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**THE MISSING ELEMENT:
HOW TO INTEGRATE EXISTING REGIONAL AND CULTURAL
UNDERSTANDING AT THE GCC LEVEL EFFECTIVELY**

by

Curtis Thorwald Anderson II

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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2 May 2013

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ABSTRACT

The recently published Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), suggests the future security environment will consist of several persistent trends including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of modern competitor states, and an increase in violent extremism, regional instability, transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources.¹ To address these trends, the joint force must develop and maintain deep regional expertise. The ability to understand political and cultural differences, especially when it comes to cooperative security operations, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare, will provide the foundations for flexible planning and operational execution in the future. Unfortunately, the Military Departments view regional expertise not as a core function, but as additional training at the tactical and operational level.

To understand the strategic environment, the combatant command staff needs to understand the region and culture in order to develop approaches that effectively shape the environment within the context of that region. This paper will discuss the importance of regional and cultural competency as it relates to planning strategy. It will show how regional and cultural competency at the combatant command headquarters remains a critical weakness for the United States. The thesis of this paper is that the degree to which the combatant commands adopt structural change to include Service regional and cultural experts, and the military Service Departments ensure that they assign appropriate regional and cultural experts to those commands, will determine the effectiveness of the United States in executing its National Security Strategy of the future. The requirement

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, 10 September 2012 (Washington, DC: 2012), 2.

to have regional and cultural experts on the combatant command staffs developing and executing long-term strategy has never been more important as the threats that face our nation are becoming increasingly complex.

The geographic combatant commands all identify the importance of having the right person at the right place and their manning documents have identified the need for regional and cultural experts within their J5 and J3 directorates. However, it remains the job of the individual Services to place the correct person in the appropriate position. To fix this weakness the Joint Staff must direct Services to assign regional and cultural experts to existing identified billets. Combatant commands must re-look the Branch-immaterial positions on their manning documents for the plans directorates, specifically to change some active component Branch-immaterial positions into the SOF specialty of Civil Affairs. In addition, combatant commands need to code regional and cultural positions to require attendance to a strategic planning course prior to assignment at the geographic combatant command. Finally, the combatant commands and Services must develop a program for Service regional and cultural experts that couples utilization and deployment into key areas within the command and out-of-theater utilization within the combatant command J5 and J3 directorates to ensure combatant commands have the most current understanding of key Operational Environment factors within the command. These recommendations will ensure the effective integration and utilization of existing Service regional and cultural competency with the combatant commands.

With many hard lessons learned about the importance of regional and cultural competence in planning and execution of operations, the Department of Defense and Military Departments must institutionalize those lessons. Failure to do so puts the Nation

on a course that is all too familiar and the combatant commands will find themselves in 20 years as unprepared culturally as when 9/11 happened.

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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my wife Faye for all her support during my research and study. I could not have completed this year without her help, understanding, patience and love. I also dedicated this thesis to our son Curtis Thorwald Anderson III, who came into our lives during this year. I serve to ensure that he may have a future that affords him the opportunity to accomplish whatever his heart desires.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the recently published Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), the future security environment consists of several persistent trends. These trends include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of modern competitor states, and an increase in violent extremism, regional instability, transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources.¹ To address these trends, the concept of Globally Integrated Operations is the focal point for Joint Force 2020. In Globally Integrated Operations, the joint force must posture quickly to combine capabilities within the existing force and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations in different arrangements with great fluidity.² One of the key requirements to conduct successful Globally Integrated Operations by Joint Force 2020 is an organization that develops and maintains deep regional expertise. The ability to understand political and cultural differences -- especially when it comes to cooperative security operations, counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare -- will provide the foundations for flexible planning and operational execution required of Globally Integrated Operations.³

The Services are attempting to develop deep regional expertise with initiatives like the Army's scalable concept of Regionally Aligned Forces. Recently, General David Rodriguez, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Commander, stated the plan is to align all units in the Army, including Army National Guard and Army Reserve units,

¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, 10 September 2012 (Washington, DC: 2012), 2.

²Ibid., 4.

³Ibid., 11.

to regions throughout the world.⁴ However, further in the article, the operations officer for FORSCOM, Major General Jeffery Bailey, stated that despite this focus, tactical units would make it a priority to train for decisive action operations so they are ready if they need to deploy for contingencies around the world.⁵ Regionally focused training will be conducted in addition and complementary to decisive action training.”⁶ Therefore, from the tactical and operational level, regional expertise is viewed still as additional training. As the Army has shown in the example above, the Service priorities are moving back towards what they deem are their core competencies. The experiences of the nation however, are that “irregular” warfare, is more often than not, regular.

In the last 10 years, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the focus of many debates. In a recent opinion article in the *New York Times*, Thomas Ricks states that our generals bear much of the blame for the mistakes as they failed to understand the conflicts they were facing.⁷ This type of criticism of senior leaders is not new and while conventional wisdom states a leader is ultimately responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen under his watch, the criticism of general officers does not change the structure of the staff beneath them. In order to develop effective strategy, the leader and staff must first understand the strategic environment in order to develop potential approaches for a more positive outcome. To understand the strategic environment, a staff needs to ensure it understands the region and culture of the operational environment.

This deeper understanding of the operational environment ensures the command

⁴Michelle Tan, “All eyes on alignment: Army pays attention to Africa-bound BCT,” *Army Times*, 5 November, 2012., 16.

⁵ Decisive Action is defined by the U.S. Army in ADRP 3-0 as continuous, simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability or defense support to civil authorities tasks.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷Thomas Ricks, “Questioning the Brass,” *New York Times*, 12 November, 2012., A29.

understands how proposed actions by the command will interact within that environment. This paper will discuss the importance of regional and cultural competency as it relates to planning strategy. It will show how regional and cultural competency at the combatant command headquarters remains a critical weakness for the United States. The thesis of this paper is that the degree to which the combatant commands adopt structural change to include Service regional and cultural experts, and the military Service Departments ensure that they assign appropriate regional and cultural experts to those commands, will determine the effectiveness of the United States in executing its National Security Strategy of the future.

The need to have regional and cultural experts on the combatant command staffs developing and executing long-term strategy has never been more important as the threats that face our nation are becoming increasingly complex. The current U.S. economic concerns further highlight the need for regional programs and theater campaigns that maximize the U.S. fiscal resources. A strategy informed by regional understanding and awareness helps the United States achieve those ends. As the geographic combatant commands identify the capability they need on their planning and operations staffs, the issue is ensuring the Services place the correct person at the right position. This paper will show that regional expertise, cultural competence, and language abilities are a life-long skill and not something that can be trained upon a specific assignment or deployment requirement. Those approaches only develop a basic understanding and not the deep cultural context discussed in the CCJO. To remedy this weakness, the combatant commands must integrate and utilize existing Service regional and cultural competency within their commands. This thesis will also explore the initiatives, policy,

and structures of some successful transnational corporations to develop recommendations to incorporate into our existing geographic combatant commands to better posture our Joint Force 2020 to fight and win in the future strategic environment.

CHAPTER 2:

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

In Samuel Huntington's 1996 book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, the central and what he termed "most dangerous dimension" of global politics is conflict among the different world civilizations.¹ Almost twenty years later, addressing these differences in civilization is still a very important part of the strategic environment. Globalization and the inter-connectiveness that has developed due to technological advances in the intervening years has only re-enforced Mr. Huntington's thesis. As he states, "global politics is both multi-polar and multi-civilizational."² Culture still counts and cultural identity is often what is most meaningful to people.

So what is the problem the Services and Department of Defense face today concerning regional, language and cultural capability? The military had to adapt from a peacetime footing to support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In the 1990s, the Services had many experiences with military operations other than war (MOOTW); however, for the leaders of the institutions, these operations were on the low end of the spectrum and were not a high priority. While Afghanistan was the first campaign in the GWOT, it was mostly a Special Forces fight in the beginning; there was no need to adjust the conventional forces of the Services for the operation. This situation changed with Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). OIF brought the conventional forces into the fight, from both a planning and execution standpoint. The conventional forces, which train for

¹Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 13.

²Ibid., 20.

what is now called major combat operations, were not quite “plug and play” when it came to the long and tedious job of nation building. The cry prior to 9/11 was that peacekeeping operations took away from a unit’s ability to conduct combat operations.³ Once a unit had completed a tour of Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Serbia, or Kosovo the unit needed additional time to re-train to get “back to basics.”⁴ By doctrine, the U.S. Army believed that by focusing on high-end war and warfighter tasks, a unit would be flexible enough to handle challenges that may arise in MOOTW.⁵ However, as stated in the 2008 report by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, U.S. House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, on language and culture, the challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought the importance of language and cultural competency to the fore; the lack of Service member proficiency is not a new problem.⁶ The recognition of this problem goes back to initially to the Defense Strategic Planning Guidance in 2004. In that guidance, it focused on a department-wide need for language and cultural capabilities across the force. Once the problem was identified, numerous government documents attempted to address the problem and ensure the requirements were fully understood. This paper reviews U.S. Government (USG) and DoD documents and directives published starting with the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap,

³ Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations Issues of U.S. Military Involvement* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2004), 1.

⁴ United States, *Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict: Department of the Army Field Manual* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 1992), 4-29.

⁵ United States, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Depts. of the Army and the Air Force, 1990), pp v.

⁶ United States, *Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: DOD’s Challenge in Today’s Educational Environment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, 2008), 5.

which was one of the first documents developed directly from the updated Defense Strategic Planning Guidance.⁷ These documents show that while USG and DoD recognized the importance of regional and cultural expertise within our Military Departments it required close coordination between Combatant Commands and the Services. This coordination however had mixed results due to the current Service and Combatant Command authority lines.

Department of Defense (DoD) documents

“Defense Language Transformation Roadmap”

Published March 2005, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap was the Department of Defense’s acknowledgement that the operational environment had changed and the military needed to change its focus on regional, cultural, and language priorities. The assumptions that were made and approved by the DoD leadership highlight that understanding and importance. The first assumption was that foreign language and area expertise were critical to sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and conducting multi-national missions.⁸ Another key assumption made was that as DoD changes, there will also be a need to increase requirements for language and regional knowledge.⁹

There were four goals set out in the Roadmap. First, create a regional and language expertise foundation. This was due to recognition that regional expertise had not been sufficiently incorporated into planning and that it was not valued as a Defense core

⁷ United States. *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2005), 1. <http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/DLTR.pdf> (accessed September 29, 2012).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

competency.¹⁰ Second, ensure the force had the capacity to surge when needed. Third, a pool of highly-skilled language experts across the Services and to ensure operational requirements were documented. Finally, fourth, recognize the need to track the progression of these professionals throughout their military career. This goal is extremely important, as there is a perception that officers trained to become regional and cultural experts have limited career mobility within their Service.¹¹ As a starting point, the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap enabled DoD to identify goals to address the capability gaps identified.

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5160.41E, “Defense Language Program (DLP)”

The next document was Department of Defense Directive 5160.41E, “Defense Language Program.” This document was originally published October 2005 and then re-issued with updated policy and responsibilities in May 2010. The directive authorizes publication of implementing guidance on staffing regional and language capabilities and defines regional expertise in terms of education focusing on political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors or documented previous experience.¹² The directive also mandates combatant commanders to incorporate surge language and regional capabilities beyond organic capabilities for all operational and contingency plans.¹³ This directive also mandates the military Service Departments organize, train, and equip personnel with regional expertise and language to meet operational

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., 13.

¹² United States, *DoDD 5160.41E, Defense Language Program (DLP)* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2005), 1-2.

¹³ Ibid., 6.

requirements and ensure units deploying overseas are properly equipped with the ability to communicate cultural awareness to the “greatest extent practicable.”¹⁴ This separation of requirements and capability development require communication between the Services and combatant commands in order to address capability shortfalls effectively.

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, “Stability Operations”

Another important directive issued by DoD in support of the new planning guidance was Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” The initial November, 2005 directive was reissued in September 2009 as “Stability Operations.” When DoD published it in 2005, critics hailed it as a landmark-shift in thinking, as it placed stability operations on the same level as combat operations for the DoD.¹⁵ The directive states that stability operations will be a core mission for DoD. As such, the Department must prepare to both support and lead stability operations.¹⁶ To do this, it charged the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop policies and programs to maintain cultural understanding and ensure integration of regional proficiency capabilities into joint and combined stability operations training and exercises.¹⁷ To ensure implementation, it charged the Services, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), to develop and maintain scalable capabilities and capacities as well as train for

¹⁴ Ibid., 7-8.

¹⁵ Dr Jeffrey Nadaner, DASD for Stability Operations, speaking at a CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project hosted event titled, “DOD Directive 3000.05 – One Year Later”, December 11, 2006. Ref online at: <http://csis.org/event/dod-directive-300005-mdash-one-year-later> (accessed 14 Dec 2012).

¹⁶ United States, *DoDI 3000.05, Stability Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2009), 2.

¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

stability operations.¹⁸ The directive also directs the CJCS to coordinate with combatant commanders to establish priorities for capability development, while the combatant commanders must integrate stability operations task and considerations into their theater campaign plans, theater strategies, and applicable DoD-directed plans.¹⁹ This requirement stresses the importance of regional and cultural capabilities on the combatant command operations and planning staffs. If the combatant command identifies shortfalls in capability, they must make recommendations to the CJCS. Services and combatant commands must coordinate closely to accomplish this task successfully, otherwise a gap potential capability and strategy becomes the result.

Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5160.70, “Management of DoD Language and Regional Proficiency Capabilities”

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness published the DoDI 5160.70 in June of 2007 to establish policy and assign responsibility for management of DoD regional proficiency capabilities based on the roles identified in both the DoDD 5160.41E and the “Defense Language Transformation Roadmap.”²⁰ This Instruction states upfront that foreign language and regional proficiency are mission-critical skills, and it provides guidelines for regional proficiency skill levels.²¹ Services must provide specific regional proficiency requirements for their Service, except those

¹⁸ Ibid., 13.

¹⁹ Ibid., 14.

²⁰ United States, *DODI 5160.70, Management of DoD Language and Regional Proficiency Capabilities* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2007), 1.

²¹ Ibid., 1.

requirements in support of combatant commands. Combatant Commands must provide their own specific needs to the Services.²²

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare”

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy published the DoDD3000.07 “Irregular Warfare (IW),” in December 2008. As published, this directive recognizes IW as strategically important as traditional warfare. The skills required for IW (foreign language, regional expertise and experience/expertise in training, advising, assisting foreign security forces and institutions), are necessary for both the Military Departments and Combatant Commands to conduct both IW and traditional warfare successfully.²³

Congressional Oversight Committee Hearings and Reports

House Armed Services Subcommittee

The 2008 report by the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations also recognized that, due to the nature of the threat, regional, cultural and language skills and capabilities within our Armed Forces are critical to national security. It also identified that the goals of the Department of Defense and the military Service Departments were not mutually supporting. Congress also provided some general recommendations that included identifying regional expertise, cultural awareness, foreign language critical/core competencies. Congress further recommended a prioritization of efforts throughout the DoD and Services.

²² Ibid., 10.

²³ United States, *DODD 3000.07, Irregular warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2008), 2.

Government Accounting Office

A review of GAO reports on the development of regional proficiency and language skills from 2009 through 2011 indicate that the Services made only modest progress towards achieving the goals of the Defense Language Roadmap. Also, while the Services identify language needs, regional proficiency requirements remained poorly defined. The 2012 Annual Report on opportunities to reduce duplication by the GAO identified how global security environment changes and experiences by the Defense Department in Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in the Department emphasizing the importance of developing language skills and knowledge of foreign cultures within its forces to meet the needs of current and future military operations. The major issue this report highlights is the inefficient approach to overall language and culture training efforts²⁴ within the DoD between military Service Departments and Defense Agencies because of the lack of an integrated approach.

Joint Documents

Joint Operational Environment

The 2007 version of the Joint Operational Environment (JOE) listed demographics, culture, and relationships as part of the 12 critical variables found in all potential conflict environments which influence military operations of the future.²⁵ The JOE published in 2010 also discussed the need for deep understanding of local culture,

²⁴ United States, *Annual Report, Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012), 40. <http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo20324> (accessed October 5, 2012).

²⁵ United States, *Joint Operating Environment* (Suffolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, Center for Joint Futures, 2007) http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfcom/joe_dec2007.pdf (accessed October 5, 2012)

politics, history, and language.²⁶ These documents clearly show the need for regional and cultural expertise at the combatant command level in order to plan effectively and operate now and in the future. The 2010 version of the JOE discussed professional military education and reconfirmed the need, as a nation, to commit to training our leaders to understand cultural framework in order to recognize and exploit potential opportunities as they arise in our complex future.

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations

In the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) published by the Joint Staff on 10 September 2012, the Chairman proposed an approach called Globally Integrated Operations.²⁷ This approach calls for military forces able to operate effectively anywhere in the world on short notice. An integral part of this approach is the requirement for regional expertise within the armed forces for executing cooperative security, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare.²⁸ To ensure our armed forces will be able to meet these requirements, the CCJO states that while new capabilities will be important in the advancement of our military, it will be innovations in areas like personnel management that will play the most important roles in the development of Joint Force 2020.

To be innovative with the management and assignment of those cultural and regional experts means that all Service Departments and Defense Agencies need to operate with the same common operating picture in assignment priorities. As all of the

²⁶ United States, *The JOE, Joint Operating Environment, 2010* (Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 2010). <http://doelib.jfsc.ndu.edu/joe2010final.pdf> (accessed on October 5, 2012).

²⁷ JCS, *CCJO*, iii.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

previous documents reviewed have shown, the Department recognizes the combatant commands must rely on the Service Departments, who organize, train, and equip forces on cultural and regional expertise. This reliance on the Services to fill joint manning requirements is a tension point as service personnel and career progression policies focus on Service needs and requirements, which may not necessarily align with joint needs. A fiscally constrained environment will make it even more important that combatant commands identify and coordinate with Service Departments critical-fill capability requirements. As the Services work to develop the resources to meet those requirements, the need remains for a complete understanding of the definition of cultural and regional competence between Services and Combatant Commands, as multiple terms have been used throughout the DoD directives, instructions, and policy documents provided to the Services. Because of these multiple terms, the next chapter will focus on defining cultural and regional competence.

CHAPTER 3:

WHAT IS CULTURAL AND REGIONAL COMPETENCE?

Many nonprofessionals may relate to the Murphy's Law quote which states, an expert is someone who knows more and more about less and less until he knows absolutely everything about nothing when trying to define cultural and regional expertise.¹ The Department of Defense directives, instructions, and documents mentioned in the preceding chapter show that there are many definitions of these terms and that these definitions continued to evolve over the last ten years. This chapter will first provide a definition of Culture and then focus on defining both Cultural and Regional Competence. This clarification will serve as a prelude to the review of historical vignettes, which will enable one to understand more clearly how regional and cultural competence can assist the commander in achieving mission success in both the current and future complex operating environments.

Defining Culture

In attempting to define culture, one quickly discovers that there are multiple definitions. Brigadier General (retired) Russell Howard was previously a commander charged with initial entry training all U.S. Army Special Operations Soldiers in cultural, regional and language training. His operational experience included Somalia, Haiti, Korea and Japan. Based on these experiences, BG (retired) Howard starts his attempt to define culture by initially stating it was a difficult task. He then goes on to say that in his

¹ Raanan Avidor, *Murphy Laws site*, <http://www.murphys-laws.com/murphy/murphy-technology.html> (accessed October 5, 2012).

research, he came across over 300 definitions of culture in one book alone.² The difficulty in defining culture relates to the fact that culture is not a solitary object, but a shared experience among people that is ever changing. Jessica Glicken Turnley, who received a doctorate in Cultural Anthropology, has worked with the United States Special Operations Command and various offices within the Department of Defense providing services in the national security arena, organizational development, corporate culture change, and policy analysis. Dr. Turnley points out in her papers on special operations forces, that an individual must engage a specific culture in order to understand it, as it is a point of reference to define the world. This interaction changes the culture as well as the individual.³

One of the most recognized metaphors for culture is an iceberg. With an iceberg, what is visible above the waterline is just a small portion of the entire object. For culture, it is the same. The visible aspects of culture we observe on the outside (family, language, art, communities) is diminutive compared to the beliefs, norms, and values that unconsciously influence the individual and group under the surface. The most useful definition of culture is one developed by LTC Timothy Williams, U.S. Army. In his 2006 Army War College paper on Cultural Knowledge and Officer Professional Development entitled, “Culture, We Need Some of That!,” Williams defines culture as, “learned ideals, beliefs, values, and assumptions characteristic of an identifiable community or population which cumulatively result in socially transmitted behavior

² Russell D. Howard, *Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration, and Potential Alternatives* (Hurlburt Field, Fla.: JSOU Press, 2011), 7.

³ Jessica Glicken Turnley, *Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups : Why SOF Are the Way SOF Are* (Hurlburt Field, Fla.: JSOU Press, 2010), 15.

patterns.”⁴ This definition will serve as the common reference point for culture through the rest of this paper.

Defining Cultural Competence

Diversity professionals as well as the health care industry commonly use four components when defining cultural competence. These four components are awareness, attitude, knowledge, and skills.⁵ Awareness is when a person understands their reaction to other cultures. Attitude builds on awareness. It is the ability to not only understand one’s reaction to a different culture, but to examine what in their values or beliefs is the foundation of that reaction. Knowledge relates not just to one’s own understanding of his culture, but also other cultures. It also looks at how different cultures react to one another. Finally, the component of skills relates to one’s ability to take the other three components to create cross-cultural opportunities.

Defining Regional Competence

Most colleges offer courses in regional studies. The purpose of these courses is to allow the students to complete specialized work in the history and cultures of a particular geographic area. For example, American University offers a program in Comparative and Regional Studies.⁶ In this program, American University teaches students about specific countries, and also engages them in cross-regional analysis. This format allows

⁴ Timothy R. Williams, *Culture - We Need Some of That!: Cultural Knowledge and Army Officer Professional Development* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 3.

⁵ Mercedes Martin and Billy Vaughn, *Cultural Competence: The Nuts and Bolts of Diversity & Inclusion*. <http://diversityofficermagazine.com/cultural-competence/cultural-competence-the-nuts-bolts-of-diversity-inclusion/> (accessed October 15, 2012).

⁶ American University, School of International Service, *Comparative and Regional Studies: SIS* <http://www.american.edu/sis/crs/Program.cfm> (accessed October 15, 2012).

the students to expand their knowledge and insight of global and regional issues. The ability to understand and apply knowledge of specific countries and regions in a comparative way, through a logical approach, highlights the definition of Regional Competence.

The Department of Defense has wrestled with a definition and categorization of regional competence since it first published the Defense Language Roadmap in 2005. With the release of DoDI 5160.70 in 2007, approved Department guidelines were included as an enclosure. This enclosure allows the Services to assign one of six regional proficiency skill levels based on their understanding and awareness of historical, political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic knowledge of a specific region or country.⁷

The first level is regional proficiency Skill Level 0+ (Pre-Novice). This level equates to knowing only basic facts about the country, region or culture. A Pre-Novice understands the major social norms and some basic communication skills and may have made a short trip to the area or country.⁸

The next level is Skill Level 1 or Novice. In the DoD definition, a Novice has had less than one year experience with a country or region and their knowledge of the region comes from a combination of things such as education or military experience and area studies. While a Novice knows what is happening in a country or region, he or she cannot explain why it is happening.⁹

⁷ United States, *DODI 5160.70*, E3.1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, E3.2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, E3.3.

The third level is Skill Level 2 or Associate. A Service member at this level has focused on a country or region for a year or two. This time studying the country or area develops a basic understanding of the region or country. However, there is still limited understanding of the culture and only basic language ability.¹⁰

At Skill Level 3, the term used to describe the Service members proficiency level is Professional. The Instruction lists two to four years specialized experience focused on a country or region. At this level, the Service member has enough knowledge of the country or region to be able to make judgments and provide solid arguments for those decisions. The Service member's understanding of the culture can be equated to the understanding one gets by becoming fully immersed in the culture for a year or more and the ability to speak the language at a level of 2 or better.¹¹

Skill Level 4 is a Senior Professional. At this level, a Service member has a deeper appreciation and knowledge of a region or country than many natives. It is at this level that a Service member can develop effective national policy solutions for a country or region and in depth briefings on the area. This knowledge and experience is normally the result of advanced education, personal research and travel. According to the definition, Service members who have achieved this level of regional proficiency can also speak the language at a level of 3 or higher and can easily live and work within the culture.¹²

The final proficiency level is Skill Level 5, or Expert. At this level, a Service member would show more knowledge than most educated people would about the

¹⁰ Ibid., E3.4.

¹¹ Ibid., E3.5.

¹² Ibid., E3.6.

country or region. Language skill and cultural knowledge are almost the equivalent of the native residents of the area. Looking at National Policy, Service members with this experience level are very capable of developing a Theater security cooperation plan.¹³

Based on the above definitions of Regional proficiency, our Combatant commands need to have officers with at least Skill Level 3, preferably Skill Level 4 or 5, developing the country engagement plans with the U.S. Country teams through a whole-of-government approach. With officers with these skill levels, a Combatant command will be able to develop Theater campaign plans along with Phase 0 engagement activities and strategies with informed contextual approaches toward regional populations, cultures, behaviors, and social backgrounds. Doing so will better ensure that the military instrument of National power executes activities in support of National Policy objectives that are also consistent with the regional and local populations' worldview and attitudes.

These types of informed approaches will help our Combatant commands as the United States addresses populations and non-state actors in our future complex operating environments. Developing Regional and cultural competence requires life-long learning as the human domain is not a static unchanging environment. This chapter has shown that the Department of Defense and Services currently view regional and cultural competence in terms of years of immersion and language capability. However, without continued interaction and study in a region, culture or language, an individual's perceptions and insights will degrade and lose relevance.

The next chapter will focus on how our defined regional and cultural experts are critical to planning and executing military operations by focusing on four case studies of

¹³ Ibid., E3.7.

recent military operations of the United States. From the large-scale campaigns of Vietnam and Iraq, to small-scale operations in the Philippines (circa 2001 to present) and Columbia, these case studies will highlight the importance of understanding regional and cultural competence to the conduct and execution of operations.

CHAPTER 4:

HISTORY OF CULTURE IN MODERN MILITARY PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Vietnam

The American military experience in Vietnam has returned to the forefront of discussions between the nation's political and military leaders because of the Global War on Terror. Vietnam was a counterinsurgency with the population serving as an important critical factor to the communist Vietnamese and U.S. /South Vietnam approaches.¹ The key to a successful counterinsurgency is to separate the population from the insurgent, both physically and mentally. Military planners must understand the culture and society of the people to separate successfully the insurgent from the population. The strategy taken by the DoD, however, focused purely on the enemy forces and did nothing to address the underlying cultural and societal causes that triggered the population support of the insurgents. It was a strategy ignorant of the village life of the Vietnamese peasants and grounded in Western cultural ideals and models of success. LTC Carolyn Kleiner displayed how high within the military establishment the American centric approach ran when she quoted former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in her Army War College Strategy Research Project. Mr. McNamara stated, "I had never visited Indochina, nor did I understand or appreciate its history, language, culture or value. When it came to

¹ Celestino Perez, *Addressing the Fog of COG: Perspectives on the Center of Gravity in US Military Doctrine* (Fort Leavenworth, KS : Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, n.d.), 10. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/COG.pdf> (accessed February 12, 2013).

Vietnam, we found ourselves setting policy for a region that was *terra incognita*.² American leaders attempted to define success in battlefield wins and body counts. While from a conventional, Western military style of thinking, these definitions should have equated to success, in Vietnam, they did not resonate with the Vietnamese. The often-quoted exchange between the U.S. Colonel Harry Summers, Jr and his North Vietnamese counterpart, Colonel Tu in which Colonel Summers tells Colonel Tu, “you never beat us on the battlefield,” and Colonel Tu responds “that may be so, it is also irrelevant,” highlights the gap between the two strategic approaches and the local culture. There were some programs, such as CORDS and the Phoenix program, which focused on the population. CORDS stands for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support. This program unified the military and civilian efforts in Vietnam and placed military manpower support to the pacification programs in the villages to enhance the influence of the South Vietnamese government in addressing population concerns.³ In conjunction with the Phoenix program, the South Vietnamese Government and U.S. began to target the bonds the insurgents had with the local population. The design of the Phoenix program allowed the United States and South Vietnam to target Viet Cong forces in the civilian population by coordinating South Vietnamese police force operations alongside local militia. This approach, as opposed to military operations, served as another way to separate the Viet Cong from the populace. U.S. support for the war ended before fully realizing the positive effects of these programs.

² Carolyn F. Kleiner, *The Importance of Cultural Knowledge for Today's Warrior-Diplomats* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: U.S. Army War College, 2008), 7.

³ Dale, Andrade and James H Willbanks, "CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future," *Military Review*. 86, no. 2 (April – May 2006): 17.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, there was a focus by the defense establishment and Services in particular to focus on their core competencies. The desire by the leadership to move past Vietnam resulted in American political and military leaders dropping virtually all counterinsurgency training, doctrine and operations, in which cultural understanding is critical.⁴ In 1986, Major David Petraeus, in *Parameters*, also wrote this as he discussed the impact of Vietnam on the military: “Vietnam would indicate that...involvement in a counterinsurgency should be avoided...Relatively little emphasis was given to preparation for this form of conflict...or in developing American capabilities.”⁵

Iraq

Cultural understanding gained traction as a part of operations late in the Iraq war. After the Thunder Runs were complete, the hard part began for not only the military, but also all elements of national power. Unfortunately, the importance of cross-cultural competence in the military went through “a period of relative dormancy since the end of the Vietnam War” and had to be re-learned by the Services.⁶ Montgomery McFate quotes Congressman “Ike” Skelton in his October 23rd 2003 letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in which he emphasized the importance of understanding culture in developing the war plan. His letter to Rumsfeld stated, “In simple terms, if we had better understood the Iraqi culture and mindset, our war plans would have been even better than they were. The plan for the post war period and all of its challenges would have been far

⁴ Kleiner, *The Importance of Cultural Knowledge for Today's Warrior Diplomats*, 7.

⁵ D.H. Petraeus, "Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam," *Parameters : Journal of the US Army War College*. 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 48-61.

⁶ Scott E. Womack, *Cross-Cultural Competence Assessment Instruments for the U.S. Military Academy's Semester Abroad Program* (Seton Hall University, 2009), 31.
<http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/docview/848429103?accountid=12686> (accessed December 12, 2012).

better, and we [would have been] better prepared for the ‘long slog’...to win the peace in Iraq.”⁷ In the Joint Center for Operational Analysis’ study of U.S. military operations over the last decade, it cites the situation in Iraq in 2003 (post-major combat operations) as an example where the approach taken by the U.S. military and other agencies did not reflect the actual operating environment. By neglecting information concerning the host-nation population, it left our planners with an incomplete understanding of the operational environment.⁸ It was the Iraq experience that was the catalyst for the statement in the 2005 Defense Language Roadmap that stated, “Language skill and regional expertise have not been regarded as warfighting skills, and are not sufficiently incorporated into operational or contingency planning...language skill and regional expertise are not valued as DoD core competencies yet they are as important as critical weapon systems.”⁹ At both the tactical and the operational level, this cultural ignorance weakened the effectiveness of the United States military toward achieving the objective of a stable and secure Iraq.

Colombia

After looking at two large-scale, conventional efforts where regional and cultural competence did not seem to play a large role in the planning, one can turn to two case studies within the special operations community that highlight how the importance of cultural competence was not lost after the Vietnam War. The first study is the United

⁷ Montgomery McFate, "Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of Their Curious Relationship," *MILITARY REVIEW*. 85, no. 2 (March – April 2005): 24-38.

⁸ Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), *Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations* (Suffolk, VA : Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), n.d.), 3. <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/u?/p4013coll11,2035> (accessed on December 12, 2012).

⁹ United States. *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap*, 3.

States efforts within Columbia from 1989 until present day. President George H. W. Bush's declaration of a war on drugs in 1989 brought Columbia to the forefront of planning efforts for the U.S. military overall and Special Operations Forces (SOF) in particular. The regional and cultural expertise of SOF was a factor that helped the national leadership authorize their deployment and support training of Colombian military and police forces against drug leaders.¹⁰

As Plan Colombia was developed, the focus of efforts became the training of Colombian counter-narcotics units. This focus changed with 9/11 and alongside counter-narcotics units, U.S. forces also conducted counterinsurgency training for the Colombia military.¹¹ The Defense Cooperation Agreement with Colombia has limited the U.S. footprint to 800 military and 600 contractors within Colombia and there is no indication that this trend will change.¹² The limited resources available to U.S. planners resulted in SOF being the focus resource, as the approach, emphasizing training and advising, required regional and cultural experts. This strategy ensured the internal struggle within Colombia was truly a Colombian fight and not a campaign designed and fought by U.S. military forces. This approach was validated to the Special Forces community with the 2008 Colombian military hostage rescue operation of 15 hostages held by the FARC named Operation JAQUE.

¹⁰ Jeffrey D. Waddell *United States Army Special Forces Support to "Plan Colombia* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003), 21.

¹¹ Andrew Feickert, *U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Information Service, Library of Congress, 2005), 20.

¹² June S. Beittel, *Colombia Issues for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 39. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf> (accessed on November 15, 2012).

Philippines

Current American involvement and operations in the Philippines provides another good example of how regional and cultural understanding can shape an overall favorable end state. The United States has a long history with Philippines, going back to the Spanish-American War. The focus of this section is on the U.S. involvement in the Philippines since late 2001. The official name for these operations became Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – PHILIPPINES (OEF-P) in early 2002 as a part of the larger GWOT. As stated earlier, to succeed in counterinsurgency operations, one must first understand the root causes for the insurgency. To achieve this understanding in the Philippines, U.S. Pacific Command deployed a Special Forces assessment team in October 2001 to the southern Philippines.¹³ The use of these culturally attuned service members allowed the planners in the command to gain critical insight on the local demographics, infrastructure, and socioeconomic conditions that influenced the social unrest in the south and “laid the foundation for the operational plan.”¹⁴ The plan developed focused on the “indirect approach.” This strategy focused on countering the insurgent threat “by, through and with” the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine government. The regional competence of the soldiers who planned operations in the Philippines allowed for this holistic approach to the issues. This approach is the 80/20 approach. The focus of 80 percent of the AFP activities consists of Civil Military Operations and the remaining 20 percent of AFP activities focus on targeting/combat

¹³ Greg Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF Philippines and the Indirect Approach," *MILITARY REVIEW*. 86, no. 6 (November-December 2006): 2-12.

¹⁴ Ibid.

operations.¹⁵ The Civil Military Operations included operations specifically focused on improving the relationship of the Philippine armed forces and the local populations as well as the interaction of the Philippine Government with its people. As planners develop their plan, the assumptions used to attain the desired end state will affect both the resources placed against that plan as well as the approach developed. In the Philippines case study, those well-informed assumptions are a direct result of the regionally and culturally attuned forces that developed the initial assessment. As Colonel Wilson writes, “Once they complete their assessments, more refined plans ranging from small-scale Liaison Coordination Element operations to larger efforts can be developed. This strategy has the added benefit of being preventative instead of just reactive.”¹⁶

Chapter Four builds on the directives and guidance presented in Chapter Two, the understanding of regional and cultural competence from Chapter Three and its importance to planning and executing operations as shown in the examples above, and Chapter Five examines Service capabilities and recent initiatives to address regional and cultural competence.

¹⁵ Joint Center of Operational Analysis (JCOA), *Partnered Counterterrorism Operations in the Philippines, A Case Study* (Suffolk, VA), 4.

¹⁶ Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 2-12.

CHAPTER 5:

SERVICE DEPARTMENT SPECIALISTS AND INITIATIVES

After reviewing some case studies in the previous chapter that highlight why regional and cultural expertise are important in the conduct of military operations, it is important to look at what capabilities reside in each Service for Regional and cultural expertise. As the Defense Department directives and congressional reports have shown, each Service had requirements to develop regional and cultural experts within their Service. Where that capability resides is important in understanding what resources are available to assist the Department and combatant commands ability to plan and execute operations in their regions that support United States national objectives.

Army

The United States Army currently has three basic branches and one functional area officer career field that focus on regional and cultural understanding and awareness. Due to the recent focus on regional and cultural expertise by the leadership throughout the government, one can find reference to the requirement for cultural competence throughout many of the Army Basic Branches and functional areas. However, there are only the four specialties in which regional and cultural competence dominate the officer development processes. Of the basic branches, there are the three SOF specialties. These are Special Forces (18 series), Psychological Operations (37 series), and Civil Affairs (38 series). These branches are “non-accession branches” which means that officers cannot be brought into them directly upon commissioning. Before entering one of these fields,

an officer must serve successfully as a lieutenant in one of the other Army Branches, to develop his or her knowledge of conventional operations and small-unit leadership.¹

Special Forces officers, as members of the only branch specially selected, trained and equipped to conduct unconventional warfare, require language training, cultural and regional orientation training to conduct operations by, with, and through surrogate forces.² In addition, the first unique knowledge element listed for Special Forces (SF) officers is an in-depth knowledge of at least one region of the world and proficiency in at least one of the region's languages.³ The branch proponent further emphasizes the importance of culture on operations by stating one of the importance attributes of SF officers is to "Have good interpersonal and cross-cultural communication skills as well as political acumen and cultural sensitivity. Mission success will often depend on an ability to establish rapport and influence the attitudes and behaviors of people from foreign cultures."⁴

Psychological Operations (PO) officers must be prepared to respond to crises throughout the world and frequently by, with, or through the platforms of key communicators and media of other forces, organizations, agencies, or nations.⁵ Because the mission of these officers is to influence the behavior of foreign target audiences to support national objectives, PO officers must understand the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behavior of the foreign audience. For these reason, it is critical that PO

¹ United States, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 2010), 15.

² Ibid., 166.

³ Ibid., 168.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., 177.

officers possess regional orientation, language proficiency, and cross-cultural interpersonal skills and gain and maintain this area orientation not only through study, but also through repetitive operational experience during their careers.⁶ The goal of the development of PO officers is to produce and sustain highly-qualified, regionally-oriented officers to lead forces in combat.⁷

Civil Affairs (CA) officers' mission requires them to engage and influence the civil populace. The conduct of these operations is by, with, or through indigenous populations and institutions.⁸ Of the officer characteristic required by the branch, some of the core competencies that all Civil Affairs officers must possess include cross-cultural communications, regional acumen, language ability, and interpersonal skills.⁹ Prior to the events of 9/11, over 95 percent of the Army's Civil Affairs force structure was in the Reserve Component, with only a battalion that had five regionally-oriented companies of Active Component soldiers. Increased demand since 9/11 for civil affairs units within the SOF community and the conventional forces resulted in the active force adding two operational brigades with five regionally oriented battalions each. This rapid growth has resulted in officer shortages over the last six years as the current training program of regional and language studies requires almost two years of training prior to utilization.

Also within the Army officer corps there is one functional specialty that requires regional specialization. The functional area that requires this specialized training is foreign area officers, or FA 48. According to the Army Pamphlet on officer career

⁶ Ibid., 179.

⁷ Ibid., 182.

⁸ Ibid., 185.

⁹ Ibid., 186.

management, foreign area officers (FAO) are “deliberately accessed, trained, educated, and developed to meet worldwide Army requirements for officers possessing a unique combination of strategic focus, regional expertise, foreign language proficiency, and professional military skills and experience.”¹⁰ They are regionally-focused experts with cultural understanding. Within the functional area, there are nine regional areas of concentration (AOC). These AOCs are Latin America, Europe, South Asia, Eurasia, China, Middle East / North Africa, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Because of the extensive training of these officers (both advanced civil schooling and in-country training) that can take upwards to four years, it has been difficult to make up shortages of these officers for the Army the past six years.

The United States Army has implemented initiatives in order to increase regional and language competency within the general purpose force. The 2012 Army Posture statement includes discussion on the Army’s culture and foreign language strategy. It states that cultural capability enables Soldiers and leaders to understand the how and why of foreign cultures and the roles that culture, religion, and geography play in military operations.¹¹ The Army has focused on improving cultural and language instruction in its professional military education programs as part of its definition of life-long learning. For near term deployments, it also provides focused support to Soldiers through a five to six hour culture and language familiarization course conducted by the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC). This deployment focus is further

¹⁰ Ibid., 256.

¹¹ Department of the Army, *Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) Information Paper*, https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2012/InformationPapers/ViewPaper.aspx?id=305, (accessed on October 16, 2012).

exemplified through the native-speaking role players for pre-deployment training and the increased recruitment of native speakers through the 09L, Interpreter/Translator Program.¹² In the future, the primary goal of the United States Army is for every soldier and leader to have cross-cultural competence, and over the course of one's career in the military, that will develop into regional competency. To accomplish this goal, the Army plans to expand immersion programs for cadets, increase language training detachments on installations, develop more language survival kits, expand the 09L program from Central Command into Pacific Command and Africa Command, and finally continue to develop on-line support.¹³ While the United States Army recognizes that soldiers at all levels must possess some cultural and foreign language capability in the future, in a resource-constrained environment, the Service's ability to fund programs to raise understanding levels from familiarization to competency will be competing against other core programs and training for limited funding.

Navy

In the introduction to the 2008 United States Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness Strategy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) stated, "success in achieving the nation's Maritime Strategy depends in large part on our ability to communicate with and comprehend potential adversaries, enduring allies, and emerging partner-nations."¹⁴ To accomplish this strategy, the CNO's guidance was to

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ J. C. Harvey, Jr., *U.S. Navy Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Awareness Strategy* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2008), 2. <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA503388> (accessed on November 16, 2012).

develop fully the Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (CLREC), as this center would assist in the professional development of FAOs as well as developing practical, Navy-wide, cross-cultural skills that will help enhance relationships with emerging partner nations.¹⁵ Also, in showing that language, regional expertise, and culture was still a priority, the CNO Guidance for 2011 stated that the Navy would continue to expand CLREC skills enhancement opportunities for all operational forces, with special emphasis on general purpose forces' cross-cultural competency training and on pre-deployment operational CLREC training for forces afloat and expeditionary units.¹⁶

The officer specialty in the United States Navy focused on regional and cultural competence is the foreign area officer. The Navy, like the Army, uses a single-track approach to FAOs, as once an officer is designated a FAO; they generally serve only in FAO positions. Currently, there are 266 Navy foreign area officers, and the goal for the Navy is to reach 400 by FY 2015.¹⁷ The Navy FAO training, similar to the Army, takes three years to complete. These officers are part of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and Navy FAOs are a restricted-line community. Each officer is apportioned regionally to the five overseas geographic unified combatant commands. (EUCOM, CENTCOM, AFRICOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM).

¹⁵ Ibid., 11.

¹⁶ Gary Roughead, *Guidance for 2011*, Department of the Navy, 7.
<http://www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202011.pdf> (accessed on November 16, 2012).

¹⁷ Department of the Navy, *FAO Community Overview Mar 2012*, Slide 2.
<http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/officer/communitymanagers/restricted/Documents/FAO%20Community%20Overview%20%20MAR12.pptx> (accessed on November 16, 2012).

While the Navy and Marine Corps officers compete to become Naval Special Warfare officers; in reviewing the published training articles on the Navy's Sea, Air Land Team (SEAL) training, there is no dedicated block of language and regional training as part of the initial-entry training. This type of training does take place once an officer has graduated SEAL training; however, there is no specific tracking of the officers to a certain geographic region. Also within the Navy are the Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Teams (MCASTs). The officer assigned to these teams, are unrestricted surface warfare officers, who upon completion of their tour of duty in the MCAST, return to the general population for future service. As such, Civil Affairs is not a full-time specialty for the Navy commissioned officer corps and at most are a functional area type assignment. Based on these items, for this paper, MCAST and Navy SEAL officers are not identified as regional and cultural experts as defined in previous chapters. At most, by the definitions previously provided, they are officers with regional and cultural knowledge and operational experiences.

Air Force

In the United States Air Force 2011 Global Partnership Strategy, both the Secretary of the Air Force and Air Force Chief of Staff state that one cannot have global vigilance, reach, and power for America without global partnerships.¹⁸ As part of that strategy, one of the ways to achieve that objective was establishing, sustaining, or enhancing capacity and capability by identifying and managing critical skill sets like

¹⁸ Department of the Air Force, *2011 Air Force Global Partnerships Strategy*, 3. <http://www.safia.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-111228-013.pdf> (accessed on November 20, 2012).

language, region and culture expertise.¹⁹ In the 2012 United States Air Force Posture Statement to the U. S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, the Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff reaffirmed the importance of language, regional expertise, and cultural competence by stating they will develop expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills.²⁰ Building partnerships remained a core function for the Air Force within the posture statement, as international engagements are requiring Airmen to operate in a culturally-complex environment throughout the globe. These partnerships will ensure interoperability, integration and interdependence between air forces, build partner-nation capability and capacity, reducing demand for large U.S. support.²¹

As part of the push for more cross-culturally competent Airmen, the Air Force established the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) at the Air University in 2006. At the end of 2007, the AFCLC became responsible for culture and language training as well as education across the entire Air Force. One of the initiatives conducted by AFCLC is the Language Enabled Airman Program or LEAP. A little over 200 Airmen were notified in early November of 2012 of their selection into the program. The LEAP program is designed to be a career-spanning program to select, develop and sustain foreign language capability and cross-cultural competence.²² Service requirements shape selections into LEAP and program participants have already served in both real-world

¹⁹ Ibid., 27.

²⁰ Department of the Air Force, *2012 United States Air Force Posture Statement*, 13. <http://www.posturestatement.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120321-055.pdf> (accessed on November 20, 2012).

²¹ Ibid., 24.

²² Air Force Culture and Language Center, "Language Enabled Airman Program announces selections," *Air Forces News Service*, November 28, 2012. <http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123327762> (accessed on December 3, 2012).

missions such as the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command as well as combined-training exercises.

For the United States Air Force the focus of regional and cultural expertise has resided with International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program. IAS officers are either Regional Affairs Strategists, or Political-Military Affairs Strategist. This program is open for all active-duty officers, except Judge Advocate General officers, who must compete for accession in a yearly board. Overall, there are approximately 530 IAS officers (220+ Regional and 300+ Political) with an annual development of approximately 150 officers (60+ Regional and 90 Political). The regional expertise and foreign language skills required for the Regional Affairs Strategist requires three years of training vice the one year of training for the Political-Military Affairs Strategist.²³

Marine Corps

As with the other Services, the United States Marine Corps has also increased its emphasis for more regionally and culturally-aware service members. This has resulted in the Marine Corps establishing regional, culture, and language familiarization as a recognized program within the Marine Corps in May of 2012. In addition, the Marine Corps developed its own language, regional and cultural strategy.²⁴ In describing the program, the message specifically states that the program does not intend to produce

²³ FAO Web, "Introduction to the FAO Program," *Introduction to the Foreign area officer's Program note pages*, 7. https://myfao.nps.edu/access/content/group/cb5fae36-035c-4361-b939-0fda6c5c0179/documents/Introduction_to_the_Foreign_AreaOfficers_Program_Tanscript.pdf (accessed October 20, 2012).

²⁴United States Marine Corps, *MARADMIN 619/12, Implementation of the Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization Program*. <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/129296/implementation-of-the-regional-culture-and-language-familiarization-program.aspx> (accessed October 26, 2012).

language, regional and cultural expertise. The program is separate and distinct from other Marine Corps programs that train and produce their small-group regional and cultural experts. The program design specifically focuses on the Marine general purpose forces.²⁵

For the commissioned Marine Corps officers, the focal specialty in which regional and cultural expertise lies is the Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) and FAO programs. The Marine FAO program is a dual-track program similar to the United States Air Force, and includes the distinction of developing a regional expert (RAO) without language skills or a fully qualified FAO that possesses the knowledge of a specific region of the world matched to an ability to speak the language.²⁶ The training program for the Marine Corps is very similar to the Army's FAO training and education; however, because there is no language or in country training requirement, the Marine Corps Regional Affairs Officer can finish his or her training around 18 months.²⁷ Overall, the Marine Corps averages almost 300 active-duty commissioned officers and brings in roughly 20 new foreign area officers a year to maintain that level of support.²⁸

For the Marine Corps, the most recent initiative to develop regional and cultural knowledge within the general purpose force is the Regional, Culture and Language Familiarization Program (RCLFP). For the officers, this program is broken into five blocks to cover an officer from the time they enter service and receive a regional focus-area as a second lieutenant until they are a lieutenant colonel (however, the focus of the

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ FAO Web, "Introduction to the FAO Program," 5.

²⁷ Ibid., 7.

²⁸ Ibid., 5.

program for lieutenant colonels is still under development). To ensure accessibility to all officers, the program currently utilizes a distant learning method of instruction.²⁹

According to Major General Tom Murray, commander of the Marine Corps Training and Education Command, the intent of this program is to have a region, culture and language for each Marine to learn throughout their career, with milestones that must be passed prior to a Marine being eligible for promotion.³⁰ However, within the MARADMIN message, there was no discussion of how those requirements are reflected in future officer promotion boards.

Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program

The AFPAK Hands Program began in 2009 upon the recommendation of General Stanley McChrystal (then International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) commander in Afghanistan) and General David Petraeus (at the time Commander of U.S. Central Command) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Admiral Mike Mullen.³¹ The program goal is to develop a cadre of personnel who have a deeper understanding of the complexities of the two countries. The training and experience of the service members assigned to the program help them understand how the countries work from the local to governmental level.³² By study of the culture, religion, tribal dynamics,

²⁹ United States Marine Corps, *MARADMIN 619/12*.

³⁰ Gina Harkins, "USMC general details training changes," *Marine Corps Times*, October 4, 2012. <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/10/marine-maj-gen-tom-murray-training-education-tecom-cg-100412> (accessed November 30, 2012).

³¹ Donna Miles, "AfPak Hands Program Pays Dividends in Afghanistan, Pakistan," *American Forces Press Service*, January 4, 2012. <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=66671> (accessed January 16, 2013).

³² Joint Chiefs of Staff, "AfPak Hands Program Brief," *AFPAK HANDS Management Element*. http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-09/090811135844_AFPAK_Hands_Program_Brief.pdf (accessed January 16, 2013).

government structures and language, service members in this program provide continuity, focus, and persistent engagement on Afghanistan and Pakistan.³³ This will help leaders of the U.S., Afghanistan, and Pakistan identify where frictions are between governments, officials, local populations, and military leaders. This program is touted as a model for future U.S. military engagement operations as it focuses on the human dimensions of the battlefield.³⁴ While the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the program, the real issue with the program was in the personnel details within the Services as they execute the program. Initially, there were no directed out-of-theater positions for service members,³⁵ and commands were reluctant to have an AFPAK Hands officer assigned due to the limitations placed on members of the program during their out-of-theater time. Also, there was no recognition of service in AFPAK Hands as a critical component toward officer development and promotion,³⁶ so for a four-year detail, officers are disadvantaged from their service peers when it comes to promotion and selection boards. Better direction to the Services in the beginning would help alleviate these personnel difficulties. Finally, the program participants are only in the program for 36-48 months, so this is not a life-long experience or specialty as those who serve in SOF or in the FAO program. By the definitions of regional competence in Chapter 3, most participants are Skill Level 2 – Associate. While the AFPAK participants have a deeper understanding

³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, “ CJCSI 1630.01 The Afghanistan Pakistan Hand Program,” *AFPAK HANDS Management Element*, 1. [http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-09/090811140102_Signed_CJCSI_1630_01_the_Afghanistan_Pakistan_Hands_Program_\(2\).pdf](http://www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-09/090811140102_Signed_CJCSI_1630_01_the_Afghanistan_Pakistan_Hands_Program_(2).pdf) (accessed January 16, 2013).

³⁴ Miles, “AfPak Hands Program Pays Dividends in Afghanistan, Pakistan.”

³⁵ Author’s personal experiences at US Army Human Resources Command from 2010-2012.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

than a Novice of regional and cultural issues, without further utilization and continued training, the program still falls short of the vision of the CCJO.

As shown above, each Service has a need to develop its own cadre of regional and cultural experts. Many of the initiatives now being taken by the Services will develop a more regionally-aware joint force, but will fall short of regional expertise. A majority of the experts trained and managed by the Services fall under FAO or RAO officer titles. That said, while every Service develops regional and cultural specialists, the vast majority of the active-duty regional experts remain in the United States Army. For fiscal year 2013, there are 2,330 SOF branch officer authorizations overall (1,057 SF, 881 CA and 392 PO) and 643 FAO officer authorizations for a total of 2,973 regional specialist authorizations within the U.S. Army. The U.S. Army field manual, FM-1 states that conflicts are normally resolved decisively within the land domain, as “land power is unique...[as] only land forces can occupy, control, and protect vital areas. People and resources (the participants, supporters, and objectives of land operations) can only be controlled or protected by land forces.”³⁷ This interaction with the people, or the human domain, due to the focus on the land domain, explains the larger authorization of regional and cultural specialists within the Army.

Besides the Department of Defense and military Service Departments, the complex problems associated with international operations and cultural and regional differences are problems that the business-world currently seeks to address. In the next chapter, this paper will look at three successful international corporations to see the approach they have developed to address regional and cultural differences as they expand

³⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 1, The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 3-35.

their market base. How these corporations seek relevance in the regional markets they compete in can help inform the combatant commands as each command addresses the unique cultural and regional differences within their areas of responsibility.

CHAPTER 6:

BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND INITIATIVES

This paper will look at corporations that compete globally, in order to determine if there are approaches and strategies that will create opportunities for efficiency in the conduct of operations for the Defense Department. While competition in the global markets are not as lethal from a human sense, companies that do not adjust their approach to the operating environment may certainly die as failure can result in a company going bankrupt or becoming acquired by another competitor. International companies also are concerned about costs, and this drives efficiencies. As DoD moves into a fiscally-constrained environment, efficiencies in our approaches to regional problems will be a requirement. While there are many potential choices within the business world to choose from, this chapter will look at PepsiCo, MacDonald's, and Toyota to see the approaches they have developed to address regional and cultural differences as they expanded their market base. How these corporations continue to seek relevance in the regional markets they compete in can help inform the combatant commands as each command addresses the unique cultural and regional differences within their areas of responsibility.

PepsiCo.

In the 2011 Annual Report for PepsiCo, it begins by stating, "One billion times a day, in 200 countries and territories around the world, PepsiCo provides consumers with affordable, aspirational and authentic foods and beverages."¹ The company founded in

¹ PepsiCo.com, "2011 Annual Report, PepsiCo, Inc.," *PepsiCo*, 1. http://www.pepsico.com/annual11/downloads/PEP_AR11_2011_Annual_Report.pdf (accessed November 15, 2012).

North Carolina by Caleb Bradham in 1902 has developed well beyond its humble beginnings. In an official brochure put out by the company, it states that that PepsiCo employs over 150,000 people speaking more than 40 languages around the globe.² What has allowed this once small local company to thrive internationally? A *CNN Money* article from Feb 2009 provides some insights. The article was entitled “The Pepsi Challenge” and its focus was on the recently selected Chief Executive Officer Indra Nooyi. Ms. Nooyi began reorganizing the giant company to make it less fixated on the U.S.³ The article goes on to quote one of the company’s consultants, Former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who states “If you look at the job entirely from the American perspective, then it becomes impossible to run a global business. You have to relate your interests to the interests of other parts of the world to be relevant in their societies. Indra [Nooyi] seems to understand this instinctively.”⁴ As part of the 2011 Annual Report, Ms. Nooyi’s statement to shareholders describes how in 2007 the company began to focus on making the business more efficient and began aligning the global operating structure to leverage the scale of the company.⁵ Within PepsiCo, there are four business units. These units are PepsiCo Americas Foods (this includes North and Latin America), PepsiCo Americas Beverages (again, includes both North and Latin America), PepsiCo Europe, and PepsiCo Asia, Middle East and Africa.

² PepsiUSA.com, “The Pepsi-Cola Story,” *PepsiCo*, 22.
http://pepsiusa.com/downloads/PepsiLegacy_Book.pdf (accessed November 15, 2012).

³ Betsy Morris, “The Pepsi Challenge,” *CNN Money*, February 19, 2008.
http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/18/news/companies/morris_nooyi.fortune/index.htm (accessed November 15, 2012).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ PepsiCo.com, “2011 Annual Report,” 2.

In reviewing the management approach, by expanding globally, PepsiCo has been able to maximize the company's growth potential. This global expansion ensures company diversity through geographic growth. The growth also has resulted in larger revenues for PepsiCo than it could have otherwise expected, as operations in the world's emerging markets ensure establishment in sectors with faster population growth as well as GDP potential than in the developed world. As part of its global strategy, PepsiCo created products to appeal to local tastes and needs by integrating local experts to tailor products to local tastes as well as consumption patterns. Some examples of this success are Kurkure extruded snacks in India, tamarind-flavored carbonated soft drinks in the Middle East, a biscuit that includes lentils and wheat in India, and Chinese medicinal herb beverages marketed in China.⁶

Having local experts within the four international business units also helps ensure price appropriate products, packaged with local consumer wants and needs in mind. Another demonstration of the way local and regional experts have increased the success of PepsiCo is the use of traditional trade channels to maximize direct to market delivery.⁷ This ability to recognize the trends of the local environments and maximize their revenue potential ensures PepsiCo will remain among the top international companies for the near future.

McDonalds

McDonald's started out as a local restaurant in San Bernardino, California in 1940. The business first went international in 1967, as restaurants opened in both Canada and

⁶ PepsiCo.com, *Management Approach*, <http://www.pepsico.com/purpose/overview/management-approach.html> (accessed November 15, 2012).

⁷ Ibid.

Puerto Rico that year. According to its corporate website, McDonalds has grown to more than 34,000 restaurants, operates in 119 countries and currently employs over 1.7 million people.⁸ In a 2001 British Food Journal article, the key to McDonald's international success is franchising. By franchising the company to local people, the delivery and interpretation of U.S. brand culture translates automatically.⁹ McDonald's business structure has taken a geographic approach as it expanded into the international market. There are five geographical divisions within McDonald's. Besides the United States Division, there are divisions for Europe, Canada, Latin America, and Asia/Pacific/Middle East/Africa. One of the aims of McDonald's is to create a standardized set of items that taste the same, whether in Singapore, Spain, or South Africa.¹⁰ However, the company also understands that because there are different countries, there are different tastes and requirements. In his article in the International Journal of Business and Management, Jing Han pointed out that each functional geographic unit of McDonald's was wholly responsible for producing and marketing its products in that region.¹¹ This allows McDonald's to focus on local customer needs in the different regions. This again goes back to a "think global, act local" theme and strategy. By incorporating regional and local experts as part of the management staff by emphasizing local managers, McDonald's is able to access the foreign country's bureaucracy and establish restaurants

⁸McDonalds.com, *Our Company*, http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/our_company.html (accessed December 15, 2012).

⁹ Claudio Vignali, "McDonald's: "Think Global, Act Local" the Marketing Mix". *British Food Journal*. 103, no. 2(2001): 97.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹¹ Jing Han , "The Business Strategy of McDonald's", *International Journal of Business and Management*, Vol 3, No. 11(November 2008): 73.

with the approval of the regional government.¹² Some examples of this regional adaptation, based on understanding cultural needs include serving Big Macs without cheese in Israel, which separates meat and dairy products as required for kosher restaurants; offering Vegetable McNuggets and mutton-based Mahrarja Mac in India, as Hindus do not eat beef and finally, having the stores in Malaysia and Singapore undergo rigorous inspections by Muslim clerics to ensure they met ritual cleanliness required to be awarded halal-certification.¹³ These strategies, developed by regional and cultural experts, have made McDonald's one of the most successful world companies by allowing it to increase its revenues, quality, and ensure worldwide consumer satisfaction through its "think global, act local" strategy.

Toyota

Toyota Motor Corporation began in 1933 as the Automotive Production Division came on line within the Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, Ltd.¹⁴ In 1957, the company began exporting to the United States and today the company has approximately 51 bases in 26 different countries and regions. The company has also established regional Global Production Centers (GPCs) within the United States, the United Kingdom, and Thailand¹⁵ that have allowed it to conduct operations and activities in the regions of North America, Europe and around the Asia Pacific.

¹² Bahaudin Mujtaba and Bina Patel, "McDonald's Success Strategy and Global Expansion through Customer and Brand Loyalty", *Journal of Business Case Studies*, Vol 3 Number 3 (2007): 58. <http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JBCS/article/view/4857/4949> (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹³ Vignali, "McDonald's: "Think Global, Act Local" the Marketing Mix," 99.

¹⁴ Toyota Motor Corporation. *75 Years of Toyota*, http://www.toyota-global.com/company/history_of_toyota/75years/text/taking_on_the_automotive_business/chapter2/section1/item1.html (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹⁵ Toyota Motor Corporation. *Globalizing and Localizing Manufacturing*, http://www.toyota-global.com/company/vision_philosophy/globalizing_and_localizing_manufacturing (accessed December 15, 2012).

In his 2003 book entitled “Toward a Total Global Strategy,” George Yip discusses how Toyota took an integrated global approach to business and has been highly successful. The company has focused on three major markets (the Asian Market, North American Market, and European Market) and created manufacturing hubs in each of those regions. This allowed Toyota to be able to adjust quickly to regional tastes and needs within each market. The other advantages of having hubs located within each region and managed by regional natives is that the company learns quickly regional and local preferences and is able to reduce the cost of transporting supplies by acquiring necessary supplies locally. Finally, by assembling their product within the region, they are able to reduce further the production costs by bypassing traditional tariffs. All of this allows Toyota to produce local, lower-priced cars that appeal to the regional consumer.¹⁶ This allowed Toyota to overtake American auto manufacturer, General Motors as the world’s largest auto manufacturer in 2008. This title was lost in 2011 after Japan suffered natural disasters with an earthquake and a tsunami, and Thailand experienced serious flooding. However, its global manufacturing base recovered quickly in 2012, and Toyota again surpassed General Motors to re-take the title as world largest automaker.¹⁷

As in the previous company examples, Toyota had to make a change when it decided to expand its focus from local to global. To accomplish this change, Toyota decided to adjust its company strategy and developed regional expertise within their marketing plans and strategy, by hiring and expanding into other regional markets. By

¹⁶ George S. Yip, *Total Global Strategy II: Updated for the Internet and Service Era* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), 299.

¹⁷ The Associated Press, “Toyota knocks off GM as world's biggest car maker by retaking lead in global sales race,” *NY Daily News*, July 25, 2012. <http://www.nydailynews.com/autos/toyota-knocks-gm-world-biggest-car-maker-retaking-lead-global-sales-race-article-1.1121536> (accessed December 15, 2012).

building hubs within those regions and hiring regional experts, Toyota ensured their product was competitive with that regional market. Finally, in a recent move by the company to make better decisions and tailor its operations in the markets it serves, Toyota recently “shook-up” management, elevating regional executives to key positions. This new “streamlined management structure is designed to enhance local responsibility over operations, clarify decision-making and keep the company focused on the customer.”¹⁸

PepsiCo, McDonald’s, and Toyota each have incorporated regional and cultural experts to inform their global and regional-market strategies. By doing this they have successfully expanded from their local area, and translated success into multiple cultures and regions throughout the world. Some of these regional and cultural experts are local residents and others are personnel trained by the companies. The point that is important to highlight is the companies recognize the importance of understanding a region or culture deeply in order to successfully compete within that region. The next chapter will look at current structures of four geographic combatant commands as these commands execute operations in support of the National Security Strategy regionally within their areas of responsibility, or as has been shown above, to “think global, but act local.”

¹⁸ Chris Woodyard, “Toyota brass shakeup aims to give regions more control.” *USA Today*, March 6, 2013. <http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2013/03/06/toyota-shakeup/1966489> (accessed March 15, 2013).

CHAPTER 7:

COMBATANT COMMAND STRUCTURE

In looking at the structure of combatant commands, one must first review the responsibilities that are outlined in Unified Command Plan. These general and specified responsibilities will influence the structure of the command. The commands must plan, conduct, and assess security cooperation activities and command U.S. forces conducting peace or humanitarian relief operations. They further must plan and conduct military support to stability operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, as directed.¹ These responsibilities require regional and cultural expertise to ensure effective execution by the headquarters. Within the combatant command, to execute these responsibilities, it is important to focus on two directorates or portions of the staff: The J5 or the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate as well as the J3, or Operations Directorate. These two directorates focus on planning and execution of campaigns and strategy in their geographic areas of responsibility. In reviewing the structure of these directorates, to determine regional and cultural competence within the structure, this paper will focus on the regional and cultural specialties of the Service active component officers in the manning document. Research into the U.S. Army manning documents for the geographic combatant commands, the J3 and J5 directorates shows that all have Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) officers assigned to them. What must be considered with AGR-coded positions is that per United States Code 10 – Section 101(d)(6)(A), the purpose of the AGR officer is for...”organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components to enhance the mobilization readiness of the Reserve Component,”

¹ United States, *The Unified Command Plan*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011), 8- 17.

vice providing regional and cultural expertise.² CJCSM 3150.13, “Joint Reporting Structure – Personnel Manual,” reinforces this as it defines AGR as “National Guard and Reserve members who are on voluntary active duty providing full-time support to National Guard, Reserve, and Active Component organizations *for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserve Components*.”³ (Emphasis added by author). These officers must spend at least 51 percent of their time on Reserve issues, whether its mobilization, administration or training of reserve officers and integrating that component into the command’s plans. If they are a regional expert, then they can focus the remaining 49% of their time on cultural and regional considerations for the command. Based on the definitions provided earlier on regional competency, this split of focus does not effectively ensure that regional and cultural considerations are part of the plan.

CENTRAL COMMAND

Central Command (CENTCOM) has been the combatant command responsible for the planning and execution of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Besides these two theaters, they are also responsible for planning and executing engagement activities in 18 other countries in the Middle East and Central Asia. In the command’s posture statement provided by Marine Corps General James Mattis to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March of 2012, General Mattis discussed the strategic priorities, vision,

² United States, *United States Code 10 – Section 101(d)(6)(A)*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011). <http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/10/A/I/1/101> (accessed December 15, 2012).

³ United States, *CJCSM 3150.13, Joint Reporting Structure – Personnel Manual*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 1999), GL-4.

and approach of the command. He states that the approach will promote regional stability through relationships with key allies and partners through consistent military-to-military engagements, building trust, and promoting security cooperation.⁴ He goes on to say that most solutions will require extensive collaboration with our allies within and beyond CENTCOM boundaries, which will place a premium on building relationships and the capacity and capability of our partners to respond to emerging challenges.⁵ These statements all suggest that regional and cultural competence is a priority within the command. They also acknowledge the fact that to advance the nation's strategic objectives, a tailored approach must seek a nexus of common interests and identifying common ground with partners.⁶

As a unified area command, there is representation by all of the military Service Departments; however, this paper will look at the Army Officer portion of the command's authorization document, to see how that Service's regional experts are represented in the plans directorate. The directorate for strategy, plans and policy at CENTCOM is called the CCJ-5. According to the CENTCOM Organization and Functions Regulation 10-2, the J5 is:

responsible to the Commander for all aspects of strategy and policy development and implementation and long range plan development for USCENTCOM, Component Commands, and Security Assistance Organizations...in the development and implementation of U.S. National security policy and strategy for the region countries of the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).⁷

⁴ James Mattis, *The Posture of U.S. Central Command*, Senate Armed Service Committee, U.S. Senate. <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/Mattis%2003-06-12.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2012).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ U.S. Central Command, *USCENTCOM Organizations and Functions Regulation 10-2*, (Tampa, FL 2007), N-1.

Within the J5 portion of the army element headquarters CENTCOM manning document there are 31 Army military personnel authorized in those eleven separate paragraphs.⁸ Out of those 31 authorized Officers, there are fourteen U.S. Army FAO authorizations, or approximately 45 percent of the Army officers in the directorate are regional and culturally trained by the Army.

The next directorate is the Operations Directorate, or CCJ-3. Within the CENTCOM regulation, the directorate's mission statement is:

Plans, organizes, directs, and controls joint and combined military operations at the direction of the Commander, USCENTCOM. Advises the Commander on all matters pertaining to the strategic and operational employment of all assigned forces, the conduct of joint/combined operations, and other necessary functions of the command required to accomplish tasks and mission.⁹

For the Operations Directorate portion of the army element headquarters CENTCOM manning document there are twenty-eight authorized officer position. However, five of those authorizations are Active Guard and Reserve branch-immaterial officers. That leaves twenty-three authorized positions within the J3 Directorate. Out of these, there are only two authorized positions (one Psychological Operations O5 and one O4) that are Service trained regional and cultural experts. This equates to approximately 9 percent of the total U.S. Army authorizations within the Current Operations section¹⁰.

For USCENTCOM, the total U.S. Army officer authorizations for both sections are 54 active component officers. Out of these, only sixteen authorizations are Service-

⁸ FY13 approved manning document for US Army Element, Headquarters Central Command, accessed at FMSWeb on November 24, 2012.

⁹ U.S. Central Command, *USCENTCOM Organizations and Functions Regulation 10-2*, L-1.

¹⁰ Ibid.

trained regional and cultural experts and puts the total percentage of regional and cultural experts at approximately 30 percent overall.

PACIFIC COMMAND

Pacific Command's (PACOM) area of responsibility encompasses 36 nations and recently, is responsible for the planning and execution of operations in the Philippines. It is also the command highlighted in the recent National Security Strategy published by the government in January of 2012. In his posture statement to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on 28 February 2012, PACOM Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, highlighted seven major security challenges within the region. The second challenge he listed was the need to manage continuously and optimize U.S. alliances and strengthen regional partnerships.¹¹ Within the PACOM strategic guidance, the number one focus area is to strengthen and advance allies and partnerships.¹² Also within that guidance, the number two guiding principle is to focus strategically by having our behavior shaped and informed by an analysis and assessment effort that seeks to understand fully the complex and dynamic Asia-Pacific security environment.¹³ All of this requires a planning staff grounded in regional expertise and cultural competence.

The J5 staff section within PACOM is responsible for developing, coordinating, and implementing the military instrument of power in support of national policies,

¹¹ Robert F. Willard, *The Posture of U.S. Pacific Command*, Senate Armed Service Committee, 3. <http://www.armed-Services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/02%20February/Willard%2002-28-12.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹² United States Pacific Command. *United States Pacific Command Strategic Guidance*, <http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/strategic-guidance.shtml> (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹³ Ibid.

regional strategy, strategic and contingency plans, theater forces structure and warfighting requirements in the PACOM area of operations.¹⁴

As with CENTCOM, the author will focus on the Army manning document for PACOM. There are twelve separate paragraphs within the PACOM manning document that comprise the J5 section. In those paragraphs there are a total of twenty-one officer personnel within the J5 section; however five of those officers are Active Guard and Reserve officers (three Civil Affairs officers along with one Combat Arms generalist and one Chemical officer). Out of the sixteen remaining officer authorizations, eight are FAO authorizations.¹⁵ So for PACOM, 50 percent of their Strategic Plans and Policy section are officers who are regional and culturally trained by the Service.

For the Operations section of PACOM there are a total of fourteen authorized positions. Out of these, there is only one Psychological Operations O5 authorization or a total percentage of U.S. Army trained regional and cultural experts within the operations section at 7 percent of authorizations.¹⁶ Overall, between the two sections within PACOM, 30 percent of their 30 U.S. Army officer authorizations are officers whom require regional and cultural training as part of their primary occupational specialty.

EUROPEAN COMMAND

European Command's (EUCOM) mission is to conduct military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic

¹⁴ United States Pacific Command. *PACOM J5 biography*, <http://www.pacom.mil/organization/staff-directorates/j5/j5-biography-messinger.shtml> (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹⁵ FY13 approved manning document for US Army Element, Pacific Command Headquarters, accessed at FMSWeb on November 24, 2012.

¹⁶ Ibid.

security and defend the United States forward.¹⁷ When Admiral Stavridis presented the EUCOM 2012 posture statement, he highlighted the commands objectives and priorities. The objectives of sustaining capable partner-nation capability and nurturing strategic relationships link to the priorities of preserving strategic partnerships and maintaining U.S. strategic access.¹⁸ They highlight the need within the headquarters for regional and cultural expertise in order to plan and execute missions in support of those objectives and priorities. Admiral Stavridis again stresses the importance and priority that the command gives regional and cultural competence when he discusses the challenges the command faces and the approach the command takes to tackle those strategic challenges. The command's two directorates that need cultural and regional competence to assist the commander in executing the objectives and priorities listed above are the ECJ3, or Plans and Operations Directorate, and the ECJ5/8, Policy, Strategy, Partnering and Capabilities Directorate.

The mission of the ECJ5/8 according to the EUCOM Organization and Functions Manual (ECM 5100.01) is:

formulation and staff direction of the execution of basic military/political policy and planning for command activities involving relations with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, other U.S. combatant commands, allied military and international military organizations and subordinate commands.¹⁹

In reviewing the Army manning document for EUCOM, twenty one separate paragraphs within the U.S. Army Element manning document comprise the Army officer

¹⁷ United States European Command. *EUCOM mission statement*, <http://www.eucom.mil/mission> (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹⁸ James G. Stavridis, *2012 Posture Statement*, European Command, 4. <http://www.eucom.mil/doc/23162/2012-high-res-posture-statement.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2012).

¹⁹ United States European Command, *US European Command Organization and Functions Manual, ECM 5100.01* (Stuttgart, GE 2012), AA-1.

contribution to the ECJ 5/8. There are twenty-nine officer authorizations within the J5 section, but two lieutenant colonel branch-immaterial positions are Active Guard and Reserve officers. Out of the twenty-seven remaining officer authorizations, twelve are FAO authorizations.²⁰ Based off those numbers, the percentage of U.S. Army officer authorizations that are Service regional and cultural trained specialists equates to 44 percent of the EUCOM Policy, Strategy, Partnering and Capabilities Directorate.

For the Plans and Operations Directorate, the ECM5100.01 states that directorate's mission:

directs development and execution of operation in support of U.S. interests and regional alliances in the USEUCOM AOR; ensures joint and combined war-fighting capability through operational directives, plans, orders, joint training and exercises; and is the principle conduit of operations information and requirements between National Command Authorities, Joint Staff, NATO, USEUCOM, and subordinate commands.²¹

To accomplish that mission the U.S. Army element manning document has a total of eleven officers authorized to the ECJ3; three of those officer authorization are Active Guard and Reserve authorizations (two of those AGR positions are Reserve Psychological Operations officers) so the total number of active component authorization are eight. The manning document has no recognized Service trained regional expert specialties in the remaining eight active component authorizations.

Overall, between both the ECJ 3 and ECJ 5/8, there are 35 active component officer authorizations in the Army manning document and the Army authorizations of regional and cultural experts out of that 35 are approximately 34 percent.

²⁰ FY13 approved manning document for US Army Element, U.S. European Command Headquarters, accessed at FMSWeb on November 24, 2012.

²¹ United States European Command, *US European Command Organization and Functions Manual, ECM 5100.01, Y-1.*

SOUTHERN COMMAND

Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) mission, vision and strategic goals from the 5 January 2009 Organization and Functions Pamphlet (SC Pamphlet 0103) is captured in four words, "partnership for the Americas".²² The mission statement on the command's official website states the command is "ready to conduct joint and combined full-spectrum military operations and support whole-of-government efforts to enhance regional security and cooperation."²³ In his posture statement to the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on 6 March 2012, General Fraser made it a point to emphasize early that while the primary mission is to defend the United States, the command also promotes regional security and enduring partnerships, and this is done through persistent, sustained engagement.²⁴ In his concluding remarks, he notes the need of the command to remain engaged with the military partners within SOUTHCOM and the priority he feels for expanding interagency, regional and multilateral efforts. All of these statements point to a need for regional and cultural competence in the headquarters in order to ensure accomplishment of the commander's vision.

To accomplish this mission, the command has spread the traditional plans and operations sections under the Napoleonic staff construct, among four different directorates. These directorates are called: Policy and Strategy Directorate; Security and Intelligence Directorate; Stability Directorate; and finally, the Partnering Directorate.

²² United States Southern Command, *SC Pamphlet 0103, Organization and Functions* (Miami, FL 2009), A-1.

²³ United States Southern Command, *Our Mission*, <http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Our-Missions.aspx> (accessed December 15, 2012).

²⁴ Douglas M. Fraser, *2012 Posture Statement*, United States Southern Command, 2. http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed December 15, 2012).

The Policy and Strategy Directorate comprises three sub-directorates. They are Strategic Policy and Concepts, Theater Plans and Programs, and finally Country Insight.

According to the SOUTHCOM command pamphlet, this directorate is responsible to develop command strategy and the theater campaign plan, maintain awareness and fully analyze the political and military situation of each country.²⁵

Under the Security and Intelligence directorate is the command's near term plans section (Plans) and current operations section (called Joint Operations). The mission of this directorate is to plan and direct operations, intelligence and other activities to implement U.S. policy and strategy in the Caribbean, Central and South American region.²⁶

The Stability directorate's mission is to execute activities that build partner-nation capabilities to meet theater strategic end states. These include executing ongoing theater security cooperation activities, as well as developing engagement projects and executing the training and exercise programs.²⁷

The final directorate is the Partnering directorate. Its mission is to foster a whole-of-government solution to address common interests in order to support capacity-building efforts in the regions through plans and activities development.²⁸ As we compare these directorate missions and line it up with the regional competency definitions provided in Chapter Three, these described missions can easily translate into a need for regional competence of at least a Skill Level 3 if not higher.

²⁵ United States Southern Command, *SC Pamphlet 0103, Organization and Functions*, C-1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, D-1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, E-1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, F-1.

In reviewing the Army staffing document for SOUTHCOM to identify if the missions have translated into billets for regional and cultural specialties there are twenty-six separate paragraphs. These paragraphs comprise the Army officer contribution to the SOUTHCOM directorates of Stability, Security, Partnering, and Policy. There are thirty-five officer authorizations within these sections; however, out of that thirty-five, a total of twelve of the authorizations are Active Guard and Reserve officers. The AGR-authorizations include branch-immaterial, Strategic Plans and Policy officers, and Civil Affairs officers. Out of the twenty-three remaining officer authorizations, ten are FAO authorizations and one authorization is a Psychological Operations officer.²⁹ Based on those numbers, the percentage of U.S. Army officer authorizations that are Service regional and cultural trained specialties equates to 48 percent of the SOUTHCOM directorates' active component Army authorizations.

As articulated in a recent *Prism* article entitled "Left of Bang," the lesson from the last decade is that failure to understand the human dimension of conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and political will for the nation to bear.³⁰ Because of this, the nation must influence activities left of bang, or before conditions develop into violent conflict. Our combatant commands plans and operations sections play a key role in this objective. They are the sections that develop the theater campaign plans and security cooperation and engagement activities to shape the environment in support of the National Security and National Military Strategies. Regional and cultural expertise within these sections is required to provide context to the theater campaign and engagement plans. As was

²⁹ FY13 approved manning document for US Army Element, U.S. Southern Command Headquarters, accessed at FMSWeb on November 24, 2012.

³⁰ Michael T Flynn, James Sisco, and David C. Ellis. "Left of Bang: The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today's Environment," *Prism* 3, no. 4(2012): 13.

shown in Chapter Six, regional and cultural experts can help craft a strategy to engage successfully global partners while advancing National Strategy. It is important for the combatant command to think globally yet act locally as the theater campaign plan is developed. As the future fiscal environment will constrain traditional activities of the combatant command, regional and cultural experts can develop more efficient and effective approaches towards national command objectives. While overall, the U.S. Army staff cultural and regional expert representation is between 30 – 40 percent, that representation is mainly focused on one U.S. Army specialty; the FAO. By ignoring, for the most part, the Army Special Operations specialties of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces officers, the combatant command loses some of the context these specialties can bring to bear. In addition, by not incorporating all of the Service Department specialties, this creates prioritization issues for the Service and creates the conditions that allow Service priorities to drive assignment to these sections vice combatant command and DoD priorities.

Another issue is that most combatant commands submit Request for Forces (RFFs) to fill the shortage of regional experts. This shortage is a result of the Services not filling valid requirements and/or the fact that the current structure of the J3 and J5 do not adequately address the needs for regional and cultural experts within the command. In looking at the U.S. Army Regulation, 525-29, Army Force Generation, Chapter 3, paragraph 3-1a, combatant commanders submit force and capability requests for *rotational and emergent requirements* on an annual basis (emphasis added by author). As we saw in Chapter 1, regional and cultural expertise requirements for a combatant command staff should be neither rotational nor emergent, but permanently identified and

resourced by the Service Departments. With future tightening budgets and resources for DoD, talks of Service core competencies threaten future tensions between the Services and combatant commands. Furthermore, if RFFs are not turned into permanent-staff structure requirements, in an environment of personnel cuts, the ability of the services to source RFFs will be challenged, thereby negatively affecting the combatant commander's ability to plan and execute National Security Strategy.

CHAPTER 8:

RECOMMENDATIONS

The geographic combatant commands all identify the importance of having the right person at the right place in their overall planning and execution of national policy objectives within their regions. Their manning documents have identified the need for regional and cultural experts within their J5 and J3 directorates, however, it remains the job of the individual Services to place the correct person in those identified positions. As shown in Chapter Six, PepsiCo, McDonald's, and Toyota each have incorporated regional and cultural experts to inform their global and regional strategy planning and execution. By doing this, they successfully expanded their area of influence and translated that initial success into multiple cultures and regions throughout the world. Without the correct regional and cultural competent service members, the approaches developed by the combatant command headquarters as they plan in support of the National Security Strategy will not effectively incorporate and resonate within the region and cultures. By implementing the following recommendations, our geographic combatant commands can ensure our Joint Force 2020 will develop effective regional approaches, culturally-informed that ensure our force can fight and win in the future strategic environment.

The first recommendation is to direct Services to assign regional and cultural experts to existing identified billets. While combatant commands can accept or reject personnel nominated by the Services, since Services determine assignment priorities, if a combatant commander does not accept the nominated Service member, the requirement may not be immediately back-filled by the Services. In addition, using the Army as an

example, the Army Force Generation Process, better known as ARFORGEN, was developed as a means to resource the manpower-intensive requirements of the last ten years of conflict. In attempting to staff not only units, but also ad-hoc joint and combined headquarters and staff requirements, a person's deployment time became a critical factor in the assignment process. This, however, when it comes to the assignment of regional and cultural specialties within the Army, should not be the driving factor, especially for low-density / high-demand specialties. For example, when a regional expert planning position on the SOUTHCOM staff is unfilled, it is not effective talent management to assign a native Spanish-speaking Latin American FAO to a branch-immaterial position in Afghanistan. Casey Wardynski, David Lyle, and Michael Colarusso addressed the issue of assignment fairness in their monograph entitled, "Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Employing Talent." In the monograph they stated that the fairest employment (i.e. assignment) behavior is when the institution assigns officers where their individual talents help defeat threats at the lowest cost.¹ In this case, the amount of specialized training, previous assignments into and out of the Latin American region, and the personal relationships the officer may have developed in the region in support of his or her military activities, make his or her utilization within SOUTHCOM more valuable to the nation than the branch-immaterial assignment to Afghanistan. An example on how to direct the Services to assign officers through the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the recent memorandum regarding placement of Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS) graduates. The purpose of the memorandum is to ensure that officers sent by the Services are able to

¹ Casey Wardynski, David S. Lyle, and Michael J. Colarusso, *Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Employing Talent* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 6.

utilize the investment of time, training and knowledge developed during their attendance at JAWS. By publishing this memorandum and directing the Service assignment priorities, it ensured the combatant commands had specially trained Service members with the right talent and skills within their commands at the planning level, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the combatant command headquarters. While combatant commands had designated positions on their planning staffs for JAWS graduates, as of March 2012, JAWS graduates had filled only two of the 75 coded positions.²

The second recommendation is for the combatant commands to re-look the branch-immaterial positions on their manning documents for the plans directorates. Specifically, this paper recommends that combatant commands change some active component branch-immaterial positions into the SOF specialty of Civil Affairs. Currently, only one combatant command has incorporated active component Civil Affairs into their TDA since the establishment of the branch as an active component branch in the U.S. Army in 2006. By incorporating active component Civil Affairs into their plans and operations directorates, the combatant commands will be addressing tasks assigned to the combatant command in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) 162-11, dated 1 December, 2011. In the JROCM, combatant commands were tasked to conduct a review of the requirements and authorizations for joint CA billets to enable effective integration within those staffs' planning and decision-making processes.³ While listing a position as branch-immaterial does offer the flexibility for the Services to assign officers, this flexibility for the Service may come at the expense of the

² Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *MCM 0007-12, Joint Advanced Warfighting School Graduate Placement* (July 19, 2012), 1.

³ Joint Staff, *Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum 162-11, Civil Affairs (CA) DOTMLPF Change Recommendation*, December 1, 2011.

requirements of the combatant command.

The third recommendation is to code regional and cultural positions to allow attendance to a strategic planning course prior to assignment at the geographic combatant command, specifically those positions in the J5 directorate. Just as regional and cultural competence requires training and practical experience, to maximize the output of a strategic plans section, we must ensure that we teach those officers assigned the foundations of strategic-thought and critical-thinking. It is important that an officer obtain this education prior to his or her assignment in a combatant command. Currently, officers can attend Joint Professional Military Education Phase II (JPME II) before, during, or after assignment at a combatant command. Unfortunately, assignment prior to attending JPME II has resulted in officers working their thirty-six month assignment at a suboptimal level, because they have reported directly to the command vice attending JPME II prior to reporting to the combatant command.⁴ A repeat of this delayed attendance experience with JPME II with officers assigned to the J5 staff section of the combatant command will happen if there is no policy directing attendance to a strategic planning course. With the threat of reduced personnel levels across all the Services, there will be even more pressure to fill personnel billets quickly, rather than sending officers to required education.

The final recommendation is an approach that the combatant commands and Services could take in the training and assignment of regional and cultural specialist by expanding on the concept of AFPAC Hands in the assignment of regional and cultural experts to the other combatant commands. This approach is very similar to what COL

⁴ Authors personal experience based on 24 month assignment to US Army Human Resources Command.

Eric Wendt recommended in his 2011 article in *Special Warfare Magazine* entitled, “The Green Beret Volckmann Program: Maximizing the Prevent Strategy.”⁵ In the article, COL Wendt discusses how regionally-focused SOF Soldiers provide expertise in individual countries and host nation units due to the persistent-presence approach being executed by SOF units in support of the global campaign against violent extremist organizations. Volckmann Program volunteers would rotate between assignments to headquarters, such as theater special operations commands, and in-country assignments. More recently, Admiral Stavridis recommended expanding the AFPAK program beyond CENTCOM by saying in a recent *Early Bird* article, “These troops would be the military’s ‘special forces’ in the world of global engagement.”⁶ This program would focus a cadre of Service members in each combatant command with deep regional, cultural, and language training, coupled with utilization and deployment into key areas within the region, and out-of-theater utilization within the combatant command J5 and J3 directorates. By creating such a program, the combatant commands have the most current understanding of key operational environments within the command. This understanding will help shape the development of the theater campaign plans and better inform the strategy of the combatant command. As with the AFPAK Hands Program, this new program will require focus and direction to the Services by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ensure talent-management and emphasis by the Services on regional and cultural experts. It is critical to make sure service members assigned to these programs can compete with their service-peers on Service-specific selection and

⁵ Eric P. Wendt, “The Green Beret Volckmann Program: Maximizing the Prevent Strategy,” *Special Warfare Magazine* (July-September 2011).

⁶ John Vandiver, “InBlog, Stavridis Pushes For Multilingual U.S. Military Officers”, (February 6, 2013), 3.

promotion boards. Besides bringing recent theater experience to the planning staff by having multiple rotations within the combatant command, they also increase the efficiency of the combatant command, as they do not require six months to a year learning the culture of not only the region, but also the specific culture of the combatant command. This efficiency is extremely important as the combatant commands will try and continue to execute operations with fewer resources.

CHAPTER 9:

CONCLUSION

The Department of Defense is approaching another crossroads because as President Obama states in his introduction to the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, “Our Nation is at a moment of transition.”¹ As operations are winding down for the conventional forces in Afghanistan, it is important our leaders continue to develop the future military force that can answer the inevitable call to defend our Constitution. Culture has been an important aspect of modern warfare. Going back to American experiences in Vietnam and reflecting on our national and military experiences in its aftermath is a good starting point as operations wind down in Afghanistan. In the Vietnam conflict, there are many lessons that our military and civilian leaders can look at and utilize to inform future policy and priorities for today’s forces. The lessons of operations and plans that poorly considered the impacts of the population and their culture and the importance of cultural experts integrated into those operations and plans, cause the United States to invest in programs and policy to address these shortfalls during the Vietnam conflict. However, when political support for the war drew down and budgets for the Services tightened, the Services focused on what they considered their core competencies. Cultural initiatives then withered on the vine. This is the situation that we find ourselves at again today, with many hard lessons learned and one of the most capable, battle-tested forces we have ever had in our nation’s history. As operations in the Middle East subside and our military faces a resource-constrained environment, we

¹ Leon E. Panetta and Barack Obama, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of Defense, 2012).
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/914475273?accountid=12686> (accessed September 15, 2012).

must institutionalize the regional and cultural lessons from the last decade of conflict. Our leaders recognize that our Nation's future success depends, in part, on investing more heavily in regional and cultural expertise across our national security structure. Our combatant commands are at the leading edge of our national security strategy planning and execution. Those commands must invest in regional and cultural experts, such as our SOF specialties of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces, and restructure their plans and operations directorates. Additionally, the Services must ensure those specialties are properly assigned to take full advantage of the skills and experiences that have been invested in these officers. Failure to do so puts the nation on a course we are all too familiar with and our combatant commands will find themselves in 20 years as unprepared culturally as we were when 9/11 happened.

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