or an obvious, “clear” leader who’s in charge, and “there’s a specific place where decisions are made (i.e., the boardroom, the corporate headquarters or City Hall)” (2006, p.19). This organizational type is called “coercive because the leader calls the shots: when a CEO fires you, you’re out. In a centralized organization rules need to be set and followed or the whole system will collapse” (2006, p.19). For example, when one gets on an airplane, better hope it is a coercive system. As Brackman and Beckstrom explain, “You certainly don’t want Mr. Johnson from seat 28J to decide that right about now is a good time to land.” No, Johnson needs to sit quietly and enjoy the movie while the captain and only the captain has the authority to make decisions to ensure that the plane flies properly” (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 19). Centralized systems, like a

spider has a head and legs, and when the head is cut off the system falls apart. In decentralized systems, like starfishes, have several arms. However, when one arm is cut off, it grows another one in its place. According to Brackman and Beckstrom:

With a spider, what you see is pretty much what you get. A body, a head's a head, and a leg's a leg. But starfish are very different. The starfish doesn't have a head. Its central body isn't even in charge. In fact, the major organs are replicated throughout each and every arm. If you cut the starfish in half, you'll be in for a surprise: the animal won't die, and pretty soon you'll have two starfish to deal with. (2006, p. 35)

The following paragraph contains an example of a centralized organization and the results of sending the information to the "head" and having to wait for a decision before any action can take place.

In 1935, one of the worst storms in recorded history is known today as the Labor Day Hurricane. According to Brackman and Beckstrom, "As the storm came closer and closer, meteorologists optimistically predicted that it wouldn't hit the Florida Keys. But retired major Ed Sheeran had a different view. Sheeran was a supervisor for an FDR public works project with more than 400 workers" (2006, p. 38). Sheeran's view was different due to his experience of living through a hurricane and "everything in his gut told him there was something to worry about. But he did not just rely on his gut: his barometer confirmed his fears; he saw clear signs that the storm was heading right for the keys" (2006, p. 38).

Sheeran told his supervisor about his fears; the supervisor called headquarters in Jacksonville and expressed his concerns and made the argument that all the workers should be evacuated (2006, p. 38). Headquarters was sympathetic and arranged for a train to pick up the workers assigned in the Keys; "the only problem was that no one bothered to inform the workers that they should get on it" (Sheeran, 2006, p. 38). Sheeran realized that the workers did not get on the train and issued another warning: "We need to evacuate those workers now! His alerts eventually made their way up the chain of command, but headquarters, once bitten decided that instead of deploying another train, the best thing would be to sit and wait" (2006, p. 38). It was decided by headquarters that Sheeran could be overreacting and they, headquarters could always

send another train from Miami if necessary. Brackman and Beckstrom remark, “The U.S. Weather Bureau contended that Sheeran was making much ado about nothing” (2006, p. 38).

As Brackman and Beckstrom state:

Unfortunately, Sheeran was right. The hurricane hit with massive force and 160-mile-per-hour winds. By the time headquarters finally approved a rescue effort, it was too late. The window of opportunity was gone. When a second rescue train was dispatched, the hurricane blew it off the tracks. Two hundred and fifty nine workers died in the storm. (2006, pp. 38-39)

There are some obvious advantages to FDR’s centralized government. “It was able to save millions from starvation and reverse a crippling depression. But FDR’s government, like our own today, was too centralized to respond quickly to the stranded workers” (2006, p. 39). The Labor Day hurricane sounds awfully familiar.

Benjamin Franklin once said “By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail” (BrainyQuote, 2013). In the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, *National Preparedness*, dated December 17, 2003, preparedness was defined as the “existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment necessary at the Federal, State and Local level to maximize the ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from major events” (2003). However, in 2005, when Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans, those on the ground, like Sheeran, had the best information; the best knowledge, “but they were powerless to implement large-scale rescue plans. Instead, before the spider could react, information had to be relayed up to the head, and then the head had to process the information, strategize, and finally react” (2006, p.39). What happened in 1935 and again in 2005 was not the fault of any one person; it was the system’s fault. Brackman and Beckstrom remark, “Yes, some individuals could have made better decisions, but it’s times like these that you need a starfish” (2006, p. 39). As Brackman and Beckstrom also explain, “An open system doesn’t have central intelligence; the intelligence is spread throughout the system” (2006, pp. 39–40).

What was missing from Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, *National Preparedness*, and the after action reports of some of America’s biggest disasters is the

concept of learning. What good are plans, policies, procedures, training and equipment if we fail to learn? The “systems” or the “spider” in all three disasters discussed; leadership, communication, and the slow deployment of resources occurs over and over again despite the fact we had the information concerning “what went wrong” from each incident that preceded the next. Donahue and Tuohy explain, “Learning is, at its core, a process of growth; thus a successful learning process requires a commitment to change” (2006).

C. HYBRID

A hybrid organization takes the best of both the centralized and de-centralized worlds; it’s not a starfish or a spider. Let’s take eBay for example. Companies like eBay use the “bottom up approach of decentralization and the structure, control and resulting profit potential of centralization. eBay is a centralized company that decentralizes the customer experience” (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 164–165).

Pierre Omidyar, a computer programmer created eBay. “It allowed users to sell items directly to each other. It never took control of inventory and never served as an intermediary” (2006, p. 165). From the start, eBay stated, “We believe people are basically good and have something to contribute (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 163).

Omidyar believed that trust is crucial so in order to ensure eBay’s motto remained the company’s primary foundation, he added user ratings (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 163). The ratings were published on the site for everyone to see. eBay empowered the users to police themselves versus that burden lying with the company (2006, p. 163). Brackman and Beckstrom state, “Knowledge and power became distributed throughout the network. People only wanted to buy from sellers with high positive ratings; sellers gained huge incentive to stay honest and trustworthy;” and “a positive or negative rating, according to Harvard researchers, has real-life consequences” (2006, p. 163).

Brackman and Beckstrom state, “For some companies, decentralizing isn’t just a matter of trying to succeed; it’s a matter of survival” (2006, p. 172). This is not the case for law enforcement agencies. Their survival is secured by the criminals they seek. However, this does not mean a law enforcement agency, LAPD specifically, could not be

a hybrid organization “a centralized company that decentralizes internal parts of the business” (2006, p.175). Brackman and Beckstrom explain, “These companies have a CEO and some hierarchy, but they also have starfish DNA” (2006, p.175). General Electrics (GE), for example, is broken up into different units that have to perform as stand-alone businesses (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 175). This approach benefited GE because it made each unit accountable and did away with inefficiencies; the business rules across the company were “be number one or two in a market or get out, generate high returns on investments; if you fail in either of these areas you will be sold” (Brackman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 175). This method allowed unit heads, or leaders, significant flexibility and independence. Having the flexibility and independence that GE gives its leaders does not make them any more important than the newly hired employee. Brackman and Beckstrom state, “Top management is a function and responsibility, rather than a rank and a privilege” (2006, p. 185).

Even if an organization is decentralized, they still have to pursue that ever elusive “sweet spot.” Brackman and Beckstrom explain, “The decentralized sweet spot, or position of excellence “is the point along the centralized-decentralized continuum that yields the best competitive position. In a way, finding the “sweet spot” is like Goldilocks eating the various bowls of porridge: this one is too hot, this one is too cold, but this one is just right” (2006, p. 189).

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V. THE LAPD; A PRIMARILY CENTRALIZED AGENCY AND ISRAELI NATIONAL POLICE (INP); A DECENTRALIZED AGENCY: MODELS FOR POLICING

As previously stated, organized criminal groups, gangs and terrorists cross paths in their effort to survive, fund their operations and achieve their goals. Some say they will remain separate threats while others warn their relationship however it developed, is a real threat to our national security; one that has been significantly under estimated. As part of the research for this thesis, a comparison was done between the LAPD and the INP. Individuals from each agency were interviewed regarding their respected organizations. What was learned from the interviews and research did not reveal that one agency was superior over the other at crime prevention and countering terrorism, as they are from opposite sides of the world and have some unique problems that they must deal with daily. It simply shows the differences between a centralized organization; the LAPD versus a decentralized organization, the INP. This comparison in no way suggests that LAPD should adopt the INP's configuration or vice versa. It simply demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of both.

A. THE MEXICAN CARTELS

The state of Mexico is involved in an increasingly violent struggle against the drug cartels which have terrorized the public, corrupted law enforcement and other government officials and created an environment of impunity to the law (McCaffrey, 2008, p. 3). Drug related murders and kidnaps are an everyday occurrence. Police officers, members of the Mexican Army and civilians have been tortured, murdered and left on public display. This malignancy now corrupts more than 295 U.S. cities (McCaffery, 2008, p. 3), including Los Angeles. Los Angeles police officers have encountered not only the ferocity of these criminals, but also their sophistication and organization, particularly in kidnap for ransom (or murder) cases. In 2009, Washington's Attorney General, Eric Holder called the Mexican cartels a threat to national security adding, "They are lucrative, they are violent, and they operate with stunning planning and precision" (Holder, 2009).

According to a confidential Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) report the violent groups operating in Mexico and in many U.S. cities are “far more dangerous than any of the other organized criminal groups in American’s law enforcement history” (Kimery, 2009b, p. 24). According to a 2008 National Drug Intelligence Situation Report, the violent groups in Mexico are the most pervasive threat to the United States” (Kimery, 2009b, p. 24) and is the leading homeland security threat. On Thursday, March 12, 2009, a Fox News report announced that the powerful drug cartels may be joining forces in order to defeat law enforcement and military pressure (Housley, 2009, p. 1).

It is said, but not confirmed that the cartels alone have 100,000 foot soldiers, which outnumbers the Mexican military by at least 50,000 (Housley, 2009, p. 1). These groups have access to assault rifles, grenades, armor piercing bullets, grenade launchers and rocket launchers (Agora, 2009, p. 12).²⁰ In 2009, experts estimated that cartels have 100,000 foot soldiers, a number that has never been confirmed. In 2012, the numbers are estimated to be in the millions.

It is reported that the cartels have joined forces with jihadists and criminal street gangs (Kimery, 2009b, p. 26). In a 100-page report on an operation known as Operation Cazando Anguilas (“hunting eels”), Al Qaeda and Hezbollah networks have positioned themselves throughout Latin America for convenience and mutual support (Kimery, 2009b, p. 26). In this same report it stated that this union was not something that occurred by accident or happenstance, but rather “by very careful strategic design” (Kimery, 2009b, p. 30). There are thousands of MS-13 and 18th Street gang members currently in the United States. In 2005 Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI, said that criminal enterprises are involved in, and have formed alliances with smugglers in order to enter the U.S. (Kimery, 2009b, p. 32). A lawyer for the 9/11 Commission reported that she read unclassified documents which detailed how members of Al Qaeda and

²⁰ According to Agora, “Mexican Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan recounted the results of a November 2008 raid in Reynosa, Mexico, that resulted in the largest weapons seizure in Mexican history. He said that the weapons seized included 500,000 rounds of ammunition, 288 assault rifles, 14 Herstal semi-automatic pistols, seven Barret .50 caliber sniper rifles, two grenade launchers, one LAW rocket launcher and 287 fragmentation grenades. Sarukhan notes that during President Calderon’s first two years in office, Mexican authorities have seized 30,231 weapons (16,401 of which were assault weapons), more than 3.5 million rounds of ammunition and 2,196 grenades” (2009, p. 12).

Columbian guerilla groups used Islamic converts in Mexico in order to enter the U.S. (Kimery, 2009b, p. 32). Kimery explains:

The *Operation Cazando* Anguilas study agrees that profit now trumps the ideals and is the motivation for participation in illegal activities...traditional adversaries will form partnerships for profit, sharing tradecraft in the process and thus obscuring the traditional signatures of activity which have been collected and analyzed over time, and which supports policy decisions. (2009b, p. 32)

B. LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

Currently, the LAPD has one unit, Robbery-Homicide Division (RHD), Robbery Special Section whose responsibilities include investigating bank robberies and kidnaps for ransom or murder. They are responsible for the aforementioned crimes no matter where they occur in the city of Los Angeles. These types of crimes are commonly used by terrorists and criminals alike.²¹ At the time this thesis was written, RHD had the luxury of handling one of these types of cases at a time. With only 12 detectives and 21 surveillance officers more than one kidnap for ransom case would overwhelm this unit and delay the investigation(s).

In addition to one specialized unit under LAPD's current configuration being overwhelmed with multiple crimes or one crime requiring exhaustive resources, this configuration also promotes an intelligence gap. Despite this knowledge, following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, LAPD created yet another specialized unit; the Counterterrorism Bureau. As previously mentioned the Counterterrorism Bureau was intended to build on existing intelligence sharing systems and promote an increased sharing of intelligence through the creation of a collaborative culture. Like RHD, the detectives assigned to the Counterterrorism Bureau are responsible for the entire city; all 451 square miles.

²¹ Official statistics cite 72 kidnappings a month according to the Mexican Attorney General. However, the Citizen's Institute for Crime Studies estimates more than 500 kidnappings a month, with the majority going unreported due to the lack of trust in authorities (McCaffery, 2008, p. 6). In the U.S., many border cities are suffering from the spillover of the violence from Mexico. Phoenix is seeing the worst. Being called the "Kidnapping Capitol" of the U.S., investigators there suspect that some of the kidnappings have led to murder in which bound and bullet-ridden bodies are dumped in the desert. In 2008, there were over 370 kidnapping incidents in Phoenix. (San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center, 2009, pp. 1-2). There were 28 cases linked to Mexico in San Diego (San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center, 2009, pp. 1-2).

The LAPD has 21 divisions or stations that make up the entire city of Los Angeles. Each of the 21 divisions or stations has its own detective unit. Each detective unit is divided up into teams and each team is responsible for a certain crime. For example, in each of the divisions there is a Homicide Team, Sexual Assault Team, Burglary Team and so on. The detectives that are assigned to a specific team handled that specific crime. In addition to the teams mentioned, each division has a Gang Impact Team, Narcotics Team and Vice. These teams work separate from one another despite the obvious cross-over between the crimes being committed and the criminals committing them. None of the 21 divisions has a counterterrorism component.

When an area has a complicated or serious crime occur, the detective assigned to investigate that crime basically controls the whole investigation. If any search warrants need to be written and served, it is the lead investigator's responsibility to make sure it is done. The lead investigator can ask other detectives to assist, but they have their own cases to solve and can usually only provide limited assistance as a result. If any surveillance or stake-outs need to take place, only the Gang Impact Team or Narcotics Unit can provide assistance, as they are the only ones experienced enough and trained to conduct such activities and tactics. If they are not available, the investigators can contact RHD's surveillance unit, but they are only available for a short period of time, as they are used by every division in the city and their priority are cases being investigated by RHD, particularly crimes of violence.

1. Robbery-Homicide Division

RHD was created to respond to and investigate crimes that are high-profile (i.e., O. J. Simpson case) or serial in nature. It is supposed to be staffed with only the most experienced and talented detectives and its caseload, although small in comparison to the caseload carried by divisional detective units, often requires travel, wiretaps, surveillance, etc. In other words, the investigations are time consuming and labor intensive. RHD, like divisional detectives, is divided into sections, with each section specializing in a specific crime or crimes. As previously mentioned, RHD's Robbery Special Section is responsible for investigating bank robberies and kidnaps for ransom or murder. Over the

years, RHD, Robbery Special Section has had the luxury of investigating one kidnap for ransom case at a time and even then those types of cases were few and far between. In addition, the kidnapers' tactics were not sophisticated and they were not part of an organized criminal organization. This is no longer the case.

A retired high ranking member of the LAPD and former commanding officer of RHD, agreed with Holder's description of the violent groups in Mexico and the U.S. and added that the kidnap for ransom or murder cases occurring today are sophisticated, time consuming and resource intensive (LAPD official, personal communication, March 6, 2009). A special agent from the FBI explained that yesterday's kidnap for ransom cases were isolated events that required basic tactical and negotiating teams (FBI official, personal communication, 2009). The agent said kidnap for ransom cases in the past required law enforcement to be reactive, which is something they are very, very good at (FBI official, personal communication, 2009). However, he pointed out that the cases they handle today, especially since the eruption of violence at the U.S./Mexican border, requires law enforcement to be both reactive and proactive. He explained that modern day kidnap for ransom cases involve entire teams of suspects who are part of a larger organization (drug cartel, gang, etc.), so even if the kidnap case is resolved, victim is recovered and suspect(s) arrested, law enforcement's work is incomplete (FBI official, personal communication, 2009). Like a terrorist cell, when one or more members are arrested, they are soon replaced (just like the starfish referenced earlier in this thesis). Gone are the days of once the crime is solved that is the end of the problem (FBI official, communication, March 30, 2009) (for examples of modern day kidnappings see appendix A).

This issue was particularly troublesome for the former commanding officer of RHD, as at the time of his command he only had 12 detectives who specialized in handling this type of crime. It will be very easy for the detectives assigned to RHD to quickly become overwhelmed should Los Angeles see the kind of kidnaps like San Diego and Phoenix are experiencing. Both the former commanding officer of RHD and the agent with the FBI said that in modern day kidnappings, law enforcement not only has to deal with getting the victim back, but they also have to identify the organization behind

the crime and dismantle it. With only 12 detectives specifically assigned to handle these types of cases, this is a daunting task for RHD.

In his interview, the former commanding officer of RHD said the kidnap squads or groups are comprised of 80 to 100 men. These squads or groups work for one of the warring cartels and have more resources, better weapons and more money than the law enforcement officials trying to combat them. He said these kidnap squads are comprised of cells, each cell being responsible for a portion of the mission (kidnap). Although numerous cells make up one squad or group, one cell is not familiar with the members from the other cells. Some examples of the different responsibilities assigned to the various cells are: scout, abduction team, transport team, those responsible for the safe house, negotiation team, money drop team, and in some cases assassination team (LAPD official, personal communication, March 6, 2009). The fact that RHD investigators are significantly out-numbered caused him to take note of the fact that numerous resources department-wide are vastly under-utilized.

C. ISRAELI NATIONAL POLICE

Unlike the city of LA or the United States, Israel is a small country. It is 8,367 square miles (the U.S. is 3,717,813 square miles) and home to 7.1 million people (Israel Information Center, 2008, p. 28). Like Los Angeles, Israel has a widely diverse population and it is described as a new society with ancient roots, a society that is still coalescing and evolving (Israel Information Center, 2008).

Known by many different names Eretz Yisrael, Zion, The Promise Land, the Holy Land, and simply the Land, Israel is rich in religious and cultural history. However, like Los Angeles, it too has a dark side. Israel suffers from the same types of crimes Los Angeles does, murders, kidnaps, sexual assaults, prostitution, drugs, gangs, etc. One difference between Israel and Los Angeles is, Los Angeles is a prime target for a terrorist

attack, but has never been the victim of one. Israel is a prime target for terrorists and has been the victim of thousands of attacks.²²

The entire nation of Israel has only one police force: the Israeli National Police. According to a Chief Superintendent, the INP has approximately 28,000 sworn personnel, including the border patrol (Chief superintendent, personal communication, March 10, 2009). It is estimated that in Israel there is one police officer for every 254 residents.

The INP does not have a unit equivalent to RHD or the Counterterrorism Unit. Their investigators, department-wide, are decentralized. In fact, with the exception of narcotic investigations, an investigator from the INP can handle a burglary, robbery or kidnap case, within their district of assignment or any other district if called upon to do so. This configuration maximizes the resources that can be deployed in the event of multiple crimes of violence or labor intensive cases like in cases of kidnap for ransom or murder, without neglecting or disrupting everyday police functions and responsibilities.

Although Israel has been the victim of thousands of terrorist attacks, the INP does not investigate cases involving terrorism. If an INP investigator obtains information regarding terrorist activity (i.e., a criminal lead turns into a lead involving terrorist activity) that information and or case in its entirety is given to the Shin Bet. The Shin Bet is the agency responsible for all crimes involving acts of terrorism and is the equivalent to the U.S.'s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Despite the fact that officers and investigators from the INP do not handle cases involving terrorism, they are well trained on how to respond to a scene involving an act of terrorism. In addition, the INP and the Shin bet work very closely with one another. This configuration and understanding of the specific missions of each agency has been very successful for Israel.

In an interview conducted with a chief superintendent assigned to the INP, he described how the INP is configured (Chief superintendent, personal communication,

²² “Arab and Palestinian terrorism against Israel existed for decades prior to the establishment of the state of Israel and since then. Thousands of terrorist attacks that resulted in the death and injury of Israeli civilians occurred during the two decades preceding the 1967 Six Day War. The establishment of the PLO in 1964 put it at the forefront of this terrorist campaign. During the 1970s and the 1980s, the various terrorist organizations under the PLO launched numerous attacks inside Israel and abroad” (Israel Information Center, 2008, p. 44).

March 10, 2009). The INP is divided into six districts and three sub-districts (the INP's districts are equivalent to the LAPD's divisions), which cover the entire country. In each district and sub-district, the INP has police stations. The number of stations in each district depends on the district's crime rate, size of the district etc. In investigating all major crimes like murder, rape, kidnap, robbery, burglary, etc., the investigations are done by teams of people if you will, with each person or persons having a specific responsibility.

There is the Analysis Team, which the Chief Superintendent affectionately referred to as the "brain" of the operation. The personnel assigned to the "brain" essentially run the investigation. The Investigation Team is responsible for processing the crime scene and interrogating any suspect(s) captured. The Detective Team handles any arrests, search warrants and/or surveillance that are needed in the case. Every station in every district or sub-district is set up the exact same way and they are all in constant communication with one another. The Chief Superintendent explained that if Israel was to experience an increase in kidnaps for ransom like some of the U.S./Mexico border cities are, any Central Unit in the INP could handle the case or assist other Central Units that are experiencing a high volume of incidents or one incident requiring extensive resources. Despite the fact that Israel has been the victim of thousands of terrorist attacks, the INP does not investigate cases of terrorism (Chief superintendent, personal communication, March 10, 2009). As mentioned earlier, the Shin Bet handles all cases involving acts of terrorism. Although the INP and Shin Bet handle different types of investigations (traditional crimes versus terrorism) their missions are the same: protecting the citizens of Israel.

1. The Positive and Negative Aspects of the INP and LAPD Configurations

The most obvious benefit of the INP configuration is the availability of resources. If Israel had a kidnapping with 80 to 100 suspects, it would have access to as many personnel with the experience and the capabilities to address the issue quickly and effectively. Another benefit of the INP configuration, one that might not be as obvious as the first one, is the collaboration and open communication between INP personnel. Since

all central units that make up the INP handle all types of criminal investigations there are no “silos.” Information and intelligence is shared because it is obviously pertinent to everyone in the unit.

The INP maximizes the knowledge of its police officers and investigative personnel who are assigned to a specific district or sub-district. The Chief superintendent explained that every sworn member of the INP is considered valuable to fighting crime and countering terrorism (personal communication, March 10, 2009). They are all provided equal training making them essentially interchangeable and able to be deployed wherever they are needed. This eliminates in-fighting, territory disputes and intelligence silos that are part of the LAPD culture.

The positive aspect of LAPD’s current alignment is the expertise, knowledge and experience officers and detectives get as a result of being assigned to investigate one type of crime; for example burglary. This is most notable in the courtroom. The attorneys trying a case before a judge and jury like to have expert testimony to provide back-up to the civilian witnesses testimony. An officer or detective that has investigated one type of crime for numerous years is nothing less than an expert.

The negative aspect of the INP configuration is personnel who are good at all criminal investigations cannot be great at one type of investigation. Detectives that specialize in one type of crime have proven to be invaluable in handling complicated, high-profile or sensitive cases within LAPD. Victim and witnesses involved in some of the more serious cases have expressed that without the expertise of the detective, they would have never received justice or closure. (See Appendix C for an interview with Yael Harel, a citizen of both the U.S. and Israel.)

Law enforcement agencies like LAPD can manipulate their current alignment to address traditional street crimes and terrorist activity without disrupting the hierarchy. They have to recognize that terrorists, like any other traditional criminal, are adaptive enemies. Whatever we do, they still have the ability to think around it and surprise us. There used to be a limit to how much we could prepare. War planners used to look at threats around the world, hundreds of potential nightmares, and, as bad as they were, they

could at least be numbered, ranked, monitored, anticipated (Ramos, 2009 p. 44). “Is there anything we haven’t thought of (Ramos, 2009, p. 44), they might ask?” “And they could feel with some certainty that there was not; but this new world” (Ramos, 2009, p. 44)? According to Ramos:

With destabilizing dangers which emerge not only from crafty enemies, but also from the day-to-day technology that we need to survive, airplanes, genetic engineering or commodities markets it is very hard to find a spot where normal lives end and risk began. (2009, p. 44)

VI. FACTORS AFFECTING THE REALIGNMENT OF SOME OF THE SPECIALIZED UNITS WITHIN THE LAPD

To first responders, it does not matter whether terrorists come from Afghanistan or Alabama. In many respects, terrorist attacks are similar to natural disasters...the effects are local...

–Graeme Newman and Ronald Clarke, 2008

A. THE FRONT LINE OF DEFENSE

State, local and tribal law enforcement officers are the nation's front line of defense against violent groups, both foreign and domestic. Since the terrorist attacks in New York and against the Pentagon three things have become clear. First, the line that used to divide organized criminal groups from terrorist groups has become less distinct. Second, bifurcating criminal from terrorist investigations could hinder counterterrorism efforts and third, intelligence work begins at the street level with the officers and the communities they serve. "After all prevention starts first and foremost at the local level" (Loyka et. al, 2005, p. 3) and, more precisely, at the street level.

With the increase of terrorist threats and their ties to traditional street crimes, law enforcement agencies must work together and with the communities they serve in order to detect, prevent and respond to a terrorist threat or attack. Newman and Clark argue, "You should emphasize dual benefit measures: those that will protect the business or community not just from terrorism, but also from crime" (2008, p. 32). The basic security measures (i.e., hardening the target) that can prevent a commercial burglary will also work to prevent that same business from a terrorist attack (Newman & Clarke, 2008, p. 83). In addition, Newman and Clarke posit, "The difference between various types of conventional crime is as great, and perhaps even greater, than the supposed differences between crime and terrorism" (2008, p. 27). People, including law enforcement officers, must know that they cannot eradicate terrorism, they can only manage it. Killing a terrorist or terrorists will not stop terrorism just as severe punishments have not stopped conventional crimes.

B. COMMUNITY POLICING AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Authors Newman and Clark explain, “Community policing should result in your local officers becoming more familiar with local communities and learning quickly about any suspicious activities” (2008, p. 53). After all, only an effective local police department that has the confidence of its citizens is going to be likely to hear about the new group of young men from abroad that have recently moved into a nearby apartment and are acting suspiciously. Also according to Newman and Clarke, “Local police are best equipped to understand how to protect citizens’ liberties and obtain such leads legally” (p. 67). In an interview with an FBI official, he stated that the FBI’s number one resource in counterterrorism is local law enforcement officers (FBI official, personal communication, March 30, 2009).²³ The Director of New York State Police Chiefs Association, Joseph Dominelli states, “Validates the value of the line officer stating that as a result of their intimate knowledge of the communities they serve, local law enforcement officers are best positioned to detect and identify potential terrorists within their respective jurisdictions” (Christano, 2008, p.1). The local law enforcement officer is the one the community member sees on a daily basis; driving by, visiting the schools, walking through the neighborhood park, attending neighborhood watch meetings and conversing with at a restaurant or mini-mart. It is this regular visibility that will make that officer the one the community members seeks when they see or hear something suspicious.

C. LEADERSHIP AND COUNTERING TERRORISM

Newman and Clarke opine, “After the initial shock of 9/11, many police chiefs might have begun gloomily to contemplate the future of policing” (2008, p. 3). However, they must take comfort in their rank and file officers as they are the ones in the best position to learn about the emergence of local terrorist threats, to know which targets are most at risk and to coordinate the first response to attacks (Newman & Clarke, 2008, p. 4).

²³This is not an official FBI policy.

Leaders of the rank and file:

Must have some expertise where fast change and unpredictability are the dominant facts of life. They should have experienced the unforgiving demands for precision and care that characterize real negotiation, as well as the magical effects of risk taking at the right moments. They should have mastered the essential skills of the next fifty years: crisis management. They should be inclined toward action, even action at times without too much reflection, since at certain moments instinct and speed are more important than the lovely perfection of academic models. (Ramos, 2009, pp. 36–37)

These types of leaders are recognized immediately by subordinates as someone they can trust, someone they have the confidence in; no matter what the consequences, they will lead them. These leaders must also possess one more quality; trust in their subordinates; after all they will be the first ones at a scene following a terrorist attack.

D. OPTIMAL USE OF LIMITED RESOURCES

LAPD is the fifth largest police agency in the nation and has one officer for every 426 residents. This significant gap between police officer and resident could become even greater, as Los Angeles is facing a \$238 million deficit (CBS Local Media, 2012). Most of the cities departments were asked to share the burden with anywhere from 10 to 30 percent in spending cuts (Behrens, 2009, p. 1). Moreover, Los Angeles City civilian employees have been ordered to take one day off each month without pay. Known as “furlough” days, civilian employees take one Friday off each month which amounts to a 10 percent cut in pay.²⁴ According to a city official, it is rumored “furlough” days may be ordered for sworn personnel and the mayor wants to raise the retirement age to 67 years (CBS Local Media, 2012). In the most recent years, the city has laid off more than 200 city employees (CBS Local Media, 2012). Since 2008, another 4,900 workers retired early or were transferred to departments that manage their own budgets (CBS Local Media, 2012).

²⁴ The state of California’s \$60 million budget gap has hit the court houses hard (Mann, 2009, p. 1). Like Los Angeles civilian employees, California court employees have been ordered to take one furlough day per month starting July 15, 2009 (Mann, 2009, p.1). The third Wednesday of every month California courts are closed; with few exceptions. The impact on Los Angeles has been significant.

As LAPD resources diminish, various criminal groups are joining forces, increasing their numbers, profit intake and lethality. The violence occurring in the United States and Mexican border is frightening and a glaring example of this dangerous factor.

In the days following the terrorists' attacks in New York, it became abundantly clear that one, America would never be the same, and two, homeland security is not the sole responsibility of American law enforcement officers. Docobo explains, "An effective Homeland Security strategy must include partnerships not only with other law enforcement agencies, but with businesses, citizens, emergency management, public health, and many other private and public organizations having a stake in counter-terrorism prevention and response" (2005, pp. 47–48). He goes on to state, "Partnerships need to be expanded as much as possible to take advantage of the many skills necessary to plan for, mobilize, and respond to terrorist acts" (Docobo, 2005, p. 48). This strategy occurs within a division between its officers and citizens.

The following chapter provides insight regarding the various views members have regarding terrorism, traditional crimes and how the two should be investigated.

VII. INSIDE THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

It is said that the best knowledge is often at the fringe of an organization; on the front lines (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 204). Toyota grasped this concept and encouraged its employees on the assembly lines to create and innovate since they knew better than anybody what was happening on the line (2006, p. 204). IBM and Sun Incorporated did the same thing. Similarly, the creator of Wikipedia knew people all over the world had deep knowledge on various subjects; Wikipedia permits them to share that knowledge (2006, p. 204). Individuals in decentralized organizations, or hybrids are not only permitted to share, they want to share. There is a basic desire to want to contribute and when they are free to do so or are otherwise encouraged to participate, that desire of sharing is enhanced (2006, pp. 204–205).

LAPD is a centralized, hierarchal organization that, according to some LAPD officials, focuses and operates based on expediency versus efficiency (LAPD officials, personal communications, June 22, 2009, and August 13, 2009). This is not only representative of its crime prevention strategies, but also its training of officers. In additional interviews with two LAPD officials, they said that the training LAPD officers receive can best be described the way we feed an animal: “We don’t ask him if he is hungry, we just give him the food and tell him to eat it” (LAPD officials, personal communications, July 22, 2009 and August 13, 2009).

Another high ranking LAPD official explained that training can be very expensive, as costs usually include the price of the location used for training, personnel water, food etc. (LAPD official, personal communication, July 22, 2009). For example, it cost the city of Los Angeles \$5,000 a day to use the Army facility in Long Beach, California for the Mobile Field Force Training in 2008/2009 (LAPD official, personal communication, July 22, 2009). Hands on training provided by officers working with officers or “cross-training,” is valuable and will cut down costs (LAPD official, personal communication, July 22, 2009). In fact, that is primarily how narcotics officers are trained. There is a basic narcotic school, but beyond that, narcotic officers obtain their own expertise by doing the job (LAPD official, personal communication, July 22, 2009).

Would this same “cross-training” work with terrorism training? Would it cost the city substantially less money than what they pay today for only the few people they pay to be trained in “counterterrorism?” Another LAPD official said that the organization is slow to share information, if the information is shared at all. They might provide training, but there is no input from line personnel, nor is the goal or the “end mission” of the training shared with the fringes of the organization, but they sure can be quick to react since LAPD is always expedient, always trying to be first, but “we will never be accused of being efficient” (LAPD official, personal communication, August 13, 2009). This same official said that the first LAPD officers were paid bonuses based on the number of arrests they made. That is a good way to compensate, otherwise provide feedback, or to use an incentive if your goal is to make the most arrests, but law enforcement organizations have evolved since that time; arrests are a means to an end, not an end in and of themselves (LAPD official, personal communication, August 13, 2009).

The interviews conducted as part of the research process for this thesis results in the emergence of three main themes; measurement and accountability, how much “horsepower” is needed to combat terrorism and the need for the counterterrorism unit to “mature” before we should make any changes.

A. FIRST THEME MEASUREMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The divisions and individual units within each division of the LAPD measure their productivity by keeping track of various statistics and submitting the same to the FBI, which keeps track of statistics for police agencies across the nation. For example, each division that makes up the LAPD keeps track of:

- how many tickets are written, felony and misdemeanor arrests are made,
- how many case are filed with the district attorney and city attorney,
- how many cases each detective is assigned and what the clearance rate is,
- how much property is recovered (dollar amount),
- how much property is held (still has evidentiary value) and destroyed (no evidentiary value or the statute of limitation on a case is up and therefore the property is of no value),
- has the division reached its goal regarding crime reduction,

- traffic collisions in comparison to drinking while under the influence (DUI) arrests and
- numerous other statistics, including those considered administrative in nature (i.e., how many officers are injured on duty (IOD), overtime, sick time usage and so on).

LAPD discusses the department-wide statistics at monthly COMPSTAT meetings held for each bureau. Each command discusses its successes, shortcomings and strategies used in both the administrative and operational areas. Other commands are given the opportunity to hear their co-workers successes and strategies used, allowing them to assess if the same things would work in their commands.

When the interviews were conducted with various participants, the same concern was repeated over and over again; how do we measure terrorism? Nobody can agree on how it's defined, never mind how we measure it (i.e., arrests, clearance rates and filing rates), and if we can't measure it, how do we hold them (those employees assigned) accountable (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009)? As an official stated, "The local cops got involved in counterterrorism after September 11, because the feds are too far removed from local jurisdictions to know exactly what is going on" (LAPD Official, personal communication, June 22, 2009) According to an LAPD official:

The TLO program was supposed to be the link between counterterrorism and patrol, but this is not happening. Officers in the divisions don't even know who their TLO is (appendix B). The TLO program exists on paper only and is an ancillary duty for some officer or sergeant who already has various other duties and responsibilities. (personal communication, June 22, 2009)

Furthermore, "The Counterterrorism Bureau needs to live up to what was promised; but what was promised (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009)? It has been 12 years since the terrorist attacks and we have not arrested anybody for terrorism. This could be because we are not investigating the right people or groups; it could be because we are investigating and arresting the right people and groups, thus preventing further development of plans to attack or stopping the attack itself or, we have

investigated a person or people for a traditional crime unaware of the links it might have had to terrorism.

B. SECOND THEME—HOW MUCH HORSE POWER IS NEEDED TO COMBAT TERRORISM?

The second theme that emerged seemed to grow out of the first theme. Since nobody really could agree on the definition of terrorism, countering or combating, it was also creating differing opinions. Some interviewees felt that the crimes employees assigned to the Counterterrorism Bureau should focus on are: identity theft, money laundering, drug smuggling, extortion, “all avenues terrorists are using to fund their enterprises” (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009). However, others disagreed indicating that the LAPD already had specialized units that handled identity theft, money laundering and drug smuggling. Having another specialized entity conducting the same types of investigations was duplicating efforts and wasting resources (LAPD official, personal communication, August 13, 2009). An LAPD official opined, “If the counterterrorism Bureau was decentralized I am afraid the force (human capitol) would be too small, thus efficiency will diminish” (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009); the ideal is to find the sweet spot of effectiveness and efficiency” (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009). Additionally, interviewees disagreed with one another on the level of sophistication of organized crime, some interviewees indicated that line personnel (i.e., divisional officers and detectives) did not have the expertise or time required for such investigations (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009 and August 13, 2009) and even if they did develop the expertise, traditional street crimes would be “left at the table” (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009 and August 13, 2009). One interviewee felt that the effectiveness of the investigations, if de-centralized, would drop. “Think of it this way, think capacity if you will, a 350 horse power engine is more powerful than 350 engines with only one horse power” (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009). The TLO is the counterterrorism component that was added to the divisions to be the liaison between counterterrorism investigators and divisional personnel. This is not happening or if it is, it is happening on a very small scale.

C. THIRD THEME NURTURING AND ALLOWING FOR MATURATION

At the end of each interview, there seemed to be a general consensus that the Counterterrorism Bureau didn't have a chance to mature. One interviewee described it as being in its "infancy stage" (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009). In addition, he questioned why the department has "sent them out on their own" (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009), but then followed that question up with the statement "it all comes back to measurement," and "I am glad Chief X has to deal with it (terrorism), I don't want to have to think about it under my command" (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009). Unfortunately, for this participant, who does not want to have to deal with counterterrorism, he has too. Like traditional crimes, terrorism does not recognize boundaries, bureaus or divisions. In addition, it does not care who is in command and who is on the front-line. Because of this, countering terrorism should be part of every patrol plan, as the patrol officer will be the first one likely to arrive at a scene, interrupt an attack, arrest a terrorist, or to be the target of an attack. Officers will embrace any added responsibilities to their current duties, if their leaders present the changes and/or additions enthusiastically and with the confidence and strength all effective leaders should outwardly display.

Another interviewee said, "The current model isn't even fully activated" (LAPD official, personal communication, June 22, 2009), "We need accountability at a higher level" (LAPD official, personal communication, August 13, 2009). One official explained, "Sergeants and officers will always adapt and innovate; they have too, but the higher up you go in rank adaptability and innovation seems to weaken because nobody wants to be the agent of change" (LAPD official, personal communication, August 13, 2009). One interviewee said that LAPD complicates everything: "They need to work on enforcing the existing laws instead of creating new ones, they need to better utilize the diminishing resources they have and open the lines of communication between existing units...basically, keep it simple" (Public safety official, personal communication, June 29, 2009). Furthermore, one interviewee felt that "It wouldn't make a difference if Counterterrorism was centralized or de-centralized as long as the "I's" are dotted and the "T's" are crossed" (Public safety official, personal communication, June 29, 2009).

The most important asset of any organization is its people. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the most important asset, including oneself, develops character, invigorates leadership and increases the chances that a plan of action, change to the existing order or the fine tuning of a strategy already in place will be successful and embraced by line personnel and stakeholders. Terrorism has come to the United States and combating it is every American's responsibility, especially that of the nation's first responders. Embracing, developing and understanding counterterrorism and the personnel assigned to such units, is paramount to the success of the same. Bryson remarks, "At its best, strategies and/or plans help leaders pursue virtuous ends in desirable ways so that public value is created and the common good is advanced" (2004, p. 297). At its worse, changes in plans or the development of a new strategy "drives thought, action and learning; makes it more difficult for leaders to do their job; and keeps organizations from meeting their mandates, fulfilling their missions, and creating public value. Whether planning or making changes helps or hurts depends on how leaders at all organizational levels use it or misuse it" (Bryson, 2004, p. 297).

Change makes people nervous; they resist when possible. There is a certain sense of comfort in the "daily grind;" having a regular routine. Asking more of people when they have less to work with can be a hard sell, but it has to be sold and bought all the same (see Table 2).

Table 2. Theory of Change

Risks and Capabilities	“As is” Performance	Value Proposition and Critical Links	“To Be” Performance
Internal Strengths	~ Officers with knowledge, information and intelligence of their areas of assignments (experts in a sense) ~Capable specialized units and tactics ~Effective and dedicated line personnel with critical relationships (potential sources) in the various communities LAPD serves	~Leverage specialized capabilities, patrol officers and Division-HQ cultural dynamics	~Combines the knowledge, information and expertise of patrol officers with the knowledge, information and expertise of specialized units—cross training—trust building—maximizing the value of each officer/unit will enhance crime prevention and counterterrorism
Internal Weaknesses	~Severe resource constraints leading to competition among stovepipes ~Operating model based on stove-piped functional expertise, not cross-functional information sharing or collaboration ~Specialized functions like CT disconnected from the street ~Under-utilization of sources or informants	~Decentralize CT functions across divisions, using a hybrid approach integrate specialized functions within divisions, eliminating organizational stovepipes	~Optimize diminishing resources around strategic objectives ~Eliminate the stovepipes, increase intelligence sharing ~Assigning a CT person(s) to each division (the combined gang and narcotics unit) to assist in the training of terrorism awareness, obtain information or intelligence first hand and identifying any links to terrorist organizations and/or plots ~Effective development and utilization of sources and informants
External Opportunities	~New vulnerabilities among criminal groups due to their collaboration (can get at one through another)	~Exploit new criminal groups’ behavior to improve crime prevention and counterterrorism	~Identifying the connection between groups early, thus identifying any links to terrorist groups and interrupting plans of attack
External Threats	Increasing cross-over, intersection and potential joining of forces among criminal elements (gangs, drug cartels, terrorists)	~Combat new cross-over criminal threats directly	~Arrest, investigate and prosecute (RICO etc.) making the union of the groups unattractive and risky

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VIII. CONCLUSION

Law enforcement officers all around the world are facing an increasingly complex problem; an adaptive, evolving enemy; an enemy with a vast array of resources and potential alliances. With all our military, material and technological superiority, why do Americans fear the enemy and have feelings of uncertainty regarding their security? Some argue it is because “some of our best minds are blinded by optimism and confusion, are using out-of-date and unrealistic models of the world” (Ramos, 2009, p. 67) are hanging on to “the ways things used to be.” They want to be able to number it, measure it and understand it. If they cannot measure it, they do not want to deal with it they prefer to let someone else deal with it, ignore it until it is too big to ignore or it simply goes away. It is tempting to say we will win and to shove this complex “thing” into a snug and constrained model (Ramos, 2009, p. 73). In fact, it is more than just tempting; it is a habit; the historical way of doing things (Ramos, 2009, p. 73).

The “historical ways of doing things’ is a familiar concept for LAPD, as it likes to create a new unit, team, bureau etc. whenever a new crime trend explodes onto the scene. For example narcotics units were created to investigate crimes involving narcotics, gang units were created to deal with the gang problem, vice deals with prostitution and gambling, and acts of terrorism are investigated by the personnel assigned to LAPD’s Counterterrorism Bureau. Instead of creating another new unit; this thesis proposed an alternative option; realign some of the units LAPD already had adding the counterterrorism component. Will a realignment of LAPD’s specialized units that deal specifically with organized criminal and terrorist investigations improve intelligence sharing and effective action against criminal and terrorist groups? If so, should these units be realigned?

The research contained herein strongly demonstrates that 1) organized criminal groups and terrorists move in the same circles, 2) patrol officers across the U.S. play a significant role in identifying and disrupting terrorist plots and, 3) training patrol officers and divisional detectives is critical in ensuring the security of Los Angeles. What the research did not show is how realigning some of its specialized units would maximize

intelligence sharing. Regardless of the configuration of LAPD's specialized units, there will always be some level of intelligence sharing, but the question is how much sharing is going on? Is it measured by the number of arrests, conviction rates, or type of crimes being investigated? If it is, then for LAPD to make the most informed decision regarding realignment would be after the realignment has taken place.

One of the LAPD officials interviewed as part of the research felt that making changes to the Counterterrorism Bureau was premature because it is still in its infancy stages (LAPD official, personal communication, August 13, 2009). He stated that it had to "mature" before any decision can be made regarding its effectiveness in combating terrorism never mind making a decision to modify it. After 12 years, it can be said that maturity is not the problem, experience is. Making changes after something happens is the historical and "reactive" response if one wants to be consistent with what has been done in the past. However, combating terrorism needs a "proactive" approach; the attack needs to be prevented from happening. This nation and its law enforcement officers are great at responding to a disaster, but isn't that the easy part? Paying attention to the warning signs, learning from past mistakes and embracing change will greatly increase the chances of interrupting a plot and stopping an attack. Training the officers, detectives or any first responder is going to increase awareness and the LAPD's chance at successfully preventing an attack.

From the time of the attacks to the present day, most agencies are doing more work with less people, funding and equipment. Despite these shortages, homeland security is not any less crucial so officers are adding homeland security strategies into their existing crime prevention measures recognizing that this is not an option; it is a mandate. Change can bring about unpredictability, but it allows for growth and development. The city of Los Angeles, in its current financial state, cannot afford to fully staff its agencies never mind the specialized entities within each agency. Despite this financial crisis, combating traditional crime and terrorism must be done regardless of the number of people doing it.

APPENDIX A. MODERN DAY KIDNAPPINGS

The following narrative is an example of a modern day kidnapping. Authors Conant and Flores describe how complex the modern day kidnappings have become.

A man, Manuel, exited a Radio Shack in Phoenix with his family one day in February 2009. According to witnesses, there was a group of Hispanic men in the parking lot watching him. One witness heard one of the men say, “do it now” repeatedly. With that, a man approached Manuel, pointed a gun to his head and forced him into a Ford Expedition. Manuel’s wife told law enforcement officers that Manuel pleaded with the men not to hurt him. She also reported that there was another car in the parking lot in which a man sat pointing a rifle out the window. Shots were fired, but nobody was hit. The cars left the parking lot with Manuel (2009, p.1).

Later in the evening, Manuel’s wife received a phone call from a man. He ordered her not to call the police and allowed her to listen to a recording of her husband’s voice in which he stated, “Tell the kids I am ok.” Before the man terminated the call, he promised Manuel’s wife he would be calling her again (2009, p.1).

Despite the warning the man gave Manuel’s wife, she called the authorities. In subsequent calls from the kidnappers, Manuel’s wife was told he owed money for drugs, and they wanted her to pay \$1 million and turn over their Cadillac Escalade for ransom. Two men eventually came for the Escalade and were captured by police. They advised the officers that they were paid by some unidentified person to retrieve the car and drive it to Tucson. They had no further information about Manuel or his kidnappers (Conant & Flores, 2009, p.1). According to Lauri Burgett, Phoenix Police Department’s recently established kidnap squad Manuel was a drug dealer and had lost a “load.” She guessed that he was brought back to Mexico to pay for that loss (2009, p. 1). Manuel’s body has never been recovered.

Another example of a modern day kidnapping unfolded as follows:

A kidnap for ransom case handled by RHD lasted eight days. In summary, a man dropped his daughter off at school one morning and was returning home. According to a

neighbor, he drove down the street they live on at a high rate of speed and pulled into his parking space carelessly, striking the car parked in front of him. At the time she noticed two large SUVs block each end of street while a small Toyota Corolla pulled up directly next to the victim. A man exited the Corolla holding a gun. He pointed the gun at the victim's head and forced him into the Corolla. The Corolla left with the two SUVs in tow. The neighbor immediately notified the victim's wife and the police were called.

The next day, the victim's wife started getting phone calls from the kidnappers. They demanded \$80,000 for the safe return of her husband. RHD detectives start talking to the kidnappers, during which time they can hear the victim being beaten. The Commanding Officer of RHD said that the kidnappers called the wife every 15 minutes from various payphones in the San Fernando Valley. They never stayed on the phone for more than one minute before they hung up and were calling from another phone. The kidnappers used cell phones, but every time RHD tried to track the call, the signal was interrupted. RHD detectives were all over the city chasing "ghosts." This wild goose chase went on for three days. LAPD experts could not figure out how the kidnappers were interrupting the signal so they called in the FBI. The FBI tried to sort it out, but was unable to do so. Finally, RHD agreed to pay the kidnappers the money, but requested to see the victim when they dropped off the money. The kidnappers refused and said they wanted the money put in a car and dropped off at a specified location. The victim then would be released at a later time. RHD reluctantly agreed.

The money was secreted in a car as the kidnappers requested and parked at a location they had designated. RHD had surveillance on the vehicle containing the money for a few days, but the kidnappers never made any move to retrieve the money. Finally, another member of the victim's family reported that an unidentified male Hispanic showed upon her doorstep with a cell phone. He handed her the phone and told her that they knew she was related to the victim, and she would be the only one they would negotiate with from now on. According to the kidnappers, the victim's wife could no longer be trusted. A few days later, the kidnappers released the victim in an alley wearing only a sheet. They gave him a cell phone and told him to come up with the money or he would be killed. The victim refused to tell RHD who the kidnappers were

and to this day, the case remains unsolved (LAPD official, personal communication, March 6, 2009).

The following example is a kidnap that occurred in the city of Chula Vista, county of San Diego:

A captain from the Chula Vista Police Department said his agency has not experienced as many kidnaps for ransom as some of the other border cities, but it estimated this could be due to the fact that 90 percent are not reported to police. He explained that there are four reasons that he is aware of why people don't report kidnaps. First, members of the cartels threaten to kill the victim if family members involve authorities. Second, the victim is or was a member of the cartel and/or he owes them money. In these cases, the captain said that the members of the victim's family are confident that their loved one is not coming back to them alive so they do not bother calling the police. Third, victims who are targeted by the cartels are done so because of their wealth and prestige (e.g, doctors, business owners, bankers). These classes or categories of victims simply have their family pay the ransom. In fact, some of the wealthier people have private kidnap insurance. All negotiations are done through the insurance company and law enforcement may never even know about the crime at all.

The captain said his officers received a call one night from a wealthy Mexican doctor living in Chula Vista who had been kidnapped, paid the ransom via private insurance, but called the police, not to investigate the kidnap, but because he was beaten up in the process. Finally, some victim's families are reluctant to call U.S. authorities to report a kidnap because they know there will be communication between U.S. authorities and Mexican authorities. They trust the U.S. authorities, but they do not trust the Mexican authorities. Most people believe that that the Mexican police and military are wrought with corruption (Chula Vista official, personal communication, March 27, 2009).

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APPENDIX B. TERRORISM LIAISON OFFICER SURVEY

The following is an actual e-mail I sent a colleague in (2009) regarding the obvious lack of knowledge and therefore training with our line personnel. I have removed my colleague's name for confidentiality purposes.

When we spoke about providing terrorism awareness training and reaching out to patrol one area we discussed was the TLO program. I mentioned that it seemed to exist on paper only and you and I were concerned that the TLOs were not providing even basic training to line personnel. You should know that in subsequent interviews that I have done for my thesis, the same concerns have come up. As a result, I did a very rudimentary, random, no frills survey of eleven of our area stations to see if officers, detectives, watch commanders etc. were familiar with their TLO. I stopped at the eleventh division because it became painfully clear that our concerns were right on...the TLO program exists on paper only. Our people, the front line people, not only didn't know who their TLO was, but they didn't even know what TLO stood for, which means they are not getting any, or very little terrorism awareness training.

This is a break-down of what I did and the results. I even wrote direct quotes I received when I asked the question, "who is your TLO?" I don't want to identify the divisions or the people I spoke to simply because I am not trying to get anybody into trouble. This was done to assist us in determining where the training needs lie.

Table 3. Results of TLO Survey

Rank:

Detective I:	10	Police Officer I:	2	Senior Lead Officer:	3
Detective II:	2	Police Officer II:	10	Lieutenant I:	2
Detective III:	5	Police Officer III:	6	Sergeant I:	3

Of the above individuals I spoke to, **only 3 knew who their TLO was.** The rest did not know who it was and some didn't even know what TLO stood for. Here are some of the direct quotes I received:

Who is your TLO?

- “I think it’s the detective CO.” (CO is Commanding Officer)
- “I think it’s the training coordinator.”
- “What does TLO stand for?”
- “Is TLO a table coordinator?” (A detective unit supervisor)
- “We have one of those?”
- “What? What the heck is that?”
- “Oh my God, good question.”
- “What the hell is a TLO?”
- “You got me on that one.”
- “A TLO...that acronym I don’t know.”
- “We don’t have one of those.”
- “Blue Cross.”
- “Let me find out for you real quick.”
- “Is that Officer Tello? Does he work here?”
- “My who?”

In 2012, I conducted the same impromptu survey; however, I didn't involve counterterrorism. I also, in or to keep things consistent, only conducted the survey of 11 divisions. Again, no names are used as this was not done to get anyone in trouble. It was done to demonstrate that we, as an agency, don't train our key personnel and there is little to no follow up.

Table 4. 2102 TLO Survey

Rank					
Detective III:	1	Detective II:	2	Police Officer III:	2
Police Officer II	6	Sergeant 1:	1	Sergeant II:	2

Of the above personnel, **five knew who their TLO was** and what were his responsibilities. The rest, like the survey in 2009 did not know who their TLO was or what TLO stood for. Here are some of the quotes I received upon inquiring:

Who is your TLO?

- “What is that? We have one of those?”
- “Let me find out?”
- “Trust...what?” “TLO what is that?” “I have to find out.”
- “Who?” “Let me check.” “I don’t even know what that is.”
- “We have one of those?”
- “Oh, I don’t know, but I think it is Sergeant X...that’s training liaison officer right?” Oh, terrorism Liaison Officer, let me check.”
- “I don’t know.”
- “I don’t know.” “I don’t even know what that means.”

Following the impromptu interview in 2009, I sent the results to Counterterrorism and other high rank officials within the LAPD. On June 8, 2009 a Special Order from the Chief of Police was disseminated Department-wide revising the Terrorism Liaison Officer Program and detailing their responsibilities. Commanding officers were ordered to select between two and five sworn employees to fill this position. Although we performed better in 2012 compared to 2009 (two more employees in 2012 could name at least one or two of their TLOs, we are still far from ensuring our line personnel are getting the information they need to do their job.

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APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW OF YAEL HAREL

Yael Harel is a citizen of the United States and Israel. She spent most of her time in Israel, but of late spends her time here, with her two children and husband. In an interview with her, she said that she prefers LAPD's configuration over the INP when it comes to investigating traditional crimes. She was a victim of financial fraud and was impressed with the fact that LAPD had a unit and detectives specifically assigned to investigate that type of crime. She said she felt like she was getting the best service, the best detectives with the most knowledge. She said she felt confident her case would be properly handled and adjudicated...and it was. However, Harel said when it comes to security issues, she feels vulnerable in the U.S. compared to Israel. Harel explained that Americans are very non-observant and have an air of confidence that they cannot be victimized because they are Americans. She said Americans have a sense of entitlement and the attitude that security is someone else's problem to deal with. This concerns Harel. She pointed out that terrorists showed America that they too can be victims, but she does not see Americans taking that threat very seriously.

Harel said in Israel, if she went to the park with her children and there was an unattended package she would call the authorities and within minutes they would respond and dismantle it. In the U.S. not only does nobody call the authorities, if they do, LAPD takes hours to resolve the matter. To Harel this type of minimal security is going to take some getting used to for her. Harel's way of life has always been the security of the country is every citizen's responsibility. The Israeli people have had to adapt and they did. Americans should not be afraid to change their way of thinking. They will be a securer nation for it.

Harel mentioned the current violence at the U.S./Mexican border and said she does not understand the U.S. response. Of course, she admits she is basing what she knows from the newspapers, but she commented that what makes sense to her is if the "bad guys" are converging that the "good guys" need to do the same. Harel believes that although she prefers the way LAPD detectives are specialized versus the INP's generalized configuration, in wake of the organized criminal groups interfacing in

Mexico and the threat that poses to the U.S., LAPD needs to combine its specialized detectives to best address the links between these groups and dismantle them. Harel said this lesson American law enforcement can certainly learn from the INP (personal communication, April 2, 2009).

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