


# Strategy Research Project

## Clausewitz and the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy

by

Colonel Matthew C. Mingus  
United States Army



United States Army War College  
Class of 2013

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## **Abstract**

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A useful theory that many authors contend explains the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century is Trinitarian warfare described by Carl von Clausewitz in his book, *On War*. While Clausewitz' theories of Trinitarian warfare are quite relevant, the hypothesis offered in this paper is that due to the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century, his theories can be improved upon. This paper will focus on linking cultural understanding to Trinitarian warfare models presented by Clausewitz in *On War*. The intent is to refine Trinitarian warfare by comparing it to a more focused cultural analysis and possibly the development of a more predictive theory of warfare.



## **Clausewitz and the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy**

I keep six honest serving men (They taught me all I knew); Their names  
are What and Why and When and How and Where and Who.

—Rudyard Kipling

The United States is currently operating in an environment with almost overwhelming uncertainty and difficulty. A more powerful and aggressive China, a more defiant North Korea, increasing Middle East tensions, and the seemingly never ending threat of cyber and terrorist attacks make providing security in a constrained budget environment even harder. These threats, compounded with the warning of a fiscal cliff, emphasize and demand the development of a successful security strategy for the United States. In order to develop a successful strategy, one must develop a useful theory of war, or framework, in order to understand the environment and develop the best strategy possible. One way to develop a more current and applicable theory of warfare is to study the past and apply some new thinking to old time-tested theories. While a truly predictive theory of warfare may never be achieved, the application may give the strategist a better understanding that ultimately results in a better strategy. What follows is a synthesis of Clausewitzian ideas combined with a new framework used to analyze culture.

Clausewitz stated "In war, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts."<sup>1</sup> He further states "...war does not belong to the realm of arts and sciences; rather it is part of man's social existence."<sup>2</sup> With these ideas in mind, one must then question how warfare and strategy interact with mankind in the current environment. This means one must develop a theory of warfare that explains the reactions of animate objects and social interaction. In other words, warfare is waged by people and ultimately an

understanding of warfare in this context is most helpful in determining and developing a strategy for its conduct. Equally important to developing a strategy to deal with one's enemies is developing a strategy for acquiring friends. As pointed out by Ike Skelton, "Making enemies is easy, but it is harder to acquire friends."<sup>3</sup> This paper will focus on linking cultural understanding to Trinitarian warfare models presented by Clausewitz in *On War*. The intent is to refine Trinitarian warfare by comparing it to a more focused cultural analysis and possibly to develop a more predictive theory of warfare.

A useful theory that many authors contend explains the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century is Trinitarian warfare described by Carl von Clausewitz in his book *On War*. While Clausewitz' theories of Trinitarian warfare are quite relevant, the hypothesis offered in this paper is that due to the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century, these theories can be improved upon. Further, by adding a human and cultural dimension to what Clausewitz theorized, one can develop a more modern and useful theory. As stated by Rich Yarger, "...strategy is an inherently human enterprise."<sup>4</sup> One way to look at the human and cultural dimension is through the concept of the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) proposed by COL Jiyul Kim.<sup>5</sup> COL Kim postulated, "The ACFSP identifies basic cultural dimensions that seem to be of fundamental importance in determining such behavior and thus are of importance in policy and strategy formulation."<sup>6</sup> Moreover, as pointed out in *The Significance of Culture to the Military*, "Culture is part of the context within which military operations and routine relationships are conducted."<sup>7</sup> In other words, in order for one to be successful, the ACFSP lens should be considered when formulating strategy and studying warfare.

The ACFSP was further developed by Sheperd and Silverman.<sup>8</sup> By considering the ACFSP with Clausewitz' trinitities, one can synthesize these ideas into a whole theory, or structure, that better defines and explains the nature and character of war. This paper uses two important concepts of Trinitarian warfare described by Clausewitz and compares them to the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy. Moreover, this paper offers a definition of war, provides a description of the twenty-first century security environment, explains Clausewitz' relevant theories, considers other relevant theories, and synthesizes this analysis into a more holistic and predictive theory of the nature and conduct of war.

While some will argue that all models are wrong and the current security environment is too complex to predict, one should at least try to develop a model that may give one an advantage.<sup>9</sup> Another way to look at the current security environment, is to consider applying the ACFSP to two views of Clausewitz's Trinitarian warfare in order to develop a more holistic and modern view of Trinitarian warfare. This paper will also make recommendations on further development and use of this analysis. While using these concepts to predict future competitor actions may not be possible, by overlaying the ACFSP on Trinitarian warfare theory, one may gain a better understanding of twenty- first century warfare. Even if we gain a fifty point one percent advantage, it may be enough to win, or as in Vegas, get banned from the casino. As explained by Clausewitz, in the end, warfare is ultimately a human and social interaction; this is why one should use the ACFSP to further analyze Trinitarian warfare.

### Definitions and the Current Environment

In order to begin an analysis of Trinitarian warfare and the ACFSP, the definition of a few key words is helpful. The first consideration is a definition of war that describes

a view of war useful in developing a positive theory of warfare for the twenty-first century. For the purpose of this paper, a helpful explanation of war is the definition of war provided by Joint Publication 1 which states, "War is socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose. In its essence, war is a violent clash of wills. War is a complex, human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules."<sup>10</sup> Clausewitz pointed out, "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."<sup>11</sup> In order to better understand the nature and characteristics of warfare in the twenty-first century, the proposition of war and warfare being socially sanctioned, violent, and for political purposes is paramount to the definition of war used in this paper.

This paper focuses on the nature and conduct of war relating to human and social interactions. In other words, one argument is that the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century is culturally dependent and in order to better understand it, one must use a framework that accounts for these human variables. The ACFSP provides such a framework. Further, since warfare is culturally and socially dependent, one must analyze it through a cultural framework while instilling still relevant Trinitarian warfare theories into the framework. Therefore, in order to better understand and apply Clausewitz' theory of war, one should apply the ACFSP to Trinitarian theories in an attempt to develop a more useful and modern theory.

One must also begin with an understanding of the current and possible future environment. As currently described in Joint Publication 1, "The security environment is extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing, disappearing, or in remission."<sup>12</sup> *The U.S. National Security Strategy* states, "The lives of our citizens—their safety and

prosperity—are more bound than ever to events beyond our borders."<sup>13</sup> Therefore, the strategic environment most likely to be encountered in the twenty-first century is one of continued volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).<sup>14</sup> Moreover, future warfare will most likely be dominated by increasing availability of information and one in which emerging technology will provide more closely connected societies.<sup>15</sup> This environment will continue to increase in volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, which means the nature of warfare will be even more complex and will pose even more challenges in developing a successful security strategy. Therefore, in order to better understand the environment and develop a successful strategy, one must account for the cultural aspect of warfare and the interaction between the human dynamics involved. Now, having an understanding of the future environment, one must seek a useful theory to comprehend how to succeed in it. The intent is for one to develop a theory that is useful for creating a positive and somewhat more predictive strategy in the current environment.

### Clausewitz' Trinitarian Theory

Before one can effectively explore the linkage of culture as it relates to Trinitarian warfare, one should first explore the concepts Clausewitz proposed. The primary and most relevant theory of War from Clausewitz that I will analyze is that of the "paradoxical trinity."<sup>16</sup> In *On War* Clausewitz presented the idea of Trinitarian warfare. He states:

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.<sup>17</sup>

Clausewitz' Trinity has been described and analyzed by many authors and scholars and is often criticized for no longer being relevant in today's environment. Two basic views of the Trinity will be used in this analysis. One, which Clausewitz described as violence, chance, and subordination to policy and the second described as people, the Army, and the government. It is the melding of these ideas with a cultural lens that may help these theories become more useful in today's security environment.

The first concept of the Trinity considered is that of violence, chance and probability, and political purpose.<sup>18</sup> To summarize, Clausewitz' view is that war is composed of primordial violence, chance and probability, and subordination to policy.<sup>19</sup> This view of warfare being composed of violent action was key in Clausewitz' view and is valid in today's environment. A quick review of current events in Libya, Israel, and Syria illustrate the fact that violence is, and will, continue to be a factor in modern warfare. Some may argue that due to an increase in technology, violence will be more important than chance and political purpose. Further, the nature of warfare being composed of chance and probability can never be overstated. Again, a scan of current events illustrates that chance and probability are still relevant in today's VUCA environment.

For example, in Israel the political purpose is for the state to survive. This leads one to understand the relevance and importance of political purpose in modern warfare. In Clausewitz' view, political purpose mattered and was relevant to warfare. In today's

environment, political purpose is still applicable and must be understood in order to truly comprehend warfare and to develop useful strategies. In summary, the three aspects of violence, chance, and political purpose are still relevant in today's security environment but can be improved upon by adding a cultural lens, or framework, for strategy development. By utilizing the Trinity and applying a cultural aspect to them, they can be better understood and possibly more predictive in nature. To further develop this analysis, one should also consider another aspect of Clausewitz' theory of warfare.

Another view of Clausewitz' Trinity that must be explored is a view that builds upon the first by linking the people, the Army, and the government to warfare. These remain significant variables in the conduct of warfare. Clausewitz further states, "The first of these aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government."<sup>20</sup> It is important to note in this analysis that Clausewitz' view of "military" is being linked with diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) power. By further expanding Clausewitz' idea of Army to the DIME, one can further expand the theory. Additionally, they must be understood and taken into consideration in order to develop a modern theory of warfare. Again, by adding a cultural framework to the ideas presented by Clausewitz, one can better analyze future warfare and develop more successful strategies for interacting with the current environment.

Due to the twenty-first century environment previously described, Clausewitz' theories are still relevant to the nature of war in the twenty-first century. While Martin van Creveld and Barbara Ehrenreich might argue that the Clausewitz' Trinity is not of much value in the twenty-first century, it does provide a lens to begin analysis and

development of a useful theory.<sup>21</sup> As pointed out by Villacres and Bassford, what is most important is the interaction of these three entities which are always shifting and independent of each other.<sup>22</sup> It is this interaction that is most important to understand and most difficult to predict. The interaction of the elements of the Trinity, as shown in a video which portrays the chaos of warfare with magnets and an unpredictable pendulum, illustrates the highly unpredictable and chaotic nature and outcome of war.<sup>23</sup> The elements of the Trinity themselves are at some times more important, or more in play than others and this interaction is difficult to predict as well. This further illustrates the need for developing a framework to help better understand the interaction of the elements of Clausewitz' theories. Further, as technology and information processing capacity increases, by studying culture within a given framework one may be able to gain an advantage in the twenty-first century environment. Therefore, one should develop a more predictive theory that is ready for this emerging technology to utilize, which in turn, could lead to better and more predictive strategy development.

### Other Theories

While Clausewitz provides a relevant, yet complex, theory of warfare, other theorists should be considered in order to form a more holistic view of warfare in the twenty-first century. One still highly regarded and often studied theorist is Sun Tzu. Among other things, Sun Tzu believed that the best warfare is not to ever fight your enemy.<sup>24</sup> He further postulated that you must also know yourself and your enemy in order to win.<sup>25</sup> While Sun Tzu's theories are useful, they do not provide a holistic lens for the future of warfare. However, knowing oneself and one's enemy should not be discounted, and in order to provide a more holistic theory of warfare, one must include an assessment of both parties in war. It is this idea of understanding oneself and one's

enemies that brings one to use a framework like the ACFSP to better understand Trinitarian warfare and future warfare. Further, an understanding of both one's enemies and allies is important to both strategy development and important to maintaining healthy relationships with one's allies. By addressing culture as a framework and applying it to Trinitarian theories of warfare, one can begin to better understand and thus gain an advantage in the current and future environment.

#### Why use the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy

While Trinitarian warfare as explained by Clausewitz is still relevant in today's security environment, one should consider other ways to analyze it or apply it. Stated another way, adding a cultural analysis lens should help improve its utility as an analytical tool and basis for developing strategy. As pointed out by Villacres and Bassford, "In itself, however, Clausewitz's description of the interaction among the elements of the Trinity leaves out the fact, strongly emphasized elsewhere in *On War*, that war is always an interaction between two opposing groups."<sup>26</sup> It is this interaction between opposing groups that must be overlaid on the two views of the Trinity outlined above. Adding the dimension of people or culture to the interaction of Trinitarian warfare must be further explored in order to better understand warfare. Moreover, in order to better understand the current environment, one can apply the ACFSP to the Trinity to further develop and understand the interaction between both opposing and allying groups. What follows is a more in depth explanation of the ACFSP.

#### The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy Explained

While Sun Tzu's theories do provide seemingly timeless advice for warfare, another more modern theory that should be considered is that of an Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy. Ultimately, this framework allows one to break

down the lens of culture into parts that can be analyzed. Adam Silverman describes this framework as a dynamic interaction of three distinct and overlapping lenses: identity, institutions, and resilience.<sup>27</sup>

Silverman explains identity as a set of commonalities that "...can be based on ethno-national, ethno-religious, ethno-linguistic, gendered, class, caste, kinship (family, clan, tribe, moiety, etc.), locality, nation, region, religion, and other ideational constructs)."<sup>28</sup> In other words, identity is who I am and why I am here. He further explains that institutions are "the way in which people organized their societies."<sup>29</sup> Said another way, institutions are how one organizes as a group to deal with the world. Lastly, he describes resilience saying "...new conceptualization of resilience is produced through the interaction between identity and structures/institutions, as well as the dynamic tension that this creates."<sup>30</sup> Another way to look at resilience is how open one is to change or modification based on interaction with the environment.

Silverman explains that using the framework can help overcome the low information gap faced by strategic leaders.<sup>31</sup> Stated another way, using the ACFSP framework helps counter the VUCA nature and conduct of warfare and thus make better strategic decisions. While the future environment becomes more complex, an understanding of the ACFSP lenses may prove to be very predictive when overlaid on the two views of the Trinity as described by Clausewitz.

With this understanding of the ACFSP in mind, it may be worth revisiting a few key points. War, as pointed out in Joint Publication 1, "... is a complex, human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules."<sup>32</sup> Further, the United States wages war employing all instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational,

military, and economic(DIME).<sup>33</sup> As previously stated, it is important to note that in this analysis and attempt to provide a more holistic theory of war, the author links Clausewitz' "military" with that of the DIME. In addition, our hypothesis is that by focusing on the cultural environment, and lens, one can gain a better understanding of future warfare. As explained in *The Significance of Culture to the Military*, "Culture plays a role in why and how people engage in conflict, while conflict itself can change culture."<sup>34</sup> This means that culture will continue to play a significant role in warfare and that future strategic success depends on understanding the interaction and relationship of culture to warfare. Therefore, it is necessary to apply a cultural lens to the Trinity and bring it into the twenty-first century. The ACFSP provides one with a way to examine the Trinity and better explain the nature and conduct of warfare. The following analysis provides an overlay of each of the two views of the Trinity described above to the ACFSP.

#### Analysis with Violence, Chance, and Political Purpose

The ACFSP provides one the best lens to help one understand the human and cultural aspects of warfare and it helps explain Clausewitz' trinity in a more holistic manner. In order to gain a strategic advantage in the twenty-first century environment and to expand on Clausewitz' trinity, it is this author's hypothesis that overlaying the ACFSP on top of the trinity to help better explain its parts may help to find a more predictive theory of war. As noted in figure one below, applying the ACFSP to the trinity allows one to frame identity with violence, institutions with political purpose, and resilience with chance and probability. This analysis provides a view of twenty-first century warfare that is more relevant to the current and future environment and more useful in developing a successful grand strategy.




Figure 1

As pointed out previously, it is the interaction of these three aspects that is most important. By linking identity to violence, one can begin to explain why warfare might be waged. Further, one can begin to identify what may make a competitor resort to war. By linking institutions to political purpose, one can begin to identify how a competitor might develop a strategy to wage war. Political purpose linked to institutional analysis also shows one the means by which a competitor will attempt to gain such purpose. Lastly, by linking resilience to chance and probability, one might be able to remove some of the pure chance in the system by understanding how it interacts with the other two aspects.

By looking at the current situation in Syria, one can see that these interactions are still relevant. For example, both the current government and those opposing it are organized to interact with the environment, and both are driven by distinct political purpose. Further, both use violence in order to achieve their ends and are doing so based on their unique identities. Lastly, the resilience displayed by the two opposing

forces illustrates the difficulty in predicting interactions between the elements of the ACFSP and also the importance of chance and probability.

By using the analysis outlined in the ACFSP, one can begin to better understand and predict the interaction between violence, chance, and political purpose. One can argue that the ACFSP provides questions which may point to nuances in the Trinity and a deeper and more useful use of the Trinity. It is this analysis that brings Clausewitz' Trinitarian warfare theory to a more holistic model and may help make it more predictive and useful.

The interaction of the three aspects of the Trinity described above could lead one to conclude that prediction and accurate analysis is difficult at best. The introduction of more variables described by the ACFSP could make it harder to develop a successful strategy for the future. However, by using the elements of the ACFSP and understanding the relationship and interaction between the elements of the Trinity, one can begin to develop a framework that will be useful to a strategist. By using the framework and variables described by Silverman, one can begin to gain a thorough understanding of one's environment and those competing in it; further, by understanding the relation to Trinitarian warfare, one can gain an advantage. It is with this framework that one begins to gain the understanding required to develop useful strategy.

#### Analysis with Government, People, and DIME

Another way to compare the Trinity to the ACFSP that must be considered is to compare it to government, people, and DIME. As illustrated in Figure two below, it is helpful to compare identity to people, resilience to the DIME and institutions to government.




Figure 2

By using the ACFSP to analyze an adversary's aspects of identity, institutions, and resilience, one can begin to better understand the interplay of people, government, and DIME as outlined by Clausewitz. It is the unpredictable nature and interaction of people, government, and army as outlined by Clausewitz that the ACFSP provides a foundation for further study and understanding.

The current situation in Israel points to the importance of understanding government, people, and DIME as these interactions all influence each other and are also influenced by culture. For example, the government of Israel uses the DIME to achieve its survival. Said another way, the DIME for Israel is directly tied to its resilience. By understanding the government through the institutional lens as described by the AFCSP, one can begin to see how the government might act. Further, by linking further analysis of people to identity, one can begin to better understand why, and perhaps when, Israel and its competitors take the action they do.

By using the framework outlined by Silverman, one can begin to possibly make more predictive suggestions with regard to the interaction between the elements of the

Trinity and the current environment. These variables and questions that the AFCSP answer get right to the heart of what Clausewitz predicted in relation to the uncertainty in the Trinitarian system.

While these comparisons and analysis may sound simple at first look, the complexity and interaction of the three respective elements of both theories are in fact extremely complex. However, the only way to gain an advantage and develop a reasonable security strategy is to analyze each of Clausewitz' elements of the Trinity with respect to the ACFSP analysis. As Sun Tzu pointed out, this analysis should be done on both oneself and ones' adversaries. One can also argue that this analysis should indeed be conducted on one's allies as well and used to develop a strategy for maintaining one's allies. Using the ACFSP can help one sift through information and determine what is important strategically.<sup>35</sup> Taken one step further, determining the important information and applying it to theory may help one devise a better strategy. This is exactly what Clausewitz attempted to do by developing a theory of warfare to help one sift through what is important and develop a better strategy. After synthesizing the ACFSP with the two views of the Trinity, a few recommendations are warranted and provided below.

### Recommendations

The first recommendation from this analysis is further study and exploration of the ACFSP overlaid with Clausewitz' theories of Trinitarian warfare. It is clear that the twenty-first century environment will be challenging and unpredictable and a strategist will need to develop a theory that helps understand such an environment. In order to develop a strategy to contend with this environment, one must consider the implications of the human dimension and use the ACFSP to better understand this dimension.

Further study could include case study analysis and an evaluation of current strategies, allies, and competitors with the cultural lens applied. Further development and analysis of the two theories could provide a more predictive view of future warfare and help develop better strategies for contending with the complexity of the future environment.

The second recommendation surmised from this analysis is that the U.S. government must begin to fully use the ACFSP in its policy and strategy development. This includes synchronizing efforts and understanding through diplomatic, informational, economic, and military means. Clausewitz' theories of Trinitarian warfare further illustrate the need for cultural understanding and analysis in developing successful strategic plans and successfully guiding decisions while conducting war. By first analyzing culture using the ACFSP overlaid on Clausewitz' Trinity, any strategy will certainly have a greater chance for success. Further, this analysis will help one predict and mitigate unwanted second and third order effects. In order to develop successful strategies, the U.S. government must further develop the ACFSP and relate it to Trinitarian warfare. While this may seem too hard to do, not doing it could also prove to be extremely costly in the long run.

The third recommendation illustrated in this analysis is the need for more education on the relationship between Clausewitz' theories of warfare and the application of a cultural framework to Trinitarian warfare. There is no doubt that students of strategy must study Clausewitz and other theorists in order to be successful at developing strategy. One idea often heard is that in order to better understand the future, one should read an old book. However, without an application and synthesis of the ACFSP into these theories and taking into account the human aspect of warfare,

education in the basics will not be enough. It is the understanding of older theories of warfare and their application to more modern theories through synthesis and analysis that may be the most important understanding required for developing successful strategy. By studying warfare theorists and then applying the ACFSP, one will have the best chance of developing more positive strategies in the future.

The fourth recommendation in this paper is developing doctrine within the Department of Defense that uses the ACFSP as a basis for strategy and policy analysis. This might include a Joint Publication or other strategic level document that helps one understand how to apply the ACFSP and its relationship with warfare. As pointed out in this paper, Clausewitz' theories are still relevant and can be very useful when used in conjunction with the ACFSP. Having the DOD provide a doctrinal reference for the study of culture will help the synchronization of policy and strategy at all levels and further help the elements of government in understanding the environment and warfare. This publication must incorporate the ideas first explained by Clausewitz and how they are related to the ACFSP. The current situation in Iran points to the importance of understanding government, people and DIME as these interactions all influence each other and are also influenced by culture. What is most important is the understanding of one's allies and enemies relative to the Trinity and the environment. This new doctrinal reference could provide just such a framework.

### Conclusion

While some discount Clausewitz' theories as outdated and no longer relevant to today's security environment, by using and applying more modern theories to his views, one can still use Clausewitz' theories with success. To be more specific, his view of Trinitarian warfare is still applicable today and by adding a cultural analysis to take into

account the human dimension of warfare, one can improve upon his basic theory and in turn, develop better strategy. While this may sound simple and not reflective of current warfare theory, war is in the end a battle of will between two human beings and therefore understanding culture is essential to success. For this reason, applying the AFCSP to Clausewitz theories of warfare described above is imperative if they are to be used in strategy development.

In conclusion, overlaying the ACFSP on Clausewitz' Trinity provides the best theory for understanding warfare in the twenty-first century and provides one a framework that can help in developing a successful strategy. Due to the current and future security environment, breaking one's enemies and allies down by using a cultural lens can prove very helpful in gaining understanding and making decisions. Moreover, by applying the ACFSP to the interplay of violence, chance, and political goals, and by further applying the ACFSP to government, people, and DIME, decision makers can further their understanding and develop better strategy.

While some will argue that due to the inherent chance in the system, a theory of warfare is not predictive in nature and therefore not worthwhile. On the other hand, by understanding Clausewitz' Trinity and its elements and the interaction between them, one may gain an advantage. While a one hundred percent predictive and accurate theory might be a bridge too far, understanding the Trinity and looking at it through another lens may allow one to gain an understanding and thus an advantage over enemies. Much like the stock market, a fifty point one percent advantage can often be very profitable. By applying the ACFSP to Clausewitz' Trinity, one can best seek to

understand the nature and conduct of war in the twenty-first century and gain an advantage over one's enemies.

## Endnotes

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