REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
17-06-2013	Master's Thesis	23-07-2012 to 14-06-2013

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

An Enduring Investment for Global Stability: Establishing Professional Values as the Foundation of Building Partnership Capacity in a Fiscally Constrained 21st Century

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

LCDR Matthew B. Krauz, USN

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Joint Forces Staff College
Joint Advanced Warfighting School
7800 Hampton Blvd
Norfolk, VA 23511-1702

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

In a time of fiscal constraint, when responsible policy will reduce the size and scope of the U.S. military, foreign policy is liable to suffer. Without continued and increased military exchange promoting professional military development in partner nations, regional and global stability and partnership capacity may decline. Supporting enduring national interests, building partnership capacity should be matured as part of a major U.S. whole-of-government mission set, incorporated into a larger partnership development strategy for the purpose of shaping the environment for favorable U.S. outcomes. To scope this paper, U.S. investment in BPC should focus on the development of professional militaries of select nation-states providing the greatest long-term return on investment.

Building partnership capacity through professional military forces enhances regional stability, promotes theater security cooperation, reduces risk, and directly supports positive U.S. foreign policy exchange between sovereign nation-states. Greater expense of national treasure, decreasing U.S. international influence, and decreasing international support are potential negative results of ignoring the need for willing coalitions forming enduring partnerships. Ultimately, this paper offers recommendations to guide the building partnership capacity selection process.

Specifically, this study is relevant to U.S. military theatre security cooperation planners, Foreign Service planners, congressional budget planners, and researchers interested in building partnership capacity through professional military development.

15. SUBJECT TERMS: C

Building Partnership Capacity, Military Exchange, Enduring Values, Military Professionalism, U.S. Military, Measuring Capacity, Transformational Change, U.S. Partnerships

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(include area code)*
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified Unlimited	91	757-443-6301

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

AN ENDURING INVESTMENT FOR GLOBAL STABILITY:

Establishing Professional Values as the Foundation of Building Partnership Capacity in a Fiscally Constrained 21st Century

by

Matthew B. Krauz

Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

AN ENDURING INVESTMENT FOR GLOBAL STABILITY:

Establishing Professional Values as the Foundation of Building Partnership Capacity in a Fiscally Constrained 21st Century

by

Matthew B. Krauz

Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: 

23 May 2013

Thesis Adviser: Name

Signature: 

Steven Guiliani, Captain, USN, Thesis Advisor

Approved by:

Signature: 

John Torres, Colonel, USAF, Committee Member

Signature: 

Robert Antis, Ph.D., Committee Member

Signature: 

James B. Miller, USMC, Director,
Joint Advanced Warfighting School

ABSTRACT

In a time of fiscal constraint, when responsible policy will reduce the size and scope of the U.S. military, foreign policy is liable to suffer. Without continued and increased military exchange promoting professional military development in partner nations, regional and global stability and partnership capacity may decline. Supporting enduring national interests, building partnership capacity should be matured as part of a major U.S. whole-of-government mission set, incorporated into a larger partnership development strategy for the purpose of shaping the environment for favorable U.S. outcomes. To scope this paper, U.S. investment in BPC should focus on the development of professional militaries of select nation-states providing the greatest long-term return on investment.

Building partnership capacity through professional military forces enhances regional stability, promotes theater security cooperation, reduces risk, and directly supports positive U.S. foreign policy exchange between sovereign nation-states. Greater expense of national treasure, decreasing U.S. international influence, and decreasing international support are potential negative results of ignoring the need for willing coalitions forming enduring partnerships. Ultimately, this paper offers recommendations to guide the building partnership capacity selection process.

Specifically, this study is relevant to U.S. military theatre security cooperation planners, Foreign Service planners, congressional budget planners, and researchers interested in building partnership capacity through professional military development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to the efforts and support of the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) team of professionals. I offer specific thanks to my thesis advisor, Captain Guiliani, USN, who provided consistent and direct support in the accomplishment of this work. I offer additional thanks to Dr. Dotolo for writing support and Colonel Torres, USAF, for his support as my faculty mentor. Lastly, thanks to my entire JAWS seminar for keeping the learning environment enjoyable and productive. Ultimately, this higher education opportunity allowed me to learn more from my peers than I could have ever hoped.

DEDICATION

I am eternally humbled and grateful for the relationship and support of my wife, Naama.

I am fortunate to continue higher education as an officer in the U.S. military and ever appreciative of my colleagues who have made the ultimate sacrifice. My work continues to be dedicated to the ideals for which they gave their lives.

Captain Jennifer J. Harris, USMC

1st Lieutenant Ronald D. Winchester, USMC

1st Lieutenant Michael Licalzi, USMC

1st Lieutenant Matthew Lynch, USMC

…gone, but not forgotten.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Background

As stated by the United States (U.S.) President, Barack Obama: "Our nation is at a moment of transition."[1] Coming out of two successful conflicts, the United States must posture for a future which requires getting its "fiscal house in order,"[2] preserving American global leadership, and maintaining military superiority. Faced with today's broad range of security challenges, leveraging innovative approaches, including "joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity,"[3] is essential to policy and strategy discussion. Now, more than ever, U.S. political and military leaders should recognize the importance of enduring military exchange missions to develop professional military forces in select nation-states. This study seeks to provide academic evidence supporting an enduring mission of military exchange in select nation-states. This study also encourages discussion of the definition of a professional military as part of military exchange in building partner capacity (BPC).

Supporting enduring national interests, building partnership capacity should be matured as part of a major U.S. whole-of-government mission set, incorporated into a larger partnership development strategy for the purpose of shaping the environment for favorable U.S. outcomes. To scope this paper, U.S. investment in BPC should focus on the development of professional militaries of select nation-states providing the greatest long-term return on investment. Further, BPC should expand beyond its current U.S.

[1] U.S. President, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: White House, 2012), Cover Page.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

military-centric approach integrating with a larger United Nations Development Programme model. Incorporating specific selection framework including U.S. values, military professionalism, institutional legitimacy, and rule of law, relationships developed through lasting change ultimately support U.S. enduring national interests. To "provide for the common defense,"[4] U.S. political leaders should support continued international military exchanges in select nation-states. A constitutional imperative, common defense may be defined as protection of the physical and epistemological, like infrastructure and ideals, from actors or conditions that may harm U.S. interests.

Defined by the U.S. Department of Defense [DOD] as "targeted efforts to improve the capabilities and performance of the [DOD] and its partners,"[5] building partnership capacity is an enduring mission with often calculable costs. Policy should continue to support building partnerships through military exchange for long-term positive returns on investment. Long-term efforts are based on years and decades of transformational change. Building partnership capacity through professional military forces potentially enhances regional stability, promotes theater security cooperation, reduces risk, and supports positive U.S. foreign policy exchange between sovereign nation-states. Greater expenditure of national treasure and reduced international support are potential risks of ignoring the need for coalitions of the willing forming lasting partnerships.

U.S. waning financial health presents an immediate and long-term challenge to continued security investment by the federal government. Responsible future fiscal policy will likely seek an amalgam of innovative, alternative, or lesser means to reach or

[4] U.S. Constitution, preamble.

[5] U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, *QDR Execution Road Map Building Partnership Capacity* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006), 4.

reduce national security objectives. While nation-states may recognize the national (internal) and regional (external) stability provided by a standing professional military, the U.S. is in a unique position to initiate partnerships, guide institutional leadership, and support the development of professional militaries through military exchange as an integral part of BPC. Increased foreign policy exchange and developing international relationships through capacity enhancement of professional military forces with select nation-states may result in significantly decreased U.S. national resource costs, shared international and regional challenges, and increased legitimacy in multi-nation interaction for enhancing security.

Purpose

> The achievement of transformational change – change which is sustainable, sustained and makes a lasting difference to people's lives for the better – is always accompanied by institutional capacity development, anywhere in the world. Indeed, at its heart, the development process is principally about institutional capacity development of one sort or another.[6]

The purpose of this paper is to advocate that building partnership capacity should be matured as part of a major U.S. whole of government mission set, incorporated into a larger partnership development strategy to effect lasting change in support of U.S. national interests throughout the world. BPC should expand beyond the military centric approach, integrate with the larger United Nations Development Programme model, and incorporate specific screening and selection criteria including U.S. values, military professionalism, rule of law, and legitimate government institutions. The enduring return on investment from BPC through the development of professional military forces may, in

[6] United Nations Development Programme, *Supporting Transformational Change* (New York: United Nations, 2011), 14. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/case_studies_of_sustainedandsuccessfuldevelopmentcooperation-sup.html (accessed August 16, 2012).

the long-term, be greater than other methods. Other programs imbedded in military exchange will be discussed. Synthesis of the discussion regarding the definition of a professional military is presented to provide a baseline understanding of how military exchange can work to develop partner nation-states.

In a time of fiscal constraint when responsible policy will reduce the size and scope of the U.S. military, foreign policy supporting security is liable to suffer. Without continued and increased military exchange promoting professional military development in partner nation-states, regional and global stability and partnership capacity may decline. This paper offers a definition of a contemporary professional military; it will discuss how a professional military affects regional stability and supports U.S. foreign policy interests. Analysis of the United Nations methodology and empirical study regarding measuring capacity and supporting transformational change through building capacity will be presented. Additionally, this study will briefly discuss current military exchange programs. Specific recommendations are offered to support continued funding or innovative approaches for military exchange. Ultimately, analysis and synthesis of research supports the U.S. military's continued growth in its mission to educate and develop professional militaries in select nation-states in regions of interest.

Benefits and Scope of the Study

In September 2012, then U.S. Defense Secretary Panetta returned from a trip to South America where he witnessed the outcomes of sustained capacity development through military exchange in Colombia. Historically, the U.S. has projected power through international basing and force deployment around the world in support of U.S. national security interests. With shrinking resources the Defense Secretary observed

campaign success against violent criminal organizations through an enduring partnership between U.S. and Colombian forces. This approach requires introspection, understanding, and adaptation across the U.S. national security organization. Specifically, the Defense Secretary notes, "[the U.S. is] going to help more nations share the responsibilities and costs of providing security by investing in alliances and partnerships."[7] The Defense Secretary's future forecast is a strategic approach to security challenges through increased security cooperation by building capabilities, developing a partnering culture, and building partner capacity in support of U.S. national interests; his forecast is resource informed accounting for likely resource constraints and the burden-sharing aspects of successful security partnerships.

The results of this paper support continued attention and discourse regarding the importance of U.S. BPC initiatives with select nation-states. A model is developed to offer guidelines in the selection process linking United Nations analysis with U.S. BPC aims. U.S. leaders should discern the importance of long-term investment versus short-term goals for national security, and the results of this study bolster and defend continued investment in military exchange and professional military development in partner nation-states.

This study is limited in scope and serves as a primer for future research. Innovative and involved leadership should recognize the potential opportunities in shaping the environment with reduced resources in fiscally challenging times. U.S. security partnership processes and initiatives deserve rigorous research to inform policymakers supporting U.S. national security interests. Ultimately, this study seeks to

[7] Leon E. Panetta, "Building Partnership Capacity in the 21st Century" (lecture, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC: June 2012). http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1691 (accessed September 3, 2012).

further academic discussion of building partnership capacity through military exchange, deepen an understanding of military professionalism, and broaden thoughtful approaches to BPC by the U.S.

Chapter I introduces the research topic and provides relevance. Chapter II is the literature review. The literature review explores recent published research, popular studies, U.S. policy and strategy statements and documents, and other academic sources in order to develop the thesis topic. Definitions, background information, and research data further understanding of the research topic and help clarify its importance. Chapter III analyzes the literature through the perspective of contemporary U.S. national security and defense policy recognizing future resource constraints. Chapter IV poses recommendations and counterarguments based on the analysis and other existing research. Chapter V concludes and summarizes the study with suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter provides a brief overview of military professionalism, measuring capacity, transformational change, and military exchange programs. Specifically this chapter seeks to define terms and offer an approach to building partnership capacity (BPC) through military exchange focusing on military professionalism, contemporary methodology of measuring capacity, U.S. military exchange programs, and nation-state transformational change. At the conclusion of this chapter the reader should have a sound understanding of military professionalism, measuring capacity, and transformational change.

As a country with rooted and enduring values distilled from its Declaration of Independence and Constitution, the U.S. seeks to increase global stability, wealth, and peace with nation-states around the world in support of its own enduring national interests.[1] A method used by the U.S. to support its national interests at home and abroad is BPC which, per "section 1206 [of the] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006…authorizes the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to conduct counterterrorist operations, or to participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S. Armed Forces are a

[1] The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy defines universal values; these values are further discussed in the later section on Enduring Values. U.S. national interests (security being the national interest of discussion in this study) are supported and enabled by imbuing nation-states throughout the world with U.S. perceived universal values.

participant."[2] Commonly viewed as a method born from World War II international economic recovery requirements, BPC is not new to the U.S. However, BPC has become a more popular politico-military approach to security interests throughout the world where the U.S. desires a lesser footprint and cost to meet objectives.

Recent fiscal challenges and expected constraints prompted the U.S. president to announce financial constraints in the recent National Security Strategy. The U.S. recognized requirement to act responsibly to reduce its debt makes the discussion regarding priority of international military programs salient. Financial conservatism dictates financial discretion when choosing foreign aid programs in which the U.S. will continue to invest. Return on investment is a pivotal component to maintaining an enduring investment in foreign defense through BPC. However, return on investment from BPC is not easily quantifiable. Required political commitment for continued funding may not be easily earned in an austere spending environment, but investigation into the importance of BPC to further U.S. security interests and enduring national interests proves a worthy discussion for responsible investment in security insurance. Though the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act authorizes BPC via the U.S. Department of Defense, annual funding requires approval from the U.S. Congress. As fiscal constraints increase, decisions for responsible spending may reduce or end long-term BPC initiative investment if BPC is not perceived as a vital component to national security by U.S. leadership.

[2] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2010-2011 (Country Training Activities),* [U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State Joint Report to Congress, October 2010], II-6. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2011/index.htm (accessed December 12, 2012).

Military Professionalism

The ongoing academic discussion of a military professional universally recognizes the military institution as a profession in modern democratic societies. Fundamental to any military being perceived and accepted as a profession are societal recognition of the military as a legitimate institution and an understanding of what makes a profession. This section seeks to provide a deeper understanding of what defines a professional military. The concept of the professionalism between officer and enlisted (specific discussion of individual professionalism within an institution) will not be discussed here, but deserves further research to increase the depth of understanding of national militaries as professional organizations.

A profession is defined in part as a calling requiring specialized knowledge; the whole body engaged in that calling is the profession.[3] Recognizing arms as a term representative of weapons, instruments used in attack or defense during the conduct of warfare, the military profession is often referred to as a profession of arms.[4] Therefore, the profession of arms is synonymous with a nation-state's legally organized military forces. "Human societies -- from tribes and city-states to empires, organized religions, and nation-states -- have regularly established and relied on groups of specialists who, willingly or unwillingly, assumed the burden of fighting, killing, and dying for the larger group. Whatever their formal name or title, theirs is the profession of arms."[5] In summary, a military professional may be defined as "the career officer who devotes himself to the expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (sic) of the professional of

[3] Merriam-Webster online dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com (accessed October 29, 2012).

[4] Dictionary.com online dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com (accessed October 29, 2012).

[5] U.S. Department of Defense, *The Armed Forces Officer: 2007 Edition* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2007), 11.

arms."[6] The military profession may be defined as the institution responsible for "the art and science of defending the security of a nation or state -- its geographic territory, its society and institutions, its people, and its way of life."[7]

Fundamentally, the profession of arms should exist to serve the state. An executor of policy, military professionals follow the orders provided by the legitimate governance in support of state interests. Though intermingling of professions exists in states where government leadership is military, the fundamental professional tenet of military subordination to governance remains consistent. Discussing civilian control over military governance, Aurel Croissant notes, "effective civilian control does neither imply effectiveness and efficiency…nor good governance in the security sector. It simply ensures that civilians alone are responsible for political decision making."[8] Military political decision making does not change the need for subservience of a professional armed force to the political decision makers. The balance between governance and military professionalism is vital to preserve legitimate government and its leadership over professional militaries. The absence of such a balance is cautioned by Clausewitz.

> Subordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that creates war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.[9]

Societal recognition of a profession as a calling in which individuals serving in the profession do so for a cause beyond individual self-interest is a crucial component for

---

[6] Donald Bletz, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1972), 6.

[7] Thomas P. Galvin, "A New Way of Understanding (Military) Professionalism," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 62 (3rd Quarter 2011): 30.

[8] Aurel Croissant, "Civilian Control over the Military in East Asia," *East Asia Institute* (September 2011): 7. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=137615 (accessed August 16, 2012).

[9] Ibid., 16.

professional status. The U.S. Department of Defense states "the profession of arms is a higher calling, to serve others, to sacrifice self, to be about something larger than one's own ambitions and desires, something grander than one's own contributions and even one's own life."[10] Integrating further academic discussion into defining professional organizations, Dr. Kevin Bond provides synthesis of features and elements that categorize professionals.

Bond identifies two categories with which to analyze professionalism. The descriptive approach he calls "essentialism, relies on identifying the necessary conditions that must be obtained for an activity to qualify as a profession; [the] normative approach [he calls] functionalism relies on identifying the appropriate function or role of an activity as it relates to society's needs."[11] Bond specifically notes that after establishing the necessary characteristics of a profession, society must acknowledge the profession as legitimate.[12] Three essential features of professionalism universally accepted in academia are central in Bond's definition of essentialism. The three features are: 1) a professional has acquired extensive training of a particular activity; 2) the activity of a professional emphasizes intellectual powers over physical ability; 3) the professional performs an activity that is an important service to society.[13] While Bond continues the analysis into further accepted categories and profession types, he notes that the three universally accepted categories are fundamental to all professions prior to defining functionalism.

[10] Ibid., 13.
[11] Kevin M. Bond, "Are We Professionals?" *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 58 (3rd Quarter 2010): 64.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.

Bond further describes functionalism as a category of professionalism that depends on public recognition rather than organizational essentials. "Functionalism," Bond states, "relies on defining professional *norms* [sic] that an activity, organization, or person must meet in order to earn the benefits and obligations of public recognition of being a professional."[14] Functionalism poses questions regarding the organization's central values, the ideal relationship between the organization and the community, clients, and other professionals, and the obligation of the members to preserve the integrity of their commitment to the organization's values and educating others about them. While not an exhaustive list, the functional questions provide an additional framework with which to define an organization as professional.[15] The combination of essentialism and functionalism ultimately allow a more analytical approach for defining professions. While not every military service member may be considered a professional using Bond's framework of essentialism and functionalism, the profession of arms meets the requirements.

Ultimately, Bond's analysis is synthesized with Samuel Huntington, a renowned military theorist, in a common definition when he writes of a profession "as a 'peculiar type of functional group with highly specialized characteristics,' which he identifies as 'expertise, responsibility, and corporateness [sic]. Professionals are experts with social responsibilities, such as physicians or lawyers, who have specialized knowledge and skills acquired through prolonged education and experience.'"[16] The U.S. military is a unique group of highly trained service members committed to serve the nation's interests, led by an educated cadre of officers upon whom policy makers rely for responsible

[14] Ibid., 65.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., 63.

leadership and expertise in matters of national security. At its core, the fundamental task of a nation's military is to fight and win its wars in support of its population and vital interests; however, a highly functioning military force achieves more than its fundamental task.[17] Additionally, armed conflicts do not have to originate solely from external threats, and professional militaries may serve the nation-state supporting internal security. Some nation-states, like Egypt, Thailand, and Indonesia, have little current risk or concern for external security threats and may be required by circumstance to focus the military institution on internal security matters.[18] Recognizing policy uses the military as an instrument to further political interests, the aforementioned Clausewitz politico-military balance must subordinate a professional military to civilian political leadership.[19] Understanding some nation-states may not legally separate military professionals from political leadership vocations, the lack of balance may prevent, threaten, degrade, or dismantle the military's professional societal status. Not all national militaries focus on external threats. Some environmental or national capacity circumstances require military professionals to maintain internal order, potentially contributing to regional stability.

The U.S. populace and government recognize and support a professional military force. The level of autonomy and trust provided to the U.S. military requires the military force sustain its professionalism using the frameworks presented to maintain its legitimacy, competence, and capabilities.

---

[17] U.S. DOD, *Armed Forces Officer*, 11.

[18] For more information about Asia read Aurel Croissant, "Civilian Control over the Military in East Asia," *East Asia Institute* (September 2011). http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=137615 (accessed August 16, 2012). For more information about Egypt read Yezid Sayigh, "Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt." *The Carnegie Papers* (August 2012). http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/01/above-state-officers-republic-in-egypt/d4l2 (accessed October 1, 2012).

[19] U.S. DOD, *Armed Forces Officer*, 11.

> …the concept of a professional, the officer as a member of a profession, part of a self-conscious group of practitioners, pursuing a common calling and practicing under a collective compact with the nation and each other. The nation allows the membership of a profession a high degree of autonomy in recruitment, training, and performance. In return, the profession accepts, collectively, the obligation to assure the competence and ethical conduct of its practitioners, to advance the knowledge of their calling, to train and indoctrinate candidates for membership, and to develop their members throughout their careers.[20]

Furthermore, understanding the nature of a military professional, its role in foreign policy deserves review to distinguish why and how military professionalism plays a critical role in BPC. The role of the U.S. military professional has adapted to evolving mission requirements since its inception. "Throughout [U.S.] history… military officers have been used in many capacities in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy."[21] An increasing role in foreign policy added a new dimension to military professionalism.[22] "The American military officer has become more intimately associated with the formulation of foreign policy while continuing his role as implementer of that policy when his particular expertise is required."[23] As the lines of diplomacy and military service continue to blur, military professionals will be more frequently called upon to participate in international affairs. Additionally, without adapting to the environment, the U.S. would be ill served if military professionals who often formally interface with U.S. partners were not capable statesmen. As building partnerships becomes a primary military mission, the future environment may require additional and better equipped military diplomats. History offers an example of early

[20] U.S. DOD, *Armed Forces Officer*, 22.

[21] Donald Bletz, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1972), 34.

[22] Ibid., vii.

[23] Ibid.

U.S. military professional diplomacy with General Andrew Jackson's invasion of Florida in 1818.

> Operating under vague orders, he captured two Spanish posts, executing two British subjects who were accused of aiding the Indians, and before returning to the United States, appointed one of his subordinates as military governor of Florida. These bold actions brought a sharp and immediate protest from Spain and precipitated a Cabinet crisis in Washington.[24]

Though the U.S. military has a history of military-politico integration, the circumstances often dictated the requirement rather than it being an inherent component of military professionalism. "The requirement that President Kennedy placed on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 'help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation' was simply the formal recognition of this new" dimension of military professionalism integrated with diplomacy.[25] Donald Bletz summarizes the integration of the military and diplomatic professional stating:

> The military professional is now involved intimately in national policy processes. This involvement is not the result of any conscious quest for political power on the part of the military but rather the inevitable product of the new world-wide commitments of the United States and of the revolution in military technology. Power in a democracy is inseparable from responsibility. Accordingly, the Military Establishment is under the most compelling obligation to exercise the power which has been thrust upon it with wisdom and restraint.[26]

The union between military professionalism and foreign policy demands a capable soldier-statesman. Diplomats and military servicemen must be able to work together in developing partnerships, peacekeeping, and preventing or preparing for war. The ability of the military professional to "fight cannot be dismissed as a matter of little consequence. The question in today's highly complex environment, however, is whether

[24] Ibid., 35.
[25] Ibid., 68.
[26] Ibid., 77.

that is in itself the only, or even the most important, qualification for higher rank and responsibility."[27]

The soldier-statesmen or politico-military capable professional is therefore a critical component to successful implementation and lasting effects of BPC. The professional military sub-domain, as defined by Thomas Galvin, is "the art and science of defending security of a nation or state - its geographic territory, its society and institutions, its people, and its way of life."[28] Galvin's definition is the core of a military's reason for existence. However, this sub-domain is perceived as a profession because of its organizational attributes and recognized enduring legitimacy by the society in which it exists. The military performs a vital function and has established the appropriate mechanisms for its members to achieve and maintain professional status. A modern fundamental element of that status is the ability for military professionals to perform as diplomats and ambassadors of good will for the U.S. Society's expectation is that the U.S. military will sustain the norms and adhere to societal expectations, thereby maintaining the balance between political and military institutions while meeting diplomatic requirements.[29]

In summary, institutional professionalism is defined and validated by society. The professional institution performs fundamental and essential tasks that meet its society's needs. The professional institution is expected to meet societal behavioral norms to maintain autonomy of action, and society retains the ability to influence the professional institution if societal norms and requirements are not being satisfactorily

[27] Ibid., 288.

[28] Thomas P. Galvin, "A New Way of Understanding (Military) Professionalism," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 62 (3rd Quarter 2011): 26.

[29] Ibid., 31.

met. A professional military institution serves a society by providing security (internal, external, or both). Just as U.S. military professionals must understand their historical and burgeoning role as soldier-statesmen, bringing security and diplomacy in service to their nation, so too must the concept of the military professional be an integrated part of any approach to build a country's capacity to provide its own security, beginning with building a professional military institution.

Enduring Values

While not exhaustive, a distinct list and explanation of values is required to understand the thesis rationale. Further analysis of literature may yield more values maintained by the U.S., but for the purposes of this paper the focal values are distilled from the recent National Security Strategy. Discussion of these values is offered using an elementary approach drawing from the U.S. Declaration of Independence and Constitution. Specifically, the National Security Strategy is a blueprint for pursuing the world that we seek by outlining a strategy to rebuild our foundations, promote a just and sustainable international order while advancing American interests, security, prosperities, and universal values.[30] The universal values noted in the National Security Strategy are Western values considered to have universal application by the U.S. government. Identifying and understanding these Western values associated with U.S. national interests are vital to the effective and efficient approach to BPC. The President of the U.S. notes the impact of values domestically and abroad.

> The United States believes certain values are universal and will work to promote them worldwide. These include an individual's freedom to speak their mind, assemble without fear, worship as they please, and choose their own leaders; they also include dignity, tolerance, and equality among all people, and the fair and equitable administration of justice. The United

[30] U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), 4.

> States was founded upon a belief in these values. At home, fidelity to these values has extended the promise of America ever more fully, to ever more people. Abroad, these values have been claimed by people of every race, region, and religion. Most nations are parties to international agreements that recognize this commonality. And nations that embrace these values for their citizens are ultimately more successful—and friendly to the United States—than those that do not.[31]

Though the universality of U.S. values is debatable, the U.S. seeks to espouse its enduring values universally as they relate to the interests of national security: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of religious worship, democracy (representative government), dignity, tolerance, equality among people, and a just rule of law. Each of these values could consume a paper alone, but critical to this thesis is the understanding of the values the U.S. associates with choosing international partnerships.

Furthermore, the U.S. President recognizes that nation-states who promote the aforementioned enduring values are often "friendly to the U.S [and] more successful."[32] Therefore, according to the White House, when searching for partnerships seeking local, regional, or global stability and supporting the national interests of the U.S., enduring values matter. Moreover, "recognizing the link between development and political progress, the [U.S. understands that] different cultures and traditions give life to these values in distinct ways…influence, therefore, comes not from perfection, but from…striving to overcome…imperfections."[33] Therefore, nation-states with differing approaches to Western values may interpret and enact them differently than the U.S., but the recognition and attempt to provide a populace with the outcomes of accepted Western values symbolizes a path to potential partnership.

---

[31] Ibid., 35.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid., 36.

Realistically, nation-states will often act in their best interest. Sometimes, a nation's best interest may contradict its professed values. As noted in the NSS, striving to overcome imperfection is a process for development and support of Western values. The U.S. did not accept and support its current value system in days or years; it can take decades or centuries to develop and sustain national values. Long-term partners recognize the change process is an enduring and evolving approach to capacity development and not a quick, easy, or simply solution. The benefit of partnerships and developing shared value systems may often be found in and throughout the change process. Therefore, nation-states still developing capacity for shared U.S. values may be viable for BPC.

A significant challenge in assessing, promoting, and sharing values with non-Western nation-states is that the West is distinctively different in the character of its values and institutions. It is therefore a challenge to introduce these ideals into foreign societies and expect immediate understanding, acceptance, and adoption. Most notable values declared by Huntington are "[Judeo-Christianity], pluralism, individualism, and rule of law, which made it possible for the West to invent modernity, expand throughout the world, and become the envy of other societies."[34] However, envy does not necessarily equate to want or need and not all nation-states governances or people believe in the universality of U.S. values and culture. In this case, nation-states may deny the U.S. claim of value universality becoming unwilling, unwanted, or significantly challenging partners.

[34] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2011), 311.

Three values noted in U.S. founding documents are commonly referred to as fundamental values of U.S. citizenry. The belief in global democratization levies these values into being universal. "[U.S. citizens] hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed [sic]."[35] Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are inherent to human kind in Western civilization, though the definitions of these rights are continually discussed. However, as mentioned, these values evolved in the West and were adopted by other nation-states forcing policymakers to explain further the universality of these values. Defining these foundational values helps connect them to the NSS values which are communicated as global democratic values for mankind. The rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are heretofore defined as follows: an individual's right to life should be considered inviolable except in certain highly restricted and extreme circumstances; the right to liberty is considered an unalterable aspect of the human condition -- it includes personal, political, and economic freedom -- an individual is free to act, think, and believe; and U.S. citizens have the right to attempt to attain (pursue) happiness in their own way, so long as they do not infringe upon the rights of others. Other notable values espoused by the U.S. founding documents are common good (working together for the benefit of all), justice (equitable treatment under the rule of law), equality (all citizens have the same rights under the law), diversity (strength in cultural, ethnic, etc. variety), and popular sovereignty (the citizenry is

[35] U.S. DOD, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 99.

collectively sovereign and holds authority over public officials and policies).[36] Ultimately, universal values are a matter of perspective. Western perspective developed the discussed universal values. Some nation-states have already adopted Western values; some nation-states are open to adopting Western values; and, some nation-states remain closed to idea of adopting Western values.

In summary, knowledge of Western values (in particular, U.S. values) is critical to building partnership capacity because sharing values requires acceptance of differing ideals and the will to adapt. Societies (e.g. nation-states, non-government organizations, religious or ethnic groups) do not necessarily share similar value systems. Knowledge of the Western value system, its foundation, history, development, and components is central to sustainable professional military partnerships. Furthermore, U.S. recognition and understanding of challenges associated with societies having dissimilar, obstinate, or antithetical value systems can support development of BPC approaches that account for potential friction.

Military Exchange

> Building partnership capacity…remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe [the U.S.] will seek to be the security partner of choice…whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. *Whenever possible, [the U.S.] will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives* [sic], relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.[37]

The U.S. partners with nation-states throughout the world through public and private military sales, foreign internal defense, and security cooperation. BPC is an

[36] Michigan.gov, *Our Core Democratic Values* (Michigan Department of Education teaching assistance). http://www.michigan.gov/documents/10-02_Core_democtaric_Values_48832_7.pdf (accessed November 1, 2012).

[37] U.S. President, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: White House, 2012), 3.

element of Security Cooperation and a program within Foreign Military Training. The broad scope of activities used by the U.S. military to engage in other nation-states promotes U.S. enduring interests through promoting U.S. influence. An enduring investment in national resources, BPC requires a long-term commitment with the most significant potential reward through lasting institutional change. The U.S. President declares the U.S. will seek its own security, the security of its allies and partners, and build partner "capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity… [while creating] new opportunities for burden sharing."[38] The focus of strengthening partnerships throughout the world continues as a rallying cry throughout U.S. policy and strategy. The Department of Defense through its standing regional combatant commands is responsible to execute political strategy through military exchange. In Asia for example, the U.S. President recognizes that "key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region."[39] Therefore, the U.S. will "expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners through the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests."[40]

The U.S. military engages other nation-states through multiple programs executed by both the Departments of State (DOS) and Defense. Foreign Military Training (FMT) is an alternative term for categories of military exchange executed by the U.S. government. Per Title 22 U.S. Code, FMT is "military training provided to foreign military personnel by the Department of Defense and the Department of State."[41] Military exchange encompasses all foreign military interaction including FMT.

[38] Ibid., 1.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid., 2.
[41] Annual Foreign Military Training Report, U.S. Code 22 § 2416 (2007): Legal Information Institute. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2416 (accessed April 24, 2013).

Unclassified program statuses are reported biennially to the U.S. Congress by a joint report from DOS and DOD. Foreign Military Sales, separate from FMT, focuses on the sale of military equipment and is funded by foreign national funds. Programs funded by the DOD include: Regional Centers for Security studies; Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities: Counter-Drug Training Support; Mine Action Programs; Disaster Response (Humanitarian Assistance); Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program; Service Exchange Programs; and, Building Partnership Capacity. The DOS funds Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, International Narcotics Education and Training, and the Global Peace Operations Initiative. While each program is relevant to furthering national interests through international security and cooperation, BPC is central to U.S. national security strategy in an environment of fiscal constraints and responsible spending focusing efforts on partnership over other methods. The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) notes the importance building partner capacity through shared technology as a critical method of improving partner capability and interoperability with U.S. forces.[42] Moreover, exercises in a cooperative and collaborative environment strengthen relationships, build capacity, and build potentially lasting security partnerships through teamwork, understanding and esprit de corps. Stating the U.S. Navy's intention to continue seeking opportunities to enhance cooperation and understanding, the CNO further notes participation "in international exercises, such as Phoenix Express in Africa, Combined Afloat Readiness

[42] U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, *CNO guidance for 2011: Executing the Maritime Strategy* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2010), 7.

and Training (CARAT) and Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) in the Pacific, and UNITAS in South America."[43]

Of the 853 pages in the U.S. Department of State's report to Congress titled *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest*, 2010-2011, Volume I, BPC receives only this statement:

> Section 1206, National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended, authorizes the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to conduct or support a program to build the capacity of a foreign country's national military forces in order for that country to conduct counterterrorist operations, or to participate in or support military and stability operations in which the U.S. Armed Forces are a participant. Building Partnership Capacity is directed toward partner nations that uphold the cornerstones of democracy, human rights, attendant fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Pursuant to Section 1206(d), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall jointly formulate this program.[44]

BPC, therefore, is legally the responsibility of both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. However, the Secretary of Defense is the lead agent for BPC activities since the program focuses on building foreign military force capabilities. Of note, the NDAA specifies enduring U.S. values as a constraint for BPC: democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and rule of law. Volume II of the congressional report notes at least one of the aforementioned FMT programs active in 105 nation-states as of 2011. A highly informative report, future research may use the specific monetary data contained within to develop trend analysis of resource allocation to foreign nation-states, potentially framing countries and regions of interest and analyzing how the U.S. chooses to allocate FMT resources.

---

[43] Ibid.

[44] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2010-2011 (Country Training Activities).* U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State Joint Report to Congress, October 2010. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2011/index.htm (accessed August-December 2012), II-6.

As U.S. military exchange sustains or increases focus on BPC, challenges exist in approaches between national militaries based on development of a defense organization founded in the post WWII environment. U.S. military institutional innovation may be needed to evolve and adapt to the changing environment. Huntington notes, "American foreign policy thinking…suffered from a reluctance to abandon, alter, or at times even reconsider policies adopted to meet Cold War needs."[45] The military organization is designed to meet the needs of a Cold War environment and not necessarily designed to meet the needs of building partnerships and developing other nation-states' professional military capacity. Therefore, there is potentially a mismatch in organizational design to current and future military requirements. The U.S. military remains flexible enough, because of size and resources, to tap its resource reservoir and execute BPC effectively, but is the military approach efficient? The topic of efficiency will likely increase its presence in policy discussions as resources are reduced. Is the Department of Defense (DOD) the right organization to lead the BPC effort with the military as its executor? Huntington further notes "statesmen can constructively alter reality only if they recognize and understand it. The emerging politics of culture, the rising power of non-Western civilizations, and the increasing cultural assertiveness of these societies have been widely recognized in the non-Western world."[46] For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will maintain the lead in BPC initiatives.

In summary, with reduced resources, innovative approaches to ongoing partnerships are necessary to effectively and efficiently execute BPC as a component of military exchange. Other FMT programs are sometimes faster and offer more easily

[45] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations,* 309.
[46] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations,* 308.

quantifiable results than BPC. However, military exchange programs provide a balanced approach, and BPC is an integral part of the balance often tying other FMT programs together for positive effects.

Measuring Capacity

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) "partners with people at all levels of society to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone. On the ground in 177 countries and territories, [they] offer global perspective and local insight to help empower lives and build resilient nations."[47] Central to the UNDP mission is capacity development. "UNDP defines capacity as 'the ability of individuals, institutions, and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner.' Capacity development is…about making institutions better able to deliver and promote human development."[48] Measuring capacity as part of the capacity development process is critical to understanding the starting point for BPC. Moreover, capturing capacity change is fundamental for developing metrics for interested parties to measure transformation (positive or negative) and recognition of end-state achievement – when capacity objectives are met whereby the developing nation-state may sustain its new or enhanced capabilities without significant foreign assistance. Also important to sustained performance over time is managing change and crises that undoubtedly occur throughout capacity development.

[47] United Nations Development Programme, comments about UNDP. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html (accessed November 5, 2012).

[48] United Nations Development Programme, *Measuring Capacity* (New York: UNDP, 2010), 2. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/capacity-building/undp-paper-on-measuring-capacity.html (accessed August 16, 2012).

Furthermore, UNDP developed a framework of thinking about measuring capacity. Looking at "activity-output-outcome-impact"[49] one can breakdown components of capacity development and quantitatively or qualitatively measure the results. Ultimately, UNDP offers a framework for measuring change in capacity by capturing it

> at two levels: at one level are capacities that enable an institution to perform effectively and efficiently, repeat good performance over time, and manage change and shocks as they come. Change in capacities at this level is reflected in outcomes. At another level are drivers of capacity, or levers of change: institutional arrangements and incentives; strategic leadership; the knowledge and skills of human resources; and public interface or accountability mechanisms. The results of activities at this level are reflected in outputs.[50]

UNDP asserts that capturing change in capacity must be clear to all those involved in the process. Therefore, vague terminology must be avoided when developing strategy to measure outputs, outcomes, and other indicators of change. Increased resources do not share a direct relationship with positive change in capacity. UNDP states four critical components to their results-based approach to measuring capacity in preparation and during development: "Strategic Planning; Impact; Outcome; Output."[51] Formal institutions define desired impact, outcomes, and outputs through a strategic planning process providing direction, consultation with stakeholders, and environmentally driven approaches rather than resource-contingent results. UNDP defines the critical terms of impact, outcome, and output. "An impact is an actual or intended change in human development as measured by people's well-being. An outcome is an actual or intended change in development conditions that interventions are

[49] Ibid., 1.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Ibid., 3.

seeking to support. An output is a short-term development result…a product and/or service that make achievement of outcomes possible."[52] Additionally, UNDP notes the importance of organizational performance, stability, and adaptability when measuring change in institutional capacity. Performance is described as analysis of effectiveness and efficiency necessary for the institution to fulfill its purpose. "Stability is the degree to which an institution can decrease volatility of performance through institutionalization of good practices and norms and identify and mitigate internal and external risks through risk management."[53] Stability is a key indication of how well an organization can sustain performance by mitigating risk, preventing corruption, and maintaining standards through a challenging environment. "Adaptability is the ability to perform in future conditions and meet future needs."[54] Taken together, understanding stability, adaptability, impact, output, and outcomes within a strategic plan allows the observer to assess the capacity of an organization and develop a roadmap to capacity development. Figure 1 is the UNDP generated illustration of measuring capacity.[55] If greater clarity is desired to understand the UNDP model for measuring capacity, the UNDP *Measuring Capacity* report offers further specificity explaining key terms.

[52] Ibid., 4.
[53] Ibid., 12.
[54] Ibid., 15.
[55] Ibid., 5 and 7.

FIGURE 1 – FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING CAPACITY



Ultimately, UNDP seeks government institutions that are stable, "stronger, better, [and] more resilient"[56] through the process of developing capacity for sustainable transformational change. Figure 1 summarizes the U.N.'s academic discussion for measuring capacity as foundational for building capacity. To plan effectively for capacity development, an interested government must be able to assess a potential partner's current state of institutional capacity and be able to measure change along the way. Therefore, impacts, outcomes, and outputs must be measurable. Though setbacks are likely and expected because of unforeseeable circumstances in a complex and uncertain environment, continuing to adapt and follow strategic direction towards set

[56] Ibid., 3.

goals to produce intended impacts which drive outputs and produce outcomes is the successfully used model offered by UNDP.

In summary, the United Nations Development Programme describes an approach to measuring nation-state institutional capacity. Understanding the UNDP methodology and lexicon informs BPC approach development and assessment of current conditions, changes throughout the BPC process, and may identify areas for significant focus of effort. The institutional system is viewed from a capacity perspective elucidating connections and sub-systems. Key terms to understand are stability, adaptability, performance, input, output, outcome, and impact.

Building Partnership Capacity and Transformational Change

> After more than twenty years of my involvement as a development practitioner, I have learned that real progress is made when countries, institutions, and people learn to cooperate as true partners. This means that they focus on the issue and its solution, rather than being concerned primarily about flag waving or positioning or advancing personal egos.[57]

The lasting effect capacity and capability development may have on national institutions is termed transformational change. Knowledgeable of an institution's fundamental capacity and capable of setting realistic measurable goals to observe and assess the change in capacity, the U.S. government can strategically plan to build partnership capacity for transformational change. The UNDP research and development into transformational change through building capacity provides a shared lexicon and informs a successfully executed method to develop a strategic approach. Understanding the U.S. military definition of BPC is necessary to incorporate an international perspective regarding how BPC may lead to transformational change.

[57] Jordan Ryan, "Speech at the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Center, Qatar" (lecture, UNDP, 2012). http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2012/02/12/jord an-ryan-speech-at-the-rule-of-law-and-anti-corruption-center-qatar.html (accessed September 3, 2012).

> BPC focuses on building or improving a partner country's capabilities through a concerted, whole-of-government approach... Capacity building is officially defined in US Army Field Manual 3-07 as, 'the process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems.' [Moreover it] includes efforts to improve governance capacity, political moderation, and good governance-ethos as well as structure-as part of broader capacity-building activities within a society. Supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks, capacity building is a long-term, continuing process, in which all actors contribute to enhancing the host nation's human, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities.[58]

Therefore, BPC is a process or approach by the entire U.S. government to increase a partner nation's capabilities and the aptitude to sustain those capabilities. UNDP requires the BPC approach be measurable and results driven and offers an illustrative framework described in the previous section for formulation of a BPC strategy. Defining transformational change, UNDP declares:

> Transformational change is the process whereby positive development results are achieved and sustained over time by institutionalizing policies, programmes [sic] and projects within national strategies. It should be noted that this embodies the concept of institutionally sustained results – consistency of achievement over time. This is in order to exclude short-term, transitory impact.[59]

When choosing a partner to embark on a journey for transformational change Dr. Veneri neatly offers two rhyming criteria: will and skill.[60] Does the potential partner nation-state have the will to embark on an enduring partnership and to create transformational change within its institutional systems? *Will* may be viewed as the

[58] Michael C. Veneri, "The partner predicament: US building partner capacity, the War on Terrorism and what the US cannot overlook," *Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy,* vol. 2 (2011): G:7, G:11. http://www.synesisjournal.com/vol2_g/2011_2_G7-17_Veneri.pdf (accessed November 2, 2012).

[59] United Nations Development Programme, *Supporting Transformational Change* (New York: United Nations, 2011), 9. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/case_studies_of_sustainedandsuccessfuldevelopmentcooperation-sup.html (accessed August 16, 2012).

[60] Veneri, "The partner predicament," G:8.

motivation and resolve of leadership, populace, and affected institutions to achieve and sustain transformational change. Does the potential partner nation-state have the skills necessary for capacity development to begin? *Skill* may be viewed as the capability or potential to change. Though simply stated questions, they are wrought with complexity and uncertainty. The U.S. must clearly assess the will and skill of potential partner nations prior to developing a BPC relationship, argues Veneri, otherwise the risk for BPC failure is great. A danger, Veneri warns, is that "capacity building requires a functioning legal framework and economic capacity allowing further utilization and enhancement of the host nation's human, technological, organizational, and institutional resources. By promising, expecting or needing to build governance and economic capacity, the U.S. government in effect, commits more than military capabilities to a partner, yet the U.S. military is expected to provide the majority of the effort and resources to building partnership capacity."[61]

The United Nations Development Programme's study of transformational change culls empirical evidence into common themes in successful nation-state development throughout the past fifty years specifically illustrated through seven country case studies.[62] Through this study, UNDP offers insight into the importance, success, and utility of transformational change through capacity development. While transformational change is not the same as capacity development, they are inextricably linked. "[D]evelopment cooperation -- and international partnerships more generally -- play a

[61] Ibid., G:10.

[62] In *Supporting Transformational Change,* the UNDP provides seven unique case studies to support empirically the transformational change model and recommendations through lessons observed. The countries cited are (in order of discussion) Mongolia, Ethiopia, Bulgaria, Romania (the Black Sea and Danube Basin), Bangladesh, El Salvador, and Cambodia.

crucial and positive role in supporting national leadership and capacity development, and thus promoting such transformational change."[63]

Transformational change is not only theory. Practical application of building partnership capacity for transformational change is evident in U.S. initiatives throughout the world. Two traditional historical examples of partner nation-states with dissimilar cultures and histories are Japan and South Korea. With U.S. support, post-World War II Japanese reconstruction developed Japan into a U.S. allied, thriving regional and global power. South Korea is a modern economic power after decades of allied support. A more modern example, Indonesia's internal security and economic development promoting a rise of the world's largest Islamic populated democracy is part of a whole-of-government and private sector unity of effort.[64] Other examples exist of less obvious but ongoing partnerships in culturally dissimilar nation-states providing regional stability and development like Egypt, Turkey, and Colombia.

Moreover, nine common themes result from the UNDP's review of seven nation-state development case studies. The common themes are: 1) centrality of national ownership; 2) developing national capacity; 3) individuals and leadership matter; 4) importance of strategic analysis (understanding the environment, constraints, and opportunities); 5) the value of tactical response; 6) consistent, sustained and flexible support (beware of a good plan with rigid implementation); 7) success breeds success (capitalize on the synergistic effects of success between programs); 8) external force majeure (crises can be an impediment or an opportunity); and, 9) post-conflict time-frame

[63] UNDP, *Supporting Transformational Change*, 89.

[64] Interviewee name withheld by mutual agreement. U.S. State Department Security Officer interview by author, Norfolk, VA, October 1, 2012.

(extend the timetable outlook if developing in a post-conflict society).[65] Grouping the themes into three levels, UNDP postulates the success of transformational change is based, in large part, on 1) Back to Basics, 2) Principled Opportunism, and 3) The Larger Context.[66] In other words, following fundamental principles of development cooperation, supporting change within a value-driven U.N. normative framework, and recognition and flexibility within the strategic environment, capture the themes.[67]

UNDP recognizes the value of international partnerships but warns the reader of limited international impact. If transformational change is "to be sustainable and sustained, it must be nationally owned and achieved."[68] External actors can promote and assist in transformational change, but sustainment purely rests with the developing nation-state. Ten to twenty years are identified as the approximate timeframe for successful transformational change as "…development is a long-term proposition and is seldom amenable to short-term solutions."[69] Recognizing limitations and risk associated with development programs, UNDP states they are not always successful. Even when programs are successful, "there is always unfinished business and uncertainties to be addressed. Development is a work in progress, in every part of the world. Development management involves taking risk, seeking to ensure successful outcomes, but acknowledging that there will be disappointments…"[70]

Overall, UNDP provides a framework for creating and sustaining successful transformational development programs based on empirical historical evidence. While

[65] UNDP, *Supporting Transformational Change*, 90-96.
[66] Ibid., 7.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid., 6.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.

the study recognizes limitations in development and risks associated with development, it overwhelmingly presents the successes that can come from long-term, properly executed investments in nation-state partnership development for transformational change. Change, however, must first and foremost be pursued by the nation-state (requiring internal will and skill). Change often finds favor in the general populace when the institution receiving capacity development is part of a legitimate sovereign national government. Mr. Jordan Ryan, Assistant Administrator of the UNDP states, "[g]overnment staff and community leaders need the education, strategic support, and guidance to enable them to function effectively."[71] Will, skill, and capable leadership are, therefore, necessary for transformational change.

Exploring the core common elements of BPC, Jason Terry offers six criteria to consider when determining nations in which to build capacity and ten considerations of successful BPC. The six common criteria for successful BPC are: 1) BPC is within U.S. national interests; 2) BPC is within the partner nation's national interests; 3) The U.S. understands the regional effects of BPC; 4) The U.S. understands long-term effects BPC has on U.S. interests; 5) The capacity for the partner nation to attain is reasonable; and 6) The capacity is integrated into the Theatre and Country campaign plans.[72] These criteria inform the development of policy and advise the policy-makers and action officers responsible for assessing and choosing potential partner nation-states for BPC initiatives.

Terry continues to elaborate on the decision making process by offering ten common key considerations in successful BPC. They are: 1) BPC starts and ends with

[71] Ryan, "Speech at the Rule of Law Center."

[72] Jason B. Terry, "Principles of Building Partnership Capacity" (master's thesis, Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010): 53-59. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA 524101 (accessed November 1, 2012).

diplomats; 2) Partner nation ownership of capacity; 3) Understanding historical and cultural context; 4) Unity of effort; 5) Understand and articulate the big picture; 6) Legitimacy; 7) Regional engagement; 8) Measurements of progress; 9) Engage at multiple levels; and 10) Seek multiple sources of sound multi-year funding.[73] Terry's key considerations when developing BPC strategy are designed to yield successful results. Taken together, the assessment of potential partnerships and the considerations in BPC strategy development seek to inform the policy-maker and strategist. Ultimately, the UNDP approach for transformational change and Terry's framework for thinking about potential partnerships and BPC approach development provide academic background based on experience, empirical evidence, and historical review.

Summary

The literature review informs the reader about U.S. and generally Western perspectives on military professionalism, enduring values, U.S. military exchange programs, and the United Nations Development Programme's approach to capacity measurement and transformational change through building partnership capacity. Understanding professionalism and the substantive meaning of a professional military forms a foundational construct for U.S. military BPC. The Western perspective of values, their history, development, and elements are central to preparing BPC approaches and relating to non-Western institutions. BPC approaches should consider foreign value systems, their history, development, culture, and will to adapt or accept Western values. Military exchange programs do not exist individually but as part of a holistic approach to foreign interaction. BPC is an integral part of the holistic military exchange program. Transformational change is the lasting effect the U.S. seeks through military exchange to

[73] Ibid., 60-67.

develop military capacity and capability with partner nation-states in pursuit of U.S. national interests. Understanding the UNDP perspective of transformational change is critical in BPC approach development and recognizing the complexity and uncertainty that may exist throughout the long-term BPC effort.

Building partnership capacity is not a new concept for the U.S., but it has received increased attention in recent years. Future emphasis on BPC initiatives in a resource constrained and responsible spending environment will likely require innovative approaches and judicious decision-making for selecting partners. The following chapter will analyze the literature to evaluate and synthesize the research into practical ideas for ongoing and future building partnership capacity initiatives.

CHAPTER 3

Analysis

Introduction

This chapter will examine the salient themes from the literature reviewed and discuss the implications of those themes relevant to promoting U.S. military exchange as a responsible financial decision for building partnership capacity (BPC) in a fiscally constrained environment. Analysis results may be useful to better inform choices by U.S. policy-makers and strategists when deciding if BPC is an appropriate approach, choosing partners, and developing unique BPC strategies for transformational change in support of U.S. interests. Ultimately, this chapter seeks to illustrate *why* the literature reviewed matters and *how* it is relevant.

Military Professionalism

The U.S. military focuses on building professional militaries in partner nations as the central component of BPC. In partnerships like Thailand, Philippines, and Colombia the U.S. has fostered lasting relationships that continue to contribute to regional and international security. Furthermore, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines could not have succeeded with only weapons systems or financial support without an enduring military partnership.[1] Central and foundational to the U.S. military's development as a professional institution and its ability to foster other nation-state militaries development as professional institutions is an understanding of military professionalism. Other military exchange programs, while important to sustained partnerships, are subject to

[1] Randall M. Walsh, "Security Cooperation: A New Functional Command," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 64 (1st Quarter 2012): 52-59. http://www.ndu.edu/press/security-cooperation.html (accessed October 15, 2012).

sustainable, sustained, and suitable military professionalism. Without military professionalism, weapons sales, education and training programs, monetary investments, and other U.S. government Foreign Military Training (FMT) programs are at greater risk of limited or negative outcomes. Positive outcomes are mainly affected by internal institutions, dynamics, circumstances, and leadership.[2] Therefore, Military professionalism (in U.S. and partner forces) is fundamental to security cooperation and BPC success.[3] Moreover, military professionalism sets a solid foundation for future military relations and military sustainability and adaptability in a possible future of local or regional conflict. Military professionalism provides a core capacity for trust and compatible long-term relationships, but does not occur in a vacuum from the other available FMT programs. Therefore, it is a balanced concert of effort necessary for successful partnerships centered on BPC that best limits risk and increases the likelihood of success.

Military professionalism is vital to the art of war by preventing over-reaction. Upholding organizational values like accountability, discipline, selfless service, and promoting professional behavior through positive and negative reinforcement, military professionalism constrains the warrior to an enduring code of conduct. This code of conduct helps define the organizational culture of the profession of arms responsible for waging war. War is the art and science of ensuring national security through legally sanctioned and organized violence or the threat of violence. This author's definition of

[2] United Nations Development Programme, *Measuring Capacity* (New York: UNDP, 2010), 1-6 and 12-15. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/capacity-building/undp-paper-on-measuring-capacity.html (accessed August 16, 2012).

[3] Aurel Croissant, "Civilian Control over the Military in East Asia," *East Asia Institute* (September 2011): 1-8. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=137615 (accessed August 16, 2012).

military professionalism and war captures the institutional legitimacy through organization, control, and legality provided by the sovereign society the military institution is formed to protect. War is a science because it is planned and executed based on natural laws. From logistics to technological employment, war can be partially quantified and calculated. The part of war that is unquantifiable is the art. War is an art because there are elements of creativity needed in which experience, insight, and intellect inform innovative thought and action. Proven military methods often require unique and sometimes innovative application based on circumstances. A professional military institution must understand both the art and science of war. Finally, violence is the inescapable method which is a defining feature of a professional military's raison d'être. However, modern history (vis-à-vis the Cold War) illustrates that the threat of violence can have a similar if not greater affect in certain circumstances depending on the strategic environment. The existence of a professional military and the threat of violence it portends can sometimes be sufficient to enable a state to achieve its defined national security ends without violence.

As previously stated, the core function of any military, as defined, is to ensure national security through violence; in other words, to fight and win a nation's wars. Additional features of a professional military are: the ability to deter wars through innovative partnerships, alliances, and institutional relationships; to win wars through effective and efficient resource-use; to serve legitimate civilian governmental leadership; and, to manage autonomously its own affairs with transparent institutionalized civilian leadership oversight and intervention. Though not necessarily a stated core function of a national armed force, the ability to work with other national military forces or

government agencies is necessary for the establishment of partnerships, alliances, and BPC. The success and sustainability of these partnerships, alliances, and BPC efforts hinge on the ability for military professionals to effectively execute roles as foreign servicemen. Therefore, an objective of developing professional militaries, or a component of assessed professional militaries, is the ability for the military institution to work successfully with foreign militaries for mutual benefits -- partnerships.

While academic discourse regarding the professionalism of individual service members continues, the literature by-in-large concedes that democratic governments' standing military institutions are professions. Developing and maintaining its unique standards, enforcing its societal norms through education, training, and discipline, and developing its professionals to gain in responsibility and autonomy while ever accountable to civilian political leadership's oversight, the U.S. military is a professional institution. "It is a basic premise of civilized societies, especially democratic ones, that the military serves the state (and by extension, the people), not the other way around. The profession of arms exists to serve the larger community, to help accomplish its purposes and objectives, and to protect its way of life."[4] Therefore, if the fundamental elements of a professional military are clearly understood and can be translated through education, then development of professional military capacity is possible. If, however, "the military professional is defined…as the career officer who devotes himself to the expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (sic) of the profession of arms,"[5] how then does the U.S. define and teach expertise, responsibility, and corporateness to develop

[4] U.S. Department of Defense, *The Armed Forces Officer: 2007 Edition* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2007), 11.

[5] Donald Bletz, *The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1972), 6.

individual military professionals? This question is beyond the scope of this paper, but offers a topic for further research about individual leadership development through BPC.

Military professionalism is a sub-domain of society's view of professionalism. Therefore, a society with which the U.S. seeks to partner must have established professional norms in which a developing professional institution can exist and thrive. Engagement with nation-states lacking professional norms is less of a partnership and more of a nation building effort. Without societal acceptance of professional norms, a professional military cannot exist and BPC will likely be a short-term success with eventual failure or a resource pit without measurable gains. Therefore, the potential partner assessment requires a socio-cultural aspect in addition to politico-military. The U.S. military offering an assessment of a potential partner's military alone may not satisfy the need to reach further into the societal norms assessing the feasibility, acceptability, and sustainability of professional military capacity development. Bond, for example, recognizes the conundrum of national power interdependencies noting, "[t]he fact is that it is virtually impossible to clearly identify a purely political or purely military environment…In its relations with the other members of the international community the nation does not, for practical purposes, have political or military problems—it has politico-military problems."[6] Additionally, resources, closely linked to economic capacity, are unquestionably necessary to developing and maintaining a functional established military force. Therefore, in summary, social, cultural, political, military, and economic factors are elemental to military professional BPC planning and execution.

Recognizing the interdependencies and connections between social, cultural, political, military, and economic societal factors allows for a holistic view in planning

[6] Ibid., 76.

and executing BPC. A challenge, therefore, is to ensure the whole-of-government perspective is available, though the U.S. Defense Department has the responsibility in planning and executing BPC. Without the whole-of-government perspective, the aforementioned factors may not be properly or fully recognized or counted. Consequently, the development of military professionalism through BPC cannot be solely planned and executed by the U.S. military. Understanding military professionalism and the nuances between and dependent upon societal factors becomes the responsibility of those who engage in security cooperation and BPC. Successful BPC then, in part, relies on actors who understand military professionalism, its interconnectedness between societal factors, and how to convey the sub-domain of professionalism through ideas, organization, and actions – a significant challenge to undertake as part of a partnership selection process and strategy.

Pivotal to the BPC approach is recognizing and developing the relationship between professional practitioners and the society in which they serve. Bond posits essential mechanisms for developing and maintaining professions within a society: establish entry-level requirements; establish sustainment requirements; establish controls over the application of knowledge (like laws, ethics, attributes and values); create rewards and prestige systems to recognize outstanding service and advance the art and science of the profession; and, create systems of censure and disrepute.[7] Bond further explains these mechanisms describing their "three main purposes: establish and sustain a contract between the [profession] and society; advocate for the profession on behalf of their member practitioners; [and], manage in autonomous fashion those controls that

[7] Thomas P. Galvin, "A New Way of Understanding (Military) Professionalism," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 62 (3rd Quarter 2011): 29.

societies have yielded."[8] Understanding the mechanisms and purposes of professional institutions and recognizing the interconnectedness of societal factors, a BPC approach may be fully informed of the military professionalism aspect.

Sustainability and adaptability through professional development can provide an enduring return on investment from BPC. The U.S. professional military did not always have an evolved political understanding or relationship. Years of development brought politico-military integration, increased knowledge, and improved processes and understanding. An outcome of BPC is to develop the capacity of the professional military, to assist its sustainable integration into the partner society, and strengthen its legitimacy across all societal factors while maintaining its unquestionable civilian control. With an evolved professional military, further BPC becomes feasible. Resources like combat systems equipment, money, education and training do not necessarily translate into military professionalism. Military professionalism enables BPC efforts, makes positive outcomes sustainable and makes an organization adaptable to change – ultimately in support of U.S. national strategic interests.

Enduring Values

> We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity…[9]

Found in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and Constitution and evolved over time through circumstance and discussion, U.S. enduring values represent ideas and beliefs that shape the vision of the U.S. and what it means to be a citizen. Furthermore, some U.S. enduring values are, in Western thought and experience, unalienable rights for

[8] Ibid.
[9] Preamble to the United States Constitution.

all mankind. U.S. foreign diplomacy shares the message of human unalienable rights based on these enduring values. Additionally, enduring values are closely tied to and help define U.S. enduring national interests. Therefore, intentionally sharing U.S. enduring values through international influence supports U.S. national interests abroad.

Moreover, when building partner capacity, an analysis should be made to invest in nation-states that share or are willing to develop similar Western enduring values. If the potential partner shares similar values with the U.S., is it willing to sustain or enhance those values as part of the partnership? If the potential partner does not share similar values with the U.S., does the political and public will support change? If the political and public will supports change, can the culture sustain the Western values shared by the U.S.? Critical to partnership is trust and understanding. Without shared enduring values, the partnership may be forced resulting in limited results and potential long-term failure. For a short-term objective, a coalition of the willing with dissimilar values may be affective, but long-term transformational change may be elusive such as the U.S. experienced after the Vietnam conflict.

Critical U.S. enduring values are: an individual's freedom to speak their mind, assemble without fear, worship as they please, and choose their own leaders; they also include dignity, tolerance, and equality among all people, and the fair and equitable administration of justice.[10] The U.S. seeks to universally promote these values as a critical component of promoting national interests through enduring partnerships. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) clearly states the U.S. intention to promote its enduring values internationally. The NSS recognizes that nation-states who share these values are typically more successful. However, development for many nation-states is

[10] U.S. President, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), 35.

nascent and cultures sometimes interpret and enact Western values in different ways than the U.S. Prior to establishing partnerships, the U.S. should recognize the sometimes subtle but always significant socio-cultural and political differences when interpreting Western values.

Furthermore, the cultural schism that may exist between the U.S. and partner cultures can be a significant impediment to BPC. National institutions and their prevailing and sub-national cultures may not have the will or skill to develop the capacity sought through partnership. Some sub-cultural activists may actively seek to destroy the potential for successful relations. A clear assessment of the socio-cultural impact of BPC with a potential partner is recommended prior to allotting resources for it. Simply stated, because of cultural impediments, BPC outcomes may not be achievable because of perceived or actual value divisions.

For example, time will tell if Afghanistan is capable of sustaining the development provided by the U.S. following Operation Enduring Freedom in spite of cultural impediments. Following World War II's U.S. victory against Japan, the Japanese culture provided opportunity for change through internal leadership and need for recovery. Ultimately, with Allied assistance, Japan developed a democratic government, integrating into and becoming a leader in the international economic system, and espousing aforementioned Western values.[11] Indonesia provides an example of a developing nation-state that espouses democratic political values but is challenged with human rights violations. Building partnership capacity efforts in Indonesia require

[11] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2011), 311.

lasting efforts [by both Indonesia and the U.S.] to espouse universal Western values mentioned in the NSS for enduring partnership success.[12]

A potentially more costly investment, the U.S. may choose nation-states in which to develop the will and skill for long-term change. As an example, U.S. development of capacity in Afghanistan requires in part development of national infrastructure, alteration of the social, cultural, and political context to support institutional transformational change, and an attempt to espouse and sustain certain Western values. Ultimately, a cultural or ideological gap can become a source of friction causing BPC failure or limited success. Therefore this gap must be properly assessed prior to U.S. BPC investment. In the end, the U.S. does not quibble over its clear message: sharing U.S. enduring values will be part of any agreement within a capacity building partnership. Though priorities may shift based on circumstance, BPC partnerships with the U.S. will include discussion of enduring Western values.

Military Exchange

> At its core, strategy should provide a guide for using available resources to achieve realistic objectives. Because the resources available to the U.S. military will be increasingly limited, the objectives must be, too - lest the result be a hollow strategy that neither worries enemies nor assures friends.[13]

Chapter II presented some current forms of military exchange reported to the U.S. Congress. Building Partnership Capacity is only one form of military exchange led by

[12] Leonard C. Sebastian and Iisgindarash, "Assessing 12-year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform" (master's thesis, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 2011). http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP227.pdf (accessed September 2012). Also derived from a discussion with Mr. Ryan Hawkins, U.S. State Department Security Officer, Assistant Regional Security Officer, Jakarta, Indonesia, 2010-2012.

[13] Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "Strategy in a Time of Austerity: Why the Pentagon Should Focus on Assuring Access." *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2012): 63. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138362/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/strategy-in-a-time-of-austerity (accessed November 14, 2012).

the DOD. In concert with the other programs, the U.S. government purports collective effectiveness.[14]

Furthermore, while international partnerships are differently shaped through interests and context, focusing U.S. efforts in BPC and prioritizing BPC as it is integrated into other foreign military training and military exchange programs may in-fact provide the greatest long-term return on investment for the lowest overall cost. The scope of this research does not significantly delve into the other U.S. foreign military training programs, but focuses the importance for continued funding on BPC of military professionalism through military exchange.

BPC does not occur in a vacuum but is a critical element to successful long-term relationships established through the use of other Foreign Military Training (FMT) approaches. Combat systems and weapons sales to partner nation-states may serve laconic economic and security interests, but long-term relationships are founded upon and rooted in partnerships that develop over time through shared values, experiences, and understanding. For example, the U.S. relationship with Japan developed over decades of shared economic, diplomatic, and security partnerships. Though Japan's partnership with the U.S. started as a result of significant crisis in 1945, the partnership development took decades to solidify, resulting in shared successes and an influential mutual enduring alliance.

BPC can be viewed as an evolutionary component to increased financial prosperity throughout the world. Sharing security responsibilities becomes a rational step for prospering nation-states desiring increased security capacity supporting increased

[14] The effectiveness is gathered as empirical data from the amount of funding and ongoing support demonstrated in the programs presented to the U.S. Congress as the Foreign Military Training status report.

prosperity potential. Seeking alternatives to war, Quincy Wright notes liberalism's potential effects. Partnership and greater international communication may provide "…diplomatic efforts to relax international tensions and educational efforts to increase attitudes favorable to internationalism, to broaden the concept of national interest, and to develop greater realization in world public opinion and the policy-making agencies of governments of the necessity for peace and international cooperation."[15] Empirical evidence of BPC success provided by the UNDP (further discussed in the supporting transformational change section of this chapter) offers a glimpse into a world order possible through long-term unobstructed efforts that remain dedicated and flexible.

Ultimately, military exchange programs are relevant and effective in promoting partnerships. Japan, South Korea, Turkey and other countries throughout the world offer examples of successful long-term partnerships in historically culturally dissimilar nations. However, partnerships are rooted through sustained and sustainable relationships built upon trust and shared values. Continued development of partnerships promotes shared values, common understanding, and furthers relationships and communication that can prevent or mitigate conflicts by providing adequate methods to ameliorate friction, misunderstanding, or perceived aggression. "Peace, consequently, has to do not with the elimination of oppositions but with the adequate methods of adjusting them."[16]

Measuring Capacity

Noted in Chapter 2, capacity measuring relies on keen understanding of four components: *strategic approach, inputs, outputs, and outcomes*. Further analysis of these pivotal terms provides better understanding of their importance to the BPC process. The

[15] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War: Midway Reprint* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 348.

[16] Ibid., 353.

strategic approach is built upon an assessment of the environment and the issue or problem set that exists in relation to U.S. national interests. Inputs are the resources available to develop capacity. Resources can come from any source -- external or internal, public or private -- but without them, development may be significantly limited and outcomes will be limited or unachievable. Outputs are products developed to produce outcomes. Tangible and calculable, an example of professional military development outputs from military BPC could be the number of troops educated in morality in combat. Outcomes are the ultimate goals of measureable inputs and outputs designed through the strategic approach. "[Outcomes] are best defined as 'the effect of outputs' on participant countries… [s]uccess can only be determined through the examination of outcomes."[17] Outcomes, therefore, may be viewed as strategic ends and the *building blocks* of transformational change.

Moreover, "…*capacity development is a long-term process* (italics mine) and is one of many factors contributing to the achievement of development goals…"[18] Short-sighted involvement in BPC may lead to limited or negative results. BPC initiatives during peacetime should have a planning horizon of 10-20 years or longer if the BPC engagement occurs during or immediately following armed conflict.[19] Policymakers should understand the time commitment required for perceptible and measurable results.

Deeper understanding of the UNDP measuring capacity model may enable DOD to increase efficiency in current and future BPC initiatives. Ongoing International

[17] Brian M. Burton, "The Peril and Promise of the Indirect Approach," *PRISM* 3, no. 1 (December 2011): 48.

[18] UNDP, *Measuring Capacity*, 2.

[19] United Nations Development Programme, *Supporting Transformational Change* (New York: United Nations, 2011), 6. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/case_studies_of_sustainedandsuccessfuldevelopmentcooperation-sup.html (accessed August 16, 2012).

Security Assistance Force security and development in Afghanistan provides a contemporary example of measuring capacity's necessity in the BPC approach. Ultimately, a goal for the U.S. DOD partnering for capacity development should be recognition of transformational change through influenced outcomes as a desired end-state. Knowing the current state of capacity and having the capability to measure that capacity to identify positive or negative trends allows for adjustments in the approach to BPC further enhancing efficiency and effectiveness. These tactical level adjustments provide the adaptability necessary to sustain a transformational change approach, capitalizing on circumstantial opportunities and mitigating circumstantial obstacles. For example, recognizing that "…competent and legitimate national institutions…capable of delivering justice and security -- without discrimination -- are the critical foundations for the rule of law, peace, and stability,"[20] provides a starting point for developing a more efficient BPC approach or informs partner selection prior to a BPC initiative. Selecting an informed approach using the UNDP model to assess potential partner capacity, evaluating the gaps, opportunities, and risks associated with getting to a desired end-state, and plotting a sustainable and adaptable course leads to BPC and transformational change.

Building Partnership Capacity and Transformational Change

> Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and stability…for the benefit of all. Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, *trust and cooperation cannot be surged* [sic]. They must be built over time so that the strategic interests

[20] Jordan Ryan, "Speech at the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Center, Qatar" (lecture, UNDP, 2012). http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2012/02/12/jord an-ryan-speech-at-the-rule-of-law-and-anti-corruption-center-qatar.html (accessed September 3, 2012).

> of the participants are continuously considered while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.[21]

BPC will likely remain a central component of the U.S. international security approach indicated by national strategy documents and leadership rhetoric. Understanding the UNDP model for measuring capacity and the empirical evidence provided by UNDP of BPC's ability to effect transformational change over time, a functional model for thinking about engagement in BPC is offered in this section. The model attempts to synthesize research and provide a framework for thinking about potential partner selection within a BPC initiative by grouping certain factors presented and analyzed. Defining the components of the model is necessary to understanding its construction and relevance.

Foundational to BPC engagement for military professionalism development are *U.S. national interests.* Without U.S. national interests rooted as the foundation for BPC, political and public will may, over time, wane; sincerity and legitimacy may be questioned and BPC results may be limited or negative.

Will and *Skill* must exist within the partner or the U.S. may squander resources with little hope for return on investment. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Will is defined as the partner nation-state's want for capacity development. The will may be viewed by different actors internal to the partner. Political will, public will, institutional will, and personal will like that of individual leaders who are potentially influential in transformational change, must be known and clearly understood. Without the will of the partner, or if internal wills conflict, BPC may have limited or negative results. Not to be misunderstood, the skill mentioned here is not part of the development approach as

[21] U.S. Department of Defense, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power* (Washington, DC: Departments of the Navy and Coast Guard, 2007), 7.

described in Chapter 2. Partner nation skill is the innate ability to receive assistance and sustain capacity development for sustainable transformational change. For example, if the culture will not recognize women as an asset outside of procreation or servitude, if ethnic strife prevents promotion of human rights and values, if development is hindered by consistent infighting among national leaders or immutable corruption, then the potential partner nation-state may not be primed or ready for development and BPC may have limited or negative results.

Strategic approach, *inputs*, *outputs*, and *outcomes* as described by the UNDP model for measuring capacity must be understood prior to U.S. engagement in BPC. The approach must be suitable, acceptable, feasible, and enduring to meet BPC long-term objectives. Suitability is measured by the approach meeting the problem set from the U.S. policy perspective. The approach must properly *fit* the requirements of actors involved in the transformational change process to develop expected adequate outcomes -- especially for the internal institutions within the partner nation-state. Acceptability relies on public and political will to engage in the BPC effort -- reasonable and satisfactory for all parties involved. Feasibility addresses whether or not the approach is possible with the resources available -- practical and able to be accomplished. Enduring assesses whether or not the U.S. is capable of investing in a long-term BPC initiative; endurance is similar to sustainability as defined by the UNDP. Additionally, the approach must be adaptable so it can flex to changing circumstances. The art and science that goes into producing outcomes is, indeed, the strategic approach. Therefore, upon execution, the components provided by UNDP are cyclical while continually interacting with a dynamic environment. The components require continuous reassessment and

flexible tactical level decision making in response to complex and uncertain environmental dynamism.

Figure 2 depicts a framework for thinking about BPC partner selection and process implementation. Foundational to BPC are national interests driving allocation of resources to BPC efforts. Understanding the national interests involved with the potential or ongoing partnership, partner will and skill must be assessed. If partner will or skill does not support capacity building, a decision point exists. Can the U.S. develop will or skill to get the partner nation-state to the point where BPC can be a valuable long-term investment? Enabling the how U.S. national interests and partner will and skill combine to support BPC are guidelines for selection. When the foundation provides a strong understanding of why the U.S. is interested in BPC with a select nation-state and how well the select nation-state may receive capacity building, then the cyclical process of developing the BPC approach may begin. Mirroring lessons observed from the UNDP capacity building methodology, the BPC approach team will develop strategy, identify inputs, outputs, and outcomes, and assess the overall approach. This process is continuous throughout the BPC relationship because of environmental dynamics, complexity, and uncertainty driving the need for continual refinement of the approach.

FIGURE 2 – BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY MODEL[22]



Furthermore, the U.S. political system challenges enduring approaches because the U.S. constitutionally mandated election processes causes potential for periodic legislative, policy, and strategy alterations. The U.S. political environment provides a significant dynamic that may help or hinder partnership initiatives, and must be counted as part of the complex and uncertain environment. Policy makers should engage in significant discussion regarding the impact on national interests, priority, and

[22] The author offers this model as a framework for thinking about building partnership capacity. The framework is a guide to assessing long-term relationship potential with a possible or existing partner and a method to develop a functional and dynamic BPC approach.

sustainability of BPC partnerships to enhance the probability of successful long-term investments. Internal policy leadership and management supporting BPC initiatives can be as or more important than external policy circumstances.

Moreover, external management of partnerships is wrought with complexity and uncertainty. Beyond potential significant environment effects, three problems can occur in partner relationships. "First, the partners' goals can conflict; [s]econd, the partners may have different risk tolerances and may prefer different tactics because of those tolerances; [and] third, within principal-agent relationships [there is inherent] difficulty [for the principal to verify] what the agent is actually doing."[23] These problems typically occur after the partnership is established and the BPC initiative is progressing. Managing these problems through adaptable programs and astute tactical decision making allows BPC to progress, but unchecked these problems may significantly limit or deter positive BPC results. Additionally, these problems require more than the U.S. DOD approach alone. U.S. whole-of-government resources are required to solve complex government level nation-state challenges to developing capacity placing greater stress on U.S. internal policy dynamics.

At his speech addressing developing capacity to further rule of law, Mr. Jordan Ryan, UNDP Assistant Administrator, emphasizes the whole-of-government effort required for successful BPC. "It is not simply a question of equipping governments to write better laws," he states, "but [the U.N.] needs to support a whole range of institutions and groups – from Ministries, through to the lawyers, judges, prosecutors,

[23] Michael C. Veneri, "The partner predicament: US building partner capacity, the War on Terrorism and what the US cannot overlook," *Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy,* vol. 2 (2011): G:11. http://www.synesisjournal.com/vol2_g/2011_2_G7-17_Veneri.pdf (accessed November 2, 2012).

police, corrective services, human rights institutions, non-governmental organizations and community groups – so that they provide public services *competently*, *equitably*, and *legitimately* (italics mine)."[24] This holistic view of effects required for successful institutional transformational change recognizes that limiting the perspective of BPC to military-only outcomes limits the potential for success and increases risk in supporting transformational change partnership approaches.

The choice to engage in BPC should recognize that its success relies on the efficacy of transformation change. Indeed, the end-state when talking about building partnership capacity is not the developed capacity of a professional military through equipment or knowledge, but an institution transformed into a resilient, sustainable, adaptable, stable, professional organization that better serves its people and its function. The U.S. military has not achieved an apex of development, but is recognizable as the largest, most advanced, and most capable military force, available with the resources to partner with and develop capacities of foreign militaries. Furthermore, transformational change in nation-states willing and able (*will* and *skill*) to partner with the U.S. can lead to increased local, regional, and international stability, increased international order, improved human rights, and increased U.S. influence throughout the world.

Transformational change through BPC cannot be completely controlled. Though the overall environment may support transformational change through collaborative and contributing nation-states, resource availability, proactive leadership, and successful processes, minor or major changes or crises can occur without expectation or forecast. These detrimental circumstances may derail the transformation change process. Adaptable teams capable of making changes to the approach on a tactical level can

[24] Ryan, "Speech."

sustain the transformational process, but not without hindrances, obstacles, or even losses; this is a challenging component of long-term partnerships for capacity development requiring fortitude. Therefore, understood as part of the process, crises or set-backs must be managed closely by engaged leadership to mitigate losses and seek opportunities for gain. Egypt provides a contemporary example of a nation in transition from dictatorship to democracy. Former military officers in Egypt are entrenched in social and political national and local leadership positions bringing their education, experience, and professionalism into their citizen roles.[25] In the end, "national ownership of the development process" is vital to its success.[26] UNDP offered a telling analogy for external nation-states seeking to support other nation-states through capacity development for transformational change: External partners can place a string upon a table, but it takes the recipient nation to *pull* the string toward itself -- the string cannot be pushed.[27]

U.S. government recognition that BPC "may entail the creation of brand new institutions -- laws, policies, programmes [sic] and organizations -- and/or the adaptation of existing ones"[28] is critical to acknowledging the amount of time and effort potentially required. Regardless of requirements, change is the consistent component in BPC; change "in policies, processes, behaviours [sic] and expectations."[29] Leadership and management of change are central to any BPC endeavor. UNDP presents three levels of

[25] Yezid Sayigh, "Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt," *The Carnegie Papers* (August 2012): 6-14. http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/01/above-state-officers-republic-in-egypt/d4l2 (accessed October 2012).

[26] United Nations Development Programme, *Supporting Transformational Change* (New York: United Nations, 2011), 12. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/case_studies_of_sustainedandsuccessfuldevelopmentcooperation-sup.html (accessed August 16, 2012).

[27] Ibid., 16.

[28] Ibid., 14.

[29] Ibid.

capacity that must be tackled for successful BPC: 1) External enabling environment -- policies, legislation, budgets, power relations, and social norms; 2) Internal organizational [sic] issues -- financial and human resources, internal policies, arrangements, procedures, and consistency of application; 3) Individual staff capabilities -- leadership, knowledge and skills, experience, attitudes and practices.[30] By synthesizing the UNDP levels of capacity and the subcomponents, U.S. BPC may better achieve transformational change through military exchange. Any Foreign Military Training, weapons sales, international military education and training, resource funding, and others, taken in isolation will, therefore, likely be less effective than a more holistic approach.

Collectively the literature analysis supports building partner capacity as a valid method for increasing U.S. security and furthering national interests. UNDP specifically identifies a complex system through empirical study supporting a mental framework for thinking about capacity development. Partnerships are formed for mutual benefit of nation-states. Long-term security relationships should be strategically essential to the U.S. This chapter provides a more holistic method of assessing current or potential BPC partnerships and recognizing the potential beneficial role the UNDP approach can serve in U.S. BPC development.

Summary

This chapter supports military exchange through building partnership capacity as a valid method for increasing U.S. security and furthering U.S. national interests. The analysis' intent is to show why military professionalism, enduring values, military exchange, measuring capacity, and building partner capacity for transformational change

[30] Ibid., 15.

are relevant by explaining how each of these components is important to BPC. Through policy, legislation, speeches, and strategy, the U.S. clearly communicates a future in which partnerships will be central to promoting security and other national interests. Enduring and strategically vital partners like Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Colombia, and Turkey with dissimilar histories, cultures, and social structures exist throughout the world. "A critical consideration for the U.S. is the need to determine what makes a reliable [long-term] partner."[31] Therefore, deepening the understanding of military exchange is fundamental to the U.S. achieving its security aims.

Through empirical study, the UNDP supports a way of thinking about capacity development. Partnerships are formed for mutual benefit of nation-states and capacity development is critical to long-term security relationships in areas assessed by the U.S. government as strategically essential.

Ultimately, this chapter seeks to deliver a framework for assessing current or creating future BPC approaches. Also, the chapter seeks to recognize the potential beneficial role the UNDP approach can serve in U.S. BPC development and deepen the understanding of military exchange through BPC. This author advocates for the BPC decision process amalgamation with the UNDP model for measuring capacity. With the empirical data studied to highlight transformational change in seven nation-state case studies and a deeper understanding of military professionalism, ongoing and future BPC approaches may be better tailored in a U.S. whole-of-government initiative. Ultimately the future of BPC relies on continued resourcing to support it. "In a world where weak states and transnational actors pose a threat to U.S. interests and several regional powers are emerging as competitors, DOD's global [security cooperation] mission, if properly

[31] Veneri, "The partner predicament," G:7.

integrated into broader U.S. Government efforts, is a wise strategic endeavor that is generally cost-effective."[32] Empirical evidence of BPC success with measurable and explainable results to U.S. legislators and policy-makers may bolster and further the dialogue necessary to gain and sustain political will and resource allocation.

[32] Gene Germanovic, "Security Force Assistance in a Time of Austerity," *Joint Force Quarterly,* no. 67 (4th Quarter 2012): 19.

CHAPTER 4

Recommendations

Recommendations for BPC approaches

Building partnership capacity (BPC) supports transformational change to develop the capacity of partner nation-states to enable and enhance security, relationships, and stability. Described by U.S. policy-makers as critical to U.S. national interests, the U.S. government should clearly define whether BPC is a national security need or want. If BPC is defined as a need, then resource efficiency becomes secondary to BPC effectiveness because the U.S. government needs to achieve success to support national interests. If defined as a want, then BPC may be prioritized with other national security approaches because resource efficiency is either equal to or greater in priority than BPC effectiveness. In a fiscally constrained environment where responsible financial policy and spending is integral to policy decisions, resource efficiency is a likely topic of discussion for current and future BPC approaches. Prioritizing BPC as a national security want does not mean resource efficiency is a lesser priority, but innovative approaches to, and thorough assessments of BPC are increasingly more important. Innovative partnerships, resource sharing, proper environmental and potential partner assessment, and national interests all factor into future BPC efforts.

Furthermore, BPC partner selection must be strategically targeted. National interests must inform partner prioritization and the type of capacity that will be developed. Additionally, in future military exchange through BPC the U.S. military should measure a partner's military professionalism starting point and potential for development (*will* and *skill*). Following this assessment, the U.S. military should design

an approach to sustain or enhance the partner's professional military capacity prior to capitalizing on or in concert with other military exchange programs to further the partner relationship, seeking outcomes favorable to U.S. national interests.

Supporting a whole-of-government approach, the Department of Defense (DOD) should develop a standard rubric for BPC partner selection to assist policymakers in choosing nation-states where BPC investment is tenable, feasible, and enduring. By design and necessity, BPC goals will vary based on the nation-state's starting point, the internal and external environment, available resources, and the overall end-state for development desired by the U.S. and the nation-state receiving support. Therefore, a standard rubric for BPC objectives is not a necessary or encouraged product since strategy is about building valid approaches to BPC, not results in all cases. The standard rubric should address the conditions under which BPC is a viable course of action for U.S. policymakers. Therefore, the standard rubric may be used as a guide to decision making prior to investing the whole-of-government for an enduring strategically targeted partnership.

In a fiscally constrained environment with financially responsible decision making at the forefront of the U.S. governmental process, resource sharing is vital to continuing necessary BPC initiatives. The author offers four approaches to better lead, manage, and share future BPC responsibilities (the approaches offered are not prioritized).

First, U.S. leveraging of standing alliances to form permanent or ad-hoc BPC specialist teams properly sized for specific approaches will allow resource sharing, specialization in BPC, and international legitimacy for allied forces when supporting

BPC initiatives. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or other legitimate standing alliances, could work together with the U.N. in action or advice to further the relationships between liberal international alliances and development support institutions. These specialists would come from U.S. conventional forces, receive specialized training in capacity building, and work for the regional combatant commander, a new functional combatant commander (as proposed in recommendation four), or the international military organization's coalition leadership. Permanent or ad-hoc BPC specialist teams would potentially sacrifice U.S. overall near-term defense readiness because of a reduction in combat readiness and manpower to gain BPC forces in routine contact and execution overseas for long-term security.

Second, the U.S. should calculate the long-term implications to national interests and develop a clear assessment of the environment prior to developing and engaging in BPC to reduce risk and strengthen an approach's opportunities for success. Clear assessments account for the institutional and regional impacts of history, culture, values, demographics, and political and popular attitudes. Though not completely comprehensive, a clear assessment should also include expected outcomes, alternative futures, and institutional will and skill to accept and sustain capacity change. Mired in a BPC effort from which outcomes are unattainable or unacceptably limited, the U.S. could experience potentially negative return on investment throughout the long-term approach. Therefore, the U.S. should be cautious not to conduct BPC just for the sake of BPC.

Third, the U.S. could diplomatically entice allies to support BPC without U.S. military direct involvement. Diplomacy must be heavily leveraged compelling allies that U.S. interests and values are inseparable from their own national interests. Where

diplomacy fails other leverage may be applied through whole-of-government influence mechanisms like commerce, financial support, military exchange, and head-of-state political discourse. Allies leading BPC efforts share responsibility internationally, enhancing legitimacy of the overall effort, and share resources for mutual benefits. Indirect leadership and teambuilding by the U.S. could translate into achieved national interest ends at reduced costs.

Fourth, in "Security Cooperation: A New Functional Command," Major Walsh posits a new security cooperation (supporting BPC) U.S. functional combatant command could ensure that efforts throughout DOD and the U.S. government are aligned with the strategic and operational objectives expressed through national security policy documents.[1] Additionally, the new functional command could ensure BPC is "conducted with forces that have the appropriate doctrine, training, and readiness necessary to succeed."[2] Recognizing military exchange as a fundamental and potentially enduring mission for U.S. security strategy throughout U.S. national policy and strategy documents, currently leadership of BPC is diffused throughout combatant commands often executed through ongoing theater campaigns. Furthermore, a functional command could root the foundational doctrine of BPC in the capacity measurement and development standards recognized by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

If a new Function Command is not possible, focus leadership and responsibility for building partnership capacity in the U.S. State Department. The National Security Council via Presidential Directive may require the U.S. State Department to coordinate

[1] Randall M. Walsh, "Security Cooperation: A New Functional Command," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 64 (1st Quarter 2012): 59

[2] Ibid.

the unity of effort between U.S. departments, agencies, and non-government organizations, allies, partners, and international organizations in support of BPC. Grow regional security development organizations led by the DOS with the U.S. whole-of-government providing resources (mainly from DOD). The DOS would provide unity of effort and lead coordination in regional BPC affairs. In the absence of violence, the U.S. DOS Head of Mission would be responsible for all BPC efforts within a specific country. If violence erupts necessitating a transfer of authorities, the Geographic Combatant Commander would immediately assume leadership responsibility for conflict resolution in his area of responsibility until diplomatic discourse without violence is again possible. This recommendation recognizes the unique character and application of U.S. instruments of national power central to supporting transformational change through BPC; it also may require a significant shift in the understanding of command relationships and structure since the U.S. State Department would have the lead for steady-state BPC efforts. U.S. DOD resources would necessarily support U.S. DOS under centralized leadership. The DOS-DOD team could also partner with the UNDP for doctrinal development and sharing of ideas for effectiveness and efficiency in BPC strategy.

Building partnership capacity is an enduring mission that receives consistent attention, study, and focus by the U.S. government. A new BPC functional command would centralize unity of effort between DOD and DOS supporting unity of purpose in U.S. engagement throughout the world. The GCCs would remain responsible for contingencies within their areas of responsibility (AOR), but would sacrifice partial responsibility for theater campaigns development and execution. Theater campaigns

would be planned and administered by the newly formed functional command. However, the GCC commander would remain in command of forces within his AOR, but work with the functional command to develop and execute theater campaigns. With significant leadership provided by the U.S. military, a unified functional command could centralize leadership, planning, execution, and effort. Partnered with and led by the DOS, DOD unity of command in planning, unity of purpose, and unity of effort in execution could potentially improve if the BPC is centrally led by a single commander and staff allowing standing combatant commands to further focus on crisis or conflict planning and execution.

Counterargument

Allocating scarce resources in a period of fiscal austerity requiring responsible spending does not necessarily afford the U.S. the means and will to pursue enduring BPC initiatives. Huntington clearly describes a world order where Western nations should overcome policy and partnership gaps to protect and sustain the Western cultural paradigm against the encroachment of rising non-Western states. Huntington's view is that neither multilateralism nor unilateralism will work as non-Western cultures advance. National resources expended to develop multilateral partnerships for local, regional, and global stability while advancing Western values is, according to Huntington, a waste of those resources. Furthermore and perhaps "…most important, [the U.S. must] recognize that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations is probably the single most dangerous source of instability and potential for global conflict in a multicivilization [sic] world."[3] However, Huntington's thesis is designed around a premise that Western

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2011), 312.

values, conceived in the West, are only suitable, acceptable, feasible, and enduring in Western states. Looking at the successful transformations in the twentieth century of Japan and South Korea, there is precedent for Eastern nations with millennia of history, adopting and thriving in a democratic system with Western values healthily mixed with Eastern culture and values. "[The West], as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has said, is 'the source – the unique source' of the 'ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom…These are [Western] ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption.'"[4] The will of a nation to adopt and sustain Western values and the capacity for change in nations like Japan and South Korea degrade Huntington's thesis and offer a way forward for BPC.

Moreover, liberalism's approach in international relations continues to support global and regional organizations supporting improved nation-state communications and potential long-term stability. The U.N., as cited in this paper, leads the research and development of building capacity in nations to support transformational change. Therefore, the U.S. should further support and align with organizations that focus on BPC like the U.N. and the European Union to maintain fiscal responsibility, conserve resources, and work within legitimate and established international systems. As Huntington posits, "[t]he principal responsibility of Western leaders, consequently, is not to attempt to reshape power, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization. Because it is the most powerful Western country, that responsibility falls overwhelmingly on the United States of America."[5] However, the U.N. is an open forum for all internationally recognized nations. With the U.N. providing internationally

[4] Ibid., 311.
[5] Ibid.

recognized legitimate rule of law, nation-states are not required to be members or maintain membership when it better serves the nation-state to withdraw. Nation-states are left to act individually or through collective defense organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in support of national interests. The European Union has yet to prove its economic solvency as it supports economically challenged nation-states. Therefore, aligning with the European Union may present a challenge to the U.S. Huntington argues shared Western values make for solid partnerships, but since the European Union is still young in comparison to other international institutions, the U.S. may lack sufficient understanding of the complexity and uncertainty working through the European Union might have on U.S. national interests abroad. Ultimately, Huntington argues an adoption of what he calls an "Atlanticist [sic]" policy to cooperate closely with European partners "to protect and advance the interests and values" of Western civilization.[6] Western powers, therefore, must consolidate, strengthen ties, reduce vulnerabilities, and strive to maintain and develop global influence against rising non-Western cultures.

The U.S. military may not be the best means by which to conduct BPC. The military is organized to fight and win in armed conflict. BPC was delegated to the military because of its deep trough of resources and its flexibility, hierarchical and authoritarian structure, and capabilities to adapt and overcome challenges. However, the U.S. military's ability to accomplish BPC does not equate to its feasibility, suitability, or acceptability as an enduring mission. "There are few agreed-upon metrics to evaluate progress, and even definitions of what constitutes a successful outcome are open to debate. Furthermore, the building partner capacity framework can overstate the

[6] Ibid., 312.

ambitions of U.S. military security cooperation abroad."[7] With the U.S. military as the lead agent, the military instrument of national power becomes the primary tool for BPC approaches. The potential for limited outcomes is likely higher without a U.S. whole-of-government approach, and while the military will seek cross department, agency, and non-governmental organization input and support, ultimately its controllable feature and power is through its own forces. The Philippines offer an example of successful but limited ends through U.S. military-led BPC efforts. Though the criminal element of terrorism in the Philippines has been reduced through military-led BPC, "the [Abu Sayyaf Group] has not been eliminated…and remains able to perpetuate acts of terrorism and facilitate transnational al Qaeda influence in the region."[8] A U.S. whole-of-government approach over a military-centric approach may offer improved outcomes supporting transformational change. "Indeed, the whole-of-government approach advocated by the [U.S.] to accomplish BPC is [possibly also a] misnomer since the U.S. government is not trained, equipped or manned to meet the requirements of BPC."[9] Historical evidence to the contrary, U.S. military exchange to build partner capacity, expand and enhance international relationships, and share regional burdens can be traced back to Commodore Matthew Perry's entrance into Yokosuka Harbor in 1853. The U.S. military is uniquely suited to share the leadership and support responsibilities of U.S. diplomacy.

[7] Brian M. Burton, "The Peril and Promise of the Indirect Approach," *PRISM* 3, no. 1 (December 2011): 49.

[8] Ibid., 52.

[9] Michael C. Veneri, "The partner predicament: US building partner capacity, the War on Terrorism and what the US cannot overlook," *Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy,* vol. 2 (2011): G:10. http://www.synesisjournal.com/vol2_g/2011_2_G7-17_Veneri.pdf (accessed November 2, 2012).

Lastly, the U.S. should not engage in other sovereign nation-state's business. "Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous."[10] Huntington expresses, in no uncertain terms, that Western ideology is not universal as declared by the U.S. National Security Strategy. Spreading Western ideology is immoral because the strategy seeks to supplant the existing cultural ideology seeing it as lesser and flawed. Danger exists in the attempt to spread Western ideology creating friction between the U.S. and other cultures that do not seek adoption of Western values. A common popular theme for rhetoric and discussion, isolationism is untenable from socio-political, economic, and informational means in a free and increasingly globalized society. Historically, U.S. isolationism is most notably connected to the interwar period between 1919 and 1941 which ended with the most lethal global war in recorded history. Interdependence through globalization as part of a liberal international relations approach has, for now, decreased resource conflict as the world seeks to rise economically and socially together rather than individually seek regional domination. Most notably, democracies rarely go to war with one another. Isolationism, therefore, is not necessarily the best answer to fiscal responsibility and long-term security investment.

[10] Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations,* 310.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

Recommended Future Research

The development of a more comprehensive rubric beyond the partner selection model proposed in Chapter III to assist policymakers in deciding when and where to use building partnership capacity (BPC) as a strategy may be best visualized in a graphic model. Future research may focus on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of past and ongoing BPC engagements to develop a graphically represented decision model using statistics in support of social science. Qualitative data may be used to better explain the implications of research in formulating strategic decisions for enduring investment into BPC.

Financial records may be reviewed to quantify the cost of enduring BPC versus short, medium, or long-term armed conflicts. The monetary data reviewed may clearly indicate the success, failure, or limited influence of BPC as an enduring investment worthy of resource allocation. Financial review may also identify common strengths and weaknesses of resource allocation through empirical study similar to the UNDP supporting transformational change review.

Leadership and specific leaders are identified in the UNDP supporting transformation change study and measuring capacity components as a significant part of successful capacity development approaches. Future research may focus on specific individuals who led, influenced, or supported decades of nation-state capacity development through partnerships.

The DOD together with the White House should assess the financial and pragmatic benefit to establishing a BPC functional combatant command. Questions for future research may include: 1) Can a new functional command work within today's combatant command paradigm; 2) How would forces be allocated to the functional commander; 3) Could the functional command assist combatant commanders in executing the enduring security cooperation function by providing an improved whole-of-government approach; and, 4) What would a security cooperation functional command look like (organizational structure), and what would be its vision, mission, and goals.

Additionally, the DOD together with the DOS should assess the possibility of DOS leadership in coordination of military forces and resources supporting BPC efforts. Is this leadership and responsibility structure possible or advisable? Are efficiencies gained from BPC leadership and unity of effort ushered by the DOS? Does the DOS see potential enhancements to BPC for transformational change through security cooperation in this approach?

Summary

> America's power and influence are enhanced by sustaining a vibrant network of defense alliances and new partnerships, building cooperative approaches with key states, and maintaining interactions with important international institutions... Recognizing the importance of fostering and improving military and defense relations with allies and partners, the [Defense] Department continues to emphasize tailored approaches that build on shared interests...[1]

National interests are the foundation for U.S. strategy of partnership. Nation-states fundamentally act in their perceived best interests often providing opportunities for the U.S. to develop partnerships through security cooperation. Military exchange

[1] U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2010), xiv.

partnerships provide opportunities to grow trust and collaboration through military programs led by the DOD. Military exchange through BPC is fundamental to development of lasting relationships. BPC requires enduring political and popular U.S. will to sustain effective partnership programs to achieve successful ends through transformative outcomes. More importantly, the will and skill of the partner nation is crucial to the potential effectiveness of the BPC approach. Indeed, BPC supports transformational change in partner nation-states and this change is likely perpetuated and leveraged over decades. In this sense, BPC is like a "marathon, [but] it also assumes the characteristics of a relay race, requiring the consistent effort of a variety of actors over a prolonged period."[2] BPC has risks and rewards, but done well over the long-term it can catalyze transformational change. Moreover, long-term development should routinely be viewed as work in progress. It is a dynamic which unfolds over the long term, with spurts of progress, accompanied by minor or even major setbacks.[3]

Internal and external environmental circumstances may wax and wane throughout the BPC approach, but these challenges should not reduce the importance of BPC supporting transformational change nor negate its ultimate and potentially enduring effectiveness. Policymakers and military leaders engaging in BPC efforts should beware of Wright's caution:

> International peace has been sought by a more perfect balance of power, by a more perfect regime of international law, by a more perfect world-community, and by a more perfect adjustment of human attitudes and ideals. These different forms of stability cannot, however, be developed

[2] United Nations Development Programme, *Supporting Transformational Change* (New York: United Nations, 2011), 16. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/case_studies_of_sustainedandsuccessfuldevelopmentcooperation-sup.html (accessed August 16, 2012).

[3] Ibid.

> simultaneously or under all conditions. Policies promotive [sic] of one may be detrimental to another.[4]

The BPC process seeking transformational change is complex, wrought with interdependent variables and chaos; [it] is neither entirely predictable, nor is it straightforward.[5] Though the future in partnerships is clearly unpredictable, empirical evidence provides history and context for common attributes of BPC successes. Decades of capacity development and transformational change provide mental frameworks to create reasonable and effective BPC approaches and understand how to lead and manage the BPC process once initiated. While a silver bullet does not "exist in terms of achieving sustained development progress," complex processes enabled by keen intellectual and dynamic approaches make transformational change possible and potentially well worth the effort and investment.[6]

Recently, the U.S. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted the Chairman's advice to the President regarding six priorities for U.S. national security interests. Ranked among the six priorities were: a) U.S. military leadership securing confident and reliable allies and partners; [and] b) U.S. led preservation and extension of universal values.[7] The U.S. clearly communicates its intentions to the world – developing secure and stable partnerships and promoting universal (Western) values are central to enduring national security interests. Overseas relationships to build partnership capacity, though often long-term in effort and execution with difficult to quantify

---

[4] Quincy Wright, *A Study of War: Midway Reprint* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 353.

[5] UNDP, *Supporting Transformational Change*, 13.

[6] Ibid.

[7] James A. Winnefeld, "Perspectives on National Security Challenges in the 21st Century" (lecture, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, 2012). http://www.acus.org/event/perspectives-national-security-challenges-21st-century/transcript (accessed December 9, 2012).

investment returns, offer potential quality of returns beyond other military exchange programs alone. With BPC at the helm, the FMT programs may be best integrated to support a holistic approach leveraging relationships for current and future security. Each transaction creates new opportunities for training, for exercises, for relationship building.[8] A more cost effective effort than combat and mode of choice in financially challenging times, *building partnership capacity for transformational change* will continue as a vital part of U.S. policy and strategy execution.

[8] Leon E. Panetta, "Building Partnership Capacity in the 21st Century" (lecture, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC: June 2012). http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1691 (accessed September 3, 2012).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Annual Foreign Military Training Report. Codified at U.S. Code 22 (2007), § 2416 et. seq. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22/2416 (accessed April 24, 2013).

Bletz, Donald F. *Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger Publishing, 1972.

Bond, Kevin, M. "Are We Professionals?" *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 58 (3rd Quarter 2010): 62-68. www.ndu.edu/press/are-we-professionals.html (accessed August 3, 2012).

Burton, Brian M. "The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach." *PRISM* 3 no. 1. (December 2011): 47-62.

Croissant, Aurel. "Civilian Control over the Military in East Asia." *East Asia Institute* (September 2011). http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=137615 (accessed August 16, 2012).

Dagget, Stephen. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2010.

Donley, Michael B. and Schwartz, Norton A. *Fiscal Year 2013 Air Force Posture Statement*. Washington, DC, February 28, 2012. http://www.posturestatement.af.mil/ (accessed October 10, 2012).

Farris, Stuart L. "Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines" (master's thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009). http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA505075 (accessed October 28, 2012).

Galvin, Thomas P. "A New Way of Understanding (Military) Professionalism." *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 62 (3rd quarter 2011): 25-31. http://www.ndu.edu/press/new-way-military-professionalism.html (accessed September 3, 2012).

Germanovich, Gene. "Security Force Assistance in a Time of Austerity." *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 67 (4th Quarter 2012): 14-19.

Horowitz, Michael C. "How Defense Austerity Will Test U.S. Strategy in Asia." *TheDiplomat.com* (August 9, 2012). http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/08/09/how-defense-austerity-will-test-u-s-strategy-in-asia/ (accessed August 16, 2012).

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Shuster Publishing, 2011.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. Jr. "Strategy in a Time of Austerity: Why the Pentagon Should Focus on Assuring Access." *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2012, 58-69. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138362/andrew-f-krepinevich-jr/strategy-in-a-time-of-austerity (accessed November 14, 2012).

Kusiak, Pauline. "Culture, Identity, and Information Technology in the 21st Century: Implications for U.S. National Security." *U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute* (August 2012). http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1122 (accessed September 23, 2012).

McHugh, John M. and Casey, George W. Jr. *A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2011*. Washington, D.C., March 2, 2011. https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2011/ (accessed November 1, 2012).

Michigan.gov. *Our Core Democratic Values,* Michigan Department of Education teaching assistance website. http://www.michigan.gov/documents/10-02_Core_democtaric_Values_48832_7.pdf (accessed November 1, 2012).

Miller, Boyd A. "Building Partner Logistics Capacity" (master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2012). http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561449 (accessed October 31, 2012).

Panetta, Leon E. "Building Partnership in the 21st Century." (lecture, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, June 28, 2012). http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1691 (accessed October 5, 2012).

Ryan, Jordan. "Speech at the Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption Center, Qatar." (lecture, United Nations Development Program, Qatar, February 12, 2012). http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2012/02/12/jordan-ryan-speech-at-the-rule-of-law-and-anti-corruption-center-qatar.html (accessed September 3, 2012).

Sayigh, Yezid. "Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt." *The Carnegie Papers* (August 2012). http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/01/above-state-officers-republic-in-egypt/d4l2 (accessed October 1, 2012).

Sebastian, Leonard C. and Iisgindarash. "Assessing 12-year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform" (master's thesis, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 2011).

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP227.pdf (accessed September 10, 2012).

Sutton, Nikki, comment on *The National Security Strategy.* The Whitehouse Blog, comment posted May 27, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/05/27/a-blueprint-pursuing-world-we-seek (accessed December 1, 2012).

Terry, Jason B. "Principles of Building Partnership Capacity" (master's thesis, Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2010), 89 pages. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA 524101 (accessed November 1, 2012).

United Nations Development Programme. *Measuring Capacity* (New York, NY). July 22, 2010. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/capacity-building/undp-paper-on-measuring-capacity.html (accessed August 16, 2012).

United Nations Development Programme. *Supporting Transformational Change* (New York, NY). November 18, 2011. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/case_studies_of_sustainedandsuccessfuldevelopmentcooperation-sup.html (accessed August 16, 2012).

United Nations Development Programme. UNDP, About Us. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/about_us.html (accessed November 5, 2012).

U.S. Chief of Naval Operations. *CNO guidance for 2011: Executing the Maritime Strategy.* Washington DC: Department of the Navy, October 2010.

U.S. Department of Defense. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.* Washington DC: Departments of the Navy and Coast Guard, October 2007.

U.S. Department of Defense. *The Armed Forces Officer: 2007 Edition.* Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2007.

U.S. Department of Defense. *QDR Execution Road Map Building Partnership Capacity*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 22 May 2006.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2010-2011 (Country Training Activities).* U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State Joint Report to Congress, October 2010. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2011/index.htm (accessed August-December 2012).

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.* Arlington, VA: Pentagon, September 2012.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership.* Washington, DC: February 8, 2012.

U.S. President. *National Security Strategy.* Washington, DC: Whitehouse, May 2010.

U.S. President. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.* Washington DC: Whitehouse, January 2012.

U.S. Secretary of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010.

Walsh, Randall M. "Security Cooperation: A New Functional Command." *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 64 (1st Quarter 2012): 52-59. http://www.ndu.edu/press/security-cooperation.html (accessed October 15, 2012).

Winnefeld, James A. "Perspectives on National Security Challenges in the 21st Century," (lecture, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 27, 2012). http://www.acus.org/event/perspectives-national-security-challenges-21st-century/transcript (accessed December 9, 2012).

Wright, Quincy. *A Study of War: Midway Reprint*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Wuestner, Scott G. "Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm" (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009). http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB880.pdf (accessed November 1, 2012).

Veneri, Michael C. "The partner predicament: US building partnership capacity, the War on Terrorism and what the US cannot overlook." *Synesis: A Journal of Science, Technology, Ethics, and Policy*, vol. 2 (2011): G:7-G:17. http://www.synesisjournal.com/vol2_g/2011_2_G7-17_Veneri.pdf (accessed November 2, 2012).

VITA

Most recently, Lieutenant Commander Krauz was the Weapons and Combat Systems Officer aboard USS CHUNG-HOON (DDG 93) in Pearl Harbor, HI. He received his commission and Bachelor of Science degree in 2001 from the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Following initial training, LCDR Krauz was assigned as the Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer and First Lieutenant in USS VINCENNES (CG 49) home ported in Yokosuka, Japan, Repair Officer in USS AUSTIN (LPD 4) home ported in Norfolk, Virginia, and shore assignments as a Company Officer and Executive Assistance to the Commandant of Midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy. He holds graduate degrees in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College and Leadership Education and Human Resource Development from the Naval Postgraduate School. Lieutenant Commander Krauz is married to the former Ms. Naama Yaron, and they have two daughters.