

Strategy Research Project

A Different Road to Implementation of the Total Force Policy

by

Lieutenant Colonel Stacy M. Babcock
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<p>The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</p>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A Different Road to Implementation of the Total Force Policy				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Stacy M. Babcock United States Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel Gregory M. Martin Department of Command, Leadership, and Management				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 5801					
14. ABSTRACT <p>Despite initial codification of the Total Force Policy almost forty years ago, little progress has been made towards Army-wide implementation of the policy. If this is not addressed, the new 2012 Total Force Policy will follow the same long road and fail while waiting for the essential actions to be taken to effectively implement it. This paper applies Kotter's eight-stage process of creating major change to identify the gaps and deficiencies in the Total Force Policy implementation efforts. The resulting analysis yields an alarming lack of consideration for the fundamental requirements for successful implementation of change. Implementation actions to date are sporadic and provide a weak foundation for policy goals to be attained. The Total Force Policy lacks steadfast leadership commitment at all levels across the components. There is not a clearly communicated vision to motivate the force to take action in a unified direction, and cultural differences between the components present barriers to implementation of even the best initiatives. Strategies to address these issues are provided, as well as the recommendation to utilize Kotter's methodology to develop a comprehensive revision of the implementation efforts of the Total Force Policy.</p>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Reserve Component, Army Reserve, Army National Guard					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: U			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 32	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

A Different Road to Implementation of the Total Force Policy

by

Lieutenant Colonel Stacy M. Babcock
United States Army

Colonel Gregory M. Martin
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management
Project Adviser

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: A Different Road to Implementation of the Total Force Policy

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 32

Word Count: 5801

Key Terms: Reserve Component, Army Reserve, Army National Guard

Classification: Unclassified

Despite initial codification of the Total Force Policy almost forty years ago, little progress has been made towards Army-wide implementation of the policy. If this is not addressed, the new 2012 Total Force Policy will follow the same long road and fail while waiting for the essential actions to be taken to effectively implement it. This paper applies Kotter's eight-stage process of creating major change to identify the gaps and deficiencies in the Total Force Policy implementation efforts. The resulting analysis yields an alarming lack of consideration for the fundamental requirements for successful implementation of change. Implementation actions to date are sporadic and provide a weak foundation for policy goals to be attained. The Total Force Policy lacks steadfast leadership commitment at all levels across the components. There is not a clearly communicated vision to motivate the force to take action in a unified direction, and cultural differences between the components present barriers to implementation of even the best initiatives. Strategies to address these issues are provided, as well as the recommendation to utilize Kotter's methodology to develop a comprehensive revision of the implementation efforts of the Total Force Policy.

A Different Road to Implementation of the Total Force Policy

Reserve Affairs' success will be measured by the degree to which we have advanced a culture of mutual appreciation and confidence in both active and reserve components.

—Hon. Dennis M. McCarthy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs¹

The term “Total Force” has surfaced from time to time as concept and then policy for over forty years. It applies to all services and components, but for the purpose of this paper will focus on the United States Army’s application and implementation of the policy. Documents directing the further implementation of and adherence to the Total Force Policy are again being drafted as the Army faces restructuring and force reductions. As recently as September 4, 2012 Secretary of the Army John McHugh issued an Army Directive that included a number of Army Total Force Policy implementation actions.² The basis of the directive is that “DoD policies require the military departments to organize, man, train and equip their active and reserve components as an integrated operational force to provide predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities.”³

The recent Army Directive lays out implementation actions that reflect strategies to resolve issues identified through lessons learned during the army’s decade at war utilizing and integrating the active and reserve components as one operational force. These implementation actions are necessary steps for the management of successful integration of the active and reserve component. What is lacking, and what has been lacking since the inception of the Total Force Policy is an effective mechanism to lead the Army through the transition to a total force. Additionally, one of the biggest challenges to successful and effective implementation of the Total Force Policy is, as

reflected in Secretary Dennis McCarthy's quote above, establishing a culture of mutual appreciation and confidence between the components. These cultural differences between the components must be understood so that they are no longer impediments to mutual appreciation and support.

The Army leadership is applying lessons learned from previous force reductions, as well as over ten years of combat operations in an attempt to maintain operational readiness and avoid becoming a hollow force. The complex environment in which we live today is very different than when Secretary Laird envisioned the Total Force concept, but the underlying principle of the Total Force remains unchanged: the nation can maintain defense capabilities at a reduced total cost through careful balance of active component and reserve component forces.⁴ The reserve components play a vital role in the structure of the future force.

This paper discusses the background of the Total Force Policy, efforts to implement the policy and recommendations developed as a result of the analysis of implementation efforts to date. The assessment of the implementation actions applied Kotter's eight stage process of creating major change to identify the gaps and deficiencies in the Total Force Policy implementation efforts. The resulting analysis yields an alarming lack of consideration for the fundamental requirements for successful implementation of change. Implementation actions to date are sporadic and provide a weak foundation for policy goals to be attained. The Total Force Policy lacks demonstrative and unequivocally vocal leadership commitment at all levels across the components. There is not a clearly communicated vision to motivate the force to take action in a unified direction, and cultural differences between the components present

barriers to implementation of even the best initiatives. Strategies to address these issues are provided, as well as the recommendation to apply Kotter's methodology as the Army goes into its fortieth year of implementation efforts.

Origin and History of the Total Force Policy

The origin of the Total Force Policy can be traced back to President Lyndon Johnson's refusal to activate Guard and Reserve forces during the first three years of the Vietnam War. Even though Guard and Reserve forces had been called on to fight in every war since the American Revolution, President Johnson insisted on addressing Vietnam with an Active component force manned through increased recruiting and increased dependency on the draft. He did so because of the anticipated high political cost of mobilizing the reserves. This refusal to mobilize reserve forces challenged the mission of the Guard and Reserve and also led to decreased experience levels and discipline issues in the active component units with drafted Soldiers.⁵

Richard Nixon promised to end the draft during his election campaign of 1968. There were over 500,000 United States personnel in Vietnam at the time President Nixon took office in January 1969. He concluded that the congressional opposition, campus protests and overall lack of support for the Vietnam War would be easier to accept if there was an end to conscription. President Nixon charged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird with getting rid of the draft in such a way that it would not detriment the ability of the United States to maintain a suitable level of manning and mission readiness. This resulted in a presidential appointed commission that recommended reliance on an "all-volunteer force" to meet the manning requirements of the military, putting an end to dependence on the draft.

Secretary of Defense Laird astutely realized that reliance on an all volunteer force meant increased dependence on the reserve component if they were going to be successful in reducing defense spending.⁶ He introduced the Total Force Concept, advocating for the integration of the active and reserve component into a “total force” utilizing the reserve component as the initial and primary augmentation of the active component.⁷ Cuts in defense spending and the end of the draft paved the way for the Total Force Concept to become policy under Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in 1973.⁸

The original Total Force Policy ensured an adequate number of forces to meet mission requirements, but fell short in its ability to maintain the appropriate level of readiness of the force. Poor readiness of both the active and reserve forces led to harsh criticism of the policy less than two years after its implementation. An increase in defense spending in the 1980’s provided the opportunity for the active component to largely overcome its readiness issues, but the under-funded and resource constrained reserve component continues to struggle.⁹

Analysis Applying Kotter’s Eight Stage Process

Kotter’s book *Leading Change* illustrates an eight stage process for attaining successful transformations.¹⁰ Implementation of policies like the one discussed in this paper is essentially a directive for major transformation. This change must be managed utilizing detailed planning, appropriate budgeting, proper organization and staffing and careful monitoring of results. Leadership is also an imperative element to successful transformation of the Army. The leader is essential to the process of establishing direction, aligning people, and motivating and inspiring them.¹¹

Kotter's eight stage process follows the following sequence: establishing a sense of urgency; creating the guiding coalition; developing a vision and strategy; communicating the change vision; empowering broad-based action; generating short-term wins; consolidating gains and producing more change; and anchoring new approaches in the culture. The first four steps help to break through the resistance to change, while the final steps introduce new practices and anchor the change into the organization's culture.¹² In some cases the military skips some or all of the initial four stages of the transformation process, as will be demonstrated in the following assessment. The downside to skipping these initial stages is that it produces change efforts that come across as being forced, and often seem to lack logical reasoning. If the transformation does not make sense, everyone from the private to senior leadership will create roadblocks to derail the transformation effort. Change can only be successfully implemented if these roadblocks or barriers to change are effectively addressed. The Army is not immune to the impact of these roadblocks. Lack of teamwork, low level of trust, competing demands for resources, deep-seated culture, and a simple unwillingness to change are just a few examples of barriers. Any barrier that affects the successful implementation of change to the organization must be addressed.¹³

Kotter's eight stages are discussed below in more detail, and used to examine the implementation efforts of the Total Force Policy to date. The stages are consecutive and movement to the next stage should not happen until the requirements of the current/previous stage(s) have been met.¹⁴ For the purpose of this paper, all stages will be discussed as if the requirements of the previous stages were met. This examination

of implementation efforts will inform the recommendations in this paper to facilitate implementation of the Total Force Policy.

Stage One – Establishing a Sense of Urgency

Establishing a sense of urgency primarily addresses the need to motivate people to let go of the status quo and drive them out of their comfort zone.¹⁵ People within an organization get comfortable with the way things are done and the Army is no exception. From initial entry into the Army, Soldiers are guided by regulations and manuals that set standards for behavior and define processes for performing tasks. People at the top make the rules and the people at the bottom follow the rules. This can be an effective way of maintaining order and discipline, but is not an effective way to modify engrained cultural views and opinions that exist between the components. In order to support effective implementation of the Total Force Policy, the Army leader needs to reorient attitudes and actions that keep them locked into the current way of thinking and doing things.¹⁶ Numerous attempts via policies, directives and transformation efforts have been made over the years to create a sense of urgency. But major transformation cannot happen if the sense of urgency does not exist at all levels. The transformation effort needs to be presented as an initiative that solicits support and involvement from all ranks.

The Total Force Policy has been a policy for almost forty years, and has yet to be fully and effectively implemented. Even though a change of this magnitude does not happen quickly, by anyone's standards four decades is too long to implement a policy. This is not to say there has been a lack of effort to implement the policy. As discussed later in this paper, there have been a number of secretaries of defense who have directed efforts to support the Total Force Policy. While these efforts are necessary to

justify activities, programs and funding, change will not happen until the Army has truly created a sense of urgency across components and down to the lowest level. Simply stated, the implementation efforts of the Total Force Policy have lacked a sense of urgency over the years. A more accurate statement might be that the policy has had a sporadic sense of urgency. Either way, the change effort will lose momentum if the sense of urgency is not maintained.¹⁷ Current fiscal challenges and restructuring of the force will create a sense of urgency at the Department of Defense level, but also creates competition for resources and relevancy as the components guard their dwindling resources.

There is still a great cultural divide between the active and reserve components.¹⁸ This likely impacts the sense of urgency for implementation of the Total Force Policy. Navigating through the mobilization authorities and other reserve component processes can make working with the reserve component a painful process. Additionally, the active component arguably has little to gain from an integrated force. Full integration of the reserve components takes resources from the active component in a zero sum environment. While ten plus years of mobilizations have done much to bring the reserve component to a level of expertise not seen in past years, the reserve components are still generally viewed as a substandard (to the active component), part-time force. Viewing the Total Force Policy as an Army initiative, rather than seeing it as a reserve components problem, creates a “sense of urgency” for the entire force. Members and leaders in both the active and reserve components need to consider the status quo unacceptable. The Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army are essential to setting the stage for the successful creation of a sense of urgency. Their

personal commitment and steadfast leadership are vital to keeping the Total Force implementation efforts moving forward.

Stage Two - Creating the Guiding Coalition

Major transformations are often mistakenly attributed to the actions and leadership of a single person. For example, the replacement of the Army patrol cap with the black beret is attributed to former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, but he was not the only one involved in making the somewhat controversial culture changing transition to the beret.¹⁹ While there are great leaders, no one person can affect major change with the sufficient force and span of influence needed. This stage of creating the “guiding coalition” involves assembling a group of people who can function as a cohesive team.²⁰ Successful implementation of major change depends on building a strong guiding coalition composed of the right people. The team needs to be proven leaders with relevant experience. These people need to be in positions of power and effective at facilitating the transition from concept to process within the organization. The guiding coalition must consist of both managers and leaders. The managers will keep the process under control while the leaders drive the change.²¹

The Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army and Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) or ASA M&RA serve as the primary “guiding coalition” for the Total Force Policy for the Army. Secretary of Defense initiatives and Secretary of the Army directives have been providing guidance to the ASA M&RA over the last forty years. Following initial implementation in 1973 several subsequent Defense Secretaries issued policy statements in support of continued adherence and implementation of the Total Force Policy. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in 1982, referenced the total force policy when addressing equipment shortages in the

Guard and Reserve.²² In 1995 Secretary of Defense William Perry issued a memorandum directing the increased use of Reserve forces in total force missions.²³ As a follow-up to this, Secretary of Defense William Cohen issued a memorandum in 1997 addressing the integration of the reserve and active components.²⁴ As the reserve component became a vital force to the support of the greater war on terrorism, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld placed primary focus on rebalancing the forces in order to provide a force structure that would accommodate a one year mobilized to five year stabilization rate for reserve forces.²⁵ Secretary of Defense John McHugh listed as one of his top priorities to codify the Army Total Force Policy.²⁶ In his 2012 directive, he listed a number of initiatives that ASA M&RA is directed to implement in coordination with the Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7. More than eleven years at war have provided for better integration than in the past and the Army needs to continue integrate the components, and applying it to the enduring way the Army works.

Stage Three – Developing a Vision and Strategy

According to Kotter, a vision needs to be created to help direct the change effort. Every vision should be accompanied by a strategy to lay out how it will be achieved.²⁷ A good vision motivates people to take action in a unified direction and provides a desirable goal or end state. An effective vision also provides a picture of what the future looks like and appeals to long term interests of members of the organization. Of the eight stages provided by Kotter, this stage is the one most familiar to military leadership. All leaders learn about the importance of a clear vision and strategy at all levels of officer professional development education. Military leaders understand that the vision transcends the entire organization and, if effective becomes part of the culture.²⁸

While the policy supports the Army's overall vision to be a globally engaged and regionally responsive force to prevent, shape and win our nation's wars, the policy in and of itself does not have the influence sufficient enough to become part of the Army culture. First line leader training can use used to train and educate Soldiers at all levels, on concepts and elements of the policy. Historically, policies that impact Army culture are implemented utilizing programs that focus on training and education down to the lowest level. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program is an example of a policy that did not necessarily have a vision but was implemented through training, education and programs established to the lowest level of Army culture.²⁹ A Total Force Integration and Implementation Program would provide the same type of training and education relevant to the Total Force Policy vision and implementation.

Stage Four – Communicating the Change Vision

Once a vision has been created, the organization needs to use every method possible to provide constant communication of the new vision and strategy. Communication comes in word and deed. In addition to typical communication mediums, the guiding coalition created in stage two, as well as key leaders, can communicate the vision by leading by example and role modeling the behavior expected.³⁰

As previously discussed, the guiding coalition resides at the Department of the Army level, with the ASA M&RA as the executive agent. The challenge for the Army senior leaders is to communicate the Total Force Policy and vision to the lowest level. The Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army periodically speak of the importance of the reserve component and its contribution to the Army as a whole. Secretary of the Army John McHugh noted the importance of leveraging the capacity

and capabilities of the reserve components as part of the Total Force in the 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance.³¹ Senior leadership has expressed the importance of maintaining the reserve component as an operational force, preventing it from reverting to a strategic reserve. The message here is that great strides have been made in improving the overall readiness of the reserve component and its continued integration into the total force. These accomplishments need to be reinforced and communicated to all levels in order to become ingrained in Army culture. The Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army must reinforce their support of this policy every chance they get.

The senior leadership cannot depend on a once or twice a year announcement addressing the importance of the Total Force Policy. Statements about the policy need to be recurring. To achieve this, several forums must be used to communicate the policy and senior leader intent. Traditional communication methods as well as social media provide a basic foundation for the communication effort. These are typically one-way communication mediums that offer little opportunity for direct discussion. Training and education programs provided at the unit level can offer a venue for the guiding coalition, as well as all leaders, to discuss the policy and its importance to the Army as a whole.

The civilian population cannot be ignored when communicating the vision. The original Total Force Policy resulted in dependence on an all-volunteer force, as discussed earlier in this paper. Over 500,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers are employed as civilians, working in businesses and organizations among the American public. Employer support to the reservist and employer partnerships will be

stronger if there is a clear understanding of the Army, its missions and expectations of the reservist. The Army needs to develop a new approach to effectively communicate the Total Force Policy and vision to Army Soldiers as well as the American public.

Leadership down to the lowest echelon, regardless of component, must actively embrace the policy and its goals. According to Kotter, true acceptance of the vision through effective communication happens when the participants are willing to give and take in the short term to accept a long term and overall more effective organization. It is then that the organization will experience mutual commitment towards accomplishing the vision.³² This is where an inability to effectively accomplish the efforts in the first three stages starts to become apparent. If there is not an appropriate level of urgency, people are not going to care about a vision or policy. If the guiding coalition is not composed of the right people, they may have difficulty communicating the right message about the vision. A bad vision or unclear vision will lead an organization in the wrong direction or generate confusion at the very least.³³

Stage Five - Empowering Broad Based Action

The goal of this stage is to empower people to take action. Empowerment of broad based action cannot occur until obstacles to change are removed.³⁴ The Army has done much over the years to implement policies to enable change and address obstacles that impact successful implementation of the Total Force Policy. Incompatible structures, legacy systems, deficiencies in skills and lack of support at all levels present obstacles to implementation of the Total Force Policy.

Force structure has been one of the main focus areas in regard to the Total Force Policy. Only two years after signing it into policy, Secretary Schlesinger became doubtful about the Total Force Policy and moved forward to have Army Chief of Staff

Creighton Abrams adopt a “roundout” strategy, under which a reserve brigade would round out active brigades.³⁵ The 1991 Gulf War brought on more discussions about restructuring the force, and throughout the 1990s a number of additional initiatives to address structure emerged. Efforts were made in 1992 through enactment of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act, to increase the number of prior service active duty personnel in the Army National Guard. It also required each National Guard unit to associate with an active-duty unit.³⁶ A 1994 restructuring plan for the National Guard and Army Reserve addressed post cold war mission changes.³⁷ Congress enacted the Reserve Forces Revitalization Act of 1996 affirming the U.S. Army Reserve Command as a separate command, commanded by the Chief of the Army Reserve.³⁸ The post 9-11 years continued to see more initiatives to address structure. Discussions about rebalancing the force and its missions were common, as the Army addressed the increasingly high demands being placed on the reserve component.³⁹ Now as the nation moves into post war reductions, force structure discussions are again on the table. Solving the structure problem will be vital to successful implementation of the Total Force Policy.

Legacy systems and processes have also made implementation of the Total Force Policy a challenge. For example, mobilization authorities have been under revision since the 1970s in an effort to more efficiently utilize and integrate the active and reserve component during deployments.⁴⁰ *Army Directive 2012-08*, signed in September 2012 lays out a very comprehensive effort to address inconsistencies in systems and processes. Personnel management and pay systems are being integrated. Equipping strategies are placing primary focus on procurement and

equipping processes that will enable units to perform missions regardless of component. Standardized training and validation processes are being implemented, as well as equitable professional development standards. The Army is consolidating regulations to better integrate active and reserve force policies and procedures.⁴¹ These initiatives are well overdue and should eliminate some of the obstacles keeping the Total Force Policy from reaching its goal.

Stages one through four of the Total Force Policy implementation assessment are undeniably lacking in actions taken to meet Kotter's criteria to move forward to the next stage. This stage, on the other hand, demonstrates the most robust activity and effort to set in place policies and remove barriers that prevent accomplishment of the goals of the Total Force Policy. But according to Kotter's sequential requirement of the stages, momentum at this stage cannot be maintained without the foundation provided by the previous four stages.⁴² This weak foundation resulting from a lack of focus on the initial stages might be the reason the Total Force Policy does not stay on the forefront and is still being implemented almost forty years later.

Stage Six - Generating Short-Term Wins

This stage involves establishing visible or measurable benchmarks towards achieving the goal or vision. Short-term wins provide motivation and affirmation that the change effort is moving in the right direction. They can also be used to justify continued commitment to and funding for the effort. Short-term goals and short-term pressure help keep the sense of urgency up. If the change effort goes too long without any indication that there is success, people will lose interest.⁴³

This absence of quick wins seems to have contributed to the ineffective implementation efforts of the Total Force Policy over the years. The goal of

transforming the Army into a “total force” is multifaceted and by its nature requires years to accomplish. Without short-term wins, it is easy to lose sight and motivation to attain the overarching goal. The Total Force Policy has been addressed by a number of Secretaries since its inception in 1973, but every time it is brought up, some changes are made, time passes and discussions and efforts towards implementation wane. The weak foundation provided in steps one through four coupled with a lack of identified short-term wins in step six, place it on a path to the back burner every time. Without the elements of the other stages, Total Force is just another great idea that does not gain and maintain the traction needed to stay the course.

The current Army Directive clearly reemphasizes Army policy in relation to Total Force, and provides a list of tangible implementation actions.⁴⁴ The implementation actions are primarily focused on revisions to current Army regulations, as well as utilization of a new mobilization authority. Short-term wins can, and should be identified for these actions. The policies mentioned in the Army directive include those addressing organization, training, sustaining and equipping the total force as well as integrated training events, streamlined mobilization and integrated personnel and pay systems. What is lacking in the directive are implementation actions to guide progress towards adherence to these Army policies. The policies are listed because the goals for them have not yet been achieved, and are essential to transition to a Total Force. If implementation actions are directed for the policies, measures of effectiveness can be determined and short-term wins identified. While some positive movement towards successful accomplishment of these Army policies has been made, it is imperative to

identify implementation actions and measurable short-term wins for each policy mentioned.

Stage Seven - Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change

This stage, like the others capitalizes on the successes of the previous stages. It utilizes the increased credibility to advance change systems, structures, and policies. By this time key change agents may have moved on, and critical momentum can be lost.⁴⁵ In the case of the Total Force Policy, senior leadership and personnel in the guiding coalition have transitioned a number of times since 1973. Forty years is a long time to undergo change, and short-term wins in the form of consolidated gains are vital to maintaining a sense of urgency and continued commitment to the change effort. At this point the change process is vulnerable to complacency and can suffer from a lack of support, even if all previous stages have been successfully navigated. The efforts of the lower ranking leaders become increasingly important as the change effort matures. These lower level leaders need to be aware of the changes being made in support of the Total Force Policy, so they can educate the Soldiers down to the lowest level. This is critical to changing the Army culture and to the success of certain initiatives like continuum of service (discussed in stage eight). Training and education efforts that present the initiatives taken, goals attained and future opportunities available as a result of successful implementation of the Total Force Policy will keep it alive and moving forward.

Stage Eight- Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture

This final stage is often overlooked, resulting in failure to effectively implement change despite successful progression through the previous seven stages. This is possibly the most difficult stage because the foundation for changing culture needs to

start in phase one and continue throughout the change effort. If the new approach or change made in the organization is not anchored in the culture, it will not be strong enough to withstand the natural tendency to go back to doing things the old way. The most successful changes can easily be reversed or forgotten if the change does not become rooted in the culture.⁴⁶

As an example, continuum of service relies on anchoring changes in culture. Continuum of service facilitates the transition of Soldiers between active and reserve components. Current continuum of service efforts focus on making the policy changes necessary to make the transition between components easier.⁴⁷ Another challenge is to overcome the negative stigma of transferring from the active component to serve in the reserve component. Time spent in the reserve component is currently viewed in a negative light by many active component Soldiers. Army culture must change in order to make this a successful initiative. The point here is that the process can be set in place, but until the culture adopts the initiative as one that is not detrimental to the Soldier's career, it will not be generally accepted as a smart career option.

Policy Recommendations

The foregoing analysis applied Kotter's eight-stage process for implementing change. This analysis identified a number of shortcomings in the Army's attempts to implement the Total Force Policy. The following policy recommendations address those shortcomings.

Revitalize and Maintain Sense of Urgency

The Army senior leadership must do more to create and maintain a sense of urgency if it wants to sustain the momentum needed to reach the goals of the Total Force Policy. Discussions about Total Force surface when a catalyst results in an

increased dependence on the reserve component. The Vietnam War, the Gulf War, Bosnia and most recent Greater War on Terrorism (GWOT) are all examples that brought discussions of Total Force to the forefront. During these times, Total Force initiatives increase, focus on readiness becomes vital and the active and reserve component move towards better integration. Unfortunately this sense of urgency is short lived. The Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army need to demonstrate and sustain an active commitment to reaching the successful implementation of the policies discussed in the 2012 Total Force directive. The policies in the directive, even though they are not new, have yet to be attained despite a forty year effort. Failure to satisfy the requirements of these policies will result in failure to implement the Total Force Policy. The Army senior leadership needs to place, and maintain the highest priority on successful implementation of all aspects of the Total Force Policy, and allocate the necessary personnel and fiscal resources to maintain the current momentum gained as a result of the *Army Directive 2012-08*.

Create and Communicate a Vision that Transcends all Audiences

The protracted employment of the reserve component in support of the GWOT has done much to keep the Total Force Policy discussion alive. The post-war drawdown, fiscal constraints and overall reduction in force structure will sustain the focus on these discussions. In this light, the reserve component cannot be viewed solely as an augmentation to the active component as stated in the Total Force definition of the 1973 secretary of defense memorandum. Instead, the Secretary of Army Directive of 2012 must communicate as the “vision” for the Total Force.⁴⁸ The vision could read something like this: “The Army will man, train and equipment the active and reserve components as an integrated operational force capable of providing

predictable, recurring and sustainable capabilities.” The vision must be understood and enforced at all levels, especially among leaders of the active component. Soldiers, families and employers need to understand what it entails and, ideally, embrace and enforce it out of a sense of conviction.

The Army should implement a training and education program for the Total Force policy starting with exposure at initial entry in the Army. Effective communication of the vision to the lowest level is necessary to provide a foundation to dissolve cultural barriers and instill mindsets that prevent change. Training and education, much like that conducted for Sexual Harassment and Assault Prevention, should occur to lock in the message and provide venues for discussion and clarification.

Establish Cross-Component Unit Alignments

Rebalancing and reorganization of the force should consider active and reserve component unit alignments. Setting up cross component unit alignments enable the units to establish rapport, integrate training and improve overall unit readiness. The movement towards geographically aligned units provides the initial foundation for establishing cross component alignment. Successful cross component alignments pave the way for consideration of enabler units like Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations to move towards a multi-component unit structure.

Establish Cross-Component Key Developmental Positions

The Army should identify integrated cross component key developmental positions in both active and reserve component units. The positions designated would be fundamental to the development of the Soldier, but also provide cross-component experience in key development assignments identified for each branch/military occupational specialty. These positions are not to be confused with cross-component

assignments that already occur. Currently reservists are assigned to a number of active component organizations. Reservists are assigned to positions in these active component organizations to support the equities of the reserve component.

The integrated key developmental positions proposed here would fully integrate the Soldier into the unit and immerse him or her into the culture of the other component. The intent is to gain as much exposure to the other component as possible through the cross-component experience. These key developmental cross-component positions need to be centrally boarded, established as career enhancing much like joint positions are, and occur early in the Soldier's career. Reserve Soldiers could apply for an active duty tour through the board to fill the position, much like the current command board process. Assignment length should be one to two years, with a requirement to return to the component of origin upon reassignment.

Conclusion

This paper examined the implementation efforts of the Army Total Force Policy. It identified the gaps and deficiencies of implementation by applying Kotter's eight-stage process of creating major change in an organization. The recommendations provided, while not all inclusive, address the gaps and deficiencies in an effort to provide a clear path to implementation for the new 2012 Total Force Policy. This new policy provides unprecedented clear guidance, and reiteration of Army policy requirements not being met. Unfortunately it will continue to travel down the long and arduous road to implementation if the mistakes of the last forty years are not addressed. Implementation has been the primary barrier to attaining the goals of the Total Force Policy. The Army should conduct a comprehensive revision to its implementation efforts

utilizing the methodology presented in this paper to address the barriers that have plagued previous implementation efforts of the Total Force Policy.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Dennis M. McCarthy, "Reserve Affairs Overview," briefing slides, Washington, DC, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, March 2011.

² U.S. Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh, "Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy)," memorandum for Principle Officials of Headquarters, Department of the Army Commander, Washington, DC, September 4, 2012.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 5, 2011), 9.

⁵ John T. Correll, "Origins of the Total Force," *Air Force Magazine*, February 2011, 94-97.

⁶ James Jay Carafano, *The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future*, (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, April 18, 2005), 2.

⁷ U.S. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, "Readiness of the Selected Reserve", memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, DC August 23, 1973.

⁸ Alice R. Buchalter and Seth Elan, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, October 2007), 15.

⁹ John T. Correll, "Origins of the Total Force," *Air Force Magazine*, February 2011, 94-97.

¹⁰ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business Review Press, 1996), 21.

¹¹ Ibid., 26.

¹² Ibid., 21-22.

¹³ Ibid., 20.

¹⁴ Ibid., 23.

¹⁵ Ibid., 4-5.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, Field Manual 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 2005), 4-9.

¹⁷ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 49.

¹⁸ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force* (Arlington, Virginia: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, January 31, 2008), 323.

¹⁹ Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric K. Shinseki, "Beret Wear Policy," HQDA LTR 670-01-1, Washington, DC, June 14, 2001.

²⁰ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 21.

²¹ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 57.

²² Ralph H. Currier, *Total Force Integration So Far*, Research Report (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College Air University, April 2008), 36.

²³ *Ibid.*, 36-37.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

²⁵ Charles J. Gross, *A Chronological History of the Air National Guard and its Antecedents, 1908-2007* (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, Historical Services Division, April 7, 2007), 30.

²⁶ John M. McHugh, *Secretary of the Army Top Priorities* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Army, November 5, 2012), 3.

²⁷ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 21.

²⁸ Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 3rd Ed. (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College, 2010), 21.

²⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Interim Guidance – Army Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program*, ALARACT 176/2004 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, November 12, 2004).

³⁰ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 95.

³¹ John M. McHugh and Raymond T. Odierno, *2012 Strategic Planning Guidance* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, April 19, 2012), 2.

³² Kotter, *Leading Change*, 87.

³³ *Ibid.*, 100.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 102-103.

³⁵ Buchalter, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components*, 30.

³⁶ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993*, Public Law 102-484, 102nd Cong., 1st sess. (October 1, 1992), 2536-2542.

³⁷ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel, *Restructuring of the Army Guard and Reserve*, 103rd Congress, 2d Session, March 8, 1994, 12-13.

³⁸ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997*, Public Law 104-201, 104th Cong., 1st sess. (September 23, 1996), 2689-2690.

³⁹ Gross, *A Chronological History of the Air National Guard and its Antecedents, 1908-2007*, 129

⁴⁰ Leslie Lewis, C. Robert Roll, and John D. Mayer, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), 35.

⁴¹ McHugh, "Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy)"

⁴² Kotter, *Leading Change*, 102.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁴⁴ McHugh, "Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy)"

⁴⁵ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 132.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁷ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force* (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, October 2008), 9.

⁴⁸ McHugh, "Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy)."

