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**SHARED IDENTITY AND RECONCILIATION: CAN A
FUTURE SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN NORTHEAST
ASIA DRAW FROM EXPERIENCES OF THE NORTH
ATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION?**

by

Andreas Langenbach

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Wade Huntley
Daniel Moran

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FRAMEWORK IN NORTHEAST ASIA DRAW FROM EXPERIENCES OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION?**

Andreas Langenbach
Major (GS), German Army
M.A., University of the German Armed Forces Hamburg, 2002

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2013**

Author: Andreas Langenbach

Approved by: Wade Huntley
Thesis Advisor

Daniel Moran
Second Reader

Harold Trinkunas
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

In the wake of the deteriorating relations between the former Allies of the Second World War, several European countries, the United States of America, and Canada came together to provide for their security and in 1949 formed a unique security alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In addition to its collective defense function, the creators of NATO also paid attention to community building among the alliance members. After reconciliation with its former enemies, the re-armed Germany was allowed to join this community even though it had caused the Second World War. These observations lead to the question of the importance of community and reconciliation for the creation and success of NATO.

On the other hand, Northeast Asia, which had also been severely affected by Japanese colonialism and the Pacific War, did not evolve into an area of peace and security. This situation might be even more surprising given the number of existing forums dealing with security issues. This thesis examines the possibility of *NATO-like* security cooperation in Northeast Asia that features community building aspects and reconciliation, both of which are assumed to be normative prerequisites of a security community.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------|--|
| APT | ASEAN Plus Three |
| ARF | ASEAN Regional Forum |
| ASEAN | Association of Southeast Asian Nations |
| EAC | East Asian Community |
| EAS | East Asia Summit |
| EASG | East Asia Study Group |
| EAVG I | East Asia Vision Group I |
| EAVG II | East Asia Vision Group II |
| NAT | North Atlantic Treaty |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NEA | Northeast Asia |
| PRC | People's Republic of China |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

In the light of the successful North Atlantic security cooperation and the volatile security environment in Northeast Asia (NEA), this thesis asks if insights from the North Atlantic experience can be applied to NEA. One of these insights (detailed in this thesis) is the emergence of a shared identity among the countries that created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When they came together in 1949 to collectively protect themselves from a threat posed by the Soviet Union, they also aimed at creating a security community based on a shared identity. The second insight is that Germany could not have joined NATO without its serious efforts to reconcile with most of its former war time enemies and victims of the Nazi regime.

The thesis looks to answer this central question by addressing several subordinate questions: What were the origins of the North Atlantic security cooperation and to which degree were a shared identity and reconciliation among its member states a necessary element of its creation and success? What is the degree of reconciliation in NEA between Japan, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Republic of Korea (ROK)? To what degree has a shared identity developed in East Asia? Are shared identity and reconciliation a prerequisite for *NATO-like* security cooperation in NEA?

B. IMPORTANCE

After having fought two World Wars in the 20th century, several European countries, the United States of America (U.S.), and Canada came together to provide for their security and in 1949 formed a unique security alliance, NATO. This alliance was a “hybrid organization: one that maintained collective security against the Soviet Union and actively pursued the construction of a trans-Atlantic community of nations.”¹ Although fascism in Germany had caused the outbreak of the Second World War, the devastation of Europe and millions of dead, the re-armed country acceded to this

¹ Mary N. Hampton, “NATO at the Creation. U.S. Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse,” *Security Studies* 4, no. 3 (1995), 610–11.

community in 1955. In spite of the assumption of some realist scholars of international relations, NATO outlasted the end of the Cold War; it also integrated former opponents from the Warsaw Pact as new members, and the continuity of the alliance does not seem to be in question.

NEA, which had also been severely affected by Japanese colonialism and the Pacific War, nevertheless did not have such a long tradition of great power rivalries that emerged in Europe with the Thirty Years' War and continued thereafter for nearly 300 years. But while the North Atlantic region has developed into an area of peace and security since the Second World War, NEA:

encompasses a diverse mix of rival great powers, thorny territorial disputes, unresolved historical memories ... The unsettled relations ... would be a challenge to manage even if the region had well-established governance institutions – but the absence of strong and coherent regional security institutions makes the challenge even greater.²

This situation might be even more surprising given the number of existing forums dealing with security issues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the East Asia Summit (EAS). This thesis aims to propose the shape of future security cooperation in NEA by looking for the existence of a shared identity and assessing the degree of reconciliation among these nations. Both of these conditions are normative prerequisites of a security community as demonstrated by the formation and success of the North Atlantic security cooperation. The importance of these prerequisites in the NATO case and their possible distinct impacts on security cooperation in NEA have not received much scholarly attention.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

A first hypothesis is that the creation of the North Atlantic security cooperation was fostered by the invocation of a North Atlantic region, inhabited by people who share a common set of norms and values and who positively identify with each other. Without this shared identity among its members, NATO would have existed only as a deterrent

² G. John Ikkenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "Between Balance of Power and Community: the Future of Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 2 (2002), 69–70.

against the Soviet Union. If that were the case, then the aspect of shared identity would be of no importance for NEA. Furthermore, with no single aggressor comparable to the Soviet Union, the NEA community would have no common threat from which to protect themselves.

The second hypothesis considers the importance of Germany's reconciliation efforts with its wartime enemies and victims of the Nazi regime as a necessary prerequisite for its inclusion in the North Atlantic community of nations and NATO. If Germany had been integrated into NATO merely because of its geostrategic importance as a bulwark against the Soviet armies, then reconciliation would not have mattered. Thus, reconciliation would not be a prerequisite for a possible NEA security cooperative. Any perceived threat would force these countries to cooperate, no matter what their perception of each other is.

The third hypothesis is that effective institutionalized security cooperation in NEA remains a challenge because it would entail some degree of curtailment of national sovereignty. Without a shared positive identity as Northeast Asians, these nations cannot cooperate under these terms. Countries in the region, and the PRC in particular, emphasize their sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs by other states. A curtailment of national sovereignty, however, would be necessary, for example, to create integrated military command structures as is the case for NATO.

As an amalgamation of the first three hypotheses, the thesis examines how shared identity and reconciliation are necessary prerequisites for an NEA security cooperative that would be comparable to NATO. This thesis evaluates the degree to which these conditions are present in NEA and the impact of these conditions on the creation of a NATO-like security cooperative among these nations.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

To answer the numerous questions raised in this thesis it is necessary to consult literature on various topics. These topics include the origins of NATO; a look at the status of reconciliation in NEA between Japan on the one side, the PRC and the ROK on the other; an assessment of the level of a shared identity in NEA; and a discussion of the

prospects for and the shape of a future security cooperative in this region based on the North Atlantic experience.

With regard to the origins of NATO, the dominant explanation is the realist paradigm arguing for the birth of NATO in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This contrasts to explanations that see in NATO the creation of a value-based community of like-minded democracies that aimed to preserve peace and prosperity in a shared transatlantic region. As Timothy P. Ireland writes, “Traditionally, in analyses of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and NATO, American historians have concentrated on the development of the ‘cold war’ between the United States and the Soviet Union.”³ Also Sean Kay argues that “the primary reason for NATO’s founding was the Soviet challenge in Eastern Europe. NATO was an alliance created in response to a threat.”⁴ These assessments are underlined by comments from high-ranking U.S. politicians who were present at the creation of NATO, including Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who said in 1966, “The plain fact, of course, is that NATO is a military alliance. Its purpose was and is to deter and, if necessary, to meet the use of Russian military power or the fear of its use in Europe.”⁵ Promoting the second strand of explanation, Mary N. Hampton argues “a central belief ... that formed a key U.S. security objective was that a trans-Atlantic community ... must be constructed. This belief preceded the American drive to balance against the Soviet.”⁶ Making his first public comments as secretary of state, Dean Acheson also argued in this way in 1949:

We North Atlantic peoples share a common faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty ... We believe that these principles and this common heritage can best be fortified and preserved and the general welfare of the people of the North Atlantic

³ Timothy P. Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance. The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), 4.

⁴ Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 31.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁶ Hampton, “NATO at the Creation,” 611.

advanced by an arrangement for cooperation in matters affecting their peace and security and common interests.⁷

Hampton arrives at her view after assessing what she calls the Wilsonian impulse, a set of ideas of the former U.S. president, and how these affected the behavior of U.S. policymakers after the Second World War. She identifies the existence of a positive security identity and attributes a significant impact on state behavior to this identity in the sense that it brought the founding members of NATO together against Russia, but it also ensured that the members of the alliance did not go to war against each other.⁸

Current literature acknowledges this dual nature of NATO and adds even more facets to the need for its creation like threats through fragile economies, weak political systems, or rising nationalism.⁹ But the literature on the origins of NATO is comparatively young and was more or less completely absent for the first forty years of the alliance. This might have been caused by the perception that the creation of NATO simply was the logical consequence of containment policy and the Cold War, and that, therefore, the reasons for NATO's origins were clear and explored to a sufficient extent.¹⁰ The end of the Cold War, nevertheless, did not see the collapse of NATO and made people ask why this was so. Literature about the early history and maybe deeper origins of NATO flourished to some extent through the 1990s, but since Gustav Schmidt's multi-volume edition of 2001 about NATO's first fifty years, the dedicated occupation with NATO's origins disappeared, and reference to its origins might be given in works on other NATO-related topics.

⁷ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 30.

⁸ Mary N. Hampton, "NATO, Germany, and the United States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-Atlantia," *Security Studies* 8, nos. 2–3 (1998), 235–36.

⁹ See Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 31–34; John English, "Who Could Ask for More? North American Perspectives on NATO's Origins," in *A History of NATO—The First Fifty Years*, vol. 2, ed. Gustav Schmidt (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave, 2001), 320; John R. Gillingham, "Introduction," in *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe*, ed. Francis C. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York, St. Martin's Press: 1992), 1.

¹⁰ Lawrence S. Kaplan, "After Forty Years. Reflections on NATO as a Research Field," in *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe*, ed. Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (New York, St. Martin's Press: 1992), 16.

The matter of reconciliation in NEA between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK is a long-standing issue. The relations between these countries are still strained by the history of Japan's colonial past and the memories of the Pacific War. This strain is measured by reaction in these countries to Japanese textbooks, the visits of Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni shrine, the issue of comfort women, or territorial disputes.¹¹ The available literature emphasizes that Japan has to overcome its habit of public excuses to its neighbors, while at the same time undercutting these excuses at home. The government continues to assert domestically that the Pacific War was started by a politico-military clique in Japan and emphasizes the victimhood of the Japanese people, assertions which must cease as a prerequisite for true reconciliation.¹² While some scholars recognize that the U.S. occupation forces fostered this Japanese attitude after the end of the Pacific War¹³, and even add that U.S. decisions "contributed to the vicious circle regarding Japan's inability to reconcile and reintegrate itself into postwar Asia,"¹⁴ the majority of the literature sees the continuing enmities between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK as rooted in the rise of nationalism, especially in the PRC and the ROK.¹⁵ The more detailed consideration of the conflict between the PRC and Japan as result of their

¹¹ For coverage of these issues in Chinese media see Jiangan Huo, "Where Are Sino-Japanese Relations Headed?: Japanese Prime Minister Is Reshaping a Tough Japan at the Cost of Relations with Neighboring Countries," *Beijing Review* 48, no. 44 (2005); Ying Ding, "Textbook Outcry: Japan Adds New Tension to Its Already Strained Relations with Its Asian Neighbors by Approving a New Textbook," *Beijing Review* 48, no. 15 (2005); Zhitao Ding, "Diplomatic Deep Freeze: South Koreans Have Been Completely at Odds With Japanese Over a Series of Disputed Issues Recently," *Beijing Review* 48, no. 15 (2005), 19.

¹² Kazuko Mori, "New Relations between China and Japan: a Gloomy, Frail Rivalry," *Modern Asian Studies Review* 2 (2007), 63.

¹³ Mariko Tsujata, "A Fragile Balance between 'Normalization' and the Revival of Nationalistic Sentiments," in *War and Militarism in Modern Japan: Issues of History and Identity*, ed. Guy Podoler (Folkstone: Global Oriental, 2009), 190.

¹⁴ Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay. Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10), 194.

¹⁵ See Mori, "New Relations between China and Japan," 60; John Swenson-Wright, "The Limits to 'Normalcy': Japanese-Korean Post-Cold War Interactions," in *Japan as a 'Normal Country'?: A Nation in Search of its Place in the World*, ed. Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 172; Jianwei Wang, "Chinese Discourse on Japan as a 'Normal Country,'" in *Japan as a 'Normal Country'?: A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World*, ed. Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 122.

struggle for regional dominance¹⁶ and the abuse of historical issues for domestic reasons,¹⁷ adds to the critical observation of the history issue in NEA.

The literature, nevertheless, overemphasizes the failure of Japan to seriously come to terms with its past and does not greatly address the need for a willingness in the PRC and the ROK to genuinely accept the Japanese apologies.

The literature on the level of integration in East Asia asserts that countries in the region (and NEA as its sub-region) have been brought together through increased economic exchanges and economic interdependency, underlined by figures of the increase in intra-regional trade since the 1980s, and that institutionalized cooperation on a functional basis has increased (such as the Chiang Mai Initiative or the Asian Bond Initiative),¹⁸ but that community building on the basis of shared identity and values is still under-articulated.¹⁹ The challenge to an NEA identity lies in the still high level of national identity and the challenge to find common goals while at the same time solving historical issues.²⁰ What seems to be a preference of East Asians is to gradually increase cooperation through dialogue rather than to agree to the establishment of overly legalistic institutions;²¹ East Asians seem to prefer networks rather than institutions that, nevertheless, lead to many informal security dialogues.²² On the other hand, several

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Chung-in Moon, "Truth and Reconciliation in East Asia: A South Korean Perspective," *Global Forum on Civilization and Peace Committee, ed. 2008, Civilization and Peace* (Seongnam-si: Academy of Korean Studies, 2009), 549.

¹⁸ Jimbo Kim, "An Emerging East Asian Community? The Political Process of Regionalism in East Asia," in *An East Asian Community and the United States*, ed. Ralph A. Cossa and Akihiko Tanaka (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2007), 15.

¹⁹ Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas, "Advancing East Asian Regionalism: an Introduction," in *Advancing East Asian Regionalism*, ed. Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (New York: Routledge, 2007), 22.

²⁰ Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, "Regionalism and Community Building in East Asia. Challenges and Opportunities," in *Advancing East Asian Regionalism*, ed. Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (New York: Routledge, 2007), 244.

²¹ Katja Weber and Jonathan Huang, "East Asian Security Revisited in the Light of the European Experience," *Issues and Studies* 46, no. 1 (2010), 114.

²² Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective," in *Network Power. Japan and Asia*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 27.

institutionalized dialogues (ARF, EAS, Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia Defence Ministers Meeting) that roughly deal with the same issues, might lead to competition between these and their subsequent paralysis.²³ The literature on the level of regionalization/institutionalization can be analyzed through its preference on (institutionalized) outcome-oriented arrangements or cooperation through (informal) dialogue; for the matter of this thesis, the former will be considered as more promising for the creation of a North Atlantic-like security cooperative.

By reviewing the existing frameworks for cooperation and analyzing the driving forces behind them, the future of security cooperation in NEA and the shape this might take is divided into two basic categories:

- Security cooperation in NEA will be based on the existing bilateral arrangements with little prospect of new ones to emerge (James Schoff, Le Bo Linh, Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, Zhang Yunling).
- Future security cooperation will still be based on bilateralism, but will incrementally grow towards multilateralism; this category can be further divided up into the scholars who emphasize the coincidental existence of various kinds of security cooperation (Shin Wa Lee, Nobuo Okawara, Peter Katzenstein, Nick Bisley, Akiko Fukushima), and the ones who argue for multilateralism as the preferable way of organization (Raymond Jose G. Quilop, Peter van Nees, G. John Ikkenberry, Min Ye).

Scholars of the first category argue that the current bilateral situation in NEA is caused by the lack of a collective identity, distrust, and conflict about historical issues between the countries of the region²⁴, and they argue that national interests, differences in security awareness, and power maximization present obstacles for politico-military cooperation.²⁵ The relationship between Japan and the PRC, in which they see themselves as strategic competitors, exemplifies this situation and underlines the lack of attractiveness of multilateralism that could help overcome the rivalry between the two

²³ Takeshi Yuzawa, "The ASEAN Regional Forum. Challenges and Prospects," in *Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism*, ed. Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs (New York: Routledge, 2012), 382–83.

²⁴ Min Hyong Park, "A Cooperative Security System in Northeast Asia: The ROK's Strategic Choices," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2011), 87.

²⁵ Le Bo Linh and Tran Khan, "Existing Foundations for Multilateral Security Cooperation in East Asia," *East Asian Review* 12 (2008), 72.

countries.²⁶ Assuming that the U.S. only encourages multilateral frameworks when these arrangements are to its advantage, Brazinsky argues (in contrast to other scholars) that the Six-Party-Talks, since they only serve one specific interest, will not be the model for a multilateral security framework in the region because there is no overlap in broader security interests between the United States and the other countries in the region.²⁷ These rather pessimistic estimates for improved security cooperation in NEA conclude with the statement that a multilateral cooperative similar to NATO will have no future in NEA²⁸ and that existing formats should be given preference before the creation of new regional institutions.²⁹

Scholars of the second category, who emphasize the coincidental mix of various forms of cooperation, concede that multilateralism due to different national interests, historical conflicts, and territorial disputes is only rudimentarily present.³⁰ It is not the norm in NEA,³¹ but part of the prevalent system of bilateral arrangements forged by the U.S. and other bilateral relations.³² In fact, national rivalries and power maximization have limited the process of further regionalization³³ so that multilateral relations will only complement rather than substitute for bilateral ones.³⁴ In opposition to this restrained enthusiasm towards multilateralism, some scholars urge for multilateralism not

²⁶ Elena Atanassova-Cornelis and Carmen Amado Mendes, "Dynamics of Japanese and Chinese Security Policies in East Asia and Implications for Regional Stability," *Asian Politics and Policy* 2, no. 3 (2010), 411.

²⁷ Gregg Andrew Brazinsky, "The United States and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," *Asian Perspective* 32, no. 2 (2008), 22, 35.

²⁸ Yunling Zhang, *Rising China and World Order* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 54.

²⁹ James Schoff, "Future Directions for Northeast Asian Regionalism: New Security and Trade Architectures (... with an Emphasis on Security)," *Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies* 20 (2010), 169.

³⁰ Shin-Wa Lee, "Construction of a Northeast Asian Community for Regional Security," *East Asian Review* 19, no. 1 (2007), 69.

³¹ Nobuo Okawara and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Japan and Asian-Pacific Security: Regionalization, Entrenched Bilateralism and Incipient Multilateralism," *The Pacific Review* 14, no. 2 (2001), 182.

³² Nick Bisley, "China's Rise and the Making of East Asia's Security Architecture," *Journal of Contemporary China* 21, no. 73 (2012), 21.

³³ Akiko Fukushima, "Political and Security Cooperation in East Asia. Promoting Functional Cooperation," in *An East Asian Community and the United States*, ed. Ralph A. Cossa and Akihiko Tanaka (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2007), 105–06.

³⁴ Weber and Huang, "*East Asian Security Revisited in the Light of the European Experience*," 115.

only as the desirable, but as the ultimate form of cooperation. They argue that only multilateralism provides lasting stability,³⁵ that it is the key to security in NEA,³⁶ and the structural changes in the region (challenged dominance of the U.S. due to economic growth of Asian countries, increase in intra-regional trade relations, change in distribution of power) make the existing bilateral arrangements untenable.³⁷ G. John Ikkenberry stands out within the literature because he urges for a formal and articulated regional security structure and openly argues that the United States should engage the PRC in multilateral institutions to contain it and at the same time strengthen its own bilateral ties in the region.³⁸

It must be mentioned that the majority of the reviewed literature dealing with the prospects for NEA security cooperation was written in the first decade of the 21st century, a period that had seen a downturn in the relations between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK under the premiership of Koizumi Junichiro in Japan. It has to be taken into consideration that the literature reflects the experiences of this time period and her aftermath and, therefore, might have arrived at pessimistic or overly optimistic conclusions.

With regard to the current mapping of literature that addresses the intersection of applying the North Atlantic experiences to NEA, there is some literature that addresses the issue from the point of realist and liberal paradigms of international relations, focusing on institutions and the distribution of power.³⁹ These contributions all seem to focus on the outcomes themselves (i.e., the shape of relations between countries), rather

³⁵ Peter van Nees, "Designing a Mechanism for Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia," *Asian Perspective* 32, no.4 (2008), 125.

³⁶ Raymond Jose G. Quilop, "Building a Security Community in Northeast Asia: Options and Challenges," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies* 18, no. 2 (2009), 146.

³⁷ Min Ye, "Security Institutions in Northeast Asia: Multilateral Responses to Structural Changes," in *Asia's New Institutional Architecture. Evolving Structure for Managing Trade, Financial, and Security Relations*, ed. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Min Gyo Koo (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2008), 122–23.

³⁸ G. John Ikkenberry, "A New Order in East Asia?" in *East Asian Multilateralism. Prospects for Regional Stability*, ed. Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2008), 226–26.

³⁹ See James R. Kurth, "The Pacific Basin Versus the Atlantic Alliance. Two Paradigms of International Relations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 505 (1989), 34–45; Aaron L. Friedberg, "Will Europe's Past Be Asia's Future?" *The International Institute for Strategic Studies* 42, no. 3 (2000), 147–59; David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong. The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003), 57–85; Cha, "Powerplay," 158–96.

than a deeper exploration of the origins of the outcomes according to the question this thesis raises. At this point, the article of Christopher M. Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein shall be mentioned. To a greater degree it explores the reasons behind different developments in the North Atlantic region and Asia, and the article finds some of these reasons in the issues investigated by this thesis. However, Hemmer and Katzenstein do not take into account the effect of reconciliation between Germany and its former wartime enemies.⁴⁰ At the other end of the spectrum, Katja Weber and Jonathan Huang draw insightful conclusions for NEA reconciliation based on the European experience, but they do not address the issue of shared identity.⁴¹ So it seems promising to investigate the relevance of shared identity and reconciliation as a prerequisite for a future NATO-like security cooperative in NEA.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis will evaluate the prospects for future security cooperation in NEA based on lessons from the North Atlantic experience, namely the presence of a shared identity and Germany's efforts to reconcile with some of its former wartime enemies.

This will be done in a two-case comparative study through an assessment of the status of shared identity in the North Atlantic region and Germany's reconciliation efforts at a certain point in time, approximately between 1945 and 1955, and the comparison of this assessment with the development and current status of shared identity and reconciliation in NEA.

The thesis will address the movements towards European integration that had been present as a rough idea since ancient times and increasingly gained seriousness since the Middle Ages. Our discussion will also examine speeches by politicians about European cooperation, such as Churchill's 1946 speech in Zurich, in which he envisaged the United States of Europe and assigned France and Germany a lead role in the

⁴⁰ Christopher M. Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002), 575–607.

⁴¹ Weber and Huang, "East Asian Security Revisited in the Light of the European Experience," 89–121.

necessary efforts towards the achievement of a European union, or the January 1948 speech by the British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin who envisaged a spiritual union of the West. The NAT and memoirs of politicians who were present at the creation of NATO (including Secretary of State Dean Acheson) will be reviewed as will the 2001 report of the East Asian Vision Group that argued for the creation of an East Asian community and the establishment of the East Asian Summit. Secondary literature, which will mainly be used, will be supplemented by primary sources.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The second chapter of this thesis will start with a look inside the long and fruitful history of movements for European unification and highlight the work of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, who was the most prominent representative of the idea of European unification during the 1920s and 1930s. Subsequently, the motivations behind the creation of the North Atlantic region and NATO will be investigated, paying attention to the relevance of a shared identity in this context.

This chapter will conclude with a look at reconciliation in Europe after the Second World War and then closely examine the status and achievements of reconciliation in NEA.

The third chapter assesses the level and nature of integration throughout the East Asian region, whether this is political, economic, or cultural, and the existence of a shared identity will be scrutinized.

The fourth chapter assesses the hypotheses developed above. This assessment utilizes the preceding analyses to estimate the extent and shape of future security cooperative in NEA, and contrasts these prospects with lessons from the North Atlantic experience.

This chronological and topic-oriented composition seems reasonable since the thesis will assess the applicability of past experiences for future security arrangements in NEA. The thesis culminates in a brief conclusion summarizing all findings.

II. THE RELEVANCE OF SHARED IDENTITY FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE AND ASIA AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

A. THE IDEA OF EUROPE

In the following sections, we will examine how the idea of a common and unified Europe developed, single out some of the idea's proponents, and illustrate their approaches. Special regard will be paid to the effect Count Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi and his pan-European movement had on European unification in the years between the two world wars. This emphasis seems justified given the account of important political figures and national leaders who acknowledged Codenhove-Kalergi's efforts. Among these were: Great Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the British and Czechoslovakian foreign ministers Ernest Bevin⁴² and Eduard Benes, as well as Aristide Briand and Edouard Herriot, premiers of France. In addition, the first Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, and other proponents of European integration, like Georges Pompidou and Carlos Sforza, were among the members of the Pan-European Union.⁴³ The purpose of this section is to show the abundance of ideas and concepts of European unity from which politicians could draw after the Second World War to claim the legitimacy of a shared European identity. The extension of this identity to the United States of America, based on shared norms and values, became at least the asserted moral basis of security cooperation between the Western European countries and the U.S.

1. Thoughts on European Unity before the First World War

The efforts to demonstrate a common European heritage go as far back as to the Roman Empire. Even if Coudenhove-Kalergi oversimplifies the effects of Roman rule by claiming that "from the boundaries of Scotland to Sicily, from Portugal to Romania, there

⁴² Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States. The Enduring Alliance* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), 6.

⁴³ Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe. A History of European Integration since 1945* (New York: Longman Group Limited, 1991), 5.

was one empire, one emperor, one administration, one army, one currency, one economic area, one culture, and, for the most part, one speech,”⁴⁴ it was the civilizing and unifying effect the Roman Empire had throughout its European estates that was considered to be conducive for the development of the idea of a common Europe.⁴⁵ After the ruin of the Roman Empire, which was followed by four centuries of the disintegration of Europe caused by the barbarian migration⁴⁶, a new but short-lived unification of Europe was brought about by the bellicose conquests of Charlemagne. European unification, however, was not only forged through military capture but maybe even more so through the thoughts and ideas of intellectuals. One of the early intellectual pioneers of Europe was the French jurist and diplomat Pierre Dubois. As early as in 1306 he proposed a permanent assembly of European monarchs to ensure peace in Europe through the application of Christian principles.⁴⁷

In 1462, the King of Bohemia George of Podiebrad brought forward the suggestion for a continental confederation created by an international treaty. This treaty already foresaw a curtailment of national sovereignty, the principle of mutual non-aggression, and a solidarity clause in the event of external attack. An institute for arbitral jurisdiction and provisions for joint military intervention and common defense were also part of George’s proposal. An assembly of delegates, which also would have a council and a president, was the highest organ of the confederation and was empowered to make decisions that were binding for all members of the confederation. In the end, Pope Paul II, who was not given a role in the confederation, undermined George’s plan so it never materialized.⁴⁸

In fact, the situation in Europe developed in a rather opposite direction from the one the king of Bohemia might have desired. Although the Peace of Westphalia in 1648

⁴⁴ Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite* (Glarus: Paneuropa Editions Ltd., 1940), 84–85.

⁴⁵ Urwin, *Community of Europe*, 2.

⁴⁶ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, 85.

⁴⁷ Urwin, *Community of Europe*, 2.

⁴⁸ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *Europe. Giving Shape to an Idea* (London: Anthem Press, 2009), 43–46.

ended the hostilities between the parties of the conflict of the Thirty Years' War, the peace accord ratified and institutionalized the division and fragmentation of Europe into national, sovereign entities. The intellectual struggle, however, to overcome the bellicose nature of relations between European states and mitigate the chaos that stemmed from this bellicosity continued. In 1625, Hugo Grotius envisaged a body where disputes between states would be mitigated by a third party outside the dispute.⁴⁹ In 1638, Maximilien de Bethune, the Duc de Sully, laid out his ideas on cooperation between European states in his memoirs, portraying them as the grand design of Henry IV, King of France. Sully suggested a federation of states to defend Europe against threats posed by the Ottoman Empire. Cooperation between European monarchs to fend off an external threat was but only one side of the coin for Sully. The division among European states caused by the wars of religion had to be overcome to ensure peace. To achieve this end, Sully demanded the re-establishment of a Christian republic and the creation of a European army. This grand design aimed at European integration, laid out in great legal detail the future administrative structure of this Christian republic, and it necessitated the restructuring of the European political landscape that would lead to the creation of fifteen states of similar size and power to ensure a balance of power between European states. Several regional councils and one general council, which would serve as a court of appeal, had to be created and would conciliate disputes between the fifteen republics.⁵⁰ In 1693, William Penn penned an essay called *Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe*, in which he called for a European diet where each member state was given a number of votes from ten to twelve based on a combination of economic factors and thereby reflecting the power a state had in relation to the rest of the diet members. Penn's essay included the threat of force to any of the member states that did not follow the decisions of the diet or tried to wage war against another member state. It also highlighted the pacifying effect socialization between European rulers would generate. Finally, some of Penn's ideas like qualified majority voting, rotating presidency, and a

⁴⁹ Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, 5.

⁵⁰ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *Europe*, 64–67.

secretariat have become features of the Council of the European Union.⁵¹ The more the enlightenment took hold, the more intellectuals shifted away from the rights of monarchs toward an institutional framework that meant the end of sovereign territorial states. Jeremy Bentham, for example, argued for a European assembly and army, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau favored a European federation.⁵²

Just as the Thirty Years' War was not a real setback to intellectuals' occupation with a unified Europe, the French Revolution, even if it seemed to mock all lofty ideas of union and peace throughout Europe by its appeal to mass nationalism,⁵³ was merely an interlude and did not stop the growth of ideas about a common Europe. The French sociologist and social reformer Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Count of Saint-Simon, incited many of the nineteenth century's advocates of European union with his proposal for an institutional European unity.⁵⁴ When in 1814 he published his study *On the Reorganization of European Society or the Necessity and Means of Uniting the Peoples of Europe in a Single Body Politic, While Preserving for Each Their National Independence*, Saint-Simon distanced himself from the overly academic approaches of some of his predecessors and laid out a very systematic and staggered approach to European unity. In Saint-Simon's point of view, this unity had to be based on strong institutions that had the ability to overcome the European balance of power politics that was established by the Treaty of Westphalia. A federal institutional structure and a parliamentary monarchy as the governmental form entirely based on common values seemed the most adequate way to achieve this aim. The Great Parliament of Europe, which was constituted by a chamber of deputies and a chamber of peers and was empowered to deal with any issues, formed the legislative and stood vis-a-vis with the king and the government as the executive. Inter alia, the parliament was tasked with the development of codes of ethics and the supervision of public education throughout

⁵¹ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *Europe*, 76–78.

⁵² Urwin, *Community of Europe*, 2.

⁵³ Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, 5.

⁵⁴ Urwin, *Community of Europe*, 2–3.

Europe.⁵⁵ In the end, the parliament should provide for that “in this way there shall be between European nations that which provides the link and the basis for all political associations: conformity of institutions, union of interest, concordance of concepts, a community of ethics and public education.”⁵⁶ The work of Saint-Simon is even more significant since he explicitly addresses a European patriotism that exists in parallel to national patriotism. In order for a European government to work, its members had to be like-minded and consist of

such a collective will which, in a national government, arises out of national patriotism, can only arise in European government from a broader generality of view, a more widespread emotion, which one may call European patriotism . . . this inclination which takes patriotism beyond the limits of the fatherland, this habit of considering the interest of Europe rather than the national interest, will be a necessary product of the establishment of the European parliament for those who are to be part of it.⁵⁷

Only a year after Saint-Simon published his study, the ideas and concepts of a shared European identity based on common norms and values seemed to have borne some fruits with the formation of the European concert of nations model. This community of European great powers emerged as a result of the post-Napoleonic settlement after the Congress of Vienna and brought about nearly a century of relative peace in Europe,⁵⁸ shared values and norms with regard to civilization and legitimacy that in principle ensured the invulnerability of national sovereignty. While this did not prevent European powers from going to war with each other in the long-term,⁵⁹ “the continental countries were knit together by a sense of shared values.”⁶⁰ The institutional functions that the Concert of Europe had to ensure security, however, became subject to the divergence of interests and power shifts between the member states. Since the institutions were unable to adapt to these changes the established fragile security

⁵⁵ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *Europe*, 124–27.

⁵⁶ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *Europe*, 123.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁵⁸ Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, 2.

⁵⁹ Hampton, “NATO, Germany, and the United States,” 241.

⁶⁰ Hampton, “NATO at the Creation,” 616.

architecture decayed.⁶¹ An important move of the European concert, nevertheless, was the re-admittance of France into the circle of the great European powers in what was seen to be conducive to stability and peace in Europe, whereas after the end of the First World War, Woodrow Wilson warned against the humiliation of Germany as a source for future instability.⁶² At that time, he also strongly pushed the creation of the League of Nations that aimed at international conflict resolution through erosion of national sovereignty by adherence to binding laws and negotiation.⁶³ The imposition of multilateral sanctions and interventions in the case of a violation of rules and principles by one of the League's members were intended to guarantee collective security. In the end, the League of Nations proved itself to be a paper tiger, unable to prevent the Second World War.⁶⁴

2. The Pan-European Movement of Count Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi

After the end of the First World War, various approaches emerged to overcome the crisis that Europe was enduring. These approaches, nevertheless, shared the same aim, namely to avoid another truculent war in Europe that would bring about the destruction of European civilization. While some people sought to reestablish Europe's future by bringing back the alleged cultural unity of Europe's Christian past, others believed that only the recognition of national sovereignty and Europe's national diversity held the key to future peace. A third group of people tried to overcome national sovereignty and wanted to establish a European federation, and sometimes these three approaches were combined in a design of a future Europe.⁶⁵ The pursuit of European union ultimately became manifest in the person of Count Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi. He was of a cosmopolitan genealogy since the Coudenhove's were aristocrats from Northern Brabant who moved to Austria, while the Kalergi's were descendants of

⁶¹ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 4.

⁶² Hampton, "NATO at the Creation," 616.

⁶³ Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, 5.

⁶⁴ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 4.

⁶⁵ Mark Hewitson and Matthew d'Auria, "Introduction: Europe During the Forty Years' Crisis," in *Europe in Crisis. Intellectuals and the European Idea. 1917–1957*, ed. Mark Hewitson and Matthew d'Auria (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 1–2.

the Byzantine imperial dynasty of the Phokas; the two families merged through marriage in the nineteenth century. In 1892, Richard's father, Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalergi, was sent to the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Tokyo. There he fell in love with Mitsuko Aoyama, the daughter of a Japanese merchant and arts dealer, and against all social conventions Heinrich married her in 1893. Richard was born a year later in Tokyo but in 1896 moved back to the ancestral seat of his family in Ronsperg (what is in today's Czech Republic). In Ronsperg, he grew up in a cosmopolitan and multicultural environment that was affected by the many scholars, aristocrats, and diplomats who were guests of his father. Richard and his siblings did not perceive their parents as Austro-Hungarian and Japanese, but rather as European and Asian; an attitude that Heinrich fostered since he wanted his children to be raised as Europeans, devoid of national bias. Overall, this environment of his childhood might have strongly influenced Richard's sense of self as being a European.⁶⁶

After having realized the need for and possibility of European unity, Coudenhove-Kalergi founded the Paneuropa movement in 1922.⁶⁷ The overall aim of his movement was to establish a European political and economic unity based on a common European ideal that would supercede but not weaken national patriotism.⁶⁸ He turned this movement into the Pan-European Union in 1923 with its headquarters in the imperial palace in Vienna. Subsequently, offices were established in various European capitals to promote Coudenhove-Kalergi's ideas.⁶⁹ The union's program included "a European League of States, with mutual guarantees of the equality, security, and independence of all European states; . . . a European military alliance . . . ; the fostering of the national cultures of all European nations as the basis of a common European culture."⁷⁰ Even if fewer than the approximately 2000 people who attended the first Pan-European Congress in 1926 included a couple of active politicians, most European statesmen only sent

⁶⁶ Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas. Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi und die Paneuropa-Bewegung in den zwanziger und dreissiger Jahren* (Wien: Boehlau Verlag, 2004), 35–37.

⁶⁷ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, 56.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 74–75.

ambassadors or messages. Shortly after the first congress, the Pan-European Union offered the honorary presidency to Aristide Briand, the French foreign minister and future prime minister of France. Coudenhove-Kalergi hoped that Briand would take the pan-European movement from the level of a private aspiration to the realm of European governments,⁷¹ a hope that at least did not immediately come true since in 1928 Coudenhove-Kalergi had to assert that “the Pan-European Union was but a private organization, and I was working as a powerless individual, neither backed nor assisted by any European government.”⁷²

He had to wait until 1929 before a major step towards bringing his ideas to the attention of European governments occurred. Briand discussed with British and German diplomats the feasibility of a European economic union as a first step towards a political union in March, followed by his announcement in July to propose the establishment of a European union at the next meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva on 4 September.⁷³ In his speech, Briand introduced his concept of the ‘United States of Europe’ to the assembly of the League of Nations, describing economic cooperation as the most pressing issue that had to be dealt with and that would be accompanied by some kind of a European federation, but which would not mean the loss of sovereignty of European states.⁷⁴ Chief delegates of the European nations met for a luncheon after the assembly meeting and subsequently tasked Briand to draft a more detailed plan for his project that should be presented at the next assembly meeting in 1930.⁷⁵ On 17 May 1930, Briand presented his *Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union* that now foresaw the subjugation of economic cooperation under the establishment of a political union and a European federation that respected the

⁷¹ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *Europe*, 167.

⁷² Richard Nicolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade For Pan Europe. Autobiography of a Man and a Movement* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1943), 125.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁷⁴ Mark Hewitson, “The United States of Europe. The European Question in the 1920s,” in *Europe in Crisis. Intellectuals and the European Idea. 1917–1957*, ed. Mark Hewitson and Matthew d’Auria (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 24–25.

⁷⁵ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade for Pan Europe*, 132.

independence and sovereignty of European nations.⁷⁶ The reactions throughout Europe to the memorandum were mixed.⁷⁷ While German and Italian newspapers regarded it as an expression of French imperialism and a way to exploit the rest of Europe,⁷⁸ and the British, German, and Italian governments officially refused Briand's proposal at a League of Nations meeting in September 1930, the other European governments paid lip-service towards his plan. They did not want to be the first to take further steps. The opposition cited Briand's emphasis on political union before economic cooperation as a plan that would do more harm than good to the League of Nations.. A couple of days before Briand presented his memorandum, Coudenhove-Kalergi received a copy of it and privately expressed his disappointment but supported it officially. It was, after all, the only proposal for European unity on a governmental level and an important result of his work for the pan-European movement. The memorandum, however, marked the break between the two men since Coudenhove-Kalergi aimed at an idealistic European union while Briand tried to achieve less in the face of the national self-interests of European states. Coudenhove-Kalergi and Briand might have had the same aim, but their methods differed.⁷⁹ Coudenhove-Kalergi criticized Briand's memorandum because it did not try to break up national sovereignty and forge a true European federation but rather an ineffective copy of the League of Nations. He also accused all the European nations of not being able to overcome their own national interests.⁸⁰ The failure of Briand's initiative brought an end to the politics of European accommodation and marked the return to more confrontational relations especially between Germany and France.⁸¹

As a tangible result of Briand's memorandum, a Commission of Enquiry for the European Union was set up. This legal provision made the idea of European union indeed

⁷⁶ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *Europe*, 175.

⁷⁷ For a detailed description of national governmental reactions and attitudes, see Hewitson, "United States of Europe," 29.

⁷⁸ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *Europe*, 182.

⁷⁹ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas*, 161.

⁸⁰ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade for Pan Europe*, 135–37.

⁸¹ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas*, 166.

legally binding,⁸² but the commission turned out to be without power and initiative.⁸³ Together with the generally indifferent attitude of its members, the commission ceased to exist in 1932 when its chairman, Aristide Briand, died.⁸⁴ The changing political landscape also contributed its part to the demise of the pan-European movement in the 1930s. The death of the Europe-friendly German Minister of Foreign Affairs Gustav Stresemann at the end of 1929 was a setback for the pan-European movement, and his successor Curtius did not seem to be able to contain the rising nationalism in Germany.⁸⁵ Briand saw his political downfall after his defeat in the election for the presidency of France, and in 1932 the German National Socialists won the elections in the German parliament.⁸⁶ The interwar period saw the struggle between an increasing feeling that the political environment in Europe had to change in order to preserve European civilization and to avoid another devastating war and a soaring nationalism that mixed with socioeconomic interests.⁸⁷ Even if the proponents of a unified Europe did not establish close ties to European governments, European economic and security cooperation seemed to have broader support throughout Europe. Such cooperation seemed to be an antidote to the harm that Europe had suffered from the First World War and to the problems that it was facing. In summary, “Europe as a cultural entity and possible sphere of state activity, alongside others, enjoyed considerable prominence in the 1920s.”⁸⁸ The global economic crisis of the 1930s, however, ultimately tipped the balance in favor of nationalism,⁸⁹ and at its end the decade saw the outbreak of the Second World War.

⁸² Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas*, 163.

⁸³ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, 63.

⁸⁴ General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, *Europe*, 183.

⁸⁵ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Crusade for Pan Europe*, 132–33.

⁸⁶ Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, 64.

⁸⁷ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas*, 329.

⁸⁸ Hewitson, “United States of Europe,” 30–31.

⁸⁹ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, *Botschafter Europas*, 329.

Coudenhove-Kalergi emigrated to the U.S. in 1940 and returned to Europe only after the end of the Second World War in 1946.⁹⁰ By that time, Winston Churchill who in 1930 mentioned, “The resuscitation of the pan-European idea is largely identified with Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. The form of his theme may be crude, but the impulse and the inspiration are true,”⁹¹ had been released from his duties as British prime minister. Churchill had started a new wave of European integration with his speech at the University of Zurich on 19 September 1946.⁹² In this speech, Churchill conjured a spirit of European unity and a common European heritage with emphatic passion. He demanded the re-creation of the European family in the structure he called the United States of Europe and instilled his audience with a sense of European patriotism and common citizenship. He also stated, “Much work . . . has been done upon this task by the exertions of the Pan-European Union which owes so much to Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and which commanded the services of the famous French patriot and statesman Aristide Briand.”⁹³ Coudenhove-Kalergi sent a letter to Churchill, expressing his gratitude and highlighting the importance of Churchill’s speech for the future of Europe.⁹⁴

B. NATO – THE ORGANIZATIONAL EXPRESSION OF A SHARED WESTERN IDENTITY

As pointed out in the introduction, there is some discussion among scholars about the motivations behind the actions of the various players who stood behind the creation of NATO and the rationale behind NATO’s right to exist. Similarly, the following discussion does not aim to make a definite judgment on what aspect of NATO’s *raison d’etre* was more important, its security community building aspects or NATO’s characterization as a security alliance that was primarily aimed against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The aim of this discussion is not to prove that European and North

⁹⁰ Anita Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi and the Birth of a ‘New’ Europe,” in *Europe in Crisis. Intellectuals and the European Idea. 1917–1957*, ed. Mark Hewitson and Matthew d’Auria (New York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 101.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 101.

⁹³ Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, *Speech of Sir Winston Churchill, Zurich, 19th September 1946*, accessed March 8, 2013, http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/AboutUs/zurich_e.html.

⁹⁴ Ziegerhofer-Prettenthaler, “Richard Nikolaus Coudenhove-Kalergi,” 101.

American countries came together after the Second World War only because they wanted to be part of an elitist and escapist group that basked in the memory of an alleged confraternity that surprisingly got tasked with a military mission. Nor does the discussion argue that NATO's sole purpose was collective defense of its member states against the Soviet Union. Rather, our purpose is to show that even in times of serious threat the leaders of the NATO member states took NATO's community building aspects seriously and paid attention to the inclusion of these aspects in NATO's institutional form. By doing so, they made the North Atlantic security cooperation more than just a military alliance and braced it in the shared identity of the countries that joined NATO. This identity enabled characteristic features of NATO-like curtailment of national sovereignty as exemplified by the NATO command structure. Since NATO should be more than a military alliance and in parallel to its collective defense aspect tie together its members also in the political, economic, and social sphere, it needed a sense of shared identity among the alliance's members to push beyond the boundaries of a military framework.

A look at the genesis of NATO will be contrasted with the kind of security cooperation that arose in East Asia after the Second World War. Bilateral security arrangements between the U.S. and East Asian countries were characteristic of this security cooperation that stands in stark contrast to the multilateral and consensus-based North Atlantic example.

The variety of explanations for the origins of NATO and the subtleness of differentiations between them, make a closer look at this issue seem worthwhile. Mary N. Hampton highlights the dual nature of NATO as a kind of security cooperation against the threat posed by the Soviet Union Based on lessons gained after the First World War and the failure of the League of Nations, though, NATO also aimed at avoiding a future war between the members of NATO through the creation of a transatlantic community that included a peaceful Germany. According to Hampton, this motive for the creation of a transatlantic security cooperation preceded the Soviet threat, and this threat was not the driving factor behind Western unity and German rehabilitation,⁹⁵ even if it did push the

⁹⁵ Hampton, "NATO at the Creation," 611–12.

U.S. and Western European countries to assign NATO also a collective defense mission.⁹⁶ The former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright shared this view in a 1997 statement, arguing that “NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War.”⁹⁷

While Lord Ismay mentions the report that was given to governments at the end of preliminary talks towards a NAT on 9 September 1949 that inter alia foresaw that the treaty should be more than military and was to “promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic peoples,”⁹⁸ John English addresses economic and cultural pillars of NATO when he compares, for example, the economic relations of the U.S. and Canada with European countries and mentions the high number of Europeans who immigrated into North America after the Second World War. In citing the British historian John Baylis, English argues that a lasting security cooperation between countries combines economic and political relationships with military power and subsequently finds strong transatlantic relationships of that kind after the war. By looking at the novelties in foreign policy behavior of countries that acceded to NATO, he identifies diplomatic revolutions and decisive moments;⁹⁹ denotations that would seem to be highly overdone if they described the creation of an old-fashioned security alliance that only was of a military nature. English stresses the fundamentality of a European linkage for the Canadians who held the belief “that a European identity was fundamental to Canadian national identity. . . . The American response was similar . . .”¹⁰⁰ Finally, English sums up the important factors that were at work at the creation of NATO: the denunciation of isolationism through a broadened focus of the U.S. away from the Americas to the Atlantic littorals; personal and cultural factors; the continued importance of Western Europe in the U.S. imagination; and, maybe most importantly, the construction of a

⁹⁶ Ibid., 622.

⁹⁷ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 10.

⁹⁸ Lionel Hastings Ismay. *NATO. The First Five Years. 1949–1954* (Bosch Uetrecht: NATO, 1954), 10.

⁹⁹ English, “Who Could Ask for More?” 306–07.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 319.

narrative in the U.S. and Canada that allowed for “a sense of fraternity that embodied a sense of common purposes and the willingness to die.”¹⁰¹

In an intentionally simplified way, Morton Kaplan sums up various opinions about NATO when he describes it as a great monument of statesmanship, a means of American imperialism, or the major obstacle to an early and peaceful resolution of the Cold War¹⁰² but finally comes to the conclusion that NATO “provided the psychological lift necessary to sustain an environment for economic recovery . . . It also established a long-term American commitment to European unity and in part led to the pressure within the United States for German rearmament as one aspect of a reasonable defense posture for West Europe”¹⁰³ and thereby strips NATO to some degree of its military purpose and makes it a means to various ends. Lawrence S. Kaplan also acknowledges that at least the effects NATO had were not only to provide security through military deterrence. Under the umbrella of NATO, the possibility of a future war between its members has become almost impossible to imagine, sovereign states connive curtailments of their sovereignty, and the politico-military as well as economic affairs between European countries that in the past were prone to conflict have fundamentally changed.¹⁰⁴ He goes on to mention that the primary role of the alliance at its creation was to deter the Soviet Union from internal subversion of the member states and from external aggression towards their territories. In 1949, the alliance was not capable to defend Western Europe from an attack from the East. In addition, the military component of the alliance was, for example, for the Benelux countries not the most important one since they saw the alliance rather as the nucleus for a united Europe.¹⁰⁵

Finally, even if Sean Kay highlights collective defense against a Soviet threat as the first and primary function of NATO, he also acknowledges that “to strengthen and

¹⁰¹ English, “Who Could Ask for More?,” 312.

¹⁰² Morton A. Kaplan, *The Rationale for NATO. European Collective Security—Past and Future* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), 3.

¹⁰³ Kaplan, *Rationale for NATO*, 13.

¹⁰⁴ Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, 2.

¹⁰⁵ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The United States and NATO. The Formative Years* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 4.

expand an international community based on democratic principles, individual liberty, and the rule of law in the context of a peaceful international society”¹⁰⁶ was one of NATO’s tasks. He mentions the high value the negotiators of the NAT placed on the principles their countries believed in. If the alliance they were about to construct should be able to endure the Cold War then this alliance must have a higher purpose than collective defense alone.¹⁰⁷ The NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen reflected on this dual nature of NATO in a speech in the year 2010. He stated that the NAT “created a new partnership between North America and Western Europe, with a pledge of mutual defense at its core. Yet common fear was not the main motivating principle for this unique Alliance. The true inspiration was a common democratic ethos. From its very beginning, the Atlantic Alliance was not only about defending territory. It was also about preserving our democratic values.”¹⁰⁸

Since she concerns herself deeply with the identity related aspects of the North Atlantic security cooperation’s genesis, two articles of Mary N. Hampton can provide more detailed information about the security community building aspects of NATO’s origins. In her article “NATO at the Creation. U.S. Foreign Policy, West Germany and the Wilsonian Impulse,” Hampton claims that a number of ordering principles shared by U.S. elites in general and people in the State Department, in particular, which influenced these elites’ view of U.S. security interests, were rooted in a certain set of beliefs. These beliefs go back to former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who refuted the European system of balance of power and instead aimed at a system of democracies that were interdependent, whose relations were institutionalized, and where shared values led to the development of common security interests.¹⁰⁹ Such a transnational community would adhere to commonly accepted principles and rules and champion the concerted conduct of international relations and subsequently become a security community as defined by

¹⁰⁶ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 33.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁰⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Renewing the Transatlantic Security Community in the Age of Globalization.” Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Central Military Club, Sofia, Bulgaria,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_63773.htm (accessed May 28, 2013).

¹⁰⁹ Hampton, “NATO at the Creation,” 613–14.

Karl Deutsch.¹¹⁰ Such a “SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become ‘integrated.’ By INTERGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.”¹¹¹ For this security community, shared values are essential for its birth and are more important than shared threats. Together with Wilson’s lament about the harsh treatment of Germany in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that denied Germany a return into the European family of nations and did not open the door to create a strong democratic system in Germany, these beliefs influenced U.S. policymakers after the Second World War and led to the development of new ordering principles in the creation of the North Atlantic security cooperation. Firstly, the U.S. had to replace the balance of power system in Europe; secondly, a transatlantic community had to be built that included a democratic and peaceful Germany; and thirdly, this “community must be forged through interdependence and the acceptance of shared democratic values.”¹¹²

Early on in the development of the transatlantic security cooperation the relative importance of community building became apparent. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson put it in 1949, “There developed on our Atlantic coast a community, which has spread across the continent, connected with Western Europe by common institutions and moral and ethic beliefs.”¹¹³ In the U.S. government, the forging of such a value-based community was often given precedence over more narrowly focused security interests. Accepting that the U.S. wanted to achieve the political goal of alliance cohesion and the construction of a Western community rather than simply the attainment of narrow military goals, political issues and national agendas of other alliance members often overlay such military considerations. Such an example is the issue of the multilateral nuclear force (MNF) of the 1960s.¹¹⁴ By itself a militarily useless initiative but pushed

¹¹⁰ Hampton, “NATO at the Creation,” 615.

¹¹¹ Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 5.

¹¹² Hampton, “NATO at the Creation,” 616–18.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 625.

¹¹⁴ Hampton, “NATO at the Creation,” 623.

by the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on the basis of Germany's demand for an equal role within the alliance, the MNF foresaw a multilateral ownership of nuclear weapons, deep integration of forces and curtailments of national sovereignty. This undertaking compromised the U.S.-Soviet relations and called forth domestic and foreign resentments, but for the sake of maintaining the transatlantic community and assuring Germany of its equal status within the community, U.S. policymakers did not waver on the issue.¹¹⁵ This underlines the character of NATO as an institution that moderates Western security issues "through the application of norms, principles, rules, and procedures to which all members were beholden."¹¹⁶ Hampton uses this finding to further substantiate her argument that the transatlantic security community pushed beyond the bounds of a traditional military alliance by refuting the traditional realistic approach to state behavior as being driven by exogenous interests like the pursuit of security. Realists cannot explain why nations would make decisions that conflict with their security interests and therefore realist approaches cannot satisfactorily explain the rationale behind NATO.¹¹⁷ In addition, Hampton shows that NATO was constructed as a durable framework when she mentions "the insistent feeling that NATO must be more than a military alliance . . . and . . . the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it."¹¹⁸

Talking about NATO's future, the renowned realist John Mearsheimer forecast in 1995 the end of NATO because "with the collapse of the Soviet Union . . . NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the new distribution of power in Europe."¹¹⁹ He was supported in his view by another famous realist, Kenneth N. Waltz, who in 1990 said that "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are."¹²⁰ Instead, NATO's survival after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its subsequent incorporation of former member states of the Warsaw pact constituted a process wherein "NATO could build on its own

¹¹⁵ For more information on the MNF, see Hampton, "NATO at the Creation," 639–52.

¹¹⁶ Hampton, "NATO at the Creation," 653.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 623.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 626.

¹¹⁹ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 6.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

cooperative-security, community-building initiatives and practices from the Cold War.”¹²¹ These initiatives and practices were vested in article ten of the NAT that says “The Parties [of the NAT] may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”¹²² As NATO members had developed a ‘we-feeling,’ they had become a security community already before the end of the Cold War.¹²³ Thus, the security community building elements that were inherent to NATO from its inception—its long-term concept as a community based on common values in addition to its function as a collective defense mechanism—helps explain why, despite realists’ assumptions, NATO has not dissolved since the end of the Cold War.

Hampton elaborates further on the existence of a shared security identity among the members of NATO in general and the U.S. and Germany in particular. The forging of a transatlantic community and fostering of a positive identification among its members would prevent member states from going to war again against each other and tie Germany to the West.¹²⁴ In Hampton’s view, security identity goes to the heart of national identity, and therefore, the existence of such a shared security identity is significant. Once NATO member states have established a positive identification with each other, they regard their security as inextricably linked to the security of all the other member states. To create such a shared security identity through the writing of a sense for common history and destiny was one of NATO’s missions, and as a result of her research she identifies the existence of a shared security identity between the U.S. and Germany.¹²⁵

In the events that led up to the signing of the NAT, more evidence can be found for Hampton’s observation that NATO transcended the limits of a traditional military

¹²¹ Emanuel Adler, “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2008), 208.

¹²² Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance. NATO, 1945–1950* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1989), 279.

¹²³ Adler, “Spread of Security Communities,” 208, 220.

¹²⁴ Hampton, “NATO, Germany, and the United States,” 235.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 237–39.

alliance. In a speech he gave on 5 March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill once again invoked the common European heritage when he described the spread of Communism as a threat to Christian civilization.¹²⁶ Against the backdrop of deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union, Churchill raised the idea of an alliance among like-minded nations¹²⁷ by arguing that “the safety of the world requires new unity in Europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast.” He also addressed the need for a new structure of relations between European countries because “the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound.”¹²⁸ The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis Saint Laurent argued in a similar vein when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly in September 1947. He said that instead of having to rely on the Security Council to come to their protection, nations “may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of international security.”¹²⁹

Since the Allied foreign ministers could not agree on a common plan for Germany’s future at their two meetings of March and November 1947, the wartime cooperation between the Western democratic Allies and the Soviet Union ended when the Soviet representatives abandoned the Allied Control Council shortly after the November meeting.¹³⁰ This break-up of the wartime alliance motivated the foreign ministers of Great Britain and France, Ernest Bevin and George Bidaut, to look for U.S. support in the defense of Europe.¹³¹ The two men had good reason to hope for some kind of support. In a speech at the Pilgrim Society in London on 12 December 1947, the U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall emphasized “the great surge of American public opinion in

¹²⁶ Winston Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace,” The Churchill Centre and Museum at the Churchill War Rooms, London, <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/biography/in-opposition/qiron-curtainq-fulton-missouri-1946/120-the-sinews-of-peace> (accessed March 8, 2013).

¹²⁷ Ismay, *NATO*, 7.

¹²⁸ “Sinews of Peace.”

¹²⁹ Ismay, *NATO*, 7.

¹³⁰ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO 1948. The Birth of the Transatlantic Alliance* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 12.

¹³¹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Long Entanglement. NATO’s First Fifty Years* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), 2–3.

support of the effort to alleviate the sufferings”¹³² and the “natural growth in the case of two peoples enjoying a common heritage and having a common outlook on the fundamentals of human society.”¹³³ At the occasion of a dinner that Bevin hosted on 15 December,¹³⁴ Bevin expressed to Marshall his vague ideas about “some western democratic system comprising the Americans, ourselves, France, Italy, etc., and of course the Dominions. This would not be a formal alliance but an understanding backed by power, money and resolute action. It would be a sort of spiritual federation of the West.”¹³⁵ Bevin elaborated on this issue and gave a startling speech in the House of Commons on 22 January 1948. This speech is so rich with statements on common Western heritage and a future Western security cooperation that some passages of Bevin’s speech have to be mentioned. He stated, “The conception of the unity of Europe and the preservation of Europe as the heart of Western civilisation is accepted by most people. . . . No one disputes the idea of European unity.”¹³⁶ Bevin highlighted “How much these countries have in common. . . . Parliamentary democracy, our striving for economic rights and our conception and love of liberty. . . . I believe the time is ripe for a consolidation of Western Europe. . . . We are thinking now of Western Europe as a unit.”¹³⁷ His explanations culminate in the statement that the British government has “striven for the closer consolidation and economic development, and eventually for the spiritual unity, of Europe as a whole; . . . if we are to have an organism in the West it must be a spiritual union. . . . The union must primarily be a fusion derived from the basic freedoms and ethical principles for which we all stand. It must be on terms of equality and it must contain all the elements of freedom for which we all stand.”¹³⁸ Bevin’s view on future security cooperation among the Western nations regarded “the old-fashioned

¹³² Kaplan, *NATO 1948*, 15.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Cook, *Forging the Alliance. NATO*, 110.

¹³⁶ Ernest Bevin, “Speech at the House of Commons,” http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs#S5CV0446P0_19480122_HOC_289 (accessed March 14, 2013).

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

conception of the balance of power as an aim that should be discarded if possible.¹³⁹ Bevin's speech led to the signing of the Brussels Pact on 17 March 1948 between Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries. This treaty, negotiated for fifty years, codified the principles of self-help and mutual assistance in case of an attack of one party to the treaty by a third power¹⁴⁰ as well as economic, social, and cultural cooperation.¹⁴¹

Bevin succeeded in winning U.S. support for the defense of Europe, and on 6 July 1948 the negotiations that finally led to the signing of the NAT officially started in Washington. These official negotiations, however, had a precursor in the form of secret negotiations between the U.S., Great Britain, and Canada based on proposals by Bevin on a future security cooperation between Western European countries, the U.S. and Canada.¹⁴² The Canadian representative Lester Pearson¹⁴³ for sure had the words of Escort Reid, an important figure in the Canadian Ministry of Foreign affairs, in mind during the meetings. In a memorandum to the Canadian prime minister on the pact that was to be drafted, Reid wrote on 13 March that "the purpose of the pact is to rally the spiritual as well as the military and economic resources of Western Christendom against Soviet totalitarianism; [and] it must therefore not be merely a negative anti-Soviet military alliance."¹⁴⁴ The Canadians wanted the peacetime alliance to be long-lived and to deepen political and economic integration as well as to promote cultural cooperation between its members. If the *raison d'être* of the alliance only was to counter the Soviet threat, Pearson argued, that "might mean that if the danger were removed, or appeared to be removed, this justification for a collective system would disappear."¹⁴⁵ George Kennan,

¹³⁹ Bevin, Speech at the House of Commons, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1948/jan/22/foreign-affairs#S5CV0446P0_19480122_HOC_289 (accessed March 14, 2013).

¹⁴⁰ Kaplan, *Long Entanglement*, 30.

¹⁴¹ Kaplan, *The Rationale for NATO*, 10.

¹⁴² Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: The Launching of the North Atlantic Treaty," *International Affairs* 59, no. 3 (1983), 351–353.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 356.

¹⁴⁴ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 21.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

a Soviet specialist in the U.S. State Department,¹⁴⁶ supplemented this statement by emphasizing that “the community of interests of the participating governments was wider than military, it was traditional, historical, and would continue. . . . Association was necessary entirely aside from the troubles of the moment and might well go far beyond the military sphere.”¹⁴⁷

The question of which countries should be invited to join the North Atlantic security cooperation was fervently discussed during the secret negotiations and thereafter. Much is written about the fact that some of the founding members of NATO did not meet the criteria of either adhering to democratic principles, most notably Portugal with its authoritarian dictatorship under Antonio Salazar, or being a North Atlantic country, like Italy. Great efforts were undertaken by diplomats to convince their audience of the rightness of these countries’ inclusion in NATO.¹⁴⁸ The sheer fact, however, that such efforts were invested in explanations as to why these countries should become members of NATO shows that the value based nature of NATO was taken seriously. Had NATO only been a military alliance against the Soviet threat, justifications for the membership of Portugal or Italy would not have been necessary in the first place.

On 18 March 1949, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson publicly announced the U.S. joining the transatlantic alliance and explained the rationale behind this groundbreaking step that ended roughly 150 years of American abstinence from peacetime alliances with foreign powers;¹⁴⁹ an abstinence that was engraved in U.S. foreign policy by Washington’s farewell address in 1706, Jefferson’s inaugural address in 1801, and the Monroe doctrine of 1823.¹⁵⁰ In a radio address to the American people Acheson pointed out that

¹⁴⁶ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 21.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 24–25.

¹⁴⁸ For more information on the membership issue, see Wiebes and Zeeman, “Pentagon Negotiations March 1948,” 360–61; Kaplan, *United States and NATO*, 5; Robert J. McMahon, *Dean Acheson and the Creation of an American World Order* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 74–75; Kaplan, *Long Entanglement*, 30–34.

¹⁴⁹ McMahon, *Dean Acheson*, 82.

¹⁵⁰ Kaplan, *NATO and the United States*, 1.

The very basis of western civilization, which we share with the other nations bordering the North Atlantic, and which all of us share with many other nations, is the ingrained spirit of restraint and tolerance. . . . These principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law have flourished in this Atlantic community. . . . For this second reason, as well as the first, North America and Western Europe have formed the two halves of what is in reality one community.¹⁵¹

The U.S. President Harry Truman sent Acheson a telegram with regard to his radio address, and he “was most generous in praise of it and, he said, approved every word.”¹⁵² When the foreign ministers of the NATO member states met in Washington to sign the NAT, Acheson again pointed out that the North Atlantic community resembled a unity that derived from common values and was based on shared beliefs, spirit, and interests.¹⁵³ This is reflected in the preamble of the NAT in which the NATO members declare their determination “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”¹⁵⁴

C. NO COMMON GROUND – THE EMERGENCE OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EAST ASIA

Even if one thinks that all the invocations of a common heritage of European nations that was shared with Americans and Canadians in the North Atlantic community were only window dressing to sell an ordinary military alliance to the North Atlantic peoples and politicians, one would nevertheless have to admit that the advocates of a shared identity had a pool of conceptions to draw from, as was shown in the chapter on the idea of Europe. In East Asia, instead, there was no such background of a positively embraced shared identity that would have been conducive to the creation of a security identity after the Second World War.

¹⁵¹ Dean Acheson, “Radio Address, March 18, 1949,” Faulkner University, <http://www.faulkner.edu/academics/artsandsciences/socialandbehavioral/readings/hy/acheson.aspx> (accessed March 16, 2013).

¹⁵² Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department* (New York: W W Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 283.

¹⁵³ McMahan, *Dean Acheson*, 84.

¹⁵⁴ Cook, *Forging the Alliance*, 277.

Until then, there had been two cases of an attempted imposition of a shared identity on the people of East Asia, namely the Sino-centric tributary system of the 17th and 18th centuries and the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere that was pursued by the Japanese at the beginning of the 20th century. At the basis of the tributary system was a presumption of Chinese superiority, while the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere manifested itself in an aggressive Japanese imperialism, expansionism and occupation of many of Japan's Asian neighbors. Both concepts were coined by militarily or economically enforced cooperation.¹⁵⁵

So while there was no shared identity among the East Asians after the Second World War, American politicians did not consider a shared community of Americans and Asians to exist either but rather considered Asians to be of an inferior community.¹⁵⁶ Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein point out that debates among U.S. politicians did not contain the mention of shared values between the U.S. and East Asian potential allies after the Second World War. Rather they do stress the differences “in civilization, race, ethnicity, religion and historical memories that lead to the articulation of strong doubts about the current and future strength of these nations as part of an Asian alliance.”¹⁵⁷ Looking for the rationale behind such statements, Hemmer and Katzenstein address the flaws of liberal and realist explanations for the emergence of bilateral security arrangements between the U.S. and some Asian states. While liberal institutionalists claim that nations are willing to join institutions when they expect benefits from cooperation, multilateral NATO-like security cooperation did not emerge in East Asia even though benefits were at hand. A realist approach that focuses on material capabilities and makes the exogenous interest of security the driving factor behind state behavior fails to explain why the U.S. pursued its interests multilaterally in Europe and bilaterally in Asia.¹⁵⁸ Looking at the different threat perceptions in the European and Asian theater to explain the respective ways security cooperation was organized also fails

¹⁵⁵ Namkung Gon, “Collective Identity in the East Asian Community: A Constructivist Approach,” *Journal of Asia-Pacific Affairs* 5, no. 2 (2004), 73–74.

¹⁵⁶ Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?” 575.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 594.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 576–77.

to explain these differences. If one accepts the notion that the multilateral NATO was founded in response to a Soviet threat that never turned into real aggression then it remains puzzling why the security cooperation in Asia remained bilateral after the Korean War that had turned the Communist threat into a real all-out war.¹⁵⁹ Finally, Hemmer and Katzenstein argue that “identification is the mechanism that helps connect the construction of specific regional groupings in Europe and Asia to particular institutional features—multilateral or bilateral—of particular military alliances.” U.S. politicians could identify themselves with Europeans through religion, shared democratic values, or race; affinities that were almost completely absent in Asia.¹⁶⁰ The ‘Eastern Establishment,’ men who were deeply rooted in a world marked by European power and had a strong European and Atlantic bias, dominated U.S. foreign policy after the Second World War and also held the institutional leverage to implement their Europe friendly policies.¹⁶¹ Ultimately, John Foster Dulles stated that “in the absence of identification, there could be no Asian equivalent of NATO.”¹⁶²

D. CONCLUSION

By the time politicians on both sides of the Atlantic thought about the creation of a transatlantic security cooperation, numerous ideas and conceptions about a European union based on common heritage, traditions, shared norms and values had already been in existence for centuries. The substance of a European union *inter alia* included curtailment of national sovereignty, the promise of mutual assistance between members of the union in case of an attack by a third party, and the establishment of a common army. Even if these conceptions were mostly the concern of intellectuals and European governments repeatedly dismissed these conceptions because of their own national interests, there was a well-tilled field from which a plan could be drawn to build a security cooperation that was rooted in a shared identity.

¹⁵⁹ Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?” 586.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 587–88.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 594–95.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 597.

The lessons of the European balance of power system that twice led to devastating wars told European politicians at the end of the Second World War that this system did not work and had to be replaced. A conception for a security community based on a shared identity was already laid out before the Soviet Union's aggressive behavior became a threat to European democracies, even if this threat finally galvanized the North Atlantic security efforts. At its very beginning, however, "NATO was an institutional shell promoting reassurance for Western Europe. The U.S. security guarantee was mostly political in nature and had no organizational structure to facilitate the tasks of the alliance."¹⁶³ Neither did it have an organized military capability, integrated forces, or defense plans. It needed events like the successful test of Soviet nuclear weapons, the victory of Mao's Communist forces in China, or the Korean War to push the military dimension of NATO.¹⁶⁴

While the Europeans could look back on a long history of notions of European unity that fostered a shared identity, this was not the case in East Asia. The Chinese tributary system as well as the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere were imposed on people and did not create a positively embraced shared identity. The lack of such an East Asian identity combined with an absence of U.S. identification with East Asians prevented the emergence of NATO-like security cooperation in East Asia.

¹⁶³ Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, 35.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

III. THE IMPACT OF RECONCILIATION ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EUROPE AND ASIA AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

This chapter will compare the sources and consequences of reconciliation in Europe and NEA. In order to meet this end, we will examine the principles and mechanisms of reconciliation and their realization in the reconciliatory process between Germany, its former wartime enemies, and victims of the Nazi regime. A close examination of the Japanese efforts to reconcile with the PRC and the ROK will illustrate the level of reconciliation in NEA that has been achieved so far.

A. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF RECONCILIATION

Interstate reconciliation is one of the most difficult and ambitious kinds of international cooperation since it is connected to some of the deepest human emotions.¹⁶⁵ As applied in this thesis, reconciliation is the process of peace building after a conflict between at least two parties.¹⁶⁶ Reconciliation changes “conditions of international enmity into a status of bilateral amity, converting old enemies into friends.”¹⁶⁷ This process is of a long-term nature and addresses the vivid commemoration of memories and an accounting of the past,¹⁶⁸ and it can be pursued for pragmatic as well as altruistic reasons.¹⁶⁹ Briefly looking at an example from NEA, reconciliation must not be treated lightly because “remembering and forgetting . . . give countries national identity, and channel the values and purposes that direct the future in the name of the past.”¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ Shiping Tang, “Reconciliation and the Remaking of Anarchy,” *World Politics* 63, no.4 (2011), 711, 745.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 712–13.

¹⁶⁷ Lily Gardner Feldman, *Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation. From Enmity to Amity* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), 1–2.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁶⁹ Steven M. Schroeder, *To Forget It All and Begin Anew. Reconciliation in Occupied Germany, 1944–1954* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 4.

¹⁷⁰ Gerrit W. Gong, “The Beginning of History: Remembering and Forgetting as Strategic Issues,” *The Washington Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (2001), 45.

Following from this understanding, history, memory, and strategic alignment are linked. When in 1998 the President of the RoK, Kim Dae-Jung, met with the Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi, Obuchi apologized for Japanese wrongdoings towards the South Koreans in writing, and Kim accepted this apology sincerely. Kim expressed his desire for “a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation.”¹⁷¹ In contrast, no written Japanese apology was offered during the visit of the PRC’s President Jiang Zemin in the same year. Even though the past and its accounting were identified as elements of a common Chinese-Japanese future, the Chinese insisted that Japan still had to learn from history. In the Chinese-Japanese case, history was confronted very openly.¹⁷²

The three issues of interplay of group emotions and politics, between domestic and international politics, and the institutionalization of memories have to be properly understood in order to gain an in-depth understanding of reconciliation.¹⁷³ The need to protect its collective ego often hinders a group or nation from coming to terms with its own past. To continue with its future, a perpetrator (in the NEA case that is Japan as a nation) prefers his victims to forgive and forget his wrongdoing.¹⁷⁴ Should the perpetrator be willing to apologize, the kind of apology still matters. At the negative end of the scale are defensive apologies because through these the perpetrator does not express any personal guilt. While with an excusing apology the perpetrator recognizes past wrongs, he still does not take moral responsibility but assigns the authorship of his wrongdoings to circumstances that were out of his control. Only genuine apologies determine the guilt and moral responsibility of a perpetrator and show his repentance.¹⁷⁵

There is, nevertheless, the possibility that the perpetrator will lapse into some kind of apology fatigue or even try to invoke a sense of his own victimhood. The rationale behind such an approach is fourfold: firstly, it protects the group identity; secondly, a

¹⁷¹ Gong, “Beginning of History,” 49–50.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 50–51.

¹⁷³ Tang, “Reconciliation,” 712.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 726–27.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 714–15.

positive and unifying national identity is forged; thirdly, the people get mobilized for post-conflict nation-building; and fourthly, it provides a justification to avoid responsibility. On the other hand, victims can stylize their victimhood for almost the same reasons; the fourth factor simply gets turned into a claim to righteousness and legitimacy, and a fifth factor is the boost to the victim's damaged collective ego. This competition between national narratives often causes backlashes to apologies in the perpetrator's country as well as to acts of forgiving in the victim's country; both apologies and forgiveness are seen as unpatriotic acts. This vicious cycle can only be overcome through the combination of psychological and political means to overcome group emotions.¹⁷⁶ Many of these findings are true in NEA as will be shown later on.

Finally, collectively held memories of past conflicts that give shape to collectively held identities and in turn get shaped by these identities,¹⁷⁷ become sticky and are difficult to adjust once they have become institutionalized. Examples of such an institutionalization are the Nanjing massacre museum in China or the visits of Japanese officials to the Yasukuni shrine. Another way to institutionalize memories is through education. Since the youth shapes the future, education is a paramount battleground for reconciliation because of the view of the past it provides to the nation's youth.¹⁷⁸ The issue of Japanese textbooks and their distinct way of portraying Japan's past will be mentioned later.

B. GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO RECONCILE WITH ENEMIES AND VICTIMS OF THE NAZI REGIME AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Looking at reconciliation in Europe after the Second World War it can be found that Germany made reconciliation efforts with its enemies and victims of the Nazi regime with the aim of political and moral readmission into the European family of nations on the basis of equality, the imperative of its foreign policy.¹⁷⁹ The first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, was convinced "that Germany was by

¹⁷⁶ Tang, "Reconciliation," 726–28.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 733.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 736.

¹⁷⁹ Feldman, *Germany's Foreign Policy*, 18.

origin, conviction and necessity a West European country.”¹⁸⁰ Adenauer made this conviction of Germany’s integration into the West his *leitmotif* and pursued it through cooperation in multilateral institutions that often brought about some curtailment of Germany’s sovereignty. Through reconciliation, Adenauer wanted to show the Western countries that Germany seriously was trying to come to terms with its past¹⁸¹ even if the German population did not always embrace his efforts and lagged behind Adenauer’s pursuit of reconciliation.¹⁸² According to Adenauer, “Germany could not become a respected and equal member of the family of nations until it had recognized and proven the will to make amends.”¹⁸³ The 1952 Luxembourg Agreement settling the compensation for Israel figures as the official German ticket for readmission into this family.¹⁸⁴

Reconciliation, however, was the order of the day for Germany. The creation of a democratic Germany on basis of the Allies’ morality necessitated “a complete overhaul of German society, introducing democratic practices in politics, the economy, culture, education, press and radio, and the legal system.”¹⁸⁵ A cornerstone of these Allied efforts was the denazification program through which Germans should be brought to mind their collective responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi era by removing former Nazis from leadership positions, holding war trials and punishing the guilty. The success of the denazification program is questionable because many high-ranking Nazis were never put on trial or even got back into influential positions in the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁸⁶ One reason might have been the need for rehabilitation of the Germans as an impediment to enlist Germany in the containment of Communism.¹⁸⁷ The demand for a German

¹⁸⁰ Feldman, *Germany’s Foreign Policy*, 27.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 26–28.

¹⁸² Feldman, *Germany’s Foreign Policy*, 19, 30–31; Schroeder, *To Forget It All*, 4.

¹⁸³ Feldman, *Germany’s Foreign Policy*, 29.

¹⁸⁴ Yuji Ishida, “Overcoming the Past? The Postwar Japan and Germany,” in *Divided Nations and Transitional Justice. What Germany, Japan, and South Korea Can Teach the World*, ed. Sang-Jin Han (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 149.

¹⁸⁵ Schroeder, *To Forget It All*, 14–15.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 20–23.

¹⁸⁷ Hampton, “NATO, Germany, and the United States,” 248.

contribution to the defense of the West geared U.S. policy to support German reconciliation.¹⁸⁸ This necessitated the reconstruction of a “German identity vis-à-vis its former adversaries away from one of hostility and to one of friendship.”¹⁸⁹

If they wanted to achieve their short and long-term goals, Germans had to align their behavior with the Allies and actively pursue reconciliation through victim recognition and compensation.¹⁹⁰ Reconciliation occurred in the way of governmental apologies, statements of regret, or bi- and multilateral agreements. In addition, the acknowledgement of grievances of the German population by some of Germany’s former enemies did not inveigle the German government to generally portray Germans only as victims of the Nazi regime or to make war crimes committed by any side during the Second World War a zero sum game.¹⁹¹ Instead, the Germans had come to realize that an occupation with their own victimhood would actually delay the realization of their goals.¹⁹²

In the course of Germany’s reconciliation efforts, territorial issues were settled with France, the Czech Republic, and Poland,¹⁹³ and monetary compensation arose as a continuous element of German reconciliation policy. In 1952, Israel received payments that strongly burdened the German budget; in 1954, a law was passed that compensated victims of Nazi persecution; in 2001, a fund was established for forced laborers; and in 2009, the Hardship Fund for living Nazi victims was substantially raised by 60 million Euros.¹⁹⁴ Such actions highlight the conviction of Germany to reconcile with its former enemies and victims since they were conducted outside existing legal frameworks: at the time of the Holocaust, the state of Israel did not exist but was compensated in 1952 and

¹⁸⁸ Ireland, *Creating the Entangling Alliance*, 221, 225.

¹⁸⁹ Hampton, “NATO, Germany, and the United States,” 248.

¹⁹⁰ Schroeder, *To Forget It All*, 40.

¹⁹¹ Feldman, *Germany’s Foreign Policy*, 325.

¹⁹² Schroeder, *To Forget It All*, 40.

¹⁹³ Feldman, *Germany’s Foreign Policy*, 325–26.

¹⁹⁴ Shan-Hoo Lee, “Germany Is Still a Model for Japan to Follow,” in *Divided Nations and Transitional Justice. What Germany, Japan, and South Korea Can Teach the World*, ed. Sang-Jin Han (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 237.

through the mechanism of special funds for individuals who were not covered by German domestic legislation.¹⁹⁵ Beyond the role the German government played in reconciliation, non-governmental organizations like: bilateral textbook commissions with France, Israel, Poland, and the Czech Republic; Action Reconciliation/Peace; and German Historical institutes were engaged in reconciliation and through their actions facilitated official efforts.¹⁹⁶

Looking at the German efforts to reconcile with former enemies and victims of the Nazi regime and taking heed of former German President Richard von Weizsaecker who pointed out that “anyone who closes his eyes to the past is blind to the present,”¹⁹⁷ and said that “to accept the whole legacy of the past with all its good and with its burdening chapters, and to carry it together - ... is what makes a nation,”¹⁹⁸ one might say with persuasion that Germany has learned its lessons from history and has returned to the family of Western democratic nations. In addition, Germans have come to understand that even if they are not the perpetrators of the past¹⁹⁹ they are “all affected by its consequences and liable for it”²⁰⁰ so that they feel a responsibility to prevent such crimes as were committed under the Nazi regime from happening again.²⁰¹

C. DEFICIENCIES IN RECONCILIATION BETWEEN JAPAN, THE ROK, AND THE PRC

In the following, by looking at deficiencies in the above mentioned three areas of reconciliation, that is, the interplay of group emotions and politics (e.g., apologies and victimhood), between domestic and international politics (e.g., varying attitude of

¹⁹⁵ Feldman, *Germany's Foreign Policy*, 339.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 326.

¹⁹⁷ Richard von Weizsaecker, “Reflections on the End of the War that Divided Germany,” in *Divided Nations and Transitional Justice. What Germany, Japan, and South Korea Can Teach the World*, ed. Sang-Jin Han (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 38.

¹⁹⁸ Richard von Weizsaecker, “Germany and Japan 50 Years after Their Imperial Ambitions,” in *Divided Nations and Transitional Justice. What Germany, Japan, and South Korea Can Teach the World*, ed. Sang-Jin Han (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 99.

¹⁹⁹ Weber and Huang, “East Asian Security Revisited,” 97.

²⁰⁰ von Weizsaecker, “Reflections,” 38.

²⁰¹ Weber and Huang, “East Asian Security Revisited,” 97.

Japanese politicians toward reconciliation, territorial disputes), and the institutionalization of memories (e.g., textbooks) in the relations between Japan, the RoK and the PRC, the maturity of their relations from a conciliatory point of view and the timeliness of a NATO-like security cooperation between them will be investigated.

On 27 September 2006, one day after Shinzo Abe replaced Junichiro Koizumi as Japanese Prime Minister, the *New York Times* editorial stated the following:

The [Yasukuni] shrine controversy, and the failure of Japanese textbooks to deal honestly with the wartime behavior of Japanese troops, complicate the nation's ability to handle contemporary military issues, like the emerging debate over amending the pacifist constitution that America imposed on it after World War II. There is no reason Japan should not be able to make that change. But unless it first comes to terms with its history and its neighbors, such a step would be poorly received by other Asian nations.²⁰²

The Japanese shortcomings in historical reckoning and a twisted view on history, combined with provocative statements by Japanese politicians and intellectuals, are the basis for repeated flare ups of conflicts between Japan and its neighbors, China and South Korea. In reaction to what the Japanese believed as being an attack by the West on their very existence and to avoid colonization by the West, they started to modernize their country and military in the late 1860s so that Japan was in a position to defend itself against any Western attempts at colonization. Yet, while Japan succeeded in economic and governmental modernization, it still felt besieged by Western countries in the 1930s. So Japan started to occupy many of its neighboring countries in reaction to the perceived threat by the West and to fend off Western influence.²⁰³ Japanese interpretations of the country's colonial and imperial period even argue that this time had a positive modernizing effect on the occupied countries, and that the Pacific War was justified in the sense that the Japanese tried to liberate Asians from Western influence.²⁰⁴

²⁰² James C. Hsiung, "Periscoping the Future: Will China and Japan Ever Be Like France and Germany?" in *China and Japan at Odds: Deciphering the Perpetual Conflict*, ed. James C. Hsiung (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 193.

²⁰³ Takashi Inoguchi, "Distant Neighbors? Japan and Asia," *Current History* 94. no. 595 (1995), 395.

²⁰⁴ Moon, "Truth and Reconciliation," 545.

When it comes to answering the question of who was the driving force behind the Japanese colonial efforts and the Pacific War, one narrative goes that a relentless militaristic caste drove the Japanese people into a devastating war and left them as victims. This point of view would allow for the Japanese population to distance themselves from the wrongdoings to their Asian neighbors.²⁰⁵ The U.S. occupation forces encouraged this attitude after 1945 by blaming the top Japanese military and political leaders of the 1930s for being solely responsible for the events that followed and took away all guilt feeling from the rest of the nation. At the Tokyo War Crimes Trial, also known as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), the Japanese people were not charged with the crimes of the Japanese Imperial Army, only some individuals were being accused. While several of the tried war criminals were set free and returned into political positions, the Japanese Emperor who some held responsible for Japan's acts of aggression against its Asian neighbors was completely absent during the trials and was not charged with any responsibility. The U.S. deliberately chose to save the image of the Emperor in order to preserve the unity of the Japanese nation under the onset of the Cold War.²⁰⁶ While the Germans were required to distance themselves completely from the ideology and values of the Nazi regime, the Japanese were not asked to take such a step so that the Japanese society could go on to live up to some of their prewar values.²⁰⁷ Thereby, the occupation forces created the basis for Japan to become an unburdened democracy,²⁰⁸ and the three 'Nos' of no admission of aggression, no repentance and apology, and no compensation to victims became the policy of Japan's dealing with history.²⁰⁹

Moreover, China also applied this narrow standard until the 1990s to justify its relations with Japan "by delineating between a group of militarists and the rest of the

²⁰⁵ Sigal Ben-Rafael Galanti, "The Memory of The Second World War and the Essence of 'New Japan': The Parliamentary Debate over Japan's Democratic Constitution," in *War and Militarism in Modern Japan: Issues of History and Identity*, ed. Guy Podoler (Folkstone: Global Oriental, 2009), 131.

²⁰⁶ Yae-Rim Lee, "A Trial of Failures: A Deeper Look into the Tokyo Trials," in *Divided Nations and Transitional Justice. What Germany, Japan, and South Korea Can Teach the World*, ed. Sang-Jin Han (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 227–29.

²⁰⁷ Ishida, "Overcoming the Past?" 147–48.

²⁰⁸ Tsujata, "A Fragile Balance," 190.

²⁰⁹ Lee, "A Trial of Failures," 231.

Japanese people they had exploited.”²¹⁰ Nevertheless, Japan was seen as the aggressor and in order not to collide with the international community and be on a par with the West, the Japanese did not speak about their different point of view that the colonial period and the Pacific War were only an interlude in Japan’s continuous history of modernization and catch-up to the West.²¹¹

Based on this interpretation of history, there are three versions of Japanese modern history prevalent across the Japanese society. The left-wing version highlights the guilt of Japan but at the same time stresses that the West was equally responsible for the developments that led to colonization and war. The center-right perspective, which is the most commonly accepted throughout the Japanese society, also puts Japan and the West on the same level of responsibility but tries to soften the overall tone of reproaches. Finally, the right-wing view sees the Pacific War as a Japanese act of self-defense against Western intrusion and as an attempt to liberate Asia from Western influence.²¹² This variety of Japanese interpretations of history, all based on the denial of a solely Japanese responsibility for colonial efforts and the outbreak of the Pacific War, overshadows Japan’s relations with China and South Korea and provokes reactions by these countries, where societies keep the memory of Japanese war crimes alive and share a definite view on Japan’s authorship of their sufferings.

The different perceptions of history by the countries in the region repeatedly manifested themselves in conflicts between Japan on the one side, and China and South Korea on the other. Out of the range of issues, a closer look is taken at the visits of Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni shrine and the discussion over Japanese history textbooks. At the Yasukuni shrine, which is a religious foundation without ties to the government, the Japanese worship those who fell in wars for Japan; but since 1978 when the remains of 14 A-class war criminals of the Second World War were enshrined at Yasukuni, it has become a symbol for the Japanese handling of its past.²¹³ For China and

²¹⁰ Mori, “New Relations,” 43.

²¹¹ Inoguchi, “Distant Neighbors?” 395.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 395–96.

²¹³ Mori, “New Relations,” 44.

South Korea, the visits that several Japanese prime ministers paid to the Yasukuni shrine in public and private capacities are “a vital issue as well as the most sensitive part of relations,”²¹⁴ and statements like “those convicted have never been considered guilty of such crimes in the eyes of the Japanese people,”²¹⁵ underlined the ambiguous attitude of Japanese officials towards Japan’s colonial and wartime history. In light of such Japanese behavior, the apologies of Japanese politicians like that of Prime Minister Murayama on 15 August 1995, 50 years after the end of the Pacific War, seem to lose their meaning and sincerity. Murayama stated that Japan caused much damage and suffering especially to Asian nations, and he expressed his deep remorse about these events,²¹⁶ but the Japanese diet followed Murayama’s statement only with a halfhearted, watered-down apology of Japan’s colonial and wartime deeds.²¹⁷

The controversy about Japanese history textbooks, which took place during the years 2001 to 2005, is another example for the not yet resolved issue of Japan coming to terms with its history and the different perceptions of Japan, China, and South Korea about modern history. In the view of China and South Korea, the textbooks that were developed by the right-wing Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform and approved to be issued by the Japanese Education Ministry on 5 April 2005, attempted to whitewash the Japanese aggression and atrocities during the colonial and wartime period, glorified the invasion of Asian countries as an act of promoting development, and renewed claims to the Takeshima islands (known as Dokdo in South Korea) that were under South Korean control since the end of the Pacific War.²¹⁸ Although the Japanese government stated that these textbooks did not reflect its point of view on history and that there were no national history textbooks, it considered the textbooks as “thoroughly examined upon necessary criteria, including the provision concerning neighboring

²¹⁴ Huo, “Where Are Sino-Japanese Relations Headed?” 17.

²¹⁵ Mori, “New Relations,” 44–45.

²¹⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama “On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the War’s End,” 15 August 1995*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html> (accessed September 6, 2012).

²¹⁷ Swenson-Wright, “Limits to ‘Normalcy,’” 174.

²¹⁸ Ding, “Textbook Outcry,” 16.

countries.”²¹⁹ Finally, the year 2005, which marked the 40th anniversary of the Japan-South Korea normalization treaty and which was intended to become a year of friendship between the two countries, turned out to mark a low point in their relations. On 17 March, South Korea’s President called publicly for Japan to apologize and displayed the Japanese claims to the Dokdo islands as “a second dispossession of the Korean peninsula that denies the history of Korean liberation.”²²⁰ Roh foresaw a diplomatic war that could freeze the relations between the two countries and even slow down the economy. Furthermore, South Korea would try to convince member states of the United Nations (UN) to vote against Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.²²¹ While in 2003 Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi stated that Roh was the person “we can build a cooperative relationship together toward the future,”²²² the events in 2005 show a fundamental change in the South Korean relations with Japan. In China in April 2005 “such large cities as Shanghai and Beijing became scenes of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations,”²²³ and Koizumi was regarded as having “ruined the promising prospects of Japanese diplomacy.”²²⁴

More than 50 years after the end of Japanese occupation of the Korean peninsula and the end of the Pacific War, Japan-South Korea relations are still burdened by historical issues and territorial disputes. While South Korean scholars argue that the history of Japan and South Korea is interrelated and cannot be viewed apart from each other,²²⁵ Japanese nationalists regard the discussion over history as a domestic issue that

²¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Press Conference 5 April 2005*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2005/4/0405.html#7> (accessed September 7, 2012).

²²⁰ Swenson-Wright, “Limits to ‘Normalcy,’” 177.

²²¹ Ding, “Diplomatic Deep Freeze,” 19.

²²² Seongho Sheen, “Japan-South Korea Relations: Slowly Lifting the Burden of History?” in *Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges*, ed. Yoichiro Sato and Satu Limaye (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 121.

²²³ Mori, “New Relations,” 1.

²²⁴ Jiangang, “Where Are Sino-Japanese Relations Headed?” 16.

²²⁵ KyungHyang Shinmun, “Can Japan Be a ‘Good Neighbor?’” *Korea Focus* 13, no. 3 (2005), 18.

is not open to the views and interpretations of foreign nations.²²⁶ Briefly after the end of the war, Japanese politicians gave the South Koreans plenty of reasons that left the impression of an unrepentant and historically ambiguous Japan. Noteworthy is the statement of the head of the Japanese officials that were engaged in the normalization talks with South Korea, Kanichiro Kubota. He publicly stated in 1953, “Japanese rule over Korea was not entirely without positive benefits.”²²⁷ The normalization talks continued, however, and the two nations signed the bilateral Normalization Treaty in 1965; but their relations are still strained by historical issues and territorial disputes. Various explanations for these circumstances can be found, one of which highlights the legacy of the Japanese occupation of the peninsula between 1905 and 1910; another stresses the uneasiness of the Japanese with the authoritarian regime in Seoul (at least until 1993); and the third addresses the role of the United States as Japan’s and South Korea’s patron by restricting their free hand and national interests.²²⁸ No matter what the reason was (or still is) the most influential one, the distance to Japan created a specifically anti-Japanese nationalism in South Korea²²⁹ and a national identity that obtains much of its essence from being in opposition to Japan.²³⁰

The round dance of rapprochement and backlash continued through the 1980s and 1990s. In 1983, the Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone paid his first foreign visit to South Korea and wanted to initiate a climate of friendship and reconciliation. Nakasone’s Minister of Education, Masayuki Fujio, spoiled this effort by publishing an article that asserted the Koreans themselves were to some degree responsible for the Japanese annexation of their country in 1910. In a similar manner, the remorse of Prime Minister Murayama in 1995 did not receive comparably strong support from the Japanese diet. In the end, the Japanese apologies were seen by the South Koreans as expressions by

²²⁶ Cheol Hee Park, “Conservative Conceptions of Japan as a ‘Normal Country’: Comparing Ozawa, Nakasone, and Ishihara,” in *Japan as a ‘Normal Country’?: A Nation in Search of Its Place in the World*, eds. Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro and David A. Welch (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 174.

²²⁷ Swenson-Wright, “Limits to ‘Normalcy,’” 173.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 149.

²²⁹ Sheen, “Japan-South Korea Relations,” 122.

²³⁰ Swenson-Wright, “Limits to ‘Normalcy,’” 172.

individuals and that they could not be considered as statements of remorse of the Japanese nation.²³¹ From the perspective of the South Koreans, there was still a lack of genuine regret for the past wrongdoings within the Japanese society.²³²

There were, however, also self-critical voices to be heard in South Korea. The day after the Japanese education ministry approved the contested history textbooks, the South Korean major daily newspaper *KyungHyang Shinmun* urged for a distinction between the Japanese government and people and extreme rightists in Japan. South Korea should increase its efforts to make the Japanese think about history so that they would truly come to terms with their past.²³³ Such an approach “will ultimately be more effective than writing hate messages in blood, burning the Japanese flag, and one-time events that serve as an outlet”²³⁴ for the rage of the South Korean people. Any nationalistic outrage against the Japanese would only deprive the South Koreans of the honesty of their criticism.²³⁵ In addition, South Korean scholar Park Yuha mentioned that as long as the South Koreans distrust the Japanese they would not accept any apology.²³⁶

The beginning of the 21st century was marked by a glimpse of hope for an improvement of the Japan-South Korea relations following the remarkable summit between South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung and Japan’s Prime Minister Obuchi. The two politicians issued an ambitious joint declaration that called “upon both countries to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation.”²³⁷ Kim Dae Jung and Obuchi called their people “to participate in joint efforts to build and develop a new Japan-Republic of Korea partnership.”²³⁸

²³¹ Swenson-Wright, “Limits to ‘Normalcy,’” 173–74.

²³² Sheen, “Japan-South Korea Relations,” 121.

²³³ *KyungHyang Shinmun*, “Can Japan Be a ‘Good Neighbor?’,” 20.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ Moon, “Truth and Reconciliation in East Asia,” 551.

²³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century*, 8 October 1998, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html> (accessed September 7, 2012).

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

In 2001, when Junichiro Koizumi came into office as Prime Minister of Japan, he could start his rapprochement towards South Korea from a properly tilled soil, and the results of a 2003 summit between him and the newly elected Minister of South Korea, Roh Moo Hyun, were well received in Japan. During his visit to Japan, Roh stated that history should no longer burden the relationship between the two countries, and he did not ask for an apology. He did not comment on Japan's military buildup or on Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine. But, while the Japanese booked the summit as a success, Roh raised much criticism in South Korea.²³⁹ This domestic backlash to Roh's rapprochement to Japan exemplifies one of the findings about reconciliation namely that forgiveness might be perceived as an unpatriotic act in the victims' country.

In addition, no matter how promising the 2003 summit might have been, the history textbook debate had already cast a cloud over the relations between the two countries since 2001. After the first disgruntlements about the history textbooks, a joint history committee was established in 2001 that should investigate common historical issues. The committee produced a considerable amount of documents, but finally broke up in June 2005 conceding that the involved historians could not find a consensus on issues of the past.²⁴⁰ Again, this failure ties in to findings on the conceptual framework of reconciliation. The institutionalization of different national narratives in the area of education through the introduction of contested textbooks poses an impediment to reconciliation.

While the Koizumi period between 2001 and 2006 can surely be seen as a setback in the Japan-South Korea relations, these seem to be improving again since Taro Aso became Japanese Prime Minister in 2008. The issue of different perceptions of the past is an exception to the generally good state of bilateral relations, and this discord has repeatedly led to diplomatic crises.²⁴¹

²³⁹ Sheen, "Japan-South Korea Relations," 118–19.

²⁴⁰ Swenson-Wright, "The Limits to 'Normalcy,'" 175.

²⁴¹ Mikyoung Kim, "Lingering Memory Problems: Compromising Hearts and Resentful Resistance," in *Changing Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Implications for Relations Between Japan and South Korea*, ed. Marie Soederberg (Routledge: London, 2011), 119.

To sum up, the relations between Japan and South Korea seem to depend on the intentions and good will of individual politicians on both sides. Their ability to guide and master public opinion, to curtail the influence of nationalistic elements in their countries, as well as to bring about a relationship based on mutual trust between the two countries' people will be crucial in building an enduring partnership. Here, the example of close personal ties between Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, and Charles deGaulle highlights the importance of like-minded leaders in taking reconciliation forward meaningfully and sustainably, while dampening resistance in the own country.²⁴²

In comparison to South Korea, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the PRC started with the declaration of a joint communiqué in 1972 (during the period of U.S. and UN transition of Chinese recognition from Taipei to Beijing). In that document, Japan and China stated their “desire to put an end to the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries.”²⁴³ As mentioned further, “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility of the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.”²⁴⁴ The communiqué also included China's denunciation of any war reparations from Japan.²⁴⁵ The declaration of this communiqué led the Japanese to the conclusion that law now solved the history issue with China. Nevertheless, the Chinese people still felt emotional about the war but were at this time not allowed to speak their feelings.

It took until the late 1990s, when in the course of the PRC's ongoing opening to the world and its incremental granting of freedom of speech to the Chinese people, there emerged popular discontent with the Japanese treatment of history.²⁴⁶ At the same time, nationalism rose in Japan and China that found its expression in a new wave of neo-nationalism by politicians in Japan and as ultra-nationalism being expressed through

²⁴² Feldman, *Germany's Foreign Policy*, 28, 327–28.

²⁴³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China, September 29, 1972*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html> (accessed September 6, 2012).

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Mori, “New Relations,” 43.

emotions by the masses in China.²⁴⁷ In Japan, the trend towards neo-nationalism went back to the 1980s when first claims about the end of the postwar era and a new Japanese global role and responsibility arose. The desire to reexamine the past added to this trend from the mid-1990s on.²⁴⁸ In China, the rise of nationalism was spurred by the realization that the country had become a power of global importance and the corresponding impression that formerly China was not self-confident enough to speak up against other powerful nations.²⁴⁹

In reaction to the Chinese ultra-nationalistic view and in an attempt to return the discussion about Japan to a formal level, Chinese scholars explored a new view on Japan that should go beyond the double standard of the government. He Fang initiated this trend in 1997 by arguing that the Japanese society was tired of apologizing over and over again for wrongdoings from more than 60 years ago, and that Japan would like to play a role in international politics in accordance with their economic weight. In 2001, Feng Zhaokui added that it was up to the Japanese to decide the issue of history.²⁵⁰ Ma Licheng and Shi Yinhong who basically argued that the Japanese had apologized sufficiently and that the issue of the war history should be taken off the Chinese diplomatic agenda took this perception to extremes in 2002–2003. Any further insistence on apologies or tabling of the history would only incite national sentiments in Japan, be counter-productive for enhanced China-Japan relations and unnecessarily burden them. Such strong statements challenged the more conservative Chinese thinkers who argued that the Chinese people's memory of Japanese wartime wrongdoings could not just be deleted on order from the government, and the government would not be in a position to prohibit the Chinese to question the deeds of Japan during that period.²⁵¹

The downturn in Japan-China relations, brought about by the ambiguous behavior of Koizumi as Prime Minister of Japan, caused a decline of the new school of thought.²⁵²

²⁴⁷ Mori, "New Relations," 49.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 57–58.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 50.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 51–53.

²⁵¹ Wang, "Chinese Discourse on Japan as a 'Normal Country,'" 126–28.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 122.

It seemed that the scholars who thought of the Japan-China relationship in a more traditional way had a better connection to and support from the public, but the new thinkers seem to be afloat again since Shinzo Abe was elected Japanese prime minister in 2006.²⁵³ After Abe paid his first overseas trip to China, he stated his aim to “build a strategic relationship of mutual benefit in which we together work to solve global challenges”²⁵⁴ and when asked about the history issue he assured, “Chinese leaders referred to the spirit of using history as a mirror to progress toward the future.”²⁵⁵ China’s Premier, Wen Jiabao, spoke in a similar fashion when he visited Japan in 2007 and gave a speech at the Japanese Diet. He declared, “By stressing the importance of drawing lessons from history, we do not mean to perpetuate hatred. Rather, we want to secure a better future for our relations.”²⁵⁶ Finally, Abe was given credit for his efforts to deepen the Japan-China relationship and the ties to Japan’s Asian neighbors.²⁵⁷

The discourse between Chinese new thinkers and scholars of a more traditional approach to Japan reveals the division in China about how to deal with the common colonial and wartime history. The understanding of China’s limited means to make Japan genuinely come to terms with its past is in contrast to the demand for apologies and keeping the memory of Japanese wrongdoings alive. The latter approach can be seen as a tool in the competition for power in the Japan-China relationship by forcing Japan to apologize to China and thereby displaying China as being more powerful. On the other hand, the approach of the new thinkers acts on the assumption of equality between Japan and China and underlines the right of each nation to pursue its national interest. As long

²⁵³ Wang, “Chinese Discourse on Japan as a ‘Normal Country,’” 137.

²⁵⁴ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, *Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Following His Visit to China, October 8, 2006*, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2006/10/08chinapress_e.html (accessed September 6, 2012).

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, *Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China at the Japanese Diet: For Friendship and Cooperation, 13 April 2007*, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t311544.htm> (accessed September 6, 2012).

²⁵⁷ Wei Yan, “Abe’s Mixed Legacy: Despite Setbacks at Home, Japan’s Outgoing Prime Minister Will Be Remembered for His Efforts to Mend the Country’s Frayed Ties with Its Asian Neighbors,” *Beijing Review* 50, no. 39 (2007), 10–11.

as the question of distribution of power between the two countries is not decided, the ups and downs in relations between Japan and China will most probably go on.

Since the memory of Japan's colonial and wartime wrongdoings against its neighbors in China and South Korea is still very much alive in these two countries, Japan's shortcomings in historical reckoning impact negatively on its relations to China and South Korea, and also present an obstacle to its efforts to take a more active role in international politics by using military power. On the other hand, there seems to be a lack of willingness in South Korea to scrutinize its own perception of history, to accept the repeated apologies made by Japanese politicians, and to genuinely forgive the Japanese for their wrongdoings of the past. In China, the discussion about Japan's historical shortcomings and efforts to become a normal nation seems to be more influenced by the overall competition for power between the two countries. It looks as though the different perceptions of history are taken hostage to achieve political gains and are, therefore, kept alive rather than these perceptions being the root causes for irreconcilable frictions between the involved countries. In other words, as long as it serves some people's interests to make use of history, then the work of settling the historical issues themselves can hardly even begin.

After all the ups and downs of the past, relations between Japan, the RoK, and the PRC, seem to be overshadowed again. At his first press conference as newly elected Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe stressed the Japanese preference for bilateral ties with the U.S. rather than with Asian neighbors by saying "that the first step in turning Japan's foreign and security policy around is reinforcing our *kizuna*—or bonds of friendship—once more under the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is the cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy."²⁵⁸ When at the same occasion Abe said "right now, at this very moment, the Japan Coast Guard and members of the Self-Defense Forces are defending Japan's seas

²⁵⁸ Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, *Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, December 26, 2012*, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/statement/201212/26kaiken_e.html (accessed December 28, 2012).

and skies off the coast of the Senkaku Islands,”²⁵⁹ he again unleashed the precarious relations with the PRC.

D. CONCLUSION

In contrast to the reconciliation efforts of Germany after the Second World War that were acknowledged and accepted by its former enemies and the victims of the Nazi regime, Thomas Huebinette asserts that

In Northeast Asia, however, neither the consequences of the Second World War and the subsequent Cold War nor the legacies of the Japanese colonial empire have been sufficiently reconciled and rectified, and . . . reconciliation has not been achieved in Northeast Asia in the same manner as in Europe.²⁶⁰

This might have been because the period that is most conducive and important to reconciliation, i.e., the phase immediately after a conflict, was marked by severe tensions in the international environment and now has passed. This phase was overshadowed by the onset of the Cold War.²⁶¹ Unlike in Europe, where several powers were capable of supporting U.S. containment of Soviet ambitions, in Northeast Asia the United States opted for a quick reconstruction of Japan because it saw Japan as the only country in the region that held the prospect to become a great power again and support the U.S. in the containment of Communism.²⁶² The perceived urgency of a Japanese contribution to the defense against Communism and the subsequent establishment of bilateral U.S.-Japanese security ties were given preference before a multilateral security framework that would have included several countries in the region. The failure of the effort to form a Pacific Ocean pact—a multilateral security arrangement that would have placed a rearmed Japan on the same level with countries like Australia, New Zealand or the Philippines—was due to these countries’ unwillingness to enter into an agreement with the former aggressor as

²⁵⁹ Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, *Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe*, December 26, 2012, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/statement/201212/26kaiken_e.html (accessed December 28, 2012).

²⁶⁰ Tobias Huebinette, “Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia: The Korean Experience (review),” *Korean Studies* 32 (2008), 196.

²⁶¹ Tang, “Reconciliation,” 741.

²⁶² Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why Is There No NATO in Asia?” 584.

much as Japan's unwillingness to join the pact. Once this had become obvious, the U.S. pursued bilateral security arrangements with other countries in the region.²⁶³ Taking this path "led to Japan's recovery but also to its isolation from the rest of Asia, and an absence of reconciliation with the region."²⁶⁴

The domestic setting of conflict-affected countries also impacted the prospects of reconciliation. The need for external acceptance and economic support after the end of the Chinese civil war drove the PRC and the Republic of China to paint the picture of Japan in brighter colors than might have been expected. Both countries attempted to downplay the crimes committed by Japanese forces during the Pacific and did not push for compensation for Chinese losses suffered during the war, in order to gain Japan's recognition and support. This in the end contributed to a low perception of a need for reconciliation in Japan.²⁶⁵

The current level of reconciliation between Japan, the RoK, and the PRC can be described as shallow reconciliation with few common narratives, a partial coming to terms with the past, limited contrition, and limited forgiveness. Deep reconciliation as distinguished from shallow reconciliation is characterized by the impossibility of future conflict between the reconciling parties.²⁶⁶ Given the current territorial disputes, the option of conflict in NEA does not seem to be completely eradicated.

For Germany, reconciliation was a prerequisite for its return into the family of European nations. As discussed above, Adenauer's central belief in an affiliation to a family of nations stemmed from a conception of European integration earlier and deeper than the emergence of these states as modern Western democracies. This context stands in fundamental contrast to the Northeast Asian situation after the Second World War. Neither Chinese civilizational superiority nor the Japanese Greater Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere instilled a positively embraced sense of belonging to a supranational family, and

²⁶³ Cha, "Powerplay," 189–93.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 196.

²⁶⁵ Tang, "Reconciliation," 730–31.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 714; see Tang's detailed and handy table on the degree of peace and degree of reconciliation on page 713.

Japan even isolated itself from its Asian neighbors and turned its back on them.²⁶⁷ This might have prevented the Japanese from realizing and acknowledging the need to reconcile with their wartime enemies and victims, and pursue re-admittance into their circle in the first place. For the Japanese, there was no such thing as an East Asian family of nations.

Reconciliation also was the prerequisite for Germany's admission to NATO because "unless two former foes can reimagine a new and benign image for each other, no robust common identity . . . is possible."²⁶⁸ As Mary N. Hampton puts it, the partner in a security community with whom a common security identity is to be shared has to be seen "as a cognitive extension of the self."²⁶⁹ The absence of such a security community in Northeast Asia is palpable.

²⁶⁷ von Weizsaecker, "Germany and Japan," 94, 98.

²⁶⁸ Tang, "Reconciliation," 744.

²⁶⁹ Hampton, "NATO, Germany, and the United States," 239.

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IV. AN EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY AND ITS IMPACT ON A SHARED IDENTITY IN THE REGION

Based on the assumption that— like reconciliation—a shared identity between the members of a security community is a normative prerequisite for the establishment of a security community, this chapter examines the success of the efforts that have been made so far to foster a sense of shared identity in East Asia. These efforts took off after the East Asian financial crisis that necessitated the need for closer cooperation between countries whose economies had become more interdependent. The evolution of a shared identity will be observed through the progress made in establishing an East Asian community (EAC) and a comparison between the claims made of creating a shared identity in various documents starting with the first report of the East Asia Vision Group I (EAVG I) in 2001 and the level of shared identity in East Asia as identified in the latest stocktaking report of the East Asia Vision Group II (EAVG II) in 2012.

Starting in the 1980s, the increase in economic interconnectedness pushed the process of integration in East Asia. Cross-border investments between countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines or Singapore brought East Asia closer together and led to a growth of intraregional trade from 33.9% in exports and 34.8% in imports in 1980 to 50.5% in exports and 59.7% in imports by 2003.²⁷⁰ As a first response to this development the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahatir Mohamed, proposed the creation of an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). His proposal was subsequently dropped because the U.S. feared its exclusion from this regional economic body as well as it saw it as a competitor to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) that was founded only in 1989. In addition, the U.S. opposition to the EAEG also made some ASEAN countries withhold support for the group.²⁷¹

By the end of the decade, however, the dramatic effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis revealed and brought to everyone's attention the need for closer

²⁷⁰ Shiraishi Takashi, "Aiming to Build an East Asian Community," *Japan Echo* 33, no. 1 (2006), 60.

²⁷¹ Luan Thuy Duong, "East Asian Community Building Process: Impetus and Obstacles," *East Asian Review* 12 (2008), 37.

cooperation between East Asian countries and demonstrated “that the political development in the region lagged clearly behind the trend of economic globalization.”²⁷²As a result, cooperation between ASEAN and Japan, the RoK, and the PRC, was pushed and subsequently led to the first ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit in 1997. At the next summit in 1998, South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung who was looking for ways to bring the countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia together in one body proposed the establishment of an EAVG that finally came into being in 1999. The EAVG “was tasked with identifying ways by which the expansion of ASEAN to involve the three major states of Northeast Asia could be taken forward.”²⁷³ To sum up, the integration of East Asia was necessitated in the first place by market forces rather than having been pushed by precise political will. In this sense, East Asian integration differs from European integration, which was taken forward by the conviction of politicians for whom economic measures were a means of integration and who were willing to cede certain amounts of national sovereignty for the goal of integration.²⁷⁴

The construction of an EAC is based on the APT process²⁷⁵ and gained further substance with the Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation of the 1999 APT summit through the provision of a framework and mechanism for this cooperation.²⁷⁶ In this statement, APT leaders agreed to intensify dialogue and collective efforts to improve the living together of East Asians. They identified measures for future cooperation in the economic, social, and political areas, recognized the ongoing work of the EAVG, and

²⁷² Baoyun Yang, “East Asian Community: The Ideal and the Reality,” *East Asian Review* 12 (2008), 153.

²⁷³ Nick Thomas, “Building an East Asian Community: Origins, Structure, and Limits,” *Asian perspective* 26, no. 4 (2002), 90–92.

²⁷⁴ Takashi, “Aiming to Build an East Asian Community,” 59–60; Interestingly, Duong holds a completely opposite view by saying that “the integration process in East Asia . . . was not governed by market mechanisms, as had been the case in Europe, but by the political will of regional leaders,” see Duong, “East Asian Community Building Process,” 43. It seems to be more accurate to follow Takashi since the situation in Europe after the Second World War with its devastated countries and economies did not seem to leave much chance for market forces to promote European integration. In the East Asian case, politicians picked up integration as a political issue only after the market forces had already shown their impacts. Duong’s statement can be granted more accuracy when it gets related to the level of institutionalized economic linkages, which developed only after the 1997 financial crisis.

²⁷⁵ Yuqing Xing, “Japan’s New Asian Policy: Hope for an East Asian Community,” *East Asian Policy* 1, no. 4 (2009), 58.

²⁷⁶ Duong, “East Asian Community Building Process,” 37–38.

“expressed greater resolve and confidence in further deepening and broadening East Asia cooperation towards generating concrete results with tangible impact on the quality of life of the people of East Asia and stability in the region in the 21st century.”²⁷⁷

The 2001 report of the EAVG subsequently laid out “a vision that would inspire East Asian peoples and governments towards building an ‘East Asian community’ that will address the region’s future challenges and advance mutual understanding and trust.”²⁷⁸ One of the goals of the EAVG report is to foster an East Asian identity, one of its key recommendations of social and cultural cooperation is to promote regional identity and consciousness,²⁷⁹ and some of the EAC’s guiding principles are the development of a shared identity through the promotion of trust, confidence, and common interests as well as the creation of a regional thinking that respects the principle of national sovereignty.²⁸⁰ This caveat with respect to national sovereignty that leaves the door open for the pursuit of national interests then begs the question of how deep this shared, regional identity that aims at promoting the welfare of all East Asians can really run.

The EAVG report lays out fifty-seven concrete measures in the functional areas of economic, financial, political and security, environmental and energy, social, cultural and educational cooperation. In accordance with report’s assumption that “cooperation in the economic field . . . [will] serve as the catalyst in the comprehensive community-building process,”²⁸¹ the majority of these measures can be found in the areas of economic and financial cooperation.

While the report addresses the need to solve security challenges like territorial and maritime disputes as well as resource conflicts and proposes confidence building,

²⁷⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9911/joint.html> (accessed May 26, 2013).

²⁷⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *East Asia Vision Group Report 2001. Towards an East Asian Community. Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress*, 2, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/report2001.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2013).

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 2–4.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

consultations and dialogue as the main vehicles to achieve this aim,²⁸² recommendations for cultural and educational programs generally foresee the appreciation of East Asian history.²⁸³ The report, however, does not propose ways to achieve a common or at least shared view on East Asian history and does nothing to address the issue of competing historical narratives in the region, especially in NEA. Therefore, it is no wonder that ambitious projects like the 2005 Japanese-RoK history textbook fail because the protagonists hold opposing historical views. Finally, even though the report claims that the direction for the building of an EAC is clear,²⁸⁴ it did not detail a final shape of the EAC,²⁸⁵ no benchmarks or definite goals were established that had to be achieved in a certain timeframe. The realization of the EAC's lofty ideals was left to the willingness of the APT countries.

In 2002, the report of the East Asian Study Group (EASG), which was written by government officials, narrowed the fifty-seven measures of the EAVG report, which was written by intellectuals of APT countries, down to twenty-six measures of high priority that seemed to be implementable and likely to produce some concrete contribution to the achievement of the vision of an EAC laid out in the EAVG report. Even though the report argues a balanced selection of measures from the various functional cooperation areas, eight out of the seventeen short-term recommendations and five out of the nine medium to long-term measures are of economic and financial nature.²⁸⁶ Like the EAVG, the EASG dedicates actions to the creation of an East Asian identity by proposing to “work together with cultural and educational institutions to promote a strong sense of identity and an East Asian consciousness.”²⁸⁷ Since the existence of an East Asian identity helps to reach the goal of East Asian integration, the report claims that it is every government's

²⁸² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *East Asia Vision Group Report 2001. Towards an East Asian Community. Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress*, 16–17, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/report2001.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2013).

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 24.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁸⁵ Nick, “Building an East Asian Community,” 99.

²⁸⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Final Report of the East Asia Study Group*, 3–4, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/report.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2013).

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 39.

responsibility to foster this sense of identity and an East Asian consciousness because people will realize that they share a common faith and they will change their way of thinking. Again, these efforts are to be supported by research, education, and publicity.²⁸⁸ The report ends with the claim that through its successful implementation “the identity of East Asia will also be greatly fostered. Advanced mutual understanding and trust, together with strengthened regional identity, will promise a bright future for East Asia.”²⁸⁹ The realization of this bright future is left to the member states; further studies and discussion are deemed to be necessary and action plans should be drawn up.²⁹⁰ Like the EAVG report, the EASG does not develop a concrete and binding timeline for implementation, nor does it define an endstate that has to be achieved in order to determine the existence of an EAC. The attempt to make the EAVG vision more feasible indulges itself in making more detailed proposals whose implementation is not demanded and is not a real step forward towards the realization of the EAC.

After this ambitious start, the EAC project seems to have fallen into a deep sleep. Leaders of the APT countries mentioned the EAC at various occasions and underscored its importance as a long-term goal to be achieved to contribute to peace, security, prosperity, and progress in the region.²⁹¹ In addition, the 2007 Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation stated the member countries; willingness to enhance “cultural cooperation, education collaboration, deepening mutual understanding an forging a sense

²⁸⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Final Report of the East Asia Study Group*, 39–40, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/report.pdf (accessed January 31, 2013).

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 62.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 61.

²⁹¹ For statements on the importance and progress of the EAC process see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, *Speech by Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing at the 10+3 Ministerial Meeting*, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg/yzs/xwlb/t206079.htm#> (accessed January 28, 2013); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, *Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Plus Three Summit*, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/zgcydyhz/ninthasean/t230635.htm#> (accessed January 28, 2013); Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *Chairman’s Statement of the First East Asia Summit Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 2005*, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/chairman-s-statement-of-the-first-east-asia-summit-kuala-lumpur-14-december-2005-2> (accessed January 31, 2013); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, *Joint Press Statement of the Seventh Summit Meeting among the People’s Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea*, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zjzg/yzs/xwlb/t289953.htm> (accessed January 28, 2013).

of East Asian identity and consciousness.”²⁹² An APT Cooperation Work Plan that also foresaw the cultivation of an East Asian identity supplemented the joint statement.²⁹³ At the bottom line, the repeated use of the same language that can be found in various documents throughout a couple of years leaves the impression that not much progress had been achieved in the building of an EAC. Also, the rather thin proposals of the second joint statement and the work plan do not offer much ground to take the EAC forward, and an emphasis on economic cooperation is always visible.

At that time, the EAC process was in a stalemate. Being asked at a press conference why the declaration of the first EAS did not provide any further guidance on the building of an EAC, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi stated that from his point of view “ASEAN’s integration will come first, and then after that, a more common understanding on ASEAN plus Japan, China, and the RoK, or on a broader East Asian community, will probably emerge as we hold more of these meetings.”²⁹⁴ Koizumi’s reluctance to more decisively push for an EAC stems from the Japanese attempt to balance against the rise of China and a claimed dominance of China in the APT framework. This finally led to the emergence of two competing frameworks to take the EAC forward: firstly, the APT process, preferred by the PRC; secondly, an ASEAN+6 (APT plus Australia, India, New Zealand) framework, preferred by Japan.²⁹⁵ Together with the overall deterioration of Japan-PRC and also Japan-RoK relations as pointed out in the chapter on reconciliation, “the negotiations on an East Asian community to fall into disarray and grind to a halt.”²⁹⁶

²⁹² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation*, 4, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/asean3/joint0711.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2013).

²⁹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan (2007–2017)*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/asean3/plan0711.pdf> (accessed January 31, 2013).

²⁹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Following the ASEAN+3, Japan-ASEAN and EAS Summit Meetings*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/eas/press0512.html> (accessed February 8, 2013).

²⁹⁵ Xing, “Japan’s New Asian Policy,” 56–58.

²⁹⁶ Makoto Taniguchi, “Building an East Asian community,” *Japan Echo* 36, no. 3 (2009), 40.

A fundamental change in Japanese foreign and security policy seemed to be on the horizon when in 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won the general elections and Yukio Hatoyama became Prime Minister of Japan. Even before the election, Hatoyama published an article in *The New York Times* titled “A New Path for Japan.” Hatoyama reminded the readers that Japan’s identity is one of being a nation located in Asia—he did not say an Asian nation—and “that East Asian region . . . must be recognized as Japan’s basic sphere of being.”²⁹⁷ He mentioned rising nationalism, historical and cultural conflicts, and conflicting national security interests as reasons for the political struggles in the region. These issues could best be addressed through deeper integration and engagement in a collective security arrangement. By invoking Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, he stated his hope that one day his ideas might become reality.²⁹⁸

During a speech in the Diet in October 2009, Hatoyama affirmed his desire to establish relationships with Japan’s East Asian neighbors based on trust and cooperation through the identification of common interests and the respect for diverse values and also committed himself to further push the realization of the EAC.²⁹⁹ After the APEC summit in November 2009 in Singapore, Hatoyama gave a lecture on the Japanese government’s policy on Asia—the foundation of which was the initiative for an EAC.³⁰⁰ Hatoyama concluded that there was no real bond of fraternity among East Asian nations “because reconciliation in the real sense of the word is not necessarily believed to have been achieved in this region.”³⁰¹ He referred to the reconciliation between France and Germany after the Second World War as the example he wanted to emulate and declared that “the central idea of my ‘East Asian community’ initiative is based upon

²⁹⁷ Yukio Hatoyama, “A New Path for Japan,” *New York Times*, August 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhatoyama.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed May 24, 2013).

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, *Policy Speech by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama at the 173rd Session of the Diet*, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200910/26syosin_e.html (accessed May 24, 2013).

³⁰⁰ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, *Address by H.E. Dr. Yukio Hatoyama. Prime Minister of Japan. Japan’s New Commitment to Asia – Toward the Realization of an East Asian Community*, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/200911/15singapore_e.html (accessed May 17, 2013).

³⁰¹ Ibid.

reconciliation and cooperation in Europe.”³⁰² At their fourth summit in October 2009, EAS countries’ leaders appreciated Japan’s reinvigoration of the EAC.

While there were a couple of scholars who emphasized Japan’s alleged new focus on Asia as a positive sign for the future of the region,³⁰³ the overall assessment of Hatoyama’s approach was considered as some kind of dual hedging that primarily wanted to promote Japanese national interests simply in a different way.³⁰⁴ Hatoyama’s aim was seen to be balancing against the rising military power of the PRC with help from the U.S., while at the same time jumping on the bandwagon of the economic growth of the PRC to crank up its own economy. Nonetheless, Hatoyama does not provide a detailed roadmap to achieve the EAC which might be due to his emphasis on the content of the EAC’s areas of cooperation rather than, for example, on membership criteria. Assuming that the diversity of East Asia does not allow for a speedy integration process, the EAC’s framework might gradually develop over time.³⁰⁵ While his quest for an Asian identity and mechanisms to mediate competing interests lacked some determined political will,³⁰⁶ his resignation on 8 June 2010³⁰⁷ did not allow him to further pursue his goals.

The 2012 report of the EAVG represents the latest chapter of the building of an EAC. This report was intended as a stocktaking exercise of all APT cooperation measures and evaluated the contribution of these measures to the community building in East Asia.³⁰⁸ Economic and financial cooperation are estimated to have been the most advanced and the report now propagates the new vision of an East Asian Economic

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Feldman, *Germany’s Foreign Policy*, 335–38; Xing, “Japan’s New Asian Policy,” 55–56.

³⁰⁴ Ryo Sahashi, “Japan’s vision: Building an East Asian Community,” East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/05/japans-vision-building-an-east-asian-community/print/> (accessed January 28, 2013).

³⁰⁵ Lijun Yang and Chee Kia Lim, “Hatoyama’s East Asian Community and Sino-Japanese Relations,” *East Asian Policy* 2, no. 1 (2010), 62–63.

³⁰⁶ Rajiv Sikri, “Building an East Asian Community,” East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/01/building-an-east-asian-community/print/> (accessed January 28, 2013).

³⁰⁷ The Prime Minister and His cabinet, “Previous Cabinets,” http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/archives_e.html (accessed June 5, 2013).

³⁰⁸ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *Final Report of the East Asia Vision Group II (EAVGII)*, 1, http://www.asean.org/images/external_relations/Report_of_the_EAVG_II.pdf (accessed May 31, 2013).

Community that should be achieved by 2020. This economic community, however, would not entail any curtailment of the member states' sovereignty, and the report also hastens to say that cooperation in the political-security and social-cultural areas remains important.³⁰⁹

Looking at cooperation in the political-security area, the report found that while the focus of measures was on confidence building, the overall implementation process of the 2007 work plan was uneven and slow.³¹⁰ Furthermore, positive efforts in the area of identity building are not addressed with a single word in the report's stocktaking section because "[t]he progress made in the past decade, however, has yet to establish an East Asian identity and deepen regional integration that would realize the vision of an East Asia community of peace, prosperity and progress, as presented by the EAVG I."³¹¹ The measures proposed under the heading of socio-cultural cooperation that are dealing with identity building emphasize that "East Asian countries shall further share their common identity through deeper knowledge of regional history."³¹² This wording might suggest that the struggle for a shared identity has been replaced by the reassuring statement that there already is some kind of a shared identity. Again, the usefulness of historical knowledge to promote regional identity is questionable since there is no commonly accepted view of the region's recent history.

A 2009 survey by a Japanese research institution that looked at the nationalistic sentiments of the youth in Japan and the PRC revealed that there still existed a mutually held perception of hostility between the comparison groups and a diametrically opposed perception of the Second World War. The Japanese youth viewed Chinese food safety as the major obstacle for closer Japan-PRC relations, followed by territorial disputes; while for the Chinese these disputes were the major obstacle, Japan's historical issues ranked

³⁰⁹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *Final Report of the East Asia Vision Group II (EAVGII)*, 2-4.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

³¹² *Ibid.*, 14.

second.³¹³ If one considers “a common identity, shaped and strengthened by shared values, ideas, norms, and experiences” to be conducive to regional integration because “the manner in which one state’s general populace views another’s will be pivotal in the establishing [of] regional cooperation [and] positive images will help reduce historical animosity and nationalist sentiment,”³¹⁴ the prospects for a shared East Asian identity might be viewed as dim.

It appears that the rapid East Asian economic integration did not generate a shared East Asian identity that could have replaced national interests or national identities,³¹⁵ Such an undertaking might be considered to be an Herculean task when one recalls Robert Scalapino’s statement that “the diversities within Asia far exceed the commonalities . . . Asia has nowhere near the cultural affinities of West Europe.”³¹⁶ As it turns out, economic integration has been easier to achieve than a political and security community.³¹⁷ The multitude of East Asian forms of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation mechanisms are not especially effective, rarely have got a functional end to their actions, and the normative blankness of the East Asian security architecture allows anything to be interpreted in it.³¹⁸ On the other hand, further East Asian integration seems unavoidable given the progress made so far, the ever-accelerating speed of globalization, and the mutual dependence of East Asian countries in economic terms.³¹⁹

There is yet no shared identity in NEA that could sufficiently provide the basis for a security community. Combining the review of the literature on East Asian/NEA security architecture with these findings would favor an increase in multilateral security frameworks that are capable of dealing with the complexities of the current and future

³¹³ Yang and Lim, “Hatoyama’s East Asian Community and Sino-Japanese Relations,” 66–67.

³¹⁴ Shin-Wha Lee, “The East Asia Summit and the Difficulty of Establishing a Security Regime in Northeast Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/east-asia-summit-difficulty-esatblishing-security-regime-northeast-asia/p26543> (accessed February 12, 2013).

³¹⁵ Fukushima, “Political and Security Cooperation in East Asia,” 139.

³¹⁶ Takashi Terada, “Constructing an ‘East Asian’ Concept and Growing Regional Identity: from EAEC to ASEAN+3,” *The Pacific Review* 16, no.2 (2003), 273.

³¹⁷ Fukushima, “Political and Security Cooperation in East Asia,” 139.

³¹⁸ Nick Bisley, *Building Asia’s Security* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 19–24.

³¹⁹ Duong, “East Asian Community Building Process,” 43–45.

security environment (energy, environment, terrorism, etc.). These multilateral arrangements would not replace but rather supplement the already existing bilateral security arrangements. It is these kinds of arrangements into which the countries in the region still vest a high level of trust and of which they are—in a time of strategic competition between the U.S., Japan, and the PRC—not yet ready to let go.

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V. CONCLUSION

This thesis argued that a shared identity among and reconciliation between the intended members of a security community are normative prerequisites for the emergence of such a community. By looking at the existing foundations of a shared identity at the creation of NATO among its members and the attention that was paid within NATO to community building aspects even under the pressure of the Soviet threat, this thesis showed that NATO members held a shared identity and were willing to accept constraints in order to honor features of security building. Germany was allowed to join this security community only after it had seriously reconciled with former wartime enemies and victims of the Nazi regime. Both aspects, the existence of a shared identity and a level of reconciliation in NEA that would allow for faithful relationships between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK are missing in the region.

The thesis' first hypothesis argued that the North Atlantic community and NATO as its military form of expression with its distinctive organizational features came into being not only as a response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union but also due to the deep roots of the shared identity among its members. The illustrated findings show that the leaders of NATO member states paid attention to the inclusion of community building mechanisms in NATO even under immense Soviet pressure. Specific institutional elements such as an emphasis on dialogue and the openness for inclusion of other countries that supported NATO's founding principles and contributed to common security were inherent in NATO from its creation. These mechanisms contributed to NATO's success, its longevity, and the ability to include former enemies that were nevertheless seen as members of a European family of nations.

The second hypothesis pondered the question of Germany's reconciliation efforts with its wartime enemies and victims of the Nazi regime and held that these efforts were a necessary prerequisite for its renewed inclusion in the North Atlantic community of nations and NATO. As shown in Chapter III, even if a German contribution to the defense of the West against the Soviet Union was crucial in the view of U.S. politicians, Germany's reconciliation with former wartime enemies and victims of the Nazi regime

was a necessary prerequisite for its ascendance to NATO. Otherwise, it would not have been possible for other NATO members to see Germany as a cognitive extension of themselves and to develop a positive shared security identity.

To allow Germany back into the European family of democratic nations after the years of the Nazi regime that had alienated Germany from the rest of Western Europe required the reestablishment of Germany as a peaceful, non-revisionist country that is guided in its relations with other countries by shared values and norms. Being driven by Konrad Adenauer's conviction that Germany is a Western European country and to promote the integration of Germany into the West, the German government undertook sincere and continued efforts to reconcile with former wartime enemies and to compensate victims of the Nazi regime. Comparing this experience with the efforts made towards reconciliation between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK the level of reconciliation in NEA can only be described as shallow. The decisive step from shallow to deep reconciliation, i.e., the perception of a former enemy as a friend against whom war is deemed to be unthinkable, has not yet been made. Even if an all-out war between Japan and the PRC is not at the horizon, the conflict over the Senkaku islands shows that the restricted use of force between these countries is still an option.

In the context of these two hypotheses, NATO's integrated command and force structure is thought-provoking. Even if one can argue that an integrated force command simply strengthens the military capacity and power of an alliance, it still needs countries that are willing to cede some of their national sovereignty and hence some of their very own instruments of power. The pre-existing necessity of some kind of community feeling seems obvious if one wants to account for the willingness of France to subordinate French troops under German command. Had the French still held the perception of Germans as hereditary enemies, such a move would not have seemed to be possible. Even if further research on this assumption might be necessary, this example in combination with other addressed elements like the multilateral nuclear force are strong indicators that it required some aspects of security community building and their embrace by NATO member states to enable the overall success of NATO and that these community building aspects were more important than realized to date. This assumption gets further support

from a look at the current bilateral security cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and the ROK. Even if the U.S. has been individually maintaining deep relationships with these countries for more than 60 years through the hub-and-spokes system of U.S. security alliances in East Asia, there is no meaningful multilateral military cooperation among the three countries as one entity and also not between Japan and the ROK, while on the other hand an integrated command of these three countries' forces surely would contribute to the efficiency of their security cooperation.

The third hypothesis examined the level of effective institutionalized security cooperation in NEA that might entail the curtailment of national sovereignty. The level of institutionalization was found to be low, in large measure due to the absence of a shared identity among the countries or any positive identification as Northeast Asians. Even if East Asian integration has been pushed firstly by economic reasons, and has made good progress in the area of economy, trade, or finance, these achievements have not translated into the emergence of a deeper identity community. Countries in the region in general, and the PRC, in particular, show a strong emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs by other states. A curtailment of national sovereignty, however, would be necessary, for example, to create integrated military command structures as are the case in NATO.

As an amalgamation of the first three hypotheses, the fourth one claimed that shared identity and reconciliation are necessary prerequisites for an NEA security cooperation that would be comparable to the North Atlantic experience, but that these are lacking or are only insufficiently present in NEA so that the creation of a NATO-like security cooperation is inhibited.

This thesis finds, that the creation of a NATO-like security cooperation based on a shared identity and reconciliation between Japan, the PRC, and the ROK does not seem very likely to emerge in the medium term. There has not yet been a concept that would have created a shared identity among NEA states that would facilitate the positive embracement of a *we-feeling* in the region. The frameworks of Chinese civilizational superiority or of a Greater Asia co-prosperity sphere were always based on the superiority of one nation over the others.

In addition, an unsatisfactory level of reconciliation, competing national narratives of the recent past, unresolved territorial conflicts, the rise of the PRC, the competition about the leading role in East Asia between the PRC and Japan, and the role the U.S. will play in the region impede the origination of a collective security cooperation in the region. Behind these evident reasons, however, lies the observation that Japan, the PRC, and the ROK might not come close enough to create a security community only through the settlement of current disputes. The resolution of these problems is surely welcome and most probably even a necessary prerequisite for closer relations among these countries—even though the possibility of skipping some of these issues or putting them aside for at least a while might be considered and prospects for such an approach could be further investigated. At the bottom line, however, the resolution of these issues may be a necessary steppingstone towards a more sophisticated security framework in NEA.

A shared identity and a sufficient level of reconciliation—being two normative prerequisites of a security community—are lacking in NEA; therefore, NATO-like security cooperation cannot emerge in NEA.

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