

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE: THE REGIONAL ALIGNMENT OF U.S. ARMY
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

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General Studies

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ABSTRACT

PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE: THE REGIONAL ALIGNMENT OF U.S. ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS, by MAJ Michael C. Flynn, 157 pages.

The U.S. Army is regionally aligning its Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) after a decade of continuous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This study examines the impact of regionally aligning BCTs with Geographic Combatant Commands. This study began by first surveying literature published by the Department of Defense, the Army, and national security scholars published in the last ten years. Second, the author conducted a survey of designated Brigade Commanders and Command Sergeants Major attending the Fort Leavenworth Pre-Command Course to receive expert feedback on the impact regional alignment will have on the training and readiness of BCTs. Finally, this study examined the after action reports three BCTs that deployed to OIF to evaluate the impact of regional training on their mission readiness. The information collected confirmed that the Army should regionally align its BCTs because the concept will make BCTs more effective at the tactical level as well as increase the Army's relevance in the future security environment.

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ACRONYMS

A2/AD	Anti-Access and Area Denial
AAR	After Action Review
ABCT	Armored Brigade Combat Team
ADM	Admiral
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AO	Area of Operations
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ASCC	Army Service Component Command
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BDE	Brigade
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CCJO	<i>Capstone Concept for Joint Operations</i>
CCMD	Combatant Command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CGSC	U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
CNAS	Center for a New American Security
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSBA	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
CTC	Combat Training Center
DA	United States Department of the Army
DOD	United States Department of Defense

DOTMLPF	doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities
FET	Female Engagement Team
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GEN	General
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
ID	Infantry Division
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IIA	Inform and Influence Activities
IN	Infantry
J2	Intelligence section of a Joint Staff
JCOA	Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis
JP	Joint Publication
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
NTC	The National Training Center Fort Irwin, California
OCT	Observer Coach Trainer
OE	Operating Environment
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OND	Operation New Dawn
PCC	Pre-Command Course
QAO	Quality Assurance Office

RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SC BCT	Security Cooperation Brigade Combat Team
SF	U.S. Army Special Forces
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
TTP	Tactic, Technique, or Procedure
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

With the impending conclusion of military operations in Afghanistan in the next year and a half, the United States Army is reaching a transition point. The U.S. military is facing budget reductions after experiencing a period of unlimited resources. In particular, the U.S. Army is facing overall force reductions and the possibility of reduced relevance as our national leaders shift their focus on the Western Pacific. Due to its vast distances and geographic make up, the Western Pacific is ideal for a technologically advanced military attempting to cut defense spending by reducing its overseas footprint. The responsiveness and longer reach of navy and air force assets make them the more viable components for any future contingency operations in the Western Pacific.

However, Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) still have a requirement to shape the security environment in their theaters in an effort to prevent conflict. The U.S. Army is a critical component of those efforts. Few nations have the air or maritime assets that the United States possesses. Most nations' primary means of defense relies upon their ground forces. The U.S. Army can assist GCCs by partnering with other nations armies to improve their capabilities and demonstrate the United States commitment to its partners and allies. In order to support the efforts of GCCs, the U.S. Army is instituting the concept of regional alignment. This study will examine the concept of regional alignment and the impact it will have on the U.S. Army's Brigade Combat Teams.

Prior to OIF and OEF, the only units in the U.S. Army that conducted specialized training on specific regions were Civil Affairs and Special Forces (Odierno 2012a). Due

to its experiences in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. Army determined that it needed to improve the language training and cultural awareness of units prior to deployment. The greater understanding of the culture in both Iraq and Afghanistan available to BCTs translated into greater success at COIN as well as advise and assist missions. In an effort to maintain and capitalize on the U.S. Army's skills at interacting with foreign cultures and militaries, it is now implementing the Regional Alignment Concept.

At the 18 September 2012 Regional Alignment of Forces Planners Conference the Army G-3/5/7 presented the definition approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army for regional alignment.

Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF): Those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and apportioned for planning. Aligned forces maintain proficiency in wartime fundamentals, but also possess a regional mission and training focus that includes an understanding of the languages, cultures, geography and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed. (Army G-3/5/7 2012, 2)

The initial draft concept under consideration uses a twenty four month ARFORGEN cycle. In the first nine months of the ARFORGEN cycle, a regionally aligned BCT will conduct training on offensive, defensive, and stability operations from individual through BCT level exercises. From months nine through twelve, BCTs will continue training on decisive action tasks, but also incorporate language and cultural training for specific nations in the region they are aligned with. Combatant Commanders provide the guidance on what nations or cultures the BCT needs to train on. At the twelve month mark, the BCT then enters the available forces pool for that region's Combatant Commander to use for security force assistance missions, advise and assist missions, or exercises with foreign militaries (FORSCOM 2012b, 7).

AFRICOM will be the first Combatant Command that tests the new regional alignment concept in 2013 (Vandiver 2012). The first BCT to execute this concept will be 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. PACOM will be the next Combatant Command to benefit from the regional alignment concept.

There are several issues impacting the U.S. Army's implementation of regional alignment. The first issue is our continuing commitment to Afghanistan. The U.S. Army will continue to deploy combat units to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) through at least December of 2014 (Obama 2011). Yet to be determined is the nature of the enduring relationship the U.S. Army will have with the Afghan Security Forces. There is the possibility that U.S. personnel will continue deploying to Afghanistan after December of 2014 in the capacity of security force assistance teams. Additionally, there will be significant reductions to the Department of Defense budget in the near future. This will impact not only the size of the U.S. Army in the coming years, but also the resources available to train units.

In October of 2011, the U.S. Army published Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. ADP 3-0 describes both the threat the U.S. Army will face in the next decade, and how it will defeat that threat. ADP 3-0 describes the new doctrine of Decisive Action. Decisive Action consists of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations against a hybrid threat in order to achieve the nation's desired end-state (DA 2011a, 5). Prior to 2003 the U.S. Army focused its training efforts entirely on offensive and defensive operations. The U.S. Army learned the hard way during the last decade in both Afghanistan and Iraq the importance of stability operations. In order to meet the requirements of the operating environments in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the

U.S. Army focused its training efforts on stability operations. As a result, the skills and knowledge necessary to conduct offensive and defensive operations atrophied in the intervening years. It will take time for the U.S. Army to regain its pre-OIF competency in offensive and defensive operations. Added to that is the additional requirement to train on and retain its stability operations skills. While the U.S. Army is grappling with the requirements involved in becoming proficient at decisive action, it will also have to meet regional training requirements mandated by the GCCs to which its BCTs are assigned. Further complicating the U.S. Army's shift to regional alignment is the fact that the Army is currently in the process of defining what regional alignment entails in terms of time and resources for training. In summary, the U.S. Army will dedicate time and effort in relearning offensive and defensive operations while maintaining proficiency at stability operations, within the construct of regional alignment and ongoing operations, while faced with the new challenges of increasingly restricted resources.

Research Question

This study develops a response to the following question: Should U.S. Army regionally align its BCTs?

Prior to answering this study's primary question, it must first answer three others. The first is answering the question "what are the threats the U.S. Army will face in the next decade?" After determining what threats the U.S. Army will likely face, this study will then answer the question "what other options can the U.S. Army adopt besides regional alignment?" Finally, this study responds to the question "will regional alignment make BCTs more effective?"

Assumptions

For the foreseeable future, the U.S. Army will conduct training and operations in a multinational environment. Based upon the National Security Strategy published in 2010, the U.S. will focus on building partnerships and working within existing alliances in the future (White House 2010, 9). Multi-national operations will require the U.S. Army build capacity and understanding in partner nations through combined-joint exercises. In order to foster these military to military relationships, the U.S. Army will have to understand not only the capabilities of partner nations, but their culture, language, economics, and geography as well.

Definitions

For this study, the term BCTs includes all Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), and Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs). The term BCT does not include any other kind of brigades such as Combat Aviation Brigades, Fires Brigades, or Sustainment Brigades. Additionally, BCT refers specifically to active duty BCTs and not National Guard BCTs.

Scope and Delimitations

This study will only focus on the impact of regional alignment on BCTs. The impact of regional alignment on any other U.S. Army formation other than BCTs is beyond the scope of this study. This study will not assess the impact of regional alignment on echelons of command above the BCT level. Additionally, this study will not assess the impact of regional alignment on the training and readiness of National Guard BCTs.

Significance of the Study

The concept of regional alignment is emerging policy at this time. In the next three years almost every BCT in the U.S. will have to implement this guidance in some form. During that time BCTs, Combatant Commanders, FORSCOM, and U.S. Army decision makers will have the opportunity to assess the impact of regional alignment. Changes and updated guidance will be sure to follow. This study identifies some of the costs and benefits involved in regionally aligning BCTs as well as provide recommendations for implementation. Regional alignment is the newest priority for the U.S. Army, and this study will contribute to the dialogue involved in implementing this policy.

Additionally, this study will identify the risks involved in regionally aligning BCTs and the impact it could have on future operations. In so doing, this study will also identify strategies to mitigate those risks. By identifying the risks involved in regional alignment, and means to mitigate those risks, this study will contribute to the overall readiness of the U.S. Army.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army is in the process of transitioning out of operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, the U.S. Army is preparing to reduce its overall troop strength and operate on a smaller budget. While doing so, it is simultaneously preparing to meet the future threats by implementing its new overarching doctrine from ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. As part of that effort, the U.S. Army is in the process of formulating the policy of regional alignment in order to be better prepared to conduct decisive action operations in key regions of the world. This study will attempt to determine if U.S. Army

BCTs should regionally align in order to be better prepared to succeed in future operations in the next decade.

The next chapter will provide an overview of the literature dealing with regional alignment. The first part of the chapter will identify the likely threats that U.S. Army BCTs will face and the regions of the world in which they will face them. The second section will identify the guidance and requirements for implementation of regional alignment for BCTs. This section will be further divided into the requirements put forth by the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands, and the guidance put out by the Army Staff and FORSCOM as the force generators. The final section will deal with materiel published by experts and their assessments of the impact of regional alignment on BCTs.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The first chapter of this study described how the U.S. Army will regionally align its BCTs to support Geographic Combatant Commands. It also discussed some of the challenges BCTs will face while training for their assigned regions. This includes the implementation of Decisive Action doctrine laid out by ADP 3-0, continuing operations in Afghanistan, and the likely reduction of the defense budget for the next decade. For Decisive Action, BCTs will train on offensive and defensive tasks in order to regain knowledge and skills that atrophied during nearly a decade of stability operations. At the same time, they will train on stability operations in order to retain the capabilities gained during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to support the host nation government, train and partner with security forces, and protect and support the local populace. BCTs will have additional tasks and requirements, such as language and security force assistance, to train on to meet their regional requirements. All of these training requirements are further compounded by the looming budget cuts as a result of the U.S.'s rising debt. The goal of this study is to answer the question of whether or not the U.S. Army should regionally align BCTs. In doing so, this study will contribute to the dialogue taking place across the Army as it transitions out of Afghanistan and prepares to meet future threats.

This chapter presents the most significant schools of thought of thought surrounding the debate on regional alignment. The literature focuses primarily on what strategies the U.S. military needs to adopt to counter threats for the next fifteen to twenty years. The various strategies presented are aimed at policy makers, and fall into three

broad categories. The first category, the capacity building school of thought, are those who advocate the need for the military, and the U.S. Army in particular, to focus on building up the capabilities of allied or partnered nations dealing with external or internal threats. The second group, the alliance school of thought, consists of those advocating the use of the U.S. Army as a means to build new or solidify existing alliances in the face of proliferating anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) technology. This group of thinkers focuses primarily on the Western Pacific and China's growing capabilities there. The third, and final, category deals with the capturing of lessons learned during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, hereafter referred to as the lesson learned school of thought. Writers in this group want to make sure that the U.S. Army retains skills learned and developed during counter-insurgency operations in both countries.

Prevent, Shape, Win

The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General (GEN) Raymond T. Odierno, is the driving force behind regional alignment in the U.S. Army. Based upon his guidance in early 2012 the Army Staff and Forces Command began developing the policy of regional alignment. GEN Odierno's policy is a synthesis of all three categories of regional alignment literature mentioned above. He laid out his guidance in two documents, the *2012 Army Posture Statement* and the *2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, and made his argument for these policies in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* titled "The U.S. Army in a Time of Transition."

In February of 2012, GEN Odierno, along with Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh, published the *2012 Army Posture* statement. In the *2012 Army Posture Statement*, the two leaders lay out their vision for the U.S. Congress in terms of

preventing conflict, shaping the international environment, and winning the nation's wars. Preventing consists of providing a credible deterrence to potential security threats. Shaping consists of working with international partners through GCCs to improve their capabilities to defeat internal or external threats. Finally, winning means that "The Army must never enter into a terrible endeavor such as war unprepared" (DA 2012i, 5-6).

In April of 2012, Secretary McHugh and GEN Odierno issued the *2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance*. In it, they expand upon the concept of Prevent, Shape, Win laid out in the *2012 Army Posture*. The Strategic Planning Guidance states that "some actions are principally aimed at preventing miscalculations by adversaries, while others are shaping efforts designed to reassure and enhance our relationships with key partners" (DA 2012h, 5). This statement clearly echoes the concerns advocated by the alliance school of thought who aim to counter China's growing A2/AD threat. The Strategic Planning Guidance then describes how the Army will contribute to national security by conducting shaping operations in support of GCCs.

Shaping is an enduring, daily requirement and is emerging as a core competency of the Army. It is accomplished by engaging with our coalition partners through routine interactions, as opportunities present themselves, or through contingencies in regions with localized conflicts. (DA 2012h, 5)

The *Strategic Planning Guidance* then goes on to elaborate on what kind of missions the Army will conduct to shape the international security environment such as exercises and security force assistance. Again, the shape portion of GEN Odierno's vision for the Army falls within the first category discussed above, namely the capacity building school of thought. The *Strategic Planning Guidance* then explains the concept embodied by Win in the Army's Vision by stating "it (the Army) requires having capabilities that can prevail in complex environments with precise, lethal force when needed, but one

equally capable of compelling favorable outcomes without applying force if possible” (DA 2012h, 6). By requiring the Army to use both lethal and non-lethal force in complex environments, complex being ones in which the enemy hides within the local population, GEN Odierno is clearly calling for the Army to retain the skills developed in Iraq and Afghanistan. This falls within the third category of regional alignment thinking, namely the lessons learned school of thought. Finally, the Strategic Planning Guidance broadly describes the Army’s objective in regionally aligning forces.

Regionally Align Forces. Aligning forces with regions allows the integration of planning and training for Combatant Command contingencies, focuses language and cultural training, and provides predictable and dependable capabilities to GCC and Army Service Component Command (ASCC) commanders. (DA 2012h, 8)

This is the first time a universally published Army document defines the purpose of regionally aligning forces. Although this initial definition clearly links regional alignment to the prevent and shape portion of GEN Odierno’s vision, there is no mention of how it will contribute to winning in future contingency operations. Instead, he answers that question in an article he wrote for *Foreign Affairs*.

In GEN Odierno’s article “The U.S. Army in a Time of Transition,” published in the May and June 2012 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, he discusses the challenges that the Army will face in the near future. These challenges are declining budgets, “pivoting to the Pacific,” and a wider range of potential missions. Odierno summarizes the budgetary challenges well when he states “maintaining the army the country requires with fewer resources will mean balancing three variables: the overall size of the force, its equipment, and its training and readiness” (Odierno 2012b, 8). He then discusses the issues involved with shifting America’s security focus from the Middle East to the Pacific. Odierno

emphasizes the importance of the Army in building relationships and deterring aggression in the Pacific, while simultaneously maintaining U.S. security commitments to Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and South America (Odierno 2012b, 8-9). In the final section, called “A Broader Mission Set,” Odierno argues that “the final major transition the Army must manage is that from a force focused on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and advising and assisting to one that actively prepares to conduct a fuller range of potential missions” (Odierno 2012b, 9). Although Odierno discusses such future challenges as maintaining conventional force to special operations force interoperability, the growing importance of cyber security, and the requirement to maintain the lessons the Army learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is in this section that he explains how regional alignment will better prepare the units for contingency operations. He states “regional commanders’ anticipation of likely contingencies should dictate the mission set for which aligned units prepare. This means that some units may focus on higher end war fighting while others dedicate much of their training to disaster relief or exercises with partners in the region” (Odierno 2012b, 10). Thus Odierno feels that by regionally aligning BCTs they will understand the environment in the region to which they will deploy, know what their likely missions will be in that region, and can then better prepare to accomplish those missions.

It is important to note that Odierno primarily argues for regionally aligning forces on the grounds that it will support the efforts of GCCs. Within Odierno’s Prevent-Shape-Win concept, he spends the majority of his effort at explaining how the Army, by creating regionally aligned forces, allows GCCs to deter aggression, build partnerships, and improve partner capacity. Odierno, except briefly in his *Foreign Affairs* article, does

not discuss how regional alignment will make the Army, and BCTs in particular, a more effective fighting force.

Capacity Building

The advocates of capacity building with partner nations want to avoid entangling the U.S. in another long counterinsurgency campaign like the ones in Iraq or Afghanistan. Proponents of capacity building want the U.S. to provide training and support to nations dealing with sources of internal and external instability instead of directly confronting it ourselves. Under capacity building, the Army missions will include training host nation security forces, supporting host nation counterterrorism efforts, and supporting host nation counterinsurgency efforts during Phase 0 operations. The main advocates for capacity building include writers for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Andrew F. Krepinevich, and John Nagl among others.

John Nagl, one of the major proponents for counterinsurgency, argues for the creation of a permanent advisory corps in *Institutionalizing Adaptation* which was published by the CNAS in June of 2007. He argues that the U.S. Army is better equipped and trained to conduct offensive and defensive operations. However, the U.S. will likely not face a conventional foe with similar capabilities in the near future. The majority of threats will consist of insurgencies that threaten U.S. interests abroad. Nagl argues that the Army, instead of confronting these threats directly, will have greater success in supporting the host nation's efforts to defeat internal instability (Nagl 2007, 3). Nagl advocates the creation of a standing advisory corps of over twenty thousand Soldiers with the purpose of training foreign nation's militaries. The Army would have to reduce the number of BCTs to make the Soldiers available to form the new advisory corps. Nagl's

position within the capacity building school of thought is an extreme one. Not only does he advocate creating this capability in the Army, but he wants to fundamentally restructure its organization to accomplish this objective.

The CNAS also advocates less extreme calls for capacity building in the Army. While giving testimony before a House Armed Services Committee on 27 March 2012, Robert Killebrew, a senior fellow at CNAS, stated:

The real counterinsurgent is the host country, and we are third-party intruders in a family fight. Our whole aim, therefore—our strategy, our training, our equipment—should be designed to make our host as strong as possible against his insurgency. We urgently need to learn how to advise foreign armies and foreign governments with minimal presence where it counts, rather than muscling in with massive troop buildups and foreign aid that eclipses and often alienates, the very people we are trying to help. (Killebrew 2012, 2)

CNAS echoes the same approach in its study *Strategic Adaptation: Toward a New U.S. Strategy in the Middle East* co-authored by Bruce W. Jentleson, Andrew M. Exum, Melissa G. Dalton, and J. Dana Stuster. In *Strategic Adaptation* the authors argue that the U.S. should withdraw all of its forces from the region except the 5th Fleet in Bahrain but maintain the ability to deploy forces if necessary (Jentleson et al. 2012, 30). The U.S. then could focus its efforts on training the regions militaries to provide their own security (Jentleson et al. 2012, 31).

Andrew F. Krepinevich is the president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) and writes about strategy and policy for the U.S. military. He also argues for using the U.S. Army to train foreign armies to combat internal and external threats. In August of 2008 he authored *The Challenges to US National Security* along with Robert Martinage and Robert Work. In it Krepinevich and his co-authors argue that the U.S.'s greatest threats in the future will be violent Islamist radicalism, a more

confrontational China, and more nuclear capable nations. In the section about countering the violent Islamist radicals, Krepinevich and his fellow authors argue that the U.S. must focus on training and advising foreign militaries. In order to do this, the authors recommend that the U.S. military “develop increased foreign language skills, cultural expertise, and familiarity with a wide range of foreign weapons, as well as specialized training and advisory skill sets” (Krepinevich, Martinage, and Work 2008, 20). Later, in November of 2008, Krepinevich authored *An Army at the Crossroads* which outlined future challenges for the U.S. Army, and provided some recommendations to counter these likely challenges. Krepinevich argues that the Army will face two types of missions in the future. The first is “persistent irregular warfare” that requires the ability to train host nation forces. The second is the need to conduct “traditional power-projection operations” that correspond with offensive and defensive operations initially followed up by a preponderance of stability operations (Krepinevich 2008, 27-28). To prepare for these two different mission sets, he recommends that the Army focus one half of its forces on conventional warfare and the other on irregular warfare (Krepinevich 2008, 65). Krepinevich then later recommends that the Army institutionalize this by turning thirty IBCTs into security cooperation brigades that only focus on irregular warfare (Krepinevich 2008, 66-67). Although it sounds similar to Nagl’s recommendation for a permanent advisory corps, Krepinevich’s security cooperation brigades are different. Their main focus would be irregular warfare and advising and assisting, but their structure would not be so different that they could not shift to conventional warfare after a short train-up period. Krepinevich modified this stance in his article titled “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets” which was published in the July and August 2009 edition of

Foreign Affairs. In it Krepinevich argues for the U.S. to focus on training, equipping and advising partner nations facing internal threats, and in particular radical Islamists (Krepinevich 2009, 25). Additionally, Krepinevich recommends that the U.S. institutionalize the lessons learned in combating irregular warfare, but he does not mention restructuring the Army.

Proponents of capacity building in partner nations and allies argue that the U.S. should limit its involvement in a foreign nations security threats by limiting the number of troops we involve. To accomplish this, they advocate either the creation of units within the Army to provide this capability or adopting this as one of the primary missions of U.S. Army conventional units. Regardless of which position they advocate, all of the experts agree that specific regional culture and language training is a requirement.

Alliance Building

The second school of thought on military strategy consists of thinkers who advocate using the U.S. military as a means to build alliances. The alliance school of thought views A2/AD technology as the greatest threat to U.S. security. Nations that possess advanced A2/AD can potentially deny the U.S. and its allies access to the global commons. The global commons consist of the ocean, space, and cyber realms. Nations with A2/AD technology can use it to destroy airbases, prevent naval forces from approaching their shores, interdict sea lines of communication, and deny power projection capabilities. Additionally, nations possessing A2/AD technology can coerce weaker nations by threatening to interdict their ocean commerce. Advocates concerned with the proliferation of A2/AD technology focus on using the U.S. military to strengthen alliances. Although it sounds similar to building partner capacity, the alliance school of

thought is different in objectives they want to achieve. Capacity builders want the military to train and support foreign militaries so they can combat instability themselves. Alliance builders want to focus U.S. efforts on developing interoperability, combined basing, and countering A2/AD from an external nation state. Actions that result in increased stability in a region are a benefit, but the main purpose of alliance building is to ensure that the U.S. maintains its position of military and economic power in the world.

The majority of advocates for alliance building focus their efforts on naval and air capabilities. A2/AD capabilities pose a threat to the U.S. military's ability to ensure air supremacy and control of the sea lines of communication during any potential conflict. The leading innovator in A2/AD capabilities at this time is China, and as a result of the distances involved in projecting power to China from the U.S., the focus is on developing U.S. naval and air capabilities. In addition to developing our own capabilities, the advocates for alliance building want us to synchronize our efforts with other regional powers to ensure a coordinated effort in defeating A2/AD capabilities. The various strategists for the alliance building school of thought advocate positions on U.S. Army involvement ranging from no involvement all the way to the primary means to shape alliances.

One of the first studies published outlining a defense strategy for a post Iraq and Afghanistan world is *AirSea Battle*. Authors Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas published *AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept* in 2010 for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Van Tol and company advocate a prioritization of effort within the Department of Defense at improving the materiel systems in the Navy and Air Force capable of

defeating or countering new Chinese anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. More importantly, the authors of *AirSea Battle* call for the Navy and Air Force to combine the use of those assets across the domains of space, cyber-space, the air, sea, and under-sea in an integrated approach that makes the whole greater than the sum of its parts. The authors' view is that if the Navy and Air Force cannot defeat the threat posed by A2/AD capabilities, the U.S. military will not be able to successfully conclude any military operations in the future. Finally, *AirSea Battle* calls for the U.S. to focus these efforts in the Western Pacific because China possesses the largest and most advanced arsenal of A2/AD capabilities (Van Tol et al. 2010, IX-XVI). Just as the name implies, the Navy and Air Force are the primary contributors to AirSea Battle. The Army's role would be that of contributing to their efforts by securing bases to operate from and assisting in missile defense (Van Tol et al. 2010, 76, 82). At no time do the authors of *AirSea Battle* discuss regional alignment or its possible contribution to future conflicts. It is interesting to note that there is no discussion of capacity building of U.S. allies in *AirSea Battle* since Andrew Krepinevich, discussed earlier in the capacity building section, is one of the co-authors.

In *Sustainable Pre-eminence: Reforming the U.S. Military at a Time of Strategic Change*, published by CNAS, authors David W. Barno, Nora Bensachel, Matthew Irvine, and Travis Sharp recommend changes to the structure, equipping, and research objectives for the Department of Defense. The focus of Barno and his co-authors in *Sustainable Pre-eminence* is to set the U.S. military on a path to deter or defeat aggression by a regional power in the near future. As a result, the U.S. Army becomes a tool for national leaders to use to develop alliances. Barno and his co-authors recommend that the U.S.

Army conduct foreign exercises to “buttress foreign partners and maintain readiness” (Barno et al. 2012, 31). They also recommend that the Army institute an advisory corps along the lines that Nagl recommended along with regionally aligning BCTs and higher headquarters to support GCCs (Barno et al. 2012, 32). Lastly, *Sustainable Pre-eminence* recommends that “the Army should significantly increase its rotational overseas exercise program to offset its lack of full-time presence around the world . . . this rotational presence will also help bolster regional confidence and deter regional aggression” (Barno et al. 2012, 33). The authors of *Sustainable Pre-eminence* clearly view the Army as a shaping effort in the future security environment. The authors agree with the threats laid out in *AirSea Battle*, but they at least assign a role to the U.S. Army in that concept.

A. Wess Mitchell and Jakub Grygiel in their spring 2011 article titled “The Vulnerability of Peripheries,” published in *The American Interest*, warn against failing to respond to Chinese, Russian, and Iranian testing of U.S. security commitments in their regions. The authors claim that America’s traditional allies in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Asian Pacific fear the U.S. will not support them against the three regional powers based upon President Obama’s foreign policy and tendency to focus on domestic affairs (Mitchell and Grygiel 2011, 14). To counter this perception among our allies, and deter aggression by regional powers, the authors recommend generating “reassurance packages” consisting of missile defense, military maneuvers, and a military presence. The U.S. can then send the packages either in a regular rotation to a region, or during a time of crisis when a regional power tests America’s resolve (Mitchell and Grygiel 2011, 15-16). Building alliances and actively supporting regional allies will then deter growing

regional powers from taking action. Regular military exercises with allies are a key reason for implementing regional alignment.

Jim Thomas, the vice president and director of CSBA, argues that the U.S. must work more closely with its international partners in the face of proliferating A2/AD capabilities and declining budgets an article titled “From Protectorates to Partnerships” published in the summer 2011 issue of *The American Interest*. He recommends that the U.S. military share bases with its allies and partners in Asia to demonstrate our commitment to the host nation’s security as well as dispersing our forces in the face of the A2/AD threat (Thomas 2011, 43-44). Thomas also recommends that the U.S. focus on developing relationships with nations that have the same interests and security concerns, and not just nations that we worked with in the past. Thomas sees the U.S. playing the role of synchronizing the collective defense efforts of multiple nations instead of just guaranteeing their security with our own efforts. Although he does not say it, Thomas’s recommendations will require the U.S. Army to regionally align its forces to achieve his goals.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published *U.S. Ground Force Capabilities through 2020* in October of 2011 written by Nathan Freier with the contributions of others. Although it does not refer to AirSea Battle directly, it does argue that any strategy that does not account for the use and contributions of land forces is incomplete (Freier et al. 2011, 14). The authors of *U.S. Ground Force Capabilities through 2020* do not directly address regional alignment as a concept but instead acknowledge the need to improve the Army’s capacity for partnering with foreign nation militaries (Freier et al. 2011, 12). The authors’ purpose for publication is reminding

policy makers of the important contribution ground forces make to any contingency operation and is a direct response to AirSea Battle. In the conclusion, Freier warns against overemphasizing SFA and stability operations at the expense of maintaining the ability to project power, conduct forcible entry, and conduct armored warfare (Freier et al. 2011, 15-16).

Lessons Learned

The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) division of the Joint Staff J7, the Directorate for Joint Force Development, published *Decade of War, Volume I* in June 2012. In *Decade of War*, the authors identify eleven “strategic themes” based upon their study of U.S. military operations since 2001 (DOD 2012e, 2). For each theme, the authors provide recommendations to the U.S. military for implementation in an effort to institutionalize lessons learned. Four of the themes, Understanding the Environment, Battle for the Narrative, Coalition Operations, and Host-Nation Partnering all have direct bearing on the regional alignment of forces in the U.S. Army.

The first lesson discussed in *Decade of War* is Understanding the Environment. The authors state that “in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, a failure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals” (DOD 2012e, 3). The study then provides examples of the U.S. military failing to grasp the nature of the environments in which it operated in the past decade. For instance, the study discusses how the U.S. focused on establishing the Iraqi government and developing infrastructure while ignoring the growing insurgency (DOD 2012e, 3). However, the study does not only focus on mistakes that were made, it also identifies some of the solutions that

commanders developed to overcome their initial lack of understanding. The study cites in particular “direct interaction with the local population through patrols, shuras, and key leader engagements” (DOD 2012e, 4). Two recommendations from this section of *Decade of War* tie in directly to regional alignment. Although the authors do not provide any details for implementation, the authors recommend that the U.S. military improve its language and cultural proficiency. This is one of the objectives of regional alignment. Secondly, JCOA recommends the U.S. military “cultivate and leverage relationships and expertise on the operating environment that result from forward presence of military and other interagency elements” (DOD 2012e, 6).

In lesson three, the Battle for the Narrative, the JCOA argues that “the U.S. was slow to recognize the importance of information and the battle for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; it was often ineffective in applying and aligning the narrative to goals and desired end states” (DOD 2012e, 11). Although the authors make several recommendations to improve our inform and influence activities (IIA), only two of them apply to regional alignment. The first is to “help partners develop the capability to report responsibly in the media and provide them key enablers to help them execute this mission” (DOD 2012e, 13). The second recommendation is “reinforce words with deeds: include a rigorous treatment of . . . cultural awareness as part of the “profession of arms” in training and leadership development” (DOD 2012e, 14). The first recommendation is regional alignment in execution while the second is to develop a cultural awareness mindset within the military.

The eighth lesson in *Decade of War* deals with coalition operations. The JCOA study states that “establishing and sustaining coalition unity of effort was a challenge due

to competing national interests, cultures, resources, and policies” (DOD 2012e, 29). The study lists several challenges to coalition operations, but only four of them pertain to the discussion of regional alignment. Four of the challenges arose from issues with interoperability, training and TTPs, culture, and information sharing and inclusion in planning. However, U.S. forces learned to operate more effectively with coalition partners resulting in greater resources, political credibility, alternative options to solve problems, and improved capabilities within coalition militaries (DOD 2012e, 30-31). In an effort to maintain this effectiveness in future coalition operations, JCOA recommends that the U.S. implement the following three policies. First, the U.S. should increase engagement and training with key partners and allies to “build relationships and opportunities for influence through theater security cooperation initiatives” (DOD 2012e, 31). Next, JCOA wants the U.S. to continue working to build a common doctrine, TTPs, and policies with partners (DOD 2012e, 31). Finally, JCOA again recommends that all services expand their language and cultural expertise (DOD 2012e, 31).

Lesson nine in *Decade of War* is host-nation partnering. The authors of the JCOA study state that “partnering was a key enabler and force multiplier, and aided in host-nation capacity building. However, it was not always approached effectively nor adequately prioritized and resourced” (DOD 2012e, 32). The authors see host-nation partnering as one of the primary missions for the U.S. military in the near future. They are in favor of it because it is a way to counter regional threats while minimizing the amount of U.S. forces involved. Additionally, JCOA argues that host nation forces are more effective in the long run at combating threats because they can differentiate between the local population and threat elements better, and local populations are more

receptive to their operations. They identify one of the key issues that U.S. forces had when working with host-nation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. They state, “general purpose forces did not always respond positively to cultural differences of the host nation, leading to reduced effectiveness due to less positive partnering and advisory relationships” (DOD 2012e, 33). Among other recommendations, JCOA sees a need to continue theater security cooperation activities. First, it will strengthen ties with existing partners and allies. Secondly it will allow positive engagement with future potential allies or partners (DOD 2012e, 34). This clearly fits with the arguments espoused by the alliance building school of thought. For their second recommendation, JCOA recommends that the U.S. “re-establish a Military Assistance and Training Advisory course to promote effective partnering and advising” (DOD 2012e, 34). Instead of changing the structure of the military along the lines that proponents of a military advisory corps, the JCOA wants to create experts in partnering and training of foreign militaries throughout the our forces and keep their knowledge resident in regular units.

Joint Doctrine

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), with the support of the Joint Staff, guidance from the Secretary of Defense and feedback from the Combatant Commands, develop requirements for the services, or generating forces, to meet. Additionally the CJCS is responsible for the Joint Doctrine of the Armed Forces (DOD 2009a, III-5 - III-7). Joint doctrine, upon which the U.S. Army doctrine is based, is one method for the CJCS to issue directives for training. The CJCS and Joint Staff issued several publications outlining capabilities and requirements that regional alignment can meet.

The first publication of note is Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (JP 1), published with its first change in March of 2009. The primary purpose of JP 1 is to lay out the roles and responsibilities of the Department of Defense, the Combatant Commands, and the military services. Additionally it provides the command structure for joint forces and defines the relationships between joint forces, other U.S. Governmental Agencies, and multinational forces. Chapter VI of JP 1 deals with multi-national operations. JP 1 emphasizes the importance of multinational operations when it states “the ability of the United States and its allies to work together to influence the global environment is fundamental to defeating 21st century threats (DOD 2009a, VI-1). It also states that “cultural, psychological, religious, economic, technological, informational, and political factors as well as transnational dangers all impact multinational operations” (DOD 2009a, VI-1). JP 1 also defines the tenets that are critical to achieving unity of effort in multinational operation. These tenets are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination (DOD 2009a, VI-2 - VI-3). JP 1 defines respect as the following:

In assigning missions, the CDR must consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process as much as possible, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment. Understanding, consideration, and acceptance of partner ideas are essential to effective communication across cultures, as are respect for each partner’s culture, religion, customs, history, and values. (DOD 2009a, VI-2)

To achieve rapport JP 1 requires that “U.S. CDRs and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from partner countries... this requires personal direct relationships that only they can develop. Good rapport between leaders will improve teamwork among their staffs and subordinate CDRs and overall unity of effort” (DOD

2009a, VI-2). Knowledge of partners means U.S. CDRs and their staffs “understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values of each partner. This will ensure the effective integration of MNF partners into the operation and enhance the synergistic effect of coalition forces” (DOD 2009a, VI-2). For patience, JP 1 states that “effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires untiring, even handed patience” (DOD 2009a, VI-2). Finally, to achieve coordination U.S. joint forces must achieve the following:

Coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics and ISR, is required. Coordinated planning for ROE, fratricide prevention, deception, IO, communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential for unity of effort. This includes an emphasis on the uses of multinational doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures; development of ISR, C2 systems, and logistic architectures; multinational training and exercises; and establishment of liaison structures. (DOD 2009a, VI-3)

Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, echoes the same tenets, however it does not elaborate any further upon them than the definitions used in JP 1. Although geared toward joint level commands in JP 1, the tenets remain sound for tactical level units to apply to their operations when working with multinational partners.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, published in August of 2011, describes how the U.S. Armed Forces organize for and execute joint operations. Additionally, it defines the type of operations in which the U.S. Armed Forces will participate, and how commanders and their staffs will design those operations. Although it does not directly call for regionally aligning forces to accomplish the missions it describes, it does discuss the capabilities that a joint force commander will require to accomplish their assigned missions. JP 3-0 builds a case for both the capacity building

and alliance building schools of thought. In describing the strategic environment, JP 3-0 states that it is “characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change, which requires persistent engagement. This environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing and disappearing” (DOD 2011a, I-2). JP 3-0 then lists the five national security priorities for the U.S.. They are secure the U.S. homeland, win the Nation’s wars, defend national interests to include deterrence, security cooperation, and responding to civil crises (DOD 2011a, I-3 - I-4). Aside from securing the U.S. homeland, the other four national security priorities will require the Armed Forces to interact with the population, militaries, and governments of other nations. JP 3-0 also states the following regarding language, regional, and cultural expertise:

Language skills, regional knowledge, and cultural awareness enable effective joint operations. Deployed joint forces must be capable of understanding and effectively communicating with native populations, local and national government officials, and coalition partners. Supporting this capability should be an understanding of the regional and local culture, economy, politics, religion, and customs. Lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM proves that these force-multiplying capabilities can save lives and are integral to mission accomplishment. (DOD 2011a, III-19)

Clearly, the senior leadership of the U.S. Armed Forces foresees the need for the military to employ these capabilities in the near future and wants to ensure that the U.S. Army does not disregard its experiences in the last decade.

In January of 2009, the then CJCS, Admiral Mike Mullen, had the Joint Staff publish the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)*. In his foreword ADM Mullen wrote that “the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations describes in broad terms my vision for how the Joint force circa 2016-2028 will operate in response to a wide variety of security challenges” (DOD 2009b, iii). Throughout the document the *CCJO*

emphasizes the importance of having a military that is capable of interacting with foreign governments, militaries, and populations. Mullen himself writes in the forward that “we will need to establish new methods for integrating our actions, both internally and with partners” (DOD 2009b, iv). The *CCJO* describes four basic categories of joint operations. The first is combat which “aims at defeating armed enemies—regular, irregular, or both” (DOD 2009b, 15). Security is the next whose “activities seek to protect and control civil populations and territory—friendly, hostile, or neutral” (DOD 2009b, 16). Engagement is the next operation which seeks “to improve the capabilities of or cooperation with allied and other partners” (DOD 2009b, 16). The final type of operation is relief and reconstruction the purpose of which is to “restore essential civil services in the wake of combat, a breakdown of civil disorder, or a natural disaster” (DOD 2009b, 18). The *CCJO* then calls for joint forces to be able to execute all four types of operations (DOD 2009b, 21). The purpose of these operations will be to accomplish one of the five national security priorities which are win the Nation’s wars, deter potential adversaries, develop cooperative security, defend the homeland, and respond to civil crises (DOD 2009b, 12). The five priorities were previously discussed in the section dealing with JP 3-0. The actual concept presented in the *CCJO* consists of the following three ideas:

Address each situation on its own terms, in its unique political and strategic context, rather than attempting to fit the situation to a preferred template.

Conduct and integrate a combination of combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities according to a concept of operations designed to meet the unique circumstances of that situation.

Conduct operations subject to a continuous assessment of results in relation to expectations, modifying both the understanding of the situation and subsequent operations accordingly. (DOD 2009b, 12)

As a result of adopting the above concept, the *CCJO* states that joint forces will need to “markedly increase language and cultural capabilities” as one of the key institutional implications (DOD 2009b, 32). The *CCJO* further explains by stating the following:

Several parts of this concept point directly toward the requirement for greater language and cultural proficiency within joint forces. The idea of understanding each operational situation in its unique political and strategic context will require a higher level of cultural attunement than joint forces currently possess. Similarly, increased emphasis on security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities implies an even more extensive contact and interaction with indigenous agencies and populations than does combat. Effective multinational cooperation, a political and operational imperative identified in the Joint Operating Environment, likewise relies heavily on cultural awareness and proficiency in foreign languages. (DOD 2009b, 32)

Thus, ADM Mullen and the Joint Staff first presented improved language and cultural capabilities as an enduring requirement for the U.S. Military in 2009.

Joint Doctrine is the foundation upon which U.S. Army doctrine is built. As a result of the joint doctrine discussed above, the U.S. Army began updating its doctrine to keep pace in 2012. The next section will discuss the current doctrine the U.S. Army employs.

U.S. Army Doctrine

As of the publication of this study, the process of regionally aligning general purpose forces in the U.S. Army is still in its initial implementation phase. The actual doctrine for regional alignment is not yet present in the ADPs and ADRPs published since August of 2012. The actual arguments for regionally aligning forces reside in GEN Odierno’s Prevent-Shape-Win concept for the Army discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Even ADP 3-07, *Stability*, which requires more interaction with foreign nationals

than any other form of operation in decisive action, does not discuss regional alignment or the importance of cultural awareness, understanding an environment, or language skills. This lack of emphasis on the aforementioned skills in published doctrine when compared with guidance coming from GEN Odierno highlights the difficult transition the Army is undertaking at this time. The Army is simultaneously attempting to capture the lessons learned from OIF and OEF as operations in the later come to a close, prepare itself to achieve success in future contingency operations, and deal with a reduced budget. The lack of inclusion of language, cultural, or regional expertise in recently published doctrine versus Odierno's prevent-shape-win vision shows how the Army is working on coming to grips with its future role in contributing to the Nation's security.

Conclusion

After more than a decade of continuous operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. Army is transitioning to a new era. In the years ahead the U.S. Army is facing a complex global environment full of uncertainty. One group of military thinkers advocate using the Army as means to build the capacity of foreign nations' militaries as a strategy to ensure security. A second school of thinkers feel that the proliferation of A2/AD technology is the next major security threat to the United States. This group of thinkers advocate using the military as a means to build alliances to counter the threat posed by A2/AD technology. A last group advocates institutionalizing the lessons learned from a decade of conducting COIN and stability operations in OIF and OEF. All of these groups had an impact on the leadership of the U.S. Army. As a result of their ongoing debate the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Odierno, issued his vision for how the Army will contribute to U.S. security with his "Prevent-Shape-Win" concept. Prevent-Shape-Win captures

elements of the capacity building, alliance, and lessons learned schools of thought to posture the Army for success in future contingency operations. As part of Prevent-Shape-Win, the U.S. Army will regionally align general purpose forces with specific GCCs.

None of the sources in this chapter discuss how regionally aligning BCTs will make them more effective in future contingency operations. The purpose of this study is to correct this situation by determining if regional alignment will make BCTs more effective in Unified Land Operations. The next chapter of this study presents the methodology used to answer that question.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The previous chapter dealt with the literature advocating various strategies for the U.S. Army in the next ten to fifteen years. There are three primary schools of thought in the literature surrounding the future of the U.S. Army. In the first group, authors advocate using the Army to build the capacity of threatened nations so they can ensure their own stability from internal threats. In the second group, authors advocate using the Army to reassure existing allies and build new partnerships to counter proliferating A2/AD technology by conducting military to military engagements. In the third group, authors want to institutionalize the lessons learned from over a decade of COIN and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GEN Odierno synthesized these three schools of thought into his Prevent-Shape-Win concept for posturing the Army for success in future contingency operations.

The purpose of this study was to answer the question of whether or not the Army should regionally align BCTs. This study responds to that question by evaluating the policy of regional alignment as it applies to BCTs to determine if it will achieve its stated goals.

This chapter contains two sections. The first section describes the steps taken to obtain information dealing with the regional alignment of forces in the U.S. Army. The second section describes the evaluation criteria used in this study to determine if the U.S. Army should regionally align its BCTs.

Research Design

This study used a mixed design by means of both quantitative and qualitative methods to answer the question “should the U.S. Army regionally align BCTs?” It used a qualitative analysis of the significant literature published in the last ten years by experts in the field, dealing with regional alignment and what role the U.S. Army should play in national security. A qualitative analysis was also done of after action reviews (AARs) provided by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), which were submitted by units following their deployments to Iraq on the impact of regional training on the BCTs’ readiness for their subsequent mission. This study also utilized key informants, consisting of future brigade commanders and command sergeants major attending the Fort Leavenworth Pre-Command Course (PCC), to provide open-ended feedback as part of a digital survey on the impact of regional alignment on the U.S. Army’s ability to support the achievement of strategic objectives and the effectiveness of BCT’s at the tactical level of war.

The quantitative methods used in this study consisted of a digital survey with close-ended questions submitted to the future brigade commanders and command sergeants major attending the Fort Leavenworth PCC. The PCC attendees were a convenience population of individuals chosen for the two most important leadership positions in a brigade due to their demonstrated expertise throughout their careers. The survey, which will be described in greater detail later in this chapter, consisted of four parts. The first part of the survey asked participants their opinions on eight close-ended questions about regional alignment, using a Likert scale with answer options of strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly agree. The second section

of the survey used close-ended questions with a Likert scale to ask the participants' opinions on the impact of regional training on the effectiveness of BCTs at the tactical level of war as defined by the tenets of Unified Land Operations described in ADP 3-0. The participants' response options were: a very positive impact, a positive impact, no impact, a negative impact, or a very negative impact. The third section of the survey asked the participants their opinions on the impact on the effectiveness of BCTs at the tactical level of war using the tenets of Unified Land Operations described in ADP 3-0 for BCTs that do not conduct regional training. Again, participants could answer based on a close-ended Likert scale from a very positive impact, a positive impact, no impact, a negative impact, or a very negative impact. The fourth section of the survey was an open-ended question requesting the participants' feedback on regional alignment for qualitative analysis as discussed above.

Methods Used to Obtain Information

This study utilized three methods to gather information on the concept of regionally aligning BCTs. The first was a thorough review of all literature published addressing regional alignment, national security, and Department of Defense doctrine. The second was a survey conducted with future BCT commanders and command sergeants major attending the Fort Leavenworth PCC to get their expert opinions on the implementation and effects of regional alignment. The third method was a review of after action reports from U.S. Army divisions and BCTs submitted after their deployments in support of either OIF or OEF.

The literature reviewed for this study fell into three types of materials published in the last ten years dealing with foreign policy, national security, and the role of the U.S.

Army. The first types were publications by the Department of Defense. This included the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands, the Department of the Army, and all subordinate commands. The publications or materials ranged from interviews and speeches by key figures within the Department of Defense and its subordinate agencies to joint or Army doctrinal manuals and training guidance.

The second type of literature consisted of articles about national security and foreign policy published in various journals. *Foreign Affairs* and *The American Interest* published the majority of articles used in this study. The third and final category of literature were studies published by various military and foreign policy think tanks. The Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published the majority of the national security and foreign policy studies used in researching this paper. The previous chapter highlighted the most significant contributions from the three types of publications.

The second method used in this study to gain information on regionally aligning BCTs consisted of a survey of future BCT commanders and command sergeants major attending the Fort Leavenworth PCC. Each PCC class consisted of eighteen officers and eighteen non-commissioned officers designated for brigade level command. Two PCC classes were asked to participate in a digital survey by an e-mail sent from the Fort Leavenworth Quality Assurance Office (QAO). Participants in the survey could then access the web based survey. Thirty-six of a possible seventy two participated in the survey, resulting in a ninety-five percent level of confidence with a ten percent margin of error. A thirty-seventh respondent initiated the survey but did not complete it. Twenty-six

officers and eleven non-commissioned officers at least initiated the survey. The initial questions in the survey established the demographics of the responding population. The demographics established the branch of the individual responding, their status as an officer or non-commissioned officer, their total years of service, and a breakdown of the number of years of service spent at BCT level and below, in a joint command, as part of a GCC, and in an Army staff at echelons above brigade level.

The Fort Leavenworth QAO validated and submitted the proposed survey to the Institutional Review Board prior to sending the survey out to the PCC attendees. Participation in the survey was entirely voluntary for the students attending the PCC at Fort Leavenworth in March and April of 2013. Additionally, anyone participating in the survey had the option to withdraw at any time. The Fort Leavenworth QAO ensured anonymity of participants by emailing the internet link to all of the PCC attendees. The attendees submitted their answers to the survey controlled by the CGSC QAO. The QAO then compiled all of the results and provided them to the researcher in a final report. The names of the participants were unknown by the researcher, and there is no way to link the answers provided to a single participant.

The first part of the survey provided the respondents with eight statements dealing with the impact of regional alignment on the Army and its BCTs. Two statements dealt with the effectiveness of regionally aligned BCTs, two with the impact of training BCTs, two with the ability for regionally aligned BCTs to support GCCs, and two statements about the impact of sending a regionally trained BCT to an area of operation (AO) for which they did not train. Participants had five options with which to respond to the statements for how much they agreed with the statements. Their answer options were

strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree.

Participants could only choose one answer for each statement. Table 1, Regional Alignment Survey Table 1, on the next page shows the eight statements provided to participants as well as their answer options.

Table 1. Regional Alignment Survey

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Regionally aligned BCTs are more effective at the tactical level of war					
Regionally aligned BCTs are more effective for GCCs in achieving strategic objectives					
Specific regional training requirements detract from a BCT's ability to train for decisive action.					
Regionally aligning BCTs will help GCCs conduct Phase 0 operations					
Specific Regional training is necessary to prepare BCTs for success in future contingency operations					
Specific regional training is necessary to prepare BCTs for success in future contingency operations.					
A BCT that receives specific regional training must be assigned to that region					
Time spent in specific regional training decreases readiness for other operations					

Source: Created by author

The second part of the survey asked participants to gauge the impact regional alignment will have on the effectiveness of BCTs using the tenets of Unified Land Operations from ADP 3-0 as their evaluation criteria. The tenets of Unified Land Operations, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, are flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization (DA 2011a, 7-9). The survey asked participants to state how much impact regional alignment would have on each of the six tenets of unified land operations. Participants could provide one response for each of the six tenets characterizing their impact as a very positive impact, a positive impact, no impact, a negative impact, or a very negative impact. Table 2, Impact of Regional Alignment Training on a BCT’s Indicators for Success, below shows the question and possible responses participants were asked to fill in.

Table 2. Impact of Regional Alignment Training on a BCT’s indicators for Success

	Very Positive Impact	Positive Impact	No Impact	Negative Impact	Very Negative Impact
Flexibility					
Integration					
Lethality					
Adaptability					
Depth					
Synchronization					

Source: Created by author. Note: Question 1: What impact will regional BCT training have on those indicators of success? Question 2: “What impact will regional alignment have on those indicators of success?”

The third part of the survey asked participants to gauge the impact that non-regionally aligned training will have on a BCT. Participants again filled in a table using

the six tenets of unified land operations as their indicators for a successful BCT. The possible answers ranged from very positive impact, positive impact, no impact, negative impact, and very negative impact for all six tenets of unified land operations. Participants could only provide one answer for each of the six tenets. Table 3, Impact of Non-Regional Training on a BCT’s Indicators for Success, below shows the questions given to the participants and their possible answers.

Table 3. Impact of Non-Regional Training on a BCT’s Indicators for Success

	Very Positive Impact	Positive Impact	No Impact	Negative Impact	Very Negative Impact
Flexibility					
Integration					
Lethality					
Adaptability					
Depth					
Synchronization					

Source: Created by author. Note: Question: What impact will maintaining current BCT training have on those indicators of success?

The fourth, and final part of the survey, was an opportunity for participants to freely ad any comments about regional alignment. The survey simply asked the participants to “please tell me your thoughts on regionally aligning BCTs.” The survey then provided them with enough space for one single spaced typed page.

The third, and final, method used in this study to gather information on the impact of regionally aligning forces involved a comparison of three unit after action reviews (AAR) submitted to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). This study used an

AAR submitted in May of 2004 by the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) after returning from a year long deployment for OIF. This study used the 2004 AAR from 4ID because the unit initially trained to execute offensive and defensive operations during the invasion of Iraq in support of OIF. After deploying to Kuwait in March of 2003, it remained in Iraq until relieved in place in April of 2004. Although it conducted limited offensive and defensive operations during that time frame, the majority of its efforts were on stability tasks in its area of operations. During its train-up for Iraq the unit did not conduct regional training to prepare itself for operations in and around the indigenous population. The second AAR used in this study came from 3rd BCT, 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) from its deployment in support of OIF III from January 2005 to January 2006. 3/3 ID's AAR provides a snapshot of the Army coming to grips with the cultural aspects of stability operations. The third AAR used for this study came from the 3rd BCT, 4ID from its deployment in support of Operation New Dawn (OND) from March 2010 to March of 2011. 3/4 ID's AAR provides a glimpse of an Army unit in a mature theater with extensive cultural training.

Evaluation Criteria

This study used the six tenets of Unified Land Operations to evaluate the effectiveness of BCTs with and without regionally aligned training. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* states that “Army operations are characterized by six tenets: flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization” (DA 2011a, 7). The six tenets are the traits the U.S. Army states a BCT must possess to achieve success in modern contingency operations. ADP 3-0 defines the six tenets as the following:

Flexibility-To achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success, commanders seek to demonstrate flexibility in spite of adversity. They employ a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operation. Commanders enable adaptive forces through flexibility, collaborative planning, and decentralized execution. They use mission command to achieve maximum flexibility and foster individual initiative. The capability to act quickly enhances flexibility and adaptability across the range of military operations. The Army requires flexibility in thought, plans, and operations to be successful in unified land operations. (DA 2011a, 7)

Integration-Army forces do not operate independently but as part of a larger joint, interagency, and frequently multinational effort. Army leaders are responsible for integrating Army operations within this larger effort. Integration involves efforts to exercise inform and influence activities with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as well as efforts to conform Army capabilities and plans to the larger concept. Army leaders seek to use Army capabilities to complement those of the joint, interagency, and multinational partners. These leaders depend on those partners to provide capabilities that supplement or are not organic to Army forces. Effective integration requires creating shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force. (DA 2011a, 7)

Lethality-The capacity for physical destruction is fundamental to all other military capabilities and the most basic building block for military operations. Army leaders organize, equip, train, and employ their formations for unmatched lethality under a wide range of conditions. Lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of violence suffices to accomplish the mission through nonlethal engagements and activities. The capability for the lawful and expert application of lethal force builds the foundation for effective offensive, defensive, and stability operations. (DA 2011a, 7-8)

Adaptability-Army leaders accept that no prefabricated solutions to tactical or operational problems exist. Army leaders must adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific situation they face. This requires an adaptable mind, a willingness to accept prudent risk in unfamiliar or rapidly changing situations, and an ability to adjust based on a continuous assessment. . . . Adaptability is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative based on relevant understanding of the specific situation. . . . Adaptation requires an understanding of the operational environment. While impossible to have a perfect understanding, Army leaders make every effort to gain and maintain as thorough an understanding as possible given the time allowed. . . . Army leaders expand their understanding of potential operational environments through broad education, training, personal study, and collaboration with interagency partners. Rapid learning while in combat depends on life-long

education, consistent training, and study habits that leaders had prior to combat. (DA 2011a, 8)

Depth-Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose. Army leaders strike forces throughout their depth by arranging activities across the entire operational framework to achieve the most decisive result. They do this to prevent the effective employment of enemy reserves, command and control nodes, logistics, and other capabilities both in and out of direct contact with friendly forces. Unified land operations achieves the best results when the enemy must cope with U.S. actions throughout its entire physical, temporal, and organizational depth. (DA 2011a, 8)

Synchronization-Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. It is the ability to execute multiple related and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing each in isolation. (DA 2011a, 9)

An analysis of the impact both regionally aligned and non-regionally aligned training follows in chapter 4 of this study. However, this study examines how each type of training impacts each of the six tenets in a BCT. The examination then determined if the type of training would have a positive, neutral, or negative impact. The impact was then graphically depicted using the symbols in Figure 1, Evaluation Criteria, shown below.




Figure 1. Evaluation Criteria

Source: Created by author.

Finally, after analyzing each of the six criteria for each type of training, the results were organized onto a single table to graphically depict the advantages and disadvantages of each type of training. Figure 2, Training Comparison, below shows the format utilized in chapter 4 of this study.

Table 4. Training Comparison

Regionally Aligned Training	Tenets of Unified Land Operations	Non-Regionally Aligned Training
	Flexibility	
	Integration	
	Lethality	
	Adaptability	
	Depth	
	Synchronization	

Source: Created by author

Conclusion

This chapter described the methods used in this study to gather information on regionally aligning BCTs in the U.S. Army. Initially, this study examined the literature published by Department of Defense to include the U.S. Army, foreign and national security scholars, and various national security think tanks. Next the study involved a survey of future BCT Commanders and Command Sergeant Majors attending the Fort Leavenworth PCC. The purpose of the survey was to gather expert feedback on the impact of regional alignment on the effectiveness of BCTs. The final method used to gather information consisted of a study of three different BCTs AARs from various time periods during OIF and OND. Next, this chapter discussed the methodology used in this study to evaluate the impact on the effectiveness of BCTs by regionally aligning them. The evaluation criteria used in this study were the six tenets of Unified Land Operations- flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depths, and synchronization. The next chapter provides an analysis of the information gathered during this study.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

The Army is currently undergoing a period of transition. Operations in Afghanistan will come to an end in December of 2014, and it remains to be seen if the U.S. will maintain a military presence in that country (Obama 2011). After nearly a decade of operations in Iraq and nearly twelve years in Afghanistan, the U.S. Army is looking to prepare its personnel and equipment for its next likely mission. Additionally, U.S. leaders are shifting the military's focus from the Middle East to the Asian Pacific after years of neglect (DOD 2012d, 2). Finally, the Army, along with the rest of the government, is facing a significant reduction in its budget due to the Budget Control Act of 2011. This will result in a reduction of overall personnel in the Army as well as tighter constraints on training resources and materiel development and requisitions. Dealing with one of these challenges is difficult enough, but the Army now has to deal with all of them simultaneously. Despite these challenges, and most likely because of them, the Army leadership decided to regionally align its forces. However, implementing regional alignment will be challenging for the Army's BCTs.

This study is an examination of the U.S. Army's plan to regionally align its forces with GCCs. The Army hopes to achieve two goals by regionally aligning forces with specific GCCs. First, the Army wants to regionally align BCTs, Divisions, and Corps with GCCs so Combatant Commanders have a regular rotation of ground forces in their areas of responsibility with which to plan for contingency operations and execute theater shaping operations. Second, the Army is hoping that by focusing units on specific

geographic regions units will be able to conduct language and cultural training, with guidance from GCCs, on areas in which they are likely to deploy for contingency operations or military exercises. By conducting specific language, cultural, and training on likely operations the unit will conduct in support of the GCC, BCTs will be more successful in their operations. The goal of this study is to answer the question “should the Army regionally align its BCTs?” The last chapter presented the methodology used in this study to answer this question. First, this study examined all of the pertinent literature published in the last ten years on regional alignment, national security, and likely threats for the next decade. Next, this study included a survey of future Brigade Commanders and Command Sergeant Majors attending the Fort Leavenworth PCC to get their expert feedback on the impact of regional alignment. Finally, this study examined the AARs submitted by one division and two BCTs after their OIF and OND deployments. The three units deployed to Iraq at different time periods and the AARs provide insight into the lack of, or efficacy of, regionally oriented training prior to their deployments. Chapter 3 also discussed the methodology used in evaluating the impact of regional training on BCTs. This study uses the six tenets of unified land operations (flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization) to evaluate the impact of regional and non-regional training on a BCT.

This chapter presents the results of the research methods presented in chapter 3. In order to answer the primary question of whether or not the Army should regionally align its BCTs, this study had to answer three secondary questions. The first part of this chapter will deal with the first secondary question, “what are the likely threats the Army will face in the next decade?” Following that, this chapter will then attempt to answer the next

secondary question, “What other options can the U.S. Army adopt besides regional alignment?” As discussed in chapter 3, this study will present other doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) options the Army could adopt instead of regional alignment. Then, this study will attempt to answer the final secondary question, “will regional alignment make BCTs more effective?” Initially this study only looked to find out if BCTs would be more effective at the tactical level. However, as a result of the research done for this study, there is also compelling evidence that regional alignment will have an impact at the strategic level as well. This chapter will present the projected results of regional alignment at both the strategic and tactical levels. For the strategic level, this chapter will use the tenets of multi-national unity of effort from JP 1. These tenets are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience. At the tactical level, this chapter will compare regionally and non-regionally trained BCTs using the tenets of unified land operations. Lastly, this chapter will present the feedback from three units’ AARs from their deployments to OIF. The first AAR is 4ID’s following their deployment from April 2003 to 2004. The second is 3-3 ABCT’s AAR from their deployment from January 2005 to 2006. The third is 3-4 ABCT’s AAR after their deployment from March 2010 to 2011. The three AARs all come from ABCT based units with varying levels of regional training prior to their deployment to Iraq.

Results of Research

Primary Research Question

The primary research question for this study is “should the Army regionally align BCTs?” An analysis of the research conducted in this study leads to the answer yes, the

Army should regionally align its BCTs. It should do this primarily for three reasons. First, it will enhance the Army's relevance for the current and likely security environment for the next decade. Between the proliferation of A2/AD technology and the growing emphasis in Washington on the concept of AirSea Battle to counter this threat, regional alignment ensures that the Army can still play a significant part in the U.S.'s national security efforts. Additionally, regional alignment postures the Army to support missions to counter international and irregular warfare threats to endangered nations around the globe without decisively engaging large amounts of U.S. ground forces. Regional alignment accomplishes both of these requirements by making BCTs more effective instruments for GCCs to use in their Phase 0 theater security plans. Second, regionally aligning forces is a cost effective means of institutionalizing the language and cultural skills developed by the Army in both OIF and OEF. Finally, regional alignment will make BCTs more effective at the tactical level of war. This study came to this conclusion after a thorough analysis of the research done to answer the secondary questions mentioned earlier. The remainder of this chapter presents the research results and analysis that led to the answers to those secondary questions.

Likely Threats

The purpose of this study was answering the question "should the Army regionally align BCTs?" Before this question could be answered, it was necessary to know what the likely threats the Army would face in the next decade. Thus the first secondary question answered by this study is "what are the likely threats the U.S. Army will face in the next decade?" An implied question that goes along with this initial secondary question is "will regionally aligning BCTs help in defeating those threats?"

Chapter 2 of this study provided a summary of the literature surrounding the debate on what the U.S. needs to prepare for in the near future security environment. Two primary themes kept coming to the forefront while conducting the research for this study. The first was the threat posed by the proliferation of A2/AD technology and its ability to prevent the U.S. from countering aggressive actions by nations possessing its capabilities. In chapter 2, proponents advocating the development of means to defeat A2/AD threats were discussed in the alliance building school of thought. The second theme was a continuing threat of instability in key regions of the world. These sources of instability run the spectrum from international terrorist organizations such as al-Qa'ida to homegrown insurgencies threatening friendly or allied governments. In chapter 2, advocates for countering this style threat fell under the capacity building school of thought. As will be shown, regionally aligning BCTs will assist the U.S. in defeating both of these threats.

The goal of nations possessing A2/AD technology is to deny another nation the ability to project forces in the event of a conflict. A2/AD technology will disrupt the command and control of enemy forces through the use of cyber attacks, anti-satellite weapons, and precision guided weapons. It will prevent an opposing nation from approaching its borders through a combination of early warning, sub-surface capabilities, and anti-ship guided missiles. It will combat enemy air capabilities first by denying them safe bases within range of their shores or borders as well as through active air defense. Additionally, any concentration of forces within range of their A2/AD weapons systems are vulnerable to destruction by ballistic missiles. Finally, A2/AD technology used against a nation's military can also be used against economic targets such as shipping and

industrial infrastructure (Van Tol et al. 2010, 18-21). Thus, A2/AD is another way to attack a target nation's economic prosperity. To defeat an aggressor possessing A2/AD technology, a nation must be willing to accept heavy losses in order to achieve its goals unless it develops the capacity to counter the threat.

Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas authored *AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept* in an effort to outline a plan to defeat a nation possessing A2/AD technology. In *AirSea Battle*, the authors state that “in the future, U.S. Forces will face at least some of the elements of an A2/AD operational approach in contexts other than that of the Western Pacific. It is however, in that theater that the A2/AD challenge is most clearly emerging” (Van Tol et al. 2010, 3-4). The authors later explain that “it is incontestable that the only state with the long-term potential to pose a serious and sustained challenge to U.S. influence and power-projection in its region for the foreseeable future is China” (Van Tol et al. 2010, 4). Krepinevich has been warning against a strengthening China for several years. In the 2008 study, *Strategy for the Long Haul: The Challenges to U.S. National Security*, Krepinevich, Robert Martinage, and Robert Work posit a “hostile or more openly confrontational China” as one of the three main security threats for the U.S. in the next two decades (Krepinevich, Martinage, and Work 2008, 2). Aaron Friedberg, a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and former Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs in the Office of the Vice President, echoes the same message. In his *Foreign Affairs* article, “Bucking Beijing,” Friedberg warns that “absent a strong U.S. response, Chinese planners might eventually come to believe that their growing A2/AD capabilities are sufficiently

impressive to scare the United States off from intervening or provoking a confrontation in the region” (Friedberg 2012, 51).

The threat of A2/AD technology and China are inseparable. China is a threat because it possesses A2/AD technology which serves as a direct challenge to U.S. national security and economic interests as well as our ability to guarantee the security of our Western Pacific allies. This study does not list China as a primary threat because any other nation interested in confronting the U.S. could adopt the same concept. Regardless of what nation possesses the A2/AD technology, the U.S. can use AirSea Battle to contest it. However, no other nation possesses the same capabilities as China at this time, so any discussions regarding A2/AD technology are inextricably linked with that nation.

The Obama Administration apparently agrees with Krepinevich. The Department of Defense published its National Military Strategy (NMS) in January of 2012 titled *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. In the foreword, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta writes that the Joint Force must be capable of “detering and defeating aggression by adversaries, including those seeking to deny our power projection” (DOD 2012d). The NMS then states that “U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Accordingly . . . we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” (DOD 2012d, 2). In the next paragraph the NMS goes on to state “the growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with

our treaty obligations and with international law” (DOD 2012d, 2). Clearly, the Obama Administration feels that countering the threat of China’s A2/AD capabilities is a priority for U.S. security.

The other major threat the Army will have to deal with is instability caused by irregular warfare. The U.S. Army rebuilt itself after Vietnam to defeat the Soviet Army in mechanized warfare in Europe. No other nation possesses the capabilities of the U.S. Army. This was demonstrated in dramatic fashion in Iraq in 2003 when two divisions, along with one U.S. Marine Corps Division, caused the collapse of the Hussein regime in a little over three weeks. However, disaffected Iraqis and violent Islamic extremists found a way to counter the U.S. Army’s overwhelming combat power using insurgent tactics. Even now, the U.S. trained Iraqi Army is dealing with the continuing insurgency (Arango 2013). Both Iraq and Afghanistan provided a blueprint for others to use in future efforts to thwart U.S. military power.

In his 2012 article in *Foreign Affairs* titled “The U.S. Army in a Time of Transition” the Army Chief of Staff, General Raymond T. Odierno, describes the likely future threats the Army will face. Besides pivoting to the Pacific, GEN Odierno wrote that “the final major transition the Army must manage is that from a force focused on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and advising and assisting to one that actively prepares to conduct a fuller range of potential missions” (Odierno 2012b, 9). However, he later goes on to say in the same paragraph that “the army will also need to preserve the intellectual and organizational knowledge it has gained about counterinsurgency, stability operations, and advise-and-assist missions” (Odierno 2012b, 9-10). Odierno cautions against only focusing on COIN operations because of what he sees as the likely threat in

the future. He wrote that “the Army will also make sure it firmly embeds one of the most costly lessons it has learned over the last decade: how to deal with the challenge of hybrid warfare. In the future, it will be increasingly common for the Army to operate in environments with both regular military and irregular paramilitary or civilian adversaries, with the potential for terrorism, criminality, and other complications” (Odierno 2012b, 10). Other writers also echo Odierno’s concerns about the future security environment. Robert Killebrew, a retired U.S. Army Colonel and Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for New American Security, stated in Congressional testimony that “we should recognize that we are entering a new post-Westphalian era of potentially constant, borderless conflict” (Killebrew 2012). Andrew Krepinevich, Robert Martinage, and Robert Work assert in their 2008 *Strategy for the Long Haul: The Challenges to U.S. National Security* that along with China’s A2/AD capability and the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, the biggest threat to U.S. interests is violent Islamist radicalism (Krepinevich, Martinage, and Work 2008, vii). In the study the authors state that “radical Islamist movements use terror and subversion, engage in modern forms of irregular and insurgency warfare, and pursue WMD to inflict catastrophic damage on the United States and its allies (Krepinevich, Martinage, and Work 2008, 2-3).

The *NMS* also asserts that instability from violent extremists is one of the major threats to U.S. security. First the *NMS* states the following”

Violent extremists will continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, partners, and the homeland. The primary loci of these threats are South Asia and the Middle East. With the diffusion of destructive technology, these extremists have the potential to pose catastrophic threats that could directly affect our security and prosperity. For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over

ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary. (DOD 2012d, 1)

The *NMS* then continues with the following statement.

Our defense efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats, as well as upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. . . . To support these objectives, the United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in—and support of—partner nations in and around this region. (DOD 2012d, 1)

All of the security experts mentioned above, as well as the civilian leadership of the military, agree that the threat of instability in the Middle East will continue to pose a threat to U.S. security in the near future. The sources of that instability, whether they are international terrorists, insurgents threatening a friendly government, a hostile nation, or a combination of the three, will continue to plague the region for years to come.

The threat of instability in the Middle East and the A2/AD capabilities of China are two primary challenges that the U.S. Army must be ready for in the next decade. In an effort to contend with both of them, the Army is regionally aligning its forces. However, this brings up the question, will regional alignment help the Army to counter sources of instability and contribute to deterring or defeating advanced A2/AD capabilities? The next two sections of this chapter will answer this question. First by examining other options the Army could explore in updating its DOTMLPF portfolio. The second by exploring what impact regionally aligning forces will have at the strategic and tactical level.

Other Options

The previous section of this chapter described the two primary threats the Army must prepare to face in the next decade. The first was the A2/AD system fielded by

China. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments' *AirSea Battle* outlines a concept for defeating this threat. However, the concept focuses on air and naval forces to defeat countries possessing A2/AD capabilities and does not explain how the Army would contribute. As shown above, the current administration is now focusing on the threat from China's A2/AD capabilities and now has the military "pivoting to the Pacific" with an emphasis on developing AirSea Battle concepts. Therefore, the Army must develop the means to contribute to AirSea Battle or face significant cuts in its budget in favor of the Air Force and Navy because of a perceived lack of relevance. The second major threat the Army must be ready for is the sources of instability in the Middle East and South Asia. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that defeating sources of instability requires the host nation's active involvement. Regionally aligning its forces is a cost effective way for the Army to contribute to AirSea Battle and demonstrate its relevance in the Western Pacific as well as prepare itself to defeat instability not only in the Middle East but in all regions of the world. This section examines the doctrine, organizational, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities solutions proposed in the research sources for this study and explains why regional alignment is the best option for defeating the two likely threats.

The overwhelming theme for doctrinal changes to the Army revolves around institutionalizing lessons learned from OIF and OEF. Although the experts listed below agree that this is a necessity, none of them provide a method to accomplish it. As mentioned in the previous section, GEN Odierno argues for the need to capture the lessons surrounding the execution of counterinsurgency, stability operations, and advise-and-assist missions (Odierno 2012b, 9-10). In their article "Special Operations/

Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical role in ‘Prevent, Shape, Win’” published in the June 2012 edition of *Army*, MG Bennet S. Sacolick, the Commander of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and BG Wayne W. Grigsby, the director of the Mission Command Center of Excellence, argue that “the Army must use the generating force as an agent of change to institutionalize lessons learned, update the doctrinal framework with linked concepts of the human domain and a 7th warfighting function, and expand the interdependence of SOF and CF. The Army must operationalize and institutionalize this change in order to adapt and continue to dominate unified land operations in the future” (Sacolick and Grigsby 2012, 39). They later explain the 7th warfighting function by stating “the Army’s warfighting function construct must be updated to reflect requirements of the future operational environment to assess, shape, deter, and influence foreign security environments. Reorganizing these lethal and nonlethal activities under the 7th warfighting function will institutionalize the capabilities and skills necessary to work with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations” (Sacolick and Grigsby 2012, 42). Finally the JCOA study, *Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*, recommends that the military “Institutionalize non-conventional warfare: Refine the ability of the military to conduct nonconventional warfare, identifying specific capabilities and adaptations developed over the past decade that must be sustained” (DOD 2012e, 9). The Army began this process in October of 2011 when it published ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, which introduces the Decisive Action doctrine. ADP 3-0 defines Decisive Action as “the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations appropriate to the mission and environment” (DA 2011, 5). ADP 3-07, *Stability*, provides a more comprehensive

explanation of how the Army will conduct stability operations. In its conclusion, ADP 3-07 explains that “stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and building the capacity of local institutions. In particular, identifying and prioritizing the local sources of instability; targeting the sources of instability; and measuring the effectiveness of the activities to stabilize the area” (DA 2012a, 18). Neither ADP 3-0 nor ADP 3-07 describe how Army forces gain an understanding of an operational environment to conduct stability operations as described in both documents. However, regionally aligning forces, and sustaining it as a policy in the future, will fulfill this glaring need. Regional training will provide commanders and their units with a better understanding of the operational environment. Additionally, understanding the environment will allow units to more easily identify sources of instability and craft solutions to deal with them. Finally, the Army’s Combat Training Centers (CTC) developed the skills and methods necessary to replicate complex environments while conducting over ten years of mission readiness exercises for units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. The systems used to accomplish this will translate well into scenarios designed to prepare BCTs to deploy in support of GCCs. Thus regional alignment, along with Decisive Action, will accomplish the task of institutionalizing the lessons learned from OIF and OEF and provide the Army with the tools necessary to combat instability in future operating environments.

Several experts recommend modifying the Army’s organizational structure in an effort to increase its ability to conduct capacity building operations with allies and partners to combat instability. John Nagl, one of the authors of Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, recommends that “the Army should create a permanent standing

Advisor Corp of 20,000 Combat Advisors—men and women organized, equipped, educated, and trained to develop host nation security forces abroad” (Nagl 2007, 3). The organization, as proposed by Nagl would be top heavy in officers and NCOs and incapable of conducting any other mission than advising and assisting or acting as a liaison element in a multi-national operation. Additionally, instituting the Advisor Corps would have secondary effects in the training, personnel, and facilities realm of DOTMLPF. For instance, where would the Army establish their Advising and Assisting training facility? Retired Lieutenant General David W. Barno, Nora Bensahel, Matthew Irvine, and Travis Sharp also recommend establishing a permanent advisory element. They recommend making it a permanent element because “recasting combat battalions and brigades into advisory units has some advantages, but it fails to account for individual attributes vital to successful advisory work” (Barno et al. 2012, 32). Their reason for instituting this organization change is an effort to “institutionalize” the capability in anticipation of growth in future advisory mission requirements (Barno et al. 2012, 32). However, this is unnecessary. First of all, U.S. Army Special Forces provide expertise in advise and assist missions. Regional alignment, as currently conceived, will provide units with their anticipated missions anywhere from six to twelve months before they deploy for mission. Conventional BCTs can then train on advise and assist skills during both their homestation training and during their CTC rotations. If designated for an advise and assist mission, the most likely scenario is for the BCT to provide additional resources to a SF advise and assist mission. The BCT will be able to train along with the SF unit it will work with in homestation training, and during CTC rotations. Second, regionally aligning forces over the long term means that Soldiers, NCOs, and officers

train for advise and assist missions multiple times over their career. Thus, the Army institutionalizes an advise and assist capacity within the conventional force. Andrew Krepinevich advocates creating security cooperation BCTs (SC BCT). The security cooperation BCTs would have a similar number of personnel and equipment to an IBCT, but have only one field artillery battery but additional intelligence, engineers, military police, civil affairs, and military information support operations elements. The security cooperation BCTs then could focus on irregular warfare, and if needed could revert to the role of IBCTs with minimal augmentation and additional training (Krepinevich 2008, 64-65). Krepinevich's concept is more manageable than the advisory command advocated by Nagl and Barno, but again regionally aligning BCTs accomplishes the same mission without changing the structure of existing Army units.

Two themes emerged in the training realm from the research materials used in this study. The first is the need to train on stability tasks and the need to prepare for irregular or "hybrid threats." The section covering doctrine sufficiently described the recommendations that overlap into the training realm. The recommendation called for the military to increase language and regional proficiency in JCOA's *Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations*. In one section, JCOA recommends that the military should "expand and incentivize language and cultural training across the force" (DOD 2012e, 6). They then reiterate the same message again in a section discussing coalition operations (DOD 2012e, 31). Regionally aligning forces gets close to the objectives JCOA recommends, but to achieve expertise would require training commensurate with the level of a Foreign Area Officer. Foreign Area Officers spend a year in graduate level language training followed by months of cultural

immersion traveling in the region in which they will serve. This level of training would be prohibitively expensive and time consuming for personnel management if it became a requirement for all key leaders within a BCT. It is possible for the Army to mandate a required level of language capability for all officers in a few key languages prior to receiving their commission. However, this would essentially mandate that all officers major in a designated language in their commissioning source. This would drastically diminish the number of officers with technical degrees such as civil engineering. Additionally, it would drastically impact the ability of the Officer Candidate School to commission promising candidates from within the enlisted population of the Army. Although it will not achieve the level of expertise recommended by JCOA, regional alignment still achieves a degree of language and cultural knowledge in a relatively cost effective program.

The literature researched for this study did not discuss any materiel solutions for the Army to develop to achieve the objectives of regional alignment. Nor would it be likely to since regional alignment is meant to increase the understanding of operational environments, culture, language, and training for designated GCC missions. However, it would be useful for the military to develop a device capable of translating speech to alleviate the requirement of translators in the absence of comprehensive language training. It is also worth mentioning that U.S. Army Special Forces units provide Special Operations De-briefing and Retrieval System that feeds a database managed by the USSOCOM J2 detailing their deployments for use by other SF units deploying to the same area to draw information (Buswell 2011, 57). The conventional Army could create a similar database for BCTs redeploying from a mission in support of a GCC to submit

similar reports to FORSCOM and the supported ASCC. Over time, the database can provide information on a BCT's designated operating environment, the current status of advise and assist missions, training reports from multi-national exercises, and recommendations for training scenarios prior to deploying. The effect would be similar to units conducting a relief in place in Iraq and Afghanistan where detailed training statuses prevented host nation partners from feeling like they took a step back every time a new unit arrived.

The training discussion above covers the recommendations made for language and cultural education made by JCOA. However, JCOA also recommends reinstating a "Military Assistance and Training Advisory course to promote effective partnering and advising" (DOD 2012e, 34). The Army already runs a similar program with the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk Louisiana (162nd IN BDE 2013). In its current configuration, the 162nd IN BDE provides a training course for key leaders in BCTs designated to support an advise and assist mission at Fort Polk. Then, during the BCTs collective training event at a CTC, the 162nd IN BDE provide Observer Coach Trainer (OCT) feedback and AARs during the mission readiness exercise in the same way as permanent party OCTs. For the foreseeable future, the 162nd IN BDE will provide this same function for BCTs designated to conduct capacity building missions in support of a GCC. Thus, there is no need to develop the Military Assistance and Training Advisory course.

Aside from the personnel implications that accompany the organizational changes recommended by Andrew Krepinevich, John Nagl, and David W. Barno and his co-authors, none of the other sources researched for this study recommended changes to the

way the Army assigns people to BCTs preparing for capacity building missions. Nagl recommends that the Army assign personnel for a period of three years in his Advisory Corps concept (Nagl 2007, 7). Krepinevich, on the other hand, recommends that personnel assigned to a SC BCT spend the majority of their careers in the same unit (Krepinevich 2008, 64). Barno and his co-authors make no recommendation on how to manage the personnel in their advisory command concept (Barno et al. 2012, 32). Keeping the same personnel in whatever form of capacity building formation the Army could potentially adopt would build a regional, language, and advising-and-assisting capacity within that unit. However, as stated above, regional alignment achieves the same effects without fundamentally changing the structure of the Army. Additionally, it ensures that over the course of a career Soldiers and officers continue to build upon the skills they learn early on. Finally, the creation of a database capturing information on the operating environment, the training status of partnered units in the host nation military, recommended training prior to deployment will ensure both continuity to the mission and BCTs that are prepared to accomplish the GCC's objectives.

Lastly, in the facilities realm of DOTMLPF, there is a glaring absence of recommendations for the U.S. Army as an alternative to regionally aligning its forces. Instead, several experts argue for the capacity building and multi-national military maneuvers that regionally aligning forces will support due to U.S. overseas base closures. Barno and his coauthors recommend that "the Army should significantly increase its rotational overseas exercise program to offset its lack of full-time presence around the world" (Barno et al. 2012, 33). Wess Mitchell and Jakub Grygiel advocate a similar policy in their article "The Vulnerability of Peripheries" published in the spring 2011

issue of *The American Interest*. In their article Mitchell and Grygiel recommend that the U.S. reassure its allies near Russia, Iran, and China by providing a “combination of theater missile defense, military maneuvers, and a naval or land military presence” (Mitchell and Grygiel 2011, 15). Additionally they recommend that the DOD “should refine this package into a cost-effective formula that can be sized to each region and regularized in future U.S. global defense planning” (Mitchell and Grygiel 2011, 15-16). With the drawdown of Army units in overseas bases, regionally aligning forces provides the GCCs with the tools necessary to conduct capacity building missions and multi-national training exercises advocated Barno’s *Sustainable Pre-Eminence* and “The Vulnerable Peripheries.”

This section provided the various alternatives advocated by foreign policy and national security experts across the DOTMLPF spectrum. It then explained how regional alignment is the best alternative in the current resource constrained environment because it accomplishes all of the DOTMLPF recommendations made by the various experts discussed above. The next section will provide an analysis of how regional alignment will make BCTs better instruments for GCCs to use in their Phase 0 operations as well as more effective at the tactical level.

More Effective BCTs

The final secondary question for this study is “will regional alignment make BCTs more effective?” Chapter 3 described the methodology used to answer this question. The results of the research conducted for this study shows regional alignment will benefit national security at the strategic level as well as make BCTs more effective at the tactical level. This section of chapter 4 will first briefly discuss the benefits of

regional alignment at the strategic level. Then this section will present an analysis of the impact of regional alignment on a BCT at the tactical level using the six tenets of Unified Land Operations.

Strategic Level

One of the questions facing the Army now that operations in Afghanistan will draw to a close at the end of 2014 is “what do we do now?” The first part of this chapter described the main threats to U.S. security in the next decade. To meet those threats the *NMS* states that “U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises. These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence (DOD 2012b, 5). Thus, the U.S. Army must prepare itself to be the instruments of the GCCs to deter, build capacity, strengthen alliances, and increase U.S. influence. Regionally aligning BCTs will assist in achieving these goals.

Regionally aligned BCTs will undergo cultural and language training prior to conducting missions in support of a GCCs theater security plan. By doing so, they will better be able to meet the four tenets of multi-national operations which are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience. The first three are self explanatory, but patience refers to the time and effort it takes to build a relationship with a partnered unit (DOD 2007b, I-3). Demonstrating these tenets to existing partners or allies will only reinforce the U.S.’s relationship with them. While demonstrating them to prospective partners can only increase U.S. influence with them and foster the desire on both sides to further the prospective relationship. Additionally, few nations possess the military assets

that the U.S. does. GEN Odierno highlights an important point in his *Foreign Affairs* article when explaining the U.S. Army's role in the Pacific when he wrote "despite the region's vast expanses of oceans, Asia's militaries remain dominated by armies, make the U.S. Army's robust relationship with its regional partners a vital resource in a broad range of situations" (Odierno 2012b, 8). When conducting military exercises, Pacific Command will depend on the U.S. Army to provide the bulk of the direct interaction with foreign militaries. Lieutenant General (Retired) Barno also advocates this role for the Army. He wrote in *Sustainable Pre-eminence* that "the Army should significantly increase its rotational overseas exercise program to offset its lack of full-time presence around the world. . . . This rotational presence will also help bolster regional confidence and deter regional aggression" (Barno et al. 2012, 33). Andrew Krepinevich on the other hand provides an alternate but equally compelling reason to implement regional alignment. In his article in *Foreign Affairs* he wrote "the United States should adopt an indirect approach to addressing instability in the developing world, conserving the bulk of its resources for meeting other strategic priorities. This means exploiting the U.S. military's advantage in highly trained manpower emphasizing the training, equipping, and advising of indigenous forces of countries threatened by subversion" (Krepinevich 2009, 25). U.S. Army BCTs have already demonstrated their ability to conduct the training and advising of host nation forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The regional training conducted in preparation for those units' deployments to both nations played a significant role in making them more effective in that mission. However, the literature reviewed for this study is not the only compelling evidence to suggest that BCTs will be more effective tools for GCCs' theater security plans.

The survey described in chapter 3 of this study also supports the assertion that BCTs with regionally aligned training will better support U.S. strategic objectives. When asked in the survey if regionally aligned BCTs will be more effective for GCCs in achieving strategic objectives the majority of participants agreed (see figure 2).




Figure 2. Effectiveness of Regionally Aligned BCTs at the Strategic Level

Source: Created by author, data found in Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, Appendix A, 110.

To verify the data provided in figure 2, the survey asked the participants a similar question. When asked if regionally aligning BCTs will help GCCs conduct Phase 0 operations, the majority of participants agreed that the training would help (see figure 3).




Figure 3. Effectiveness of Regionally Aligned BCTs at the Strategic Level

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, Appendix A, 112.

The survey also afforded the participants to voice their opinions on regional alignment. Several of them discussed how regional alignment would impact U.S. goals at the strategic level. For instance, one participant commented on JP 3-16’s knowledge of partners tenet for multi-national operations when he or she wrote “regionally aligned BCTs should allow us to develop a better understanding of our allies limit[at]ions and] the amount of time required to “train up” when a contingency arises” (Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey 2013, 131). Another respondent commented on the beneficial aspects of regional alignment in regard to building rapport. The participant wrote that “the regional alignment concept will pay dividends in the relationships built between U.S. and foreign

forces during peacetime training” (Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey 2013, 132). Another participant commented not only on the build alliance and influence aspects of regional alignment, but also discussed the benefits in countering A2/AD capabilities. The participant wrote that regional alignment “will better enable [the] U.S. to prevent, shape and win (consolidate gains) consistent with our vital national interests. Regionally aligned forces (RAF) better enables us to secure and maintain access to the operating environment, gain an understanding of the operating environment, set conditions for operations, influence partners/of the local populace, and build partner capacity” (Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey, 133). Lastly, another participant brought up a benefit of regional alignment not mentioned in the literature researched for this study. This particular participant wrote that “by regionally aligning our force, the Army is forward thinking and will be better prepared for operations in specific regions with a force that is familiar with that area. Our previous experiences in specific regions with a force that is familiar with that area. Our previous experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that it takes our forces approximately 4 to 5 years to fully understand the battlespace. If we regionally align, we become proactive in the target area rather than reactive, a trait we have long been prone to repeat” (Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey, 135). This concept, of regional alignment building an understanding of an operating environment, also becomes apparent when researching the AARs submitted by units in OEF and OIF. This will be further explored later in this chapter.

Based upon the experts mentioned above, and the results of this study survey, regional alignment will benefit U.S. security efforts at the strategic level. Regionally aligned BCTs will assist in deterring aggression, building partnerships, improving

interoperability, and gaining access to areas that could come under threat of A2/AD capabilities. However, regional alignment will also have an impact on a BCT at the tactical level. The next section of this chapter will examine that impact using the six tenets of Unified Land Operations.

Tactical Level

Although BCTs can be utilized as tools at the strategic level, they conduct their operations at the tactical level. Therefore any training adopted by a BCT must benefit it tactically. Regional training will improve BCTs at the tactical level of war by increasing their flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. These are the six tenets of Unified Land Operations which characterize successful Army operations (DA 2011a, 7). This section of the study explains how regional alignment improves the effectiveness of BCTs at the tactical level.

In defining the term “flexibility” as a tenet of Unified Land Operations, ADP 3-0 uses “flexibility” in five of its six sentences. However, flexibility implies the ability to do well in many different tasks simultaneously. “They (commanders) employ a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations” (DA 2011a, 7). For instance, a BCT must be able to conduct both lethal and non-lethal operations. It must be able to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations at anytime, and often simultaneously, during an operation. This implies that the BCT trains upon the requisite tasks prior to the operation. A BCT that does not will have to learn “on the job” instead. This could potentially lead to errors during their operations that have an impact. BCTs that are regionally aligned will conduct training on tasks they will likely face in the operational environment that their supported GCC assigns them to. A BCT that does not

train for a specific region will train for decisive action, but not necessarily on the tasks they will need to conduct. An example of this kind of training to develop of flexible capability is the creation of Female Engagement Teams (FETs) to interact with the female population in both Iraq and Afghanistan. FETs were created in both theaters to fill a capability gap identified after a unit deployed. What initially started as a stop gap measure became a tactic, technique, or procedure (TTP) based on the operating environment. Additionally, ADP 3-0 calls for both decentralized execution and individual initiative guided by mission command for operations within its definition of flexibility. A BCT that executes decentralized operations with leaders utilizing individual initiative within the commander's intent will likely be successful because they take advantage of opportunities. However, a leader with a greater understanding of the operational environment, provided by regionally aligned training, executing decentralized operations guided by commander's intent will be more likely to identify opportunities and take advantage of them than a leader who does not conduct regional training. Therefore, a BCT will regionally aligned training will exhibit more flexibility than a BCT without. When asked in the survey what impact regional training would have on a BCTs flexibility, the majority of participants felt that it would have a positive impact (see figure 4).




Figure 4. Impact of Regionally Aligned Training on a BCT's Flexibility

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

When asked the impact on flexibility for a BCT without regionally aligned training, more than half of the participants in the survey felt it would have no impact. Interestingly, over one third of the participants felt that not conducting regional training would have a positive or very positive impact. This is likely because they feel that a unit that goes into an operation with an open mind will not assume that they already know the correct answer. They will therefore be more open to trying new TTPs. However, more than half of the participants feel there will be no impact, while the remaining feel that there will be a negative impact (see figure 5).




Figure 5. Impact of non-Regionally Aligned Training on a BCT's Flexibility

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

ADP 3-0 states that “integration involves efforts to exercise inform and influence activities with joint, interagency, and multinational partners as well as efforts to conform Army capabilities and plans to the larger concept” (DA 2011a, 7). A BCT that conducts regionally aligned training will be better prepared to conduct inform and influence activities with the aforementioned partners because they will better understand the environment. Additionally, regional training will involve the missions and tasks they must accomplish in support of the “larger concept.” The regional BCT will then be better prepared to immediately begin supporting that “larger concept” because they will have a greater understanding of the overall mission and how they fit into it. Also, BCTs

designated for a specific region are more likely to conduct their training prior to deployment with at least their interagency and joint partners. They can begin working out the TTPs that build interoperability in controlled environment in which consequences for mistakes are not detrimental to their mission. This allows them to begin “creating the shared understanding and purpose through collaboration” required by ADP 3-0 (DA 2011a, 7). Participants in the survey overwhelmingly agreed that regional training would have at least a positive impact on a BCT’s integration (see figure 6).




Figure 6. Impact of Regionally Aligned Training on a BCT’s Integration

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

When asked the same question with regard to a non-regionally aligned BCT, more than half of the respondents felt there would be no impact. However, almost a third of the respondents felt there would be a positive impact on integration by not conducting regionally aligned training. This may be an anomaly since it would make sense for an equal amount of respondents to say there would be a negative impact from regionally aligned training. Participants' faith in a BCT's ability to integrate any element into their formation after a decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan could also account for these results. Nonetheless, the majority of participants feel that not conducting regional training will have a neutral effect on BCTs (see figure 7).




Figure 7. Impact of non-Regional Training on a BCT's Integration

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

ADP 3-0 states “the capability for the lawful and expert application of lethal force builds the foundation for effective offensive, defensive, and stability operations” (DA 2011a, 8). BCTs that regionally train will not only understand their operational environment better, but the enemy they will face as well. They can train at both at their home station and at a CTC against an opposing force utilizing the same tactics they will face when deployed. A regionally trained BCT will not have to learn how the enemy fights in combat conditions. Additionally, when facing a hybrid threat, a regionally trained BCT will possess better target discrimination. Operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the importance of not just killing targets, but more importantly killing the right targets. However, the survey participants disagree with the above assertions. Most participants feel that regional training will have no impact on lethality, while only one third feel that it will have a positive impact (see figure 8).




Figure 8. Impact of Regional Training on a BCT's Lethality

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

However, when asked the same question for a non-regionally trained BCT, participants provided almost the same results (see figure 9).




Figure 9. Impact of non-Regional Training on a BCT's Lethality

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

Lethality is the only tenet that most participants in the survey do not feel will be improved by regional training. As demonstrated by both tables above, the majority participants in the survey feel that both kinds of training will have no impact on a BCT's lethality.

ADP 3-0 states that "Army leaders must adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific situation they face. This requires . . . an ability to adjust based on continuous assessment" (DA 2011a, 8). It further states "adaptation requires an understanding of the operational environment. . . . Army leaders expand their understanding of potential operational environments through broad

education, training, personal study, and collaboration with interagency partners. Rapid learning while in combat depends on life-long education, consistent training, and study habits that leaders had prior to combat.” Regional alignment will give leaders a fundamental understanding of an operational environment. However, if it is maintained over the long term it will maintain the mindset in the Army to understand and constantly assess the environment for risks and opportunities as discussed in the doctrine portion of the previous section. BCT’s with leaders who possess this institutional mindset will be more likely to identify those opportunities and avoid risks. Thus, regionally trained BCTs will be more effective than a non-regionally trained BCT. The majority of participants in the survey agree with the above assertion. Two-thirds of the participants feel that regional training will have a positive impact at a minimum, while the majority of the remaining participants feel there will be no impact (see figure 10).




Figure 10. Impact of Regional Training on a BCT's Adaptability

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

In the case of a non-regionally trained BCT, the majority of participants felt that there would be no impact on adaptability, while one-third felt there would be at least a positive impact, and only one-sixth felt it would have a negative impact. Comparing the two tables shows that the majority of participants feel that regional training improves the adaptability of BCTs (see figure 11).




Figure 11. Impact of non-Regional Training on a BCT's Adaptability

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

ADP 3-0 defines depth in terms of both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. For combined arms maneuver, “Army leaders strike enemy forces throughout their depth by arranging activities across the entire operational framework to achieve the most decisive result. They do this to prevent the effective employment of enemy reserves, command and control nodes, logistics, and other capabilities both in and out of direct contact with friendly forces.” For wide area security, “employing security forces and obstacles, maintaining reserves, conducting continuous reconnaissance, and managing the tempo of an operation illustrate building depth within the friendly force” (DA 2011a, 8). Regionally trained BCTs better understand the methods an enemy will use to attack,

defend, and conduct their own inform and influence activities. With this knowledge, BCTs can then craft their own operations to the effects describe for combined arms maneuver while protecting their own force in terms of the definition for wide area security. The majority of survey participants also feel that a regionally trained BCT has more depth than a non-regionally trained BCT (see figure 12 and figure 13).




Figure 12. Impact of Regional Training on a BCT's Depth

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, See Appendix A.




Figure 13. Impact of non-Regional Training on a BCT's Depth

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

Lastly, ADP 3-0 states that synchronization “is the ability to execute multiple, related, and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing each task in isolation” (DA 2011a, 9). One example of a BCT utilizing synchronization is a lethal targeting of an insurgent network, while at the same time non-lethally targeting the sources of instability within their area of operations. Eliminating the sources of instability will make it more difficult for the insurgents to find sanctuary as their support in the population erodes, while the lethal targeting depletes their manpower and resources. The two mutually supporting operations reinforce the each other. Success in one effort leads to further success in the other. A regionally trained

BCT will more readily identify the sources of instability and craft methods to fix them. The same BCT will also better understand the insurgent's tactics and thus have greater success in eliminating members of the network. Participants in this study's survey agree that BCT's with regional training achieve better synchronization than BCTs with no regional training (see figure 14 and figure 15).




Figure 14. Impact of Regional Training on a BCT's Synchronization

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, See Appendix A.
















Figure 15. Impact of non-Regional Training on a BCT's Synchronization

Source: Created by author, data from Regionally Aligned Brigade Combat Teams Survey 2013, See Appendix A.

This study utilized the six tenets of Unified Land Operations to judge the impact of regional training on the effectiveness of BCTs at the tactical level. The survey described in chapter 3, and the results of which are contained in Appendix A of this study, show that the majority of participants feel that regional alignment will make BCTs more effective at the tactical level. Regional alignment, and the training that follows as a result of it, improves a BCT's flexibility, integration, adaptability, depth, and synchronization resulting in a positive rating (see chapter 3, figure 1). Participants judged that a non-regionally trained BCT would maintain the status quo resulting in a neutral rating for each tenet (see chapter 3, figure 1). The only result that remains neutral for a

regionally trained BCT was the tenet lethality which the majority of participants judged would have no impact thus resulting in a neutral rating. See table 5 for a summary of the analysis.

Table 5. Impact of Regional and non-Regional Training on the Six Tenets of Unified Land Operations

Regionally Aligned Training	Tenets of Unified Land Operations	Non-Regionally Aligned Training
	Flexibility	
	Integration	
	Lethality	
	Adaptability	
	Depth	
	Synchronization	

Source: Created by author.

Official AARs

This study examined three different AARs from the 4th ID, 3/3 ID, and the 3/4 ID. This study utilized the AARs from these units because they are all ABCT based units, deployed to the same area of responsibility, and all provided AARs upon re-deployment containing a section on their training prior to their deployment. However, they all

deployed at different time periods in the course of OIF and experienced different levels of regional training to support their mission readiness exercises.

The 4 ID's ABCTs conducted training for OIF in 2003 with a focus on "large scale actions" (4ID 2004, 12). Their initial mission was invading Iraq through Turkey. When conditions changed, they entered Iraq in April of 2003 and became a stabilizing force around Tikrit. The 4ID ended up executing a mission for which it had not prepared. However, the unit adapted and provided feedback to the CTCs to better replicate the OIF environment so follow units would not have to begin over again. Their issues and recommendations focused on preparing units for FOB operations, decentralized operations focused on gathering intelligence, and replicating threats to sustainment operations (4ID 2004, 11-14). In essence, 4ID was providing the CTCs, and really the Army as a whole, with the basic information necessary to replicate the OIF operating environment.

The 3/3 ID submitted their AAR in 2006 following the unit's second deployment to OIF. In the 3/3 ID's AAR, the unit focused on more detailed issues within the OIF operating environment for CTCs to replicate. The regional training improved, but still did not reach the level of complexity the unit encountered in Iraq. Requests included training for female search teams, replication of evidence collection, and broader use of interpreters so lower level leaders and Soldiers had the opportunity to use them (3/3 ID 2006, 3-28). The 3/3 ID requests indicate that the CTCs were better replicating the OIF operating environment. The 3/3 ID had a better understanding of the operating environment prior to their deployment, and thus were prepared for the operations they

conducted. The majority of their issues focused on improving the details, or greater quantities of the training they received during their JRTC rotation.

The 3/4 ID deployed in 2010 as an advise-and-assist brigade augmented by security transition teams. The 3/4 ID recommendations for pre-deployment training demonstrate a unit that understands the theater into which it deploys. Their issues center around a lack of theater provided equipment as opposed to a lack of cultural training or a failure to replicate the operational environment (OE) (3/4 ID 2011, 12-15). Additionally, they provide TTPs on their advise-and-assist mission relating to integration of STTs and achieving unity of effort with their Iraqi counterparts (3/4 ID 2011, 15-22). The 3/4 ID AAR demonstrates the impact that a realistic training scenario has for a unit. The 3/4 ID fixated on the lack of specialty equipment as opposed to a lack of realism in their training.

In summary, 4ID's AAR demonstrates their initial lack of knowledge in the OE. They did not conduct regional training prior to deployment but instead trained to defeat a Soviet-modeled army. As a result, they had to adapt to the operating environment while conducting their operations. The 3/3 ID leadership understood the operating environment heading into their deployment in 2005 because of the regionally based training they received. Their main issue was they did not get enough of it for their Soldiers. Finally, 3/4 ID received the cultural and language training they needed prior to deployment their main issue stemmed from a lack of theater provided equipment prior to deployment. These examples show that the better a training environment replicates an actual operating environment, the more prepared a unit will be to execute their mission successfully.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the analysis of the data collected for this study. The study's purpose was to answer the question "should the Army regionally align its BCTs?" The answer is yes, the Army should regionally align its BCTs. However, the Army is accepting some risk by implementing regional alignment for its BCTs. Regionally aligning its BCTs will have several benefits to the Army and to U.S. national security. First, it will make BCTs more effective at the tactical level. Second, it will make BCTs more valuable instruments for GCCs to use in their theater security plans. Third, regional alignment is a cost effective way for the Army to prepare itself for likely contingency operations in the next decade. Regional alignment will ensure that the Army, and BCTs in particular, institutionalize the lessons learned from OIF and OEF on stability operations fostering a mindset in its leadership to truly understand operating environments.

The next chapter will present the conclusion to this study. It will include an interpretation of the findings described in this chapter. In addition, the next chapter will also describe some of the risks that the Army is accepting by adopting regional alignment along with some opportunities to mitigate those risks. It will contain some recommendations for further study and improvements on the methodology utilized while researching. Finally it will provide some recommendations for improving regional alignment.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to answer the question “should the Army regionally align its brigade combat teams (BCTs)?” The answer is yes, the Army should regionally align its BCTs, but with an understanding of the risks involved. To answer this question, this study examined the literature surrounding regional alignment, conducted a survey of future Brigade Commanders and Command Sergeant Majors attending the Fort Leavenworth Pre-Command Course (PCC) to elicit their expert opinions on regional alignment, and examined the after action reviews submitted by BCTs from OIF for the impact of regional training on their effectiveness. The previous chapter presented an analysis of the findings that resulted from the methods used above. This study found that the U.S. is facing two major threats to its national security in the next ten years. The first is the threat of instability within key partners and allies around the world. The second is the threat of A2/AD technology limiting the U.S.’s ability for power projection. The study then analyzed other DOTMLPF options presented by experts in the literature examined during the course of this research. The analysis determined that regional alignment is the most cost effective means available at this time to prepare the Army for the two most likely threats it will face. Following that was an analysis of the data from the survey conducted with the PCC attendees. The analysis of the data found that experts feel regional alignment will make the Army more effective at achieving GCC’s strategic objectives. It also determined that regional alignment will make BCTs more effective at the tactical level by analyzing its impact on the six tenets of Unified Land Operations.

Lastly, the study analyzed the AARs submitted by 4ID following its deployment to OIF in 2004, 3/3 ID's AAR following its deployment in 2006, and 3/4 ID's AAR following its deployment in 2010 for the impact of regional training on their effectiveness. The AARs indicated that the longer the Army worked on its regional training for Iraq, the more effective its BCTs became when they deployed.

This chapter is organized into two sections. The first section will cover the interpretations of the study's findings. This will cover the result of the findings, the implications of those findings, and unexpected results of the study. The second section will provide some recommendations for further study.

Interpretation of Findings

Based upon the research and the results of the survey, this study concluded that the Army is making the correct decision by regionally aligning its BCTs. Since the beginning of operations in Afghanistan, the ground forces of the U.S. military have been the focus for the Department of Defense. Now that operations are coming to a close at the end of 2014, the citizens of the U.S. are looking to reduce the budget deficit. In addition, the U.S. is not interested in becoming involved with large amounts of ground forces in another country's internal problems, as evidenced by its limited participation in Libya and minimal intervention in Syria. With the current budget crisis ongoing, there is the possibility that members of Congress could call for drastic cuts to the U.S. Army in an effort to achieve short term gains in spending at the expense of long term security. With regional alignment, the U.S. Army is implementing a policy that ensures its relevance to the nation's security. Regional alignment will prepare the Army for efforts to eliminate

sources of instability threatening U.S. interests around the globe as well as increase the nation's influence in areas threatened by A2/AD capabilities.

However, there are some implications involved in regionally aligning BCTs. The first is that the Army is going to have to carefully balance how it prepares itself for future contingency operations. There is no way to predict the future. The Army must be ready to win in any situation when called upon by the citizens of the United States. The Army's adoption of decisive action ensures that it institutionalizes the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan on the important part stability operations play in modern conflict. Regional alignment lends itself well to supporting stability operations by preparing BCTs to interact with a different culture. Many of the operations that GCCs will want BCTs to execute will involve stability operations such as security force assistance and advising and assisting. However, there is a possibility that the Army could become so overzealous in its efforts to prepare for missions in support of GCCs that it neglects its training for offensive and defensive operations. Many of the participants in the survey echoed these same concerns. One individual wrote "I fear regional alignment will force BCTs to focus too much on preparing for the low end of conflict at the expense of training for high intensity operations" (Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey 2013, 132). Another participant stated "depending upon the region in which the BCT is aligned there is a chance that BCTs could become less capable of executing their high-end war time mission" (Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey 2013, 132). Lastly, another individual wrote "if training funds are limited and force BCT commanders to reduce core training to allow for regional specific training, this program risks having a negative impact overall" (Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey 2013, 135). Supporting GCC objectives is an

important mission for the U.S. Army, but it is equally important to ensure that it is ready to execute any other unanticipated contingencies that could occur. Additionally, an Army that is well prepared to conduct the more lethal side of Decisive Action operations acts as a deterrent in and of itself. Balancing the requirements of regional training with the offensive and defensive tasks will be difficult, but not impossible. As long as the Army does not lose sight of its requirements, it will remain a credible force for the Nation's defense.

There is another implication with regional alignment that the Army must be ready for in the event of a major contingency in the future. What is the risk incurred by BCT deploying to a region for which it was not trained? The Army currently plans on using the ARFORGEN model to prepare BCTs for supporting GCC's missions. This means a BCT will either be in the ready force and available for deployment, in the process of training up, or in the process of resetting after having been in the ready force. One-third of the Army's BCTs will be prepared to deploy on a moment's notice, as long as they are not currently deployed in support of a GCC, for a major crisis if one arises. Another third will be available with a short amount of additional training. The final third will take several months before they can deploy in support of the crisis. Depending upon the severity of the crisis, the Military may decide to deploy a 'ready' BCT to a region with which it is not aligned. One of the participants in the survey wrote "I remain concerned that regional alignment could lead some [BCTs] to lose agility and ability to respond in deployments different from their regional[ly] aligned training" (Regionally Aligned BCTs Survey 2013, 132). However, just like balancing the training requirements discussed above, the Army leadership will have to remain aware of this risk. The Army must maintain a

training standard for the whole organization that ensures the interoperability of all BCTs no matter which region they are assigned too.

One surprising lesson came as a result of the survey done with PCC course attendees. As shown in chapter 4, this study concluded that regional alignment would have no impact on a BCTs lethality. This came as a surprise. Lethality entails hitting the correct target, not just the maximum number of targets. A BCT training for a contingency in a specific region will train against an opposing force that closely replicates the most likely threat they will face. An example of this was CTCs establishing improvised explosive device (IED) networks that targeted sustainment elements during rotations. BCTs not only worked on reducing the success of IEDs against them by working on their defensive tactics, but also ‘attacked the networks’ by actively working on the supply and emplacement of IEDs. A BCT that worked against this kind of OPFOR became more lethal for the IED networks they encountered in Iraq. They did not have to learn their lessons beginning on the day they arrived. They showed up ready to begin attacking the IED network in their area of operations. Regionally aligned training should provide the same opportunities in the future. With some effort and intelligence collaboration, CTCs can replicate the likely enemy any BCT will face when it deploys in support of a GCC. That could be a guerrilla group from SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility, conventional military like North Korea’s for PACOM’s area of responsibility, or a hybrid threat like the one Israel faced in Lebanon. Knowing your enemy, their strengths, weaknesses, and tactics, makes you more effective, or lethal, when you face them. However, the survey participants disagreed with this argument. This is likely because they do not associate

regional training with offensive and defensive tasks, but only with culture and language skills that support stability operations.

Recommendations for Further Research

Several interesting questions arose in the process of completing this study. The first question was “what is the impact on a BCT that deploys to a different region than the one it trained for?” There is a recent example of this which could serve as a case study for a future research project. The 5/2 ID was originally training for a deployment in support of OIF in 2009. After conducting training for over a year in preparation for Iraq, 5/2 ID mission was changed to OEF two weeks before its mission readiness exercise at the National Training Center (NTC) to support the ‘surge’ in Afghanistan. The 5/2 ID had only those two weeks at NTC for their culture and language training prior to their ID deployment. Attempts to gather materials for this study on 5/2 ID’s deployment and the impact of their late change of mission were unsuccessful. The Center for Army Lessons Learned only had one AAR, and it did not deal with the impact of their change of mission. A thorough case study of 5/2 ID’s train-up and deployment could provide valuable insights into the risks inherent with regional alignment.

Second, the JCOA study used in the research for this paper repeatedly called for improving the language proficiency of the whole military. But what would it really take to acquire these skills in the Army? The implications of the JCOA’s recommendation are that every officer in the Army must acquire the ability, or at least close to the ability, of a foreign area officer. However, is this really possible given the broad range of education in the U.S.? Just answering the question “should the Army make fluency in a foreign language mandatory for commissioned officers?” could be a complex research project.

This study used the term BCTs as a generic reference for IBCTs, SBCTs, and ABCTs. Yet, these are dramatically different organizations with drastically different logistics requirements to deploy each organization's equipment. The three types of organizations also all have very different sustainment requirements. The ammunition and fuel requirements for an ABCT are much greater than those of an IBCT. Additionally, the U.S. Army is entering a period of fiscal austerity which will reduce its training budgets as well as funds available to ship equipment. The logistic support required to ship an IBCT is much less than what is required for an ABCT. With this in mind, will IBCTs become the most commonly used formations for regional engagement in the future? After a few years of executing regional alignment, it would be interesting to conduct a study of how it is impacting the training and readiness of IBCTs as opposed to SBCTs or ABCTs.

Conclusion

This study set out to answer the question "should the Army regionally align its BCTs?" As a result of the research conducted to answer that question, this study concludes that yes, the Army should regionally align its BCTs. However, it will have to guard against two potential risks. The first is becoming overly fixated on regional training and its related stability operations at the expense of training for offensive and defensive operations. The second is the Army must be cognizant of the risk involved in deploying a BCT to a region for which it has not trained. Several possible research projects came to light during the course of this study that could provide opportunities for others in the future. The first involves a case study of the impact on 5/2 SBCT of changing its deployment to Afghanistan after it had trained for Iraq. The second is answering the question "should the Army make speaking a foreign language mandatory for

commissioned officers?” Lastly, an examination of how regional alignment is impacting the training and readiness of the different types of BCTs could provide a potential research project.

We have learned many lessons over the last 10 years, but one of the most compelling is that—whether you are working among the citizens of a country, or working with their government or Armed Forces—nothing is as important to your long term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values.

— General Raymond T. Odierno, *Regionally Aligned Forces: A New Model for Building Partnerships*, Army Live

GLOSSARY

- Antiaccess. Those capabilities, usually long range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy from entering an operational area.
- Area-denial. Those capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep the enemy out but to limit his freedom of action within an operational area.
- Combatant Command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.
- Force Projection. The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations.
- Foreign Internal Defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.
- Global Commons. Areas of air, sea, space, and cyberspace that belong to no one state.
- Operational Access. The ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission.
- Multinational Operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.
- Security Cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC. See also security assistance.
- Security Force Assistance. The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.

APPENDIX A

REGIONALLY ALIGNED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS SURVEY

Count and Bar Charts Report
Friday, April 12, 2013

37 / 72 Response Rate


± 10% Margin of Error, 95% Confidence Level

Survey Demographics

Branch

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one

Infantry	9
Armor / Cavalry	1
Special Forces	1
Field Artillery	1
Engineers	1
Aviation	3
Signal Corps	3
Logistics Corps	4
Medical Service Corps	1
Military Intelligence	2
Other	10
Total Responses	36




Other Responses

Military Police	2
AC	1
Air Defense Artillery	1
CA	1
Civil Affairs	1
FA50	1
Total Responses	7

Are you a...?

Response Rate: **100%** (N=37) Question Type: Choose one


Commissioned Officer	26
Non-Commissioned Officer	11
Total Responses	37



Years of Service

Response Rate: **100%** (N=37) Question Type: Choose one

15-19	0
20-24	23
25+	14
Total Responses	37




How many years of service did you spend in the following types of assignments?

Scale 1

Question Type: Choose one


	1-2 years	3-5 years	6-9 years	10+ years	Total Responses
Geographic Combatant Command	9 53%	6 35%	0 0%	2 12%	17
Brigade Level and Below	0 0%	2 6%	4 11%	29 83%	35
Joint Command	11 52%	10 48%	0 0%	0 0%	21
An Army Staff at echelons above Brigade	11 55%	4 20%	3 15%	2 10%	20
Total Responses	31	22	7	33	93



Geographic Combatant Command

Response Rate: 46% (N=17) Question Type: Choose one


1-2 years	9
3-5 years	6
6-9 years	0
10+ years	2
Total Responses	17



Brigade Level and Below

Response Rate: 95% (N=35) Question Type: Choose one

1-2 years	0
3-5 years	2
6-9 years	4
10+ years	29
Total Responses	35




Joint Command

Response Rate: 57% (N=21) Question Type: Choose one

1-2 years	11
3-5 years	10
6-9 years	0
10+ years	0


Total Responses 21



An Army Staff at echelons above Brigade

Response Rate: 54% (N=20) Question Type: Choose one

1-2 years	11
3-5 years	4
6-9 years	3
10+ years	2
Total Responses	20



Survey Part 1- Regional Alignment Questions

Please select your agreement or disagreement with the following statements.


Scale 1

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Responses
Regionally aligned BCTs are more effective at the tactical level of war.	6	14	9	5	2	36
	17%	39%	25%	14%	6%	
Regionally aligned BCTs are more effective for Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) in achieving strategic objectives.	7	22	4	0	2	35
	20%	63%	11%	0%	6%	
Specific regional training requirements detract from a BCT's ability to train for decisive action.	2	7	5	20	2	36
	6%	19%	14%	56%	6%	
Regionally aligning BCTs will help GCCs conduct Phase 0 operations. (Phase 0 operations are combined exercises with, or training of, local security forces meant to deter aggression toward or conflict in a partnered or allied nation)	11	20	4	0	1	36
	31%	56%	11%	0%	3%	
Specific Regional training is necessary to prepare BCTs for success in future contingency operations.	10	17	4	3	2	36
	28%	47%	11%	8%	6%	
Specific Regional training is a waste of government funds when a BCT is assigned to a region that differs from the specific regional training.	2	6	3	20	4	35
	6%	17%	9%	57%	11%	
A BCT that receives specific regional training must be assigned to that region.	1	14	8	8	5	36
	3%	39%	22%	22%	14%	
Time spent in specific regional training decreases readiness for other operations.	1	7	12	14	2	36
	3%	19%	33%	39%	6%	
Total Responses	40	107	49	70	20	286

Question Type: Choose one

Regionally aligned BCTs are more effective at the tactical level of war.
Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Agree	6
Agree	14
Neither Agree nor Disagree	9
Disagree	5
Strongly Disagree	2
Total Responses	36



Regionally aligned BCTs are more effective for Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs) in achieving strategic objectives.

Response Rate: 95% (N=35) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Agree	7
Agree	22
Neither Agree nor Disagree	4
Disagree	0
Strongly Disagree	2
Total Responses	35



Specific regional training requirements detract from a BCT's ability to train for decisive action.

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Agree	2
Agree	7
Neither Agree nor Disagree	5
Disagree	20
Strongly Disagree	2
Total Responses	36



Regionally aligning BCTs will help GCCs conduct Phase 0 operations. (Phase 0 operations are combined exercises with, or training of, local security forces meant to deter aggression toward or conflict in a partnered or allied nation)

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Agree	11
Agree	20
Neither Agree nor Disagree	4
Disagree	0
Strongly Disagree	1
Total Responses	36



Specific Regional training is necessary to prepare BCTs for success in future contingency operations.

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Strongly Agree	10
Agree	17
Neither Agree nor Disagree	4
Disagree	3
Strongly Disagree	2
Total Responses	36



Specific Regional training is a waste of government funds when a BCT is assigned to a region that differs from the specific regional training.


Response Rate: 95% (N=35) Question Type: Choose one

Strongly Agree	2
Agree	6
Neither Agree nor Disagree	3
Disagree	20
Strongly Disagree	4
Total Responses	35




A BCT that receives specific regional training must be assigned to that region.
Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one

Strongly Agree	1
Agree	14
Neither Agree nor Disagree	8
Disagree	8
Strongly Disagree	5
Total Responses	36



Time spent is specific regional training decreases readiness for other operations.
Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one

Strongly Agree	1
Agree	7
Neither Agree nor Disagree	12
Disagree	14
Strongly Disagree	2
Total Responses	36




What impact will regional BCT training alignment have on those indicators of success?

What impact will regional alignment have on those indicators of success?

Question Type: **Choose one**


	Very Positive Impact	Positive Impact	No Impact	Negative Impact	Very Negative Impact	Total Responses
Flexibility	2 6%	20 56%	9 25%	5 14%	0 0%	36
Integration	6 17%	22 61%	6 17%	2 6%	0 0%	36
Lethality	1 3%	13 36%	18 50%	4 11%	0 0%	36
Adaptability	6 17%	18 50%	9 25%	2 6%	1 3%	36
Depth	4 11%	19 53%	10 28%	3 8%	0 0%	36
Synchronization	3 8%	25 69%	7 19%	1 3%	0 0%	36
Total Responses	22	117	59	17	1	216



Flexibility

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	2
Positive Impact	20
No Impact	9
Negative Impact	5
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Integration

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	6
Positive Impact	22
No Impact	6
Negative Impact	2
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Lethality

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	1
Positive Impact	13
No Impact	18
Negative Impact	4
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Adaptability

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	6
Positive Impact	18
No Impact	9
Negative Impact	2
Very Negative Impact	1
Total Responses	36



Depth

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	4
Positive Impact	19
No Impact	10
Negative Impact	3
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Synchronization

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one

Very Positive Impact	3
Positive Impact	25
No Impact	7
Negative Impact	1
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36




What impact will maintaining current BCT training have on those indicators of success?

What impact will regional alignment have on those indicators of success?

Question Type: **Choose one**


	Very Positive Impact	Positive Impact	No Impact	Negative Impact	Very Negative Impact	Total Responses
Flexibility	3 8%	11 31%	19 53%	3 8%	0 0%	36
Integration	2 6%	9 25%	19 53%	6 17%	0 0%	36
Lethality	2 6%	10 28%	23 64%	1 3%	0 0%	36
Adaptability	1 3%	12 33%	17 47%	6 17%	0 0%	36
Depth	1 3%	10 28%	19 53%	6 17%	0 0%	36
Synchronization	1 3%	11 31%	21 58%	3 8%	0 0%	36
Total Responses	10	63	118	25	0	216



Flexibility

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	3
Positive Impact	11
No Impact	19
Negative Impact	3
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Integration

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	2
Positive Impact	9
No Impact	19
Negative Impact	6
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Lethality

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	2
Positive Impact	10
No Impact	23
Negative Impact	1
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Adaptability

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	1
Positive Impact	12
No Impact	17
Negative Impact	6
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Depth

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one


Very Positive Impact	1
Positive Impact	10
No Impact	19
Negative Impact	6
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Synchronization

Response Rate: 97% (N=36) Question Type: Choose one

Very Positive Impact	1
Positive Impact	11
No Impact	21
Negative Impact	3
Very Negative Impact	0
Total Responses	36



Survey Part 4- Open Ended Question

Please tell me your thoughts about regionally aligning BCTs:

Response Rate: 84% (N=31) Question Type: Paragraph

Please tell me your thoughts about regionally aligning BCTs
Think it makes sense...12 years of war has proven that a regional focused force, one whose Soldiers have learned the culture, history and terrain of their assigned region, are much more successful in accomplishing tactical to strategic objectives.
1. There is more to it than sprinkling a little bit of culture and language on top of a training schedule. 2. MilOMil engagement is a big money maker, but can go bad as well if not planned like a deliberate assault. 3. Not a lot of cultural expertise available to start these programs. Recommend looking to the S-9 (Civil Affairs) section to help.
ARSOF (SF, MISO, CA) forces are already specially trained and aligned by language/cultural training to conduct Theater Engagement ISO GCCs. Soldiers in these units are specially selected and trained to obtain, and maintain these regionally-aligned capabilities, which is not easily replicable within large maneuver formations. Maintaining these specific skills will detract from already limited training budgets and time, from full-spectrum operations skills--which have atrophied over the last 12 yrs of war.
I do not believe that Regionally aligned BCT's will work. They might work for Special Operations; but not for the Regular Army in our current configuration. The only way a Regionally aligned force will work is if we find a balance on the East, West and Central U.S. of Heavy, Medium, and Light forces. Having 5 x Stryker Brigades on the West Coast/Hawaii/Alaska and none on the East coast while the East coast is more armor/airborne/air assault/mountain heavy than the West coast is not a good balance and therefore doesn't support a Regional alignment. If North Korea invades South Korea where is the out of country Armor going to come from (Carson/Bliss/Hood)? How long would it take it to get into theater in the middle of summer/winter? There needs to be a balance of light, Medium and Heavy for all BCT's to work. Even Special Forces changed their mind with being Regionally tied after a couple of years of the GWOT. I really doubt 3d ID would just sit on the sidelines while North and South Korea duke it out.
I believe our Soldiers need to be more culturally aware of the regions where they may be required to operate. This regional alignment gets at this issue. and it allows us to focus on a specific enemy vice still fighting the Kraznovians.
Regionally aligned BCTs should allow us to develop a better understanding of our allies and limit the amount of time required to "train up" when a contingency arises.

Please tell me your thoughts about regionally aligning BCTs
<p>Enablers such as CA or PSYOP should be integrated with those BCTs. USACAPOC forces are already regionally aligned but we should take it a step further and integrate those forces with the BCTs that will be aligned to their respective CCMDs. The regional alignment concept will pay dividends in the relationships built between US and foreign forces during peacetime training. We should look to add more stability to personnel assignments as we move forward in an effort to allow those personal relationships to mature. If we move personnel too quickly it will be more difficult to build and sustain those relationships. BCT alignments should also be leveraged in assisting those partner nations in response to natural or manmade disasters (assuming they ask for the assistance). Typically the same individuals with whom we would work in disaster response would also be the ones with whom we work on other types of military operations.</p>
<p>Great idea, but I think we are over selling it. On the positive side we are potentially establishing great habitual relationships, just like we had in the old days. However, my greatest fear is that we will go down the dangerous path of thinking we can "understand" the operational environment of the entire region. The broad regions we are aligning with are every bit as complex as the world as a whole. We can't prepare a BCT to fight in Africa any better than we can prepare that BCT for worldwide contingencies. As long as we focus on the fundamentals and don't get wrapped up in the region we will be OK.</p>
<p>In an economic constrained environment this alignment will help commanders and CSMs prioritize training. However, depending upon the region in which the BCT is aligned there is a chance that BCTs could become less capable of executing their high-end war time mission.</p>
<p>I think they are the right answer. We can focus language, cultural and other factors and train soldiers for those specific conditions, since regional unrest is the most unlikely scenario in the next 25 years</p>
<p>1. In the future, please take the time to check the spelling and grammar of your questions. These shortfalls cause me to doubt the value of contributing to your survey. 2. Regional alignment is perceived by some to be the Army's justification for force structure (i.e., create a demand signal for forces). The Army needs to be clear in its purpose, implementation and execution of regional alignment. 3. We never accurately predict the next conflict. Assigning BCTs to regions is value added for Geographic Combatant Commands' Theater Security Cooperation Plans. The value of regional alignment to the BCT in preparing for their next contingency is not as clear and depends on where the next contingency takes place (i.e., in their assigned region or elsewhere). 3. I fear regional alignment will force BCTs to focus too much on preparing for the low end of conflict at the expense of training for high intensity operations. 4. The Army must provide the capabilities required for Combatant Commanders to execute their mission while preparing for future contingencies. These two requirements are not always in alignment and will require the Army to balance training resources carefully.</p>
<p>I concur with the concept and think it is good for the BCT as a focus for training and for the Combatant Cdr to have a dedicated BCT. Think a BCT could both train on both base METL and regionally aligned METL.</p>

<p>Please tell me your thoughts about regionally aligning BCTs</p>
<p>Will better enable U.S. to prevent, shape and win (consolidate gains) consistent with our vital national interests. RAF better enables us to secure and maintain access to the operating environment, gain an understanding of the operating environment, set conditions for operations, influence partners/or the local populace, and build partner capacity. RAFs will better enable us to: (+) Gain cultural understanding and language proficiency. (+) Understand the political, social, economic and local dynamics. (+) Understand the infrastructure and HN military/security forces. (+) Understand the influential actors such as threat and criminal networks. (+) Understand the friendly networks. (+) Influence behaviors of people, HN/indigenous security forces, and government. (+) Establish and maintain unity of effort with JIIM partners. (+) Work "by, with and through" our partners and indigenous forces. (+) Apply the "whole of government" approach - working with DoS, USAID, IA, Special Operations Forces, etc..</p>
<p>I have spent more than 12 years assigned overseas at units that are Corps level assets, they operate at the Brigade or below level. While assigned to Panama, the two infantry battalion and all support elements were trained to support/defend the Canal and respond to the Panamanian Government. As a result, all the Panama based units performed flawlessly during Operation Just Cause. In Germany, prior to the peace accord, the two Divisions and support elements were not actively training on peace keeping operations. We has only one field problem with multi-national units like we going to face in Bosnia. However, this did not preclude us from performing extremely well during Operation Joint Endeavor. In Hawaii, the division was focused on its Iraq/Afghanistan rotation not the Asian-Pacific. In all instances, as a Soldier living abroad, I found immersing in the culture to be a positive experience. Just as I believe focusing a BCT on a particular region and making the investment for partnership, culture broadening, and realistic and valuable training.</p>
<p>I support the regionally aligned BCT.</p>
<p>The fiscal constraints and uncertainty between 2013-2017 will require DoD to develop strategies with available resources and regionalization of BCT is one means to support strategy and preserve readiness and resources. Our military capability portfolios will continue to be developed to address current and future threats to our national security. The current economical frailty plaguing the United States is pressing the Department of Defense (DoD) to do more without more resources. In light of this, DoD must develop an affordable and reliable force structure and readiness strategy that plans and prioritizes its requirements, resourcing, and acquisition processes in order to get the capabilities it needs to achieve the goals and objectives specified in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and make CCDRs successful. Using this revised concept, I think the CCDRs would have the authority and responsibility to identify requirements and capability gaps, and then identify resources to support their area of responsibility (AOR). CCDRs could horizontally coordinate with their other CCDRs to assess mutual requirements and share resources. Army leader need to ensure the concept support the NSS, DPG, QDR and NMS. BLUF: Like the concept!</p>

Please tell me your thoughts about regionally aligning BCTs

Overall - very skeptical of the concept and driving factors behind it. Some issues I have: Each Combatant Commander (CCDR) gets a Div HQ to serve as JTF but the division's subordinate brigades will be not necessarily be aligned with same AOR - I thought 12 years of war taught us we should work to keep the Div teams together when able. RAF concept slides say we'll do Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture at no additional expense - how? Where are the resources going to come from and are we going to ask our Soldiers to learn this stuff on their own time from on-line resources as we generally do to squeeze in non decisive action training? How about the funding for the regional engagements and persistent movement of small teams to/from theater (like AFRICOM) - who's budgeting for this non contingency / non named operation deployments? Overall I believe language training for traditional units is waste of time/resources - too difficult to maintain skill, especially based on a "likelihood" that Soldier will need those skills while assigned to the unit. Compounded by movement to follow on units with different regional alignment and possibility the Army may change regional alignment of brigades every few read/train cycles - nonsensical. Portuguese one tour and Swahili the next for our Soldiers, on top of all else they've got to remain competent in MOS and combined arms skill - seems excessive. There's a reason SOF Soldiers stay in one SF Group for years and generally don't move around between groups. Aside from budgeting and perhaps excessive training requirements (e.g. language skills) for individual Soldiers, RAF can be beneficial if brigades are allowed to maintain the same alignment for several ready/train cycles, develop a regional understanding based on a cultural and operating environment framework that's unique to their associated geographic area, and the forces are integrated by the CCDR in methods synchronized with State Department efforts and in direct support of the Global Engagement of Forces and Defense Strategic Planning Guidance.

Good idea. Should help focus troops on realistic training when not on a patch chart.

I remain concerned that regional alignment could lead some to lose agility and the ability to respond in deployments different from their regional aligned training. However, this application does allow GCC's to have dedicated forces that can be used for shaping and Phase 0 operations. The regional alignment should coincide with allocation of resources that reflects change in regional events. This will require greater resourcing agility across several domains of DOTMLPH. For example, all the resources and training budget might go to PACOM to reflect strategic priorities; however, the most likely units to be employed would likely be AFRICOM/EUCOM/CENTCOM. Have we address the emerging agility now required to shift resources to support units with impending crisis employment? Will resourcing support possibility or probability?

They are great if used and trained properly.

Provides a focus for the BCT as overseas contingency operations wind-down in Afghanistan. Also the associated preparation/ processes for this mission is relevant and beneficial regardless of whether the BCT serves in the region or not. For the GCC having a designated BCT(s) will also be extremely useful as they build and implement their theater engagement strategy/ plan.

Please tell me your thoughts about regionally aligning BCTs
<p>There are two things that concern me. The first is putting too much on a BCTs plate. Having to train for and support RAF mission ISO the ASCC will be very difficult while trying to maintain Decision Action skill sets. Second is the chain of command. I do not think the ASCC having DIRLAUTH with the BCT is a good idea (believe that to be the plan but have not seen anything recently). The ASCCs should have to work through the Corps and Divisions. Having too many masters is one of the negative side affects of 10 years of war and should be something we strive to reduce, not continue to create.</p>
<p>This is not a new concept. In the late 80's and early 90' (when I entered the Army) Divisions and Brigades were regionally aligned. At that time they faced more of a what's good for the country type need/alignment versus focusing specifically on a GCC. METLs for the RAF should compensate (commanders should ensure) for other missions that may not be specifically relevant to that Region to ensure they are trained. It may be inevitable that just because my BCT was trained and RAF for South America (SOUTHCOM), my BCT may be needed in Korea (PACOM). Resources will be surged where needed. I do think this RAF is good to ensure that the GCCs needs and requirements are acknowledged.</p>
<p>Regionally aligning BCTs make sense if combatant commanders are the tip of the spear for focusing on tactical and strategic contingency missions. Some flexibility will be lost in training for a specific region if that BCT is sent to another region. This can be fixed with extra training.</p>
<p>I think regionally aligning BCTs is a good concept, but that all it is right now. At this point, it is difficult to project the impact of the required training on readiness. I believe the results of this survey will be based purely on speculation.</p>
<p>By regionally aligning our force, the Army is forward thinking and will be better prepared for operations in specific regions with a force that is familiar with that area. Our previous experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that it takes our forces approximately 4 to 5 years to fully understand the battlespace. If we regionally align, we become proactive in the target area rather than reactive, a trait we have long been prone to repeat.</p>
<p>I think it is awesome--but the program could take additional funding, which is going to be very hard anytime soon.</p>
<p>Greatly improves our ability to shape and understand the operational environment. Provides focus and allows organizations to maximize training dollars. Establishes enduring relationships.</p>
<p>I like the idea of regionally aligned BCTs as this will allow units to focus their training to a specific area. Lessons learned can be passed to follow on units and the BCT will gain more knowledge of the area they are going to. I also believe that a regionally aligned BCT can train on decisive operations. Training management will need to be applied so that units can train for their specific role to the GCC as well as staying prepared for other contingencies.</p>

Please tell me your thoughts about regionally aligning BCTs

Good initiative that will add to those skills needed to be effective in foreign cultures, even when the unit is assigned outside of the region of alignment. The key question is funding. If training funds are limited and force BCT commanders to reduce core training to allow for regional specific training, this program risks having a negative impact overall.

Great concept as long as the units are properly employed by the GCC and managed (cultural, language training) at the DA level

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