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**JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**



**UNIFIED LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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
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
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## ABSTRACT

The Armed Forces must establish a unified leadership development enterprise to develop the leadership skills required to build trust at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict.<sup>1</sup> Current leadership development practices do not develop military leaders sufficiently to excel in unified organizations. Specifically, the Armed Forces do not train and educate leaders properly to overcome barriers of trust, culture, and communication within friendly organizations.

A unified leadership development enterprise consists of a Joint Center of Excellence for Leadership Development, a unified network as a body of knowledge and practice, and existing service-based institutions responsible for leadership development. The plan to develop unified skills resembles a campaign plan, using an ends-ways-means-risk construct to illustrate how the enterprise meets intent. Key recommendations include establishing a Joint Center of Excellence for Leadership Development, creating a unified network, establishing joint leadership doctrine with shared values, requiring foreign language proficiency of all officers, and expanding Joint Professional Military Education requirements.

Although the audience of military leaders includes commissioned, warrant, and non-commissioned officers, this analysis focuses on commissioned officers only. Clarifying commissioned officers' leadership problems will inform future studies on improving warrant and non-commissioned officer development.

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<sup>1</sup> Joint doctrine does not define enterprise. In a November, 2008 speech to CECOM Life Cycle Management Command and Fort Monmouth, N.J., GEN (Ret.) George W. Casey, Jr., described an enterprise as “a cohesive organization whose structure, governance systems and culture support a common purpose.” Ed Lopez, “Facilities, personnel converge on Army Enterprise concept,” U.S. Army, [http://www.army.mil/article/23598/Facilities\\_personnel\\_converge\\_on\\_Army\\_Enterprise\\_concept/](http://www.army.mil/article/23598/Facilities_personnel_converge_on_Army_Enterprise_concept/) (accessed January 3, 2013).

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- Former commanders, peers, and subordinates who provided inspiration and developed me as a leader.
- My wife and daughter, who have been incredibly patient and have supported me throughout this process.

## **DEDICATION**

For Armed Forces service-members. They deserve great leaders.





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## INTRODUCTION

Military leaders at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels must employ joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, and multi-national (JIIM) leadership skills to succeed in the future operational environment.<sup>1</sup> These skills—associated with “comprehensive approach” and “whole of government” approach—are consistent with the joint concept of “unified” action.<sup>2</sup> Current practices do not develop military leaders with required skills or habits of mind to excel in unified organizations. Specifically, the Armed Forces do not train and educate leaders properly to overcome barriers of trust, culture, and communication within friendly teams, units, and planning groups in order to operate cohesively. As a result, leaders waste energy reducing internal frictions instead of applying energy toward defeating common enemies.

Future conflicts will include joint forces and multi-national partners fighting uniformed and non-uniformed enemies in unpredictable environments. As noted by Clausewitz, chance and uncertainty are inevitable in warfare, making “the simplest things difficult.”<sup>3</sup> Leaders of Armed Forces can reduce some of the uncertainty and friction inherent in organizations by building trust among culturally diverse teams. Building trust between leaders of differing cultures is not a quixotic errand or a refusal to accept that

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Army, *Operational Terms and Symbols*, Army Doctrine Publication 1-02 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2012), 2-5.

<sup>2</sup> Unified action refers to “the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.” See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25 2013), II-2 – II-3. “Comprehensive approach” from U.S. Department of the Army, *Operational Terms and Military Symbols*, Army Doctrine Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2012), 1-9. “Whole of government” approach from U.S. President, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2010), 14.

<sup>3</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 117, 138.

“the impossible is impossible.” On the contrary, properly skilled leaders can build trust among domestic and international partners to prevail in future conflicts.<sup>4</sup> However, leaders cannot build trust simply by pressing buttons or reading books. Leaders earn trust from peers and subordinates as they learn trust from their senior leaders. From this expectation emerges the question central to this paper:

“What must change in the U.S. Armed Forces to develop leaders capable of building trust in unified teams and prevailing in future conflicts?”

This thesis asserts that a unified leadership development enterprise will enable U.S. Armed Forces leaders to develop the unified leadership skills needed to build trust at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict.<sup>5</sup> An enterprise approach allows the Armed Forces to coordinate the development of leadership skills and to establish an accessible body of comprehensive knowledge to build trust more rapidly among unified elements. The enterprise adds value by enabling the development of generations of culturally astute, team-oriented leaders with minimal manpower costs. Services have matured beyond Constitutional expectations for standing forces and have grown more powerful and more rapidly than anticipated by lawmakers. A comprehensive system of leadership development will ensure proper development and reduce friction caused by isolated service efforts.

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<sup>4</sup> Colin Gray, *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007): 86-88. Maxim #21—“the impossible is impossible”—serves to remind the blindly optimistic that some conditions are irrefutable and unsolvable by military action.

<sup>5</sup> Joint doctrine does not define enterprise. GEN (Ret.) George W. Casey, Jr., described an enterprise as “a cohesive organization whose structure, governance systems and culture support a common purpose.” Ed Lopez, “Facilities, personnel converge on Army enterprise concept,” U.S. Army, [http://www.army.mil/article/23598/Facilities\\_personnel\\_converge\\_on\\_Army\\_Enterprise\\_concept/](http://www.army.mil/article/23598/Facilities_personnel_converge_on_Army_Enterprise_concept/) (accessed January 03, 2013).

The unified leadership development enterprise retains much of military services' current practices, but requires the following adjustments to current leadership development models:

- Establish shared values, ethics, and attributes for all service-members
- Require foreign language proficiency of all commissioned officers
- Require joint education for promotion at each grade for commissioned officers
- Expand career models to promote excellence in a variety of career fields
- Expand Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and enforce Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) to ensure lifelong joint education
- Establish joint leadership doctrine publications
- Establish of a Joint Center of Excellence for Leadership Development
- Establish a body of leadership knowledge accessible to U.S. Government and selected international leaders

In a design similar to a campaign plan, this proposal analyzes guidance and operational assessments to provide an ends-ways-means-risk model. Congressional mandates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) guidance frame the requirements for leadership development. Recognizing that leadership development has no end state if pursued effectively, the plan describes *desired conditions* instead of *end states*. The design acknowledges the extraordinary volume of scholarly writings and varied opinions on leadership development, drawing from a variety of recommendations and proposing amalgamations of best practices. Many current methods of leader development are valid and this proposal makes no claim to crisis. However, the Armed

Forces must improve aspects of education, self-development, experience, and training to reduce avoidable friction, build trust more rapidly among diverse teams, and prevail in future conflicts.

Following this introduction, this study comprises four chapters: “the problems;” “the desired conditions;” “the means;” and “the ways.” The first chapter describes five conditions distorting perceptions of leadership development to allow closer examination of real problems with leaders’ experience, training, education, and self-development. The second chapter distills doctrine and guidance into desired conditions for experience, training, education, and self-development. These conditions reflect the desired qualities of unified leaders in terms of character, education, and experience.

The third chapter, “The Means”, proposes a Joint Center of Excellence for Leadership Development (JCELD), leaders, organizations, schools, families, and self-development resources required to achieve the desired conditions. The fourth chapter, “The Ways”, describes actions connecting means to desired conditions through two major lines of effort (LOE). The first LOE combines the efforts of experience and training; the second LOE combines the efforts of education and self-development.

Three assumptions underpin the proposed enterprise: the United States will continue to depend upon an all-volunteer force for at least one generation; future combat attrition will be low enough to allow tailored development of leaders; and the United States will continue or increase its involvement in unified actions. The first assumption of an all-volunteer force accepts the challenge of developing leaders without highly selective selection processes. The Armed Forces must forge leaders from the broad range of skills, backgrounds, and temperaments found in volunteers. The second assumption

does not exclude the possibility of mass casualties, but expects conflict attrition levels low enough to allow tailored development versus current mass production models. The third assumption reflects guidance from senior military leaders, strategists, and intelligence analysts in national strategy documents and CJCS guidance.

Although the audience of military leaders includes commissioned, warrant, and non-commissioned officers, this analysis focuses on commissioned officers only. Clarifying commissioned officers' leadership problems will inform future studies on improving warrant and non-commissioned officer development.





## CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEMS

*“Sir, the U.S.A. has so much money and power. Why are you still here in Afghanistan?”*

*- “Khan”, local interpreter.<sup>1</sup>*

Khan’s simple, but exasperating question resonates with many U.S. military and civilian leaders who have spent precious time and resources on reducing internal friction at the expense of the energy needed to solve greater problems. Recent conflicts have demonstrated the requirement for Armed Forces leaders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to lead or coordinate effectively with leaders from other services, agencies, and countries. The Armed Forces must develop leaders capable of building trust more rapidly among joint, inter-agency, inter-governmental, and multi-national teams. The U.S. efforts in Afghanistan since 2001 represent a microcosm of a greater leadership development problem within the Armed Forces. The internal struggles among U.S. Government and other government entities during Operation Enduring Freedom are samples of reducible, internal friction among friendly leaders. Leaders’ inability to establish trust between friendly teams hinders efforts to secure U.S. national interests.

Current criticisms of military leadership describe perceived and real problems with leadership development. Critics decried the perceived incompetency of several general officers during campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, questioning why services

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<sup>1</sup> Khan’s real name is not provided at his request. Following a successful attack by Afghan and U.S. military forces to secure the Chak, Wardak district center in August 2011, the author met with U.S. and Afghan military and civilian leaders to complete negotiations for a road improvement project. Despite many resources available, leaders could not forge agreement to complete the road project. Khan’s question followed that unsuccessful meeting.

failed to purge these leaders.<sup>2</sup> The statistically improbable number (25) of U.S. Navy commanders relieved in 2012 suggests either incredible, coincidental failure of the Navy's PME, or a recent effort by senior naval leaders to demonstrate less tolerance for failures.<sup>3</sup> Highly visible cases involving general officers affirm that sexual misconduct, financial misconduct, and incompetence are intolerable in the profession of arms. Clearly, leadership has failed when an Army Captain addresses her superior Brigadier General as "pappa panda sexy pants."<sup>4</sup>

Given these examples of leadership failures, a casual reader of these reports might conclude that all Armed Forces leadership development practices are morally bankrupt. However, several distorting conditions confuse matters of personal indiscipline with actual leadership development processes. The critical task is to identify the problem correctly. Identifying the problems must precede developing desired conditions, means, and ways. Understanding certain distortions and setting them aside will allow clearer inspection of problems related to leaders' experience, training, education, and self-development.

### **Distortions of the problems**

At least five conditions associated with recent criticisms of military leadership inhibit trust and distort perceptions of leadership development: "hyper-communication";

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, "General Failure," *Atlantic Magazine*, (November 2012), <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/general-failure/309148/> (accessed January 02, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> Stars and Stripes, "Navy Commanders Relieved of Duty 2012," Stars and Stripes, (December 13, 2012), <http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/navy-commanders-relieved-of-duty-in-2012-1.168999> (accessed January 02, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> Friends of Sinclair, "The Jeffrey Sinclair Controversy," Friends of Sinclair, LLC, <http://www.sinclairinnocence.com/who-is-jeff-sinclair-accuser/> (accessed March 22, 2013).

groupthink; generational bias; toxic leadership; and relative deprivation.<sup>5</sup> These distorting conditions exaggerate some perceptions of leadership development problems, but do not necessarily reflect actual flaws in development processes. Common to each condition are effects of recent technologies allowing instantaneous communication. Technology is not leadership's enemy, nor is it appropriate to dismiss leadership failure by blaming technology.

### Hyper-communication

The first of five distortions affecting public perceptions of leaders is the recent phenomenon of "hyper-communication". Hyper-communication refers to rapid advancements in communications technology, resulting in shorter, faster, and more frequent messages without correlating increases in fidelity.<sup>6</sup> People are transmitting and receiving information more rapidly and broadly, but they may not be communicating effectively or responsibly. Without discipline, or a wise editor, any person capable of pressing an "enter" key may launch a global screed against another person. For leaders receiving accusations, damage may be immediate and diffuse, well before opportunities for due process or exoneration.<sup>7</sup>

Instant communications are no license for libel. The digital age of blogging and texting offers unlimited potential to distort uninformed opinions into leadership problems. Responsible citizens and senior leaders in the digital age must demonstrate

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<sup>5</sup> Hans U. Gumbrecht, "Infinite Availability on Hyper-communication (and Old Age)," *Iris* 2, no. 3 (01 Apr 2010): 205-207; Leonard Wong, "Generations apart: Xers and boomers in the officer corps," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000):4; Leonard Wong, "Stifled Innovation? Developing tomorrow's leaders today," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002):6.

<sup>6</sup> Gumbrecht, "Infinite Availability on Hyper-Communication (and Old Age)," 205.

<sup>7</sup> Author's experience with *Stars & Stripes* reporter Seth Robson. Court transcripts (available upon request) show Robson quoting the author inaccurately and out of context. Seth Robson, "Soldier gets 6-month sentence for refusing to deploy to Iraq," *Stars and Stripes*, February 22, 2008.

sound judgment to filter worthy commentary from baseless rants. Hyper-communication does not reveal a specific problem with current leadership development practices, but the effects of hyper-communication may skew the perceived magnitude of leader failures.

### Groupthink

Related to hyper-communication are distortions of leadership problems reflecting “groupthink” from critics and military leaders.<sup>8</sup> “Groupthink” refers to “a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures.”<sup>9</sup> Critics of military leaders may succumb to digital groupthink, a genuine concern for journalists employing Twitter and other social media to produce stories supported by “Twitter-forged consensus.”<sup>10</sup> Writers equipped only with blog or Twitter consensus can skew perceptions of leadership effectiveness and provoke global reactions with unproven accusations.<sup>11</sup> As a consequence, bloggers and persons adding comments to web-based publications may parrot uneducated opinions in an effort to join a majority. Casual readers may infer alarming trends in leadership failures by confusing the comments’ volume with accuracy.

Military leaders must avoid groupthink’s tendency to increase unnecessary friction between friendly teams. Military groups reporting statistically high levels of affinity, harmony, and agreement have been found to be most susceptible to groupthink

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<sup>8</sup> Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 8.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>10</sup> Dana Milbank, “Trending on Twitter: Groupthink,” October 23, 2012, *The Washington Post*, [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-23/opinions/35502699\\_1\\_tweets-debate-coverage-obama-line](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-23/opinions/35502699_1_tweets-debate-coverage-obama-line) (accessed February 03, 2013).

<sup>11</sup> Joe Gould, “Texts show Sinclair and accuser went hot, cold,” January 28, 2013, *Army Times*, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2013/01/army-pr-firm-uses-texts-in-attempt-to-clear-sinclair-012813/> (accessed February 04, 2013)

and ultimately, poor decisions related to the group's mission.<sup>12</sup> Specialized organizations and teams low in diversity, but high in self-acclaim and resistant to external review, are at greatest risk for groupthink's negative effects. Cultural prejudice bred into high-performing teams can trigger groupthink and inspire rejections of an outside leader's rational actions based on prejudice rather than critical thinking.

Groupthink is avoidable and U.S. Government leaders have successfully formed cohesive, effective teams at all levels without suffering from groupthink. Hyper-communication and groupthink fail to indicate problems with leadership development processes, but each condition adds a layer of distortion to root causes of process problems. Three more distortions require understanding to isolate the problems related to experience, training, education, and self-development properly.

### Generational Bias

The third condition distorting leader effectiveness and inviting friction is generational bias between "Baby Boomers", "Generation X", and "Millennials."<sup>13</sup> Scholars of generational theory have found patterns of behavior consistent with generation cycles over several centuries.<sup>14</sup> Proponents of this theory suggest western civilizations have a recurring human affairs rhythm spanning roughly 80-90 years called a *saeculum*.<sup>15</sup> Within each *saeculum*, four distinct periods, or "turnings", tend to produce generations with distinct behaviors or archetypes.<sup>16</sup> The archetypes born during the

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<sup>12</sup> Janis, *Groupthink*, 198.

<sup>13</sup> William Strauss and Neil Howe, *The Fourth Turning: An American Prophecy*, (New York: Broadway Books, 1997), 17-19.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 13-17.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 15-19.

associated “turnings” have surprisingly consistent attributes over the last five centuries in western civilization.<sup>17</sup>

Summaries of the generational archetypes, periods (or turnings), and group characteristics provide insights to friction between generations. “Prophets” today are Boomers, or flag officers; they were born during a “High” period of renaissance or new civic order and grew up narcissistic, but became moralistic in mid-life. “Nomads” today are Gen Xers, or mid-grade officers; they were born during an “Awakening” period of challenges to social contracts and raised relatively unprotected to become middle-aged skeptics. Today’s “Heroes” are the Millennials, or junior officers; they were overprotected children during an “Unraveling” period, but became heroic teammates in a “Crisis” period. The “Artists” of today are overprotected children, born during a Crisis period of overreliance on government; they will grow up in the shadows of Heroes to reach mid-life during an Awakening.<sup>18</sup> (See figure 1.)

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<sup>17</sup> Strauss and Howe, *The Fourth Turning* , 14-15.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

Time Frame	Key Events	Era (Turning)	Children (Age 0-20)	Young Adults (21-41)	Mid-Lifers (42-62)	Elders (63-83)
1946-1964	McCarthyism Civil Rights Affluent Society	High (1 <sup>st</sup> Turning)	Prophets (Baby Boomers)	Artists (Silent Gen.)	Heroes (G.I. Gen.)	Nomads
1964-1984	Vietnam War Woodstock Watergate	Awakening (2 <sup>nd</sup> Turning)	Nomads (Gen Xers)	Prophets (Baby Boomers)	Artists (Silent Gen.)	Heroes (G.I. Gen.)
1984-1996	Berlin Wall Desert Storm American Prosperity	Unraveling (3 <sup>rd</sup> Turning)	Heroes (Millennials)	Nomads (Gen Xers)	Prophets (Baby Boomers)	Artists (Silent Gen.)
1996-2012	Dot-com Bubble 9/11/2001 OIF/OEF	Crisis (4 <sup>th</sup> Turning)	Artists (Gen. Tech)	Heroes (Millennials)	Nomads (Gen Xers)	Prophets (Baby Boomers)
2012-2025	Debt Crises Cyberwar Multi-Polarity	High (1 <sup>st</sup> Turning)	Prophets (?)	Artists (Gen. Tech)	Heroes (Millennials)	Nomads (Gen Xers)

Figure 1, generations adapted from Strauss and Howe’s *The Fourth Turning*.<sup>19</sup>

In general terms and allowing for normal distribution, today’s flag officer Boomers were born between 1946 and 1964, followed by today’s mid-grade Gen Xers between 1964 and 1984. Today’s junior officer Millennials were born between 1984 and 1996.<sup>20</sup> The broad characteristics of each generational archetype trend toward tension between military leaders: Boomers tend to be goal-oriented, driven, and intolerant of defects; Gen Xers are skeptical of authority, pragmatic, and independent; and Millennials are team-oriented, optimistic, and well-nurtured.<sup>21</sup>

The combination of generational archetypes and digital competencies invites more friction between leaders of different generations. Flag officers tend to be digital immigrants and junior officers tend to be digital natives; mid-grade officers are

<sup>19</sup> Strauss and Howe, *The Fourth Turning*, 83. Author’s adaptation of data from Strauss and Howe’s table, including author’s projected key events for period 1984-2025 and possible name for generation succeeding Millennials.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.

<sup>21</sup> Wong, “Generations apart: Xers and boomers in the officer corps,” 6-9; Wong, “Stifled Innovation? Developing tomorrow’s leaders today,” 5.

somewhere in between, thinking like natives with immigrant roots.<sup>22</sup> Millennials grew up with constant feedback from parents, text messages, email, and social media. Gen Xers grew up with computers and adapted to social media, but expected little attention or feedback to solve problems. Boomers adapted to computers and email as mid-grade officers, but struggle more than other generations trying to manage digital information.<sup>23</sup> The frictions associated with generational bias and digital savvy, combined with conditions fomenting groupthink and hyper-communication, may distort perceptions of leaders and appear as toxic leadership.

### Toxicity

The fourth condition distorting leadership development processes is the perception of toxic leadership. Reports of toxic leadership across the services in the past 15 years have caused alarm among senior leaders.<sup>24</sup> However, toxic leadership is not new; service-members have suffered bad leaders for centuries, but service-members now have the ability to voice complaints widely and instantly. Toxic military leadership usually manifests itself with three symptoms: “an apparent lack of concern for the well-being of subordinates;” “personality or interpersonal technique that negatively affects organizational climate;” and a “conviction by subordinates that the leader is motivated primarily by self-interest.”<sup>25</sup> The services have tried to determine if toxic leaders

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<sup>22</sup> Marc Prensky, “Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants” *On the Horizon* 9, no. 5 (October 2001): 1-3.

<sup>23</sup> Wong, “Stifling Innovation: Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders Today”, 5; Wong, “Generations apart: Xers and boomers in the officer corps”, 6-9.

<sup>24</sup> Greg Jaffe, “Army worries about ‘toxic leaders’ in ranks,” *The Washington Post*, [http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-06-25/national/35233995\\_1\\_army-officers-army-leaders-commanders](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-06-25/national/35233995_1_army-officers-army-leaders-commanders) (accessed January 31, 2013).

<sup>25</sup> George E.Reed, “Toxic Leadership,” *Military Review* 84, no.5 (July-August 2004): 67.



somehow bypassed internal screening mechanisms or if services were creating bad leaders with bad processes.<sup>26</sup> One of the resultant efforts was personality trait screening.

Research efforts to isolate predictive traits of outstanding leaders have been inconclusive, despite promising initial results. Proponents of Five Factor Theory (FFT) suggested that observers consistently associated low neuroticism (N), high extraversion (E), and high openness (O) with strong leadership.<sup>27</sup> Studies of FFT also indicate that personality traits do not vary significantly across cultures, making FFT an attractive model for assessing a diverse organization like the Armed Forces.<sup>28</sup> Thus, advocates of FFT concluded that screening military leaders for desired N-E-O traits would successfully deter induction of potentially toxic leaders without bias toward a specific culture, gender, or ethnicity.

Although behavioral research confirms a positive correlation between FFT personality traits and leadership perceptions, the same research confirms no correlation between observed traits and “leadership effectiveness or ...group performance.”<sup>29</sup> Performance trumps perception. Leadership effectiveness correlated positively to characteristic adaptations, or individual changes in behavior due to environments.<sup>30</sup> The premise that a leader can “fake it until you make it” may be appropriate for political leaders and Technology, Entertainment, and Design (TED) talks, but will not inspire

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<sup>26</sup> Michelle Tan and Joe Gould, “Army wants to rid top ranks of toxic leaders,” *Army Times*, July 31, 2011, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/07/army-wants-to-rid-ranks-of-toxic-commanders-073111w/> (accessed February 13, 2013).

<sup>27</sup> Oliver P. John, Richard W. Robins, and Lawrence A. Pervin, *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*, (New York: Guilford Press, 2008), 167.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 164.

<sup>29</sup> Robert G. Lord, Christy L. DeVader, and George M. Alliger, “A Meta-Analysis of the Relation Between Personality Traits and Leadership Perceptions: An Application of Validity Generalization Procedures,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 71, no. 3 (1986):407.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 163-165.

service members in combat.<sup>31</sup> In basic terms, such a leader is a phony; he looks and sounds good, but cannot lead effectively.

The FFT model has some value for gauging perceptions and perceptions are important.<sup>32</sup> Given a choice between two leaders of equal effectiveness, many service members would logically choose a leader perceived to be agreeable and open-minded over one perceived to be abrasive and closed-minded. At issue is whether an otherwise courageous, competent leader is *effective* if subordinates find that leader *unfriendly*. An uneasy tension exists today between service-members' demand for likeable leaders—bolstered by omnipresent social media—and warfare's inherently unnatural demands for leaders to order subordinates into harm's way.

“Toxic” leaders are often more unlikeable than unskilled or incompetent, indicating a possible process problem if leaders meet all service standards for promotion, but fail the test of followership.<sup>33</sup> Many reports of toxic leaders reveal a dearth of emotional intelligence, or “how leaders handle themselves and their relationships.”<sup>34</sup> Although service processes do not overtly breed toxic leaders, not all service doctrines address the competencies associated with the emotional intelligence domains of self-

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<sup>31</sup> The Technology, Entertainment, and Design (TED) conferences hosted guest speaker Amy Cuddy, who posited that one can fake confidence and perceived competence with changes in body language. “TED Talks: Ideas Worth Sharing,” TED Conferences, LLC, [http://www.ted.com/talks/amy\\_cuddy\\_your\\_body\\_language\\_shapes\\_who\\_you\\_are.html](http://www.ted.com/talks/amy_cuddy_your_body_language_shapes_who_you_are.html) (accessed February 10, 2013).

<sup>32</sup> Lord, Devader, and Alliger, “A Meta-Analysis of the Relation Between Personality Traits and Leadership Perceptions,” 408.

<sup>33</sup> Joe Gould, “Ex-Brigade Commander slammed for behavior,” *Army Times*, 20 Nov 2011, <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/11/army-brigade-commander-slammed-for-behavior-112011w/> (accessed February 13, 2013).

<sup>34</sup> Daniel Goleman, Richard E. Boyatzis, and Annie McKee, *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence*, (Boston:Harvard Business School Press, 2002):6.

awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management.<sup>35</sup> Some services have initiated self-assessments and multi-dimensional or “360” assessments by subordinates, peers, and senior leaders. The aspect of emotional intelligence bears on the leadership component of self-development and the self-development section of this chapter will explore process problems.

### Relative Deprivation

Some criticisms of leadership, specifically of leader education, imply relative deprivation rather than systemic problems of leadership education. In this analysis, relative deprivation means “wanting what one does not have and feeling that one deserves whatever it is one wants, but does not have.”<sup>36</sup> Some criticisms of leadership indicate a desire for a local change in policy or procedure that may be unrealistically isolated from greater, strategic requirements and available resources. Many professors within PME institutions denounced PME practices and pleaded for reform, but Congressional reviews of PME found education programs generally adequate.<sup>37</sup> Some complaints appeared alarmist for purposes other than the purity of professional development. In fairness, no profession advances if complacency smothers constructive criticism. Education problems most relevant to this proposal pertain to developing the appropriate habits of mind in leaders to succeed in a unified environment. Some of the

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<sup>35</sup> Goleman, Boyatzis, McKee, *Primal Leadership*, 39.

<sup>36</sup> Iain Walker and Heather Smith, *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration*, (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2.

<sup>37</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Twenty Years After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel : Hearing Before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, Hearing Held May 20, 2009 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2010):69-70.

following criticisms require change to process; some reflect a sense of relative deprivation.

Recent complaints about PME tend to suggest that the services ignore education in favor of practical experience.<sup>38</sup> Major General (Ret.) Robert Scales disparaged current officers for actively dodging PME to gain combat experience.<sup>39</sup> Noting the low rate of current senior leaders with instructor backgrounds, Scales opined that “31 of the 35 most successful corps commanders in World War II served at least one tour as an instructor in a service school.”<sup>40</sup> Scales claimed that “the school house...has become an intellectual backwater” and lacks sufficient academic rigor required of strategic leaders.”<sup>41</sup> His comments suggest there was a moment in Armed Forces history when institutions regularly produced outstanding, strategic leaders through application of superior academic rigor. History suggests otherwise.

Other complaints suggest that services relegate weak officers to instructor duties. An Air War College (AWC) professor provided a supporting observation of Air Force Colonels currently employed as faculty at that school: “the Air Force considers these officers unsuitable for further promotion and has not elevated a single one of them to brigadier general in the last eighteen years.”<sup>42</sup> The same professor saved particular venom for retired colonels with doctoral degrees who serve as faculty, noting that “these

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<sup>38</sup> James Jay Carafano and Alane Kochems, “Rethinking Professional Military Education,” *The Heritage Foundation*, July 28, 2005, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/07/rethinking-professional-military-education> (accessed February 18, 2013).

<sup>39</sup> Robert H. Scales, “Education & Training Focus – Too busy to learn,” *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute* 136, no. 2 (2010): 30.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>42</sup> Daniel Hughes “Professors in the Colonels’ World,” in *Military Culture and Education*, ed.by Douglas Higbee (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010), 150.

ersatz civilians normally are quite deficient in the breadth and depth of their knowledge but lack nothing in self-confidence.”<sup>43</sup> A Naval War College (NWC) professor caviled about a military colleague from the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) being “unqualified” and teaching “based on (his) opinion rather than knowledge.”<sup>44</sup> Congressional and senior military leaders are quite aware of these observations, but are reluctant to demand sudden reductions in military instructors for institutions. The realities of an aging workforce, availability of qualified instructors, and service assignment practices support a continued blend of active duty, retired military, and civilian instructors.

Within the service schools, criticism of systems and command climate from professors is acute. An English professor at the U.S. Naval Academy ridiculed service academies as “the ultimate nanny state”<sup>45</sup> Professors excoriated senior service college students for having “too much power” over faculty and being too lazy to take exams or write papers.<sup>46</sup> Concerns about academic freedom and command influence spread at the JFSC after the CJCS directed a negative officer evaluation report for a military instructor alleged of wrongdoing.<sup>47</sup> An AWC professor cringed at the anti-intellectualism demonstrated by Air Force general officers visiting the school, several of whom

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<sup>43</sup> Hughes, “Professors in the Colonels’ world,” 151.

<sup>44</sup> Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, “Professional Military Education: Separate Military Requirements and Academic Degrees,” *Small Wars Journal*, July 12, 2012, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/professional-military-education-separate-military-requirements-and-academic-degrees> (accessed February 17, 2013).

<sup>45</sup> Bruce Fleming, “The Few, The Proud, The Infantilized,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 8, 2012, <http://chronicle.com/article/The-Few-the-Proud-the/134830/> (accessed February 18, 2013).

<sup>46</sup> Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Reform of Military Education: Twenty-five Years Later,” *Orbis* 56, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 149.

<sup>47</sup> Perry Chiamonte, “Legal group comes to aid of Army instructor ousted over Muslim groups’ complaints,” *Fox News*, October 5, 2012, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/10/05/rising-career-us-army-officer-matthew-dooley-halted-for-teaching-soldiers-on/> (accessed February 18, 2013).

nostalgically recalled their own academic failures, laziness, or poor class standing as former AWC students.<sup>48</sup>

Criticisms and calls for education reform suffer a paradox; senior leaders and legislators become inured to professors' cries for aid to fix ailing PME systems when confronted with senior officials' concurrent boasts of superior military prowess.<sup>49</sup> Some civilian professors at service schools decry student performance and faculty intellect, yet seem to enjoy the higher salaries and less peer competition compared to colleagues at many civilian universities.<sup>50</sup> Professors, military and civilian, must take care to avoid hypocrisy or professional cowardice in efforts to reform education. The PME systems are imperfect and some problems warrant immediate attention, but many complaints hint of prejudices or matters of relative deprivation.

Hyper-communication, groupthink, generational bias, toxicity, and relative deprivation are distorting conditions inhibiting trust in teams, but mostly obscure problems of process related to experience, training, education, and self-development. Responsible citizens and senior leaders must recognize these distortions and have the professional discipline to distinguish real from perceived leadership failures. Communications technology will not regress. Generations will continue to abrade each other. Groupthink is recognizable and preventable. Some level of toxic leadership seems to be historically unavoidable, but potential exists to develop leaders with improved emotional intelligence to mitigate the occurrence of toxic behavior. Understanding these

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<sup>48</sup> Hughes, "Professors in the Colonels' world," 158.

<sup>49</sup> Robert H. Scales, "Grading Officer Education - Return of the Jedi: Reforming professional military education," *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2009, <http://armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4266625/> (accessed February 18, 2013).

<sup>50</sup> Hughes, "Professors in the Colonels' world," 158, 165.

distortions will allow an examination of the components of experience, training, education, and self-development to identify process problems.

### **Experience**

The problems specific to leaders' experience under current development practices are adherence to the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), retaining joint skills forged in war, and modifying service models to meet future requirements.<sup>51</sup> Leaders undergo the most development through experience in organizations and each service depends upon its commanders at every level to develop subordinate leaders. The OPMEP defines required levels of joint education for leaders, but joint force commanders consistently receive officers without requisite training. The strength gained from increased joint activities during the past 12 years of warfare could atrophy if services elect not to participate or fund joint training exercises. Service component career models historically emphasize "one-size-fits-all" approaches to officer development without room for tailored development. Each challenge presents an opportunity for improvement with increased cooperation and trust.

Current service practices do not consistently assign the right leaders to nominative joint assignments. Service cultures reluctant to reward joint staff duty have suffered from forcing or allowing less capable officers to serve in joint billets.<sup>52</sup> Services are compelled to send high quality officers to joint duty, but officers who fail in those billets tend to attract more attention and create more permanent legacies than those who succeed.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> The OPMEP describes the Chairman's guidance and policy for commissioned officers to receive service and joint military education. United States. *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 1.

<sup>52</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads?*, xiv, 38-39.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 38-39.

Officers who struggle in unified environments may simply be weak leaders, or they may be effective only within their service cultures. From career inception, leaders must develop unified skills, requiring services to expand leadership development programs.

Concerned retirees have lamented various flaws with current military leaders—too much tactical experience, too little tactical experience, too young for their rank, too old for their rank. It would seem that no generation of military leaders has ever been as capable as its forebears. Suggesting that field grade officers serving in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom are too tactically proficient and therefore strategically deficient ignores leaders such as MG H.R. McMaster, LTC (Ret.) John Nagl and dozens of senior leaders who have demonstrated both tactical and strategic proficiency.<sup>54</sup> Regardless of current skepticism about today's force, the challenge for the future is preserving joint experience at the tactical, operational, and strategic level with full recognition that the next conflict will differ from the last two. Leaders must resist the historic tendency to withdraw from joint activities or revert to nostalgic practices unrelated to future threats.

Officer career models do not address sufficiently the demands of the current and future operational environments. The current three military generations—Boomers, Gen Xers, and Millennials—are the first cohort of flag officers, mid-grade officers, and junior officers, respectively, to lead and know only all-volunteer forces since the Civil War.<sup>55</sup> The current cohort has known only volunteer incentives, centralized selection boards, and centralized career management practices during a post-Vietnam era of relatively low

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<sup>54</sup> Scales, "Return of the Jedi", <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4266625/> (accessed February 18, 2013).

<sup>55</sup> United States. An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and for Other Purposes. S.I: s.n, 1863.



levels of combat attrition. As a result, some services espoused career patterns rewarding maximum leadership time at low levels and disdain for broadening programs. Success was surviving the “20-year trench” and an O-5 command.<sup>56</sup> Services must expand the realm of successful career paths for officers to acknowledge the value of career fields other than operations.

### **Training**

Leader training problems in three areas require attention: leader training for mid-grade and flag officers; joint education and training for junior officers; and language skill training for all officers. Services provide the most leader training to officer candidates and junior officers, but provide little leader training to officers beyond the grade of O-3. The past twelve years of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan have improved joint skills among service-members at all levels, but the “joint dividend” from these conflicts will dissipate if services retreat from joint training opportunities as funding inevitably shrinks. The most glaring deficiency of U.S. officers in unified environments is the lack of language skills. Each of these three areas merits closer inspection to determine the desired states of the unified leadership development model.

Leadership training among the services tends to peak at the junior officer level and rapidly diminish as officers gain experience and rank. Services provide *education* for their officers beyond the O-3 level, but do not *train* officers, through PME, to perform specific leader actions required at the operational and strategic levels. The difference between training and education is the difference between knowing how and knowing

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<sup>56</sup> Author’s experience from nearly 23 years of active-duty service.

why.<sup>57</sup> Training provides leaders skills to perform tasks or actions to specified standards of proficiency. Services must acknowledge that mid-grade leaders require leader training—not just experience—to master communication and organizational skills required in unified operations. Specific leader actions at the mid-grade and flag officer levels, such as hosting a meeting of military and civilian leaders or influencing a government agency to take action, require consistent training, not trial-and-error.

The improvements in joint war fighting during the last ten years significantly increased joint experience, but may deceive leaders into believing current methods of JPME and training are adequate. Services could squander this joint experience if they retreat from joint education reform amid end strength and budget reductions. Despite OPMEP guidance for joint education at the junior officer level, service institutions rarely enforce joint education standards in service school curricula. For example, at Fort Benning’s Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course, the joint education is limited to classroom training on employment of Close Air Support.<sup>58</sup> Future joint education anticipates increased levels of joint coordination at lower echelons, uneven distribution of combat experience among services, and increased frequency of joint training exercises.

Currently, Armed Forces officers have extremely limited foreign language skills compared to officers from international partner nations. As noted by the EUCOM Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, fewer than “10% of us speak a second language—an obvious capability gap in an organization that operates globally to accomplish its

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<sup>57</sup> Robert H. Essenhigh, letter to the editor, *National Forum: The Phi Kappa Phi Journal*, Spring 2000.

<sup>58</sup> Memorandum, IBOLC, 25 Jan 13, “Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course (IBOLC) Requirements” and “IBOLC Generic 17-week Laydown” available through AKO at <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/designer> (accessed March 23, 2013).

mission.”<sup>59</sup> Stavridis suggests that all Armed Forces officers should speak a language in addition to English in an effort to build trust and improve partnership in global operations.<sup>60</sup> The Admiral’s recommendation echoes Department of Defense guidance and recommendations found in the 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR).<sup>61</sup>

The DLTR recommendations included making “foreign language capability a criterion for general officer/flag officer advancement” and making “junior officers complete language training.”<sup>62</sup> Five years later, the *Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the Department of Defense* reinforced guidance for developing language skills: “markedly increase language, regional and cultural capabilities and capacities.”<sup>63</sup> Limited language skills are a significant liability for officers charged with leading forces and building trust among partners in combined environments. Although officers may matriculate through pre-commissioning programs with fluency in languages not spoken by locals in the next conflict region, officers with foreign language skills demonstrate a proclivity for cooperation and cultural open-mindedness to coalition partners.

## Education

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<sup>59</sup> Admiral James Stavridis, “Supreme Allied Commander Europe” blog site, 5 Feb 13, <http://aco.nato.int/saceur/to-know-the-world.aspx> (accessed March 03, 2013).

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., <http://aco.nato.int/saceur/to-know-the-world.aspx> (accessed March 03, 2013).

<sup>61</sup> United States, *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap*, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2005), 7-8.

<sup>62</sup> United States, *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap*, 7-8.

<sup>63</sup> Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (P&R), *Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the Department of Defense* (September 23, 2010), 14.

Leaders' education must establish a foundation for life-long learning and mental habits to complement the effects of training. The specific problems with education stem from the foundations taught—the basic values essential to professional military service. Analysis of service values, doctrine, schooling, and organizational structure will reveal flaws in each category. Education need not change for the sake of change, but should change to meet the desired conditions of unified leaders.

### Values

Service cultures are rooted in values, customs, and beliefs promulgated through oral traditions, practices, and publications. As part of an officer's education, service doctrine and related publications prescribe behaviors expected of officers. Although the services produce a variety of publications describing service leadership foundations, there is no specific leadership publication in the Joint Publication hierarchy.<sup>64</sup> The current military leadership guide for all services is *The Armed Forces Officer*, which provides excellent descriptions of leader characteristics, officership, and the joint mindset.<sup>65</sup> Because each service indoctrinates leadership principles at officers' inception, the Armed Forces must ensure that pre-commissioning and junior officer education promotes the sense of teamwork demanded in conflict.

The OPMEP guides PME and describes the “policies, procedures, objectives and responsibilities” of PME and JPME.<sup>66</sup> Under authority of U.S. Code, Title X, the OPMEP

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<sup>64</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, “Joint Electronic Library,” Joint Staff J-7, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jointpub.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm) (accessed March 03, 2013).

<sup>65</sup> United States, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, National Defense University Press, 2007).

<sup>66</sup> United States. *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 1.

provides direction to service chiefs for educating and developing leaders.<sup>67</sup> Although not a leadership doctrine manual, the OPMEP guides joint leadership development through its education policies and refers to commonly shared values among services:

U.S. military service is based on values that U.S. military experience has proven to be vital for operational success. These values, while not specific to joint operations, adhere to the most idealistic societal norms, are common to all Services, and represent the essence of military professionalism.<sup>68</sup>

Contrary to this OPMEP assertion, the five branches of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defense (DoD) do not share a single value as expressed in service doctrines.<sup>69</sup> The services and the DoD describe similar qualities with the concepts of duty, honor, service, and courage, but each organization describes its *values* in different terms.<sup>70</sup> A comparison of service doctrines' descriptions of values and service doctrine illustrates the distinctions between services. (See figure 2, below.)

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<sup>67</sup> United States, *Officer Military Education Policy*, 1-2.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, A-A-6.

<sup>69</sup> United States, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 137, and United States, *Joint Ethics Regulation (JER) DoD 5500.07R*, (Washington DC: Secretary of Defense, 2011), 118-119. The JER self-describes on page 1 as the “single source of standards of ethical conduct and ethics guidance” and prescribes 10 primary ethical values. In contrast, the DoD website lists the six values of duty, integrity, ethics, honor, courage, and loyalty. However, these six values are not found in authoritative DoD publications. The author cites the authoritative *Joint Ethics Regulation* definitions of values. Other authors have cited the DoD website list of values found at <http://www.defense.gov/about/dod101.aspx#values> (accessed March 27, 2013).

<sup>70</sup> United States, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 137.

Dept of Defense Ethical Values DoD 5500.07R	Joint Joint Pub 1	Army ADP 6-22 ADRP 6-22 FM 6-22 ATPs (4)	Navy NDP-1 <i>Command at Sea</i>	Air Force AFDD 1-1	Marine Corps MCWP 6-11	Coast Guard NDP-1  COMDINST M5351.3
Loyalty		Loyalty	Naval Ethos			Guardian Ethos
Caring	Competence	Duty	Commitment	Excellence	Commitment	Devotion to Duty
Respect		Respect				Respect
Responsible Citizenship	Teamwork	Selfless Service		Service		
Honesty	Moral Courage	Honor	Honor		Honor	Honor
Integrity	Integrity	Integrity		Integrity		
Pursuit of Excellence	Physical Courage	Personal Courage	Courage		Courage	
Fairness		(Empathy)				
Accountability						
Promise Keeping						

(Figure 2, Service and DoD values adapted from associated doctrinal publications)

Definitions promote understanding. Varying definitions of values, traits, and other terms result in cultural differences as officers mature. The differences in service doctrine definitions seem slight, but these variances resemble the separation between five ships setting sail from the same port along azimuths one degree apart. Over time, the distances become great and, without correction, the ships will fail to recognize each other. Leaders immersed in service culture for ten or more years before attending JPME must overcome service culture differences and perceived differences in service values.<sup>71</sup> Absent shared values or understanding, newly-commissioned officers begin service at a trust deficit that deepens over time spent immersed in service cultures.

Inculcating a sense of joint values early in officers' careers will improve trust between leaders of different services. Leaders must fully grasp the concepts associated

<sup>71</sup> United States, *Officer Military Education Policy*, A-A-A-1.

with values and ethics from career inception and re-visit those concepts regularly during service. The authoritative Department of Defense dictionary, Joint Publication 1-02, fails to define ethics, values, and other concepts associated with leadership foundation.<sup>72</sup> The Army chose to remove military definitions of such terms in its latest leadership publication, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, deferring to common usage.<sup>73</sup> Defining *ethics, values, principles, competencies, traits, characteristics, and attributes* will frame the necessity for sharing some concepts between services and preserving other concepts within service purview.

Ethics are “the rules or standards governing the conduct of members of a profession.”<sup>74</sup> For U.S. military leaders, ethics follow the Just War Tradition, embracing the concepts of *jus ad bellum* (justice of war) and *jus in bello* (justice in war).<sup>75</sup> These concepts are the premise for the Law of Armed Conflict guiding the behavior of service members.<sup>76</sup> Each service describes an ethos or ethics guiding behavior; only the Marine Corps claims “a sense of elitism” and how Marines are different from other services because of “selflessness,” despite every other service also embracing the concept of selfless service.<sup>77</sup> Each service describes ethics as behavior desired according to laws, moral codes, and duty obligations—aptly summarized as *cedat emptor*, or “let the taker

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<sup>72</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense dictionary of military and associated terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010).

<sup>73</sup> U.S. Army, *Army Leadership*, ADRP 6-22, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, August, 2012), vi.

<sup>74</sup> William Morris, *The American Heritage Dictionary*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 467.

<sup>75</sup> Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 21.

<sup>76</sup> United States, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 15.

<sup>77</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Leading Marines*, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 6-11, (Washington DC: U.S. Marine Corps, November 27, 2002), 8. The MCWP 6-11 describes USMC ethos as distinct from other services, despite similar references to selfless service in Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard leadership publications.

believe in us.”<sup>78</sup> Thus, services have a logical basis to share a commonly-defined, professional service ethic without fear of losing service identity, traditions, or values.

Values are those concepts or ideals “that guide someone’s life,” helping that person “to make important decisions.”<sup>79</sup> As noted, services describe values in similar ways, but do not agree on specific terms. In each service, values represent those positive conditions associated with a leader’s character, guiding behaviors within the framework of a service ethic or ethos. Values have no specific relation to any service. Courage under fire is just as important to Marines as to Sailors; integrity is equally important to Airmen as to Soldiers. The absence of shared service values breeds suspicion among the uneducated and inexperienced, inhibiting trust between services.

Similar to values, principles are those elements “determining intrinsic nature or characteristic behavior.”<sup>80</sup> In leadership doctrine, principles serve as parameters for behavior, much as the principles of joint operations guide warfighting.<sup>81</sup> Principles provide guidance for behavior and thought regardless of service component and do not require service-specific definitions. Common definitions of principles and values reflect similar dependence on the conceptual notion of the terms; service-members gain no advantage by the introduction of redundant terms in leadership doctrine. This paper will retain *values*, but not *principles*, in the discussion of desired conditions for leadership development in Chapter Two.

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<sup>78</sup> David Segal and Karen DeAngelis, “Changing Conceptions of the Military Professions”, chapter 10 in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider (eds.), *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 197.

<sup>79</sup> A. Ivanovic and Peter H. Collin, *Dictionary of Human Resources and Personnel Management*, (London: A & C Black, 2006), 64.

<sup>80</sup> William Morris, *The American Heritage Dictionary*, 985.

<sup>81</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 20 2009), ix.



Competencies are defined as “duties or tasks performed as part of a job with the standards which should be achieved in those duties.”<sup>82</sup> Each service describes competencies differently in its doctrine. The U.S. Coast Guard provides a comprehensive list of its 28 desired competencies in its service doctrine.<sup>83</sup> The Air Force neatly organizes eight competencies within three categories and provides sub-competency definitions.<sup>84</sup> The Navy prescribes five competencies in its Navy Leadership Competency Model.<sup>85</sup> The Army describes only three.<sup>86</sup> The Marine Corps has no competencies, but managed a feat of tautology with this statement on leader foundations: “these standards and ideals—from ethos to traits and principles to our core values—are recognized as essentials of good leadership.”<sup>87</sup>

Given the remarkable array of competencies described by services, broad definitions of leader attributes are not surprising. The Air Force provides a concise history of the evolution of leadership descriptors, showing how attributes in 1948 have become today’s Air Force values.<sup>88</sup> However, the same publication also defines attributes reflectively as competencies.<sup>89</sup> The Army defines attributes as “how an individual behaves and learns within an environment” in its leadership requirements model and

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<sup>82</sup> Ivanovic and Collin, *Dictionary of Human Resources and Personnel Management*, 54.

<sup>83</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, *Commandant Instruction M5351.3: Leadership Development Framework*, May 9, 2006 (Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, May 9, 2006), 3-1 to 3-21.

<sup>84</sup> U.S. Air Force, *Leadership and Force Development*, Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1 (Washington DC: U.S. Air Force, November 8, 2011), 53.

<sup>85</sup> U.S. Navy, “Center for Personal and Professional Development,” U.S. Navy, <https://www.netc.navy.mil/centers/cppd/News.aspx?ID=1> (accessed February 24, 2013).

<sup>86</sup> U.S. Army, *Army Leadership*, ADRP 6-22, 1-6.

<sup>87</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Leading Marines*, MCWP 6-11, 34.

<sup>88</sup> U.S. Air Force, *Leadership and Force Development*, AFDD 1-1, 26.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

prescribes attributes of character, presence, and intellect.<sup>90</sup> The Marine Corps leadership manual displays 14 leadership traits on a single page with no further definitions or explanation; these “traits” are consistent with other services’ descriptions of attributes or characteristics.<sup>91</sup> The CJCS has described “understanding, intent, and trust” as key joint leader attributes.<sup>92</sup> No matter how the services define the term, attributes are not specific to any service culture.

A trait, in the context of behavioral science and leadership studies, is “an element of personality that is relatively stable throughout the lifespan and across contexts”<sup>93</sup> Studies indicate that behavioral traits can change as a function of environmental impacts, but are resistant to development after the age of 40.<sup>94</sup> Currently, officers often serve their first joint assignment between ages 35-45. As life experience solidifies certain traits, officers are unlikely to adapt personality traits for demands of the joint environment.<sup>95</sup> As mentioned in the section on “Toxicity,” traits correlate to perceptions, not performance. However, characteristic adaptations necessary for effective performance are less likely to occur as a service-member approaches 40. Thus, the services must inculcate the desired adaptations when officers are much younger to “create jointness sooner and deeper in the force.”<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> U.S. Army, *Army Leadership*, ADRP 6-22, 1-6.

<sup>91</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Leading Marines*, MCWP 6-11, 103.

<sup>92</sup> Martin Dempsey and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mission Command White Paper*, (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 3, 2012), 5.

<sup>93</sup> Dan P. Adams and Bradley D. Olson, “Personality Development: Continuity and Change Over the Life Course”, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 61 (2010): 517-542.

<sup>94</sup> John, et al, *Handbook of Personality*, 389.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 390.

<sup>96</sup> Dempsey and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mission Command White Paper*, 3.

Characteristics, defined as “a distinguishing feature or attribute,” are nearly identical to attributes for purposes of leadership development doctrine.<sup>97</sup> Service doctrine publications would better serve the Armed Forces to use *characteristics* or *attributes* to describe the general qualities of an Armed Forces leader, but preserve *competencies* to describe service-specific abilities with relevant actions. *Values* and *ethics* are common to all Armed Forces officers; describing these concepts consistently in all service doctrine publications will increase trust and promote habits of mind consistent with joint operations.

### Doctrine

The second category of leaders’ education requiring adjustment is doctrine. The services describe leadership behaviors in similar ways, but the volume and scope of service leadership doctrine is striking. For example, the Army felt compelled to employ four levels of over-lapping publications to describe leadership: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22; Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22; Field Manual (FM) 6-22; and Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 6-22.1, 6-22.2, 6-22-3, and 6-22.4.<sup>98</sup> The Air Force and Marine Corps each employ a single reference, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 6-11, respectively, to describe the desired leadership traits and competencies. The Navy mentions values briefly in three pages of its Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP)-1, but

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<sup>97</sup> Morris, *The American Heritage Dictionary*, 259.

<sup>98</sup> U.S. Army, “Doctrine 2015,” Mission Command Center of Excellence, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/MCCOE/Doctrine2015Tables.asp> (accessed February 13, 2013).

describes seven leadership categories in *Command at Sea*.<sup>99</sup> The Coast Guard employs a thorough, albeit formulaic, explanation of 28 leadership competencies in its Commandant Instructions 5351.3, but excludes description of values already described in NDP-1.<sup>100</sup>

Service doctrine for leadership competencies and service-specific skills makes sense. Different doctrines for values and attributes do not make sense. As noted in the previous section on values, there is no joint publication for leadership development. The gap between *The Armed Forces Officer* and the OPMEP invites unhelpful suspicion between services as they defend their values and culture from change.

### Schooling

Comparison of service leadership doctrines and PME processes reveals shortcomings in JPME compliance prescribed by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols).<sup>101</sup> Each service developed doctrine and assignment practices long before the introduction of Goldwater-Nichols. As a result, the perception lingers that JPME is just another certification instead of a vital component in joint officer development.<sup>102</sup> Closer inspection of each service's leadership development and school assignment practices will reveal specific shortcomings related to building trust and leading in a unified environment.

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<sup>99</sup> James C. Stavridis and Robert Girrier, *Command at Sea*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 144; U.S. Navy, *Naval Warfare*, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, (Washington DC: U.S. Navy, March 2010).

<sup>100</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, *Commandant Instruction M5351.3: Leadership Development Framework*, 3-1 to 3-21.

<sup>101</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads?*, 44, 96, 115.

<sup>102</sup> Vincent C. Bowhens, "Manage or Educate: Fulfilling the Purpose of Joint Professional Military Education," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 67 (4<sup>th</sup> quarter, 2012): 27-28.

The Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) oversees nearly all training and schooling for soldiers, but not assignments.<sup>103</sup> Subordinate to TRADOC, the Army's Combined Arms Center (CAC) is responsible for professional military education and leadership development.<sup>104</sup> However, TRADOC and CAC have no control over assignments; the Army G-1 oversees Human Resources Command (HRC), the command responsible for all personnel assignments.<sup>105</sup>

This relationship allows supported commands to influence officer assignments to meet wartime needs. The Army's demand for leaders during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) resulted in many officers attending PME schools later than expected or not at all.<sup>106</sup> This demand created flux for schools and administrators. As one retired Army Lieutenant General remarked, the Army now has field grade leaders who are "immensely qualified in combat leadership," but "less than fully prepared for senior leadership."<sup>107</sup>

The Army provides a structured PME system that complements the JPME requirements in theory, but not in practice.<sup>108</sup> All company grade officers must attend resident courses at the O-1 and O-3 levels; however, those courses rarely include joint

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<sup>103</sup> U.S. Army, "About TRADOC," U.S. Army, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/About.asp> (accessed February 13, 2013).

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> U.S. Army, "Army G-1 Organization Chart," U.S. Army, <http://www.armyg1.army.mil/g-1org.asp> (accessed February 13, 2013).

<sup>106</sup> Scales, "Education and Training: Too Busy to Learn," <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-02/too-busy-learn> (accessed February 13, 2013).

<sup>107</sup> James M. Dubik, "Education, Experience, and Training: Responsibilities to the Army as a Profession," *Army Magazine* 62, no.6 (June 2012): 22.

<sup>108</sup> U.S. Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, DA PAM 600-3 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, February 1, 2010), 8-9. There is no mention of joint education for junior officer leadership development.

education.<sup>109</sup> During recent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, junior officers interacted daily with leaders from other services, government agencies, and nationalities.<sup>110</sup> Army officers normally complete JPME Phase I during Intermediate Level Education (ILE) as recently promoted majors.<sup>111</sup> The resident ILE course includes officers from other services and nations. Majors usually attend ILE before serving on a joint staff and are adequately prepared to serve at the Joint Task Force level.

However, the Army does not consistently assign JPME II qualified, O-5 officers to joint assignments.<sup>112</sup> Senior Service Colleges (SSC) provide JPME II to board-selected, senior Army Lieutenant Colonels, most of whom graduate from SSC as Colonels.<sup>113</sup> Thus, the Army creates a JPME II gap between an officer's 12<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> year of service. To compensate for the decade-long joint education gap between ILE and SSC, joint commands must routinely send Army O-4, O-5, and O-6 officers to the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) for 10 weeks during a joint tour.<sup>114</sup> Joint commanders should expect the Army to provide joint-educated Army O-5 officers to fill O-5 billets, not to lose these officers for 10 weeks to receive necessary training and education. The resulting PME throughput has limited joint education for junior officers

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<sup>109</sup> U.S. Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 8-9.

<sup>110</sup> Author's observation as Task Force Commander in OEF XI. For example, during OEF XI, one U.S. Company Commander in Wardak Province commanded over 100 U.S. troops (including USAF and USN personnel); partnered with Afghan Police, Afghan Battalion staff and two Afghan Army companies; and coordinated with four Czech Republic Mentor Teams.

<sup>111</sup> U.S. Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 3, 9.

<sup>112</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads?*, 39-42.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 39-42.

<sup>114</sup> Joint Forces Staff College, "Joint and Combined Warfighting School Overview," National Defense University, [http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools\\_programs/jcws/course\\_description.asp](http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jcws/course_description.asp) (accessed March 17, 2013).

and mismanaged JPME II-level assignments. The combined effect of these practices has degraded trust between services and produced officers with overly service-specific focus.

The U.S. Navy PME structure meets CJCS requirements, but its practical application frequently does not meet the CJCS intent. Primary PME, covering service-specific knowledge and an orientation to joint service capabilities, is available as an online course. Officers at the Lieutenant Commander level attend Intermediate service PME and JPME Phase I at the College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS), an equivalent service command and staff college, or through distance learning. Officers complete Senior Level PME and JPME Phase II at JCWS, service college, or joint senior level college as Commanders or Captains.<sup>115</sup>

Although the Navy continuum provides the means to complete required JPME, the institutional requirements do not provide sufficient ways to reach desired conditions. The Navy requires JPME Phase I only of officers assigned to CNCS and the Navy requires JPME Phase II only of officers selected for command in the rank of Commander.<sup>116</sup> By this practice, an officer could, in theory, complete a 24 year career, retire without command as a Commander, and never complete any JPME.

Complicating the Navy's limited distribution of JPME is its selection process for JPME attendance. The Bureau of Personnel has no selection process for assignment to JPME and no automated mechanism to discern which Officers have completed JPME.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> U.S. Navy, *Joint Professional Military Education Command Requirement*, Naval Administrative Message 093/05, Chief of Naval Operations, (Washington DC: U.S. Navy, May 02, 2005), <http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/documents/navadmins/nav2005/nav05093.txt> (accessed March 17, 2013).

<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Christopher Hayes, "Developing the Navy's Operational Leaders: A Critical Look," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 93.

The Navy does not discern how the course work was completed (in residence or distance), nor is there coherent joint assignment policy to fill mandatory Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) positions.<sup>118</sup> The Navy's wide latitude in selection practices for PME and limited regard for JPME invite a mindset in which joint education is merely a distracting requirement from proper naval assignments.

The Marine Corps Order (MCO) P1553.4B defines Marine Corps PME. The governing MCO describes course completions by grade, as well as cross-service equivalencies to maximize completion opportunities.<sup>119</sup> The order establishes expectations at each grade for completion of Professional Reading and formal courses in order to be competitive for promotion. Although the MCO does not prescribe any PME at the O-1 to O-3 level, it directs PME courses for O-3 through O-9.<sup>120</sup> The Marine Corps routinely assigns officers with requisite JPME qualifications at appropriate times to appropriate joint staff billets. Although the Marine Corps encounters few of the problems related to JPME reported by other services, the Marine Corps limits joint education primarily to mid-grade leaders with little focus on joint matters at the junior officer level.

The Air Force Instruction 36-2301 prescribes Developmental Education (DE), including PME, at all levels of an officer's career as one of three core elements in the Continuum of Learning.<sup>121</sup> Leaders must complete each level of DE to be competitive for promotion: Basic Developmental Education (BDE); Intermediate Developmental

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<sup>118</sup> Christopher Hayes, "Developing the Navy's Operational Leaders: A Critical Look," 93.

<sup>119</sup> U.S. Marine Corps, *Professional Military Education*, Marine Corps Order 1533.4B (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, January 25, 2008), 1-4.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-4.

<sup>121</sup> U.S. Air Force, *Developmental Education*, AFI 36-2301 (Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, July 16, 2010), 4.



Education (IDE); and Senior Developmental Education (SDE).<sup>122</sup> Air Force Captains complete BDE at Squadron Officer School as residents of the ten week course or through distance learning. The school develops officers with a deep understanding of air power and its application, but has no Joint focus or content. The IDE-level Air Command and Staff College (ASCS) resident and correspondence courses provide JPME phase I for O-4s. The Air War College, SDE, provides JPME II to O-5 and O-6 officers from all services, but only for leaders attending the resident course. Officers may complete SDE through distance learning, but will not earn JPME II credit. As a result, an Air Force officer unable to attend any resident PME could serve twenty years or longer without the benefit of joint peer contact in a learning environment.

The U.S. Coast Guard receives guidance for leader development through the Commandant Instructions Memorandum (COMDTINST) 5351.3.<sup>123</sup> The instructions reflect results of critical internal reviews conducted in the Junior Officer Needs Assessment (JONA) and Mid-Grade Officer Leadership Gap (MOLGA) reports.<sup>124</sup> The studies proposed improvements in officer education and leader development reflected in the current policy, defining 28 competencies in four broad categories among five leader responsibility levels. The instructions comprise a detailed series of spreadsheets cross-referencing categories to levels to competencies, providing sufficient proof that each competency aligns to multiple educational or training courses.

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<sup>122</sup> U.S. Air Force, *Developmental Education*, 4.

<sup>123</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction M5351.3: Leadership Development Framework, 1-2.

<sup>124</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, *Junior Officer Needs Assessment Final Report*, U.S. Coast Guard, August 20, 1999, <http://www.uscg.mil/hr/cg133/na/jona.pdf>, (accessed March 02, 2013) and U.S. Coast Guard, *Mid-Grade Officer Leadership Gap Analysis (MOLGA) Report*, U.S. Coast Guard, December 27, 2007, <http://www.uscg.mil/leadership/lac/MOLGA.pdf> (accessed March 02, 2013).

Despite the tremendous effort to produce the matrix design of the COMDTINST M5351.3, these instructions offer no joint leadership development courses or programs for officers until “responsibility level three,” or O-3/4.<sup>125</sup> The MOLGA report identified significant shortcomings in strategic thinking, political savvy, human resource management, and vision development, recommending a structured school approach similar to the U.S. Army’s basic and career courses for junior officer development.<sup>126</sup> The current USCG approach to officer development lacks consistent mechanisms to provide comprehensive education programs to its junior officers and would benefit from a structured approach similar to the Army’s basic and career courses.<sup>127</sup>

At the joint level, JPME guidance and joint practices also have shortfalls contributing to problems of building trust. The existing Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) provides guidance for JPME. The military services do not implement the policy evenly. Congressional review determined that current JPME “is basically sound;” its greatest weakness is the widely reported “disconnect between JPME and joint duty assignments.”<sup>128</sup> Services must coordinate PME and JPME requirements with projected career paths of officers. Most criticisms of JPME decry its timing more so than its substance.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, *Commandant Instruction M5351.3: Leadership Development Framework*, 4-13 to 4-20.

<sup>126</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, *Mid-Grade Officer Leadership Gap Analysis (MOLGA) Report*, 2.

<sup>127</sup> Rosemary P. Firestine, “United States Coast Guard: Officer Corps Military Professional Development Program,” Master’s thesis, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, June 10, 2011), 108, 114.

<sup>128</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads?*, xiv.

<sup>129</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads?*, xiv.

The Joint Qualification System (JQS) allows deployment-related joint credit and has excused many leaders from JPME at crucial times during their field grade years.<sup>130</sup> Services, in compliance with Congressional requirements, offer JPME II at Senior Service Colleges, with some variance to standards.<sup>131</sup> Unevenly applied JPME II standards and JQS credit have encouraged the perception of joint education as a mere certification rather than a habit of mind. If officers view joint duty and joint education as temporary penalties from the oasis of their service cultures, they cannot lead sincerely and effectively in unified environments.

### Organizational Structure

The organizational structure for coordinating leadership development does not sufficiently enforce the guidance provided by the OPMEP and Goldwater-Nichols.<sup>132</sup> A 2010 U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services (HASC) report identified a key problem in the supervision of PME: “twenty years later, there is no dedicated full-time director of military education that could respond in a comprehensive way to the spirit of the Skelton Panel’s recommendation.”<sup>133</sup> The Directorate of Joint Force Development, DJ7, has “responsibility for joint training, exercises, professional military education, doctrine, concept development, experimentation, lessons learned and operational analysis,” but not leadership development.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Qualification System Self-Nomination,” Joint Officer Management, <https://pki.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/jqs/init.do> (accessed April 2, 2013).

<sup>131</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads?*, 68-69.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 97-98.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>134</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Directorate for Joint Force Development,” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, <http://www.jcs.mil/page.aspx?id=22> (accessed March 17, 2013).

The Armed Forces must bridge the organizational gap between service-specific leadership development and leadership development required to succeed in globally interdependent operations. Five services will not independently develop leaders with necessary skills unless supported by an organization capable of coordinating service, agency, and international leadership issues. The closure of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in 2011 forced the Joint Staff to absorb multiple functions and responsibilities.<sup>135</sup> As a result, the saturated conditions observed by the HASC “Crossroads” 2010 report only worsened with increased missions assigned to the DJ7.<sup>136</sup>

### **Self-Development**

Officers have a duty to seek self-improvement throughout their service and become experts in the conduct of warfare. Armed Forces officers must demonstrate the initiative, discipline, and stamina to study history, warfare, language, and themselves. Leaders should expect sound leadership from their services, but should not expect to receive every skill or habit of thought from PME and duty assignments. For many officers, the most difficult task is achieving self-awareness. Less hierarchical organizations and improved communications technology have produced more sources of reflection for an officer’s self-awareness, but existing leader development practices tend toward “one-size-fits-all” models with little room for tailored development. The principal problem with self-development is the lack of tailored development. Two examples of self-development practices will illustrate the potential for improvement.

Several services have introduced 360 assessments soliciting unattributed feedback to

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<sup>135</sup> Bill Sizemore, “Dignitaries, Brass to officially dissolve JFCOM today,” *The Virginian-Pilot*, August 4, 2011, <http://hamptonroads.com/2011/08/dignitaries-brass-officially-dissolve-jfcom-today> (accessed Mar 17, 2013).

<sup>136</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads?*, 95-98.

provide officers with better self-awareness.<sup>137</sup> The Army, for example, provides a Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback (MSAF) website enabling individuals to select subordinates, peers, and leaders as reviewers.<sup>138</sup> The MSAF presents reviewers with a Likert-type scale to assess leader behaviors in context of attributes and competencies. The assessment provides reviewers' anonymous comments and an automated synopsis of the rated leader's strengths and weaknesses. The problem is the reviewer selection process. Rated leaders may choose anyone as a reviewer and reviewers can opt not to participate without penalty. Reviewers may also provide unhelpful feedback because of the inherent lack of accountability in the process. As a result, leaders may select a favorable, agreeable population of raters to ensure positive results. Comity does not equal competency and insincere agreement does not foster trust.

Leaders conduct self-development throughout their years of service through professional reading and study, but the practical execution and supervision of professional reading programs lacks focus and discipline. Professional reading lists are valuable if leaders read the documents and advance from lower levels of Bloom's taxonomy to upper levels through the synthesis of discussing readings.<sup>139</sup> Currently, too few leaders actively discuss professional readings to provide context and a better understanding. If senior leaders post reading lists on websites, but subordinates fail to follow up with appropriate discussions of the readings, the effect is not unlike leaving a

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<sup>137</sup> Sam Fellman, "CNO's tough new rules for screening commanders," *Navy Times*, <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2012/06/navy-commander-fired-screening-360-reviews-061812/> (accessed March 03, 2013); U.S. Army, "Multi-Source Feedback and Assessment Overview," Army 360, <http://msaf.army.mil/Help/Default.aspx> (accessed March 03, 2013); Jill Laster, "AF asks airman to rate their own performance," *Air Force Times*, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/03/air-force-airmen-to-rate-their-own-performance-031812w/> (accessed March 03, 2013).

<sup>138</sup> U.S. Army, <http://msaf.army.mil/Help/Default.aspx> (accessed March 03, 2013);

<sup>139</sup> Benjamin S. Bloom, *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives; The Classification of Educational Goals* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1956), 77.

student at a library with instructions to “get educated.” Professional reading is essential to unified leadership development and need not be a random, unchecked pursuit in today’s collaborative environment.

## CHAPTER 2: THE DESIRED CONDITIONS

*But the fact remains that the services are not alike, that no wit of man can make them alike, and that the retention by each of its separate character, customs and confidence is essential to the conserving of our national military power. Unification has not altered this basic proposition. The first requirement of a unified establishment is moral soundness in each of the integral parts, without which there can be no soundness at all.*

—*The Armed Forces Officer*<sup>1</sup>

The desired conditions for Joint Force 2020 leaders must balance the demands of the projected operational environment with respect for the traditions of American military leaders.<sup>2</sup> The 2010 JOE estimate provides analysis of emerging trends across the range of factors affecting national security. The CJCS White Papers and CCJO provide guidance for leadership development of Joint Force 2020. Understanding strategic guidance and the operational environment provides appropriate framework for expressing the desired leader conditions of a unified leader development enterprise. Following a description of the desired conditions, this proposal provides a campaign model to portray the relationships of ends, ways, means, and risk in developing unified leaders.

Strategic assessments describe a future environment with increasing levels of security cooperation among international forces to deter armed conflict as competition for

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<sup>1</sup> United States, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington DC: Potomac Books, National Defense University Press, 2007), 13.

<sup>2</sup> In this paper, “American military leader” refers to leaders in the U.S. Armed Forces with full recognition that the United States of America is only one country on the North American continent and “American” is not a term exclusive to U.S. citizens.

resources becomes more acute.<sup>3</sup> Leaders of the next 20 years should expect to serve in “coalitions in which the United States may or may not be the leading actor, but in which partners will invariably play an important part.”<sup>4</sup> An increasingly multi-polar world, influenced by nation states and non-state actors, requires leaders to understand the importance of “alliances, partnerships, and coalitions” that “will determine the framework in which Joint Force commanders operate.”<sup>5</sup>

The 2010 JOE estimate concludes that Armed Forces will remain engaged in “combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction.”<sup>6</sup> Leaders should expect increased global interconnectivity, increased asymmetrical threats, increased transnational criminal organizations, and increased competition for energy. Specifically, the CJCS envisions the emerging concept of “globally integrated operations” requiring more agile Joint Task Forces and international partner interdependence.<sup>7</sup>

The CJCS introduced the concept of *globally integrated operations* in the most recent CCJO, describing the need for globally-positioned, joint force elements and mission partners to forge teams and capabilities quickly across boundaries and domains.<sup>8</sup> The key change is focus on mission over geo-political boundaries at the Joint Task Force level. The CJCS recognizes fully that “mission-based Joint Forces” will not “replace geographically or functionally-based ones,” but affirms that some missions will require

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<sup>3</sup> U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment 2010* (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Command, February 18, 2010), 38, states “...cooperation and competition among conventional powers will continue to be a primary operational context for the Joint Force for the next 25 years.”

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 70.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2012), 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.



Joint Force Commanders to “explore hybrid command arrangements that provide greater flexibility in how Joint Forces accomplish their mission.”<sup>9</sup>

Leaders must anticipate becoming part of joint and coalition organizations with limited combined training experience. The CJCS envisions joint leaders who have the abilities to “lead transitions” and “operate on intent.”<sup>10</sup> The United States may not be the principal force provider in some circumstances and U.S. leaders must be capable of conducting operations as part of a multi-national team with minority U.S. force representation.<sup>11</sup> Leaders must mitigate disruptive, cultural differences hindering team success and accept roles as supporting members of international teams.

The Chairman directs current and future leaders to embrace the concept of *mission command*, which stresses mission-type orders executed by subordinates with “disciplined initiative.”<sup>12</sup> Mission command is not a new thought and appeared in U.S. service doctrine in 1982.<sup>13</sup> Leaders with unprecedented situational awareness and communications technology must develop the discipline and courage to allow subordinates to execute—and sometimes fail—within established intent. The CJCS affirms the need for leaders who demonstrate “creativity, adaptability, critical-thinking, and independent, rapid decision-making.”<sup>14</sup> The Armed Forces must promote trust-building behaviors to allow “adaptive, innovative, critical thinking” leaders freedom of

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<sup>9</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CCJO*, 6.

<sup>10</sup> Martin E. Dempsey and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mission Command White Paper* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 3, 2012), 5.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CCJO*, 5-6.

<sup>12</sup> Dempsey and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mission Command*, 1.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Army, *Operations*, FM 100-5 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1982), 2-1, 2-3, 2-7.

<sup>14</sup> Dempsey and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Mission Command*, 5-6.

execution as they balance requirements for “hybrid command,” effective partnerships, and interoperability.<sup>15</sup>

Based on strategic leader guidance and environmental assessment, three principal conditions emerge for developing unified leaders:

- Leaders of character with shared values, ethics, and attributes who are experts in their service competencies and cooperative in unified environments.
- Well-educated leaders with habits of mind and disciplined self-development skills who demonstrate mastery of the profession of arms.
- Trained and experienced leaders with language and cultural skills who lead confidently in uncertain conditions as part of a unified team.

Achieving these desired conditions in each Armed Forces officer requires understanding of each condition and necessary adjustments to service practices. The services have developed leaders to win the nation’s wars for roughly 12 generations. Any adjustments to service practices must happen carefully and with full consideration of the history and success of each service’s leadership programs.

### **Unified Leadership**

A unified leadership development enterprise must consistently recognize and leverage American strengths to ensure strong leadership through the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The connection of military leaders to the Constitution and its citizens is a critical factor to national power. The unified enterprise must embrace the past and future of American culture to maintain the vital connections between government and the governed. As demographics change in the United States over the next century, the Armed Forces must embrace leadership development programs capitalizing on enduring American strengths.

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<sup>15</sup> Martin E. Dempsey and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Education White Paper* (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2012), 6; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CCJO*, 6,10.

America's best military leaders reflect diverse backgrounds and changes to U.S. society, law, and national interest over the past 238 years. Well-known, outstanding leaders such as George Washington, John Paul Jones, A.A. Vandegrift, and Henry Arnold share certain leadership attributes with less famous, outstanding leaders such as Smedley Butler, William Sims, Daniel James, and Roy Benevidez. Demographics, technology, and strategy have changed significantly since the creation of the United States, yet the national fabric, torn during the Civil War and frayed at times, has remained surprisingly durable.

The United States Armed Forces are distinct from other nations' forces because of the high degree of ethnic and religious diversity among volunteer service members. Forging a common ethical foundation in a diverse group of leaders with common loyalty to the Constitution requires an agile enterprise. The Military Leadership Diversity Commission, established by Congress in 2009, recommended the services "include education in diversity dynamics and training in practices for leading diverse groups effectively."<sup>16</sup> The committee distinguished the leadership diversity training from current equal opportunity training; leaders must have the right skills to produce excellent results from diverse teams.<sup>17</sup> However, diversity does not grant individuality. Armed Forces leaders enforce service before self. The unified leadership development enterprise acknowledges variances of personality traits and temperaments within diverse groups, but demands shared values, the utmost professionalism, and demonstrated loyalty.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #6: Diversity Leadership* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, February 2011), 18.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>18</sup> Oliver P. John, Richard W. Robins, and Lawrence A. Pervin, *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*, (New York: Guilford Press, 2008), 167.

Given the diversity of the volunteer force, the services must develop selected skills in leaders and ensure leaders demonstrate these skills at regular phases of development. The establishment of unified values and attributes does not prevent the services from improving upon these leader foundations. Sound, well-researched arguments exist within each service for inclusion of distinct attributes, such as presence or intellect.<sup>19</sup> Emphasis on service-specific competencies is necessary and appropriate. However, adopting one service's leadership doctrine above all other services' doctrine is an emotionally charged proposition and a recipe for friction.

The principal challenge to the services is defining who "we" are. Services must imbue leaders with a mature mindset to ensure that "we" mean all members of the current team in the current fight—whatever the team and wherever the fight. Bridging inevitable gaps in personalities and cultures is possible through education, training, and effective communication, but the decisive point in leadership is trust. A maxim attributed to General of the Army George Marshall reflects the desired attitude for unified leaders: "there is no limit to the good you can do if you don't care who gets the credit."

### Values

*The Armed Forces Officer* describes essential qualities of leaders with the philosophical concept of *Arete*, or premise that the nature of an object defines it.<sup>20</sup> The book proposes eight qualities of a leader's *Arete*: honor, respect, devotion to duty, service, excellence, courage, commitment, loyalty, and integrity.<sup>21</sup> This list blends values

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<sup>19</sup> U.S. Army, *Army Leadership*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2012), 1-5.

<sup>20</sup> United States, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 44.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

and attributes from each service's doctrine and represents qualities desired of all Armed Forces' leaders. Historical review of American leaders yields a similar list of enduring characteristics. The enduring characteristics of America's greatest leaders include courage, honor, ingenuity, sacrifice, and tenacity. Trust—in each other, in leaders, and in subordinates—fuels these characteristics.

Given the definitions of *values*, *attributes*, and *competencies* from chapter 1, the unified leadership qualities should comprise three categories: unified values; unified leader attributes; and service competencies. Narrowing the range of descriptors currently found in service doctrines to three broad categories provides clarity, but allows for service emphasis on additional dimensions or competencies of leadership. Melding services' values, attributes, and traits into unified values and unified attributes represents a compromise of best practices from each service.

Derived from the services' most desired leader characteristics are the four unified leadership values: duty, honor, country, and trust. The concept of duty includes devotion to duty, commitment, sacrifice, and selfless service. Duty requires service before self and commitment to complete any mission. American leaders accept that the security of the Constitution is worth the ultimate sacrifice. Duty requires selflessness in combat or in peace. Shirking duties or assignments in peacetime is as morally reprehensible as cowardice under fire in combat.

Honor is the soul of the professional military; the nation demands honor of its service members under all circumstances. Public support for the military has directly reflected military leaders' honorable conduct; a volunteer force with uncertain funding must rely upon honor as a foundation for service and conduct. Love of country,

inextricably linked to honor, inspires leaders to preserve the Constitution and defend national interests. Trust is the essential bond of leadership and forms “a mutual relationship between leaders and those they lead.”<sup>22</sup> A leader’s credibility depends on his deeds matching his words and his words matching sincere commitment.

### Attributes

The unified leader attributes are courage, respect, ingenuity, tenacity, integrity, and loyalty. These attributes incorporate services’ descriptions of desired leader attributes, traits, characteristics, and competencies with focus on essential elements most common to all services’ traditions and expectations. The services are currently developing leadership qualities inherent to each unified leader attribute; formally educating all Armed Forces leaders at service inception with these particular attributes will provide a common bond.

Courage enables leaders to brave hostile enemy fire, defend honorable but unpopular principles, and do what is right at the risk of personal loss. Respect demonstrates sincere belief in treating others as one wants to be treated. Service leadership doctrine describes the characteristics of ingenuity and tenacity in multiple ways: “gets results”; “never quits”; “endurance”; “creativity”; “entrepreneurship”; and “innovation”. As expressed by General George S. Patton, Jr., despite some hyperbole for the occasion, “Americans love a winner. Americans will not tolerate a loser. Americans despise cowards. Americans play to win all of the time.”<sup>23</sup> The American leader will find a way to win or make one; American service-members will never quit.

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<sup>22</sup> United States, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 53.

<sup>23</sup> Charles M. Province, *The Unknown Patton* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1984),32.

Integrity means leading by example—*ductos exemplo*—at the most basic level, but implies adherence to a particular ethos without public observation or consideration of reward. Leaders of integrity abide by a moral code under all circumstances. Loyalty includes the concept of selfless service and manifests itself in devotion and “bearing true faith and allegiance to the Constitution.”<sup>24</sup> Leaders demonstrate loyalty to the Constitution, their service, their units, and their families; the Marine Corps embodies the concept of loyalty best in its motto, *Semper Fidelis*—always faithful.

The desired conditions for American leaders in unified operations comprise the values of duty, honor, country, and trust. Trust is the primary source of inspiration, born of ethical behavior and a genuine concern for the welfare of the team. The desired attributes of Armed Forces officers are courage, respect, ingenuity, tenacity, integrity, and loyalty. Services may emphasize a variety of other skills and competencies beyond these values and attributes, but must begin the professional journeys of their leaders from these solid foundations. Indelibly marking these values and attributes on leaders throughout their years of service are the associated influences of experience, training, education, and self-development.

### **Experience and Training**

The desired conditions of experience and training for unified leadership development are well-documented and exercised by each service, but some modifications to leader training, promotion requirements, career models, language requirements, and networking will ensure leaders meet the demands of future operating environments.

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<sup>24</sup> United States, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 46.

Services must provide unified leader training to complement education received through JPME.

Mid-grade and flag officers require leader training, not just education, to lead at operational and strategic levels. Services currently invest vast resources to train junior officers, but expend minimal effort training mid-grade and flag officers to lead organizations and coalitions. Specifically, services must train leaders to demonstrate the communicative and team-building skills required in unified teams. Mid-grade and flag officers must be able to conduct work groups and conferences with military and civilian leaders in person and in digital forums. Leaders must develop skills to influence audiences outside their organizations and participate effectively in civilian forums.

Officers must demonstrate proficiency at each JPME continuum level as a pre-requisite for promotion. Services should retain assessment tools and evaluation processes reflecting guidance from service chiefs and needs of the services, but must include demonstrated joint proficiency as a promotion requirement. Service emphasis on joint education and unified leader skills will ensure the right officers are prepared to lead in the future operating environment.

Complementing training requirements are adjustments to service career models allowing officers to succeed in career paths previously marginalized. Services must establish diverse career models reflecting the importance of broadening programs and strategic fellowships. Technology provides services the ability to review carefully each officer's service path and avoid some of the mystery currently associated with assignment practices. Establishing service career models with many paths to success will provide



services with the flexibility to employ excellent, motivated leaders in a variety of situations and organizations.

Armed Forces leaders must speak more than English to contribute successfully in future operational environments. Senior leaders do not expect service components to assign specific languages to all officers given the unknown future areas of operation, but do expect officers to communicate comfortably in a language other than English. Some services have embarked toward this desired condition: the Army's Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency (CULP) program affords contracted cadets a month-long opportunity to immerse themselves in a foreign country, in uniform, and provide humanitarian assistance while practicing local languages.<sup>25</sup>

The 2012 CCJO guidance for increased integration of international partners demands increased networking and appreciation of partners' doctrine.<sup>26</sup> Unified leadership attributes and unified leader training promote effective cooperation among diverse teams. Professional networks are desired conditions for leaders at all levels. Unified leaders will employ interpersonal skills and a structured body of knowledge to foster relationships with agency and international partners. Armed Forces officers must develop and maintain positive relationships with partners before conflicts arise.

### **Education and Self-Development**

Education must provide lifelong learning and habits of mind; self-development must span the gaps between formal education periods. Most existing goals for leader education remain intact in the proposed unified enterprise. Educators must continue to demand

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<sup>25</sup> U.S. Army, "The Cultural Understanding and Language Proficiency Program (CULP)," U.S. Army Cadet Command, <http://www.cadetcommand.army.mil/culp/> (accessed Mar 03, 2013).

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CCJO*, 6, 13.

academic rigor to prevent “Google-deep” intellect. Services must carefully balance distance learning with the necessary human interaction to develop *coup d’oeil*. Officers must learn to educate—not just train—junior leaders in joint warfare. However, the future environment warrants some adjustments to desired conditions of leader education. Leader education requires expanded JPME, synchronized school assignments, joint leadership doctrine, and tailored leader development.

The current OPMEP prescribes five military education levels in the PME continuum, but requires two additional levels to meet future requirements. Based on recommendations from the 2010 HASC report on JPME for increased strategic education, the unified leadership development enterprise includes additional JPME at O-6 and O-7/O-8 levels.<sup>27</sup> Joint education must develop strategic thinkers with minds “permanently armed” to handle the “the relentless struggle with the unforeseen.”<sup>28</sup> As noted by LTG (Ret.) David Barno, the Armed Forces have developed education continuums and duty assignments to create an “inverse relationship between intellectual development and strategic responsibility.”<sup>29</sup> Proposed Level III JPME resembles current JPME II instruction, but will be a requirement for officers prior to promotion to O-5. Similarly, officers will receive proposed Level IV JPME through senior service colleges in preparation for strategic duties. Current and proposed JPME levels reflect

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<sup>27</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Twenty Years After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel : Hearing Before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services*, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, Hearing Held May 20, 2009 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2010): 62-63.

<sup>28</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 117.

<sup>29</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads?*, 62.

recommendations from the HASC 2010 report and senior leaders. (See Figure 3, below.)

JPME Levels	Current JPME Model	Proposed JPME Model
Level 0	Pre-Commissioning (Candidates/Cadets)	Pre-Commissioning (Candidates/Cadets)
Level I	Primary (O-1 through O-3)	Primary (O-1 through O-3)
Level II	Intermediate (O-4)	Intermediate (O-4)
Level III	Senior (O-5 or O-6)	Senior (O-5)
Level IV	General/Flag Officer	Strategic (O-6)
Level V		General/Flag (O-7 and O-8)
Level VI		General/Flag (O-9 and O-10)

Figure 3, Current and proposed JPME continuum levels adapted from OPMEP.

The services must adhere to the OPMEP and CJCS guidance when assigning officers to joint education. The intent behind the JPME continuum requires officers to receive joint education before starting joint assignments. Services must enforce the mindset that joint education and joint service are essential activities for the success of the Armed Forces, not annoying certifications or banishments from tactical assignments.

The third adjustment to desired education conditions is creation of unified leadership doctrine. *The Armed Forces Officer* provides substantial guidance and wisdom for officers of all services, but lacks prescription of leadership development for unified environments.<sup>30</sup> The OPMEP adequately describes JPME requirements throughout the continuum, but lends little emphasis to leadership development as a Joint Learning Area.<sup>31</sup> Establishing a Joint Publication for Leadership Development will span the seams

<sup>30</sup> United States, *The Armed Forces Officer*, 90-91.

<sup>31</sup> United States. *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), E-1 to E-M-4. The OPMEP requires officers mostly to “evaluate” leadership behaviors through historical context for Intermediate through Flag Officer levels, but offers no leadership objectives for Pre-commissioning or Primary level officers.

between the broad guidance in Joint Publication 1, “Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States”, the wisdom of *The Armed Forces Officer* handbook, and the prescription of JPME within the OPMEP.

As leaders develop emotional intelligence and recognize those desired characteristic adaptations not realized, leaders require tailored leader development to learn how personal strengths and weaknesses complement particular teams or groups. Leaders never lead alone. Service leadership doctrines focus mostly on the individual leader, without regard to the type of organization led. The difference in skills required to lead hierarchical organizations and teams of peers is acute. Leaders must develop skills to understand quickly how individual skill sets fit within a given team, where there are redundancies or overmatch, and where there are skill shortfalls or “dead space”.

### **Unified Leadership Development Model**

A proposal for a unified leadership development enterprise respects historically successful practices and demands of the future operating environment. The enterprise maintains existing service component organizations responsible for leadership development, but adds a Joint Center of Excellence for Leadership Development (JCELD) and a unified leader network. An enterprise provides coherent framework for coordination among services, agencies, and international partners. Current efforts to prescribe joint leader skills, execute JPME per the OPMEP, and coordinate with extra-military partners have met disruptive, but avoidable, friction. Just as Goldwater-Nichols established JPME and streamlined national command structures to promote joint


cooperation, formally establishing a unified leadership development enterprise will provide structure, coordination, and efficiency to leader programs.<sup>32</sup>

The enterprise model allows for change to desired conditions, means, and ways, but provides sufficient structure to establish resource expectations and facilitate planning. The model assumes service practices and desired conditions remain intact unless specifically addressed as a leadership development problem. Six resource areas, or means, enable services to develop leaders along two broad lines of effort (LOE). Officers mature through seven phases, or levels, of JPME to provide necessary development of strategic leaders. The services employ two LOE in complementary fashion; services emphasize experience and training for junior officers, but taper training venues during mid-grade years. Conversely, services increase emphasis on education and expectations of self-development as leaders become mid-grade and flag officers. (See Figure 4, below.)

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<sup>32</sup> United States, *Another Crossroads?*, xi-xv.

Figure 4, Unified Leadership Development Model



## **Risk**

The proposal for a unified leadership development enterprise assumes risk. The plan presents moderate risk if not adopted and low risk if executed. If services choose not to employ the enterprise approach as described, leaders will continue to receive training and education, but will muddle through the next conflict and face similar frictions encountered during the last 12 years of war. The risk of making no changes is moderate to mission due to increased reliance on international partners in unified operations during the next conflict. Continuing current leadership practices will not reduce inter-service and extra-service friction among partners. More dependence on international partners requires U.S. leaders with skills to excel at unified operations. Ignorance of other cultures and languages will further isolate leaders of the Armed Forces from international partners and provide a significant vulnerability to threat actors.

Adopting the proposed plan also presents risk of weakening effective practices with the introduction of new practices. Implementing change without ensuring proper understanding will reduce trust among service-members instead of increasing trust. Service leaders may perceive the establishment of the JCELD and unified enterprise as encroachment on services' responsibilities for leadership development. Similarly, if services adopt the plan, but the CJCS does not provide appropriate authorities to the JCELD commander, the enterprise will lack proper effect.

## **CHAPTER 3: THE MEANS**

The means, or resources, available for leadership development must enable leaders to reach desired end state conditions through appropriate ways. The Armed Forces have proven practices, capable facilities, and sufficient manpower to meet current challenges, but require improved coordination of the means to ensure long-term success. Establishing a Joint Center of Excellence for Leadership Development (JCELD) will allow the Armed Forces to coordinate the employment of the following means: leaders; schools; families; organizations; and self-development resources. Further analysis of each resource will define necessary adjustments to use resources most effectively.

### **Joint Center of Excellence for Leadership Development**

Establishing a JCELD will provide a Congressionally-recognized, authoritative command with responsibility for coordinating leadership development activities among services, government agencies, and international military partners. Merely naming an organization a “center of excellence” does not increase its value. A JCELD adds value to the Armed Forces by providing a body of knowledge and appropriate authorities to coordinate actions between military leaders, U.S. Government agencies, and selected international partners.

The CJCS should establish, with Congressional authorization, the JCELD within the National Defense University (NDU) at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) in Norfolk, Virginia. The NDU family of educational schools currently includes the College of International Security Affairs, the Information Resources Management College, the National War College, the Eisenhower School, and the Joint Advanced Warfighting



School.<sup>1</sup> The JFSC, located at Naval Support Activity Norfolk, is neighbor to the Coast Guard Training Center Yorktown, Marine Corps Forces Command, Naval Base Norfolk, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Allied Command Transformation, among many other service activities.<sup>2</sup> Establishing a JCELD at the JFSC provides a single center with physical and digital access to every service component and NATO partners, fostering stronger relationships, improved coordination, and unified leadership development.

The JCELD will serve as the U.S. Armed Forces’ principal organization for leadership development and the coordination center for the unified leadership development enterprise. Service chiefs will retain authority and responsibility for developing officers in each service to meet national needs and joint requirements. The supervising authority of the JCELD, potentially an O-8 active duty officer, will absorb joint leader development from the many missions of the DJ-7, providing more focus on leader issues and maintenance of the unified leader network. The JCELD facilitates joint distribution of leadership development practices through the unified leader network and JPME in-residence students. The CJCS and service chiefs of staff will determine specific authorities for the JCELD commander to ensure the enterprise retains substantial influence in leader development and service practices.

The unified leader network is the platform for communicating guidance, maintaining leadership doctrine, capturing leader insights, and coordinating with domestic and international partners. Accessible through Defense Knowledge Online to

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “National Defense University: Colleges and Schools,” National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/colleges.cfm> (accessed March 03, 2013).

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Forces Staff College: About Us,” Joint Forces Staff College, [http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools\\_programs/se\\_jpme/about.asp](http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/se_jpme/about.asp) (accessed March 03, 2013).

U.S. Government employees and select international partners, this digital network provides the body of knowledge and practice for leader development. The JCELD maintains the leader network as an authoritative repository of the most current leadership doctrine, applicable regulations, JPME requirements, scholarly writings, self-development resources, on-line conference sites, and links to service leadership websites. Within the unified network, selected international partners will have access to share doctrine, cultural norms, and best practices, thereby increasing understanding among all leaders prior to physical contact. The collaborative design will allow rapid corrections within a centrally-controlled, authoritative body.

### **Leaders**

Leaders are the Armed Forces' best resource for developing other leaders. Encouragement from families, education from professors, and knowledge from professional reading are important to leadership development, but leaders frequently have the most influence and pronounced effect on other leaders' development. Recognizing the primacy of leader-to-leader contact in the development process is critical for the success of the enterprise. As technology affords greater reliance on digital communication, the Armed Forces must adapt accordingly to ensure leaders employ a proper balance of digital and physical presence toward leadership development.

The proposed unified leader development enterprise reaffirms and incorporates most of the current service practices for counseling and junior officer development. Time-tested methods of personal interaction to develop other leaders are basically sound. The proposed adjustments to leaders, as a resource, are improving leaders' mentorship skills and developing leaders' teaching skills. Each change will require service emphasis

within service schools and reflect service-specific competency. Every officer must be a leader, trainer, and educator to ensure subordinates inculcate unified skills from the start of their service.

Mentorship must become a standard skill among Armed Forces leaders and services must set expectations for subordinates and mentors. As a means or resource, mentorship provides encouragement and perspective—not direct influence—from more senior leaders outside of the immediate chain-of-command. Recent interest in mentorship has spawned multiple service initiatives with varying degrees of participation. A study completed in 2007 of the Army’s mentorship program, hosted through the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) network, revealed approximately 0.068% of personnel with AKO accounts used the mentorship web resources.<sup>3</sup> The Army mentorship initiative has good intentions, but has yet to make significant traction. Mentorship must become an accepted and expected part of the service culture, not a random occurrence for favorite sons and daughters.

Leaders must be educators as well as trainers. Currently, leaders routinely *train* subordinate officers through Officer Professional Development programs and the like, but are rarely required to *educate* their officer. Some professors may scoff at the thought of a military officer capable of providing education as well as training, but the level of joint education required is well within the abilities of mid-grade officers.<sup>4</sup> Services can ill-afford to transport thousands of junior officers to select joint schools. Organizational leaders can monitor distance learning progress and facilitate education for junior officers.

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<sup>3</sup> Richard J. Nieberding, “Effectiveness of the Army Mentorship Program,” Master’s thesis, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 30, 2007), 8.

<sup>4</sup> Daniel Hughes “Professors in the Colonels’ World,” in *Military Culture and Education*, ed. by Douglas Higbee (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010), 151.

Leaders must integrate joint education requirements into existing organizational leader development programs. Leaders are currently resourced to provide an adequate level of joint education to junior officers at the organizational level.

### **Organizations**

Organizations at the tactical level provide the majority of leader training and provide the best environment for reinforcing leadership education with practical leadership experience. Services must ensure that service cultures in units and organizations reflect the desired conditions of the unified leadership development enterprise. As officers mature through the combined effects of their assignments, units, and experiences, they assimilate the service culture and identify with cultural norms within an organization. All other service-members in a unit influence the leader and vice versa; this continual interaction creates norms and defines leader expectations. Experience in units frequently measures officers' perceptions of right and wrong. As a result, officers may lack skills to function within joint and unified environments due to organizationally-reinforced precepts.

The unified enterprise requires a coordinated approach to leadership development from all available means. Officers' experience in organizations tends to confirm or deny military education received in schools. Organizational leaders have an obligation to ensure that the development of service-specific competencies does not come at the expense of unified desired conditions.

### **Schools**

As means, service institutions generally provide adequate resources to achieve desired conditions, but schools must address joint education as prescribed in the OPMEP

for pre-commissioning and junior officer curricula.<sup>5</sup> The unified leadership development model proposes no structural or organizational modifications to service schools; they are effective means of training and education. However, the lack of emphasis on joint education at pre-commissioning and junior officer levels fails to meet requirements for unified leaders in the future environment. Service schools are quite capable of providing the required joint education with proper senior leader emphasis and existing resources.

### **Families**

The United States' ability to use military force as an instrument of national power depends upon American society and its families. Clausewitz identified a trinity between violence, chance, and reason in the conduct of warfare reflecting the respective roles of a nation's people, its military, and its government.<sup>6</sup> The government and its military forces must sustain the trust and participation of American families. Journalists have noted a growing isolation in the last generation between the Armed Forces and American society.<sup>7</sup> Until recently, the draft process tethered American forces to society by mobilizing citizens and augmenting relatively small, standing forces. As noted by a

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<sup>5</sup> United States. *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*. (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), A-A-1.

<sup>6</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 101.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, "The widening gap between military and society" *The Atlantic*, July 1997, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/07/the-widening-gap-between-military-and-society/306158/> (accessed February 24, 2013); Mark Thompson, "An Army Apart: The Widening Military-Civilian Gap", *Time*, November 10, 2011, <http://nation.time.com/2011/11/10/an-army-apart-the-widening-military-civilian-gap/> (accessed February 24, 2013).

former CJCS, “long term, if the military drifts away from its people in this country, that is a catastrophic outcome we as a country can’t tolerate.”<sup>8</sup>

Service members are products of American society and enter the service with a wide variety of social norms, family values, and adolescent experiences. The Armed Forces must strike a balance between forging warriors with service values and alienating the American people. The current CJCS has vowed to “keep faith with our Military family” and respects the importance of the family to the volunteer force.<sup>9</sup> The Armed Forces maintain a healthy relationship with this critical resource through strategic communications, community involvement, re-integration efforts, and professional care for America’s sons and daughters in uniform. The services must formally recognize American families as a critical means to the leadership development campaign through consistent, sincere engagement within and outside military communities.

### **Self-Development Resources**

The information technology available to Armed Forces officers presents an incredible opportunity to improve the general awareness, education, and trust among officers in every service. The primary adjustment to current practice in means available is the employment of a leader network. The unified leader network provides leaders access to leadership doctrine, reading list programs, professional networks, 360 assessments, scholarly writing, and lessons learned. Linked to service component networks, this unified leader network will allow users faster access to information and better

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<sup>8</sup> Mark Thompson, “An Army Apart: The Widening Military-Civilian Gap”, *Time*, November 10, 2011, <http://nation.time.com/2011/11/10/an-army-apart-the-widening-military-civilian-gap/> (accessed February 24, 2013).

<sup>9</sup> Martin Dempsey, *Letter to the Joint Force*, 1 Oct 2011, <http://www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2011/10/general-dempseys-letter-to-the-joint-force/> (accessed March 10, 2013).

organization of material. Critical to the success of the network is improvement to the existing search engine algorithms in DKO and related government networks; without better search engines, leaders will revert to “cold start” searches with Google or simply avoid interaction altogether.

## CHAPTER 4: THE WAYS

Two lines of effort (LOE) provide ways for services to employ the means described in chapter 3 to the desired conditions described in chapter 2. The first line of effort, experience and training, comprises actions related to developing leader skills and guiding career management. The second line of effort, education and self-development, includes mostly cognitive efforts to produce habits of mind and adhere to OPMEP requirements. For junior officers, services employ more effort toward experience and training than education and self-development. As officers mature to mid-grade, services provide more effort toward education and self-development, relying on the cohorts' experiential base and training to complement operational and strategic education. The two LOE are not exactly inversely proportional. The model graphic demonstrates the balance of each LOE over time during an officer's career. The education and self-development LOE requires its greatest resources for officers advancing from grade O-5 to grade O-6 due to Senior Service Colleges, fellowships, and joint education requirements. This LOE tapers in scope as the small percentage of mid-grade leaders attain flag officer rank.

The simplicity of two LOE belies the difficulties applying coordinated action through service-based organizational structures. The first LOE, experience and training, demands coordination, if not singular command, of service organizations responsible for officer assignments and officer training. A singular directorate or command responsible for the LOE will ensure responsible balance between assignments and training. The second LOE, education and self-development, requires coherent supervision of officers' growth and education in addition to close cooperation with owners of the first LOE. The



enterprise construct of inter-related LOE will foment closer coordination between responsible service components and increased attention on JPME requirements for all officers.

### **Line of Effort 1: Experience and Training**

The first line of effort includes existing methods of developing leader and several adjustments to ensure leaders are prepared for the unified environments of the future. The proposed improvements to current methods include disciplined assignment practices, senior leader training, team-building tools, language training tools, and unified networking. Each service uses some version of the recommended actions to train leaders, but the application is uneven across the Armed Forces and merits more coherent use.

Services must demonstrate discipline and common sense in assignment practices. Adherence to the OPMEP is a requirement and ensures success of the Armed Forces. Failure to assign officers to JPME at required intervals penalizes officers and joint commands. Because of identified discontinuities between service commands responsible for officer management, service commands responsible for education, and service commands responsible for doctrine, services are unlikely to mend errors unless service chiefs actively promote JPME and joint assignments. The establishment of a unified leadership development enterprise provides a catalyst for changing and enforcing officer assignment policies.

Leadership training must continue beyond the junior grade years. The modeling, practice, feedback, and execution cycles consistent with junior officer leader training are equally important to developing mid-grade and flag officer skills. Just as services train junior officers to lead small teams, platoons, and air crews with emphasis on tactical

skills, field grade officers require training on communications skills associated with video teleconferences, Defense Connect Online (DCO) meetings, and negotiations. Officers of all ranks must have significant media training, including how to react to negative media, hacked communications devices, press queries, and communications blackouts.

Building trust among leaders of different cultures requires respect and understanding. When time allows, leaders build trust most effectively by personal contact. Leaders at mid-grade and flag officer level must build trust in dynamic environments and diverse work groups without the luxury of frequent personal contact. Unified leaders require additional “breaching tools” to accelerate the process of identification and reduce barriers to understanding within groups of dissimilar leaders. One widely employed technique is the Dominance, Influence, Steadiness, and Conscientiousness (DiSC) tool for forging teams and reducing misunderstanding. The DiSC tool, as part of a “leader layout” prior to meetings, allows participants to anticipate friction and separate personalities from problem sets.<sup>1</sup>

Leaders require access to language training tools, such as Rosetta Stone and SuperMemo, to meet requirements for language proficiency. However, the limited effects of on-line resources without live feedback demand increased contact between officers and native speakers. Language training, as part of the first LOE, includes regular conferences with international officers using Skype and similar products to improve language skills and foster healthy relationships.

Increased networking among Armed Forces officers, U.S. Government partners, and selected international partners will reduce ignorance and facilitate trust-building. Tools

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to Five Factor Theory traits, participants use DiSC profiles to estimate meeting friction points and reduce personality-based conflict. William Marston, “What is DiSC?,” InScape Publishing, <http://www.discprofile.com/whatisdisc.htm> (accessed March 24, 2013).

exist to establish professional networks and informal conferences through the unified network. Many current flag officers and some current mid-grade officers may be reluctant to foster relationships in this manner, but Millennials and their successors engage naturally through digital communication tools.

### **Line of Effort 2: Education and Self-Development**

Approaches to education and self-study reflect a blend of proven methods and emerging technology to produce excellent leaders in the digital age. The Joint Staff must establish joint leadership doctrine and a unified network to coordinate service efforts and promote self-development along this LOE. Services must enforce the CJCS guidance in the OPMEP. Essential to the success of this LOE is the coordination between service commands responsible for education with service commands responsible for assignments.

Joint leadership doctrine will prescribe common values, ethics, and attributes among Armed Forces leaders, but must enable each service to promote service-specific competencies, traditions, and history. Joint leadership doctrine also serves to inform broader audiences from U.S. Government and partner nations in an effort to increase mutual understanding. The JCELD will maintain links from joint leadership doctrine to service sites, ensuring more common and thorough understanding of service initiatives.

Joint leadership doctrine includes self-development and the growth of emotional intelligence. Leaders will use the unified network tools to promote self-awareness and professional education through 360 assessments and professional reading programs. The assessments must offer greater fidelity toward an officer's specific strengths and weaknesses followed by personal counseling with an engaged supervisor to review assessment data. Supervisor involvement is crucial to ensure officers, especially junior

officers, do not succumb to making characteristic adaptations toward popularity or comity at the expense of desired values, ethics, or attributes.

As leaders develop emotional intelligence, they must also develop practices to adjust leadership efforts based on the led. Leaders aware of weaknesses, or “dead space”, in particular attributes or competencies must identify how they fit into a given team or unit. For example, leaders cognizant of weaknesses in interpersonal skills or respect for others’ opinions should identify teammates with those strengths, overtly recognize the disparity, and make the collusion known to the team. By acknowledging personal shortcomings and others’ strengths in an effort to promote team effectiveness, a leader builds trust, grows emotional maturity, and contributes to team success.

Leaders also develop themselves through professional reading. Services will proctor web-based knowledge checks of reading lists, monitored and controlled by commanders, to complement officer development activities at the organization level. Common understanding of particular readings will increase situational awareness and improve trust between services as leaders gain appreciation of other cultures. Just as services must provide tailored self-development tools to officers, officers must demonstrate the initiative, discipline, and integrity to study their professions.

Finally, services must adhere to the OPMEP as prescribed by the Chairman. All necessary mechanisms exist for services to adhere to CJCS guidance; services must comply or provide rational arguments for failure. The common complaint from non-compliant services in response to OPMEP requirements for joint education is the urgent need to have a particular officer in his current assignment. Such complaints embarrass both officer and non-commissioned officer corps. Even if officers fill positions with no

immediate, supporting non-commissioned or warrant officer, all services have commands structured to absorb some amount of temporary loss. The U.S. Armed Forces derive much of their strength from the peculiar abilities of their non-commissioned and warrant officer corps. History has repeatedly proven that the absence of one officer in a given unit is not unlike the hole left behind when one removes his fist from a bucket of water.

## SUMMARY

A unified leadership development enterprise will enable leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces to develop the unified leadership skills needed to build trust at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict. The enterprise model, built as a campaign plan, includes desired conditions, ways, means, and risk. The approach proposed adjustments to some current, unsuccessful practices, not replacements for successful practices or time-honored traditions.

Several conditions distort problems associated with current leadership development practices. Hyper-communication, groupthink, generational bias, toxicity, and relative deprivation contribute to perceptions of PME failures, but many of the leader failures are due to failures of human nature. The identified problems with leader experiences were adherence to OPMEP, retention of joint skills from war, and narrow service career paths. Training problems included scarce leader training beyond the O-3 grade, scarce joint education below the O-4 grade, and poor foreign language skills in all grades. Education problems included lack of shared values, absence of joint leader doctrine, inconsistent schooling, and poor organizational structure. Self-development suffered mostly from lack of tailored development practices.

Desired conditions evolved from senior leader guidance and assessment of the operational environment. The desired conditions maintain current service requirements of leaders and include components of the future operational environment. A summary of the desired conditions for unified leaders follows:

- Leaders of character with shared values, ethics, and attributes who are experts in their service competencies and cooperative in unified environments.
- Well-educated leaders, imbued with habits of mind and disciplined self-development skills, who demonstrate mastery of the profession of arms.
- Trained and experienced leaders with language and cultural skills who lead confidently in uncertain conditions as part of a unified team.

Key recommendations to developing leaders of character included the establishment of common values, ethics, and attributes. In the realms of experience and training, the proposal recommended increased leader training, promotion requirements linked to JPME throughout service, expanded career service models, and mandatory foreign language skills. Desired conditions for education and self-development include expanded JPME requirements for all grades, established joint leadership doctrine, improved schooling assignments, and tailored leader development.

The means required to produce unified leaders are currently available, but require a coordinating authority. Establishing a Joint Center of Excellence for Leadership Development (JCELD) provides appropriate authority and focus to coordinate leadership development practices among services and with external agencies. The means include leaders, organizations, schools, families, and self-development resources.

The ways to implement the plan involved two lines of effort (LOE). One LOE, experience and training, required greater service emphasis for junior officers and less for mid-grade and flag officers. Conversely, the second LOE, education and self-development, required more emphasis as officers reached mid-grade and continued to increase expectations of self-development for flag officers. The combined nature of each

LOE implies considerable coordination, if not singular command, of service components responsible for training, education, and assignments.

The risk to adopting the proposal is low. Executing this plan has the potential of creating suspicion among services with the introduction of new practices. Implementing change without ensuring proper understanding will reduce trust among service-members. Service leaders may perceive the changes as a threat to service responsibilities for leadership development. The plan will not work if the CJCS does not provide appropriate authorities and support to the JCELD supervisor.

Failure to adopt the plan presents moderate risk; future conflicts will require the U.S. military to rely upon international and interagency partners in unified operations. Continuing current leadership practices will increase friction among partners and inhibit trust. Continued ignorance of other cultures and languages will further isolate Armed Forces leaders from international partners and will provide a vulnerability to threat actors.

The unified leadership development enterprise provides a coordinating headquarters, a body of knowledge and practice, and joint leadership doctrine to support existing service leadership development programs. This proposal claims no crisis in leadership development despite contrary media assertions. Service practices are mostly adequate, but will not sustain the force through the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The proposed changes and enterprise approach will take time to install. Each is necessary to meet senior leader guidance and the expected conditions of the future operational environment.



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