

Strategy Research Project

U.S. Government Interagency Reform Needed in Support of National Security

by

Colonel David P. Mauser
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE U.S. Government Interagency Reform Needed in Support of National Security				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel David P. Mauser United States Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor William.J.Flavin Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 5,699					
14. ABSTRACT The United States faces serious threats from established states, weak and failing states, and non-state actors from around the world. In the current volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous international environment, one in which the U.S. is trying to exercise global leadership, the U.S. government must reform its interagency apparatus to ensure our national security. Effective and efficient interagency coordination is vital to national security. However, the lack of updated or current legislation requiring the integration of capabilities and capacities of the separate U.S. government agencies and departments has led to wasteful spending, mistrust of U.S. intentions, in-fighting for resources and prestige, and failure to implement the NSS and execute effective foreign policy. Congress must mandate interagency reform in support of national security.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Improvement of Cooperation Among Defense, Diplomacy, and Development					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

U.S. Government Interagency Reform Needed in Support of National Security

by

Colonel David P. Mauser
United States Army

Professor William.J.Flavin
Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: U.S. Government Interagency Reform Needed in Support of National Security

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 34

Word Count: 5,699

Key Terms: Improvement of Cooperation Among Defense, Diplomacy, and Development

Classification: Unclassified

The United States faces serious threats from established states, weak and failing states, and non-state actors from around the world. In the current volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous international environment, one in which the U.S. is trying to exercise global leadership, the U.S. government must reform its interagency apparatus to ensure our national security. Effective and efficient interagency coordination is vital to national security. However, the lack of updated or current legislation requiring the integration of capabilities and capacities of the separate U.S. government agencies and departments has led to wasteful spending, mistrust of U.S. intentions, in-fighting for resources and prestige, and failure to implement the NSS and execute effective foreign policy. Congress must mandate interagency reform in support of national security.

U.S. Government Interagency Reform Needed in Support of National Security

America's interagency toolkit remains a hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes. While, other countries move quickly to funding projects and building relationships.

—Secretary of Defense Robert Gates¹

The United States faces serious threats of terrorism and cyber-attacks, as well as threats to our access to natural resources, and freedom to navigate on the global commons. These threats emanate from established states, weak and failing states, and non-state actors from around the world. On the surface, it appears that the Department of Defense (DoD) should be the lead agency for addressing these threats. However, a more comprehensive approach is needed to prevent the U.S. government from using a hammer when a screwdriver is needed. In the current volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous international environment, one in which the U.S. is trying to exercise global leadership, the U.S. government must reform its interagency apparatus to support the National Security Strategy (NSS) and ensure our national security.

In his 2010 NSS, President Obama declared that we must strengthen and integrate the capabilities of DoD, the Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) so that we can advance our interests and the interests we share with other countries and peoples to ensure our collective security.²

In May 2010, during a NSS conference at the Brookings Institute, then Secretary of State Clinton further advocated an increase in collaboration and cooperation among DoD, DoS, and USAID. She advised that defense, diplomacy, and development are not separate entities, either in substance or in process. She claimed that they had to be viewed as part of an integrated whole, so the whole-of-government approach was the

best way to protect and preserve the nation's interests.³ Likewise, prior to being confirmed as the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Panetta was asked by a senator if he believed that the U.S. government needs to establish new procedures to manage stability operations. Secretary Panetta responded that he believed one area in which we can improve is in our collective ability to conduct whole-of-government planning. He claimed this approach would enhance the management and the effectiveness of the U.S. government's stabilization and reconstruction activities.⁴

The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State, along with many national-level think tanks espouse a whole-of-government approach to improve interagency cooperation and thereby increase efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy— and reduce wasteful ineffective actions. However, no single U.S. government entity is yet equipped, structured, or funded to plan, coordinate, integrate, and execute the U.S. responses to the many international threats that the U.S. faces in the immediate future. This lack of integrated planning allows the many U.S. departments and agencies to develop their own independent views of the problems, issues, challenges, and objectives of the U.S. government.

Effective and efficient interagency coordination is vital to national security. However, the lack of updated or current legislation requiring the integration of capabilities and capacities of the separate U.S. government agencies and departments has led to wasteful spending, mistrust of U.S. intentions, in-fighting for resources and prestige, and failure to implement the NSS and execute effective foreign policy. Without appropriated legislation, efforts to implement U.S. foreign policy will continue to prove ineffective, wasteful and, at times, counter-productive. It appears that DoD, DoS, and

USAID, except for a few specific examples, stovepipe their efforts, aligned with traditional departmental and agency procedures. They do not cooperate sufficiently with each other, in the pursuit of our national security.

Very few congressionally mandated programs are as successfully integrated as the international military education and training program. Congress requires genuine interagency cooperation and coordination in the execution of this program. The international military education and training program serves as an excellent model for the U.S. interagency.

The U.S. cannot implement its stated National Security Strategy or most of its foreign policies effectively, or ensure ongoing U.S. global leadership, unless it truly reforms its interagency apparatus. It needs to develop a whole-of-government approach that uses all elements of national power— diplomacy, information, military, and economic— in a well-coordinated collaborations.

In his 2010 National Security Strategy, President Obama described that successful international engagement depends upon the effective use and integration of all the elements of American power. The NSS posits that the coordinated efforts of our military, diplomatic and developmental resources will support the emergence of new and successful partners from the Americas to Africa, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia to assure the U.S. national security and prosperity.⁵ President Obama, like his predecessors, champions a whole-of-government approach. Therefore, he directed the U.S. agencies and departments to improve their interagency teamwork and to collaborate on the planning and execution of U.S. foreign policy. Unfortunately, there is

little evidence that interagency coordination in support of national security, has improved since he took office in 2008.

In addition to the 2010 NSS, the Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, and DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review and other DoD publications, such as Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, call for an improved interagency coordination on national security issues. However, dozens of scholarly articles, books, and Congressional Research Service's reports continue to criticize the U.S. interagency process and the perceived lack of a whole-of-government approach that integrates all elements of national power effectively.

Despite the President's urging and despite bureaucratic rhetoric, DoD, DoS, and USAID are still not sufficiently planning, coordinating, or executing U.S. actions around the world. They must do more and do better for three principle reasons: First, DoD, DoS, and USAID are primarily responsible for implementing the NSS and executing U.S. foreign policy. However, each of these agencies plans, coordinates, and executes its own activities in different ways that are often stovepiped, in contrast to a whole-of-government approach. Second, in the current fiscal environment, the United States cannot afford to be ineffective or inefficient in the implementation of the NSS or foreign policy. Duplicated and wasteful practices must be identified and stopped. Third, and more importantly, the U.S. is facing unprecedented threats from near-failing or failing states and non-state aggressors who operate in states that fail to police their territories. Only the coordinated efforts of DoD, DoS, and USAID can coordinate programs that

facilitate improvements in the security, governance and economic development of weak and failing states to prevent them from serving as breeding grounds for illicit activities.

There is also a long history of mistrust, parochialism, and infighting among DoD, DoS, and USAID. This has inhibited effective coordination among these three agencies. The roles and functions of DoD, DoS, and USAID must be clarified in the first step toward creating of an effective whole-of-government approach to U.S. foreign policy and national security.

Roles and Responsibilities

The Department of Defense's mission is to field, sustain, and employ the military capabilities needed to protect the United States and its allies and to advance our national interests. DoD defends the United States from threats, deters potential adversaries, fosters regional security, and assures access to the global commons by assisting partner nations in improving their security capacity and by supporting U.S. diplomatic and development efforts.⁶ DoD continues to support, work with, and cooperate with other U.S. agencies, especially DoS and USAID to plan and conduct shaping activities such as stability operations, theater security cooperation programs, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. In recent years, DoD has published several doctrinal manuals affirming the importance and describing how to conduct interagency coordination. However, in practice, there still lacks a true integrated approach among DoD, DoS, and USAID in dealing with national security issues.

The Department of State is the lead agency for foreign affairs. It is responsible for advancing U.S. objectives and interests in shaping a freer, more secure, and more

prosperous world. DoS is responsible for all foreign affairs activities to include U.S. representation abroad, foreign assistance programs, countering international crime, and foreign military training programs.⁷

One successful interagency coordination effort is the Department of State's lead in foreign military training programs that directly contribute to U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. Close interagency coordination between DoD and DoS, in providing foreign military training, results from a congressional mandate. The Secretary of State is responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction and determination of U.S. military assistance and U.S. military education and training programs to ensure that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and that U.S. foreign policy is best served.⁸ Congress has clearly specified that The Secretary of State is responsible for the entire foreign military training program, for which DoD assumes a supporting role. Congress' identification of the lead and supporting agencies and specifications of their respective responsibilities has produced an effective program that demands interagency coordination that supports national security.

USAID plays a vital role in supporting U.S. national security and foreign policy by promoting peace and stability to foster economic growth, to protect human health, to provide emergency humanitarian assistance, and to enhance democracy in developing countries. USAID primarily offers long-range economic and social development assistance to foreign countries.⁹

This summary of the roles and responsibilities of DoD, DoS, and USAID clearly reveals many areas of overlap among them. For example, DoD is clearly responsible

for supporting DoS's diplomatic efforts and USAID's developmental programs. In addition, DoS is the lead agency for foreign military education and is responsible for shaping a freer and more secure environment, which requires coordination with DoD and its pre-hostility shaping operations. However, it is very clear that DoD has taken the greatest steps toward interagency cooperation.

The Department of Defense Embraces Whole-of-Government

Interagency cooperation and coordination and the whole-of-government approach are clearly advocated in many of DoD's directives and doctrinal publications. Several Joint and Army publications specify that a whole-of-government approach is needed to support the NSS and foreign policy. For example, DoD doctrine calls for interagency cooperation in the conduct of foreign humanitarian assistance. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, states that the delivery of foreign humanitarian assistance is a DoD mission, in support of USAID, conducted outside the United States to relieve or reduce human suffering. Likewise, DoD conducts foreign internal defense operations. However, these complex operations are designed for U.S. civilian and military personnel working together and with other countries' civilian and military departments to protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.¹⁰ These are clearly interagency operations.

In November 2005, DoD issued directive 3000.05, which designated stability operations as a core U.S. military mission that the services must be prepared to conduct and support. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 described stability operations as military and civilian activities that are conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict. Additionally, stability operations are conducted to help establish order that

protects U.S. interests and further U.S. values. The near-term DoD goals are to provide the local populace with security, to restore essential services, and to meet humanitarian needs. After DoD establishes a secure environment, DoS and USAID can begin working on their long-term goals of developing democratic institutions, growing a robust civil society, and building a viable economy.¹¹

In September 2009, DoD reissued Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 as Department of Defense Instruction 3000.05. One of the major changes to the former directive is its definition of stability operations. DoD now defines stability operations as an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, to provide essential governmental services, to carry out emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and to deliver humanitarian relief. DoD continues to advocate that integrated civilian and military efforts are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations. Once again, DoD must collaborate planning efforts with DoS and USAID to strengthen governance, security, and promote economic growth that supports increased indigenous capacity to self-govern.¹²

In December 2008, DoD issued Directive 3000.07 Irregular Warfare, which establishes policy and assigns each service's responsibilities to conduct of irregular warfare and to develop capabilities that address irregular challenges to our national security. Irregular Warfare includes a variety of DoD operations such as foreign internal defense and stability operations that seek to establish or re-establish order in a fragile state. DoD must synchronize activities related to irregular warfare with the collaborative

policies, plans, and procedures of other U.S. agencies— including collaborative training and exercises that promote interoperability, and coordination between DoD and DoS. Additionally, DoD has directed the services to support exchange programs and rotational assignments between the U.S. agencies and department, that enhances the service's and DoD's overall understanding of the functions and structures of other relevant organizations.¹³ In compliance with Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization hosted several interagency education and training workshops. However, interagency participation was limited. It appears that a major challenge to increased interagency participation, especially by DoS and USAID employees, is the lack of a designated lead agency for stability operations. DoS and USAID do not want to subvert themselves or be responsible to DoD, while DoD sees itself as the leader in stability operations. Additionally, it is not mandatory to participate in interagency training and education programs and is a relatively low priority for DoD, DoS, and USAID. Congress has attempted— at least twice— to mandate interagency training and education. However, both of these legislative attempts failed to garner enough votes to become law.

What has Congress Done

Members of Congress have launched several attempts to make interagency coordination and cooperation more effective. However, most recent legislative attempts died in committees or proved too weak to bring about needed change. Currently, there are few laws or mechanisms requiring DoD, DoS, and USAID to work together in a holistic manner to ensure the nation's security.

This need for improved interagency coordination is not new. The first Congressional attempt, following World War II, to make interagency coordination and cooperation more effective and, thereby, to make the United States a more secure nation, was the National Security Act of 1947. Through passage of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress intended to establish integrated policies and procedures for U.S. departments, agencies, and functions related to the national security. One of the major provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 was the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC). It is responsible for advising the President on the formation of domestic, foreign, and military policies that pertain to national security.¹⁴ Additionally, the National Security Act of 1947 established the Transnational Threats Committee, with representatives from DoD, DoS, and other agencies as directed by the President. The Committee was responsible for coordinating and directing the activities of the US government in combating transnational threats. The transnational threats Committee was designed to develop strategies that enabled the U.S. government to respond to transnational threats and to assist in the resolution of operational and policy differences among agencies in their responses to transnational threats.¹⁵ However, 57 years later, after countless DoD and DoS operations, U.S. interagency efforts remain difficult, uncoordinated, and challenging, according to the report from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.

Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which was intended to enhance the U.S. foreign policy, security, and general welfare by assisting peoples around the world in their efforts to develop their economies and to secure their countries. Additionally, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 created USAID.¹⁶ However,

like many other legislative attempts, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 did not require DoD, DoS, or USAID to coordinate their efforts. Ironically, it just created another bureaucratic stovepipe in the foreign policy arena.

Following President G.W. Bush's issuance of National Security Presidential Directive 44, Congress attempted to pass the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008. This act provides authorization and appropriation to fund the office of the Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction. The House of Representatives passed a version of this act. However, the Senate never voted on the bill and it died in committee. Fortunately, the National defense Authorization Act of 2009 incorporated the authorization of the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 directed the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID to monitor political and economic instability worldwide. They were to anticipate the need for mobilizing U.S. and international resources for reconstruction and stabilization of a country or region that is at risk of, is already into, or is transitioning from conflict or civil strife. Additionally, DoS was tasked to ensure the adequacy of training and education of civilian personnel and other agencies that performed reconstruction and stabilization activities. Finally, to improve effectiveness and avoid duplications, DoS was directed to ensure that plans for U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations were coordinated with and complement activities of other governments and international and nongovernmental organizations.¹⁷

In 2009, Congress attempted to improve interagency coordination by suggesting to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Administrator for USAID, that they establish an interagency advisory panel. The National Defense Authorization Act

of 2009 authorized establishment of an advisory panel for reviewing and recommending ways to improve coordination between DoD, DoS, and USAID on matters of national security.¹⁸ Unfortunately, Congress did not direct, only suggested, the creation of the advisory panel. DoD, DoS, and USAID never established the advisory panel.

Another Congressional attempt to improve interagency coordination was the formation of the Center for Complex Operations, which was also authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2009. The Center for Complex Operations was envisioned to provide effective coordination in the preparation of DoD personnel and other government personnel to conduct complex operations and to assure unity of effort during complex operations carried out by U.S. departments and agencies. The Center for Complex Operations was directed to conduct research; to collect, analyze, and distribute lessons learned; and to compile best practices in matters relating to complex operations. Additionally, the Center for Complex Operations was tasked to identify education and training gaps and facilitate efforts to close those gaps. However, Congress stopped short of directing the implementation of the Center for Complex Operation's research findings and best practices. Congress only directed the Secretary of Defense to seek the Secretary of State's concurrence with these findings. However, Congress did not mandate that the Secretary of State adopt or even work with the DoD to enact proposals of the Center for Complex Operations. To further muddy the waters on who is responsible for leading complex operations outside the United States, Congress defined complex operations as the following types of operations: stability operations, security operation, transition and reconstruction operations, or operation involving irregular warfare.¹⁹ However, Congress did not designate who was the lead

agency or if agencies needed to coordinate amongst themselves during the conduct of any of these operations.

In May 2010, the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives submitted, to the full Congress, Report 11-491 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. The Report claimed that the advisory panel on improving interagency national security coordination, originally authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2009, would provide invaluable objective information and recommendations on how to improve coordination and collaboration among U.S. agencies. The House Armed Services Committee encouraged, but did not direct, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of USAID to stand up the advisory panel immediately. Additionally, the Committee also requested the advisory panel to determine how the agencies should collaborate on providing interagency training, education, and rotational assignment opportunities for their personnel, and how the agencies should incentivize their personnel and organizations to enable and encourage rotational assignments. Unfortunately, authorization for the advisory panel on improving interagency national security coordination did not make it into the final National Defense Authorization Act of 2011.²⁰ The original authorization for the establishment of an advisory panel on improving interagency national security coordination expired December 31, 2012. Therefore, there is no current authorization to establish an advisory panel on improving interagency national security coordination.

In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, Congress directed the President to develop a plan for achieving the vision for whole-of-government integration that he cited in his 2010 National Security Strategy. Congress directed the President to

provide details on what actions were to be taken by the President and the executive agencies to implement organizational changes and programs that would provide a whole-of-government approach cited in the NSS. Additionally, Congress requested an outline of specific actions desired or required to be taken by Congress to achieve each component of the NSS's whole of-government vision.²¹ Even though Congress required the President to submit a report on his vision for whole-of-government integrations by December 31, 2012, it appears that the President has not submitted the report.

Interagency Reform Actions by the President

A success story in interagency coordination began in 1999 when President Clinton issued Executive Order 13055, which was intended to improve the coordination of U.S. sponsored international exchanges and training programs.²² Acting on this executive order, Congress later that year mandated, in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, the establishment of a senior-level interagency working group. This working group was designed to improve the coordination, efficiency, effectiveness, understanding, and cooperation among the U.S. agencies conducting international exchange and training programs. The interagency working group consisted of senior representatives from DoD, DoS, and USAID, the Department of Education, and the Department of Justice. In order to make the most efficient and cost-effective use of Federal resources, the interagency working group was tasked to identify administrative and programmatic redundancies and overlaps of activities by the various U.S. agencies involved in international exchange and training programs. Further, this group was tasked to explain how each government-sponsored international exchange and training program promoted U.S. foreign policy.²³

The interagency working group's 2011 annual report states that the interagency working group strives to break down barriers to interagency communication and promote a sense of community among federal program sponsors. Open communication and cooperation supports our current efforts to improve the coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness of all U.S. sponsored international exchange and training activities.²⁴ This example demonstrates that interagency cooperation and coordination can be effective and have positive impacts on U.S. foreign policy.

In 2004, President G.W. Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44, which directs enhancement of the capacity to stabilize or reconstruct countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. It directs establishment of a sustainable path toward peaceful societies. Additionally, President G.W. Bush directed the Secretary of State to coordinate efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure collaborations and cooperation on any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. It directed these departments to develop guiding precepts and implementation procedures for reconstruction and stabilization, which could be integrated into military contingency plans and doctrine. DoS was tasked to ensure program and policy coordination among departments and agencies of the U.S. government in carrying out the policies outlined in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, and other relevant laws. Finally, the Secretaries of State and Defense were directed to develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels. To assist in these interagency coordination efforts, President G.W. Bush directed the establishment of the Office of Coordinator for Stability and

Reconstruction, known in interagency circles as the S/CRS. The Office of S/CRS was created in response to experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan; it was based on lessons learned that revealed the need for improved coordination between civilian organizations and the military. The Coordinator for stability and reconstruction was directed to strengthen U.S. security through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance rendered to foreign states, in order to execute U.S. foreign policy and to enhance U.S. security and protect the nation's economic interest.²⁵ Unfortunately, the S/CRS never developed into the effective coordination center envisioned by President G.W. Bush. In 2011, the Department of State's newly formed Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations subsumed the Office of Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction.

Once again, in 2007, in an attempt to enhance national security and improve interagency coordination, President G.W. Bush issued Executive Order 13434, which directed the establishment of the national security professional development program. President G.W. Bush believed that providing national security professionals with access to integrated education, training, and interagency and intergovernmental assignments would enhance the national security professional's mission-related knowledge, skills, and experience—and thereby improve their capability to safeguard the nation's security. Similar to the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the national security professional development program established professional development guidelines for career-advancing opportunities. This program, if implemented, would increase the expertise and effectiveness of national security professionals working in an interagency environment.²⁶ However, Congress never authorized funding for the

national security professional program and participation has been mainly limited to military personnel. Fortunately, it appears that President Obama reaffirmed the importance of the national security professional program. President Obama remarked in his 2010 NSS that a key step to more effectively ensure our national security strategy is adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges.²⁷

An unintended setback to the improvement of interagency coordination efforts occurred in 2011, when President Obama directed the establishment of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, which was designed to advance U.S. national security by fostering integrated, civilian-led efforts to address the full spectrum of conflict, from prevention to stabilization response. This comprehensive approach was intended to help DoS anticipate and adapt to 21st century security challenges while supporting U.S. leaders in emerging crises by setting conditions for long-term peace. The unintended setback to interagency cooperation occurred when the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations subsumed and integrated the role of the Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction. However, the Bureau of Conflicts and Stabilization Operation's charter does not direct the Bureau to conduct interagency coordination, as was initially directed in President G.W. Bush's National Security Presidential Directive 44.²⁸ Again, it appears that bureaucratic momentum overtook a potential mechanism that was designed to improve interagency coordination.

Recent Actions Presented to Congress but not Acted on

In September 2010, Representative Ike Skelton introduced the Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development System Act

of 2010. Skelton believes that national security professionals must acquire interagency knowledge, skills, and experience in order to effectively integrate and utilize the full capabilities and power of the U.S. and its allies to address national security challenges. The bill was crafted to create a system to educate, train, and develop interagency national security professionals across the entire government, similar to President G.W. Bush's Executive Order 13434. Just like the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, which stipulated prerequisites for military officers to attain the rank of general or flag officer, the National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development System Act of 2010 required senior national security professionals to meet interagency education, training, and experience requirements. Unfortunately, the bill was never approved. It died in committee.²⁹

Senator Lieberman introduced the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 in June 2011. His proposed legislation is very similar to Representative Ike Skelton's Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration and Development System Act of 2010 and President Bush's Executive Order 13434. Lieberman's Act was designed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. security activities by providing for greater interagency experience among national security and homeland security personnel. Lieberman's legislation called for the development of a national security and homeland security human capital strategy. Additionally, this Act made interagency rotational service a requirement for selection to senior executive service, thereby facilitating interagency cohesion and the accomplishment of national security objectives in an efficient and effective manner.³⁰ Just like Representative Skelton's bill,

the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 was introduced to committee; but never enacted.

In 2011, Representative Carnahan submitted the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011. Carnahan believed that despite several efforts to improve interagency coordination, such as the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the issuance of DoD Directive 3000.05, there were still serious imbalances and insufficient interagency coordination. His Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act would have established an independent entity, designated the United States Office for Contingency Operations. This office would have been tasked to monitor political and economic instability worldwide in order to anticipate the need for mobilizing U.S. and international assistance for the stabilization and reconstruction of a foreign country. Additionally, this office was to develop contingency plans and procedures to mobilize and deploy civilian and military personnel to conduct appropriate foreign stabilization and reconstruction operations in support of U.S. national security. This Act would provide for unity of command, and thus achieve unity of effort, in the planning and execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations. It would also optimize the use of resources by eliminating redundancy in functions.³¹ Like many of the other bills designed to improve interagency coordination and to foster a whole-of-government approach to national security issues, this bill was never implemented into law. It too died in committee.

As this review demonstrates, several presidents, senators, and members of Congress have proposed ways to improve interagency coordination and cooperation in

support of national security. Despite all of these efforts, it is still apparent that much needs to be done to improve the U.S. Interagency working environment.

What Can Be Done

The U.S. government has made some improvements in interagency coordination in support of national security. For example, with the urging of President G.W. Bush and the full support of Congress and the Senate, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created through the integration of 22 different federal departments and agencies into a unified, integrated department. DHS has proved a more effective and integrated approach to domestic security. The nation benefits from a strong homeland security enterprise that is better equipped to confront the current range of threats.³²

However, it took the 9/11 terrorist attacks to trigger Congress to pass legislation that created DHS, which was designed to ensure coordinated efforts of the agencies responsible for homeland defense.

DoD, DoS, and USAID's roles and responsibilities are too large and divergent to be merged into a single department similar to DHS. However, lessons learned from the creation of the DHS and the combined actions of several presidents, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and of legislators can support and guide the development of a more coherent interagency approach to U.S. foreign policy. Only such a concerted effort can ensure that U.S. national security and foreign policy sustain U.S. global leadership in the 21st Century.

Only an act of congress and the full support of the President can generate effective and efficient interagency coordination. Congress must pass legislation that not

only recommends interagency cooperation but also directs DoD, DoS, and USAID executives to assure that this cooperative approach is demonstrably institutionalized.

The first and most crucial step in interagency reform in support of national security is for Congress to establish a blue ribbon panel to study and recommend ways of improving interagency coordination in support of national security. In the past, Congress has suggested or advised the Secretaries of Defense and State to form a blue ribbon panel to study interagency reform. However, until the Secretaries are mandated to form such a panel, the effort will not receive the attention that is needed to make it a success. Congress must follow up by implementing the blue ribbon panel's recommendations in legislation that mandates coordination among DoD, DoS and USAID on matters of national security.

Congress should adopt a version of the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011. Congress should establish an independent office, with the proper authorities and funding to direct the coordination and collaboration among DoD, DoS, USAID, as well as other U.S. departments and agencies in the conduct of appropriate foreign stabilization and reconstruction operations in support of U.S. national security.

Congress can make an immediate impact on interagency reform by mandating that DoD, DoS, and USAID implement the Center for Complex Operation's lessons learned and best practices in matters relating to complex operations. Additionally, the Congress should direct, at a minimum, DoD, DoS, and the USAID to work with the Center for Complex Operations, to identify gaps in education and training and then specify the best possible ways of filling those gaps.

Congress should also implement a combined version of the National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development System Act of 2010 and the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011. Both of these bills died in their respective committees. However, there are critical components in each of these bills that would greatly enhance interagency coordination in support of national security. Congress should pass a law that provides authorities and funding to develop and implement a system that supports interagency education and training for interagency national security professionals across the entire government. Additionally, the law should mandate prerequisites for senior level national security professionals. The law should specify gates and the level of interagency education and training and the length in time spent in interagency assignments needed to qualify for senior level positions. Finally, this combined bill should clearly specify that interagency and intergovernmental assignments are career enhancing, not career-stoppers. Otherwise, most national security professionals will avoid interagency or intergovernmental assignments.

Congress must mandate interagency reform in support of national security. DoD is responsible for engagement and security cooperation activities; diplomacy and development are DoS's and USAID's responsibilities. Their separate contributions to the nation's security and welfare and should be lauded. However, the time has come for all three agencies to contribute in a more concerted effort to effectively and efficiently shape a more stable and peaceful global environment. DoD, DoS, and USAID must develop, through training, education, and assignments the ability to plan and execute a whole-of-government approach to support the NSS and to strengthen the nation's foreign policy.

Endnotes

¹Foreign Affairs, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," by Robert M. Gates, Volume 89, No. 3, May/June 2010, p. 4, 2-6, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/214287629?accountid=4444> (access January 12, 2013).

²Barack H. Obama II, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, CD: The White House, May 2010), 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed January 12, 2013).

³Hillary R. Clinton, "Remarks On the Obama Administration's National Security Strategy." The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, May 27, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/05/142312.htm> (accessed January 21, 2013).

⁴U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, confirmation hearing on the Honorable Leon E. Panetta to be Secretary of Defense, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 2011, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/06%20June/Panetta%2006-09-11.pdf> (access January 11, 2013).

⁵Barack H. Obama II, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, CD: The White House, May 2010), 11, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed January 12, 2013).

⁶*DoD Home Page*, <http://www.defense.gov/about/#mission> (accessed January 10, 2013)

⁷*DoS Home Page*, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/436.htm> (accessed January 13, 2013).

⁸Dianne E. Rennack and Susan G. Chesser, *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: Authorizations and Corresponding Appropriations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional research Service, July 29, 2011), 6, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40089.pdf> (accessed January 10, 2013).

⁹The United States Agency for International Development, *USAID Primer: What We Do and How We Do It*, (Washington, DC: USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse, January 2006), 2, http://transition.usaid.gov/about_usaid/primer.html (accessed January 12, 2013).

¹⁰U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publications 3-0 (Washington, DC: Joints Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), v.

¹¹Gordon England, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005), 2-3, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹²Michele Flournoy, Department of Defense Instructions, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009), 1-2, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹³Gordon England, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 1, 2008), 1-2, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf> (accessed December 12, 2012).

¹⁴National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (July 26, 1947), 7, <http://intelligence.senate.gov/nsaact1947.pdf> (accessed December 12, 2012).

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 9-10.

¹⁶Henry J. Hyde and Richard G. Lugar, *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2003), 19-23, <http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/ads/faa.pdf> (accessed January 12, 2013).

¹⁷*Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2009, Public Law 417, 110th Cong., 1st sess., (October 14, 2008), 2998-300, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ417/html/PLAW-110publ417.htm* (accessed December 20, 2012).

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 254.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 235.

²⁰U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Report on the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal year 2011, 11th Cong., 2nd sess., May 19, 2011, 336, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt491/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt491.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2013).

²¹National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 81, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (December 21, 2011), Section 1072, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1540> (accessed January 18, 2013).

²²William J. Clinton, Executive Order 13055, *Coordination of United States Government International Exchanges and Training Programs* (Washington, DC: The White House, July 1997), 1-2, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1997-07-21/pdf/97-19341.pdf> (accessed January 10, 2013).

²³Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law 277, 105th Cong., 2nd sess. (October 21, 1998), 112, sec. 2414, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ277/html/PLAW-105publ277.htm> (accessed January 10, 2013).

²⁴Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training 2011 Report, (Washington, DC: U.S. government Printing Office, 2011), 2, http://www.iawg.gov/rawmedia_repository/3a617beb_864e_4211_8175_5cbf0bba8330 (accessed January 18, 2013).

²⁵George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 7, 2005), 2, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html> (accessed December 15, 2012).

²⁶George W. Bush, Executive Order 13434, National Security Professional Development (Washington, DC: The Whitehouse, May 17, 2007) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13434.htm> (accessed January 15, 2013).

²⁷Barack H. Obama II, National Security Strategy (Washington, CD: The White House, May 2010), 14, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed January 12, 2013).

²⁸Nina M. Serafino and Catherine Dale, *Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional research Service, December 22, 2011), 37, <http://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/row/R42133.pdf> (accessed January 21, 2013).

²⁹Ike Skelton, Interagency National Security Professional Education, Administration, and Development System Act of 2010, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., (September 29, 2010) <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr6249> (accessed January 20, 2013).

³⁰Joseph Lieberman, Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (June 23, 2011), 50-64, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1268> (accessed January 15, 2013).

³¹Russ Carnahan, Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (December 14, 2011),8-20, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3660> (accessed January 15, 2013).

³²*The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Home Page*, <http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security> (accessed December 15, 2012).

