



U.S. ARMY

# United States Army WHITE PAPER



Concepts for the  
**OBJECTIVE FORCE**

# Report Documentation Page

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**UNITED STATES ARMY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF**

**FOREWORD**

On 12 October 1999, The Army leadership unveiled The Army Vision, defining how The Army will meet the Nation's requirements today and into the future. The Army's transformation into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of conflict was outlined in the Transformation Campaign Plan. In June of 2001, The Army published FM 1, *The Army*, which tells who we are, what we do and how we do it. It delineates our purpose, roles and functions as established by the Constitution, the Congress and the Department of Defense. FM 3-0, *Operations*, also published in June of 2001, is The Army's keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations. It explains the role and contributions of The Army at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and as a member of joint, interagency and multinational teams. FM 3-0 also describes the impacts of technology on Army operations, our Soldiers and their leaders. These documents and Army Transformation are grounded in the operational framework of Joint doctrine and concepts. These documents provide the context for a complete understanding of Army Transformation and the Objective Force – how The Army operates as the land component of America's joint warfighting team.

Building on this foundation, this White Paper further elaborates the Objective Force. It is intended for leaders within the U.S. Government, the defense establishment, industry, and the academic and intellectual communities. This paper also provides a broad description of the advanced capabilities and core technologies needed to enable the Objective Force for government, defense industry and scientific community use. Finally, it is intended for use by our Soldiers and leaders as they set the conditions for irreversible momentum to the Objective Force.

While the Objective Force concept is anchored in doctrine, it reaches beyond it to describe new ways and means of conducting military operations in the future. As with the Interim Force, the Objective Force concept will benefit from discoveries growing out of additional investigation and experimentation, generated by periodic updates to doctrine, force structure, and training. The success of Army Transformation and the realization of the Objective Force will ultimately depend on our people. Soldiers remain the centerpiece of our formations, and it will take trained, educated, disciplined, tough, and dedicated Soldiers at every level to implement change, transform to the Objective Force, and achieve The Army Vision.

The Army will continue to refine this concept as we remain ready to fulfill our non-negotiable contract with the American people - to provide land force dominance in fighting and winning the Nation's wars - decisively.

Soldiers on point for the Nation.

ERIC K. SHINSEKI  
General, United States Army



## Concept for the Objective Force Concept Summary

The Objective Force is our future full spectrum force: organized, manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable across the entire spectrum of military operations from Major Theater Wars through counter terrorism to Homeland Security. Objective Force units will conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances, creating diverse manifold dilemmas for our adversaries by arriving at multiple points of entry, improved and unimproved. As necessary, Objective Force units conduct forcible entry, overwhelm aggressor anti-access capabilities, and rapidly impose our will on our opponents. In this manner, Objective Force units arrive immediately capable of conducting simultaneous, distributed and continuous combined arms, air-ground operations, day and night in open, close, complex, and all other terrain conditions throughout the battlespace. Army units conducting joint and combined operations will *see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively* at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation.

Army Objective Force units will dominate land operations, providing the decisive complement to air, sea and space operations. They create synergy within the Joint Task Forces by controlling ground, where people and political authorities reside, and by defeating our opponents in their protective sanctuaries or forcing them into the open where they can be destroyed with joint fires. The psychological effects produced by the power and precision of Objective Force units will serve to deter hostile acts, both prior to deployment and during the stability phases of operations. The presence of Objective Force leaders and Soldiers, disposed across the battlespace yet operationally integrated through an information network, provides the Joint Force Commander situational dominance in applying lethal and non-lethal effects with unprecedented precision across the spectrum of military operations.

Soldiers and leaders enabled by advanced technologies will provide revolutionary increases in operational capability. Information systems provide dominant situational understanding enabling combined arms units to conduct simultaneous, non-contiguous, distributed operations. Weapons technology breakthroughs promise significantly greater tactical, operational, and strategic lethality from smaller, more agile forces. Platform designs in an arrangement of system-of-systems technologies will enable decisive maneuver, horizontal and vertical, day and night, in all terrain and weather conditions.

These breakthroughs will give Objective Force units the lethality and survivability needed to deliver full spectrum dominance, the versatility to change patterns of operation faster than the enemy can respond, and the agility to adjust to enemy changes of operation faster than he can exploit them. Advanced technologies empower Soldiers and leaders to achieve situational dominance, creating a powerful construct for the use of force. The hallmarks of Objective Force operations will be developing situations out of

contact; maneuvering to positions of advantage; engaging enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons; destroying them with precision fires and maneuver; and tactically assaulting enemy capabilities or locations at times and places of our choosing.

At its most fundamental level, war is a brutal contest of wills. Winning decisively means dominating our enemies. Potential opponents must be convinced that we are able to break them physically and psychologically and that we are willing to bear the cost of doing so. For some opponents, mere punishment from afar is not enough. With these adversaries, the only way to guarantee victory is to put our boots on his ground, impose ourselves on his territory, and destroy him in his sanctuaries. And when we put our Soldiers in the mud, these units must be organized, manned, equipped, and trained to do the job decisively. This means that we must prepare and resource them to overcome both the risk of mission failure and the risk of exorbitant casualties even through the mission succeeds. This is the foundation of decisive operations.

Therefore, the enduring hallmark of the Objective Force will be its Soldiers. At the heart of the Objective Force are Soldiers and leaders -- Warriors -- who will go into harm's way to impose our Nation's will on any adversary. They must know and live Army values, be disciplined, be physically tough and mentally conditioned for combat, have perseverance, be competent in our doctrine, and possess the will to win - these are the precepts of physical and psychological force domination. Into their hands, we will put the world's finest warfighting technology. They must be expert at the use of emerging technologies and trained for the full range of operations. They will have the moral determination to kill our enemies as readily as they are willing to help alleviate the suffering of innocents.

Leaders must know how to conduct rapid tactical decision making. This means changing from plan-centric to intent-centric operations; changing from physical rehearsals to virtual ones; and changing from static command posts to situational awareness on the move. They will be adaptive and self aware -- able to master transitions in the diversity of 21st Century military operations.

These tough, resilient, resourceful, agile professionals, equipped with the best technologies and equipment our Nation can provide and led by the most competent leaders we can grow, will remain Persuasive in Peace and Invincible in War, the ultimate guarantors of America's interests around the world.

## I Introduction

During the past decade, The Army has been engaged in a deliberate and sweeping effort to adapt its organizations, Soldiers, equipment, and methods of operation to the mission requirements of a rapidly changing strategic and technological landscape. The Army Vision describes the force characteristics of the future Objective Force, and emerging technologies promise a clear path to that future. The power of advanced technologies, especially information technology, enables The Army to achieve situational dominance and decisionmaking momentum to create a new construct for the application of force.

The Army's Objective Force will continue to be the 21st Century's preeminent land force for the broad range of missions from support, including Homeland Security, to decisive warfighting. It will be organized, manned, equipped, and trained for prompt and sustained land combat. It will be a decisive force and can be the integrator in joint and combined military operations. It will ensure its ability to dominate across the spectrum of military operations through well-trained and well-led formations that can execute our warfighting doctrine with force and will. This requires a strategically responsive, technologically advanced, versatile force, complemented by special purpose forces. The full spectrum qualities of this force will ensure both its long-term dominance over evolving, sophisticated threats with asymmetric capabilities and its continued relevance for the unpredictability of the evolving operational environment. The Objective Force will be an offensively oriented, combined arms, multi-dimensional maneuver force that will employ revolutionary operational concepts - - enabled by new technology.

The Army's Transformation strategy must be harmonized with similar efforts of other Services. Army Transformation is grounded in the operational framework of Joint doctrine and concepts and the concepts for future joint and combined operations. A joint team that is decisive in any type of operation against any level threat, in any environment, requires an Army that is strategically and operationally responsive, rapidly deployable, mentally and physically agile, and able to transition rapidly across the spectrum of operations -- a versatile force capable of dominating any situation or adversary with minimal organizational adjustment and time. It must be lethal in combat and able to generate overmatching combat power by leveraging the synergy of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership; empowered by dominant situational understanding resident in a vibrant information network. These operational capabilities will assure its greater survivability.

This paper articulates the overarching framework for the Objective Force, its operational concept, the characteristics that have guided its development, the enablers that will facilitate its fielding, and the criticality of the human dimension to its development.

## II Underlying Considerations for the Objective Force

### A. Emerging Operational Environment

The world is changing and so too are our adversaries. At one end of the spectrum, creative and adaptive opponents will employ strategies to destroy U.S. resolve by attacking our homeland, killing innocent civilians, and conducting prolonged operations. Some will immerse themselves in our culture, exploit our vulnerabilities, and seek to create maximum fear in the hearts of our citizens and coalition partners. They will seek to fracture confidence in public institutions, generate economic uncertainty, and divide the focus as well as the will of the general public. Respecting the superior power of U.S. military forces, they will employ anti-access strategies comprising several integrated lines of action (from diplomacy to information operations to direct and indirect military actions) aimed at preventing or limiting U.S. impact on regional crises. Simultaneously, they seek to physically thwart U.S. intervention through strikes against forward operating bases, entry points, command and control nodes, and the forces themselves extending all the way back to the CONUS base. Army wargaming repeatedly demonstrates that the longer an enemy can delay effective U.S. response, the greater his chances for success. Anti-access capabilities could include theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long-range rockets and artillery, weapons of mass destruction and other unconventional means, and information operations.

Common access to outer space will challenge, perhaps even limit, U.S. ability to achieve strategic surprise. Knowing that a total denial of our access to outer space is unlikely and that confrontation with the U.S. may be unavoidable, potential adversaries are designing other options to avoid U.S. strengths and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. To this end, the enemy could seek to accomplish its initial objectives quickly by an aggressive, territorial move with conventional forces against a neighbor, leaving sufficient time to prepare for and deny external intervention. Once U.S. forces are committed, however, respect for our significant capabilities causes the enemy to forego massed formations in favor of smaller dispersed forces with lethal capabilities targeted against strategically significant symbols to generate confusion and encourage tentativeness in our use of force. To reduce its exposure and complicate U.S. targeting, the adversary will disperse and operate from areas of physical and moral sanctuary often located in complex, urban terrain, shielded by civilians and culturally significant structures. Humanitarian concerns will limit key attack options and impose an increased burden on Joint Force Commanders. The enemy will resort to decentralized, small-unit operations when it perceives that we have the advantage and will exploit linked operational and tactical intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to determine whether attack opportunities exist and when conditions are right for offensive action.

U.S. operations will continue to receive the attention of the global media. The enemy's goal will be to fracture U.S. and coalition resolve by degrading our capabilities and or destroying selected U.S. and allied facilities, inflicting high casualties, prolonging and increasing the cost of continued operations, and exploiting media coverage of any friendly setbacks and strikes at the U.S. homeland. In prolonging a conflict, the enemy will often be satisfied to achieve a stalemate, preserving its military capabilities for future employment when conditions for success are more favorable.



## B. The Evolving Conduct of War

While the *nature* of war remains constant, the *conduct* of war is continually undergoing change in response to new concepts, technologies, and capabilities. How armed forces adapt to such changes determines their readiness to confront future operational challenges and threats. Applied immediately, technological innovations can provide battlefield advantage, particularly when they facilitate or complement new ways to conduct war. Clearly, the industrial revolution transformed society and the ways and means by which warfare was conducted in the 19th and 20th centuries. Now, the information revolution, with the promise of accelerating breakthroughs for surveilling, understanding, and communicating is expected to create a base of knowledge for military planning and execution unprecedented in scope, volume, accuracy, and timeliness. While the requirement for information superiority is not a new concept, information technologies make this simpler and easier and therefore, more powerful, than ever before. Combining this new kind of knowledge base with related improvements in mobility, precision, range, lethality, survivability, agility and sustainability will have a dramatic effect on future military operations.

The widespread proliferation of these new technologies and advanced capabilities are clearly leading to a rapidly expanding, non-linear, multi-dimensional battlespace. Operations are becoming more distributed in time, space, and purpose and increasingly joint, multinational, and interagency in nature. At the same time, potential future adversaries are studying the U.S. closely, learning from our operations and adapting selected advanced capabilities and innovative strategies to overcome U.S. military dominance, particularly with respect to ground forces. Weapons of mass effects and destruction, and cyber attacks will be a part of the threat framework. Our Objective Force, especially its Reserve Components, must be prepared and equipped to deal with these realities. In this atmosphere of constant change, no military force desiring to remain effective and relevant can remain stagnant. Therefore, the Objective Force concept couples a deep appreciation for the enduring nature of warfare with a realization that bold innovation and technological advances offer the promise of revolutionary change in the conduct of warfare. Ultimately, it will be the excellence of Soldiers and leaders that will realize of the full potential of the Objective Force.

## C. Full Spectrum Operations

Preserving stability in this kind of environment will demand frequent and *timely* actions by the U.S. and international communities, increasing the likelihood of military operations for U.S. armed forces. While The Army must remain optimized for major theater war, it must be sufficiently versatile and agile to handle smaller-scale contingencies which will occur more often, presenting unique challenges. The quality, maturity, experience, and intellectual development of Army leaders and Soldiers become even more critical in handling the broader range of simultaneous missions in this complex operational environment. The Army must field capabilities required to decisively defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. The Army must be capable of simultaneously

conducting warfighting and stability operations and transitioning smoothly from one category of operation to the other and back again without any loss of momentum or operational focus.

Warfighting is complex, but the historical lessons of war, the tenets of Army operations, and our warfighting tactics, techniques, and procedures boil down to several rules of thumb applicable at every level of war. First, units win on the offensive; while they must be able to defend well, they win on the offense. Next, leaders should always seek to initiate combat on their terms - - at a time, in a place, and with a method of their own choosing - - not their adversary's. Third, units should gain the initiative and retain it for as long as possible - - and never surrender it unless forced to. Fourth, build momentum quickly and win -- decisively.

These rules of thumb require commanders to master transitions. Transitions – going from offense to defense and back again, projecting power through airheads and beachheads, transitioning from peacekeeping to warfighting and back again – sap operational momentum. Mastering transitions is key to winning decisively. Forces that can do so provide strategic flexibility to the National Command Authorities, who need as many options as possible in a crisis. The Army, with the versatility and agility of its formations, has historically provided those options and the Objective Force will continue to do so in the evolving operational environment of tomorrow.

Attaining these capabilities in the Objective Force raises the bar for any enemy we may face. The Army is sending a clear message to the Nation's adversaries - - We see you think. We sense your uncertainty. We diminish your confidence - - while building our own. We attack when you're tentative. We deny you any vulnerabilities to leverage - - ultimately presenting you with multiple, simultaneous dilemmas that accelerate the collapse of your will to fight - - that is full spectrum dominance.

### III Objective Force Concept: Strategic, Operational and Tactical.

Doctrinally, we have always described three levels of operations and warfare - - the strategic level, the operational level, and the tactical level. Each level recognized the tension between risk and opportunity that exists at that level, and the decision-making authority at each level has been responsible for balancing risk and opportunity within the higher commander's intent in order to reduce vulnerability for the next lower command. Historically, each level has been separate and distinct in its mission focus and objectives while acknowledging the framework of the higher commander's intent. The power of web-based command and control systems to provide common situational understanding is compressing the strategic, operational, and tactical echelons. The expanded battlespace and reach of tactical units, provided by the capability to see and understand the enemy in a holistic sense, enables tactical echelons to employ strategic and operational assets with decisive effects. This reality is increasing the importance of the tactical level of war to strategic outcomes.

#### A. The Strategic Level.

At the strategic level, the Objective Force will continue to meet The Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American people to fight and win our Nation's wars. Our unique contribution to national security is prompt sustained land dominance across the range of military operations and the spectrum of conflict. The Army's strategic responsiveness, forward presence, and force projection capability assists strategic shaping of the environment, deters would-be aggressors, and provides options to the National Command Authorities in regions of U.S. national interest. Through military engagement activities, The Army provides the linkage to the people, governments, and militaries of other nations. The Army acts as an integrating agent with respect to the other instruments of national power with its unique strategic planning capabilities regarding operations on land, where populations and governments reside and decisive outcomes are achieved. For example, Army presence on the ground among the people of Bosnia has helped to stabilize the environment and enabled application of the other instruments of national power -- diplomatic, economic and informational -- with greater effect. In the Homeland, The Army is inextricably linked with the American Public through both People and missions. Thus, any commitment of The Army to hostilities abroad is the Nation's ultimate symbol of resolve.

#### B. The Operational Level.

At the operational level, The Army provides headquarters which act as integrating agents within Joint, interagency and multinational teams. Designated Objective Force headquarters and major commands act as Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters, Joint Force Land Component Commands (JFLCC), and/or Army Service Component Commands (ASCC). For land campaigning, the Objective Force will provide operational level information superiority to Joint Force Commanders (JFCs), enabling them to gain and maintain operational initiative. Information superiority will be gained through operational level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); information management (IM), and information operations (IO). When coupled with Objective Force land campaign planning expertise, information superiority enables JFCs to see first, understand first and act first at the operational level. The Objective Force continues to provide designated support to other services within the joint warfighting team and to other lead federal agencies when conducting interagency operations. In multinational operations, The Army's unique skill sets with Special Forces, Foreign Area Officers, communications and logistics capabilities facilitate integration of allies and partners into coalition operations. Strategic and operational responsibilities must be enabled with increased emphasis on capabilities for interoperability with joint, interagency and multinational elements. Ongoing integration of digital command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems within the joint community - - e.g. Wide Area Relay Network -- is just one way in which The Army is working to ensure Objective Force interoperability within JTFs. In concert with the joint community, The Army will refine and strengthen interagency planning, coordination and operational procedures, and information system linkages.

In the Homeland, The Army is committed to Homeland Security and will further refine the role and contributions of the Objective Force to the evolving requirements of this critical mission. Building on existing linkages with federal agencies and state governments -- the operational level

of Homeland Security - - the Objective Force continues to execute The Army's important role in security and deterrence, consequence management, training of first responders, Title 10 responsibilities, and support to State missions, among others.

At the operational warfighting level, Objective Force units as part of joint teams will conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances, creating diverse, manifold dilemmas for adversaries by arriving at multiple points of entry. Early arrival in a crisis may deter hostilities and preclude war, in which case, Objective Force units are prepared for stability operations. If deterrence fails, Objective Force units may conduct forcible entry operations, rapidly overwhelming any anti-access defenses and decisively attacking and defeating the center of gravity of any adversary. Objective Force units will conduct simultaneous, continuous, combined arms air-ground operations interoperating with joint, interagency or coalition elements. Operations will occur day and night, in open, close, complex, or urban terrain throughout the battlespace. The continuous and non-contiguous nature of Objective Force operations will retain the initiative for the Joint Force Commander and afford the best opportunity to bring about a rapid enemy collapse. Should the campaign prove protracted, The Army possesses the capabilities for sustained ground combat enabling the joint force to achieve decisive outcomes.

### C. The Tactical Level.

*“Without tactical success, a campaign cannot achieve its operational goals. An essential element of operational art, therefore, is the ability to recognize what is possible at the tactical level...” FM 3-0 Operations pg. 2-4*

The Army's ability to dominate the tactical level of war – the short sword warfight – upon which operational and strategic success is built, is essential for Joint Force success on land. Recognizing what is possible at the tactical level has been the subject of years of intense Army study and wargaming and, more recently, training enhanced with networked situational awareness within Legacy and Interim Force formations. Objective Force units are optimized to win on the offensive, to initiate combat on their terms, to gain and retain the initiative, build momentum quickly and win decisively. They will be capable of mastering the transitions in warfare - - from fort to foxhole, from offense to defense, from warfighting to support operations - - that can sap operational momentum and threaten retention of the initiative.

At the tactical level, Objective Force Units will *see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively as the means to tactical success*. Operations will be characterized by developing situations out of contact; maneuvering to positions of advantage; engaging enemy forces beyond the range of their weapons; destroying them with precision fires; and, as required, by tactical assault at times and places of our choosing. Commanders will accomplish this by maneuvering dispersed tactical formations of Future Combat Systems units linked by web-centric C4ISR capabilities for common situational dominance. With these capabilities, the Objective Force will master the transitions at all levels of operations.

See First. Objective Force units will see first by detecting, identifying, and tracking the individual components of enemy units. Advanced technologies that lead to unprecedented intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities coupled with other ground, air, and space sensors networked into a common integrated operational picture enabling us to see the enemy, both in whole and in part, as a complex, adaptive organization. Commanders refine their information requirements based on their intent for the operation. Staffs leverage information systems to meet those information requirements. Enablers for seeing first include, as a minimum, combat identification systems; organic sensors that are robotic, multi-spectral, and disposable; unmanned aerial vehicles; embedded C4ISR; Special Operations Forces (SOF); Long Range Surveillance Detachments (LRSD); and air and ground reconnaissance operations. Data fusion systems, the Joint Global Information Grid, and leader training will enable decision makers to have a synthesized, common picture of the battlefield, the common operational picture (COP). Blinding the enemy through the use of obscurants, jamming, signature reduction, deception, and pattern avoidance techniques will additionally enhance the Objective Force's ability to see first.

Understand First. The COP produced by Seeing First provides an unprecedented opportunity to understand what the enemy is doing and better anticipate its intentions. As leaders at all levels observe this common picture, they simultaneously analyze and share assessments through a collaborative planning process enabled by information technologies. Objective Force commanders are able to leverage the intellect, experience, and tactical intuition of leaders at multiple levels in order to identify enemy centers of gravity (COGs) and conceptualize solutions, thus creating a collective genius through accelerated collaborative planning. As commanders decide on a course of action, they instantaneously disseminate their intent to all appropriate levels, affording maximum time for subordinate levels to conduct requisite troop leading procedures. The time gained through effective use of these information technologies permits Objective Force units to seize and retain the initiative, building momentum quickly for decisive outcomes. The key enablers for Understanding First include a knowledge-based Battle Command system; mentally agile, intuitive, self-aware and adaptive leaders at all levels; and an execution-centric C2 system that goes beyond command and control on the move - - the commander has TOC-like capability anywhere on the battlefield. Leaders must be educated for rapid synthesis of information, intuitive assessments of situations, and rapid conceptualization of friendly courses of action. They must be able to clearly define their information requirements and, most importantly, develop and effectively communicate their intent. Units must be highly trained and disciplined in the use of information technologies that can assure timely delivery of critical information. The concept of Information Dissemination Management as part of the Global Information Grid suggests a means to obtaining this end. Achieving information dominance will require disciplined adherence to information protocols, leader education, and new training and leader development concepts in both live and constructive environments.

Act First. Seeing and understanding first gives commanders and their formations the situational dominance necessary to act first - - to engage at times and places with methods of their own choosing. Instantaneous dissemination of commander's intent coupled with broad access to the COP on a non-contiguous battlefield will provide unprecedented opportunities for decentralized

decisionmaking. Using initiative within the commander's intent, subordinates will be able to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and reduce their risk as opportunities present themselves. To act first, Objective Force Soldiers, leaders, and units must have information dominance. In the case of stability operations, acting first may include use of non-lethal means to stop riots or enforce peace between factions. To translate information dominance into decisive outcomes, Objective Force platforms and systems must be capable of moving, shooting, and reengaging faster than the enemy. Target acquisition systems will see farther than the enemy in all conditions and environments. Units will be able to rapidly assess options, act first by understanding when and where they must transition between actions, and remain fully synchronized throughout execution. The design is to deny the enemy any respite or opportunity to regain the initiative while Objective Forces operate at high operational tempo inside their opponent's decision cycle. In making well-informed decisions at the lowest levels, Objective Force units will operate faster than current units where decisions are more centralized. The force's agility and versatility will enable exploitation of opportunities as they occur and can generate opportunities to gain momentum. As subordinates report their actions, those reports are part of the COP. Elements of the force affected by the action learn of it, understand the impact, and can synchronize their actions - - self-synchronization.

Finish Decisively. Objective Force units finish decisively by destroying the enemy's ability to continue the fight and achieving moral dominance quickly. Objective Force units do this by building momentum and rapidly transitioning to assault and exploitation operations without allowing the enemy time or opportunity to regroup and continue the fight on its terms. Units will maneuver by both ground and air to assume tactical and operational positions of advantage through which they will continue to dominate the enemy and pursue subsequent campaign objectives. Objective Force units will continue to exploit the initiative until they have broken the enemy psychologically and/or physically, thus achieving decisive victory.

#### IV Objective Force Design

The Objective Force will be more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of military operations than the Legacy Force. It will provide the Nation an array of more deployable, more agile, more versatile, more lethal, more survivable, and more sustainable formations that are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. These capabilities will enable the Objective Force to win on the offense, to initiate combat on their terms, to gain and retain the initiative, build momentum quickly and win decisively. As part of Objective Force development, The Army is elevating discussion of force design beyond existing frameworks. Objective Force development is guided by the seven characteristics articulated in The Army Vision, FM 1, *The Army* and FM 3-0, *Operations*. After describing the characteristics, this chapter articulates the design parameters, organizational concepts, and enablers that will guide the achievement of those characteristics in the Objective Force.

## A. Characteristics.

### Responsive

Responsiveness embodies time, distance, and sustained momentum. The capability to employ force, if it deters miscalculation by adversaries, provides a quality of deterrence all its own. The Army helps ensure critical access is available when needed through forward-deployed forces, forward positioned capabilities, peacetime security cooperation initiatives, and, when called, through force projection from the CONUS or any other location where needed capabilities reside. In addition, its full spectrum quality permits rapid actions in support of homeland security missions. Since both access and homeland security include other elements of national power, leaders need expanded decision making and leadership skills to operate seamlessly within interagency operations. The Objective Force's unprecedented level of responsiveness increases strategic options and may facilitate shutting crises down before they cross irreversible thresholds for a warfight.

Organized into more deployable, smaller, but more capable formations, the Objective Force will exploit all military and commercial strategic lift to arrive in theater ready to fight, fully synchronized with other elements of the joint force. Advanced airlift and high speed, shallow draft sealift capabilities that reduce reliance on improved airfields and seaports and permit multiple entry points, even within austere theaters, afford a strategic advantage to the Nation by increasing operational options. Army wargaming suggests that such lift will introduce the greatest advantages for landpower projection and help close the gap between initial entry and follow-on forces. These new strategic platforms will accelerate force flow, complement use of prepositioned stocks, enable entry operations through multiple points, degrade the adversary's anti-access strategy, and permit the JFC to employ the Objective Force with greater flexibility. Coupled with some organic capability for self-deployment directly into the combat zone from operational distances, the Objective Force's strategic maneuver capability contributes directly to regional deterrence. Strategic responsiveness is further enhanced by the capability of the Objective Force to fight immediately upon arrival, compelling the adversary to abandon his plans and respond immediately.

### Deployable

To be truly responsive, Army forces must be deployable and capable of quickly and rapidly concentrating combat power in an operational area. The Army goal is to deploy a brigade combat team anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in theater in 30 days. This will drive system and capability parameters. Systems must be transportable, logistics must be focused and flexible, and a culture within The Army that accepts deployment readiness as a way of life must be sustained. The Army needs support from the other Services to achieve the levels of deployability required to provide these options to the National Command Authorities. Objective Force units must be capable of en route mission planning and rehearsal, exercise of battle command, synchronization of combined arms, and integration into the gaining theater command during movement by air, land and sea. Objective Force units must be unburdened of significant deployment and sustainment tonnages, and must

be deployable by a variety of lift platforms to include C130 profile aircraft, ultra fast shallow draft sealift, and advanced vertical and horizontal airlift.

In order to overcome an aggressor's anti-access capabilities, entry into areas of operations must be enabled without reliance on conventional Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODS) and Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODS) where denial efforts will be focused. Operational maneuver from strategic distances will require an Objective Force optimized for rapid commitment on short notice to operations of uncertain scope and duration in immature theaters.

In the face of enemy anti-access measures, the Objective Force will retain the ability to conduct forcible entry operations. Forcible entry will occur from both strategic and operational distances. Upon insertion of platforms, either in the assault or immediately following, Objective Force units translate the strategic or operational initiative gained into tactical advantage with offensive operations against key enemy capabilities or vulnerabilities.

### Agile

Army forces must possess the mental and physical agility to transition among the various types of operations, just as we have demonstrated the tactical warfighting agility to task organize on the move. Agile forces will be required to transition from stability or support operations to warfighting and back again. Agility is tied to initiative and speed. Agile formations make those transitions quickly because they are more mobile and able to adapt faster than the enemy, thereby denying it the initiative. As the Army crafts a more rapidly deployable force structure, it must continue to grow leaders who are highly adaptive and mentally agile. Objective Force leaders will be schooled in operational art and science and must be masters at troop leading in dynamic operational environments - - the intellectual component to a more agile force. They must be able to develop mission type orders that enable decentralized small unit initiative, perform battle command of decisive combat operations, and negotiate effectively in missions requiring this skill. Leaders and units must have the agility to deal with the variety of conditions they will encounter on the non-contiguous, complex battlefield. They must be able to seamlessly transition from vertical maneuver to mounted operations to foot movement in any environment.

Information technologies will enable agility. In over seven years of experimentation with C4ISR technologies, The Army has demonstrated that this area holds the greatest promise of delivering revolutionary advances in force effectiveness. Information superiority via a web-enhanced, knowledge-based common operating picture is key to this effort. This demands C4ISR systems that are vertically and horizontally layered and integrated from the strategic to the tactical level across all systems. Drawing information and tailored intelligence products, updated in near-real time, from a wide variety of automated and human sources provides a knowledge backbone that revolutionizes and expedites the decision-action cycle. This architecture will provide the means for forces at all levels to achieve situational understanding, and establish, maintain, and distribute a common operational picture tailored to unit and mission. Improved situational understanding will enhance force protection and sustainment, allowing the force to preserve combat power for



decisive outcomes at times and places of the commander's choosing. Extended-range, redundant communications networks will extend the commander's reach and ensure continuous connectivity through multiple pathways.

While emerging information technologies facilitate coordinating, fusing, sharing, and displaying relevant information, these functions remain very human dependant. The non-contiguous battlespace places increased emphasis on the initiative, agility, judgment, and tactical and technical competence of skilled leaders at all levels. Advanced information technologies enable the force, but are not a substitute for training to standard and aggressive leadership.

In order to achieve this level of agility, Objective Force units will be enhanced "learning organizations" with embedded capabilities to accept and employ periodic, information technology enhancements. Designs must be robust to preclude interruptions in information flow and to sustain situational dominance. This will include the capability to identify critical information requirements and assure delivery of that information. Accordingly, the Objective Force will use a system-of-systems approach (layered, multiple paths), coupled with flexible operating procedures, to provide the level of redundancy necessary for information assurance.

#### Versatile

Versatility describes the inherent capacity of Objective Force formations to dominate at any point of the spectrum of military operations. The Army will move from today's task organized combined arms formations to organic combined arms units in the Objective Force. These units incorporate combined arms capabilities with the cohesion and teamwork of organic units at the lowest tactical levels maximizing versatility, agility, and improving the capabilities for the close fight. These formations will be capable of adapting to changes of mission - - mastering transitions - - with minimal adjustment. Smaller elements at lower echelons will be designed to employ functions and capabilities that currently reside in higher echelons, e.g. combined arms battalions with today's brigade-like capability.

The Objective Force will be designed for full spectrum success while optimized for major theater war. The force design means that formations will possess the inherent versatility to operate effectively anywhere on the spectrum of military operations without substantial augmentation to perform diverse missions within a single campaign. As technology produces the breakthroughs necessary for the Objective Force, distinctions between heavy and light forces will blur. Special purpose capabilities previously associated with today's heavy or light formations - - to include vertical maneuver capability - - are designed into Objective Force formations. These units will possess the lethality, speed and staying power associated with heavy forces and the agility, deployability, versatility, and close combat capability of today's light forces. While The Army will retain certain special purpose capabilities and units, the majority of the force will be combined arms and full spectrum capable.

Objective Force units will possess superior tactical mobility. Platforms will negotiate all surfaces, road, off-road, trails, water crossing, and narrow gaps. They will possess superior

capability to detect presence and disposition of mines and booby traps and possess an in-stride mark and breach capability. Mounted units require the capability to conduct route reconnaissance with forward looking and off-road sensors to clear at greatly increased speeds (50+ kph). Objective Force Soldiers will be capable of movement with 40 pound fighting load in all terrain and weather conditions - - with an interest in getting the Soldiers' fighting load to 15 pounds.

Objective Forces will possess the organic capability to conduct tactical vertical envelopment and air assault in both independent actions and as complementary maneuver in support of committed ground forces. Executed rapidly, vertical maneuver provides positional advantage, achieves surprise, overcomes difficult terrain, exposes enemy capabilities to destruction throughout the JOA, and blocks, isolates, or otherwise dislocates enemy forces. Vertical maneuver psychologically dislocates the enemy, causing him to fight in multiple directions and develop plans to defend areas that he may have considered secure. Other ground elements may be committed simultaneously to support and exploit the psychological and positional advantage achieved through vertical maneuver.

Maximizing commonality of design and systems and building fixed organizations with discrete sets of capabilities will contribute to a modular construct that enables rapid force tailoring prior to deployment as well as during employment, increasing force versatility and operational flexibility. The Objective force will use a 'Train, Alert, Deploy' model, vice the 'Alert, Train, Deploy' method employed with today's specialized formations that must tailor force packages after alert.

The versatility of Objective Force elements will significantly reduce, but not eliminate, the need for commanders to alter the mix of forces or to introduce new forces for post-conflict stability operations. Objective Force Soldiers and leaders will need to perceive post-conflict operations as combat-ready tasks, equally important to the missions accomplished during combat operation. Seamless transition from combat to stability operations underscores the need for agility in the future force.

Objective Force units will use collaborative, distributed decision aids. These aids will enable leaders to maintain uninterrupted situational understanding and enables their effective leadership during dynamically changing conditions anywhere on the battlefield whether stationary or on the move, mounted or dismounted.

### Lethal

The elements of lethal combat power remain fires, maneuver, leadership, protection, and information. When the Objective Force deploys, every element in the warfighting formation will be capable of generating combat power and contributing decisively to the fight. Its lethality will exceed that of today's conventional heavy forces. Through technological improvements in weaponry and munitions, the Objective Force will have the capability to destroy enemy formations at longer ranges, with smaller calibers, greater precision, and more devastating target

effects. Key enablers include organic line of sight, beyond line of sight, and non line of sight fires. These fires will overmatch the enemy in all conditions and environments, and be based on one shot – one kill, disciplines and designs. New propellants and materials will permit smaller caliber penetrators, and, together with increased accuracy, reduce ammunition weight, opening new possibilities for system as well as unit agility. Embedded intelligence will enable selective engagement of those targets whose destruction creates the greatest effects on the enemy force.

As forces optimized for decentralized, non-contiguous operations, Objective Force elements will be employed in simultaneous operations distributed across the entire JOA in accordance with the JFC's intent for the operational-level campaign. In contrast to the phased, attrition-based, linear operations of the past, this approach is focused on disrupting the integrity of the enemy's battle plan by exposing the entire enemy force to air/ground attack, rather than rolling his forces up sequentially. Non-contiguous operations will have a dramatic impact on the architecture of the battlefield and in the relationship between combat, combat support and combat service support formations. Superior situational understanding, based on advanced C4ISR capabilities embedded at all levels, enables ground commanders to operate non-linearly, bypassing what is less important or non-decisive, to focus operations against forces and capabilities most critical to the enemy's defense.

Through simultaneous engagement with lethal and non-lethal means, the Objective Force will exploit and complement joint interdiction to directly attack the enemy's Center of Gravity, critical capabilities from which the enemy derives his freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. These focused operations throughout the Joint Operational Area (JOA) exploit enemy vulnerabilities to deprive the enemy of key requirements and capabilities essential to the integrity of his defense and staying power, further accelerating his collapse.

Through planned and coordinated cycling of available forces, Objective Force commanders will conduct continuous operations with few significant pauses, creating and controlling an operational tempo that overwhelms the enemy's ability to respond effectively. High operational tempo and continuous pressure will seriously hinder the enemy's ability to regroup, reconstitute capabilities, or reconfigure forces to support new plans. Continuous operations will require innovative sustainment concepts and capabilities, based on sharp reductions in sustainment demand, significant improvements in reliability, split-based operations, and refined procedures for accelerated throughput, battlefield distribution, and mission staging.

Exploiting advanced situational understanding, fires, and Army and joint aviation, Objective Force units will conduct mobile strike operations at tactical and operational distances. Mobile strike operations combine ground-based fires, attack aviation, and ISR systems to mass effects without massing forces in order to deny the enemy freedom of maneuver, prevent reinforcement, support friendly maneuver, and destroy key enemy forces and capabilities (such as C2 nodes, air defense systems, and mobile long-range surface missiles and artillery). Manned and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will improve situational understanding and function as sensors for mutually supporting long-range (Army and joint) fires. Man-in-the-loop Army aviation provides

advantages throughout the JOA for engaging fleeting targets, focusing terminal effects, assessing results, and controlling effects after munitions are in flight.

Ultimately, all Objective Force decisive operations are based on tactical success in close combat and imposing our will in stability operations. In combat, the capability of the Objective Force to seize and control key terrain and to close with and destroy enemy forces is critical. Close combat has one purpose—the defeat or destruction of enemy forces to decisively resolve the outcome of battles and engagements. In this sense, close combat tactical actions are the fundamental building blocks for operational success and strategic victory. In some joint campaigns, the decision will depend on the capability of the land force to integrate firepower, maneuver, and assault to win the close combat fight. In others, land forces may support a main effort by some other component. Objective Force units conduct decisive combat by denying the enemy any sanctuary and defeating him in detail through a series of rapid, violent actions.

Tactical engagement will be characterized by development of the situation out of contact and the integration of standoff fires, skillful maneuver, and close combat assault to achieve tactical decision simultaneously at multiple locations across the JOA. Objective Force tactical commands will direct the continuous integration of powerful sub-elements, moving along multiple, non-contiguous axes to objective areas, while engaging the adversary with organic, overmatching, and precise fires. The engagement culminates in enemy capitulation or destruction by fires or close combat assault.

The environment is growing more and more urban - - avoiding built-up areas is simply not possible. Future adversaries will exploit urban and complex terrain for sanctuary. Objective Force units must be extensively trained, properly equipped, and psychologically prepared for urban warfare. The Objective Force will use speed, precision, and violent action in urban raids against enemy decisive points. When this is not possible because determined opponents have entrenched themselves in urban or complex terrain, Objective Force units will isolate and systematically reduce enemy forces with precision fires and combined arms assault, while limiting collateral damage and non-combatant casualties.

### Survivable

The Objective Force will take advantage of technologies that provide maximum protection at the individual Soldier level, on or off platforms. The agility of our formations combined with the common operating picture is critical to maximize survivability. Ground and air platforms will leverage the best combination of low observable, reduced electronic signature, ballistic protection, long-range acquisition, early discrete targeting, shoot first every time, and target destruction each time we pull a trigger. Objective Force survivability will be linked to its inherently offensive orientation, as well as its speed and lethality. By seizing the initiative and seeing, understanding, and acting first, the Objective Force will enhance its own survivability through action and its retention of the initiative.

Objective Force soldiers will be physically and psychologically prepared for non-contiguous warfare, fighting in small units separated from their higher headquarters or sister units for days at a time. The Army will provide Soldiers the maximum protection at the individual level, whether that Soldier is on a platform or on the ground. The Soldier and platforms will leverage integration of lighter, more effective ballistic protection (composite materials) with active and passive protection systems to enhance survivability against kinetic energy weapons, and current and projected enemy lethal effects. Ground platforms will leverage the best combination of: low observable technologies, on-board immediate multi-spectral capabilities, long-range acquisition, early discrete targeting, shoot first every time, and target destruction each time we pull a trigger. Platforms will provide improved early warning and defeat of enemy ground and air launched conventional and smart weapons.

### Sustainable

The Army will aggressively reduce its logistics footprint and replenishment demand. This means that the Objective Force will deploy fewer vehicles and leverage combat service support reach capabilities that allow commanders to reduce stockpiles in theater while relying on technology to provide sustained velocity management and real-time tracking of supplies and equipment. The Objective Force design parameters will seek to achieve maintenance efficiencies through more reliable systems and commonality across joint formations - - in chasses, repair parts, fuel, munitions and components. Through this process, The Army is changing the conduct of war in the way it transports, maintains and sustains its people and materiel. Units will organically sustain themselves for 3 days of high tempo operations without replenishment from external sources in continuous combat in mid-to-high intensity conflict or be self-sustainable for up to 7 days in low-end conflict and peacetime military engagement.

Objective Force units possess a system of potable water generation and replenishment at every echelon to minimize the need for special-purpose units and demands. FCS lethal effects reduces ammunition weight and cube to enable unit agility. In addition to a common design, Objective Force units will maximize commonality of platforms, ammunition, C4ISR and components to reduce the sustainment load, and to simplify logistics management in today's organizations. Commonality also contributes to simplification of other processes, such as deployment and training.

### B. Objective Force Enablers: Human and Technological.

While the greatest potential for revolutionary advances in capability derives from technology, The Army recognizes that only through the synergy of parallel advances in doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, material and Soldiers (DTLOMS) will the Objective Force achieve its full potential. Technology is not a panacea, and it brings its own set of unique challenges and vulnerabilities. The *integration* of the human and technological enablers, as well as all of the DTLOMS areas, is critical to successful transformation to the Objective Force.

There are a number of areas in which technology will enable the Objective Force. Because information technologies have had the greatest impact on our society and the global economy in general, market demand has driven innovations in that sector. C4ISR advances also have tremendous applicability at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. While weapons system technologies do not have the same market forces propelling them, nor the same applicability at all three levels, their potential impact on tactical success - - the essential ingredient for operational and strategic success - - is profound.

The strategic landscape, organizations, technology and threats place greater demands on space-based capabilities than ever before. For the Objective Force, long-range communications, missile warning, terrestrial and space weather information, positioning and navigation, intelligence, reconnaissance, and space and terrestrial surveillance increasingly rely on space assets to provide the rapid real time support required by a strategically responsive force. To maximize the full combat capability of sensors and communications, the Objective Force requires linkage from the satellites down to the Soldier on the ground. Space communications provide an opportunity for command and control on the move, including the capability for en-route mission planning and the ability to maneuver in compartmented and urban terrain. Space surveillance, reconnaissance, and tracking capabilities help provide the situational awareness to see and understand first - - increasing lethality and survivability. Space assets also provide the capability for a smaller deployed footprint with “reach back” and “push forward” tailored communications capabilities. The careful design of space platforms to meet future requirements can also help reduce the design weight of ground systems. In addition, this increasing importance of space has not escaped the attention of our potential adversaries who have also begun examining and fielding ways to exploit space to benefit their aims. This emerging threat requires a capability for space control to deny potential adversaries the ability to see us, target us, and attack us from space. All of these demands make it essential for The Army to aggressively support efforts to improve and increase the space capabilities of the U.S.

Combat Service Support Transformation is essential to realization of the Objective Force concept. Logistics efficiencies are necessary to support the very challenging sustainment time/distance/volume/weight/physiology paradigm. The Combat Service Support Transformation will encompass both advanced capabilities and new logistical concepts. The knowledge-based C4ISR architecture that supports Objective Force operations will also enable more efficient, more effective logistics. Innovative, multi-modal distribution concepts, exploitation of more reliable systems, systems commonality, new power generation, higher fuel efficiency, and improved system maintainability will reduce maintenance and supply requirements, while improving readiness and enhancing strategic deployability. The use of C4ISR-enabled split-based operations will further reduce the battlespace footprint. These improvements and others will produce a more strategically responsive force, while sustaining a higher tempo of operations.

### C. Impact on Joint Force and Army Requirements

Strategic Lift. There will never be enough strategic lift, especially in the early stages of a crisis. The crucial challenge is how to make the most effective use of the strategic lift allocated at a time when seizing the initiative and building essential early momentum are crucial and may hang in the balance. The Army must provide the Joint Force Commander ground force options that will decisively prosecute a multidimensional campaign throughout the depth of the enemy's battlespace. There will be an early reliance on strategic mobility assets capable of delivering ground forces into unimproved points of entry, particularly shallow draft, fast sealift ships and aircraft which are not dependent on improved airfields. A campaign of this nature will require all Services to increase combat power capability/potential per unit of deployment. Sustainment is the most challenging aspect of this requirement. Battalion-sized organizations will be capable of independent operations for 3-7 days. By reducing and pacing the demand for combat consumables through systems commonality, standard caliber weaponry, reliability, maintainability, improved engine efficiencies, precision munitions, micro-/nanotechnology, and effective packaging, The Army's CSS Transformation will ensure that Objective Force units represent a high-payoff investment in limited strategic lift capacity. Task organizing unit capabilities and utilizing reach capabilities will make it possible to configure Objective Force combat support and combat service support units more effectively and thus reduce the strategic transportation burden and the deployed logistical footprint.

Information Connectivity. Neither the strategic nor operational momentum associated with future multi-dimensional operations can be achieved without quantum improvement in information and command and control connectivity. This will be a major challenge for joint forces accustomed to relying on service-unique information systems. Space-based systems are essential both for intelligence and communications connectivity, as well as other vital functions from navigation to targeting. As third party and commercial space systems proliferate, their products are accessible to users who can pay for them or with whom the owners have mutual political or economic interests. Future military operations can assume neither uninterrupted nor sole access to space products. Objective Force C4ISR systems, embedded at all echelons, must fit seamlessly within the joint structure, including space assets, and be effective even in a degraded environment. The Army will continue work with the Joint community to achieve interoperability in this critical area.

Army Support to Other Services. The Army supports and enables the entire joint force as well as other Federal agencies through execution of its mandated joint responsibilities as executive agent for logistics. In addition, The Army provides essential capabilities to the joint C4ISR structure, filling in gaps and bolstering capabilities for real time technical intelligence, human intelligence, combat assessment, and communications. Similarly, unique Army capabilities in the areas of aviation, health, military police, ground security, logistics and combat construction further support the entire joint force in accordance with commanders' priorities. Overall, these unique Army capabilities are critical to the effective integration and operation of the joint force.

Echelonment. Echelonment in the Objective force is a complex question that demands extensive analysis and experimentation. The Objective Force will fulfill a variety of strategic, operational

and tactical purposes, while interacting with various political, military, interagency and non-governmental actors, both international and domestic. Thus, The Army must maintain some combination of functional competencies at all levels. The Army will address many factors to include the challenges of span of control, the increasing complexity of operations, the expanding battlespace geometry, the differences in tasks and purpose, interoperability, and the human capabilities (and limitations) of future leaders and staffs at each level. The Army is using the Unit of Action/Unit of Employment construct to initiate this process of examination. Units of Action (UA) are the tactical warfighting echelons of the Objective Force. Units of Employment are the basis of combined arms air-ground task forces. They resource and execute combat operations; designate objectives; coordinate with multi-service, interagency, multinational and non-governmental activities; and employ long range fires, aviation and sustainment. They also provide C4ISR and tactical direction to UAs.

Reserve Component. The Objective Force will require higher levels of integration between the active and reserve components to the point of truly being The Army, not three separate components. This has to be accomplished in order to achieve strategic responsiveness and dominance across the spectrum of military operations and to simultaneously provide for homeland security. The distribution of Objective Force capabilities between the active and reserve components must accommodate requirements for immediate strategic responsiveness as well as the maintenance of a strategic reserve for extended campaigns and multiple global engagements. Contingency response requires selected RC forces with unique complementary capabilities which must be maintained at readiness levels commensurate with the active forces. Additionally, the reserve must include capabilities that mirror those of the active force for expansibility, but which are afforded additional response times prior to commitment.

Threshold Capabilities. In order to keep pace with rapidly changing technologies, new Objective Force systems will be designed with threshold capabilities and Technology Insertion Points (TIPS) that facilitate the integration of new technologies into the system of systems as The Army progresses toward full Objective Force transformation.

Summary. The ability of Objective Force elements to strike multiple, decisive points puts at risk the enemy's COG both in combat operations and stability operations. Objective Forces will not have to fight linearly through forces disposed in depth to reach centers of gravity. Rapid tempo and improved agility will reduce the duration and frequency of transitions resulting in battles occurring closer together in time. This pace coupled with our multiple decisive actions will psychologically overwhelm the enemy, creating shock and degrading his ability to focus his efforts or respond effectively. Simultaneously, the physical effects of our attacks against his key capabilities will remove his remaining options until he is faced with surrender or destruction.

## V. The Human Dimension

*“Capabilities associated with the tools of war will improve, and combat techniques will reflect these changes. But fundamental to the realization of any improvements in*



*technology, techniques, operational concepts, or strategy will be the capacity of the Soldier to bear the hardships of combat and adapt to mission demands. Soldiers remain the centerpiece of our formations. Their collective proficiency and willingness to undergo the brutal test of wills that is combat remains the ultimate test of Army force readiness.”*

*-- FM 1-0, The Army, pg. 35*

#### A. Soldiers are the Centerpiece of our Formations.

The human dimension of warfare will always remain preeminent. War is uncertain, mentally complex, physically demanding, and an intensely emotional experience. Objective Force Soldiers must be physically and mentally tough enough to dominate their opponents despite these challenges. Objective Force Soldiers and leaders must also possess the competence and confidence to close with their opponents in open, close, and complex terrain -- and kill them. They must be highly trained in all tasks across the spectrum of military operations. They must be knowledgeable and disciplined in their application of Rules of Engagement. They must be multi-faceted, adaptive and self aware -- knowing how to clear a room, send a digital message, or repair a vehicle -- because sustainment in the first 72 hours of a deployment on a non-linear battlefield will be limited. These Soldiers will need demanding, realistic training conducted by leaders who feel a moral obligation to train them correctly and make them tough, disciplined, and motivated. Knowing and adhering to high standards of discipline, fitness, and competency are essential to Objective Force success.

Full spectrum Training. Training units for this capability requires more training resources and time. The Army will examine training management doctrine, resource allocations, and training facilities to ensure that Objective Force units are resourced to achieve this level of proficiency. Objective Force leaders must be capable of training their units without significant external support packages and will need to be innovative, creative, risk-takers in both training and in warfighting. The Army's Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) will help to inform The Army about successful training and leader development strategies.

Knowledge-based Battle Command. Leaders will be educated for rapid tactical decision making -- this means changing from plan-centric to intent-centric operations; changing from physical rehearsals to virtual rehearsals; and changing from static command posts to command and control on the move. The power of our information systems makes decision-making more decentralized -- A Soldier can commit tactical, operational, and strategic level assets from a single platform and those actions can have strategic implications. This means leaders and Soldiers must have a clear understanding of their commander's intent and have the confidence and competence to make the right decision in the absence of orders. Professional education will develop more knowledgeable and competent commanders through studies of history and commander-focused simulations conducted under likely operational scenarios and threat conditions. Web based command and control (C2) systems enable commanders to reduce decision cycles within their organizations by engaging subordinate leaders and staffs in collaborative planning and decisionmaking at all levels within units. Web-based C2 systems facilitate the rapid dissemination of orders to the lowest

levels, thus maximizing time available for tactical units to prepare for, to synchronize and to initiate decisive action.

The Leader's Role in Attainment of the Objective Force. Change in any large organization is not easy. Leaders at all levels have a critical role in The Army's attainment of the Objective Force and must work to overcome the inertia that impedes progress. Leaders must embrace The Army Vision and become agents and disciples of change themselves. Leaders must establish an environment of innovation and encourage initiative that will harness the creative energy required in the development of the Objective Force concept. We are not changing for the sake of change; we are changing for the sake of future generations of Soldiers who will fight on some unknown battlefield in defense of Freedom. We have a moral obligation to get it right!

## B. The Objective Force Culture

During the Cold War, Army doctrine defined three distinct types of forces - Heavy, Light and Special Forces. Each of these communities possessed its own distinct set of combat capabilities and missions, and as a result developed its own unique culture. As we move to the Objective Force -- as evidenced by the IBCT -- we are erasing the distinctions between heavy and light forces and are training conventional units using special operations techniques. Rather than substitute one of the existing cultures for the others, we have an opportunity to combine what is best from each community, to transcend the differences between the three as we create a Warrior culture for The Objective Force.

From the heavy force, we have Soldiers who know how to combine speed, overwhelming firepower, and combined arms operations to dominate opponents. From the light force, we have highly versatile Soldiers who bring a rapid deployment mentality - - rucks packed and ready to deploy worldwide on a few hours notice. From the special operations community, we have close combat specialists who are the best in the world at urban and night operations. Objective Force Soldiers will possess a Warrior Ethos built through high standards and realistic, tough, and demanding training. All will be linked with the latest digital C4ISR technologies, enabling them to accelerate tactical decisionmaking, maneuver out of contact and choose the time and place of their action. The Soldiers and leaders of the Objective Force will ensure that the United States maintains the unmatched land power preeminence that we enjoy today.

## VI Conclusion

The Objective Force Concept describes how future Army forces will conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. The concept envisions a skilled, knowledge-based force, exploiting the revolutionary potential of information superiority and networked sensors, shooters, supporters and decisionmakers. Objective Force units will be substantially different in structure and content than their predecessors. Combined arms will be organic at lower tactical levels. Units will be modular and organizations will be highly versatile. Revised

training and education that strengthen soldier and leader initiative, adaptiveness, and skills will underpin advanced material capabilities. The Objective Force will be more responsive, more deployable, more agile, more versatile, more lethal, more survivable and more sustainable than today's forces, ready to provide precise and dominant capabilities for land campaigning. The Objective Force is optimized to win on the offense, initiate combat on its terms, gain and maintain the initiative, and build momentum to win – decisively. The Objective Force will provide combatant commanders and the NCA with the means for decisive victory in land combat operations and a full spectrum capability for all other uses of military power. Soldiers remain the centerpiece of The Army's Objective Force: adaptive, self aware, highly disciplined, tough, well trained, and well educated. Our most magnificent moments as an Army will continue to be delivered by our people. With them, The Army will remain Persuasive in Peace and Invincible in War, just as it has for over 226 years of service to our Nation.