


Strategy Research Project

U.S. Army's Role in the Asia-Pacific: Rebalancing Across the Pacific Rim

by

Lieutenant Colonel Yi Se Gwon
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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Lieutenant Colonel Yi Se Gwon
United States Army

Dr. James Gordon
Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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This paper examines the mission of the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) forces stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), and presents a new framework for modernizing EUSA's role to reflect the contemporary environment that prompted the Obama Administration's "rebalance to the Asia-Pacific." The framework requires an understanding of the historical basis for the US-ROK mutual defense treaty, and an analysis of changes in the security environment that have transpired since the end of the Cold War. New notions of cooperative and asymmetric security in the region can then be introduced as a means of transforming EUSA from a ROK internally-oriented deterrent force to an externally-oriented asset for building partner capacity in the entire Asia-Pacific region. Due to the current obstacles with leveraging EUSA's capabilities as a Landpower, the strategic leadership of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) Commanding General (CG) will be essential in enabling EUSA to transform. The end result will be a more efficient utilization of the army in the Asia Pacific towards maintaining the United States' global leadership for the long-term.

U.S. Army's Role in the Asia-Pacific: Rebalancing Across the Pacific Rim

In an environment of reduced budgets, increased global commitments and tighter fiscal constraints, the United States (US) military has become a precious and limited instrument of national power. This paper examines the mission of the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) forces stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), and presents a new framework for modernizing EUSA's role to reflect the contemporary environment that prompted the Obama Administration's "rebalance to the Asia-Pacific." The framework requires an understanding of the historical basis for the US-ROK mutual defense treaty, and an analysis of changes in the security environment that have transpired since the end of the Cold War. New notions of cooperative and asymmetric security in the region can then be introduced as a means of transforming EUSA from a ROK internally-oriented deterrent force to an externally-oriented asset for building partner capacity in the entire Asia-Pacific region.¹ Due to the current obstacles with leveraging EUSA's capabilities as a Landpower, the strategic leadership of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) Commanding General (CG) will be essential in enabling EUSA to transform. The end result of this transformation will be a more efficient utilization of the army in the Asia Pacific towards maintaining the United States' historical global leadership for the long-term.

History

The US bond with the ROK was formed at the end of World War II with the establishment of the 38th parallel to divide the Korean peninsula in 1945. The US served as the master superpower to guide the future of the newly formed ROK in the south, while the Soviet Union oversaw the reconstruction of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the north. Given the centuries of Korea's dynastic rule

and 40 years of Japanese occupation, the Korean culture was not prepared for the ideology and institutions of the democracy which the US sought to educate and socialize to the ROK. The DPRK's failed attempt to reunify the two Koreas through military force, the Korean War of 1950-53, resulted in the entangled future of South Korea's political and social development with its security. The US and ROK established a bi-lateral Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in 1953 to deter future attacks from North Korea.

During the Cold War period that followed between the US and Soviet Union, the ROK mounted a combined effort with the US to prevent Communist expansionism on the Korean peninsula. This "client-patron" effort consisted of mechanisms such as a trip-wire style defense, a nuclear umbrella, military assistance and training, and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) consisting of US and ROK forces under a US war-time command.² This security approach remained relatively stable until 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The reduced ability of the former Soviet Union to project military forces in support of the DPRK, eventually led to North Korea's efforts to develop a nuclear capability while at the same time engaging the ROK government through dialogue.³ For the ROK, the continued influence of the US was successful and directly responsible for the ROK shift from centuries of dynastic rule towards stable democratic institutions and ideologies.⁴

The demise of the Soviet Union also provided China the opportunity to strengthen their influence over the DPRK as the remaining Communist power in the region. "In Seoul, some now call China the "new America...with which South Korea must work in promoting peace and unification because China has more influence over

North Korea than any other nation.”⁵ Although a conflict between the two Koreas is not inevitable, it is imperative that the United States continue to manage security issues in the region so that an incident with North Korea does not spiral out of control.⁶

Clausewitz’s Trinitarian War theory provides a means for understanding these security issues and the role that the US defense treaties with the ROK, Japan, Philippines, Thailand and Australia will play in managing regional security in the future.

Trinitarian War

According to Clausewitz’s Trinitarian War, war is suspended between three magnetic poles representing the emotions of the people, the uncertainties a military commander must face, and the policies of a government.⁷ It is in the relationships of each pole to the others that explains the root causes of different wars, and why different strategies were taken for each war to achieve national objectives.⁸ Governments determine whether a strategy is suitable based on “the value governments place on the political object in war, and the scale of sacrifices to be made for it.”⁹ Military commanders determine the feasibility of a strategy based on the fog and friction inherent with going to war and what commanders assess is necessary for achieving victory.¹⁰ The public determines whether the manner in which a strategy is to be conducted is acceptable to a society’s culture and sense of values. Strategy is essentially then the development of limits and controls on war to prevent it from succumbing to its “dominant tendencies” of uncontrolled, absolute violence.¹¹

The US-ROK MDT of 1953 was the product of extremely polarized poles between the US government, military commanders, and American public in fighting a limited war and the lack of a cohesive strategy for it. The President of the United States, Harry Truman, was unwilling to risk a nuclear war with the Soviet Union or a

protracted ground war with China. The military commander, General Douglas MacArthur, was adamant that limiting his advance to the 38th parallel was inconsistent with the necessity to the North Korean Army and the threat it posed to the ROK. Based on the American public's experiences of total war in World War I and II, the concept of a "limited war" was foreign and unacceptable. These destabilizing tensions eventually reshaped President Truman's strategy from victory to armistice. The US-ROK MDT with the commitment of the US Army served as a significant deterrent to "restrain each side's impulses to resume hostilities."¹²

Today, the MDT serves as a military pedestal for the ROK that preserves the existing security order and promotes the security and stability necessary for a country to develop its government, military and population.¹³ For the US, the MDT has become an "instrumental security asset that serves the U.S. interest in projecting power and preventing the emergence of a regional hegemony."¹⁴ Although EUSA has been largely successful in implementing this deterrence for the last 61 years, its presence has also "made the Korean peninsula one of the world's most volatile places."¹⁵ Consequently, the Obama Administration is reviewing the U.S. defense strategy against emerging threats as they rebalance the nation's focus from Middle East towards the growing opportunities in the Asia-Pacific. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's remark that the "new U.S. strategy to rebalance towards Asia is not designed to contain China," indicates an adjustment of the political objectives that form the basis of the bilateral MDTs in the region to reflect changes in the security environment.¹⁶

Political Climate Changes

The most significant change to the security environment in Asia since the end of the Cold War has been the rising influence of China. China is projected to become the world's largest economy by 2030, and worked to implement its 12th five year plan to “transition their economy from export dependence and investment led growth to domestic consumption and economic rebalancing.”¹⁷ Most recently, China has sought to increase their military capabilities for conducting area access and area denial missions in order to bolster their claims to disputed territories in the East China Sea.¹⁸ China's rising dominance in the region makes the nation a key economic partner to the United States despite the potential security threats.¹⁹ As a result, China has become the focal point of many of the U.S. security agreements and initiatives in Asia.

The **US-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015** transitions responsibility for the ROK defense from U.S. to South Korean government control. This initiative also moves and consolidates all U.S. Army forces further south of the demilitarized zone; outside the ROK's capital city of Seoul and well out of range from North Korean artillery fire. A fundamental change from the 1953 MDT is the role of the EUSA from having forces directly committed to a combined defense plan to a reserve role for the ROK forces to be employed where necessary. This change creates flexibility for the ROK in the employment of EUSA across a broader range of contingencies, and opportunities for the US in utilizing EUSA to build partnership capacity outside of South Korea. EUSA already participates in bi-lateral annual exercises with the Philippines and Thailand. Military to military partnership building will be a key aspect of executing Secretary Panetta's intent that “across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice.”²⁰

ROK Defense Reform 2020 (RDF 2020)

RDF 2020 downsizes and redesigns ROK defense forces from manpower centric to a smaller, cost-effective network centric force. The ROK plans to leverage existing and developing technologies to account for battlefield expansion and asymmetrical changes in the security environment.²¹ The development of effective command and control technologies is a precursor to the effective implementation of a Strategic Alliance 2015. The reform also plans to outsource the ROK Army Combat Service Support (CSS) functions as a means of reducing military manpower requirements. It is important to note that these types of reforms are not localized to the ROK or the US, but come as the result of the interconnected nature of nations' economies and the strains that a global recession has placed on maintaining standing military forces. As armies downsize, the gaps in capabilities provides a means of tailoring U.S. Army support to the U.S.-ROK Alliance and other nations across the war fighting functions.

2012 US National Defense Authorization Act

In Section 436, Congress directed the Department of Defense to “commission an independent assessment of United States security interests in the United States Pacific Command area of responsibility.” The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) submitted their assessment to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on June 27, 2012, identifying North Korea as the primary military threat to U.S. interests in the region. Subsequently, CSIS recommended implementation of U.S-Korea Strategic Alliance 2015 without any reduction in the size of the Army force in theater, and an increase in USMC rotational presence. Leveraging the small unit of action concepts developed in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the current force structure of EUSA provides a variety of military packages that could be used in the

development of combined exercises with other nations. In other words, rather than deploy an entire combined arms battalion or company to support a defense exercise, EUSA could deploy a medical team to conduct combined training on disaster relief.

2010 Japan National Defense Guidelines (2010 JNDG)

2010 JNDG laid out a road map to transform their Self-Defense Forces (SDF) from a static force to a more active defense in response to Chinese military operations around Japan.²² This multilateral strategy entails initiatives like participating in military exercises with India and Australia, strategic planning meetings with the U.S. and ROK, and disaster response training with the U.S. and Philippines.²³ This indicates a strong willingness for nations in the Pacific Rim to overcome their strong sense of nationalism and antagonistic histories to work together for specific objectives.

Cultural Climate Changes

The debate between the US and ROK over utilizing the forces of EUSA beyond the ROK borders has strained bilateral relations in the past. In 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's announcement that "US forces would be pulled back from the demilitarization zone and that the overall size of USFK would be reduced in the near future," triggered suspicion and recriminations among the South Korean public.²⁴ Geert Hofstede's 5 Cultural Dimensions provides a means for highlighting the cultural changes in the ROK that make transforming the role for EUSA more agreeable and in the best interests of both the ROK and US.

Hofstede defines culture as the "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group of people from those of another."²⁵ Hofstede's 5 cultural dimensions are Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism, Masculinity and Long-term Orientation, which collectively can be used to distinguish

how different societies are inclined to organize and behave.²⁶ The subsequent descriptions of each dimension and their relevance to cultural climate changes in the ROK will reveal both the need and prospects for redefining overall security in the region.

Power Distance (P.D.) is the “extent to which the less powerful members of society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.”²⁷ As previously stated, the US’ continued partnership with the ROK directly contributed to changing their institutions and mass belief systems from a large power distance rooted in dynastic rule towards a democratic ideology. However, the power distance remained larger than most western democratic countries, as the ROK maintained a strong government over civil society. This is in large part due to the necessity of maintaining legitimacy against the presence of an existential threat to the north.²⁸ This approach to governance led to the rise of strong and influential military institutions “to the extent that society embraced the norms and values consistent with militarism.”²⁹ During the course of the last seven years, the ROK government has made a concerted effort to strengthen civilian-led control over the military and close the power gap with society.³⁰ The ROK Ministry of Defense considers these measures necessary in order to modernize a force that under the ROK-US alliance has had no significant changes for the last 50 years.³¹

Uncertainty Avoidance (U.A.) is defined as “the degree to which people in a country prefer structured over unstructured situations.”³² Countries like the ROK that have a high level of uncertainty avoidance have clearly defined laws and rules for behavior. The modern aspects of war that ROK military leaders observed in OIF in terms of battlefield expansion, long-range precision strikes and network centric warfare opened the ROK government to modernizing of ROK military capabilities. Additionally,

the ROK's OIF observations are necessitating the transformation of institutions and pre-existing rules to prevent this discrepancy between ROK capabilities and the demands of warfare in the 21st century from occurring in the future.³³

The Individualism dimension refers to “the degree to which people in a country prefer to act as individuals rather than members of a group.”³⁴ Hofstede defines Masculinity as the “degree to which values like assertiveness, performance and competition prevail over values like quality of life, warm personal relationships and service.”³⁵ The ROK in addition to a significant number of Asian Pacific countries have demonstrated a low predilection for individualism and masculinity, and have been more inclined towards collectivism and service. Collective societies identify themselves as a group that will protect them when they are in trouble. The members of the group also feel a deep sense to contribute to the overall welfare.

The final dimension is Long-term Orientation which is “associated with the values of thrift and perseverance as opposed to tradition and saving one's face.”³⁶ Long-term Orientation is dominant in most East Asian Pacific countries.³⁷ Although the dimensions of Collectivism, Femininity and Long-term Orientation remain relatively constant with the ROK, they serve as optimistic indicators for adapting to the growing trend of economic globalization and increased complexity of strategic security threats. The U.S. currently maintains bi-lateral mutual defense treaties in the Asia-Pacific, this opens up the possibility for the development of multi-lateral arrangements for the purposes of regional stability through collective security, as well as economic prosperity.

The implications of ROK cultural changes are significant for the EUSA. Rather than trying to overcome ROK reluctance to an expansive USFK in order to avoid being

itself entangled in an unwanted war, it would be beneficial to all partner nations for EUSA to play an active, expeditionary role in the region. For countries that are greatly invested in their land forces for long-term security, the EUSA would serve as a major enabler to redefining the regional security environment and for building the requisite partner capacity for collective security to work.³⁸

New Notions of Security

Deterrence security has served as the fundamental element of the US' security agreements in the Asia-Pacific, and has been responsible for the bi-lateral nature of the codified mutual defense agreements. Each country had a specific adversary(ies) that they were trying to deter with US assistance, and there was no major threat to necessitate countries to enter into a multi-lateral agreements. However, the nature of deterrence is changing.

Since 9/11, China has become a dominant economic and military power in the region, and asymmetrical, dispersed violent extremist organizations (VEO) have risen. VEO's like Al Qaeda do not respond to classic deterrence and require a significant amount of land forces on the ground to defeat.³⁹ During a period of global downsizing and smaller militaries, countries no longer have the full range of contingencies that these two emerging threats pose.

Cooperative Security theory postulates that nations can best preserve and protect their interests by active participation in "international institutions and frameworks that serve the common good."⁴⁰ Through cooperation, nations are able to protect more of their own interests than they would be alone.⁴¹ Consequently, it is through these international institutions that nations can deter major aggression through the use of trust-building measures and open lines of communication. Additionally, a cooperative

security approach would increase each nation's capacity for defeating VEOs and transnational criminal organizations (TCO) operating in the region.

Hofstede's 5 Cultural Dimensions provide an initial framework for successfully building cooperative security. "In countries with smaller Power Distances, the leaders as well as those led will function best with a wider spread of decision power than in countries with larger P.D.s; in countries with stronger U.A., all will need more structure and rules."⁴² "The structuring of organizations is primarily influenced by the two dimensions of Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance. Individualism and Masculinity affect primarily the functioning of the people within the organizations. Long Term Orientation affects the economic performance of organizations."⁴³ This cultural assessment warrants the development of clear rules and guidelines amongst Asian-Pacific nations with an inclusive decision-making body for all involved with maintaining a cooperative security.

Role of Landpower

The dominant nature of the sea domain in the Asia-Pacific region combined with the lack of indigenous naval resources presents an important role for U.S. seapower. However, EUSA, as the major Landpower in the region, has the most significant role in the achievement of the Obama Administration's national objectives. During peace, conflict and war the other domains of sea, air, space, and cyber power affect the land domain indirectly, but it is ultimately Landpower that is capable of bringing lasting permanent change.⁴⁴

"The Defense Department's current strategic guidance was driven by the approaching end of a decade of war, a changing technological and geopolitical landscape, and the national security imperative of deficit reduction."⁴⁵ DOD places a

preponderance of responsibility on sea and air power to achieve national objectives as part of the rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific with the disposition of the EUSA land forces remaining relatively unchanged. However, the United States' ability to influence regions across the globe before national security challenges become unmanageable is rooted in U.S. Landpower.

During times of peace, combatant commanders employ steady state engagement strategies to bolster current relationships and reassure potential partners of U.S. commitment to conflict prevention. Prevention requires a credible land force, since it is only through the introduction of land forces that the military balance in a region can truly shift.⁴⁶ This is particularly favorable to partner nations under external threat, and is invaluable for combatant commanders in developing the close personal relationships among regional nations that facilitate the employment of land forces in a conflict.⁴⁷ For potential adversaries, the fact that “the US can rapidly put boots on the ground anywhere in the world still gives our opponents pause.”⁴⁸ The increasing influence of VEOs and TCOs to destabilize a region has made the need for a large, flexible land force that is capable of deterring or defeating the enemy, door-to-door if necessary, indispensable.⁴⁹

When peace does escalate towards conflict, land forces play a crucial role for theater commanders in shaping a campaign to either de-escalate the conflict before it becomes a full-scale war or for the successful execution of a war.⁵⁰ Despite a wide range of shaping options, the “insertion of ground troops is the most tangible and durable measure of America’s commitment to defend American interests, protect friends and deny aggression.”⁵¹ The employment of Landpower through land forces allows for

direct engagement with our partners to foster a mutual understanding from hands-on military-to-military contacts while building in our partners the ability to defend themselves.⁵²

In the event of war, land forces can act to deter further aggression and/or bring about a decisive military outcome. The ability for land forces to occupy the land domain provides a means for managing the population and creating lasting conditions post-conflict. In other words, land forces can not only seize, occupy, and defend areas; they can also remain in an area until National long-term strategic objectives are secured.⁵³ Over the last 10 years, land forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have often influenced, assisted, and coerced according to the situation and at every level of war “to make permanent the otherwise temporary gains achieved through combat.”⁵⁴ Landpower has also played an integral role in the US’ response to natural disasters. Land forces have provided relief from suffering and enabled the restoration of essential services and normalcy.

Although Landpower has the greatest and most diverse impact on the accomplishment of national security objectives, there are natural and man-made interdependencies with the Sea, Air, Space and Cyber Domains that must be considered for effective employment. It is in this manner that the role of EUSA must be transformed and leveraged to ensure the success of the “Rebalancing to the Pacific.”

Transforming EUSA

A new U.S. military strategy for the EUSA requires redefining the existing roles and capabilities rooted in Cold War dynamics to ones that reflect a “new security environment in which U.S. global commitments have proliferated in recent years.”⁵⁵ The current ground force employment in the region, based on the Mutual Defense Treaty of

1953, reflects a bilateral, cold-war era deterrence force against North Korea and its principal ally China.

The forward positioned Army forces must become more expeditionary nature, as a strategic asset to build trust, capacity to and capability with Asian-Pacific nations. The development of mil-mil relations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels should promote confidence with current and future partners for a cooperative, integrated military strategy in peacetime to protect collective interests. Increasing EUSA's participation in existing maritime and air multi-lateral training exercises would have the added benefit of improving interoperability between the military forces of different nations for a wider range of contingencies.

This would also send a stronger message of prosperity through collective security by working directly with the main source of Asian-pacific long-term security, Landpower. The tremendous influence and impact of the land domain is a primary reason that many nations develop Landpower as their principal military force. The high cost of manning and equipping sea power and airpower assets is another reason, but even in the predominantly maritime environment of the Asia-Pacific, nations have placed their long term security predominantly in Landpower.⁵⁶

Given the inherent need to synchronize EUSA's changing role with the other instruments of national power, successful implementation will require a significant diplomatic effort. Collective security objectives will need to be developed and renegotiated with the ROK government. The objective of the U.S.-ROK alliance has been to preserve the existing security order on the peninsula through a combined deterrence effort by ROK and U.S. military forces. A new framework entails moving the

Korean security dilemma away from an alliance based on military primacy towards a coalition based, cooperative security approach that emphasizes multi-lateral actions and trust building measures for maintaining security. The increased participation of both the U.S. and ROK governments in international institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can reduce the possibility of armed conflict. This cooperative security approach also increases the prospects for China to play a more cooperative role with the U.S. and South Korea in ending the Korean security dilemma.

The central theme of an information campaign to redefine the U.S. Army's role in the Asia-Pacific should be that the U.S. still remains the global leader in honoring existing security agreements during a period of fiscal constraint. The reduction of military forces in response to the global economic crisis is not localized to the U.S., and the possibility of achieving prosperity through collective security will appeal to current and potential partners. A critical aspect of a successful information campaign will be the increase in shared intelligence between nations as both an added capability for partners for their own security and an incentive for non-partners to move towards a collective security approach.

Economically, the Army's role in collective security as a means of avoiding conflict will improve the likelihood of successful negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership. Economic partners will now become stakeholders in maintaining regional security, and therefore be less inclined to allow competing nationalisms and disputes to spiral out of control towards war. Collective security would also open up markets in the Asia-Pacific region for open trade and technological innovation.

In regards to joint operations, the capabilities of seapower and airpower remain an active part of the strategic equation for the region. However, leveraging existing land forces to bring about permanent change in the region will require realignment of resources and priorities between the services by the Strategic Leader in the region, the Commanding General (CG) for United States Forces Korea (USFK), Combined Forces Command (CFC) and United Nations Command (UNC). The “modified Mintzberg framework” provides a means for understanding the competencies the Commanding General of these forces will need to leverage to overcome the cultural challenges of the Northeast Asia security environment.

Strategic Leadership

The three major categories of strategic leader roles that Henry Mintzberg outlines are interpersonal, informational, and decisional.⁵⁷ A (strategic) leader will establish their expectations for the scope of actions based on their understanding of these roles, which will impact how effective a leader is in implementing change in an organization.⁵⁸ Given the current implementation of the Administration’s strategy of “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific,” the USFK/CFC/UNC CG’s competencies as entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator and negotiator are paramount to successfully transform the major military organizations on the Korean peninsula.

The CG for USFK/CFC faces complex leadership challenges as he negotiates the transformation of a multi-service, multi-cultural and multi-national organization with a reduction in resources, while still maintaining the same level of security. United States Forces Korea consists of over 28,000 U.S. service-members and Department of Defense civilians serving in Korea, as well as operational control of over 3000 Korean Army Soldiers serving in U.S. units as Korean Augmentees to the U.S. Army

(KATUSAs). The coalition that forms United Nations Command has 16 nations contributing to the mission of monitoring North and South Korean compliance with the 1953 armistice. Finally, the Combined Forces Command entails the employment of all U.S. and Republic of Korea armed forces in the event of hostilities on the peninsula. Each of these commands has various organizational structures, sub-systems and cultures that must support the common purpose of promoting a secure environment.

Entrepreneur

In responding to perceived threats, strategic leaders seeking to change an organization must create new alignments between organizational capabilities and environmental opportunities.⁵⁹ For the CG, the threat of resumed armed conflict between North and South Korea has existed for the last 61 years. The military capabilities aligned against that threat have also remained relatively steady with a combined force of U.S. and R.O.K. units operating within range and ready to respond immediately to a North Korean attack. The most recent U.S. defense strategy repositions U.S. forces out of tactical harm's way with an annual rotation of ground troops to Korea. By changing the character of U.S. forces from "forward deployed and committed" to "forward deployed and uncommitted," the U.S. gains flexibility in responding to threats along the entire Pacific Rim. The repositioning and rotation of ground forces does not resonate as favorably with the current Korean government. It will be up to the CG to redefine the perceived threat in South Korea in a manner that allows him to successfully realign resources with the opportunities that the U.S. defense strategy provides.

Disturbance Handler

Based on the volatile nature of the strategic environment, a strategic leader must determine how the organization responds to crisis from either inside or outside the organization.⁶⁰ This requires an understanding of the cultural and institutional dynamics within the organization, as well as the external pressures that will impact strategic decision making. A lack of understanding could result in a waste of resources or the preclusion of significant strategic options by “forcing a cultural conflict among decision makers.”⁶¹

Resource Allocator and Negotiator

The strategic leader’s role as resource allocator extends beyond tangible assets; it also includes the allocation of the leader’s time to areas, issues and other roles.⁶² As the primary catalyst of change within an organization, how a leader divides his time between competing demands plays a significant role in how successfully an organization will change. Since time is limited, a strategic leader can improve the efficiency of his time by establishing a command climate that builds a sense of unity and empowers subordinate leaders to achieve a common goal.⁶³ In a multi-cultural environment where maintaining the flow of key resources requires tremendous negotiation between stakeholders, an effective command climate is a major combat multiplier.⁶⁴

The current CG, General James D. Thurman, provided an excellent example of the strategic leader’s role as a resource allocator and negotiator when he decided not to move the 210th Fires Brigade as part of the President’s rebalance to Asia. Although one could argue that his decision conflicted with the Obama Administration’s intent for increasing the flexibility of U.S. ground forces in Korea, General Thurman allocated his

available resources to provide the best possible chance for the President's grand strategy to succeed. Long-range artillery serves as a tremendous deterrent to North Korean aggression. The relocation of the Fires Brigade would have weakened the overall South Korean defenses, and brought the strength of the U.S. commitment to the R.O.K. into question with the Korean government. Combined, these factors would have increased the possibility of another Korean conflict and jeopardized U.S. national interests in Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

The U.S. has maintained a long-term security commitment with the Republic of Korea (ROK). As a major part of this commitment, the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) has served as a forward deployed and committed force to the defense of the Korean peninsula. The current changes in the political and cultural climates in the region, however, warrant an expansion to the EUSA's role from a display of U.S. power projection to an instrument of building partner capacity. In other words, the existence of a highly pragmatic "Asian security order" blended from multiple security pathways exists" and should be leveraged to develop a multilateral system of cooperative security.⁶⁵

The primary threat with redefining the Army's role in terms of strategic flexibility within a cooperative security framework is that deep-rooted nationalism will inadvertently lead to resentment towards the U.S. for working with historical competitors and autonomy from working through international institutions. The significance of EUSA as a Landpower to mitigate this risk through face to face engagements, which can then lead to permanent changes should not be overlooked in the "Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific" strategy. It is through this transformation of the Army's role in the Asia-Pacific

that the US will be able to secure US interests and maintain its status as a global leader over the long term.

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