

FORCE PROJECTION IN THE PUNIC WARS: CONTRASTING APPROACHES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

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2013-01

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 14-06-2013		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2012 – JUN 2013	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Force Projection in the Punic Wars: Contrasting Approaches			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Ali Jon Besik			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This paper examines how several ancient states dealt with the issues of military recruitment, how they differed and ultimately how these varying approaches met the needs of their countries. A general overview of how ancient Mediterranean democracies raised and equipped forces to conduct operations that steadily moved from local defense to enforcing inter state policy will be given. Specifically the cases of Rome and Carthage will then be examined and contrasted. The emphasis will be on the mechanics of how states actually recruited their forces, how commanders were appointed, how they were trained, what they were expected and asked to do by their governments, and how successful were they in prosecuting these goals. This analysis postulates that it is against a democratic state's long term interests to rely on non-government, for profit (mercenary) military and security forces.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Rome, Carthage, Roman Army, Carthaginian Army, Punic, Punic Wars, Contractor, Mercenary, Punic Navy, Roman Navy, Carthaginian Navy, Roman Legion, Polybius, Livy					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	83	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

FORCE PROJECTION IN THE PUNIC WARS: CONTRASTING APPROACHES, by Ali Jon Besik, 83 pages.

This paper examines how several ancient states dealt with the issues of military recruitment, how they differed and ultimately how these varying approaches met the needs of their countries. A general overview of how ancient Mediterranean democracies raised and equipped forces to conduct operations that steadily moved from local defense to enforcing inter state policy will be given. Specifically the cases of Rome and Carthage will then be examined and contrasted. The emphasis will be on the mechanics of how states actually recruited their forces, how commanders were appointed, how they were trained, what they were expected and asked to do by their governments, and how successful were they in prosecuting these goals. This analysis postulates that it is against a democratic state's long term interests to rely on non-government, for profit (mercenary) military and security forces.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis was made possible by several instructors from the Department of Military History at the United States Army Command and General Staff College and the research librarians at the Combined Arms Research Library. Thanks to the original committee chairs, Mr. Edward Bowie and Mr. David Holden for encouraging the topic. Dr. Alexander Bielakowski for introducing me to Dr. Kije and assuming duties as Chair. Dr. Ethan Rafuse for suggesting alternate viewpoints. Dr. Matthew Gerges for stepping in when the trumpets blared. Dr. Nicholas Murray for allowing creative scheduling. Finally this would not have been completed without the razor sharp “pen” and efforts of Dr. Jonathan House. These thanks can only partially convey the gratitude.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

All sovereign governments face the problem of equipping a military force. This can take various forms, but it is generally agreed that in order to be a functioning state some type of “monopoly on violence” must be enforced. How a government goes about recruiting, training and employing its armed forces often has much to do with the relationship it then maintains with that body. The demands placed on its military also have a great effect on both the composition of the armed forces and how they relate to their originating nation. Projecting power to further strategic goals is a much different prospect from mere territorial defense. These questions have been wrestled with since armies were formed and nations decided to expand the scope of human conflict to proportions beyond tribal feuds. It is a question our nation is currently grappling with as we enter a period where political demands will force our military to cover even more eventualities yet most likely reduce in size. The way we shape our force and meet these goals will be amongst the most pressing planning considerations for the United States military in the near future.

The contemporary security environment is one where both state and non-state actors contest one another for influence around the globe. These conflicts take various forms from public opinion campaigns to direct combat between uniformed forces. The current conflicts the United States has become involved with demand new approaches and have exposed gaps in US capabilities. As the following charts from the Department of Defense display, the US has increasingly relied on contracted support to cover these

shortfalls.¹ The proliferation of private security contractors raises several issues regarding what level of control the US exercises over them.

USCENTCOM reports, as of its 4th Quarter 2008 census, the following distribution of private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan:

	Total	US/Coalition	Third Country National	Local/Host Country National
Total DoD PSCs in Iraq	10,446	886	8,188	1,372
Armed DoD PSCs in Iraq	9,863	823	7,883	1,207
Total DoD PSCs in Afghanistan	3,847	9	32	3,806
Armed DoD PSCs in Afghanistan	3,144	4	20	3,120

We believe these numbers include most subcontractors and service contractors hired by prime contractors under DoD contracts.

USCENTCOM reports, as of 30 September 2009, the following distribution of private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan:

	Total	U.S. Citizens	Third Country National	Local/Host Country National
Total DoD PSCs in Iraq	12,684	670	9,212	2,802
Armed DoD PSCs in Iraq	11,162	590	8,567	2,005
Total DoD PSCs in Afghanistan	11,423	76	1,017	10,330
Armed DoD PSCs in Afghanistan	10,712	71	1,002	9,639

We believe these numbers include most subcontractors and service contractors hired by prime contractors under DoD contracts.

¹Cheou-Kang Private Security Monitor, “US CENTCOM reports,” http://psm.du.edu/articles_reports_statistics/data_and_statistics.html (accessed 19 April 2013).

USCENTCOM reports, as of 4th quarter FY 2010, the following distribution of private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan:

	Total	U.S. Citizens	Third Country National	Local/Host Country National
DoD PSCs in Afghanistan	18,869	197	858	17,814
DoD PSCs in Iraq	11,628	1,017	9,713	898

These numbers include most subcontractors and service contractors hired by prime contractors under DoD contracts.

Figure 1. US Centcom Reports on Personal Security Contractors 2008-2010

Source: US CENTCOM reports cited by Cheou-Kang Private Security Monitor Site, http://psm.du.edu/articles_reports_statistics/data_and_statistics.html (accessed 19 April 2013).

Situations such as this in which governments are required to re evaluate the way they form their armed forces are not new. In the ancient Mediterranean region, two powers rose with distinctly different attitudes towards raising and fielding military forces. They then set these two forces on a collision course to determine which one of these states would shape the next several centuries. Rome and Carthage engaged in three struggles in which armies of very different natures fought one another across several theaters in the Mediterranean basin. Rome focused on raising troops from citizens and allied contingents tied to a sense of civic responsibility to enforce the political will. By contrast, Carthage determined its best interest was to leverage its financial power by hiring large numbers of competent mercenaries to prosecute its foreign entanglements. This paper will examine in detail how these opposing forces were respectively raised.

Is it in a state's best interest to rely on citizens or other sources to field its military? This question is particularly important if the state in question has some degree

of democratic character. This thesis argues that relying on predominantly private “for profit” groups for national defense or foreign policy causes untenable problems for a democratic government in the long run. Whether successful or not militaries composed of private “for profit” forces will eventually have interests that potentially run counter to those of the democratic states that employ them.² This potential conflict tends to offset any potential advantage in their utilization. The situations of the two states of Rome and Carthage must be reviewed in regards to political system and methods of appointing leadership. Ultimately the question of what caused these governments to generate forces in the manner they chose must be answered. In answering this question there are correlations that can prove useful in current debate on the future of our own nation’s military direction.

The continued outgrowth of Samuel Huntington’s theory on civil military relations is that not only is a military separate from the population as a whole, but that military can be paid to alleviate “the whole” from having to deal with the complications arising from military actions. While this idea is not new or unfeasible, it does ignore a moral dimension that most states (including the United States) claim to uphold. If the belief that “free market” economics always produces the most efficient solution to problem sets based on pure competition, where do we draw the line in regards to violence? It is this fundamental issue that can be illuminated by examining Rome and Carthage’s respective approaches. This should provide some measure of the advantages and disadvantages of each mindset.

²Robert Mandel, *Armies without States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 44.

As this fundamental question is answered several subordinate questions will reveal themselves and provide other examples that should prove useful to the nation's current problems regarding military force structure. Was the intent of Rome and Carthage to field long term formations, or were these armies meant to be dispersed after the conflicts? Rome always had a tradition of levying soldiers from its citizenry and allies, but not in the numbers or for durations that were required to prosecute these wars. Carthage on the other hand always approached force generation as a formula in which money was applied to meet a set of needs as they arose. This also greatly affected the relationship between these armies and ruling governments of their states. Was this relationship productive or divisive?

In order to address these questions with a degree of relevance to more modern situations the arguments will be presented beginning with a brief overview of the prevailing military structures in the Mediterranean basin. In the aftermath of Alexander's campaigns the accepted pattern was for states to hire trained bodies of troops; Rome's model of mobilizing citizens for defense and force projection while not a new concept was the aberration in the region. The Carthaginian military will then be examined with particular emphasis on how the state contracted forces. Groups of wildly different character found themselves under Carthage's banner and were generally respected as more than cannon fodder by their employer. However, what secured their loyalty was the prospect of monetary gain and when that was threatened it led to problems off the battlefield or created new types of battles for Carthage. The Roman legions and allies of the period will be discussed to give the contrasting view on how to raise a military. The Roman idea of civic duty and *virtus* will be expanded upon as ideas the United State's

founders understood and sought to emulate. Its ultimate successes over forces such as Carthage are worth studying. How these forces performed against one another must be analyzed in regards to how these two opposite ideas on foreign policy enforcement fared against one another. Finally concepts and lessons that may have direct impact on modern military structure will be considered. With the US military relying more heavily on contractors than at any other point in its history and with some senior political leadership open to the ideas of expanding their roles to include direct combat these lessons should be remembered and considered.

Throughout the paper some terms will be used repeatedly to reference Rome, Carthage and their militaries. A “Legion” is reasonably defined by period sources, but maniple and allied formations may not be. Carthage’s forces, being composed of groups of fighting men from disparate societies, had little in the way of defined standardization as related by ancient sources. In these instances “regiments” and “brigades” are used. The term “regiments” will be defined as units recruited from the same ethnicity and equipped in a similar manner; “brigades” are groupings of regiments that were unified by commander and/or missions. “Nation” will be used in reference to both Rome and Carthage in order to better associate concepts with modern equivalents while acknowledging that by modern historic definition both were pre-national “states.”

Ultimately the manners in which Rome and Carthage raised their forces not only represented differing views in those societies but these views carry forward to the modern era. Should a nation depend on its citizenry to form its basis for defense and foreign policy or should it utilize its resources to hire outside agencies to conduct these vital areas of national interest? From the standpoint of history the lesson of Rome’s citizens

responding to her needs provides examples that are still superior for a nation's long-term interests today.

CHAPTER 2

3RD CENTURY BCE MEDITERRANEAN MILITARIES

In downtown Baghdad near the embassy complex two contractors await the payment representative. The local contractor is transporting provisions for the army; the other has traveled thousands of miles with his group of well-trained men under contract to guard the provisions as they move. Both are secure in the knowledge that the government will come through with payment. However both also know they could be paid by a different group less than a year from now. The payment representative appears, final instructions are given, and the two groups move off down one of the major avenues to fulfill their mission.

The above scenario could describe activities in Baghdad around 2006 at the height of the Iraq War. It was also just as applicable in 300 BC in the Baghdad of the Seleucid Empire. The Seleucid Empire was one of the several states that formed in the wake of the death of Alexander the Great, filling the power void throughout the region left by his early demise. The pattern of troops for hire began to come to the fore during this period. Greek city-states often hired mercenaries to bolster their citizen phalanxes. Phillip and Alexander's campaigns changed the scale of size that a state's army was expected to be, increasing the demand for such mercenaries. With the collapse of Alexander's government following his death, well trained bodies of soldiers realized they could command significant salaries to quickly swell the ranks of the Diadochoi³ as they attempted to consolidate power. This concept grew in prominence as Alexander's

³Term for Alexander's generals who succeeded him, e.g. Ptolemy, Kassandros, Seleukos, etc.

successors vied for the loyalty of the many remaining groups of professional soldiers. In turn these groups of soldiers were looking for where their next source of income would come from. Governments preferred the ability to hire trained soldiers in order to be able to raise forces quickly but then be able to dismiss them when no longer needed, avoiding the incurred cost of a standing army. This was increasingly the norm in the Mediterranean world circa 300 BC.⁴

Alexander the Great of Macedon had led a professional army raised predominantly from his native country and immediate vassals across the known world. Predominantly Greek citizen soldiers, they had proven what determined, well trained soldiers could accomplish. The makeup of this army also served as a model for the next hundred years for many states in and around the Mediterranean in terms of organization, training and equipment. It set the standard for what states expected of their militaries for several centuries.

Alexander's Macedonian and Greek force was the descendent of the Greek traditions of warfare. This predominantly centered on well-drilled armored infantry.⁵ The term hoplite derives from the Greek term for the large circular shield (hoplon) they initially carried. These infantry hoplites were generally fielded in formations called phalanxes. The phalanx was designed to maximize the advantages these infantrymen possessed by presenting enemies with large frontages of spear points with the large shields overlapping to provide personal protection. This type of infantry proved several

⁴A. G. Russel, "The Greek as a Mercenary Soldier," *Greece and Rome* 11, no. 33 (1942): 110.

⁵Victor Davis Hanson, *Wars of the Ancient Greeks* (New York: Harpercollins, 2004), 47-53. Hanson references Xenophon's *Hellenika*, 4.2.19 and 7.2.10.

concepts to be superior across numerous ancient battlefields. Specifically the phalanx proved the necessity of discipline and command and control. Discipline was essential to ensure soldiers remained in proper formation during the chaotic nature of battlefield conditions.⁶ This then facilitated command and control as these formations could be mobile despite their mass and tight formation. In battle these phalanxes would be used to present nearly impenetrable obstacles that could deny the enemy the ability to maneuver in certain ways or be used to force decision by advancing on enemy formations.

When phalanx armies were employed against one another, as often happened during the incessant interstate conflict between Greek City States, discipline again often became the dominant factor during battle. As phalanxes came to blows the side that was able to withstand the pressures of close contact the longest carried the day.⁷ Other commanders were able to conduct a flanking movement with multiple phalanxes, with one fixing an enemy force and another able to assault a flank. This was not always practical given the terrain of Greece, but extremely effective if command and control were sufficient to conduct this type of operation. These were the types of infantry units that proved dominant on the battlefield against other cultures for centuries.

The cultural organization of the Greek Poleis⁸ also contributed to the preeminent position of infantry in these armies. Within these societies the idea of their citizen taking up arms to defend their state was deeply ingrained.⁹ The land owners, often farmers, were

⁶Hanson, 55; Xenophon, 4.2.18.

⁷Xenophon, 4.2.18.

⁸Poleis–Greek for “city-states,” plural of Polis.

⁹Hanson, 52-53.

expected to have more investment in the well being of the state, an idea that was echoed in Rome's early organization. In most city-states Hellenic citizens were required to maintain their own arms and armor in peacetime and to serve when called in the hoplite phalanx formations.¹⁰ They subjected themselves to rigorous drill and were expected to serve for the duration of a conflict. Often this was less than a year, which did not significantly disrupt the agricultural and economic cycles of the states.¹¹ When wars began to span multiple years (such as the Peloponnesian War) more arguments arose over what the requirements for citizenship should be and who should share the burden of state defense.¹² The requirements of citizenship also restricted the available number of men which could be called to arms, thus armies during this period rarely exceeded 10,000, a range between 4,000 and 5,000 being more the norm.

Cavalry in the region at this time was often constrained to skirmishing activities. They were organized to conduct reconnaissance and light missile harassing attacks. This was a cultural development as maintaining large numbers of horses is resource intensive on many levels to include the amount of land required. Most Greek city-states decided these resources were better dedicated to other ends. Additionally, training disciplined infantrymen was a less time consuming task than teaching soldiers how to effectively ride a mount and fight.¹³ However, cavalry continued to be raised and utilized in the roles

¹⁰Ibid., 57-61.

¹¹Hanson, *Wars of the Ancient Greeks*, 52; Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.18.2-6.

¹²Hanson, *Wars of the Ancient Greeks*, 109.

¹³Nicholas Sekunda, *Macedonian Armies after Alexander 323-168 BC* (Oxford: Osprey, 2012), 9.

outlined above. While some commanders appreciated the enhanced battlefield mobility of the horse, the development of effective cavalry organizations was a slow evolution given the cultural status of the Hoplite. The nature of the terrain and battles the ancient Greeks participated in did not make this a particular tactical vulnerability. As Greek city states began to conduct more operations outside of the immediate area of the Aegean, the usefulness of cavalry began to be more appreciated.

Phillip II of Macedonia, Alexander's father, cultivated effective cavalry forces from amongst the nobility of his state north of Greece.¹⁴ Macedonia's large class of nobility made this more practical than in the poleis to the south. With larger groups of men trained from youth in the employment of horse he was then able to come up with new ways to utilize them on the battlefield. Mounted shock tactics in a Greek tradition began to take shape during this period. Armed with shortened pikes these cavalry could operate as a force capable of quickly striking an opponent's flanks especially while they were already preoccupied with dealing with phalanxes to the front. This larger body of available men and horses made fielding units in sufficient size feasible.

Phillip made numerous contributions to the development of military organization in addition to establishing a combined arms mindset that integrated cavalry. Many of these were not necessarily original but were implemented on scales that were not previously considered. Recruited from Macedonia and Greek vassal states infantry soldiers carried long pikes and were employed in compact phalanx formations much like their hoplite predecessors. He standardized long terms of service for his citizenry, this allowed discipline and drill to be raised to even higher levels, producing units that were

¹⁴Ibid., 9.

responsive to changing situations and hardened to chaotic situations. Phillip's Macedonian Army took the best ideas and traditions of the Greek city state Hoplites, integrated them into a combined arms mindset, and fielded them on a scale unseen since the Greek-Persian wars of a hundred years earlier, which had required the combined efforts of nearly every Greek Polis. Phillip combined all of these concepts into a force that was responsive to one state and had the resources necessary to project itself outside of the state for long periods of time. This was the army Alexander inherited and with which he launched his conquests in 334 BC.

This force proved extraordinarily effective over a decade of combat under the right leadership. Alexander was able to push the boundaries of his territory into India where these types of forces still proved victorious on the battlefield. Off the battlefield signs of stress did begin to show in the organization of these units. This was primarily expressed in the expectations of the soldiers themselves. Though Phillip had lengthened terms of service for his citizens most were probably not expecting to be separated from their homelands for such a great length of time. As citizens they were expected to defend their home state, the question arose as time went on for how long they should be expected to remain abroad or not be allowed to settle. Eventually Alexander had to deal with a group of his longest serving veterans refusing to continue.¹⁵ This problem would become more pronounced as he attempted to hold his conquests together. He died before he had to find a long-term solution to this growing problem, balancing needs of state defense with the standards of service by citizens.

¹⁵Arrian, *The Campaigns of Alexander*, 7.10.5-7 (Anabasis Alexander).

As the successor kingdoms began vying with one another for position they competed for these veterans of Alexander's campaigns with the promise of money and land. There was no central authority holding any troops that wished to return to Greece and Macedonia, though some of the local commanders held troops at their stations. Eventually a system arose where veteran units were courted with payment to enter the service of one of Alexander's surviving generals. These self-proclaimed heads of state then faced the problem of raising forces to defend their territorial claim. Often they ruled in lands where they too were foreign. The pronounced effectiveness of Alexander's armies was not in question, what changed was the manner that was practical to raising these types of formations. In many cases it was not possible for these rulers to locally recruit for these types of forces from their new subjects. The cultural differences and time required training foreigners properly made this prohibitive. Thus many states chose to hire these units from other societies, often recruiting actual Greeks with coin. There was ample opportunity for this with many Greeks finding the pay of a mercenary preferable to their other options at home.¹⁶

These mercenary groups organized themselves as Alexander's armies had, often as armored infantry in close formation with pikes or as cavalry for screening or exploitation. Additional groups specialized as lighter infantry, relying on missile weapons in the traditions of other groups around the Mediterranean. Standard unit sizes were ideally 256 or 512 (based on multiples of 16 as they had been in many Greek states) but in reality were probably closer to some function of 250, 500 or 1000. Larger groups were

¹⁶Theodore Kershaw, "The Mercenary Phenomenon in the Western Military Tradition" (Masters Thesis, US Command and General Staff College, 1973), 8-11.

not uncommon (re: Xenophon) but groups at these sizes would contract to specific governments such as the Seleucids or Ptolemys and be formed into armies.

This became the new military pattern in the Mediterranean world as these states dominated the region politically. Kingdoms would hire bodies of soldiers for specific lengths of time. The units were expected to come fully prepared to fight if necessary. For the first decade after Alexander's death, many of these forces contained veterans of his campaigns. This enabled all of these states to field competent and well equipped armies in a short amount of time. Even after the veterans became a minority or disappeared from the scene the influence of Macedonia and Greece was acutely felt in military formations due to their successes and the distribution of Greek ideas through Alexander's travels. Additionally many of the political and military leaders were well aware of the expense they would incur to replace these units. This understanding led most leaders to be reluctant to force decisive battles in lieu of negotiated settlements.

This was the accepted standard for raising forces amongst most of the major powers during the third century BC. It was into this system that Rome and Carthage ascended. Carthage was ideally suited to field forces in this manner as it was the region's most economically prosperous commercial state.

CHAPTER 3

CARTHAGE

Carthage was established as a Phoenician outpost some time in the 9th century BCE. The Phoenicians originated in what is modern Lebanon and evolved as a seagoing trading culture.¹⁷ They established a loose conglomeration of cities along the banks of the Mediterranean basin in order to allow for mercantile ships to travel relatively safely. Carthage's location was critical to its success, being located at a point where several shipping routes passed along the North African coast, easily defensible and with a natural formation suited for shipping docks.¹⁸ It became part of the extensive trading network of Phoenician city-states in the ancient Mediterranean. The city of Tyre was the "first amongst equals" in this network due to its size and location within the original Phoenician lands of what is now Lebanon. Nebuchadnezzar's defeat of Tyre in 573 BCE caused Carthage's influence to rise and become preeminent amongst the Phoenician cities. When Alexander laid siege and destroyed Tyre in 332 BCE the remaining Phoenician cities looked westward towards Carthage for support.¹⁹ The increase in control over trade became a near monopoly in several areas of the ancient Mediterranean and Carthage would be the most economically prosperous state in the region until its final defeat in 146 BCE.

¹⁷Serge Lancel, *Carthage: A History* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1995), 1-37.

¹⁸Polybius, *The Histories* trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 159. This corresponds to the original text of Polybius, 3.39.1.

¹⁹Hanson, 181.

The principles that governed Carthage from its beginnings related to trade.²⁰ According to Greek, Roman, Egyptian and other sources, the Phoenician merchants had learned to navigate the seas better than any other group and utilized this skill to control trade.²¹ Carthage became a center of exchange for goods going from east to west and vice versa, taking its percentage in the form of tariffs, docking charges and administrative fees. The demand for the resources that came along both easterly and westerly sea-lanes ensured that currency flowed nearly continuously into the city's treasury. As the city government's predominant interest was the practice of trade this constant activity was subjected to decisions and policies that further increased the efficiency with which Carthage made a profit. From establishing and enforcing monopolies wherever practical to influencing currency exchange rates through its control over many mining sites the government was essentially synonymous with the trading conglomerates that controlled the city. These practices were actually not a primary source of later grievances against Carthage, as the efficiency and stability it encouraged seemed to be a reasonable exchange for economic advantage. No less an authority than Aristotle included Carthage in his list of ancient governments to be admired and imitated.²²

Exact reconstructions of Carthage's government are difficult at best. The lack of Carthaginian sources to draw from and the difficulty in identifying Carthaginian ruins are a testament to Rome's thoroughness. The government apparently went through two

²⁰Benjamin W. Wells, "Business and Politics at Carthage," *The Sewanee Review* 28, no. 4 (1920): 499.

²¹Polybius, 19 (1.20.35).

²²Nic Fields, *Carthaginian Warrior 264-146 BC* (Oxford: Osprey, 2010), 12. Fields is citing Aristotle's *Politics*.

phases, the earlier more of a dictatorship or monarchy and the latter more of a republic, though not a popularly elected one. These major reforms to the government circa 480 BCE and 304 BCE resulted from military catastrophes in campaigns that were not directly related to the physical security of Carthage. This indicates the importance of military operations as a mechanism for foreign policy throughout Carthage's history.

Originally, the government is believed to have been structured similarly to a monarchy, though influence of a clan's merchants is thought to have been more the deciding factor over relation or heredity.²³ The arrangement most likely arose out of the necessity to have a respected authority set rules for the conduct of the city's harbor and markets. The most influential trading cartel was probably in the best position to set and enforce these types of rules. This "first amongst equals," whether known as king, tyrant, or chairman of the board, was advised by a senior council of the remaining heads of trading groups to establish laws. From the early 6th century onward the Magonid family provided the majority of these rulers.

Around 480 BCE this system was modified as a result of a war lost in Sicily (Battle of Himera) that began as an enterprise of the Magonid clan but whose failure threatened the power structure of Carthage's trading empire.²⁴ The ability of one of the clans to start an international conflict that threatened the city's existence demanded reform. The change echoed business practice, in that it was undertaken to correct a problem that could result in loss of status or profit as opposed to indignation that the rest

²³Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* (London: Cassel), 29-30.

²⁴Richard Miles, *Carthage Must Be Destroyed* (New York: Viking, 2011), 114.

of the government was not advised about the war. This issue would be repeated again later in Carthage's history.

Two executives known as Suffetes and elected from the city's elite families replaced the single "first amongst equals." The advisory council was elevated in stature to become more of a Senate, with 104 members appointed to special committees to act as a judiciary and investigative body for the government.²⁵ There was another group of thirty senators who held a supervisory position evidently based on seniority. These thirty were referred to as "judges," they are at times referred to as the body that would review the conduct of other government officials, such as senior officers on campaign. Carthaginian senators (also confusingly referred to as "Suffetes" in some sources) gained their membership in this body through their economic influence, whether through direct assessment of wealth or contributions to the state or bribery is unknown. It is also unclear if the two elected Suffetes had to be senators or merely from the same social strata.²⁶ A popular assembly was instituted for the citizens of the city at large with limited power in foreign affairs, except for the ability to break deadlocks in the higher echelons. The popular assembly did have a direct voice in matters regarding issues within the city proper. From the outside this system actual appears quite similar to the Roman system, albeit without the mechanisms of popular election that characterized the Roman system. Additionally the two executives were not quite equal to the Roman consuls in the scope

²⁵Miles, 116.

²⁶Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, 30.

of their authority nor were they up for election every year.²⁷ As befits a mercantile power there were lower echelons of representative bodies that represented various labor groups akin to unions and other guilds.

This was the system Aristotle found admirable, with the true decision makers (the Suffetes) being men who had proven themselves in the fields which were of concern to the city's history of trade, overseen by two committees chosen from that body, and with the common citizens provided a political outlet through the assembly. No less a Roman than Cicero later observed "Carthage would not have held an empire for six hundred years had it not been governed with wisdom and statecraft."²⁸

Carthage pursued foreign policy interests with the same framework as its domestic decisions, that is, always considering foreign policy in regards to business potential. Its importance as an international actor in the Mediterranean is shown by references to treaties as far back as 509 BCE with Rome and various Hellenic kingdoms.²⁹ In all its endeavors, the city government attempted to create environments that were conducive to production and trade in some fashion, whether textile, agriculture, mining or otherwise. Closer to home the government made arrangements with neighboring tribes in northern Africa to set rates for raw materials to be brought into the city and for finished goods to be transported back out. Ancient Libyan and Numidian

²⁷Wilhelm Ihne, *History of Rome* vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1871), 17.

²⁸Fields, *Carthaginian Warrior 264-146 BC*, 15. Citing Cicero's *De re publica*.

²⁹Polybius, 147. Corresponds to the original text Polybius, 3.22.1.

groups relied on Carthage for their supply of goods.³⁰ These same groups were often the providers for military force that were used in other regions.³¹

Trading posts were established throughout the western Mediterranean to further expand Carthaginian economic influence. Many of these outposts developed into functioning cities and became Carthaginian colonies by default.³² By the 4th century BCE Carthage had holdings on Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and the Iberian Peninsula. All of these locations shared the goal of sending merchandise raw or finished to Carthage to then be shipped further east or north towards Hellenic or Levantine cities for further profit.

Carthage's rulers had decided that all foreign policy was to be treated as an extension of business and consequently all military matters were decided through this framework.³³ Wars were considered an unnecessary expenditure of resources. Warfare became part of the business calculation only when there was an opportunity that profits could be exponentially increased by imposing trade terms with force or when foreign actors threatened a facet of Carthaginian commerce. Then, as has been observed elsewhere, it was carried through as "sort of a gigantic commercial venture."³⁴ As sea trade was essential to the flow of commerce, Carthage did maintain a full time navy and this was the greatest source of its ability to move strategically until the end of the First

³⁰Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, 29.

³¹*Ibid.*, 33.

³²*Ibid.*, 27.

³³Wells, 503.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 504.

Punic War. The problems of raising ground forces with a limited manpower pool in the capital city were resolved with the resource they had in abundance, currency, by hiring mercenaries.

Observation and history often demonstrate that governments will pursue armed conflict to further their goals when other measures fail, provided that those goals are deemed sufficiently important. Thus, with Carthage's government organized predominantly to further its constituents' mercantile aspirations, the approach to war as an extension of their trade policies becomes logical. Essentially war was to be conducted in the most efficient manner so as not to disrupt the flow of trade. Large forces could be hired quickly and transported to a crisis area with the Carthaginian navy's supremacy in the region. This approach proved successful for centuries.

Carthage's navy was thus the foundation for this success. The sea initially determined the city's location and this proved fortuitous for defensive reasons being effectively isolated from land-based threats. With so much of the population engaged in sea trade recruiting trained sailors was fairly easy and the navy was a socially acceptable choice to the city's inhabitants.³⁵ It is unlikely that all sailors were employed all year round, although this is possible given historians commentary that the city invested so much into its military harbor and separate military fleet.³⁶ Given Carthage's commercial thought process it is likely that crews were hired seasonally or that part of the merchant fleet could be called upon to man the warships in a sort of reservist arrangement. The

³⁵Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, 31.

³⁶Peter Connolly, *Greece and Rome at War* (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), 271.

commercial fleet could also be pressed into service for transport, an occurrence that transpired several times and without much comment of incident during Carthage's various conflicts.

This mastery of the sea gave Carthage several powerful advantages: freedom of movement throughout the Mediterranean, denying an enemy that same freedom and keeping trade routes open. The ability to project forces quickly was a key factor in Carthage's rise to dominion over much of the Western Mediterranean, as no other power in the region could counter the navy effectively. If coastal cities wished to resist Carthage's business advances, few if any other powers would be able to contend with Carthage's sea power to land a credible threat so far from their own shores. When cities were reluctant to accept Carthaginian terms, they could be persuaded by the arrival of several thousand mercenaries in Carthage's employ courtesy of their fleet. Often this would result in minimal or no bloodshed, which suited Carthage even more. It was much more economical to contract a large force to send overseas somewhere for just one season instead of having to renew old contracts or find new mercenaries to replace battle losses. These were the kinds of calculations that drove Carthaginian war making.

The navy was successful for centuries until it met an enemy determined to deplete it at the opponent's own expense. The First Punic War saw Rome out-build Carthage at over three ships to one if Roman sources can be believed.³⁷ Despite winning the majority of naval engagements during the first years of the war the Carthaginian navy eventually

³⁷J. F. Lazenby, *The First Punic War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 107.

succumbed to attrition as the Romans developed different tactics.³⁸ Respect for Carthage's navy made its dismantling a key component of the treaty which ended the Second Punic War.

The Army

Carthage did have a standing force from its inception. This small force of less than ten thousand was initially divided into two groups, called the "Sacred Band" (higher class citizens) and simply the "levy."³⁹ After a crushing defeat at Krimisos in Sicily circa 341 BCE the standing force was reorganized into one group as references to the "Sacred Band" being organized separately cease.⁴⁰ Sources are conflicting as to whether the reorganized force was on the order of 2,500, 5,000 or 7,500 but all agree there was still a form of standing "city guard" until the final destruction of the city in 146 BCE. While serving in this group the Carthaginian senior officers would gain their initial training in what passed for basics of military science at the time, most likely instructed by displaced Greek veterans.⁴¹ These trained senior officers provided a pool from which the Senate elected senior commanders from when expeditions were organized and larger forces of hired soldiers had to be employed.

³⁸Hans Delbruck, *Warfare in Antiquity* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 303.

³⁹Terence Wise, *Armies of the Carthaginian Wars 265-146 BC* (Oxford: Osprey, 1982), 7.

⁴⁰Fields, *Carthaginian Warrior 264-146 BC*, 18-19.

⁴¹Wise, 7.

This small force was the only form of military manpower initially available to a Carthaginian commander once the decision was made to mount a military expedition. At times even these sources were not committed, trust being given completely to the appointed commander and his ability to hire and utilize mercenary units. The idea of mobilizing more of the city's population to arms was never seriously considered until the prospect of annihilation during the Third Punic War (149-146).

In essence the model for Carthage to conduct its foreign military operations may be reconstructed along the following lines: A need for military operation would be identified either through direct observation by Carthaginian representatives or petitioned for by client interest; The Suffetes appointed a commander from the officers of the standing army and allocated government funds; The commander organized a staff and sent recruiting officers to various locations to contract the types of forces required. The army was then organized, assembled and transported to conduct operations. It is unclear whether the standard was for groups to meet in Carthage to assemble prior to proceeding to their theater of operations, but there are examples of forces being hired and directly sent to Sicily in contrast as well as Hannibal's recruiting during his march into and through Italy⁴².

Once this force was engaged its effectiveness was judged by the Senate in Carthage from a cost-benefit standpoint, as in any efficient business.⁴³ It was not deemed in Carthage's best interest to "throw good money after bad." Therefore, if an operation

⁴²Fields, *Carthaginian Warrior 264-146 BC*, 44. Polybius is unclear offering examples of both. It is likely as wars became longer forces would be requisitioned and transported directly to their area of operations.

⁴³Miles, 147.

was not immediately successful the Suffetes and council of 104 would examine the situation and decide whether to continue operations or not. The costs to Carthage were weighed in terms of trade rights and profit potential, costs of breaking treaty requirements, and amount of resources already expended. If the benefits were high more funds were allotted and the commander was authorized to continue. If the cost was higher than the perceived reward then negotiations were started with the other party. In all cases the government in Carthage closely scrutinized the commander's performance. Observers would report to the council of 104 and the thirty judges.⁴⁴ If the commander was deemed to have been guilty of mishandling an operation he was replaced. In the more extreme cases the state crucified a failed commander as an example to others.⁴⁵ While this was seen as an incentive for victory, it could also be interpreted as a signal to ensure commanders did not squander the resources and funds with which they were entrusted.

From the beginning Carthage had relied on some form of external augmentation to mount even the most basic of military operation. Mercenary relationships thus played an important role throughout Carthage's military history. The tribes of ancient Libya in the local area to the south of the city were required by treaty to provide soldiers for Carthage in exchange for economic benefits and other protections.⁴⁶ These were often the first forces raised in any military expedition. The Libyans and other African contingents are often described as swordsmen or skirmishers, but there is no definitive evidence of

⁴⁴As with many Carthaginian institutions, it is unclear if all thirty judges observed every case or if they were detailed to investigate different areas of responsibility in some manner.

⁴⁵Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, 32.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

how these African contingents were equipped. It is likely they were the source of some of the spear wielding formations mentioned in Polybius and Livy's accounts, as the only other source for drilled spear formations was most likely various Greek mercenary contingents.

These foreign formations were kept loyal by Carthage's generous terms of employment. In both the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily there is evidence of large Carthaginian outposts or colonies that were guarded by these forces. Raw materials such as metals (silver) were refined locally and used to pay these units before the balance was transported back to Carthage. Additionally, some accounts mention that tracts of land were set aside for veterans of these units to begin using in their own right, predominantly as farms but some as smaller mining operations that in turn fed back into the Carthaginian economic cycle.⁴⁷ These veterans were never granted any type of legal citizen status within Carthaginian society, however, and there are instances of indigenous groups coming into conflict with Carthaginian veteran communities. Sicily in particular in the 4th century was essentially a Carthaginian military camp except for Syracuse and a few other Greek cities on the eastern coast.⁴⁸

In short, compared to working for other potential employers of the ancient Mediterranean such as Ptolemaic Egypt or Macedon, Carthage represented fair wages and decent treatment with the danger of being in nearly constant states of conflict depending on where one was sent. This was particularly attractive to groups that did not have larger political structures to look out for their interests such as inhabitants of the Balearic

⁴⁷Miles, 138.

⁴⁸Ibid., 134-136.

Islands or Celtic tribes in Gaul and Iberia (France and Spain). This reputation coupled with the amount of money generated by its trade allowed Carthage to field forces as quickly as suitable units could be contracted, responding to threats or opportunities by the expenditure of capital.

This system had several advantages that Carthage wielded to its benefit. The aforementioned speed at which trained units were fielded was one of the most paramount. This was not unique in the Mediterranean at the time, especially upon Alexander's death and the subsequent political shift to competing successor kingdoms. Most governments in the region relied on mercenary forces to some degree.⁴⁹ The cost of training and fielding armies made of citizens was exorbitant, especially when the possible disruption to the normal economic cycle was considered. Hiring trained forces eliminated the time requirement to raise units from citizens and they often came equipped, eliminating another cost for the government. Perhaps the biggest financial advantage was that unlike standing armies the mercenary units could be released from their contracts once the perceived threat was over, thus relieving the government of the financial drain when not required for defense. This pattern repeats several times in Carthage's history; often Carthage would allow forces to stay in the areas they had campaigned in, such as Iberians in Sicily or Italians in Northern Africa. These resettlements did not have political rights attached to them, unless one considers the economic treaties granted keeping in tradition with Carthaginian priorities. Many colonies were established in this manner which while not directly tied to Carthage politically further added to its economic potential.

⁴⁹F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 89. Discusses Polybius' views on mercenaries as expressed in Polybius. 1.67.13.

Another advantage related to the first was the speed at which trained units were recruited and thus deployed.⁵⁰ Without having to worry about training time for units Carthage deployed forces to areas rapidly, especially in conjunction with its excellent navy. In many instances units were hired close to the theater they would be serving in; contracting officers from Carthage traveled ahead to regions and make contacts with tribes or governments that were hiring out groups of fighting men and had them converge at a designated meeting place to begin operations. The institutional development of these contracting officers and their supporting apparatus allowed Carthage to continue to deploy forces even during the forced decline of their Navy after the treaty of 241 BCE. During longer wars soldiers and warriors were often hired from the population of the nation Carthage was directly engaged against,⁵¹ in the form of deserters or groups that felt Carthage offered better prospects than their own governments. This ability to hire forces close to the contested area meant Carthage deployed forces and responded to threats before opposing parties were able to arrive at the decision to go to war. In this manner Carthage was able to completely outstrip a rival's decision cycles millennia before that concept became fashionable to write about.

The other advantage this method of developing armies granted to Carthage was the ability to tailor forces depending on the situation. If the campaign terrain supported cavalry contracting officers possessed the resources to expand the percentage of mounted units within an army so long as there were adequate sources of such available. This points to a potential weakness inherent in this system, that at times Carthaginian armies were

⁵⁰Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, 33.

⁵¹Fields, *Carthaginian Warrior 264-146 BC*, 20.

constrained by the types of units available when a crisis occurred. This was particularly acute when unforeseen challenges put Carthage on the defense immediately. However this was often mitigated by the expanse of Carthaginian influence throughout the Mediterranean, often able to find suitable units and transport them into the campaigning area quickly. Diversity in composition meant that Carthaginian commanders were forced to become adept at ancient combined arms warfare and that specialized units were often available immediately within an army, as opposed to raising or training a new unit.⁵² This was essential to integrate units with different weapons and tactics.

These advantages allowed Carthage to greatly expand its influence where it determined opportunity existed. Hiring forces in this manner led to successes for centuries. So long as Carthage enjoyed near unlimited access to funding this model continued to meet its needs.

Prior to the First Punic War Carthage was able to gain control of much of the western Mediterranean through judicious application of these types of armies. Coupled with the control of trade routes by its powerful merchant and naval fleets few competitors could resist the terms offered by Carthage and enforced by these mercenaries. Often the terms were simply economic, which given the benefits of trading with Carthage was often seen as beneficial.⁵³ In Iberia, Carthage first established a trading presence that eventually progressed to control of its mines and ports, the few cases of resistance being overcome by armies hired and sent to ancient Spain. In many cases competing tribes were simply paid off and put under Carthaginian colors in order to ensure the flow of

⁵²Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, 34.

⁵³Wells, 507-509.

economic materials. These types of enforcement campaigns or “gunboat diplomacy” were the norm as Carthage’s prestige grew. This tendency to enforce economic agreements through force probably led some to believe their trade practices were unfair.⁵⁴ Once Carthage supplanted Tyre as the leading Phoenician city, a new motivation for military campaigns began to appear in the form of political appeals.

As the network of Mediterranean coastal cities began to look to Carthage for protection, in turn Carthage expanded its control over these localities, continuously adding to the financial commitments of various city-states to feed the home city. The century between the Peloponnesian War and Alexander’s campaigns redistributed power throughout the ancient Mediterranean and Carthage found itself responding to requests from cities and colonies for protection and assurances of trade against various competing spheres of influence. Befitting a commercial mindset, instead of allowing this fluid situation and multiple demands on its resources to stretch itself too thin Carthage responded ably and increased its trading influence. During this period from approximately 430 BCE to 300 BCE Carthage enjoyed tremendous success in its operations, as evidenced by the city’s growing economic power that causes Carthaginian silver coinage to be found throughout the Mediterranean basin to the modern day.

⁵⁴Lazenby, *The First Punic War*, 25.

CHAPTER 4

ROME

Rome and its army has been the subject of countless research and analysis, particularly over the last 150 years, much of this influencing other forms of media and becoming part of cultural knowledge. The majority of this image is from the imperial period (44 BCE onward) when the army was preeminent on ancient battlefields. This study is concerned with the era approximately two hundred years earlier, the Republican Period, when the army was organized along similar lines but the composition of its recruits and motivations were different.

In the Republican period the Rome's government was representative but not democratic in the modern sense of the word. A census accounted for not only people but wealth established the class of society a family found itself a part of. Though all Roman citizens benefitted from legal protections the right other aspects of democratic participation were limited. Voting was done by blocks called "centuries" according to social status, with all people in one block counting as one vote. The higher the social status of a block, the fewer people were considered part of the block. In this manner all citizens were allowed to vote, but the higher classes votes were weighted stronger. At the apex of the government, the Senate, votes by senators were counted as a full one vote per member. At the lower end of the spectrum, the population group known as the "capite censi," only accounted for one block or vote out of a possible 193 votes in the Popular Assembly. The fairness of the system stemmed from the practice of the census, where a family could move from one class to another relatively easily depending upon the amount

of wealth a family amassed.⁵⁵ Additionally, there were executive offices and representative offices from each century which were decided by population election within the century.

During the period examined all male citizens of Rome possessing a defined amount of land were called to serve annually, essentially a system of selective service.⁵⁶ Based on surviving accounts from both this period and the later imperial period it was a matter of civic duty to participate in such operations and there were serious social consequences for those who shirked their responsibilities. The upper class of senators was not exempt from this, as future political success hinged upon proper military service.⁵⁷ Senators who did not serve in some capacity could be exiled for failing to meet their responsibilities. This attitude would carry through to the later stages of the Republic when not only service but also successful command was a prerequisite for obtaining the highest elected positions via Caesar or Pompeii. Based on formal agreements with Rome, allied contingents from neighboring city-states served alongside these units; their compensation was legal status and citizen rights for their hometowns as opposed to direct monetary compensation from Rome. It is this idea of civic duty and citizen soldiers that stands in contrast to the previously examined Carthaginian model.

Roman citizenship was prized for the protection and support that the Roman political system guaranteed. As in other places in the Mediterranean of the period, citizen

⁵⁵Lawrence Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 16.

⁵⁶Polybius, 385. Corresponds with original text Polybius, 6.19.1.

⁵⁷Ibid., 385 (6.19.1). Ten years service had to be completed to stand for senior political office.

status was essentially a contract between the state and the individual, pledging support in exchange for various duties. On its most basic level, Roman citizenship was based around the idea that property owners would have the most at stake in defending physical territory and thus be the most motivated to serve as soldiers. Thus the census determined how much property a man had accumulated and dictated his position within the initial conscription. It is no coincidence that this same census determined who was a member of the Senate, large amounts of property being the criteria for ruling in the name of the population. This also dictated that the Senate provided the leadership for these armies, further reinforcing the social contract. Moreover, the citizens were expected to provide their own equipment and (in the case of equestrians) horses, thereby reducing the expense of war to the state.⁵⁸ In return, citizens were pledged protection of their property by the state and its resources amongst other rights, such as the right to utilize property without state interference, right to trial, etc.

This idea that citizens should have a personal stake in the survival of the state was what separated Rome from many of her contemporary states. Even in the Hellenic city states where the same idea had once held sway the advent of Alexander's campaigns and the successor kingdoms had changed how most states viewed their armies. No longer were Soldiers drawn from a population's workforce to execute the will of the polis; rather Soldiers were employed to defend the ruling class from foreign or domestic threats. The Soldiers in these armies were inheritors of Alexander's traditions, serving for long terms and often in the same cohesive units. While discipline and training had been conducted

⁵⁸Adrian Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare* (London: Cassel, 2002), 50. Referencing Polybius, 6.19.1.

with the previous generations of Soldiers recruited from other occupations, soldiering was now a full time occupation for most in the ranks. The fluid nature of allegiances in the post Alexander construct made the concept of service in exchange for legal rights guaranteed by a government difficult to implement. Governments were not accountable in many instances for anything other than honoring a payment contract with their subordinate forces. As mentioned earlier this is one of the factors that made working for Carthage attractive to many adventurous groups.

Having established a social contract between its citizens and the state, the Roman government had to actually manage raising forces. For nearly two centuries the procedure was remained generally unchanged within the guidelines of the property stratification. Citizens would present themselves to the Capitol generally in the early spring for the “dilectus,” essentially a draft.⁵⁹ Not all citizens who were eligible were taken every year. Much depended on the size of the army that was needed for the upcoming season. “Legio,” from which “Legion” is derived, originally meant the entire draft taken at a dilectus as opposed to a discrete unit.

The Army

During the time period of the wars with Carthage, the general standard was for four legions to be raised each year, for something on the order of 20,000 men. The intent was that these legions would conduct their operations if any, then return and be disbanded and be replaced by the following year’s dilectus. At the height of the wars with Carthage there are instances of eight legions being raised in a single year in addition to

⁵⁹Nic Fields, *Roman Republican Legionary 298-105 BC* (Oxford: Osprey, 2012), 14.

the previous years' units being kept in the field in some capacity. This created a demand for manpower that had to be balanced effectively to keep the economy going as well.⁶⁰ For this reason strict records were kept of a citizen's service. Though sources conflict on details, citizens were apparently compelled to complete six years service once taken at a dilectus. Normally this meant returning to Rome each year and being compelled to stand for the draft again. This did not necessarily mean that a citizen would be chosen in consecutive years. The law simply stated that he had to present himself. However during times of emergency many men were kept for a continuous six years.⁶¹ Once the records indicated that a citizen had stood for dilectus six times, he was released to another pool of citizens that were only supposed to be called to present themselves in case of national emergency for ten additional years, what would be called a reserve pool in modern parlance. This amounted to a citizen being liable for up to sixteen years of military service.⁶² In addition to such mandatory service, there are examples of those who volunteered to serve repeatedly, essentially creating a small professional core to the military.

When a citizen presented himself on the Campa Martia for dilectus his name was recorded and checked against the census records of the various tribes that constituted the acknowledged population of Rome. The importance tied to family status made the

⁶⁰Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare*, 70.

⁶¹During the height of the Second Punic War the men in some legions were kept for over ten years, for example, the survivors of Cannae were sent to garrison Sicily and not allowed to return to civilian life. Scipio Africanus would later recruit these legions for his later campaigns. Livy, 29.24.1.

⁶²Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare*, 53.

officials responsible for conducting the census (the “censor”) very powerful in the Roman government. Most years there would be more citizens present than were needed to man the four legions.

During emergencies, special drafts could be organized to recruit forces. After the battle of Cannae, which was the third costly Roman defeat in two years, there was a shortage of fighting aged men in the city proper. In order to organize a defense of the city an *evocatus*, or emergency dilectus, was declared. During the *evocatus* men older than 46 were asked to join again even if they had fulfilled their obligations. More strikingly, two legions were recruited from Rome’s large slave population with the offer of citizenship for service.⁶³

There were five classifications of Soldier, four infantry and one cavalry. During this time period the state was not responsible for equipping its Soldiers. Thus the classifications by wealth were intended to serve as a predictor of what types of kit a family could afford to outfit a father, brother or son with. The cavalry was reserved for the wealthiest part of the population, those just below the Senatorial class, as one would have to provide one’s own horse. The infantry were divided first by wealth, with the lowest income citizens being assigned as *Velites* or skirmishers, the idea being their lower income would preclude a family from owning armor to send with a male member. Those families with enough money and property to qualify for the middle grade of infantry were then subdivided by age, from youngest to eldest *Hastati*, *Principes* and

⁶³Livy, *The War with Hannibal*, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt (New York: Penguin, 1985), 73-158. This translates Livy’s original accounts, 21.53.1 through 22.57.8 of the battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae.

Triarii respectively.⁶⁴ The ideal legion during this time period mustered 300 horse, 1,200 skirmishing Velites, and 3,000 Hastati, Principes and Triarii for a total of 4,500.⁶⁵ This process while regimented probably took several days in the Capitol for citizens to be classified, assigned to units and recorded properly.

Rome managed to perform this function at least once a year for centuries and field tens of thousands of troops. The combination of repeating this process annually, older veterans showing younger men how to behave, and having some who volunteered for multiple years enabled many of these units to be fairly effective on the battlefield as opposed to levies of green troops with little to no experience.⁶⁶ The senatorial tribunes were responsible for ensuring that experienced members of the draft class would be distributed relatively uniformly throughout the new legions. This was to ensure each of the new units had some experienced members who would be able to assist during training and provide example during combat. Subordinate officers such as centurions and optios would be appointed, often from those who had already had some experience. This type of professional “cadre” of soldier had already started to appear during this time period, as Livy refers to.⁶⁷

Once recruited Rome’s legions then trained. The responsibility fell upon the tribunes and centurions to ensure each new man understood the responsibilities their

⁶⁴Nic Fields, *The Roman Army of the Punic Wars* (Oxford: Osprey, 2007), 24, citing Polybius, 14.8.5.

⁶⁵Goldsworth, *Roman Warfare*, 51; Polybius, 2.24.13.

⁶⁶Fields, *Roman Republican Legionary 298-105 BC*, 20.

⁶⁷Keppie, 53, Commenting on Livy, 42.34.5-11.

oaths bound them to. Taking the Roman military oath, the “sacramentum,” could be compared to modern recruits taking their enlistment oath that subjects them to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The fact that many members of the *dilectus* class had served previously probably made this function reasonably smoothly, as there was likely a high degree of unofficial discussion that took place in camps.

One of the distinguishing features of the Roman field armies was the ability to conduct rapid marches. To ensure this advantage, legions trained their members for standard marches with individual equipment. Though other rulers had trained their formations to march efficiently, few did it on the scale of Rome. More importantly, legions trained their membership in how to build roads. First throughout the Italian peninsula and then later throughout the Mediterranean wherever feasible, these roads added to the mobility of the legions, allowing them to reposition and converge where necessary. Each legionary was not a trained engineer, but by the end of their period of service, most Roman men understood the basics of constructing roads and other works. This skill would diffuse into the population at large as veterans returned home.

During the period in question Rome was not the undisputed master of the Italian peninsula and had fought several conflicts with neighboring cities and tribes. Groups such as the Campanians, Volscians and Sabines were in various stages of attaining full Roman citizenship for their populations. Treaties compelled these neighboring groups to provide manpower, either in the form of pre-organized units or men at the *dilectus*.⁶⁸ In some respects these treaties were similar to agreements Carthage had with its Libyan and

⁶⁸Hannibal would later use the terms of some of these treaties to attempt to convince many of the cities and tribes in Rome to renounce their alliances during the Second Punic War.

Numidian neighbors in Africa. These groups would be formed into units roughly the same size as the legions. Rome's allies had clear political rights guaranteed by these treaties, as opposed to the purely economic agreements in most of Carthage's arrangements.

Their internal organization is not well defined by sources, with some using Roman terms such as "Century" and "Maniple" and others clearly articulating that these allied forces were able to keep their indigenous organization. Regardless of their internal titles the Romans demanded they were equipped similarly, the exceptions being some tribes were specifically asked to provide mounted troops. Roman army commanders, who usually thought less of allied infantry than legionaries, were essentially used interchangeably with Roman legionaries. As standard practice the Romans would demand enough troops from their allies to field an additional four legions a year. Coupled with the four raised annually during the period this amounted to a dilectus producing approximately 40,000 men under arms each year.

The Navy

Rome also possessed an effective merchant fleet that could expand into a navy as the need arose before becoming a permanent fixture of the state in the wake of the First Punic War. Initially not operationally proficient and limited in its ability to transport masses of troops the navy by the end of the Second Punic War was uncontested in the Mediterranean. For much of the time period concerned in this analysis it still had to deal with Carthage's more capable navy, pirates and vessels from other states with their own interests. At first not as effective as Carthage's well-practiced merchant crews, the

Roman vessels were still able to place troops on the ground where they were needed, whether it was Sicily, Northern Africa or Spain.

Rome did possess a merchant fleet and was not completely unfamiliar with the sea. The three major problems the Romans faced in building a navy were building the ships themselves, the manpower needs to crew the vessels, and developing and training tactics that would best the Carthaginians at sea. The first problem was reconciled through setting up manufacturing centers and obtaining a viable ship design. Polybius and Livy relate that a Carthaginian ship which had run aground was reverse engineered in short order to copy what was thought to be the best design.⁶⁹ The story may not be entirely accurate, but it is likely that however gained, Punic quinqueremes were built in large numbers by both sides throughout the First Punic War. The manpower requirements for the fleet did not compete directly with the *dilectus* for the legion as crews were generally recruited from the *capite censi*, men without enough property to qualify for the legions. The ship crews also including soldiers for fighting boarding actions, marines. At times described as being detachments from the legions, other times these marines are described as specifically recruited from the same class as the ship crews as they did not have to be armored. Lastly, the Romans devised some new methods of naval warfare to alter the balance at first, the most famous being the *corvus*, but through experience Roman fleets defeated Carthaginian forces in the traditional naval warfare practices of the day halfway through the First Punic War.

Worth mentioning is the circumstance related by both Polybius and Livy that serves to further illustrate the concept of civic duty impressed upon citizens of Rome.

⁶⁹Polybius, *The Histories*, 20 (1.20.15).

When a large Roman fleet was defeated and sunk during the First Punic War and government funds were unavailable to procure replacements, the Senate asked for donations from its own membership and other upper class families. The result was a fleet of 300 new ships that were bought by private money and donated to the government, in addition to the wages (admittedly small) for the crews to man them.⁷⁰ Because so many died from the usual strata of the population that ship crews were drawn from, many of the new crew were members of the citizenry who had already completed their mandatory six years of service within the legions but felt it was their duty to continue service to the state.

This system coupled with its population enabled Rome to field forces of tens of thousands of men annually. By increasing the numbers required at *dilectus* and extending service obligations Rome fielded upwards of twenty legions at different stages of the Second Punic War while simultaneously absorbing casualties that would be crippling to most other nations. Twenty legions plus allied contingents equate to a quarter of a million men under arms at the height of the Second Punic War across all theaters of conflict. This does not include the still large naval requirements. Polybius and Livy give credence to these numbers in their descriptions of the effort undertaken against Hannibal.⁷¹

What made the Roman system particularly viable for long-term use was the governments understanding of how to grow the potential pool of manpower. The Senate encouraged citizens to be members of the class that would be liable for service through

⁷⁰Ibid., 59 (1.59.9).

⁷¹Polybius, 3.107; Livy, 23.57 offering similar accounts of events during the period.

legal entitlements tax benefits were used. The Romans were very open to the idea of the “*homo novo*,” the new man who elevated himself through work and profit to the Senate and possible a consulship. Lowering the necessary land holding to qualify for service was another method.⁷² Expanding citizenship opportunities to other territories was something not found in most other contemporary states. As Roman dominion expanded, the number of Roman citizens grew proportionally and in some cases, exponentially with the absorption of new populations.

⁷²J. F. Lazenby, *Hannibal's War* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 100.

CHAPTER 5

OPERATIONAL OUTCOMES

Rome and Carthage fought several wars in the third and second century BCE including the three against one another for which they are most famous. In these conflicts their respective methods of raising forces proved to have both advantages and disadvantages. Describing these in terms of their operational results and the problems either solved or created gives a measure of the effectiveness of each approach to force generation.

Both Carthage and Rome came into conflict with Pyrrhus, the Hellenistic ruler of Epirus in modern Albania, circa 280 BCE. With Pyrrhus attempting to expand his influence against both states these conflicts led to treaties of mutual support between Rome and Carthage.⁷³ Responding to calls for support from the city of Tarentum in 280 BCE against Roman expansion southward, the high cost of the resulting “Pyrrhic” victories convinced Pyrrhus to seek his victories elsewhere. His reputation led Syracuse to offer him alliance and command against the Carthaginian forces on Sicily. In 278 BCE he landed on Sicily to press political claims and support his new ally. This was the impetus for the renewed treaties between Rome and Carthage.⁷⁴

Rome fought Pyrrhus on the Italian peninsular and thus had the advantage of being able to move its troops over land, at which they were already well practiced at. The legions met an Alexandrian style army in open combat for the first time and proved their

⁷³Lazenby, *The First Punic War*, 32; Polybius, 3.25.2.

⁷⁴Miles, 63.

system to be viable tactically. Pyrrhus was a well-regarded commander of the period and expected to win against the “citizen-soldier” legions. Tactically he did win his engagements, but at the high cost now associated with “Pyrrhic” victories. Pyrrhus and his units were products of the wars of the Diadochi and considered some of the best the Macedonian system produced. Rome’s ability to annually recruit armies on the order of 40,000 troops from its population proved decisive despite any qualitative advantage provided by Pyrrhus’ more “professional” formations.

Engaging the Carthaginians on Sicily, Pyrrhus was able to expand Syracusan and Greek control westward. His army met with much greater success against the Carthaginian forces. Eventually Carthage’s large presence on the island was reduced to the city of Lilybaeum on the western coast.⁷⁵ At the prospect of losing their foothold on Sicily entirely, the Carthaginians began issuing peace overtures to Pyrrhus. This was in their tradition of viewing conflicts as economic matters, because the territories in Sicily probably were not thought as important as the secure port for trade. Thus, paying for a peace settlement to guarantee the safety of their presence outweighed any other foreign policy concerns. The Epirote king’s ability to force engagements and defeat isolated Carthaginian units exposed a serious flaw in how Carthage’s armies deployed. In an offensive operation the ability to tailor forces and dictate where to meet via sea travel was an advantage. When deprived of the initiative Carthage was unable to coordinate a response properly as units could not be contracted and transported to Sicily in time to affect Pyrrhus’ march westward. Thus when Carthage did not anticipate the necessity for a large army and began in a defensive posture, its practice of hiring soldiers became a

⁷⁵Ibid., 164.

disadvantage due to the time and distances involved. The only practical response that could be coordinated was to send forces as they became available to Lilybaeum, which was under siege.

During this stage of the conflict Carthage's navy proved indispensable as it kept material, men and money flowing to Lilybaeum. However they were unable to utilize this advantage to force a change in the status quo. Pyrrhus had plans in motion to break the deadlock by constructing his own fleet when the methods he was using to do so backfired on him. This was the latest in a series of actions Pyrrhus undertook which threatened his alliance.

Carthage's salvation against Pyrrhus proved to come from an area outside what they were trying to influence at the time, the political realm, again exposing a flaw in their ability to utilize their military strength. Pyrrhus had managed to alienate the majority of his Greek allies on Sicily, including the lead city of Syracuse. These city-states were not happy with the conditions that Pyrrhus set as the leader of the alliance and did not wish to negotiate a peace treaty with Carthage. Rome was also not happy; as it had understood that when Pyrrhus' attention tired in Sicily he would return to the peninsula. According to one of their treaties with Carthage, peace negotiations with Pyrrhus were to be entered jointly.⁷⁶ Eventually the pressure became too great; despite defeating another Carthaginian force in 276 BCE which was attempting to relieve the siege of Lilybaeum, Pyrrhus decided to return to the Italian peninsula. Though Carthage had won tactical victories during the course of these conflicts, the city-state's military

⁷⁶This became another example cited to justify the Latin derogatory epithet "Punic Faith."

structure proved incapable of forcing a favorable outcome had the political situation not changed.

The Roman Republic finally expelled Pyrrhus from Italy proper in 275 BCE at the battle of Beneventum, this time a Roman victory, albeit still a costly one. Training new units each year took its toll on field effectiveness even with the presence of veterans who had served previously. Rome's citizen legions continued to prove a match for what was considered one of the best of the Mediterranean armies.

During the First Punic War (264-241) land operations were predominantly confined to the island of Sicily, with some actions in Northern Africa. The decisive actions in the First Punic War were on the seas. By many accounts the manpower demands for these naval operations outstripped the land components and were the largest naval engagements until the 20th century.⁷⁷ In this respect both parties faced similar problems: how to field armies of sufficient size and training to enforce the political desires on the island of Sicily, how to organize a navy to transport these forces to the island and how to disrupt the opponents transportation efforts.

The populations of both states helped determine how they were able to generate forces for this war. At the time Rome and her allies, the majority of the Italian peninsular states, numbered approximately three million people.⁷⁸ According to Livy the census for 264 BCE of adult male Roman citizens was 292,234.⁷⁹ This entire group was not eligible for service in the legions. As referred to earlier the various accountings of how many

⁷⁷Lazenby, *The First Punic War*, 1.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, 11.

⁷⁹Livy, 11.1.).

campaigns a citizen had presented themselves for eventually added up to a point where one was “mustered out.” There were additional age restrictions as well, such as those over 46 not being compelled to campaign and only being liable for defense of the city proper. This still represents a large number of male citizens who came to the Campa Martia in Rome for the dilectus and displays the organizational acumen of the Romans who were able to conduct this process relatively swiftly.

Carthage is estimated to have had political influence over approximately the same number of people, three million or several hundred thousand more when considering the seaport colonies.⁸⁰ However this number is not as informative as the Roman census. While three million may accurately represent the number of people over which Carthage had some measure of political influence, the nature of the Carthaginian government made utilizing their population a much different prospect. Unlike Roman territory, 90 percent of this number represents populations that were not required by any type of legal agreement to provide forces for common defense or military expedition. The city itself, while referred to as the most economically prosperous in the Mediterranean, was not as populous. There were perhaps 160,000 people in the city proper, although this was still a metropolis by the standards of the day. Even the majority of this urban population was not liable for service as soldiers on land. Those peoples (including Libyan and Numidian Africans) who were legally bound to provide soldiers were not granted legal rights but economic ones which limited their interest in Carthage’s government.

Conflicts with Pyrrhus and Hiero, King of Syracuse, had diminished Carthage’s territorial control on Sicily to the city of Lilybaeum and surrounding areas by the early

⁸⁰Lazenby, *The First Punic War*, 25.

third century BCE.⁸¹ Groups of mercenaries in Carthage's employ were often at odds with the Greek city-states on the island for control of its resources.⁸² However, Punic control of Lilybaeum and the political unrest that followed the departure of Pyrrhus enabled them to begin reclaiming some of their economic influence. This level of influence and their ties to the region granted them significant advantage in the beginning of the First Punic War.

The First Punic War began when the Sicilian city of Messana appealed to both Carthage and Rome for assistance against Syracuse. Carthaginian representatives on the island responded quickly as they had forces in position to do so. It is unclear if these local Carthaginian commanders acted on their own initiative or if they had been directed to do so by the home city of Carthage. Examples of either case can be found in descriptions of Carthage's history. The Suffetes and Judges of the Carthaginian Senate tended to allow their subordinates this type of latitude in foreign affairs if they were deemed in Carthage's best interest (generally economic) overall. Regardless of whether they acted on their own initiative or directed, Carthage likely did not count on precipitating a war that would last twenty-three years.

Carthage's approach to reinforcing its initial success on Sicily was to contract more units to expand their capabilities and wrest more control away from Syracuse. As usual, the overriding Punic concerns were access to ports for their ships and claims to

⁸¹Pyrrhus discussed above; Hiero, former general under Pyrrhus and King of Syracuse r. 270–215 BCE.

⁸²Dio, *Roman History*, trans. Earnest Carey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 13. Corresponds to the author's original text, Dio (12.16.10). Of note is the diffusion of cultures due to Carthage's system, Dio mentions units of Gauls on Sicily at this early date.

mines. The Carthaginian leaders were not expecting Rome's violent reaction to their decisions. Unlike the conflict with Pyrrhus however they had seized the initiative and Rome's formal declaration of war gave them more time to deploy forces to the region. Again their business model showcases itself, though impossible to be precise with numbers, they seem to have always hired what they felt were the minimum number of troops necessary to defend their claims against Roman incursions. This likely never grew larger than 60,000 on Sicily, as their armies seem to have met the Roman legions on Sicily in relatively equal numbers or are in garrisons according to most accounts. This worked as there were few pitched battles in the First Punic War, the majority of operations being sieges on towns in Sicily or raids on elements of enemy forces. Therefore, Carthage was able to hire units and deploy them to one of the ports they still controlled. Even as the Roman Navy improved to blockade ports directly, it was often possible to land troops along the coastline. Unlike other Carthaginian campaigns, the piecemeal manner in which units were committed to Sicily inhibited their familiarity with one another and ability to execute complex maneuver as described in both previous and later conflicts. The last major reinforcement to the island came in 250 when Carthage dispatched a force of 10,000 men to Lilybaeum.⁸³ Though groups were dispatched by Carthaginian contracting officers, their strategy had shifted to a defensive one in practice if not by design. In 247 BCE when Hamilcar Barca was appointed commander for all of Carthage's forces in Sicily, he was unable to force a decisive engagement despite his tactical achievements, ultimately setting the stage for Carthage's withdrawal from the island.

⁸³Lazenby, *The First Punic War*, 126, Quoting Polybius, 1.44.2.

The Roman campaign in 256 BCE to north Africa was also met with the purchasing power of Carthaginian silver as opposed to large numbers of Punic citizens rallying to the colors. No less than a Spartan was hired by the Suffetes to organize the defense of the city and countryside.⁸⁴ Xanthippos, as he was known, exercised command during the Roman advances on the city.⁸⁵ He was noted for his ability to relate to the mercenary units quickly and establish rapport based off competence. Hiring Xanthippos worked well for Carthage, as by 254 BCE the Romans left Africa. Instead of renewing this general's contract, Xanthippos evidently found himself in the employ of the Ptolemy's of Egypt. This may have been personal whim but also points to a lack of overall direction in the Carthaginian effort. Hiring more mercenaries to present themselves for the defense of the city is understandable given the circumstances, however, the percentage of troops from the city proper was still low given the population.

The Punic Navy began the war highly regarded, but after its initial victories in 264 BCE the Roman Navy began to make exponential strides. During the first few years of the war the Punic Navy forced the Romans to either sail wide and land far from objectives or risk night crossings and landings. This changed with the advent of the Corvus and the adoption of innovative battle tactics. From the Battle of Mylae in 260 to 249 BCE Carthage's navy would be without a major victory in battle. However it still successfully supported operations by running the blockades around the Sicilian coast

⁸⁴Lazenby, *The First Punic War*, 102; Diodorus Siculus, *Universal History* vol. 11, trans. C. H. Oldfather, 101, (23.14.1).

⁸⁵Polybius statement (1.32.1) about Xanthippos indicates he was likely not a full Spartiate citizen, and thus was someone who took part in the Spartan training system but left to seek fortune elsewhere.

moving supplies and troops. Given that both sides are mentioned as keeping fleets upwards of 200 vessels and the estimated crew compliment of the warships of the period (150-200 for a total of 30,000 to 40,000) it is likely the crews represented the bulk of the fighting aged men of the city of Carthage. That it was able to maintain its operational relevance during over a decade of setback points to experienced Punic seamanship. It is clear Carthage was depending on its navy to make the supply situation untenable for Rome in the late 250's. The argument can be made that this utilization of manpower was worthwhile given the capabilities of their navy. However the ultimate result in the loss of Sicily and the terms of the peace treaty makes this position suspect, especially in light of the limited effect the navy had in disrupting Roman operations to north Africa.

Perhaps the greater flaw in Carthage's approach in the First Punic War was the lack of direction. As long as trade flowed and money continued to exchange hands, the Suffetes and Judges seemed to treat the First Punic War as a trade infringement. It was not deemed worth spending more money on troops, home grown or foreign purchased, so long as the troops that were already committed maintained the status quo of ensuring silver flowed back towards the home city. By most archaeological finds, this proved true even after the war in places other than Sicily. Not until a Roman army landed on their doorstep did the government believe it was in a serious fight, and then they still paid for temporary troops to deal with the threat to their home city. The reliance on mercenaries would lead to other immediate problems as soon as the war with Rome concluded.

Rome's approach to deploying forces in the First Punic War was modeled on their traditional *dilectus* but added a new component, that of sustaining forces overseas for long periods of time. As previously stated, the beginning of the war found Rome

attempting to intervene on behalf of the city of Messana against Syracuse. Unlike Carthage which had forces already on the island, Rome had to await organizing and training their legions prior to embarking some to travel the straight to Messana. Upon their arrival, the inhabitants of the city apparently thought they would receive better treatment from the Romans and betrayed their erstwhile Carthaginian allies. The Carthaginians subsequently crucified their own commander for failing to secure his position against such an action. The naval skirmishes that followed led to all out war from the Roman standpoint.

Throughout the war the *dilectus* was held every year along with the standard elections in Rome. This formed units and provided commanders for the duration. The disadvantage to the system was the turnover in the command structure. Rarely did Roman commanders serve consecutive terms and the units themselves often had to rotate and be replaced by a new year's class of draftees. The rotation of consuls exercising command was recorded with great fidelity, though the mechanics of rotating legions back to Italy was not. It is likely that units had to remain in place until new units arrived to relieve them, effectively extending the term of service. The practice of granting some commanders "proconsul" status, that is, to remain in command until their mission was complete was not used as often as in later eras. This also reduced the state's burden of paying for the serving legionaries once the previous years' soldiers returned home. Additionally the internal rivalries of the Roman senate often derailed any sort of long term planning. However the ability of the state to equip four legions and associated allied forces each year consistently put an enormous amount of pressure on the Carthaginians, who as seen decided it was not economically suitable to hire enough mercenaries to go on

sustained offensive operations on Sicily. In this manner Rome was able to maintain a standard presence of approximately forty thousand on Sicily.

During Rome's campaign to north Africa a force approximately twenty thousand strong was deployed. This equates to about half of a dilectus for a year, or half of the consular army. The expedition was considered important enough to warrant both consuls participation in the first phase. After the successful landing and initial establishment of a base of support the consul Vulso was recorded as departing back to Rome. The fact that two consuls were in Africa and there was no discernable decline in the forces mentioned in Sicily makes it probable that of the legions raised for 256 BCE two plus allies were sent to Africa and the other half reported to Sicily. This implies that two legions were kept on duty for a longer period, which was increased when the expedition to Africa was ultimately unsuccessful and they could not count on being reinforced until the following year's dilectus. Still, putting sixty thousand citizens under arms did not seem to seriously tax the Roman system.

Rome's decision to engage Carthage on the sea required it to build a navy with the attendant requirements of manpower. During different periods Rome is spoken of as having a fleet of two hundred to three hundred fifty vessels.⁸⁶ Using the same types of ships as the Carthaginians with similarly sized crews puts a conservative estimate upwards of 60,000 to crew the fleets. If the estimates closer to three hundred crew per quinquereme are in fact correct, a three hundred fifty ship fleet as mentioned in 255 BCE represents over 100,000 men required for crews. The navy recruited heavily from the population known as "capite cense," citizens with all rights excluding the right (and vice

⁸⁶Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, 115.

versa, the duty) to serve in the legions. In practice, however, many members of the citizenry who had already served their legionary commitments volunteered for further service in the navy. Though there were manpower strains Rome did not have to resort to forced impressments in order to man its ships.

Even with the conservative numbers closer to 60,000, when combined with the requirements for the legions this required the state to call forth over 100,000 able bodied men to serve in some capacity annually. For a nation of approximately three million people to do so repeatedly over twenty years was unprecedented. Compounding these numbers were the incidents in which three Roman fleets were lost due to storms and weather, casualties numbering over 100,000 are recorded as these fleets were often transporting other forces. That there is only one instance mentioned by all historic sources as internal unrest over being called to serve as naval crews evidences that classes outside the traditional land owners in the legions felt a responsibility to the nation.⁸⁷ By war's end Rome was no longer a "land only" power; its fleet having equaled and in some areas surpassed Carthage's in terms of influence in the Mediterranean.

The Roman ability to organize and train units annually despite the exorbitant manpower demands of both army and navy was decisive in this war. Carthage could have effectively neutralized this advantage with the amount of capital they were still raising by hiring more forces to counter the Roman advantage, but the Carthaginian approach was to maintain the status quo and continue the flow of trade. In particular Rome's creation of a navy and the innovation it displayed in its learning curve to overcome the Punic naval advantage is a strong point in favor the flexibility of their system. Taking the census and

⁸⁷Lazenby, *The First Punic War*, 73.

dilectus approach and modifying it to assign responsibilities for providing naval crews shows that the system was able to adapt to changing strategic situations. The idea of Roman “virtus,” which encompassed responsibility to the state, is what kept citizens coming back for muster each year despite some very costly setbacks such as the defeat at Drepana and the loss of the fleet to weather in 254 BCE. Rome used the service of their allies to improve their legal status on the road to full citizenship. In this manner they laid the groundwork to expand their system in the future. By the turn of the next century groups coming from cities such as Capua were not only fulfilling alliance requirements, they were fully committed to upholding their own “virtus.” This ability for the dilectus system to change would be further tested in the Second Punic War.

Immediately following the conclusion of the First Punic War Carthage found itself embroiled in another war that posed a direct threat to the city itself. The Mercenary War (240–237 BCE) was a direct outgrowth of unresolved issues stemming from Carthage’s military system in the First Punic War. Rome played only a peripheral part, not taking action against Carthage directly, though acquiring some territory opportunistically while Carthage’s attention was diverted.

As per the treaty ending the first war Carthage began redeploying troops from Sicily. As the majority of the troops were not Carthaginian the matter of settling payment and transporting them to their home countries or previously agreed to locations became a logistics problem. Hamilcar Barca was recalled to Carthage and replaced by Gesgo. The new commander began organizing brigades out of regiments of the same nationality for familiarity and transporting them in groups to Northern Africa near Carthage to await

payment by the government.⁸⁸ The plan was to pay off a brigade of one nationality and put it onboard transports to their final destination before the next brigade presented itself at Carthage for payment.⁸⁹ This type of logistics operation with what amount to staging areas and call forward points should be familiar to modern observers. The businesslike nature of politics at Carthage soon decided this plan could be modified for their economic benefit. Deciding to not pay the brigades as they redeployed to Northern Africa, the Punic government felt they could negotiate a better pay price by holding the loss of Sicily and the cost of transportation over the units. This caused the units to begin looting communities outside the city proper. When envoys were dispatched to negotiate with the mercenary units the disparate ethnic groups banded together in open revolt. Carthage was now faced with a veteran army 20,000 strong on its doorstep.

The tactical details of this war are not attested to in the surviving histories but what is known is that the mercenary force was very successful at first. Carthage's citizen units were kept as defense of the city proper until more mercenaries could be found and thus the rebel force initially moved unchecked. This soon caused many of the restless Libyan tribes to revolt swelling the number of troops available to the rebels.⁹⁰ Finally able to organize a successful army, under the general Hamilcar Barca, comprised of mercenary nationalities other than those in revolt under, Carthage eventually put down the revolt in 237 BCE. This disrupted the Carthaginian economy more so than the first war did, having been fought completely in northern Africa.

⁸⁸Polybius, 57. Corresponds to original text Polybius, 1.66.6.

⁸⁹Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, 133.

⁹⁰Ihne, 116.

This war with those who had been fighting for their goals a year earlier highlights how some aspects of Carthage's system could have caused their government to fail. Had the rebels been better organized it is entirely possible that they would have captured the city and Rome would have never had to contend with a second or third war. Even with the debacle of the Mercenary War which diverted money to pay for more troops and disrupted the taxation system of the Punic system Carthage was able to pay off its war indemnity early. The ability of Carthage to prosper economically was commented upon by all ancient authors and this probably vindicated the business ethic of the Punic elites in their decision-making.

The Second Punic War (218–202 BCE) began with Hannibal Barca's attack on Saguntum in 219 BCE.⁹¹ This struggle has been studied exhaustively predominantly from the tactical level. What caused its continued interest is the nature of Hannibal's army in addition to his demonstrated battlefield prowess. Again this was a Carthaginian force made up predominantly of mercenaries. This conflict was their most impressive showing despite its ultimately unfavorable outcome for Carthage.

This second contest with Carthage occurred twenty years after the end of the first, enough time having passed for the populations to recover and to some extent grow. The Roman nation was expanding in its granting of citizenship status whereas Carthage generally maintained its status quo, though it did acquire new territories to exploit for economic gain and manpower in the intervening years. Carthage's navy was also intact in

⁹¹Hamilcar Barca's son, generally referred to as simply "Hannibal" by later historians as opposed to the several other Punic commanders named Hannibal. Apparently there was a shortage of first names in Phoenician Carthage.

spite of Rome's best efforts on the sea, though the Roman navy's learning curve would not be as steep. Manpower issues plagued both sides again through this war.

It is unlikely Carthage sought out this direct conflict at this time. Hannibal had been in command in Punic Spain since 221 BCE and campaigning there to enforce Carthage's claims on mines and ports since 237 BCE with his father Hamilcar. The manner of Hannibal's elevation to command and the nature of the attack have been a matter of historic debate. Regardless of such details, the attack on the Roman allied city of Saguntum caused Rome's Senate to demand Carthage repudiate Hannibal's actions and order him to surrender or war would be declared. The dramatically satisfying toga ultimatum story is repeated often enough, and Carthage went to war with Rome again.⁹²

Carthage had similar advantages and disadvantages in this second round. They possessed a forward deployed force that was ready to act on short order with Hannibal in command. They were economically prosperous again, which enabled them to hire more forces as the war continued. Their navy was still capable of conducting operations. If their population numbers were indeed at a level similar to or greater than that which they entered the first war with, they had every reason to be confident in their ability to succeed. It is estimated that approximately 16,000 men came available for military

⁹²Polybius, 155. Corresponds to original text Polybius, 3.33.1-5. Livy repeats the story, 21.18.10-35. The senior Roman envoy (likely M. Fabius Buteo or M. Fabius Maximus based off records) to Carthage's Senate held a fold of his toga in each hand as he told the assembled group Rome held peace or war in its hands to chose from, "we bring you peace and war, take what you will, it matters not to us," to which the Punic Suffetes replied "the choice is yours." Fabius dropped one hand and said "war" to which the Carthaginians replied "we accept it." Depending on the veracity (in least in spirit if not quotation) of the story, it indicates Carthage's willingness to confront Rome whether or not Hannibal acted rashly in attacking Saguntum.

service annually in the city proper.⁹³ Contrasting this to the 40,000 a year Rome was able to call upon this brings into question the notion that equivalent populations translated to equal opportunities to recruit soldiers. Carthage relied on its mercenary contingent to make up the difference.

Hannibal's army conducted its legendary march into Italy in 218 BCE. Polybius estimates his beginning troop strength at approximately 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry.⁹⁴ This army included some regiments from the city of Carthage and Libyan tribes, the closest equivalent to citizen troops Carthage possessed, totaling perhaps 20,000. The rest were an amalgam of nationalities such as Iberian tribes, the Balearic Islanders, Celts and assorted other groups Hannibal's contracting officers were able to hire. Much of this was paid for directly by the mines in Spain that Hannibal's forces controlled, thus the Carthaginian government may not have been in a position to prevent the build up even if they had chosen to do so. As this army marched across the mountains it lost tens of thousands to sickness and desertion. When Hannibal entered the Po Valley five months later, the numbers of the army are given at 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry.⁹⁵ To this group he added tribes of Gauls that he and his money were able to persuade to join as they journeyed. By the time of the first major battle with Roman forces, Hannibal had just over 30,000 soldiers. This was only two months after Hannibal had entered Italy, a testament to the speed at which the Carthaginians were practiced at

⁹³Wells, 515.

⁹⁴Polybius, 157. Original text Polybius, 3.35.1.

⁹⁵Ibid., 173. Original text Polybius, 3.56.5.

hiring forces and their ability to integrate them into a cohesive fighting force as Hannibal's tactical exploits would prove over the next decade.

Hannibal's expedition to Italy and the subsequent decade of campaigning in the peninsular represents a high point in the effectiveness of Punic mercenary armies. Hannibal and his troops defeated every Roman army fielded against them and caused several of the allied communities to renounce their treaties with Rome.⁹⁶ This second issue was of grave concern for Rome, as it directly impacted the number of men who would report for the annual *dilectus*. Towards the end of this period from 216 BCE–206 BCE Rome had positioned forces in Iberia and threatened to wrest control of ancient Spain away from Carthage. The way Carthaginian political leadership regarded the two theaters illustrates both advantages and problems with the system.

Carthage's rulers were benefitting from Hannibal's actions with little direct cost to the city's economy. Hannibal's father Hamilcar had established systems in Iberia that provided the majority of funding for Hannibal's later invasion. Thus silver from Spain continued to fund Punic mercenaries in Italy until Rome destroyed Carthage's power in Iberia. The threat to Punic Spain then caused the Suffetes and Judges the most concern as it was funding their successes. The decisions to reinforce Spain over Hannibal can be justified in that context. What Carthage failed to recognize was Hannibal's successes in breaking some of the Roman alliances held greater potential. Had he been able to turn these allies actively against Rome with political assistance from Carthage it would have dramatically altered the balance of resources available to the opposing belligerents.

⁹⁶Appian, *Appian's Roman History*, trans. Horace White (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 359. Corresponds to Appian, 7.38-7.47.

Though he was able to recruit some Italians as mercenaries, none of the cities which defected from Rome were under obligation to provide material or personnel support to Carthage. The closest the war came to disrupting Rome's available pool of manpower was in 209 BCE when representatives from twelve allies petitioned the Roman senate to end the war due to their inability to provide sufficient numbers of men for the *dilectus*. However, these Latin allies did not defect to Hannibal. Carthage did not understand how to utilize Hannibal's success on the Italian peninsula to their advantage. Hannibal never brokered deals where communities such as Capua directly supported Carthage.⁹⁷ This level of agreement was probably never on the mind of the Carthaginian leadership, as very few of their subject communities were bound to actively support them in such a manner. It would follow then that even if he had the authority, Hannibal would probably not have offered these kinds of terms to defecting cities.

The rulers in Carthage seem to have understood the existential threat of the war they were faced with against Rome, but their decisions seem to be still guided off of business principle. The level of resources committed to Hannibal were not commensurate with his success, instead, most resources that were dedicated by the Suffetes and Judges went to Spain to guard against increasing Roman excursions designed to disrupt the trade and mining enterprises Carthage controlled. Hannibal received few reinforcements from Spain and only once was a large group of reinforcements dispatched from Carthage to Italy even with his spectacular victories and demonstrated ability to garner support in traditionally Roman areas. Within the Punic political leadership there was a distinct lack of appreciation for what would cause Rome to capitulate. What is particularly puzzling

⁹⁷Lazenby, *Hannibal's War*, 90.

was their apparent disregard of the threat to their home city which had been posed three times before in the previous century and which Rome would press to advantage to end this war.⁹⁸

Eventually Rome found a commander who was able to best Carthaginian generals in the field and possessed an understanding of greater strategic context. Scipio Africanus⁹⁹ executed the Roman plan to deprive Carthage of Spanish treasure and at the same time avoid direct confrontation with Hannibal. Scipio was from a senatorial family as all senior commanders in this period were, though not a member of Rome's senate due to his youth when initially appointed. The Roman political system however allowed him to directly speak and influence the senate in a way Hannibal never was able. Scipio was a member of the senate and elected consul in 205 when the senate agreed to his plan to invade Africa. This episode highlights the effect the Roman idea of civic duty held, as Scipio was not authorized the number of troops he felt sufficient to the task. He received authorization to recruit from legions stationed in Sicily at the time to bolster his force. At the time Sicily was not under threat and the units stationed there were predominantly survivors of Hannibal's initial victories, in particular Cannae. These men were stationed there in a manner of exile. When offered the chance to become the core of Scipio's African invasion nearly all volunteered. While they were legally exiled and arguments that they were more motivated by personal gain than patriotism have merit, it is also

⁹⁸Agathocles, Tyrant of Syracuse, invaded Northern Africa in 310 to compel Carthage to reduce its presence on Sicily; the Roman consul Regulus invaded during the First Punic War for the same reason and the subsequent Mercenary War was fought within marching distance of the capital city.

⁹⁹Born Publius Cornelius Scipio, "Africanus" was an honorific granted after the Second Punic War victory at Zama circa 202 BCE.

recorded that many had been able to re establish themselves in the Sicilian community and were not under obligation to join Scipio's expedition. The fact that so many did displays the level of civic duty instilled in them endured a decade of neglect. At the very least it shows that the trappings of Roman citizenship in Italy proper were sufficient motivation to compel these soldiers to leave their garrison existence and go on active campaign.

Scipio's influence in the Senate also shows another advantage of citizens serving. He was able to get the senate to vote and agree on a direction the war should be taken. Once made consul he controlled much of the state's resources such as the navy to enable his plan. This led to a unity of effort not matched by Carthage. The difference proved decisive, rendering Hannibal's victories and personal inspiration of his troops irrelevant. With that, the Second Punic War ended.

The Third Punic War (149–146 BCE) removed Carthage from the scene of the ancient Mediterranean. It nearly removed them from the historic record as Rome obliterated the city. The war was caused mainly by Roman fear of Carthage's potential. The war debts imposed by the treaty ending the second war were thought to be exorbitant and ruinous to the Punic economy. Carthage was also deprived of its territories outside of Northern Africa. When Carthage's economy began to flourish again and the debt paid off on time, Roman senators began to worry. When Punic merchant vessels again became a fixture of the ancient Mediterranean and a Carthaginian mercenary army launched an attack on an African neighbor, Rome decided to end the threat finally. Rome placed demands on Carthage that were increasingly unreasonable, culminating with the demand that the city be evacuated and relocated inland to restrict its access to the sea. With that,

Carthage had to face Rome without access to the resources it had commanded in the first two wars.

Carthage's initial successes in 149 showcase the ingenuity of its commanders and the skill of the few soldiers it was able to muster, according to record approximately 30,000.¹⁰⁰ Isolated politically and physically it was not able to draw mercenaries to its cause though it probably still had the money to do so. As Rome now controlled most of the territories they historically recruited from, even if they had been able to communicate with those regions it is likely the fear of Roman reprisal halted any mass movements to reinforce Carthage. Carthage was then left to its own devices to defend against the legions Rome could mass against it. Without a large body of citizens to draw from and a limited amount of experienced personnel Carthage's 30,000 quickly dwindled as historians record that Rome put over 80,000 into Northern Africa again. Carthage's fate was sealed from the moment she disagreed with Rome's demands, however unreasonable they were. Reduced to the city itself, they were assaulted and destroyed in 146 BCE. The nation that had used its economic success to rule half of the Mediterranean was removed from the map for over one hundred years until their conquerors decided to rebuild the city as a Roman outpost in Africa.¹⁰¹

These contests showcase varying attributes of both systems. Carthage and Rome possessed similar resources at the outset of the wars. Their commercial mindsets of both parties was also not as far apart as might be suspected, as Rome was committed to trade and as evidenced by the census system Romans viewed business and economic success

¹⁰⁰Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars*, 345.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, 355.

very importantly. The attitudes of how to utilize their respective resources differed drastically. These different view points expressed themselves in how the respective combatants recruited their militaries and made their strategic decisions. In brief the attitudes can be viewed that to Romans, personal economic success was a result of the nation being strong, thus citizens had a responsibility to ensure the nation was as strong as possible and defended. This is in character with the idea that the more property one owned, the more direct personal interest a family had in the state's ability to protect itself. Carthage seems to have held the view that economic success is what made the nation powerful, and therefore all decisions were calculated in the manner of immediate cost-benefit. Extending this attitude towards foreign policy and military decisions it freed the citizenry to focus on making more money. However, money did not prevent a determined opponent from destroying the city when Carthaginian economic success was viewed with envy and apprehension from their neighbors.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

What do the armies of Rome and Carthage have to recommend to contemporary decision makers? Direct comparison is unwarranted and suspect, but there are recurring themes that prove useful in designing military forces. The stated purpose of this paper is to provide examples of how certain philosophies on the organization of forces are incongruent with modern democratic systems. While the likelihood of a US Army manned by predominantly mercenary or “for profit” troops as opposed to US soldiers under oath is slim, over the last decade there have been decisions and precedents that should be re-examined and re-thought.

The two nations in this study represent two divergent opinions on how to recruit military forces and utilize them to pursue foreign policy decisions. The Romans felt the requirement was best satisfied as a form of civic duty from their citizens. Though Rome did employ some mercenary forces throughout its history, even when the military was comprised of full time soldiers during the imperial period it was still drawn from citizens or those hoping to earn citizenship through service.¹⁰² Roman leaders felt the combination of civic duty, virtue, and government oversight, often in the form of direct service by numerous government officials, were the best ways to meet the demands created by the foreign policy decisions. When the scope of the decisions warranted larger

¹⁰²Rome’s first large scale use of mercenaries recorded by Dio Cassius, *Roman History vol. 2*, trans. Earnest Carey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 13. Corresponds to original text Dio Cassius, 12.16.8. During the Imperial Period (circa. 31 BCE onward) Legions were recruited from Roman citizens, Auxilia units were recruited from non-citizen populations with full citizenship as a retirement award in a similar manner to Republican era allied units.

forces, the principles were kept intact, while the system adapted to providing larger numbers.

On the opposing side, Carthage decided that foreign policy was more efficiently served by capital investment in all facets. Carthaginians were not unaccustomed to civic duty, and there were always some Carthaginian citizen soldiers in Punic armies as well as naval crews drawn predominantly from the city itself. However, at some early date the leadership decided it was better to employ foreign troops en masse.¹⁰³ The rulers of Carthage seem to have been committed even in military matters to their commercial business model of government. They apparently understood the benefits of citizen soldiers but made little effort to expand citizenship throughout the empire they held, preferring to hire large numbers of mercenaries to press their claims.¹⁰⁴

In the preceding chapters major problems inherent in the Carthaginian approach were: 1. Lack of control over the training and accountability of troops; 2. Deficiency in political oversight and strategic planning as wars evolved to encompass multiple theaters; Carthage's system did not require the development of such systems; 3. Lack of infrastructure or knowledge to rapidly expand the military when conditions changed, as happened to Carthage during the Third Punic War. Carthaginians continuously believed they would be able to solve problems with the expenditure of money without necessarily

¹⁰³A good candidate for this decision seems to be the Battle of Crimisos (or Krimisos), a Carthaginian defeat on Sicily in 341 BCE. After this defeat references to large Carthaginian units are absent from the historic record, even the majority of Hannibal's "Punic" forces are African allies. Plutarch, *Plutarch's Lives*, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Random House, 1965), 313. Corresponds to original text Plutarch Timeolon, 28.6.

¹⁰⁴Wells, 514.

having the invested interest of the people performing their will. Overall Carthage's political structure proved flawed in comparison to Rome's ability to expand the franchise of citizenship and thus expand the available manpower it directly controlled.

With recent decisions on how budgets will be spent to organize US military forces, some of these ancient issues point to concerns today. While the great majority of US forces involved in combat over the last eleven years are US service members under oath, there have been examples of private security contractors conducting traditional military missions such as patrols involved in engagements in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the definition of what "combat" operations are can be politically motivated, as there are thousands of foreign contracted security guards at US bases around the globe. When enemy forces engage these security guards then these contractors are in combat by historic precedent if not modern political definition. Similar to the first point raised, how is the US to ensure that forces conducting combat on their behalf are trained to standards commensurate with executing the increasingly complex US foreign policy? While it may be possible to stipulate behavioral requirements in contracts, is this something that is best left in the hands of a third party? It should follow that troops trained by their own government have the greatest chance of reacting to enemy actions in a manner consistent with that government's objectives and values.

The trend to hire private contractors to conduct missions that were once thought to be the exclusive domain of US forces only leads to the probability that further issues will arise. The US has already experienced other governments expressing consternation and demanding the withdrawal of certain groups of contractors. In 2007 the Iraqi government requested that the United States stop contracting the Blackwater Company to

conduct operations in Iraq over concerns of not adhering to US rules of engagement. The Afghan government has expressed similar concerns. There are precedents for these objections, for example, according to the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, a person recruited and motivated to participate in warfare by a high rate of compensation may not even qualify for the protections of a prisoner of war.

There is perhaps a greater concern in this trend as the level of scrutiny and oversight on these types of forces is not the same as US military forces. There are specific laws in place to oversee the conduct of military operations and to ensure some measure of transparency to the government and population at large.¹⁰⁵ These laws are often circumvented in the employment of private contractors in these roles. Our democracy is supposed to limit the ability of the government to act in such a manner. Allowing such precedents to be set only decreases the responsibility our constituents have over the actions of our government. While it may not be in the nation's best interest to require all to serve in the manner of Roman *virtus*, citizens should have the ability to understand what their government is doing. In order to allow the legal mechanisms to ensure proper oversight it would be best for forces to be actual members of the US government, e.g. US service members, military or otherwise.

Is the threat of monetary reprisals enough to ensure the behavior of those contracted to perform security or other missions in conjunction with US forces? Historically this has not always been the case and there is no reason to believe the situation will improve as contractors gain increasing access to sensitive or classified US military systems. This type of espionage has recently been documented in other nations

¹⁰⁵Mandel, 45.

use of private security contractors.¹⁰⁶ Anyone can commit an act of treason by allowing sensitive material or equipment to pass to the enemy, but it is much more difficult to enforce punishment on those outside of the military's jurisdiction, whether they are US citizens or foreigners.

There are already concerns over unity of effort between political and military leadership as such unity it is currently understood by the US. These arguments are held despite the existence of institutions such as the Joints Chiefs of Staff and the integration of the military into various aspects of government.¹⁰⁷ In Carthage's case the reliance on mercenary forces resulted in a lack of military experience for most Carthaginian leaders. The military leadership apparently gained their initial experience in the small contingent of city guard units. They then joined an expedition under a commander appointed by the Suffetes. Though the government kept a close account of the campaigns of their armies, there is very little evidence of any of the senatorial bodies, the judges, the council of 104 or the Suffetes themselves giving guiding directives to their field commanders. The few examples were considered matters of national survival, such as Hannibal's recall to Carthage in 204 BCE to counter Scipio's landing. This was surprising, given the fact that a similar incident from the previous war resulted in Carthage hiring the Greek Xanthippos and recruiting a new army as opposed to recalling one of their armies already in the field. This highlighted a gap in the understanding between the government and their field commanders. The economic viewpoint of the political leadership did not

¹⁰⁶Mandel, 80.

¹⁰⁷The National Security Council and Military Congressional Aides are two examples of direct integration.

always translate into objectives that leaders on campaign could target effectively with the resources they were given. Hannibal's decade long campaign in Italy attests to this remarkably.

The system was devoid of any mechanism to encourage the sharing of ideas between the political and military leadership. Even if they had been able to, the nature of Punic armies would have hammered any translation of these ideas almost impossible across disparate brigades and regiments from foreign lands. While ancient warfare did not necessarily require strategic plans to be understood down to the level of individual soldiers, senior officers within an army would have benefitted from understanding the desired goal or endstate of operations. Hannibal provided some measure of communication with his subordinates from foreign lands in appealing to their desires to be free from Roman hegemony. However, this example can further illustrate the disconnect between the Carthaginian general and the Suffetes as it is unlikely that the Suffetes originally expected that Hannibal would break the Roman system of alliances.

If the reliance on mercenary forces becomes too great, how will a nation determine that hired units understand the desired endstates? Again, contracting is offered as the solution to this dilemma, but there is an inherent weakness in this system as it supposes leadership that can clearly articulate endstates properly in a contract. As the percentage of private "for profit" forces increases, where are the political leaders supposed to derive their knowledge from so as to clearly state these objectives? Or, would this be another skill set that must be hired, that of senior commander who can bridge this gap? With all the roles that need to be hired, how does one ensure the objectives of the government are intact and not lost, especially as new hires are required?

While it is possible to think of constructs that resolve some of these issues within the mercenary framework, it would seem simpler if a government had its own military to begin with.

The last point is a situation the US is not likely to find itself in soon, but it bears mentioning; dismissing it out of hand could have catastrophic consequences in the future. If government gets to a point where the majority of its forces are hired units, where does the expertise to safeguard against unforeseen threats or the failure of those hired units to fulfill their bargain? If the military role is completely outsourced to include all training and responsibility in addition to operational missions, what happens if those sources of soldiers get displaced through other means, or if the economic conditions change and hiring large numbers is no longer viable? In order to safeguard its monopoly on violence, any government must be prepared to recruit and organize a military. If this function is contracted out over too long a period, the skill sets necessary to organize may not be present in the population or at least not to the extent necessary in case of emergencies. This was another safeguard the Roman system had built in, as veterans were found throughout the republic and later empire. Entire communities were often settled by veterans who were capable of providing some measure of emergency response in crisis situations.

The above issues are three practical reasons to rethink the numbers of contracted forces conduct our military operations, in particular any relating to direct combat. While contracting has been present in the US military since its inception as the Continental Army, historically contractors were found predominantly in the logistics realm. Many of the reasons given over the last decade for the increasing trends have been the inability of

the system to cope with the demands placed on it by the government. This displays the beginnings of a disconnect between government expectations and military capabilities. One of the factors that made the Roman system work for so long was its ability to adapt the method of recruitment and organization. Instead of adapting or modifying the system of recruitment and organization, the government has essentially bypassed several inconvenient issues by contracting out to private security firms. The increasing rate at which this occurs demonstrates that certain groups within the government are pleased with the results. While there are undoubtedly some successes, it has established a dangerous precedent.

The United States military does not employ mercenaries or private security contractors in percentages approaching the Carthaginians. Nevertheless, over the last decade of conflict there have been precedents set which create dangerous pitfalls as outlined above, especially in a democratic state that is supposed to be relatively transparent to its constituents. It could be argued that Carthage was a quasi-democratic state, but government transparency was definitely not one of its values. If political leadership finds more and more reasons to hire private contractors to conduct military operations, then many of the other concerns grow. Nations which rely on predominantly mercenary forces tend to end catastrophically. While the US military does not quite look like the Punic one, it would be prudent to remember that Carthage's military did not always look Carthaginian either, until a decision was made that it would be easier to throw money at problems than ask citizens to share the burden of solving them.

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