

Strategy Research Project

Security Cooperation: Contributions Toward National and Regional Stability in the Balkans

by

Colonel Kenneth W. Dobbertin
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGEForm Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Security Cooperation: Contributions Toward National and Regional Stability in the Balkans				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel Kenneth W. Dobbertin United States Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Professor Janeen M. Klinger Department of National Security and Strategy				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 7,689					
14. ABSTRACT The dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the resulting emergence of several independent states provide a good case study for assessing the effectiveness of security cooperation programs implemented by the United States. Accepting the importance of security cooperation programs in addressing that portion of the overall United States national security strategy aimed at strengthening national and regional security and stability, this research paper addresses the security cooperation programs that have been implemented in Southeast Europe. More specifically, this research project focuses on identifying the general limitations to security cooperation in contributing to national and regional stability that can be drawn from the Balkans example.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Nation Building, Security Assistance, Former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 42	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Security Cooperation: Contributions Toward National and Regional Stability in
the Balkans**

by

Colonel Kenneth W. Dobbertin
United States Army

Professor Janeen M. Klinger
Department of National Security and Strategy
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: Security Cooperation: Contributions Toward National and Regional Stability in the Balkans

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 42

Word Count: 7,689

Key Terms: Nation Building, Security Assistance, Former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo

Classification: Unclassified

The dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the resulting emergence of several independent states provide a good case study for assessing the effectiveness of security cooperation programs implemented by the United States. Accepting the importance of security cooperation programs in addressing that portion of the overall United States national security strategy aimed at strengthening national and regional security and stability, this research paper addresses the security cooperation programs that have been implemented in Southeast Europe. More specifically, this research project focuses on identifying the general limitations to security cooperation in contributing to national and regional stability that can be drawn from the Balkans example.

Security Cooperation: Contributions Toward National and Regional Stability in the Balkans

A coalition for democracy---it's good for America. Democracies, after all, are more likely to be stable, less likely to wage war. They strengthen civil society.

—President William J. Clinton, remarks to the 49th session of the UN General Assembly, September 26, 1994

The above declaration by President Clinton provides insight into the strategic interest of the United States to pursue a national security strategy and national military strategy which places high value on policy, programs, and a range of military operations that seek to stabilize nations and regions around the world. “Of the world’s more than 70 low-income nations, about 50 of them—excluding well-armed hostile nations such as North Korea—are weak in a way that threatens U.S. and international security.”¹ Providing stability to these weak nations is not only in the interest of those nations and regions requiring assistance but supports the interests of the United States.

To the end of providing support to other countries, nation assistance operations consist of civil or military assistance provided by U.S. forces to a nation within that nation’s territory with the goal of promoting long-term regional stability. This assistance is intended to support the host nation by promoting development and growth of responsive institutions. Nation assistance operations can be conducted during peacetime, crises, or war based on an agreement between the United States and the individual nation.²

The Department of Defense through its security cooperation program conducts missions, tasks, and actions aimed at interacting with foreign defense and security establishments in an effort to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S.

security interests and address the above problem of weak states. In addition to other interests, security cooperation efforts develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities in order to provide for internal and external defense as well as for contributions to multinational operations. These security cooperation efforts also provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to the host nation. As well as improving the host nation's institutions and increasing its ability to provide capable security forces, security cooperation programs are thought to enhance a host government's willingness and ability to care for its people.³

Accepting the importance of security cooperation programs in addressing that portion of the overall United States national security strategy aimed at strengthening national and regional security and stability, this paper attempts to address questions aimed at the security cooperation programs that have been implemented in Southeast Europe. More specifically, what are the general limitations to security cooperation in contributing to national and regional stability that can be drawn from the Balkans example?

The dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the resulting emergence of several independent states provides a good case study for assessing the effectiveness of security cooperation programs. The scope of this paper will, however, be limited to addressing select security cooperation programs and their implementation in certain countries that were formed when Yugoslavia dissolved.

The current economic situation and the pending decline in the U.S. defense budget makes it imperative to determine which programs and capabilities require prioritization and which should be reduced or eliminated. Security cooperation programs

will not be exempt from the debate as to which programs should face cuts; making the topic of this paper both relevant and timely with regard to discussing acceptable ways available to reach the strategic end of furthering national and regional security and stability.⁴

To assess the contribution of U.S. security cooperation programs, this paper first reviews relevant theory on the basic elements necessary to create national and regional stability. The second portion of this paper provides general information on security cooperation programs. Third, a case study outlines a brief history of the Balkans focusing on the conflicts of the 1990s that created the most recent instability. This section will also address security cooperation with select individual Balkan partners and analyze the effects these programs have had on the stability of the individual countries there. The conclusion of this paper will summarize the findings regarding security cooperation and its limitations in contributing to national and regional stability in the Balkans as well as identify general limitations to the use of security cooperation as a means to establish national and regional stability.

The Problem of Instability

Theories on International and Regional Stability

Two theories help explain international and regional relations based on the stability of the individual states, with the likelihood of conflict or peace being related to whether the individual states are either mature democracies (Democratic Peace Theory) or at a minimum some form of stable state (Stable-State Theory).

The democratic peace theory postulates that, “Democratically organized political systems in general operate under restraints that make them more peaceful in their relations with other democracies.”⁵ The theory also claims that in modern international

systems, democratic governments are “less likely to use lethal violence toward other democracies than toward autocratically governed states or than autocratically governed states are toward each other.”⁶ Some look at the democratic peace theory with less optimism, believing that; “The democratic peace theory may be less true in the early stages of transition to democracy, and may not fit states whose democratic transition is unfinished.”⁷ Others, however, believe in an expanded version of the democratic peace theory that hypothesizes, “Political stability makes peace... [and that] states with stable and durable political systems will lack incentives to externalize domestic discontent into conflict with foreign countries.”⁸

This “stable-state theory” also claims that, Stable states “will be even more reluctant to engage in conflict against other states that are politically stable.”⁹ This theory stresses stability of governments in contributing to peace, versus the importance of which type of government these stable nations have. The stable-state theory also takes into account the relationship of the government to the people and society, believing that if an antagonist state sees the government of another state as possessing substantial legitimacy, the antagonist will expect the people and those sectors of society that have ensured domestic stability to support their “legitimate” government against external threats and conflict.¹⁰

It is generally accepted, that In addition to the stability of individual states, membership in international organizations contributes to regional stability. International institutions foster mutual respect, recognition of nation, state, and sovereignty issues, as well as more transparency with regard to individual state intentions including those for security and defense programs.¹¹

State participation in regional and international institutions assists in fostering regional stability by managing expectations among members in the following ways. First, the institutions provide a sense of continuity with the perceived increased permanency of the organization creating reassurance that the relational norms are more likely to be there tomorrow. Second, the rules of interaction within the institution foster a sense of fairness and reciprocity. If one member gets more today, it is likely another member may get more at a later time. There is less need to worry about each transaction because over time it will likely balance out. Third, institutions, with standard status and activity reports, provide an increased level of information flow. Members are better informed of who is doing what and how that is likely to affect other member states. Finally, regional and international institutions provide more acceptable methods for conflict resolution, allowing members an avenue of resolution short of aggressive or antagonistic ways. The institution encourages peaceful resolution through the involvement of interested yet neutral states that may have ties to both parties of the conflict. Linked to this final point of conflict resolution is the ability that institutions have to collectively punish “free riders” in order to encourage members to commit adequate resources toward the development of capabilities to be used for the mutual defense of organization members.¹²

Regardless whether states are members of international organizations or whether the governments of these states are democratic, it is imperative that any attempt to create regional security and stability must first address the critical elements required within each individual state to ensure the stability of that state. In this way the

overall region will be better stabilized through individual states that can adequately address transnational non-state security threats in addition to conducting more predictable relations among other regional partners that are themselves stable and hence more predictable.

Approaches to Establishing Individual Nation Stability

Although different authors use varying terminology in identifying the key elements that contribute to creating a stable state, most subscribe to one of two overarching approaches. The first approach reflects material or concrete elements and is widely recognized as the “institutional approach”. The institutional approach focuses on the state institutions, their efficiency,¹³ the state’s administrative capability and “the ability of the state apparatus to affirm its authority and to secure its grip on society.”¹⁴ From an institutional perspective there are “three critical functions that the government of all strong, stable states perform: security, the provision of basic services, and protection of essential civil freedoms.”¹⁵

The second approach, known as the “legitimacy approach”, reflects the more idealist elements of norms and values and is concerned with “socio-political cohesion and the legitimacy central authorities can generate.”¹⁶ Based on the legitimacy approach, there are three crucial elements that contribute to the strength of a state:

the physical base of the state (effective sovereignty, international consensus on territorial limits); the institutional expression of the state (consensus on political ‘rules of the game’ but also scope of state institutions); and the idea of the state (implicit social contract and ideological consensus pertaining to a given society).¹⁷

The first two elements of the legitimacy approach overlap with the elements contained in the institutional approach, while “attention to ‘the idea of the state’ is an element unique to the legitimacy approach.”¹⁸

Kalevi J. Holsti contends that the concrete or material elements of the institutional approach are not sufficient to explain strength or weakness of states. Instead, “the critical variable is legitimacy”.¹⁹ Furthermore, the element of legitimacy has two critical dimensions. Horizontal legitimacy, “defines the limits of and criteria for membership in the political community which is ruled.”²⁰ Horizontal legitimacy “refers to the attitudes and practices of individuals and groups within the state toward each other and ultimately to the state that encompasses them.”²¹ Vertical legitimacy “establishes the connection (the “right to rule”) between society and political institutions and regimes, it “deals with authority, consent, and loyalty to the idea(s) of the state and its institutions.”²²

It is important that a state have a physical base and the necessary institutions. However, without a deep rooted legitimacy of the state, given by the majority of the people, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the institutions to function and survive.²³ Although the institutional approach is useful in identifying some of the key elements a state should provide, it appears somewhat incomplete in its ability to adequately capture the requisite relationship among the state and the people, without which the stability of the state will be tenuous at best.

Regardless of the approach or the author, one function of the state is considered indispensable and a prerequisite to all other elements that contribute to a stable state: security. “A state’s most basic task is to provide security by maintaining a monopoly on the use of force, protecting against internal and external threats, and preserving sovereignty over territory.”²⁴ Although all elements of the institutional and legitimacy approaches are important for the stability of the state, it is widely accepted that security

is the foundation for all the others.²⁵ Development of effective institutions to provide security against both internal and external threats to the people and the state must come first. Without security the other functions of state will also be ineffective. The combination of ineffective institutions and lack of security will most certainly deteriorate the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the people. The requirement for security within these two different dimensions drives the need for early development of both a military force (external and internal threats) and a police force (internal threats).²⁶

Even given his staunch belief in the importance of the element of legitimacy in creating a stable state, Holsti acknowledged the vital foundational requirement of security to the stability of every state:

In the implicit contract between individuals and the state, whereby the citizen agrees to state extractions, the most fundamental service purchased, as Hobbes emphasized, is security. The leviathan must provide law, order, and protection...that means that the authorities must protect communities against each other, individuals from individuals, and individuals against predatory actions of authorities. If the state cannot provide security, or if the state itself becomes a major threat to the life and welfare of individuals and the well-being of communities, it can hardly exercise authority or expect loyalty in return. Populations faced with these problems cannot and do not extend the "right to rule" to such states.²⁷

Synthesis of Theory on Individual Nation and Regional Stability

Based on the approaches to national stability and the theories relating to international and regional stability there are several functions that a state must fulfill in order to be stable: security (internal and external)²⁸, governance (including institutions and accepted norms of state administration)²⁹, and legitimacy (both horizontal and vertical³⁰). Furthermore, when regions are comprised of individual stable (or mature democratic states) there is a greater chance that the region will also be stable. Individual nations can, in addition to being themselves stable, increase regional stability

through additional efforts taken to make their actions and intentions more transparent to regional partners. International and regional institutions as well as participation in confidence and security building measures assist in fostering this necessary transparency and trust.

Based on the interrelationship of U.S. interests with the security and stability of the broader international system, the 2011 National Military Strategy of the United States requires as one of its three broad themes, that the joint force deepen security relationships with allies and create opportunity for partnerships with new and diverse groups of actors.³¹ This guidance recognizes that in today's interdependent environment, less than stable states pose a threat to their citizens, regional stability and security, international safety, and ultimately the interests of the United States. To influence this situation positively, the United States conducts security cooperation as a means to develop security institutions of individual states, encourage regional security cooperation, and reduce the likelihood of tensions leading to a crisis.

Security Cooperation

The Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, explains, that “operations are grouped into three areas that compose the range of military operations.”³² The three areas, with increasing levels of intensity, are: military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations, and; major operations and campaigns. Security cooperation, contributes to “ongoing routine activities that establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement).”³³ Within the phasing model, security cooperation is a phase zero “shaping” mission. However, it is

commonly accepted that it continues throughout and contributes to all phases of an operation.³⁴

Activities conducted through security cooperation in one country, to gain a specific determined effect (e.g. Stability through increased security capabilities), can and frequently do, lead to additional effects. These added effects can influence the same country, other countries in the region, and/or other operations or countries, globally. In order to better ensure synergy and complementary effects among security cooperation and development programs of other agencies, security cooperation must be properly planned, administered and monitored. When security cooperation activities are properly conducted they have the potential to provide adequate ways and means to achieve multiple sometimes unrelated ends.

Security Cooperation Definition and Program Management

The Department of Defense Directive 5132.03, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, defines security cooperation as:

Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.³⁵

Security cooperation programs are grouped into seven major categories, including: Security Assistance Administered by the Department of Defense, Global Train and Equip, International Armaments Cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance, Training and Education, Combined Exercises, and Military-to-Military Contacts.³⁶

Security assistance as a subset of security cooperation consists of twelve major programs, seven of which are administered by the Department of Defense even though they remain under general control of the Department of State as components of US foreign assistance. The twelve SA programs include: Foreign Military Sales; Foreign Military Construction Services; Foreign Military Financing Program; Leases; Military Assistance Program; International Military Education and Training; Drawdowns; Economic Support Fund; Peacekeeping Operations; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; and Direct Commercial Sales.³⁷

Given the many programs and the need to balance the interests of the United States with those interests of the different host nations, no two countries will have the same combination of, or emphasis on, security cooperation activities. The security cooperation program for each country must be tailored based on the existing situation and environment of that country.

There are numerous organizations that contribute to the overall security cooperation mission, however, the role of the security cooperation organization (SCO) is unique. The SCO under the direction and authority of the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché acts as the primary interface among the embassy country team, the Geographical Combatant Command, and the host nation on the vast majority of security cooperation issues.³⁸ While there are exceptions where the SCO will not be the lead for certain security cooperation programs in the assigned country, the SCO is still responsible for awareness of these programs.³⁹

Security Cooperation Planning

As a member of the Ambassador's country team, the SCO is responsible for providing security cooperation input for the development of the Mission Strategic Resource Plan. The Mission Strategic Resource Plan "is the primary planning document within the U.S. government that defines U.S. national interests in a foreign country and coordinates performance measurement in that country among U.S. government agencies."⁴⁰ The Mission Strategic Resource Plan also links program accomplishment to established strategic goals.

Based on the requirement from the Secretary of Defense outlined in the Guidance for Employment of the Force, the Geographical Combatant Command must develop a theater strategy and campaign plan. The SCO, as the primary Geographical Combatant Command representative for security cooperation in each country, will normally lead the development and execution of a country-level campaign plan. The country campaign plan will bring together and ensure the synergistic effects of the objectives from the Mission Strategic Resource Plan, regional guidance from the Geographical Combatant Command, and national security interests of the host nation.⁴¹ This country campaign plan becomes the country-specific component of the theater campaign plan and outlines how SC programs will be conducted in order to meet the objectives of the Ambassador's Mission Strategic Resource Plan (with a Department of State focus) while also supporting the goals of the Geographical Combatant Command (Department of Defense focus).⁴² It is through this planning process that the nesting of goals and objectives from the national strategic level down through the Geographical Combatant Command to each individual country team is accomplished.

Security Cooperation and Stability

The majority of the security cooperation programs are aimed at developing a state's security institutions and enhancing the state's capability to provide its own external and internal security. These stable states are less likely to require the support of large stability operations or to initiate conflict with neighbors that can spill over into regional conflict and threaten American interests; potentially requiring U.S. Intervention.⁴³

Once security cooperation has contributed to the increased capabilities and capacity of the individual nation to provide for its own security, often the host nation steps up to fill the function of a regional security provider versus that of a security consumer. In this way, the Department of Defense, using security cooperation activities, contributes to U.S. Government efforts to increase the stability of nations and regions.

Case Study

Background

For several hundred years prior to the twentieth century, the boundaries between the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire divided the Balkans region. The rule of the Ottoman Empire within the region ended following the Balkans wars of 1912-1913 and the Austro-Hungarian Empire was defeated in World War I.⁴⁴ Woodrow Wilson viewed the suppression of nationalities as among the primary causes for World War I. Therefore, he included the idea of self-determination in his famous fourteen points as part of the plan to serve as the basis for armistice following the carnage of World War I. The principle of self-determination was used to remake post-World War I Europe and for redrawing Europe's map.⁴⁵ Wilson's point XI specifically addressed the Balkans region and referred in part to establishing "...relations among several Balkan states to one

another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality...⁴⁶

Accordingly, the state boundaries of the Balkans were reformed and on December 1, 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes announced its existence. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes included the former kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro (including Serbian-held Macedonia), as well as Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austrian territory in Dalmatia and Slovenia, and Hungarian land north of the Danube River.⁴⁷

In 1929, King Alexander I declared a royal dictatorship, and changed the name of the state to Yugoslavia. In addition, nine “prefectures were formed in a way which cut across traditional boundaries of the different ethnic regions.⁴⁸ Yugoslavia was occupied by the Germans during World War II.

Socialist Yugoslavia was formed in 1946 after Josip Broz Tito and his communist-led Partisans helped liberate the country from German rule. This second Yugoslavia covered much the same territory as its predecessor, with the addition of land acquired from Italy in Istria and Dalmatia. The kingdom was replaced by a federation of six nominally equal republics: Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. In Serbia the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were given autonomous status in order to acknowledge the specific interests of Albanians and Magyars, respectively.⁴⁹ Latent in the ethnic diversity of Yugoslavia lay the potential for weak horizontal legitimacy to cause stresses within the state.

In 1963 the country was renamed to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and it was determined that Josip Broz Tito would be Yugoslavia’s president for life. This

government allowed each republic as well as province or district to have its own constitution, Supreme Court, parliament, president and prime minister; but President Tito still retained rule over the entire country. The creation of individual constitutions, like the earlier 1918 re-mapping in accordance with self-determination, assisted in the conceptualization of the republics as individual “nations”. Tito's rule continued until 1980 when he died.⁵⁰

Slobodan Milosevic became president of the Republic of Serbia in 1989. Milosevic's ultranationalist calls for Serbian domination ultimately lead to the breakup of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines.⁵¹ Under Milosevic's leadership, Serbia led various military campaigns initially to prevent the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and later to unite ethnic Serbs living in neighboring republics into a "Greater Serbia."⁵² Although these attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, the ethnic violence and warfare within and among the republics and provinces of Yugoslavia as they fought for their independence resulted in severe instability. Government institutions, especially those tasked with the provision of internal and external security, were dysfunctional. For example, by the end of the 1991-1995 war in Croatia, 250,000 of the 4.4 million citizens were internally displaced, including 32,000 ethnic Serbs.⁵³ In Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a total population of 3.8 million, the war ending in 1995 led to the displacement of over a million people and the creation of ethnically homogeneous areas within the newly independent state.⁵⁴ Likewise in Kosovo, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated the remaining number of displaced persons, 13 years after the conflict, at 17,900. Most ethnic Serbs live in northern Kosovo where their security, education, and health care are ensured through a parallel system of government provided entirely by

Serbia. Additional groups of Serbs live in enclaves throughout Kosovo where they can coexist among a majority of Serbs but where their freedoms and movement are restricted and they face little access to jobs or services.⁵⁵

The sections below provide additional information pertaining to the conflict and independence of four of the new states eventually created from three former republics and one autonomous province (Kosovo) of Yugoslavia.⁵⁶

Slovenia

Slovenia was the Yugoslav republic located closest to Europe and had deep historic ties to both Austria and Italy. Slovenia was a wealthier and more developed republic.⁵⁷ Moreover, unlike most of the other republics Slovenia had a very homogeneous population with over 90 percent of its population being ethnic Slovene.⁵⁸ The “population was strongly unified” in their decision “to declare independence and establish a new government based on democratic pluralism and human rights and freedoms.”⁵⁹ This unity of both ethnicity and will provided the basis for a strong horizontal legitimacy in Slovenia. Although war broke out in Slovenia following its declaration of independence from the Yugoslav Federation in 1991, “fighting between Slovenian nationalists and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) lasted only ten days before the JNA withdrew from Slovenia.”⁶⁰

Croatia

A referendum held in Croatia on 19 May 1991 showed that 94 percent of the citizens wanted Croatia to declare independence and seceded from Yugoslavia. On 25 June 1991 the Croatian Parliament proclaimed the Republic of Croatia an independent and sovereign state.⁶¹ Croatia although overwhelmingly in support of the referendum for independence was less homogeneous than Slovenia, with a Serb minority population of

about 12 percent.⁶² Although the majority of Croats had voted for independence from Yugoslavia, a large portion of the ethnic Serb residents formed militias and asserted their right to create their own state inside the sovereign territory of Croatia.⁶³ These ethnic Serb militias, supplied and supported by the JNA, fought against the Croatian nationalist forces until a cease fire was signed at the end of 1991. By this time the Serb forces (militias and JNA) controlled about one-quarter of Croatia's territory.⁶⁴ It took Croatian nationalist forces over four years to clear the occupying Serb forces from Croatian territory. In addition to the Serb forces the military actions of the Croatian nationalist forces also cleared the majority of ethnic Serbs from Croatia's territory.⁶⁵

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia held a referendum on independence in March 1992, which divided Bosnia along ethnic lines. The Muslims, representing 44 percent of the republic's population, and the Croats, representing 17 percent of the population, strongly favored independence. The Serbs (31 percent of the population) like in Croatia were vigorously opposed to the secession of Bosnia and abstained from the vote. "Like their compatriots in Croatia, most Serbs in Bosnia preferred to remain part of the Yugoslav federation -- in which Serbs were the dominant group -- rather than become a permanent minority in a newly independent state."⁶⁶ Even with the Serb's boycott, the Bosnian referendum for independence passed with overwhelming support.

A civil war erupted, with intense fighting among paramilitary forces from the three ethnic groups.⁶⁷ The Bosnian-Serbs, supported by Serbs from both Serbia and Montenegro began to force Muslim and Croat Bosnians out of areas that were controlled by Bosnian-Serbs. Although the Muslim and Croat forces had initially cooperated to achieve independence for Bosnia, a breakdown in this alliance resulted in

fighting among all three ethnic groups with the Bosnian Serbs having a distinct military advantage. The Bosnian-Serbs eventually were able to take control over 70 percent of the Bosnian territory.⁶⁸ In 1992 United Nations peacekeeping forces arrived in Bosnia in order to safeguard relief supplies. These forces were later used to protect “safe-havens” as well. Along with these efforts, the international community attempted to broker a settlement but the Serbian forces having the marked advantage saw no reason to negotiate. Settlement efforts were also hampered by the Muslim groups who also refused to negotiate any settlement where the Serbs would gain political control over the areas they gained through the use of ethnic cleansing.⁶⁹ In summer 1995, the Muslim and Croat forces again cooperated to recapture areas controlled by the Bosnian-Serbs. Having lost their military advantage the Serbs decide to enter into serious peace negotiations.⁷⁰

On December 14, 1995 the three parties formally signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Accord) in Paris.⁷¹ The Dayton Peace Accords retained Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries and created a multi-ethnic and democratic government charged with conducting foreign, diplomatic, and fiscal policy.⁷² The Dayton Accord established requirement for national elections that would establish pan-Bosnian political institutions, including a three-member presidency (one from each of the three major ethnic groups) and a bicameral parliament.⁷³ Also recognized was a second tier of government composed of two entities roughly equal in size: the Bosniak/Bosnian Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS).⁷⁴ The country was divided into ethnic subunits, according to a detailed map. Areas controlled by Muslims and Croats would together form the

“Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Whereas areas controlled by Serbs would form “Republika Srpska”. Each of these “entities” would have its own democratically elected political institutions. A draft constitution set out the federal division of powers between the national government and the entity-level governments.⁷⁵ However, the Federation and RS governments were charged with overseeing most government functions.⁷⁶

Kosovo

In 1998, Serb forces were sent to the formerly autonomous Serb province of Kosovo by President Milosevic in response to civil unrest and an insurgency by the Kosovar-Albanians; the majority ethnic group of the Kosovo province. The Serb forces responded to the insurgency by conducting massacres and expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. This action resulted in a guerrilla war between the Kosovo Liberation Army (ethnic Albanians) and the Serbian forces. In 1999, after Milosevic refused to stop the Serb’s violent crackdown on Kosovar Albanians, NATO conducted a 78 day bombing of Serbia. The NATO air campaign destroyed key government and military facilities and infrastructure and forced Milosevic to withdraw Serbian military and police forces from Kosovo. A NATO-led force was stationed in Kosovo to provide safety and security to the ethnic communities.⁷⁷ Based on the Serb actions in Kosovo, Milosevic was indicted for war crimes by a special UN tribunal. In 2000, following an election and huge protests Milosevic stepped down as Serbia’s president.⁷⁸ Widespread violence predominantly targeting ethnic Serbs in Kosovo caused the international community to open negotiations on the future status of Kosovo in January 2006.⁷⁹

In February 2008, the province of Kosovo declared itself independent of Serbia - an action Serbia refuses to recognize. At Serbia’s request the United Nations General

Assembly (UNGA) requested an advisory ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as to the legality of this declaration of independence. The ICJ issued an opinion in July 2010 stating that declarations of independence were not prohibited by international law.⁸⁰

In late 2010, Serbia agreed to enter into talks with Kosovo, as long as the focus was on practical issues and not on the status of Kosovo. A new round of discussions among the European Union, Belgrade and Pristina was initiated in October 2012.⁸¹ Although Kosovo has been officially recognized by 100 nations as of 21 December 2012, Serbia still does not recognize Kosovo as a sovereign nation.

While Slovenia had almost no ethnic diversity, Croatia had a less homogeneous population, but was able to resolve the majority of issues resulting from this low level of diversity. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have been unable to adequately address the much higher level of ethnic and religious diversity within their populations, resulting in a lack of horizontal legitimacy with a corresponding deficit in vertical legitimacy as well. Legitimacy issues continue to plague both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, effecting all elements of their national stability.

The development of the new Balkan states, following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, provides a unique opportunity to identify and assess security cooperation and its contribution to the various elements of national and regional stability. The following section will use Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo for this purpose. These countries were selected because of the varying degree of conflict each experienced during their war for independence from Yugoslavia, the type and amount of

security cooperation programs implemented in each, and the uniqueness of the national and international political environment surrounding each country's development.

Security Cooperation Program: Participation

The security cooperation activities for each of the four countries assessed (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo) differ based on the existing situation and environment of that country. The general participation of all four countries in the security cooperation programs of International Military Education and Training (IMET) as well as the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will provide a basis for comparison.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)

The IMET program, administered by the Department of Defense, provides financial assistance to foreign military and in some cases foreign civilian personnel in order to allow them to attend U.S. schools, primarily in the United States. The program is for the development of individuals and senior leadership of the recipient country. One aim of IMET is to educate a core cadre of professional host nation leaders in the topics of general leadership as well as in military occupational specific skills. Because IMET training is conducted in American schools, the recipient country's candidate is required to pass an English language test prior to receiving orders to attend the U.S. school. This English language requirement provides the added benefit that for each officer the recipient country sends for IMET training, there is one more leader that has proficiency in English. This is important for development of security forces that can operate within NATO. In addition, the IMET program assists in establishing a professional military leadership within the recipient countries with firsthand knowledge of America and personal and professional relationships with American military personnel.⁸²

The recipient nations overwhelmingly send their best and brightest officers who then use this education to provide meaningful doctrinal, structural, and operational improvements to the recipient nation's security institutions. Because these talented officers usually become the most respected among their peers and progress upward through the ranks, IMET is an investment in the future senior military leadership of that country. The familiarity with U.S. doctrine, policy, and norms of appropriate civil-military relationships assist partners in the development of their security institutions. The established trust, understanding and relationships contribute to future enhanced access and influence for U.S. diplomatic and military representatives.⁸³

The relatively small amount of money invested in the personnel and leadership of these foreign countries provides a lasting return for U.S. policy. The host nation's participation in the IMET program serves to enhance the professionalism of the force and strengthen the ideal of democratic civilian control of the military. Participation in IMET builds far more capable security institutions and forces that can provide both internal and external security.⁸⁴

Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo all receive IMET funding and take full advantage of the program. The following numbers are provided as a means of comparison and include funding dollars and the amount of personnel trained from the date of the countries' recognition through fiscal year 2011. Slovenia received \$11,772,000 and trained 1,934 personnel. Croatia⁸⁵ received \$6,792,000 and trained 948 personnel. Bosnia received \$12,678,000 and trained 1,200 personnel. Kosovo received \$2,005,000 and trained 132 personnel.⁸⁶ The higher IMET numbers for Slovenia are understandable given the longer period of time that Slovenia has been

independent. Likewise, Slovenia's more developed security organizations and forces, for both internal and external security, correspond to the higher level of IMET funding and training it received.

Croatia received approximately half of the funding received by Slovenia and Bosnia. However, Croatia was still able to maximize the number of personnel trained. Although Croatia received only 50% of the IMET funding of Bosnia, Croatia still managed to train roughly 75% of the number of personnel Bosnia trained. Croatia even with less funding than Slovenia and Bosnia has been able to develop security organizations and forces for both internal and external security that are of equal quality with those of Slovenia.

Kosovo's markedly lower IMET numbers are due to the fact that it only received independence and subsequent recognition by the U.S. in 2008, prior to which it did not have access to IMET. Kosovo's lesser level of development within its security institutions and forces, when compared to Slovenia and Croatia, is understandable given the comparatively short amount of time since Kosovo declared independence.

The anomaly is Bosnia. Even though the conflict in both Bosnia and Croatia ended with the signing of the Dayton Accord in 1995 and Bosnia has received more IMET funding than Croatia, the security institutions and forces of Bosnia are markedly less developed than those in Croatia. This trend is even more remarkable given the fact that Bosnia is also the benefactor of seventeen additional years of international assistance through ongoing stability operations.

Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP)

The Foreign Military Financing Program is administered by the Department of Defense (DoD) and provides grants and loans to eligible foreign governments to enable

them to purchase U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. The purchase of the desired items is conducted through a government-to-government agreement. The items may be provided from DoD stocks or from new procurement. If the desired purchase items are to be supplied through new procurement, the U.S. military department assigned responsibility for the case is authorized to enter into a contractual agreement with U.S. industry in order to provide the purchased items.⁸⁷ This contractual agreement provides certain protection for the purchasing country (normally including 2 year service and initial familiarization training) and also established control requirements which the recipient country must follow. The FMFP program has been essential in providing state-of-the-art modern equipment to countries that are in the process of modernizing their security forces and developing advanced capabilities that are compatible with the U.S. forces; especially those with the eventual goal of NATO membership.

Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo all receive FMFP funding and take full advantage of the program. The following numbers are provided as a means of comparison and represent FMFP funds received from the date of the countries' recognition through fiscal year 2011. Slovenia has received \$28,412,000, Croatia has received \$25,484,000, Bosnia-Herzegovina has received \$74,359,000, and Kosovo has received \$9,000,000.⁸⁸

The similar amount of FMFP funding received by Slovenia and Croatia seems to correspond with the comparable level of development within the security institutions and forces of both countries. The substantially lower amount of FMFP funding received by Kosovo is based on its declaration of independence and subsequent recognition by the U.S. in 2008. While the amount of FMFP is substantially lower, training of security

institutions and acquisition of equipment have been greatly advanced through international donations, most of which have supported the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force. While Kosovo's security situation continues to be of concern, this is not contrary to expectations based solely on FMFP funding. Bosnia's relatively high FMFP funding level (Bosnia received approximately 3 times as much FMFP as either Slovenia or Croatia) when compared to its failure to establish adequate security institutions and forces is alarming.

Security Cooperation Programs: Measure of Effectiveness

Stability Operations

Any attempts to determine effects that security cooperation programs have had on the stability of the individual Balkan states must consider the continued international assistance required by some Balkan states in order to provide a minimum level of security; both internal and external security. The continued presence of peacekeeping forces within a state's territory is a strong indication that the state is incapable of providing security, and calls into question the stability of the state as well.

Considering Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo; only Slovenia has not required the presence of a peacekeeping force within its territory during any portion of its transition to independence. While the peacekeeping operation in Croatia ended in the mid-1990s⁸⁹, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo still require a peacekeeping force. Bosnia-Herzegovina still hosts the European Union-led, European Force⁹⁰ which presently consists of one multinational battalion of approximately 600 soldiers.⁹¹ The Kosovo Force continues to operate in Kosovo with over 5,000 peacekeeping forces from 30 different nations, including 773 U.S. forces (as of 31 January 2013).⁹²

The continued requirement for peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo indicates the inability both countries have to fully provide the most basic element of state stability, security. Neither country has the capability to yet monopolize the use of force in order to protect its citizens from both internal and external threats.⁹³ The requirement for continued international peacekeeping forces in Kosovo symbolizes a faltering process to develop a stable state. Evidence that Kosovo is still experiencing ongoing difficulties with its internal security was indicated by the presence of non-governmental sanctioned security forces in the north Kosovo Mitrovica area. This was brought to the forefront by a statement made by the KFOR Commander on 31 January 2013. The Commander, KFOR stated, "I am aware of a self-proclaimed "Civil Protection Corps" (CPC) in the municipalities in the Northern part of Kosovo. I will not evaluate the legitimacy and legal status of CPC."⁹⁴ Bosnia's inability to provide its own security seventeen years after the end of the fighting there is an abysmal failure in the development of security as a prerequisite to establishing a stable state.

The lack of a current requirement for an international presence in Slovenia and Croatia in order to assist their state security forces in the provision of both internal and external security, serves as a strong indication of their stability; especially as related to the element of security.

International Organizations

While the presence of peacekeeping forces denotes a lack of security and stability in a state, membership acceptance into multinational organizations serves as a positive indicator to a state's security and stability. International organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) require that states meet certain basic requirements before receiving full membership. For

member acceptance into either organization there is an established process which takes into consideration the many legal authorities, institutional qualities and operational functions of the political, military, and economic realms of the state structure. Although greatly oversimplified here for brevity, in general, the membership of a country in NATO denotes a certain level of stability in the security and governance parameters of the state. Likewise, a European country's membership in the European Union denotes the achievement of relative stability in security, governance, and to some degree economic standards. Over the last 20 years, the general trend is for developing European countries to first strive for NATO membership as a stepping stone to achieve membership in the European Union.

With regard to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, only Slovenia and Croatia have demonstrated the requisite level of stability to gain membership in either NATO or the EU. Following its independence in 1991, Slovenia acceded to both NATO and the EU in 2004.⁹⁵ Following its declaration of independence in 1991 and the resulting war until 1995, Croatia was accepted as a member of NATO in April 2009. Additionally, Croatia signed the EU Accession Treaty in December 2011, and ratified the Treaty in January 2012. Croatia is on track to become a full EU member in July 2013, after all 27 EU members ratify the treaty.⁹⁶ Although Bosnia-Herzegovina joined the Partnership for Peace⁹⁷ in 2006 and NATO agreed to launch their Membership Action Plan in 2010, Bosnia-Herzegovina has not achieved membership in either NATO or the EU.⁹⁸ Kosovo requested membership in the Partnership for Peace program in 2012 but has not been granted membership. Kosovo has not been granted a Membership Action Plan, nor membership to NATO or the EU.

Conclusion

This study has considered the individual histories of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo while looking at how U.S. security cooperation has contributed to the stability of each of these relatively new states. Realizing the complexity and vast numbers of variables that impact state stability, the scope of this case study has, in many ways, greatly oversimplified the problem.

Security cooperation by definition is directed primarily at the security institutions and security forces that provide internal and external security for the state. While some security cooperation programs do impact state institutions and functions beyond the security function of the state, the influence of security cooperation on the other elements of state stability, such as governance and legitimacy are not far reaching.

The U.S. security cooperation activities in Slovenia and Croatia, based on the information presented in this paper, have contributed to the creation of security institutions and security forces with enough capability and capacity to positively affect the internal and external security of these states. The measures of effectiveness used to indicate the success in Slovenia and Croatia are their inclusion in both NATO and the EU.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, however, still struggle with the establishment of adequate security institutions and forces to address the internal and external security of their respective states. The inability of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo to, as of yet, gain membership in NATO and the EU as well as the continued requirement for the presence of international peacekeeping forces in both these countries, highlights the continued struggles these states have in achieving security.

The legitimacy approach to state stability theory identifies the functions that a stable state must fulfill as security, governance and legitimacy. The U.S. security cooperation programs have assisted both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the development of security institutions and forces with greater capacity and capability. However, the lack of legitimacy (both horizontal and vertical legitimacy) precludes the success of these states to provide both internal and external security as well as adequate governance. The general limitation of security cooperation, drawn from this study, is the importance horizontal legitimacy and vertical legitimacy play in the creation of overall state stability. Security cooperation cannot generate legitimacy among a state's population and without this legitimacy the other functions of the state are severely undermined, making lasting stability an impossibility.

Endnotes

¹ Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (January/February 2005), in ProQuest (accessed February 2, 2013).

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), V-14, V-15.

³ *Ibid.*, V-10.

⁴ Gene Germanovich, "Security Force Assistance in a Time of Austerity," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 67 (4th Quarter 2012), 14.

⁵ Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 11.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and David A Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History, Eighth Edition* (New York: Longman, 2011), 63.

⁸ Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 29.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Nye and Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict*, 60.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Nicholas Lemay-Hebert, "Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutional Approach," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3, no. 1 (2009): 22.

¹⁴ Ibid., 23.

¹⁵ Ibid., 24.

¹⁶ Ibid., 22.

¹⁷ Ibid., 24, 25.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 97.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 87.

²² Ibid., 97, 84.

²³ Lemay-Hebert, "Statebuilding without Nation-building," 25.

²⁴ Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States."

²⁵ Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 40.

²⁶ Robert C. Orr, ed., *Winning the Peace* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 43.

²⁷ Holsti, *The State, War, and*, 108.

²⁸ Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States."

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Holsti, *The State, War, and*, 84.

³¹ M.G. Mullen, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America's Military Leadership* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 8, 2011), 10, Cover Letter.

³² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, x.

³³ Ibid., x-xi.

³⁴ Ibid., V-6.

³⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, Department of Defense Directive 5132.03 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 24, 2008), 11.

³⁶ Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, *The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book)* (Wright Patterson AFB, OH: DISAM, 2012), 1-7 to 1-24, <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pages/pubs/greenbook.aspx> (accessed February 1, 2013).

³⁷ Ibid., 1-2 to 1-6.

³⁸ Ibid., 4-1.

³⁹ Ibid., 4-3.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 4-8.

⁴¹ Ibid., 4-9.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Germanovich, "Security Force Assistance," 15.

⁴⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/535435/Kingdom-of-Serbs-Croats-and-Slovenes> (accessed February 1, 2013).

⁴⁵ Holsti, *The State, War, and*, 53.

⁴⁶ Yale Law School, "President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, 18 January 1918," http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp (accessed February 11, 2013).

⁴⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Kingdom Serbs, Croats, Slovenes."

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Serbia: Introduction," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html> (accessed February 2, 2013).

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Croatia: Housing Rights and Employment Still Preventing Durable Solution," <http://www.internal->

[displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/7928D486A14C897D802570A7004C7215?OpenDocument](http://displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/7928D486A14C897D802570A7004C7215?OpenDocument) (accessed March 4, 2013).

⁵⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Broader and Improved Support for Durable Solutions Required,” [http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/C8DEEFACFF6821AD802570A7004C6A42?opendocument](http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/C8DEEFACFF6821AD802570A7004C6A42?opendocument) (accessed March 4, 2013).

⁵⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Kosovo: Durable Solutions Still Elusive 13 Years After Conflict,” [http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/\(httpCountries\)/165F03EE03E9D015C1257662005CE095?OpenDocument](http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/165F03EE03E9D015C1257662005CE095?OpenDocument) (accessed March 4, 2013).

⁵⁶ Although Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are also states which were prior republics within Yugoslavia, they will not be addressed in detail since they will not be referenced in the “case study” portion of this paper. The rationale for the exclusion of these three republics is that Serbia and Montenegro were still, for all practical purposes “Yugoslavia” and were acting against the break-away republics under authorities as the Former Yugoslavia. In addition, Montenegro’s eventual independence was a peaceful separation from Serbia. Macedonia will not be addressed, as its separation was not contested and later violence there was, instead, the result of an insurgency, not its declaration of independence.

⁵⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Kingdom Serbs, Croats, Slovenes.”

⁵⁸ Infoplease, “Timeline: The Former Yugoslavia,” <http://www.infoplease.com/spot/yugotimeline1.html> (accessed January 28, 2013).

⁵⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, “Kingdom Serbs, Croats, Slovenes.”

⁶⁰ Paris, *At War’s End*, 97.

⁶¹ www.hr, “Homeland War (1991-1995),” <http://www.hr/croatia/history/homeland-war> (accessed January 28, 2013).

⁶² Infoplease, “Timeline: Former Yugoslavia.”

⁶³ Holsti, *The State, War, and*, 55.

⁶⁴ Paris, *At War’s End*, 97.

⁶⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, “Serbia: Introduction.”

⁶⁶ Paris, *At War’s End*, 97-98.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Paris, *At War's End*, 99.

⁷² Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Serbia: Introduction."

⁷³ Paris, *At War's End*, 99.

⁷⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Serbia: Introduction."

⁷⁵ Paris, *At War's End*, 99.

⁷⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Serbia: Introduction."

⁷⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Serbia: Introduction."

⁷⁸ Nye and Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict*, 195.

⁷⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Serbia: Introduction."

⁸⁰ UN News Centre, "Albanian Leader, Addressing UN, Calls for Greater International Recognition of Kosovo," September 23, 2010, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36116&Cr=kosovo&Cr1=#.USpSviAo5LM> (accessed February 24, 2013).

⁸¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Serbia: Introduction."

⁸² Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, *Management of Security Cooperation*, 1-4.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Croatia received less IMET Funding because in 2003 key provisions of the American Service Members' Protection Act (ASPA) went into effect. Specifically, the provision of restricting military assistance to states that are parties to the International Criminal Court and that have not entered into non-surrender, Article 98 Agreement with the U.S. As a result, effective 1 July 2003 military assistance to Croatia was suspended. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2007 allowed resumption of IMET funds for countries under ASPA sanctions.

⁸⁶ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Historical Facts Book: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Other Security Cooperation Historical Facts* (Washington, DC: DSCA, September 30, 2011), 91-112, www.dsca.mil, (accessed February 2, 2013).

⁸⁷ Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, *Management of Security Cooperation*, 1-2.

⁸⁸ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Historical Facts Book*, 33-34.

⁸⁹ The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operated in Croatia and Bosnia from 1992-1995.

⁹⁰ NATO, "Operation Joint Endeavor," (<http://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm>) (Accessed February 2, 2013).

⁹¹ EUFOR, "Multinational Battalion (MNBN)," http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17&Itemid=139 (Accessed February 2, 2013).

⁹² NATO, "Kosovo Force (KFOR): Key Facts and Figures," November 30, 2012, www.nato.int/kfor/structur/nations/placemap/kfor_placemat.pdf (accessed February 22, 2013).

⁹³ Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States."

⁹⁴ NATO, "Kosovo Force: COMKFOR' Statement in Mitrovica," January 31, 2013, <http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/news-room/press-releases/2013-07.aspx> (accessed 22 February, 2013).

⁹⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Serbia: Introduction."

⁹⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Serbia: Introduction."

⁹⁷ The Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program is a NATO program aimed at creating trust between NATO and other states. PfP has been used as a stepping stone for states to work with NATO and prepare for NATO membership.

⁹⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook*, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Introduction," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html> (accessed March 4, 2013).