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S. MARINE CORPS. 1ST. DIVISION.

FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATION.

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# Report Documentation Page

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FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATIONS . PHASE III .

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*U.S. Marine Corps. 1st Division*  
DIVISION COMMANDER'S FINAL REPORT ON  
GUADALCANAL OPERATION *Ev. 31,*

Phase III

001505

## ORGANIZATION OF THE LUNGA POINT DEFENSES

10 August - 21 August

### INTRODUCTION

On Guadalcanal all ground objectives had been occupied by sunset on August 8 but unloading operations were proceeding at a most unsatisfactory rate due to insufficient labor to unload boats and clear beaches. Congested beach conditions existed from the Tensvatu stream to the Block Four river, and in consequence divisional supplies were exposed to possible air, sea and ground attack. In addition a strong sea-borne attack from the direction of Rabaul appeared imminent. All naval forces had withdrawn the evening of the 9th after heavy losses the previous night in the First Battle of Savo. In view of the foregoing it was decided on the morning of 9 August to suspend ground operations temporarily in order to organize beach defenses on Lunga Point and move all supplies within the defensive position thus established.

### SCHEME OF DEFENSE

The order for the defense was given orally and was based on a plan of defense prepared during the approach to the Solomons. The decision was to defend Lunga Point in strength at the water's edge, with short flank extensions inland. The right rested on the Tenaru River, a strong natural obstacle, with the right flank refused for a distance of 600 yards inland along the west (left) bank of the river. The beach defenses covered the sea approaches from the mouth of the Tenaru River westward around Lunga Point and thence to a point 1000 yards southwest of Kukum. Here a high hill overlooked the beach and provided a comparatively strong point upon which to secure the left flank. Beach defenses consisted initially of a continuous cordon of weapons' emplacements and fox-holes. .30 caliber machine guns emplaced to fire normal barrage missions (final protective lines) along the water's edge formed the back bone of the defense. Thirty-seven MM and .50 caliber guns were emplaced to fire anti-boat missions. Some infantry were used to provide protection for weapons emplaced but the majority were held in prepared positions in rear of the cordon defenses

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in readiness to counterattack or contain any penetration of the water's edge defenses. Seventy-five MM half-tracks were held mobile in dug in positions several hundred yards inland, prepared to move on call to prepared firing positions near the water's edge. Mortars were emplaced in rear of their battalion or company sectors prepared to fire normally in front of the beach positions. Artillery was emplaced in centrally located battalion position areas south of the airfield, prepared to support the defense of any sector. No barbed wire or sand bags were available, none having been landed. The supply of engineer tools was extremely limited. Captured Japanese rice bags made of woven straw were available in quantity for use in lieu of sand bags.

The original front was divided into two regimental sectors; 5th Marines less one Bn. held the left (west) sector while 1st Marines held the right (east) sector. The boundary between sectors was the Lunga river inclusive to 1st Marines. Initially the rear of the Lunga Point position received only the incidental coverage afforded by local security detachments of artillery and other rear installations. However, the annoyance caused by the penetration of snipers and small nuisance patrols at night was such that a regular outpost line was soon organized to provide rear area security.

The defenses, as described above, were in place by the night of 9 August but the completion of field fortifications and the necessary coordination of fires required a longer period. The defenses were meanwhile augmented by the 3rd Defense Battalion which established 5" gun batteries east and west of Lunga Point, a 90 mm anti-aircraft battery near the fighter strip and numerous medium and light anti-aircraft positions around the perimeter of the airdrome. Annex A includes a map of the area showing all defenses established during the period.

The establishment of these defenses was subjected to almost continuous hostile observation and interference. By day and by night submarines and destroyers shelled the area. Large flights of high level bombers attacked the airfield daily, and hostile observation craft were continually intruding with light bombs and strafing attacks. At night enemy patrols became increasingly active. In view of the continued threat of a hostile landing and the absence of any means of aerial reconnaissance it was necessary to mount an alert continuously throughout the hours of darkness.

#### COMPLETION OF AIRFIELD

The principal motive for the seizure of Guadalcanal was to obtain possession of the enemy airdrome known to be under

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construction near Lunga Point. In consequence a first priority in all matters was given to the completion of the airfield and the preparations necessary for the reception and operation of combat aircraft. The engineer battalion was employed primarily on this major task and by 12 August, 2600 feet of the runway were ready for use. By 18 August this was extended to the full length of 3778 feet. Approaches were improved by clearing away dense growths of banyan trees, some of which were of thirty feet diameter at the base. Within the limits of the means available, every effort was made to provide rudimentary servicing and rearmament facilities for the planes and primitive accommodations for pilots and crews.

The need for air support had been apparent from the beginning as the lack of aircraft even for reconnaissance was a severe handicap to our operations. When the first two squadrons arrived on 20 August it was considered that a major turning point in the operation had been reached. Details of the establishment of the airfield appear in Annex B.

### LOGISTICS

Coincident with the establishment of the Lunga Point Defenses and the completion of the airfield there remained a third major problem, that of moving the division's supplies from Red Beach to proper dumps established within the defense perimeter. Although only a portion of the total Division supplies had been landed the tonnage was nevertheless impressive and their removal taxed to the utmost the available transport facilities. All available vehicles, including captured Japanese trucks and our own amphibian tractors were used. The pioneers threw a substantial bridge over the Ilu river, repaired existing bridges over smaller streams and to the limit of their ability labored to maintain and improve the Government Track, as the coastal road to the Lunga was called. Vehicles moved both ways in an unending procession. Ledge alligator tractors lumbered along the beach in the shallow waters just outside the surf and beyond them a flotilla of lighters, left behind with the boat detachment, plied between Red Beach and Kukum.

In four days the major part of the task was accomplished and the division stores were segregated in dispersed and classified dumps. Upon inventory it was found that about 4 units of fire 30 days supply of food, (including captured rations) and a considerable quantity of gasoline were available (Annex C Logistics).

Loss of supplies through enemy action was continuous but never reached serious proportions. Fortunately hostile aviation did not take the opportunity of attacking the supply target

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presented by Red Beach during the first few days of the operation. Had the enemy done so the consequences might well have been incalculable and ruinous. As time went on additional lessons were learned which enabled us to reduce losses still further. For example, in examining the effects of our own bombardment, aerial and Naval, it was readily apparent that the probability of damage to supplies varied directly in proportion to the vertical height of the dump. Gasoline drums laid on their sides, for instance, were rarely hit, whereas drums standing on their ends were invariably ignited by a close hit. The same was true of ammunition and other inflammable stores. By the simple expedient of requiring dumps to be kept at the minimum height consistent with the size of the smallest dimension of the unit package it was possible to reduce fire losses to a minimum. Likewise the practice of camouflaging dumps with the dead palm fronds, grass or other inflammable material was forbidden. During the later stages it was possible to get much of the material below the level of the ground in the shelter of shallow trenches. This was extremely effective, but required much time and labor.

#### CAPTURED MATERIEL

Materials captured included about every conceivable item used by a military force; arms, ammunition, equipment, food, clothing, fuel, transportation, tools, and building material. A great deal of this was wasted through pilfering and souvenir hunting, but large quantities were salvaged by the division quartermaster and made the subject of regular issue. As the division, throughout the entire period was acutely short of everything needed for its operations, the captured material represented an important if unforeseen factor in the development of the airfield and beach defenses and the subsistence of the garrison. A partial list of captured equipment appears in Annex D:

#### JAPANESE REACTION

Reaction of the enemy to our seizure of his Solomons' bases was immediate and violent. Heavy air attacks on August 7 and 8 were followed by the attack of a strong cruiser formation which surprised our screening forces in the night battle of Savo Island in the early hours of 9 August. Upon the withdrawal of friendly naval forces enemy surface craft and submarines dominated the Lunga Sound by day and night, harassing our operations, interdixting circulation between Guadalcanal and Tulagi and destroying inshore patrol craft by means of which we attempted to supplement the security of the beach defenses at night.



While initial attacks from the air were directed against the transport areas, the enemy lost no time in beginning a systematic assault on our shore establishments as soon as our naval forces had withdrawn. Day and night cruiser seaplanes operated in almost continuous relays over Lunga Point, observing our movements and activities and delivering low level attacks as targets of opportunity presented themselves. Strong formations of two engined bombers would appear regularly at midday to deliver a heavy bombardment against the airdrome and surrounding installations. Our only means of reply lay in the hasty creation of anti-aircraft defenses. At first these were limited to guns of light caliber but a 90mm battery was soon in place and the effectiveness of its fire forced the enemy bombers to extreme altitudes with consequent reduction in the effectiveness of their attacks. As the situation developed all anti-aircraft defenses were consolidated under the control of the attached 3rd Defense Battalion, an organization whose high state of training was reflected from the outset in a finely professional performance under most disadvantageous circumstances.

#### FIRST OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY

On August 7 the Japanese garrison on Guadalcanal, in evident panic, had dishonored its own traditions and fled to the westward. It was the desire of the division commander from the outset to seek out and destroy this garrison but no substantial forces could be spared due to the urgent necessity of completing the airfield and erecting defenses against the eventualities of a large scale sea-borne attack. Daily patrols, however, were sent out in all directions to establish contact and seek out enemy bases. Small patrol contacts were of daily occurrence but the presence of numerous bands of partially armed and uniformed laborers introduced a note of confusion in our attempts to locate the hostile main body. Within a few days, however, it became apparent that the more sanguinary hostile contacts were being made by patrols of the Fifth Marines to the west of our positions in the direction of the Matanikau.

On 9 August one officer and several enlisted men were wounded in a contact with a heavily armed enemy patrol east of the Matanikau river. The following day a large patrol, attempting to force a crossing was pinned down by heavy fire. It reported that the high ground on the west bank was organized for defense with a series of prepared positions which dominated the only crossing--a sand spit across the mouth of the river which was destined to be the scene of bitter fighting and, in fact, to become the critical terrain feature in the entire battle for the possession of Guadalcanal.

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### THE GOETTGE PATROL

These incidents focused attention on the Matanikau - Kozumbona area as the most probable Japanese stronghold, and intense efforts were made to gain further information of the terrain and its defenders. In addition it appeared desirable for humanitarian reasons to take steps to bring in the remaining labor troops who were wandering in bands beyond our outpost line. A prisoner taken on 12 August, on examination at division headquarters, stated that there were many like himself starving in the jungle. The prisoner was a naval rating, recalcitrant and surly, but admitted upon questioning, that he came from the Matanikau area and that there were others in his particular group who might be willing to surrender. This information coincided with a patrol report that a large white flag had been seen displayed from the high ground beyond the Matanikau. It should be stated here that the prisoner was not cooperative in any way and there was nothing to indicate that he was acting in concert with others. Likewise, with respect to the white flag, it is now believed that it was merely a large Japanese infantry flag, white, with a red ball center, intended as a banner and not as a signal for parley or surrender. Such flags were commonly seen in later operations but the mistake can be attributed to lack of detailed familiarity with the enemy's habits which prevailed in the early days.

This combination of circumstances caused the Division Intelligence Officer, Colonel Frank B. Goettge, to organize a patrol for the purpose of contacting any groups wishing to surrender, or, failing in this, to obtain information of the terrain and defenses beyond the Matanikau. The patrol consisted of twenty-five officers and men largely intelligence personnel from Division Headquarters and the 5th Marines. Although the Japanese prisoner was taken along as being of possible service, he had nothing to do with the conduct or planning of the operation.

The patrol, under the personal command of Colonel Goettge, embarked at Kukum after darkness of 12 August and proceeded west along the coast. It disembarked on the beach at a point between Matanikau River and Point Cruz, probably opposite Matanikau village. The patrol was met with heavy fire shortly after landing, and Colonel Goettge, who was slightly in advance of the others, was killed. Shortly thereafter the patrol was heavily attacked and overwhelmed by superior enemy forces. Three men escaped. The account of this action has been set forth above in considerable detail for the purpose of counteracting sensational versions of the encounter which have appeared in the press.

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FIRST ACTION ON MATANIKAU

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Following the Goettge patrol, a force of three companies from the 5th Marines was directed to seek out and destroy the enemy in the area beyond the Matanikau. One company was to cut its way through the jungle, cross the Matanikau well inland and approach Matanikau village from the landward side, with the dual mission of destroying any enemy there and recovering the bodies of the Goettge patrol. Another company was to land from Higgins boats at Kokumbona and cut off any enemy attempting to escape from Matanikau westward along the beach. The third was to occupy the defenders by an attack from the east across the mouth of the river. Accordingly Company L (Spurlock) set out at 0800 on 18 August on an inland route to cross the Matanikau 1,000 yards upriver from its mouth. The company encountered no opposition enroute to the crossing point except three Japanese, two of whom were killed. Arriving at the river late in the afternoon, Captain Spurlock took his company across, meeting no opposition in the movement. Immediately across the river a recently vacated enemy bivouac was found. A short distance beyond this point, two more Japanese were found and killed. The company bivouacked for the night near the river and plans were made to attack the next morning at 0900.

Meanwhile Company B (Hawkins) had left its battalion bivouac area and advanced to the Matanikau in order to be in position to attack in the morning.

On the morning of the 19th Company L began its attack following artillery preparation. Almost immediately scouts discovered a line of enemy emplacements dug in along a ridge about 1000 yards to the left flank. As the company continued its attack, Sergeant John H. Branick, an acting platoon leader, was killed by rifle fire from this ridge. The Company executive officer, Lieutenant George H. Mead, Jr. took command of this platoon and covered the advance of the other platoons by fire thus enabling them to continue their advance across open ground exposed to hostile fire.

Company L arrived at the outskirts of the village at about 1400. During the advance Lieutenant Mead had been killed and his platoon taken over by Marine Gunner Edward S. Rust, attached to the company as Regimental Liaison Officer. Meanwhile Company B on the opposite bank of the river had been unable to force a crossing at the mouth, but engaged the enemy by fire. One platoon of Company L entered the village, losing contact with the remainder of the company. The other three started to enter the

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village and were met by a bayonet charge. This was broken up with heavy losses by a prompt change of front followed by extremely effective close range fire.

Shortly after 1500 Company L was in place on the edge of Matanikau village about three hundred yards west of the river, delivering rifle, machine gun, and rifle grenade fire into the enemy positions there. Company B from the other side of the river continued to occupy the enemy by fire. Defending in depth, enemy positions extended from the river 200 yards through the village. By 1600 the defenders fire became spasmodic and ineffective, and the village was taken by assault.

Casualties were some sixty-five Japanese dead in the village as opposed to our losses of four dead, and eleven wounded.

In the meantime Company I (Hardy) had left Kukum by boat at 0430 to land west of Kokumbona and to attack toward the river at 0900. The landing boats came under rifle and machine gun fire as they proceeded along the beach and were shelled in landing by two Japanese destroyers and a submarine. The landing was successfully carried out despite the hostile fire. Japanese were found in Kokumbona village and this was attacked and occupied, the surviving defenders retreating to the hills. At about 1700 Company I returned to the Kukum area.

This action on the Matanikau, while costly to the Japanese, proved of no great import to the campaign. It did however, confirm the whereabouts of the garrison which had fled from the Lunga region on the first day of the landing.

#### ARRIVAL OF FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT

Although the captured airrome was prepared for the reception of supporting aircraft by 12 August no planes were immediately available. During the night of 18 August a converted destroyer arrived off Kukum to discharge a small cargo of bombs and aviation gasoline under cover of darkness. She was the first friendly surface vessel to return to the area since 9 August. In addition to supplies she landed a small party of aviation ground personnel. Almost daily a single B-17 visited the area inspecting the progress of the airport by "dragging" the runway at low altitude, and on one occasion attacking a large enemy destroyer off Lunga Point. This attack, delivered at low altitude, succeeded in crippling the enemy ship which proceeded out Sealark Channel at reduced speed, ablaze, and in obvious difficulty.

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In the late afternoon of 20 August one squadron of Marine F4F Grumman fighters and one squadron of Douglas dive-bombers landed at Henderson airfield and were dispersed in the plains and palm groves bordering the runway. These planes comprised fighter squadron 223 (Smith) and bomber squadron 232 (Mangrum). They were destined to give a most remarkable account of themselves in subsequent operations. On the following day 5 - F400 Army fighters (Brannon) also arrived. These were low altitude fighters unable to participate effectively in high level interception, but their armament and the zeal and fine training of the pilots enabled them to undertake ground support missions which were to contribute as materially, if not as spectacularly, to the defense of Guadalcanal. There were almost no facilities available for servicing the incoming aircraft and little provision could be made for personnel. Despite these handicaps, all squadrons reported themselves ready for duty and began operations at once.

#### BRUSH'S PATROL

Captain W.F.M. Clemens, a young, active and highly intelligent officer of the Solomons civil administration force, commissioned at the outbreak of war in the Solomon Islands Defense Force, had remained in observation on Guadalcanal throughout the period of enemy occupation. He reported information by radio on hostile activities as it reached him through scouts and friendly natives. Reporting in from the hills on 14 August he at once set about the organization of an information gathering agency based on the use of native police and scouts who could move rapidly and secretly through the bush and along the maze of native tracks. From these sources it was learned that a small group of Japanese near Gurabusu 35 miles to the east of Lunga Point, was operating a radio station presumably in contact with enemy vessels and bases. As a routine measure, a strong patrol with native guides was dispatched to the east with orders to destroy this enemy detachment and its equipment.

This patrol, a detachment from Company A, 1st Marines (Brush) made no contact until it reached the vicinity of Taivu on the evening of 19 August where it encountered and surprised an enemy patrol of 4 officers and 30 men proceeding boldly and carelessly along the beach. In a brief encounter the hostile patrol was enveloped and wiped out, only two men escaping. Our losses were three killed and three wounded. Captain Brush returned with his wounded sending an advance party ahead with information of the contact and captured enemy documents. From an analysis of this action the following appeared definitely established.

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1. The enemy were well equipped, clean shaven and wore fresh uniforms, indicating that they had been on the island only a short time.

2. The helmet insignia was the five pointed star of the Imperial Army rather than the anchor and chrysanthemum device of the Naval Landing Force troops who comprised the original garrison.

3. The high proportion of officers and their comparative seniority indicated that singular importance was attached to the patrol mission.

4. The quantity and high quality of radio equipment captured indicated likewise the importance attached to communication with other forces.

5. Diaries indicated that at least certain members of the patrol had recently departed from Truk apparently in company with a larger force.

6. Documents included a prearranged code for use in ship to shore communication during landing operations against resistance.

From the foregoing and from additional information received from Commander Task Force 62 it appeared that an attack in force was imminent. Enemy capabilities appeared to include an attack delivered against our right flank following an unopposed landing to the east, an attempt at a forced landing in the face of the Lunga Point defenses, or a combination of both.

The position of our own forces was in brief as follows:

Five infantry battalions were available for the defense of Lunga Point. Four of these were committed to beach defense; one was withheld as division reserve. On 15 August work had begun on a further extension of the right flank by refusing it inland along the west bank of the Tenaru for a distance of 3200 yards. This work involved road and bridge construction and extensive clearing prior to the establishment of field fortifications. As of 18 August little progress had been made.

Our courses of action were two; first to send the division reserve to the east with orders to destroy any enemy forces encountered, second to continue work on defenses limiting operations to the east to strong patrols and outposts. The first course involved the premise that the main force had already landed to the east and could be located and dealt with by one battalion. This was rejected as being unsound as there had been no verification of a landing in force to the east and even assuming that such a landing had been made, there still remained the doubt as to the ability of a single battalion to deal with it.

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This detachment of the reserve would also greatly weaken the defenses of Lunga Point in the event of an attack on the western flank or from the sea. The second course was accepted as being more consistent with the facts then established and as offering greater promise of a successful defense against any possible course of action the enemy might follow.

In pursuance of this decision additional native scouts were sent along the coast and strong patrols covered the area to the east as far as the Malimbiu by day, with listening posts established along the Ilu and Block Four by night. The reserve was kept closely in hand and all defenses were maintained at "stand-to" during the hours of darkness.

#### SUMMARY

The period covered by this section of the report, 9 August - 20 August is made distinct by the fact that the division was forced by circumstances to operate entirely without air or surface support, with a minimum of supply and materiel and under conditions creating uncertainty as to the state of our line of communications with our bases to the east. Nothing was known of the general naval situation or the extent of our losses at sea. Radio communication was unsatisfactory and little information was received as to the results of aerial reconnaissance conducted from the rear areas. Observation over the sea approaches was limited to shore observation points which could provide only limited surveillance during the day and none at night. Patrolling was constant but the extent and type of terrain to be covered was such that little reliance could be placed upon negative information obtained from patrol reports. The original enemy garrison on Guadalcanal had been sharply defeated but not destroyed in the action on the Matanikao on 19 August. Surviving elements had made good their escape into the jungle where they retained comparative freedom to continue their harrassing tactics. Short rations, continuous hard labor and lack of sleep were reflected in a steady deterioration in the physical condition of the troops. Morale remained high however, as all ranks made light of their hardships and refused to take too serious a view of their situation. Little was known of the enemy's intentions and not until the patrol action near Taivu on 19 August did it appear that the enemy had landed, or was preparing to land, fresh troops in an effort to regain possession of the island.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

##### EQUIPMENT

1. During this period it became apparent that our armament

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and equipment while satisfactory for landing operations is in general too heavy for jungle operations. Troops must be taught to strip down to bare essentials and travel on light rations; Patrols must be specially armed and equipped in accordance with the terrain and type of resistance to be encountered. Specific recommendations are:

- (a) Carry only 40-60 rounds per rifleman with proportionate reductions for the B&R and light machine gun.
- (b) A limited system of selective or optional armament permitting the following substitutions for special occasions

- Light machine guns for heavy machine guns
- 60 mm mortars for 81 mm mortars
- Increased number of submachine guns and carbines required by close terrain
- Sufficient machetes to issue one per man when required

- (c) The "C" ration is too bulky and the "D" ration unsatisfactory for extended patrols. Troops must be trained to live for considerable periods on individually prepared rations of rice, bacon, raisins and coffee.

- (d) This ration should be varied and supplemented by airplane drops of canned fruit and "C" ration at intervals of four or five days.

- (e) Two canteens are necessary

- (f) Blankets are not required; men should carry only the shelter half or poncho.

- (g) Make preparations in advance for airplane drops of ammunition and medical supplies in the event of a serious action.

- (h) Organize natives as carrying parties as soon as possible after landing.

2. All types of marine corps combat transportation proved highly satisfactory. The superiority of our 4-wheel drive equipment over the 2-wheel drive type of Japanese truck was most apparent. Despite its short mechanical life the amphibian tractor continued to demonstrate its usefulness and versatility.

3. Reproduction equipment will always be needed. It should be brought in with the second echelon. Little reliance can be placed on obtaining cartographic assistance from rear areas.

4. The failure to land engineer equipment and machinery severely handicapped our efforts to complete the airfield and its defenses. Construction equipment and personnel are not a luxury

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but an absolute necessity in modern warfare. Bridging equipment is particularly necessary.

5. A well organized boat detachment with repair facilities should be provided the landing force. The detachment left at Guadalcanal initially lacked all semblance of organization, many of the crews being simply left behind when the attack force departed. A high percentage of the boats were damaged. The situation was gradually improved but was never entirely satisfactory.

#### LOGISTICS

6. To reduce waste and wanton destruction, orders should be issued prior to the landing covering the disposition of captured materiel.

7. Security for supply dumps is to be found in wide dispersion rather than overhead cover. Second only to the foregoing is the necessity for limiting the height of stacks of inflammables to a maximum of two feet instead of the normal six feet as the maximum density of fragments of the enemy personnel bomb appears in a sheaf extending horizontally and about three feet above ground impact level. These fragments have an incendiary effect. As rapidly as possible dumps should be placed below ground level.

#### TRAINING

8. On every occasion our troops proved themselves superior to the Japanese in actual combat. Their great deficiency was inadequate physical training and hardening prior to combat. An important secondary deficiency was the failure of small patrols to operate effectively. This was corrected in subsequent phases, but precombat training proved definitely inadequate.

9. Troops in training must be made to live hard and to march long distances by day and night through unfavorable terrain. Ease and comfort in training periods will lead to excessive losses in combat.

10. Care of the feet including daily foot inspection by junior officers is particularly essential in jungle warfare. In one instance during this period one battalion had 159 ineffectives due to minor and entirely avoidable foot ailments.

11. Troops must be trained to preserve their clothing and equipment. This is an important disciplinary problem and its only solution is constant inspection followed by disciplinary action

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and checkage against offenders. This should be impressed upon the troops beginning with their recruit training period so that it will be instinctive during field operations.

#### ENEMY COMBAT METHODS

12. During the period the enemy revealed for the first time certain specific weaknesses which were to be repeated again and again. These were:

(a) Lack of perception--failure to attack the supply target on Red Beach.


(b) Careless disregard of security measures--Brush's patrol.

(c) Fondness for the tactically dramatic (Bushido)--improvident "Banzai" charge against Company L, Fifth Marines, near Matanikau. Initiated at long range and without fire superiority it presented us with a gratuitous opportunity for annihilation by fire.


(d) Lack of intelligence and initiative--as individuals, or in groups without formal leadership the Japanese soldier displayed tenacity and a willingness to die on the spot but no capacity to take independent action to redeem his situation.

(e) Lack of combat discipline as demonstrated by their general habit of keeping and carrying diaries together with operation orders and other documents into action. Their weakness provided a valuable and never failing source of information.

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Capt. Brush's Patrol  
19 August 42  
Diagrammatic Sketch



THE FIRST ACTION OF THE MATANIKAU RIVER  
18, 19 August 1942.

LIST OF ANNEXES FOR PHASE III

- A Defense Overlay
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NOTE: In many cases annexes are appended merely to present a fresh and more detailed point of view. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed therein do not necessarily bear the approval of this headquarters.

ANNEX B

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DETAILS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF THE AIRFIELD

Upon capturing the airfield at Guadalcanal on 8 August 1942 a survey was made to determine the readiness of the runway for operations. It was found that 2600 feet of the runway 180 feet wide could be made ready for operations within about two days using captured equipment, and that the remaining 1178 feet could be made ready within about a weeks time. A report was made on the condition of the field to Commander Task Force Sixty-two by LtCol. Frank Geraci, Division Engineer and Major K.H. Weir, Division Air Officer. Commander Task Force Sixty-two stated that aircraft would be sent in on 11 August after hearing the report.

On 9 August the 1st Engineer Battalion was hard at work on the runway with nine captured power rollers, a narrow gauge railway, captured trucks, dynamite, in fact practically everything used to complete the runway was captured. A large steel roof grider intended for one of the Japanese hangars was used as a drag on the runway. All the dirt required to fill the gap in the runway (196 feet at the 2600 foot point) had to be moved by hand shovels, trucks and dump cars as no power shovels were to be had. Ours were not landed and unfortunately the Japs had none on the island. This was quite a task as about 100,000 cubic feet had to be moved and rolled to complete the job, however, the gap was filled and the entire 3778 feet of runway were available for use on the 18th of August. Some delay was caused by damage to the rollers by bombs, at one time only one of the nine rollers being in commission. Tojo's intelligence system was apparently functioning perfectly as the bombers planted six bombs directly in the runway on the 19th of August. The holes were quickly filled and packed down and the field was ready for the planes on their arrival on 20 August 1942.

With the arrival of dump trucks and pneumatic tampers it was possible to fill in a 500 kilo bomb crater in thirty minutes. Dump trucks were kept loaded with gravel and sand and immediately following an air raid they would proceed to the runway with Engineer crews to fill any holes. In this way it was possible to repair any damage in the minimum of time.

On 9 August 1942 an air raid warning system in its most primitive form was established. Occupying the Pagoda the Division Air Officer with the help of four enlisted men from the 1st Engineer Battalion set up a captured Japanese siren to give warning

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of the approach of hostile aircraft. Initially only a five minute warning could be given as the planes appeared from clouds directly over the island. The lookouts had little time to take cover, after giving the alarm, before the bombs landed. Very few of the lookouts were able to identify planes of any type and it was necessary that the Division Air Officer remain at the Pagoda in order to identify planes and avoid needless air raid alarms. This crude system was later amplified by the arrival of the Australian Coast Watchers who soon thereafter gave us timely information of the approach of hostile aircraft. In some cases two hours and forty minutes warning was received prior to attacks. The method of sounding the alarm was improved by hoisting a flag on top of the Pagoda to indicate the approach of hostile planes and lowering it when all was clear. Augmenting the flag and siren a radio was established in the Division Command net which transmitted a "Division Flash" to all units which in turn sounded alarms within their respective areas. In turn it was further augmented with the landing and installation of radar equipment. It may well be stated here that radar equipment should be landed and installed immediately after the initial landing as in the Guadalcanal operation it was fully two weeks after the landing before radar equipment was even landed.

On 12 August 1942 the first U.S. airplane landed on Henderson Field, PBV-5A (#05045) piloted by Lt. W.S. Sampson, U.S.N., and departed soon thereafter evacuating two wounded. At this time only 2600 feet of the runway was usable.

Major C.H. Hayes and Second Lt. Rutledge joined the Division on Guadalcanal from VMO 251. These two officers and Ensign Polk of Cub 11, by their tireless efforts and foresight assisted materially in preparing the field for aircraft. They made preliminary arrangements for feeding and billeting the plane crews and for servicing the aircraft.

ANNEX C

LOGISTICS

ENGINEERS - PHASE III

Japanese equipment left on the airfield included the following:

- Nine (9) Road rollers (three damaged beyond repair).
- Two (2) gas engine powered locomotives with hopper cars.
- Six (6) small 1-KW Homelite type generators (two damaged beyond repair).
- About fifty (50) hand carts for hauling dirt.
- One (1) winch with gasoline engine.
- About seventy-five (75) hand shovels.
- Two hundred and eighty (280) explosives (equivalent to 30% dynamite with two fuses and caps).

It was interesting to note that only one piece of equipment was found on the airfield which had any apparent deliberate damage to prevent further use. This was one of the road rollers, on which someone had apparently used a hammer to smash spark plugs, distributor and carburetor. This machine, however, along with five others, was soon put back into operation by Engineer mechanics. The other three were so damaged by shellfire as to be beyond repair; they were, however, very useful as a source of spare parts with which to keep the others in operation.

All enemy equipment, except that which was apparently very new, as in the case of the gasoline locomotives, had obviously been used continuously for some time with practically no maintenance work at all. For this reason, Engineer mechanics were kept constantly on the run from one machine to the other in order to keep as many in operation as possible.

The Japs had apparently planned the construction of the runway to be done by working from the two opposite ends toward the middle, for there was a gap of about 180 feet which had yet to be finished. No Engineer earth-moving equipment whatever had been unloaded before the departure of the ships, and so thus it was that on the morning of 10 August, the Engineer Battalion was faced with the problem of making a fill involving an estimated 6700 cubic yards with only such equipment as could be salvaged. Speed was required, for information had been received that friendly planes might arrive within two days.

By means of captured explosives and hand shovels, dirt was loosened from the side of a small hill near the runway, and transported to the fill by means of the locomotive powered hopper cars, and a half dozen Japanese cargo trucks-- just as the Japanese themselves had apparently been operating. It seemed, how-



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ANNEX C (CONT)

ever, a never-ending job to men accustomed to the plentiful use of machinery on a job of this type--an ordinary power shovel, a bulldozer and a few dump trucks would have been a godsend, but that equipment was still aboard ship and was not received until weeks later.

On 18 August, when work on the runway had just been completed, a large flight of Japanese bombers came over, and, as was to be true for many days to follow, the airfield was their target. There were 17 hits (including three (3) 500KG.) on the airfield, and the runway was a mess. Engineer casualties were nine injured and one dead. No friendly planes had arrived as yet, but they were expected any day, so the Engineers began feverishly to repair the damage. This air raid occurred at about 1300, and at least two delayed action bombs were dropped, which exploded at 1630 and 2030. It was assumed that these bombs were of the acid-fuze type, commonly used for delayed action.

In filling craters on the runway, care had to be taken that work was done properly to prevent development of a "pot-hole" where the crater was. This was accomplished by first squaring off the inside of the crater with hand shovels then tamping thoroughly with the air compressor attachments about every foot and a half in depth as the crater was filled. Thus very little settling occurred later. Air compressor and truck loads of dirt were kept standing by at all times with working crews readily available, so that repair could commence immediately after a bombing occurred. This procedure was essential because the runway must be made ready to receive our own fighter planes which were usually in the air when bombings occurred.

During this period (10-20 August) other Engineer activities included the establishment of a Division water point just South of the LUNGA RIVER Bridge on 10 August; the destruction of duds of all types, both Naval shells and bombs (two crews were kept busy continuously at this work), road and bridge reconnaissance in consideration of future plans, as well as salvage of engineer materials of all types. In addition to Engineer duties, the Battalion was frequently called upon to establish night defense on the airfield against possible parachute attacks. On one occasion, when a parachute attack was expected, Engineers were ordered to place all available machinery and vehicles in scattered positions all over the runway and vicinity to prevent the possibility of enemy planes being landed, should such an attack develop. Air raid lookouts were maintained continuously on PAGODA HILL throughout daylight hours.

The Engineer Battalion moved on 19 August from its initial bivouac area north of HENDERSON FIELD down into the jungle area south of the field and south of the positions occupied by the 11th Marines in that area. A defensive line was organized and dug in there.

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ANNEX C (CONT)

PIONEERS - PHASE III

ADM. Map #104

During this period, the Pioneers built a road from the airfield (8090199.9) to the LUNGA RIVER at (8040198.7) and erected a bridge across the river at that point. This was a trestle bridge constructed from Temporary Pier material. The road was extended about 350 yards through the jungle on the far shore to a possible site either for dumps, or the Division CP. Company "C", Pioneers, was entrusted with this task and they provided an outpost to protect the bridge while the Battalion bivouacked in the area. During this phase the beach area just to the Northeast of Kukum which had been used by the Japs was cleaned up, various dumps of Japs supplies were moved back from the shore, shear legs were repaired and re-rigged and the beach placed in condition to receive supplies of our own. The beach was organized into five unloading points, Vehicles, Gasoline, Ammunition, Rations and Organizational Equipment. Runways and ramps were constructed in order to facilitate movement of supplies over the sand, either into trucks or dumps.

Runways were built of salvaged Jap lumber (2x12), steel sheets 3/8" x 4' x 6' and coconut leg corduroy. One gasoline drum ramp was built of timber from water's edge to firm sand, and another of salvaged steel channels. Salvaged straw sand bags were extensively used to mat the approaches over mats. These installations materially facilitated unloading operations. At a later date, Cub One constructed a runway of Manston mat--very efficient.

Provisions for feeding and watering working parties on the beach by the Pioneers is especially important to note. Under the conditions prevailing at this stage, it was necessary for working parties to be at the beach at 0600 to utilize every hour of daylight in speeding unloading. Working parties had to leave the lines before daybreak, and cooking fires had to be shielded from air observation. Consequently breakfast was at an early hour and meagre. All available vehicles were at the beach, so that noon meal prepared in the troop's bivouac area was often delayed for want of transport and water carts were never provided by own organizations. The heat was so great men could not quench their thirst with one canteen for 12 hours, and their efficiency was consequently impaired.

ANNEX C (3)

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ANNEX C (CONT)

AMMUNITION

It was apparent that ammunition was insufficient to establish a division reserve. Accordingly a speedy distribution to organizations was made by the Ordnance platoon, which established guides and dispatched truck loads arriving at the Teneru in principle, and proportions as follows:

- (1) All Pack Howitzer and 105mm ammunition to 11th Marines Dump.
- (2) All 90mm ammunition to 3rd Defense Battalion dump.
- (3) 37mm ammunition
 

3	truck loads to Special Weapons Battalion
1	" " " 1st Marines
1	" " " 5th Marines
1	" " " 11th Marines
- (4) 75mm gun ammunition
 

3	truck loads to Special Weapons Battalion
2	" " " 5th Marines
1	" " " 1st Marines
- (5) Small arms, Grenades, and Mortar shell: 2 truck loads to 1st Marines  
1 " " " 5th Marines
- (6) All demolitions to 1st Engineer Battalion
- (7) Other organizations received no addition to the ammunition which they brought ashore, for the time being.

RATIONS

Organizations, at first, used their combat vehicles to transport rations on the beach to their respective dump. A disparity of types and amounts was inevitable. Accordingly, this practice was forbidden, and all rations were sent to the Division dump, inventories were required of all organizations and allocations were made to all organizations to build up 10 day's supply, with consequent equitable distribution by types and kinds. The troops subsisted for the first 4 days on Types C and D rations. Thereafter, rations rapidly supplanted the emergency rations. A shortage of rations was early perceived, and the entire Division was ordered to restrict meals to two per day and to supplement our own rations with captured rations, particularly rice. The slaughter of cattle was forbidden with a view towards conservation and eventual control of fresh beef by Division quartermaster personnel. The inventory of rations was taken about August 15, and estimated in terms of days as follows:

Type B	17 days
Type C	3 days
Japs	10 days

ANNEX C (CONT)

AVIATION GASOLINE

In preparation for the expected arrival of friendly aircraft, on D plus 3 days, all aviation gasoline (560 drums), aviation lubricating oil, and camouflage nets were given priority of transport to positions around the airfield selected by the Division Air Liaison Officers. The job was completed on time, though the planes did not arrive until August 19th. Approximately 500 cases of 50 cal. ammunition was spotted adjacent to the airfield and 50,000 rounds were belted by Ordnance personnel for immediate arriving of the expected fighters.

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

All signal equipment and supplies were taken over by the 1st Signal Company.

OTHER SUPPLIES

All supplies, other than those above noted, including clothing, chemical warfare, tentage, camouflage nets, etc. were placed in Division quartermaster dump.

Engineer supplies and equipment for defensive works were critically short.

Landed on Red Beach:                    8 intrenching sets, Infantry  
   1200 shovels, intrenching.  
   18 spools of barbed wire.

The Engineer Companies reverted to Battalion control, and were charged with completing the bomber strip for receiving friendly aircraft. Consequently, combat units were deprived of the normal supply of intrenching tools. As is evident from the above list, no barbed wire was available for defensive work. Some wire was salvaged from plantation fences, but the amount was trifling.

HANDLING OF FUELS ETC.

The Division Salvage Officer was assigned to handle receiving, disposition and issuing of fuels other than aviation. At the time he had been acting as Division Salvage Officer and the Division Quartermaster assigned these additional duties as no other personnel had been provided for the purpose within the Division. The method of handling was therefore not well planned, work done by untrained personnel and for this reason lacking in mechanical smoothness and practically devoid of paper work such as inventories, reports etc. We had to learn by doing, so this report will not be 100% accurate. For clarity, it will be broken down into six sections.

I - Organization for Handling

The Division Salvage Officer was placed in charge of handling fuels other than aviation and was directly responsible to the Division Quartermaster. He had the Salvage Platoon of fifteen NCO's and men, for overseers, guides and minor working parties. One Jap truck was assigned to the organization for small deliveries and general transportation of working parties and tours of inspection.

One man was placed in charge of each dump, a "beach detail" was assigned to coordinate activities of unloading at the beaches and dispersal, and the balance were general duty.

A corporal in Motor Transport was put in charge of refueling vehicles, and in the beginning he also issued to units. Eventually for better control and organization he was instructed to confine his activities to pumping gasoline and to send all other requests to the Division Quartermaster for bulk issue. This was found to work much more satisfactorily. Motor Transport Repair Section handled all greases and lube oils.

II - Captured Japanese Fuels - Types and Uses

In addition to handling American fuels, this organization also had all Japanese fuels turned over to them for handling. The following is a survey of this fuel and its uses.

## A-Naptha Gas or "Benzine"

Tests by Navy analysts reported this fuel to be a high-grade naptha gas, unsuitable for use in vehicles. It was too highly volatile to be useful in lanterns or stoves and was finally used to soak and burn dead Japs and their unserviceable equipment. About 15,000 gallons were found in five-gallon tins.

## B-Deisel Oil - Road Oil - Crude Oil

About 40,000 gallons of heavy oil was found in 50-gallon drums. About half of this was classed as Deisel Oil. Most of it was found adjacent to the two Jap Power Plants along the Lunga River, and was used by the CB's to run these power houses. The balance was a heavy and dirty oil which was classed as Road Oil. This was found at Kukumi beach in the dump there. It was used as a road oil to keep dust down etc. A large quantity was never used during our occupation.

## C - Kerosene

Kerosene was found in drums and in five-gallon tins. The Navy analyst reported

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ANNEX C (CONT)

it as being of a very high quality. It was excellent for use in "Buzzy-cot" burners, converted '37 burners and lanterns. In an emergency it served well in stoves requiring White Gas, providing the carbon was cleaned out daily.

D- Jap Aviation Gas

About 800 or 900 drums of Japanese gasoline of about 90 Octane were found and classed as aviation gas - marked by three white painted stripes circling the circumference of the drum, in the middle section. Much more was found on RINGBOLT and brought to CACTUS for use there. The octane was too high and carbon content too great for use in vehicles and Higgins Boats, unless cut evenly with our 72 octane motor fuel. It could not be cut with Jap motor fuel (60 octane) as it also had a high carbon content and combined they fouled motors quickly and made them unserviceable. Mixed with 72 octane though, results were a little better than average. (Higgins Boats require an American 80 Octane gas for 100% functioning).

E - Jap Motor Fuel

Jap motor fuel is about 60 to 65 octane grade. Unreliable for use in our combat vehicles, in emergencies we used it evenly mixed with 72 octane in jeeps and ration trucks and other non-or semi-combat vehicles, especially Jap trucks, but commanding officers would not trust it in prime-movers, or ammunition and troop carriers. About 150,000 gallons were found in various dumps and consumed in emergencies. Some was also brought over from TULAGI.

F - Lube Oil

About 800 gallons of lubricating oil of an SAE of about 10w or 20w were found in five-gallon tins. Used by motor transport in servicing vehicles requiring such a weight oil and by Navy at Jap Powerhouses.

III - HANDLING OF FUELS ON THE BEACHES

When supply ships arrived at CACTUS, men detailed from our organization were posted on the beach to identify and sort drums, make emergency issues when necessary, oversee working parties unloading lighters and to act as guides on trucks to either permanent or temporary dumps. Temporary dumps were established close to the beach when transportation for the longer hauls to permanent dumps was not available. Our men handled unloading of trucks and storage at these dumps. Beachside working parties did the majority of the manual labor.

An effort was made to unload gasoline and deisel oil from shipside bulk

stores into empty drums set aside on the beach and lightered to the ship for this purpose. Large old-type artillery lighters were used; loaded with empties, stood on end, bung-hole up. These were run alongside the ship and filled by hose from ships bulk stores. This did not work too smoothly because this large lighter tied up alongside congested the flow of boats to the loading points and also ships' officers were prone to lose their head of steam pumping oil when air-raids were imminent and a quick get-away often necessary. However with more careful preparation, planning and cooperation between ships and shore in advance, this process could be speeded up considerably and should work. One of our main difficulties was that ship's captains did not in most cases, expect us to get fuel in this manner, and cooperation from the ship's officers was difficult to obtain. If definite plans were made in advance, a lighter could be made ready prior to ship's arrival and pull right alongside immediately to start loading without any argument.

After trying numerous systems of handling fuel on the beach, it was found that the best plan was to have as few of my men as possible helping to clutter up the beach. A man to identify and sort fuel at the unloading point was all that was necessary on the beach proper. The beach party would load trucks and despatch them to a convenient cross-roads where our guides would pick them up and take them to the proper dumps. This method eliminated "special duty" men and additional overseers from the congested beach area and left very simple orders for the beach party to execute.

Empty drum dumps were established adjacent to the beach-head so that trucks on their return trips from dumps to the beach could carry empties, and these drums were available at all times, convenient to send to shipside for filling or for shipment from the island for refilling elsewhere.

#### IV - DISPERSAL

Several schemes were attempted in dispersing fuels in a manner that was reasonable safe from bombing and shelling and at the same time accessible to a fair degree. From actual trial-and-error experience, the following plan was found to be the most satisfactory of all from the standpoint of availability to units requiring fuel, concentration in a small area, camouflage and safety from enemy damage.

Holes, about 6' x 6' were dug in the ground in rows: about ten to fifteen yards between rows and between holes. These holes were 12" to 15" inches in depth, and six drums were rolled into each hole and laid on their sides. The excavated dirt was then thrown up against the sides of the two-thirds buried cans with a small sprinkling over the top as camouflage and to prevent the metal from reflecting the sunlight. By actual test, personnel bombs (the most effective),

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ANNEX C (CONT)

bursting as close as fifteen feet from drums thus buried, would ignite one in ten and puncture three or four others, whereas cans above ground are exposed to 80% to 100% damage. It was also noticed that any area occupied by our troops was subject to indiscriminate bombing and shelling, and that we suffered less loss from fuel Buried adjacent to the airfield than we did to fuel dispersed and camouflaged in out-of-the-way areas. Shellfire, artillery fire and bombing, particularly at night, was such that "misses" or "overs" and "strays" were as dangerous to fuel as concentrated attacks, in view of the damage done. Therefore, it was concluded that whenever possible the best plan was to establish several dumps (where volume on hand requires or warrants it), not only camouflaged, but buried; location governed to a large extent by its availability to consumers. The only time any dump was actually picked as a target was when a large dump of empty drums piled in plain sight adjacent to Kukum beach was subjected to a severe and ineffectual shelling by an enemy field piece.

V - ISSUE

After many weeks of haphazard issuing, it was found best, whenever the supply on hand made it possible, to issue on week's supply at a time to Regiments or separate organizations (such as Special Troops Battalions) and functions (water purifications, Radar, hospital etc.). In this way an attempt at control could be made. Motor Transport was allotted about a three to four days supply at a time (200 to 300) drums for their dump. This was for pumping directly into vehicles, not for issue. Thus the issuing was centralized and it was simpler to maintain a timely inventory. Further, when supply was low, we could fairly well control issuing to priorities first and substituting mixed US-JAP fuel to others. By issuing weekly to organizations we could keep a fair estimate of their daily and weekly consumption.



ANNEX D

PARTIAL LIST OF CAPTURED MATERIEL - GUADALCANAL

(a) Construction equipment

6 Rollers, heavy, gasoline  
1 Tractor, rubber tired, gasoline  
2 Tractors, heavy, gasoline  
1 Tractors, light, gasoline  
1 Welding unit  
3 Cement mixers, gasoline

(b) Vehicles

<u>Total</u>	<u>Serviceable</u>	
4	3	Cars, 5-passenger in poor condition
60	34	Trucks, 1½ - 2-ton, 2x4
5	4	Motorcycles, delivery type
40	40	Bicycles

(c) Tools

1 Blacksmiths, set  
2 Mechanics tools, sets  
Miscellaneous hand tools, such as saws,  
hammers, picks, shovels, etc.

(d) Gasoline

150,000 Gasoline, about 65 octane, gallons (can  
only be used in Jao trucks)

(e) Lubricating oil by SAE symbol

800 Oil, about 10w - 20w, SAE, gallons

(f) Fuels other than gasoline

15,000 Benzine, gallons  
7,000 Kerosene, gallons  
8,000 Fuel oil, gallons, low grade  
40,000 Crude oil, gallons

(g) Building supplies

600 Cement, tons  
80 Reinforcing bars, tons  
40 Steel trusses, 20', tons  
20 Steel girders and beams, tons  
Miscellaneous lumber, random lengths.  
Miscellaneous nails, copper and wire.

## (d) Building supplies Con't.

Miscellaneous pipe, 3/4" and 1"  
Miscellaneous steel cable of all sizes.

## (h) Ordnance

9 Machine guns, heavy  
7 Machine guns, light  
1 AA Machine gun  
2 Mortars, infantry  
1 1.1 triple mount AA gun  
4 3" AA guns (2 in action)  
3 37mm anti-tank guns  
2 70mm Bn cannon (1 in action)  
2 75mm guns (1 in action)  
2 Flame throwers, portable

TULAGI

## (a) Construction equipment

1 Jack  
1 Tractor, Allis-Chalmers  
1 1/2-ton chain hoist  
1 Double-gearred, hand-operating winch, 3-ton capacity  
1 Jack, 8-ton, moveable base screw  
1 Mixer, concrete, hand-operated, 3-cubic feet  
1 Hoist, one-ton chain

## (b) Vehicles

1 Motorcycle (in need of repair)  
3 1/2-ton trucks (2 serviceable)  
6 Trucks, two (2) in operating condition  
Chevrolet and Reo

## (c) Tools

1 Wrench, pipe  
1 Cutter, pipe  
1 Hammer, sledge  
24 Wedges, steel

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ANNEX D (CONT)

(c) Tools con't.

30 Picks, mattocks, shovels  
6 Handles, pick, axe and shovel, bags  
4 Saws, 2-handed, crosscut  
Miscellaneous small tools (some may be salvageable)

(d) Gasoline

500 Gasoline, 72-Octane, gallons  
7 Gasoline, 58-gallon; "SHELL", high-octane  
base, drums  
800 Gasoline, aviation, 90-Octane, gallons  
3,500 Gasoline, 72-Octane, gallons

(e) Lubricating oil by SAE symbol

24 Oil, 60 SAE, drums

(f) Fuels other than gasoline

300 Kerosene, gallons

(g) Building supplies

1 Angle iron, ton  
300 Nails, 4, 6, and 8 penny, pounds  
50 Screws, assorted, wood, pounds  
200 Nails, assorted boat and wire pounds  
100 Line, 3/4", new pounds  
100 Lines, 1/2", new pounds  
200 Nuts and bolts, assorted, pounds  
2 Twine, one ply, bales  
3 Nails, roofing, kegs  
1 Hinges, assorted, box  
100 Rope, grass, 1/2", pounds  
6 Metal stock, brass, copper, iron, steel, in  
varying thicknesses, tons, varying shapes  
2 Nuts and bolts, assorted, tons  
30 Sheets, aluminum, 3' x 6', heavy gauge  
1 Fittings, pipe, large, ton  
2 Mesh, concrete reinforcing, tons  
2 Iron and pipe, angle, assorted, tons  
12 Paper, tar, rolls

ANNEX D (CONT)

(h) Ordnance

- 2 13mm AA guns
- 21 Rifles, .25 calibre
- 1 Thrower, flame (unserviceable)
- 3 Machine guns, heavy
- 7 Machine guns, light
- 1 20mm AA gun
- 1 13mm gun, dual mount
- 2 13mm guns
- 3 3-inch guns

ANNEX E

EXTRACTS FROM OPERATIONS DAILY JOURNAL  
10 August

<u>Time</u>	<u>Message</u>
1320	From 1st Pio Bn to CG- Request information on bombers and fighters just passed heading south.
1315	From CG to CTF 62 - Twenty five Heavy Bombers covered by twelve Zeros circled this area at thirteen thirty no bombs dropped X Four Zeros flying low on reconnaissance came over at thirteen thirty.
1750	From D-2 to CG - All 3 patrols went into jungle approx 1½ miles no enemy encountered X found traces of men who passed through there several days ago X the area is very thick jungle.
1926	From CG to CTF 62 - Makambo and Mbangi Islands captured and occupied nine August.  From ComSoPac to Radio Tulagi - Report situation briefly X Vandegrift from Ghormley X Negat Xray Zed authenticat- or reply by giving names of destroyer and carrier on which you last saw Callahan.
11 August	
0405	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - All Stations X Number of unidentified boats approaching Nelu Beach.
0930	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 1415 negative approximate 15 minutes after a large black column of smoke observed east end Florida Island. This area entirely in our hands have made defensive dispositions will continue to dig in Snipers active but progress being made against them.
0952	From D-2 to CG - Just received message from Nicholson dated 0630, that 3 B17s were expected in this area at sunrise from ComSoPac
1718	From D-2 to CG - 3-1 reports large number of barrels and boxes floating in shore about 800 yards from Beach
2360	From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Situation unchanged X Why is defense preparation planned X 75 Pack Howitzer at unidentified submarine at 1700 which submerged flew no flag and did attempt to communicate X Can you supply us as per our 0800 request.

ANNEX E (CONT)

0902 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Situation changing, can you supply us with entrenching tools, sandbags, barbwire, Diesel oil and TBX batteries X None of these materials have been landed

12 August

0112 From ComAirSoPac to CG - What quality Avgas 100 Octane is available Cactus X Can improvised fueling facilities for fighters aircraft be made available X Is radio being installed

0140 From CG to ComAirSoPac - Four hundred drums good quality one hundred octane Avgas available Cactus X Improvised fueling facilities can be made available for fighters aircraft X Radio not landed X Endeavoring to put into operation captured radio

1200 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Our fire one hit forward conning tower X Submerged at eleven fifteen headed north west X Request air plane search and bombing X Submarine surfaced eight thousand yards bearing one eight zero mike from southeastern tip hill two eight one at eleven hundred X Sub fired at Higgins boats believed no hits X Results

13 August

0610 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Was Tulagi shelled X Report whether submarine or surface craft and extent damage

0810 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 0640 negative

0950 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - No change in situation enemy activity of reconnaissance nature on adjacent coast of Florida Island

1120 From Pio Bn to CG - Pio Bn reports firing on Tulagi and that Tulagi is returning fire. Enemy firing from sea positions

1245 From CG to All Units - Reports of approaching aircraft will be telephoned directly to Air Raid warning Station Texas 14 X Report must give Msg bearing approximately number of planes Center and approximate height

1710 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Suggest you contact Roses request codes frequency call signs coast watchers in Solomons be dropped you and Tulagi enable us secure immediate information hostile activity these islands and

1710 (Cont).

approaches Tulagi enemy aircraft X Also desire Roses contact Yoke Jig X Jay 10 directed Kennedy on (YSA be 1) designate place time rendezvous boats Tulagi earliest possible date X Kennedy familiar (Geland) other available here X Need assistance contemplate operating that island unless you have someone with you competent this task

14 August

- 0750 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Same as last report X Mopping up operations Florida Island will begin tomorrow do you have any beef on the hoof
- 0820 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Defensive work continues X Friendly natives brought 2 Jap prisoners to Tulagi
- 1525 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Sub appeared at 0720 8000 yards bearing 170 degrees from hill 281 remained for two hours periscope only showing at 1500 sub was above surface eastern side Savo /k

15 August

- 0742 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Submarine observed vicinity Savo Island during day Florida Island vicinity Haleta mopped up no contact with enemy have 5 prisoners natives very friendly
- 0836 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Must move Combat Team Two to Guadalcanal as quickly as air coverage is available for movement X Perhaps within next three days X Frank Goettge missing almost certain killed in action
- 1050 From CG to CO Tenaru Sector - Prepare extension of your position along west bank of Tenaru River and its most easterly tributary for a distance of 1700 yards from the beach X This extension will have priority over further work on beach defenses X Report progress of this work to Division Headquarters at 1900 daily X Instructions are being issued to First Bn First Marines (Div Res) to extend this position to the south for a distance of 1500 yards
- 1050 From CG to First Bn First Marines - First Marines have been instructed to prepare an extension of their position along the west bank of the Tenaru River and its most easterly tributary for a distance of 1700 yards X Your battalion will prepare a further extension for a distance of 1500 yards along the southeasterly banks of the most

~~SECRET~~  
ANNEX E (Cont)

1050 (Cont).

easterly tributary of the Tenaru X Report progress of this work to DivHq at 1900 daily

- 1155 Six Bombers approaching from the northwest dropped approximately ten bombs X Flow at about 2400 feet and were fired upon by the anti-aircraft X No damage
- 1205 From Amph Trac Bn to CG - Schedule route along beach to point opposite ration dump then parallel to existing road passing south of airfield fuel dump to bridge across Lunga River, crossing river north of bridge thence to park immediately south of above bridge.
- 1245 From 1st Bn 1st Marines to CG - Small packages been landed by parachutes on beach red/k
- 1415 From AV Look Out to CG - Low flying planes approaching from Northeast
- 1510 From CG to ComSoPac - Six Orange bombers over Cactus at 1155 three dropped bombs no damage other three at least six parachutes four recovered carried ammunition and rations Does the information have any significance in connection with you 141035
- 1217 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Request attached units combat team two remain Tulagi Major Earright/k
- 1250 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Reliable information hostile forces approaching
- 1300 From CG to ComSoPac - Your 142358 please elaborate in order that proper dispositions may be made
- 1330 From CG to ComSoPac - If not already arranged request air search dusk tonight

16 August

- 0800 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 151252 have suspended mopping up operations period desire resume if you advise X 3 PBY, anchorage available Tulagi Harbor today
- 0822 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Your 151178 retain Battery Easy and alligators but be prepared move remainder CT2 when coverage available



~~SECRET~~  
ANNEX E (CONT)

- 0830 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Mopping up operations conducted this date at Halavo Port Purvis and Bungana Islands no Japs encountered X Large dump aviation gasoline at Halavo period PBY over Bavutu 17 patrols went to Harora 1st night rescued 1 marine from Quincy under care of natives X Natives delivered 3 prisoners to Port Purvis patrol promise delivery more X Heavy explosions heard direction Savo Island PBY landed 1900
- 0950 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Continue mopping up operations
- 1325 1st Eng Bn to CG - Duds disposed of 8" shell in C Co area Eng Bn  
8" shell in CP of 1st Eng Bn 5th Mar  
6 shells 5" in 5th Marines area  
1 shell 5" in 5th Marines Reg't CP  
8" shell in O Btry 5th Bn 11th Marines  
8" shell in 3rd Defense Bn  
In 3rd (3 shells 5" in 3rd Defense Bn  
Bn 1st -: 1 Aerial bomb 100#  
Mar area (8 Japanese 3" shells  
in 1st -(4 shells 5" - 12 incendiaries  
Mar Dump  
near hosp+ " " " " " "  
ital  
Air port-(15 5" duds  
vicinity  
near water purification  
Lunga -(1 Aerial bomb 100#  
River
- 1410 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - My 152000 marine reported is Pfc Joseph William Hilz Jr. Serial No 302750 X Not injured X Father Joseph Hilz, 5 Main Street, Hamilton Ohio Firebaugh deliver condition excellent /k
- 1915 From 1st Bn 5th Marines to CG - Occupied assigned position at 1700 CP at M523289 No wire communications
- 2130 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Has CP secured
- 2130 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Florida Island operations resumed X PBY arrived 1735 we have established communication with Australian coast watchers
- 2230 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - PBY damaged replacement 11 landed X Unable return tomorrow X Lt. Reister pilot requests report ComAirSoPac X Pilot delivered letter addressed you from ComAirSoPac period Reference landing group reserve of Bauer John Hart etc This letter stated probably 18th X APD probably bring you another letter

2230 (cont)

and certain key personnel X Suggest you then send for letter we have X PBV anchorage and fuel available here

17 August

- 0650 From CG to ComSoPac - PBV damaged X Reister pilot reports unable return this date X No parts requested X Letter not received X No mail service between Ringbolt and Cactus X Request mail for Cactus be dropped on airfield
- 0730 From CG to 1st Bn 1st Marines - Push out patrols today X Meet me at Battery Inter position at 0900 this day
- 1045 From Dog Batry Off to CG - Seaplane unidentified bearing S from W
- 1500 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Request you give us current coast watchers code words if available X Otherwise request you obtain by dispatch from Roses and inform us
- 1650 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - There is no coast watcher on Florida X District Officer is here X He warns to be very careful in dealings with George Begasi
- 1750 Two APDs arrived off Beach Red (Oral)
- 2015 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Have your visitor examine captured avgas to determine if suitable for PBV also inform him to report to COMAIRSOPAC whether means available to improvise refueling of PBVs
- 2320 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - My 171400 you 171710 we have located call signs frequency all coast stations in Solomons listen but unable decode without present key word request this be furnished earliest opportunity for direct communications and information this source X No connection man you men or other watchers Florida Islands
- 2320 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Vlva Point discovered held red dummy 2 inch gun emplacement Killed 4 Japs 6 others escaped unarmed X 356 arms and ammunition destroyed X PBV landed 1735 searched 100 miles west No results PBV will drop letter you command post morning 18 August display panels

Air field on Guadalcanal designated as Henderson Field by CG

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ANNEX E (CONT)

18 August

- 0815 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 172040 affirmative entire message X Drums marked shell 90 X Undoubtedly used their planes X Actual test desired but no facilities
- 1025 Extracts from Asst Div Comdr to CG - We raided TANAVOLA POINT (SANDFLY PASSAGE) complete surprise X About 10 Japs there killed 4 and 6 got away X Dummy gun emplacement, gasoline and camp destroyed X Radio set and 2 boats captured X One platoon on way to EAST POINT X Company A Raider pursuing 50 Japs to interior X Natives very friendly have been rewarded for bringing in information
- 1137 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Your one seven one nine two one X Within few days expect send you a district officer with radio and codes X Local authorities here consider that most workable scheme X Mac Kensie wished Horton, Waddell and Josselyn here X Do not send them as long as they are of value to you
- 1300 Eight enemy bombers flew over and scored one hit on the airfield also on five drums of avgas One hit was scored on an enemy plane Dropped 16 bombs varying from 300 to 2000 lbs. Three small bomb hits in runway two large, bomb hits along side of runway X Damage slight X Four personnel slightly wounded and one killed
- 1710 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Did you find radio equipment X If affirmative what communication have you had concerning it
- 1855 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Information received from CTF62 indicates attack on Cactus Ringbolt Area possible within next forty eight hours
- 2000 Submarine shelled Guadalcanal and fired approximately 20 shells No Damage

19 August

- 0615 Several destroyers shelled Guadalcanal without much damage X Firing continued for approximately an hour
- 0625 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Three unidentified ships passing Savo Island toward Guadalcanal
- 0643 From Captain Neal NOB to CG - Destroyer moving fast seems to be bearing 40° from Kukum moving west to east parallel to south coast of Florida Island X Firing from foremost turret (Oral)

~~SECRET~~  
ANNEXE (CONT)

0755 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Report size of enemy force your area

0830 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Your 0810 none

0843 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Enemy vessels appeared to be bombarding Tulagi at 0700 X Was this the case if so what damage was done

1025 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - At 0700 observed hostile destroyers firing on Guadalcanal one destroyer then attacked Higgins boat and killed or captured occupants midway Guadalcanal-Tulagi X 0850 same destroyer fired on targets opportunity this area/k

1034 From Special Weapons Bn to CG - Observation Plane reported dropping supplies to enemy on beach

1300 From Air Lookout Station to CG - Four motored plane overhead is friendly bomber

1312 From D-2 to CG - R-2 11th Marines reports approximately 20 men in dugout waving white flag vicinity of Mataniko River From Comm Off 11th Marines

1312 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Request shift primary frequency from 3807 to 2820 for Assistant Division Net X Much interference Major Enright

1345 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - No Radar equipment found here

1505 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Observe float biplane your area X Request information whether friendly

1505 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Your 191500 hostile

1525 From D-2 to CG - 5th Marines have control of village awaiting boats X Short of ammunition have some wounded X R-3 11th Marines will land and pick up wounded unless ordered otherwise

1530 From D-2 to CG - R-0 reports one Jap destroyer proceeding east along coast of Tulagi

1540 From D-2 to CG - L Co holding beach at village (From R-2 5th Marines via D-2)

1725 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Alhena arrives ringbolt 22 August make arrangements unload her expeditiously as possible

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ANNEX E (CONT)

2126 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Patrol to east point reported Jap outpost evacuated X Rations on hand will last ten days on half rations

20 August

0755 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Enemy destroyer southeast of Tulagi shelled Chinese quarters and Gov't Wharf area X Suggest Button be notified send 114 B17 bombing planes to destroy craft

0810 From CG to ComAirSoPac - Tulagi being shelled by hostile destroyer (Cancelled)

1130 From CG to All Units - (Less Tulagi Group) D-2 Section Map #101, 18 Aug 42, 1/20,000 has been distributed to all organizations X It will be used exclusively for operations in the LUNGA-TENARU Area

1145 From CG to All Units - (Less Tulagi Group) All officers and noncommissioned officers leading patrols will be instructed that any enemy material falling into their hands and which cannot be transported to camp will be destroyed. A patrol in contact with the enemy on 19 August was suddenly charged with bayonet by the hostile firing line. This is a favorite Japanese tactic and all personnel will be warned concerning it

1155 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - My 0800 1 dead and 3 wounded

1155 From Asst Div Comdr to CG - Raider Company returned from Florida Island patrol contact negligible reports indicate hostile force poorly equipped and scattered X My 0650 destroyer departed no casualties

1325 From CG to ComAirSoPac - Your 192121 DD shelled Ringbolt 0800 not now in sight X Enemy DD observed vicinity Lengo Channel yesterday but no indications of mine laying

2105 From CG to Asst Div Comdr - Our planes arrived today (Grummanns and Dive Bombers)

ANNEX F

INTELLIGENCE  
PHASE III

On the morning of 10 August the division CP was moved to a point between the western end of the airdrome and the Lunga River. Here in a well sheltered position placed centrally in the defense scheme, the division CP stayed during the entire operation except for the short period in September when it was moved south of the airfield.

On the 10th too, the first representatives of the natives, led by one Vouza, retired, but for twelve years a sergeant major of native police on Tulagi, made their appearance at the CP. They had brought in an aviator from the Saratoga who had crashed behind Koli on the seventh. Vouza and his men offered their services, as scouts and guides, in any way they could be of use to help round up and fight the Japanese on the island. That day the order was sent to all divisional units that Solomon Islands natives were to be treated as friends and as covered by orders. They were to be admitted with their information during daylight hours and granted passage to division headquarters.

From the first, relations of the utmost friendliness were maintained between the Marines and the natives, a sharp contrast with the previous relations between the natives and the Japanese which was continually manifest by the aid given to our forces by the natives in all subsequent operations.

The periodic report covering the first twenty-four hours of the phase follows:

From: 0000, 10Aug42  
To : 2400, 10Aug42  
1st Marine Division  
North Coast Guadalcanal (M320360)

1. Enemy situation at end of period:

Further penetration into inland bush areas by our patrols yielded information concerning location of scattered enemy dugouts and bombproof shelters. Nothing but minor contact with any enemy forces.

2. Enemy operations during period:

Information from friendly natives of the Solomon Islands indicates that there are small enemy forces at VISALE with one AA gun, and a small force estimated at 10 or 12 in the

ANNEX F (CONT)

vicinity of TAIVU. It is believed main enemy strength is concentrated in the area South of the area occupied by the First Marine Division.

At 1250 twenty enemy bombers accompanied by 14 fighters passed over our area. No bombs were dropped. At 1325 four low-flying enemy Zero fighters dropped "belly" fuel tanks and 2 white parachutes with tubes attached. These landed in woods behind our positions and in the water off Kukum, none being recovered. No damage or casualties were inflicted by these planes.

A submarine was reported in the channel between Tulagi and Guadalcanal. Confirmed later by sighting when fully awash.

3. Miscellaneous:

No new prisoners of war reported. Two enemy killed by patrol from 5th Regiment West of Kukum.

4. Capabilities of the enemy:

The enemy is being given additional time to consolidate and reorganize for attacks during night or early morning hours. It is not believed that enemy forces now on Guadalcanal have sufficient strength or variety of weapons to stage effective daylight attacks on our forces.

The events of the following day, August 11th, are covered in the next periodic report:

From: 0000, 11Aug42  
To : 2400, 11Aug42  
1st Marine Division  
North Coast Guadalcanal.

1. Enemy situation at end of period:

No change since 10 August. No contact with any enemy units or new information regarding location of enemy forces or installations.

Enemy activity increasing in Rabaul area.

2. Enemy operations during period:

No operations reported of enemy land forces on Guadalcanal.

At 1355, six enemy planes, reported to be three fighters and three reconnaissance planes, flew over area.

There were further reports, from 5th Marines observation posts, of SS periscopes sighted during the day, and of signal lights, believed to be possible destroyer signals, seen several miles offshore from Kukum during the night.

ANNEX F (CONT)

3. Miscellaneous:

Two enemy prisoners reported. No enemy casualties reported.

4. Enemy Capabilities:

See report of 10 August.

To these details should be added the following message sent out by Colonel Goettge at 1045:

Request CTF62 info Comsopac daily reconnaissance and report enemy activities Solomons, especially number and types ships Rekata Bay, Rabaul and SE.

Reply was received from Comsopac at 0849/12:

Estimate of orange surface strength in Bismarck-Bougainville area 10 August: 7 possibly 8 cruisers, 10 to 12 destroyers, 1 seaplane tender, 5 XAVs, 8 APs, 6 AKs, 10 smaller merchant ships, about 30 small combat vessels and 12 subs. Air forces increased and more coming to area. Carriers indicated as still in home waters. No report of any activity Rekata at present.

Request and reply show some vagueness on our part as to the centers of enemy activity in the Solomons area. Our interest in Rekata on the North Coast of Isabel was perhaps out of proportion with the present development of that strong point, as was our concern over Kieta on the North Coast of Bougainville: Gizo in the New Georgia group was to assume far more immediate importance. And while enemy bombing missions were evidently based on Rabaul, the shipping concentrations which affected our theater of war were gathered, as we came to realize only too well, in the Faisi-Buin-Tonolei area, Southeast Bougainville, with Imperial Japanese Navy headquarters at Shortland.

A system of passwords set up in five day groups by the intelligence section was inaugurated on the 12th. These were devised as tongue twisters for the Japanese by the senior interpreter.

The events leading up to Colonel Goettge's patrol culminated on the 12th with the information from a Japanese prisoner, part of the former naval garrison force at Lunga Point, that there were more of his fellows across the Matanikau who might be induced



to surrender. Humanitarian reasons argued also the advisability of letting the labor troops know that their surrender meant food and fair treatment, for at this time many were still wandering, starving and sick through the jungle outside the defense perimeter. The enemy was known to be present in force beyond the Matanikau, and a patrol report on the 12th had mentioned a white flag displayed by Japanese dug in across the river. Later events and knowledge make it fairly obvious that this was not a signal for surrender or parley, but merely a Japanese infantry flag, probably so displayed that the red ball center was not visible from a distance.

Accordingly the patrol was organized, attained a strength of twenty-five, including four officers, and, led by Colonel Goettge, departed from Kukum in a Higgins boat at about 1800. It landed at a point between the Matanikau and Point Cruz, met with heavy opposition, and only three Marines escaped. The bodies of the patrol were never recovered and all but the three survivors were listed as Missing in Action.

The situation report for 12 August, last to be put out in that form by the intelligence section, follows:

From: 0000, 12Aug42  
To: 2400, 12Aug42  
1st Marine Division  
North Coast Guadalcanal

1. Enemy situation at end of period:

Minor contact only made with scattered enemy units and snipers. Our own reconnaissance patrol of 25 officers and men reported to have encountered machine gun fire and strong local opposition at approximately 2200 upon landing at a point about 4 miles West of Kukum. Three members of this patrol who returned reported severe casualties suffered by our patrol.

2. Enemy operations during period:

At 1215, three enemy planes dropped bombs in the woods to the West of the area occupied by the 1st Mar Div forces. No damage or casualties suffered. Signal flashes and lights West of Kukum observed during the night.

3. Miscellaneous:

32 prisoners captured. Unknown number of enemy casualties.

4. Enemy Capabilities:

Enemy forces in the inland areas to the South and those

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ANNEX F (CONT)

believed to be encamped close to shore approximately five miles West of Kukum, are still believed to be too few and without coordinated organization to carry out any forceful attack on our forces. Infiltration of snipers and small enemy patrols during hours of darkness, for the purpose of harassing our outpost positions, appears to be the only course open to enemy land forces on this part of Guadalcanal.

On 14 August the Intelligence section was taken over by Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Buckley, formerly of the 11th Marines.

The evening after Colonel Buckley joined the section the first white man to emerge from the bush came through the lines, and division was made acquainted with the man who had reported to allied headquarters Japanese activities on Guadalcanal since the enemy landing in June. This was Captain W.F.M. Clemens, former district officer for Guadalcanal commissioned for wartime service in the British Solomon Islands Defense Force. When the Japanese had come down to Tulagi and sent men to Guadalcanal, he had withdrawn to the bush with radio equipment and stores, secreted his schooner at Marau Sound, and by means of native scouts and personal observation had kept allied headquarters in the Pacific advised of the situation on the island.

Captain Clemens immediately set about organizing an additional information service from not only his own constabulary service of 18 men but also from all able-bodied natives on the island, who acted generally as spies.

The Coastwatcher system of which Clemens was a part extended throughout the Solomon and New Georgia Islands, and it was the warnings from the northern stations that later permitted the slow climbing Marine and Naval fighters enough warning to enable them to climb high enough to effectively combat enemy high level bombers. The same stations watched the Japanese return flights and confirmed, usually enlarging, the division estimates of bombers destroyed.

Enemy material captured on the island was so plentiful that it would have taken the division interpreter months or years to read completely through the documents, diaries, and orders found. Accordingly the interpreter threw away from half to two thirds of the data after a rough check and extracted from the remainder what might be useful in operations. Samples of equipment

ANNEX F (CONT)

were boxed and sent to interested higher echelons.

A few days after the arrival of Captain Clemens a system of divisional OPs was established. Increased enemy activity and the numerous conflicting reports by untrained observers in the lower units were the direct cause of this establishment. Changing personnel in the beach defense sectors had been performing the function but because of constant changes in position, assigned watchers from the lower echelons had no opportunity to become well trained in their duties. It was felt that permanently assigned members of the OP teams might prove more satisfactory. The reports from the lower units were not discontinued, but the presence of the OP personnel provided a quick and useful means of checking on all sightings. The two divisional OPs were so placed as to allow a maximum of visibility possible from the marine held area of the coast.

The making of a new useful map of the island was immediately projected after the section arrived at its permanent location. For this purpose photographs of the Lunga area and area westward were requested of COMSOPAC. Meanwhile a colored surveyor's map of Lever's holdings from Tenevatu to Matanikau and inland was recaptured from the Japanese. This was traced at Colonel Goettge's direction and blown up to scale of 1/10,000 for infantry purposes, showing fields of fire, with additional details of terrain, including the present road system obtained from the pioneer battalion. It was completed for lithographical purposes at the time of the Goettge patrol. It was not used, however, outside of division headquarters, as with the arrival of Colonel Buckley on 14 August, first fresh aerial photographs of the area as of 2 August were received from COMSOPAC and a second map project was undertaken, using these photographs.

The pictures consisted of an aerial mosaic on a scale of 1/20,000 mounted on plywood. This was flown in by PBY and delivered to D-3. From it an accurate tracing was made and turned over to the 11th Marines to be gridded for artillery purposes. Certain additions were made and a 1,000 yard grid system imposed, and the tracing was turned back to the division intelligence section's photo-litho unit for reproduction. This new map, Map #101 went into effect for all units as of noon, 20 August.

At the same time as the new map of the Lunga area went into effect, a second general reference map of the island of Guad-

ANNEX F (CONT)

alcanal was issued by the Intelligence section to replace the 3 sheet Guadalcanal, 16 July, 1942, prepared in Wellington from an admiralty chart. Captain Clemens brought in with him on 15 August a copy of a district map with his own corrections and additions, particularly in the matter of place names, and showing the principal native trails. This was most useful as a reference, particularly when Coast watcher reports from the stations of Guadalcanal started to come in mentioning activity at villages and points not on any other map. Captain Clemen's map was copied and reproduced by the photo-litho unit and distributed as Map #102.

Continuous contacts and sightings of enemy surface and aircraft kept the section busy checking and relaying reports. Two important land engagements of the period were, however the first action on the Matanikau which happened on 19 August and the encounter of Captain Brush's patrol with the Japanese scouting party near Koli Point,

The first of these occurrences proved the contention that the remnants of the Japanese Lunga Point garrison had been established in strength around Matanikau village. The second was a much more important contact, as it established the fact for the first time since the opening of the campaign that enemy forces not on the island at the time of the landing on 7 August were now landed or going to be landed in the near future.

On 20 August the division's attached air arm made its first appearance in the form of a squadron of Marine Grumman fighters (F4F4s) and a squadron of Marine dive bombers (SBDs). From the point of view of intelligence this meant that the section now had the means of extending its enemy information sources very materially by aerial observation.

## ANNEX G

### ARTILLERY PHASE III

During this phase the artillery units occupied defensive positions south of Henderson Field, prepared to support the 1st and 5th Marines in defense of Lunga Point. The 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines (less Btry "E") was in direct support of the 5th Marines, the 3rd Battalion 11th Marines was in direct support of the 1st Marines, and the 5th Battalion 11th Marines was in general support. Special Weapons Battery, 11th Marines, was broken up and assigned to Special Weapons Battalion and to weapons companies of the infantry regiments.

Positions were prepared for defense, with guns dug in and ammunition protected. Alternate positions to cover adjacent sectors were selected and prepared. Survey was instituted and a map prepared. Local defense of battery positions was prepared, and patrolling to the south of the artillery area instituted. During this phase no infantry protection was available south of the artillery position area, and the artillery was organized as part of the perimeter defense. This is an expedient of questionable virtue. While it is necessary for the artillery to be prepared to furnish its own local defense, it is not possible to use the artillery as infantry and still obtain satisfactory artillery support. The infantry must furnish protection to artillery positions.

The most serious problem of this phase, other than the lack of infantry protection in rear of artillery positions, was the lack of maps and map making equipment. For accurate artillery fire maps are a necessity. The topographic sections of artillery regimental and division headquarters should be developed and trained in map making, and provisions should be made for satisfactory photographic assistance. The aerial photographic facilities at Guadalcanal were not adequate. Wide angle photos are the only practicable substitutes for proper maps.

Defense operations during this phase were limited to sporadic infantry activity in defense of batter areas, and a few rounds fired at a Japanese submarine on 14 August.

Offensive operations were limited to support of Colonel Whaling's patrol attacking Matanikau village on 19 August. 2nd, 3rd and 5th Battalions all participated. Observation was from Hig-

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ANNEX G (CONT)

gins boat operating off Matanikau village. Batteries were registered on 18 August by observer in Higgins boat, and preparation of 10 rounds per piece fired on time schedule. Communication was by radio, and fire control followed normal F.D.C. procedure.

Ammunition expended was 240 rounds of 75mm howitzers and 200 rounds of 105mm howitzers.

ANNEX G (2) ~~SECRET~~

ANNEX H

MEDICAL  
PHASE III

Phase III - August 10 to August 20, 1942 was devoted to organizing the Lunga Point defenses. During this period of comparative quiet on Guadalcanal the medical sections of the Division were able to set up in positions which were maintained throughout the operation, with only a few minor changes.

"B" Company, First Medical Battalion occupied and improved the wooden buildings northeast of the airport and D plus 3 day had a functioning Division Field Hospital. H&S Co., First Medical Battalion utilized a portion of one of these buildings as a headquarters and record section. "E" Company, First Medical Battalion was functioning as a tent hospital about five hundred yards east of the Division Field Hospital. "A" Company, First Medical Battalion was set up as a tent hospital in the same area but contemplating an early change of position to better cover the area west of the Lunga River. The Division Command Post was established near the northwest corner of the airfield and from this point the Division Surgeon was able to organize and advise the units under his command.

In the early part of this phase of the operation, there were almost no enemy contacts, patrolling was limited, and casualties were few. The battalion, regimental and supporting medical sections, "dug in" literally. Foxholes were dug for emergency occupation while air raid shelters were constructed for patients and personnel. Valuable supplies were placed underground and emergency water and rations were made available in these areas.

Reserve and working supplies, now in the hands of the Division Medical Supply Officer, (all supplies were pooled at the beach line), were distributed in two large depots about one mile apart. One of these was in the area occupied by the Division Field Hospital and the second was west of the Lunga River in the Fifth Regiment area. Each larger depot was again divided into seven approximately equal, small, subdivisions dispersed over a wide area and protected by canvas. The most valuable drugs, such as quinine, atabrine, and sulfonamides were placed in air raid shelters well underground. Within a few days, all issues of medical supplies came from these supply depots by way of H&S Company, supply section. Pharmaceuticals were prepared and issued by "B" Company, First Medical Battalion, at the Division Field Hospital. August 12, 1942, the first boat left Guadalcanal for Tulagi, and with it supplies of quinine, sulfa drugs, and dressings requested

ANNEX H (CONT)

from that area.

The medical sections of the Division were established in what was to be permanent positions, with the exception of "A" Company, First Medical Battalion, to handle two hundred and fifty (250) bed patients and twice as many ambulatory cases. Messing facilities were adequate, field sanitation established, and inspection of the areas underway.

Sanitation of the areas was a tremendous problem. The enemy had apparently been completely surprised by the attack. Food remained in dishes and kitchen utensils; clothing was thrown about in a frantic attempt to take those things that would be useful in living in the bush. Naval gunfire and bombing from the air had cut down trees, dug holes below the level of the water table, and equipment of all kinds had been thrown over the areas. Since this could not be burned (due to frequent air raids), the problem of disposing of this tremendous quantity of rubbish was an impossible one for the present. Neither the time nor personnel was immediately available to bury or otherwise adequately dispose of this waste material. All enemy facilities for the disposal of human excreta were destroyed and new fly proof latrines were constructed from lumber captured from the enemy.

For the first five days all water came from local supply sources, chiefly the Lunga River. This was chlorinated from stock solutions made up fresh and water tank or tank cart was individually treated. This was done by medical personnel either at the source or in some instances at individual sick bays; through which all water for the area was routed. At no time was there any evidence that this method was not adequate and at no time during the operation was there any water borne epidemic. On the twelfth of August a portable filtration chlorination plant was set up on the west bank of the Lunga. Although its capacity was supposed to be limited to 6,000 gallons daily, it was possible to make 12,000 gallons of clear water with a chlorine content of 1 to 1.5 parts per million. From that day all drinking water in the Division originated from this type of plant (additional plants were set up later).

Constant patrolling, shelling from the sea (probably submarine), and repeated bombings resulted in some casualties. These were all given emergency treatment and dressings at the site of the injury. Corpsmen accompanied all patrols and a medical officer or officers accompanied any patrols of over two companies.



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ANNEX H (CONT)

From the initial landing to 2400 August 20, 1942, 172 patients were admitted to the Division Field Hospital, 78 to "E" Medical Company, and 12 to "A" Medical Company, from the First Marine Division. Two patients were evacuated by plane but the regular evacuation of casualties by air did not begin until September 3, 1942, some two weeks later.

In addition to their functions as a tent hospital, "E" Medical Company, held sick call and cared for the sick and wounded among the captured enemy personnel. A small hospital was established in the region of the old Tenarau enemy camp and staffed by three hospital corpsmen. Patients were seen daily by a medical officer. At times this hospital ran a census as high 28 patients. Surgery was done where indicated and prisoner patients were fed from "E" Company mess three times daily.

Casualties among the enemy prisoners differed from Marine casualties in the longer duration and greater contamination of their wounds before treatment. Many were brought in with grossly contaminated, maggot-filled, wounds. At first these were cleaned up but better results were obtained by returning to the old idea of allowing the maggots to remain in the wounds. Results justified the procedure.

From the time of the initial landing the problem of transportation of casualties was apparent. Six ambulances got ashore and on the fourth day these were assigned to the First and Fifth regiments and medical companies. The Division Field Hospital retained two ambulances as an emergency measure.

August 19, 1942, the first action of the Matanikao resulted in fifteen casualties; 4 dead, 1 missing, and 10 wounded. These were evacuated by ramp and Higgins boat to the beach at Kukum and then by ambulance to the Division Field Hospital. This original plan was to be used later on other occasions and proved to be a safe and comfortable mode of transfer from the combat area.

At the termination of this phase of the operation the first planes to be based on Guadalcanal arrived. A defensive area around Henderson Field had been set up. Patrols and the first battle of the Matanikao had initiated all medical sections in the care of combat casualties. One medical officer had been declared missing in action after the Goettge patrol. Real action was to begin shortly in the defense of the Tenaru sector.

ANNEX H (CONT)

The Tulagi experience differed only in the duration of the first action. Not until August 11, 1942, four days after the initial landing was mopping up completed and the Tulagi area entirely in our hands. Casualties received after the departure of friendly transports on the evening of August 9, 1942 were small in number and were treated by "A" Company, Second Medical Battalion which had established a hospital in the prison on Tulagi, later moved to an area better protected from naval gunfire.

The lack of necessity for having extensive patrol operations and relative immunity to naval gunfire and bombing from the air contributed to the small number of casualties after the initial action.

Water supply was a real problem as the area was too small to develop large streams. This lack of water became a real hardship and personal hygiene suffered as a result. Water for human consumption was obtained in limited amounts from wells and springs, both enemy and English in construction and from rainwater collected from the roofs of several buildings, chlorinated by hand and issued under guard.

The sanitary problem on Tulagi was complicated by the comparatively large number of troops employed in this small island. Burial of the dead, was a much greater problem for constant sniper fire made progress slow and dangerous. By the end of the first week this had been accomplished, and enemy as well as our own troops had been safely and respectfully buried.

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX I

FIRST MARINES, FIRST MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE.

"HISTORY OF THE FIRST MARINE REGIMENT"

PHASE III  
(10 August--20 August)

On 10 August, the Second and Third Battalions began digging in within their respective sectors with salvaged barbed wire, primary, alternate and dummy emplacements. As each day passed by, positions were improved.

Enemy patrols infiltrated at night down the Tenaru River. A night defense line was established by the Second Battalion at the headwaters of the west branch of the Tenaru in order to check the enemy harrassing.

On 16 August a defense line was set up along the west bank of the Tenaru River in preparation for a possible enemy attack from the east. The defense line connected with the First Battalion which, still under Division control, had been ordered into position along the headwaters of the Tenaru on 15 August. By 18 August, fields of fire had been cleared, emplacements dug, barbed wire layed and the defense line along the Tenaru was completed and manned.

A reserve line was dug running north and south across the field west of and approximately 600 yards behind the Second Battalion defense line along the Tenaru River. This reserve line approximately 400 yards long was to be manned on order from Colonel Gates by a company of the Third Battalion.

A Regimental Intelligence Observation Post was established on the point at the mouth of the Tenaru River. A Second Battalion Intelligence Observation Post was set up on the beach 200 yards west of the mouth of the Tenaru. The Third Battalion also established a similar Observation Post on the beach in their sector.

On 18 August a patrol from A Company, First Battalion, under Captain Brush, surprised and annihilated a Japanese reconnaissance patrol of 18 men and officers in the vicinity east of Beach Red. The enemy patrol was well supplied with maps, radios

~~SECRET~~

and other reconnaissance equipment. It was deduced that the Japanese patrol was on a Reconnaissance mission in advance of an attacking force.

Japanese infiltration at night by small groups necessitated all-around security for each and every unit. The purpose of these enemy harrasing patrols seemed to be to create general confusion, keep us awake during the night, cause us to waste ammunition and divulge the positions of our automatic weapons. Alert outposts, all-around security per unit, not firing a shot during the night unless absolutely necessary, and vigorous patrolling against the enemy during the daytime, proved to be successful means to frustrate the enemy's patrol efforts.

Already the enemy had shown his tendency to work under cover of darkness, though this did not mean that security slackened off during daylight hours.

The most effective type of outposts were the two-men-listening-posts in foxholes with one man on the alert and the other asleep. In order to meet the constant threat of night attacks the men, as well as those who manned the listening posts established beyond the lines at night, lived in their two-man foxholes. This eased the psychological strain on the men and contribute toward greater combat efficiency. Handgrenades, arms, field rations and full canteens of water were kept in the holes at all times to cope with any emergency.

Standing double foxholes with overhead cover with an ample opening from which to throw grenades and an accessable exit for hand to hand combat greatly strengthened our defensive positions. Machine gun emplacements were constructed with a pit in front, wide and deep enough to catch rolling handgrenades, exploding them harmlessly.

ANNEX J

GDG/eas

FIFTH MARINES, FIRST MARINE DIVISION,  
FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
C/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

February 26, 1943.

RECORD OF EVENTS - 10 August, 1942 to 20 August, 1942.

August 10, 1942 -

Position from Lunga to Kukum strengthened. Regt'l Hdqs and the 1st Bn sent patrols along the beach southwest of Kukum and to the area South to Southwest. Combined patrol of Regt'l Hdqs and Co A, reinforced, met an enemy patrol about 5 miles Southwest of Kukum. Two Japanese were killed and several were wounded. 2nd Lt. J.J. Gately, Pvt. H.J. Doyle and Pvt. G.H. Gallant of A-1-5 were wounded and evacuated to the Division Field Hospital. At 1000 a patrol from L-5 brought in Lt. James J. Sutherland, U.S.N. of Fighter Squadron Five whose plane had been set afire in a dog fight at 2 P.M., August 7. He reported he had bailed out and landed along the beach and that he was picked up and well cared for by natives who had finally brought him in. He reported that the natives were friendly and did not like the Japs. Natives were hired to bring in several other white men known to be in the bush and who are expected to return Thursday.

August 11, 1942 -

Extended and consolidated all positions. Two companies of the 3rd Bn rejoined the Regiment, taking up a position on the left of the 1st Bn area, 1000 yards west of Kukum. Units continued patrolling adjacent areas. Two prisoners were captured. One captured by the 1st Bn threw his clothing at the patrol, and jumped into the river where he was killed while trying to escape. The one caught by the patrol from Hdqs, 5th was sent to Division Hdqs.

August 12, 1942 -

All positions extended and consolidated. Patrols sent out from Hdqs, 5th, 1st Bn, and 3rd Bn captured 18 prisoners.

A Division patrol with Col. Goettge in charge, Lt Comdr Pratt, Capt Ringer, 1st Lt Corey, Pl Sgt Caltrider, Pl Sgt Few,

ANNEX J (CONT)

Sgt Arndt, Sgt Stauffer, Sgt Stanfill, Cpl Bainbridge, Cpl Geizer, Cpl Kowal, Cpl Lyons, Cpl Raht, Cpl Sordula, Pfc Gauntt, Pvt Kelly, and Pvt Lovelace of 5th Marines Hdqs left the Regt'l C.P. at about 1800. At about 2100 word was received from the 1st Bn, 5th that signal shots were being fired from the location where the patrol landed.

At 2100 word was received from Division that starting 13 Aug only 2 meals would be served daily.

August 15, 1942 -

At 0500 the Division area was shelled by naval gunfire (submarine or destroyer) for about 10 minutes. No damage was done. At 0530 Sgt Arndt returned from Intelligence Patrol by swimming along the beach. He reported that Col Goettge had been killed when his patrol landed. The rest of the patrol, he reported, was fighting on the edge of the jungle about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles down the beach. He reported that the patrol landed on the beach at 2200 and that they encountered the enemy at 2215. Sgt Arndt was ordered by Capt Ringer to return at 2230.

Co "A", 1st Bn, was ordered to proceed by boat and contact the enemy. They left Kukum at 0650 with Capt Kaempfer in command. At 0725 Sgt J.W. Spaulding, D-2 Section runner returned from the patrol. He reported that he left the patrol at 0100 and that Lt Corey, Dr. Pratt and several of the men were wounded when he left. He stated that he had passed a Japanese camp on the way that would hold 300 troops.

At 0800 Pl Sgt Few returned (wounded) from the patrol and he reported that all of the patrol had been killed when he left and that he had fought his way back to camp. At 1010 a message was received from Capt Kaempfer that he had landed about 10 miles from Kukum. At 1045 shell fire was received in "C" Co area (Lunga Delta) from a submarine. The submarine submerged after 10 rounds when D Co fired at it with a captured 3 inch shore gun.

At 1145 Col Whaling with two platoons of "L" Co, 3rd Bn plus 1 section of Light Machine Guns, left by boat to reinforce Capt Kaempfer and contact the enemy. Both units were in contact with camp by radio (TBX). At 1645 received a message from Col Whaling that he was unable to locate any signs on beach of Col Goettge's patrol and that he was returning to the north of the Matanikau River and was going to work back to the river and Japanese Camp.

At 1650 the Regt'l area was shelled by a submarine. The fire was returned by the 1st Bn 3 inch guns and the Weapon's Co half track 75mm guns. One direct hit forced the submarine to crash dive.

ANNEX J (2)

ANNEX J (CONT)

At 1655 received word from Col Whaling that his patrol was moving on Japs but that he might return to camp late at night. At 1660 a small patrol returned bringing 4 prisoners sent by Col Whaling. At 1800 rifle fire was heard to the southwest, believed to be Col Whaling in contact with the enemy. At 1930 Capt Kaempfer returned with A-1-5 and reported he had been ordered to advance westward on Jap Camp along beach while Col Whaling cut his way through the jungle to the rear of the Jap Camp. Both patrols started back to camp at 1700. It was found that the enemy had fortified both sides of the river. As it was then about dark, the order to withdraw had been given and the patrol had returned to camp. About 15 Japs were killed and others were wounded. As soon as Capt Kaempfer reported, plans were made for continuing the attack as soon as Col Whaling returned with the other half of the patrol.

August 14, 1942 -

At 0235 the Camp was awakened by a slight earthquake. No damage was done. At 1110 received word that enemy planes were approaching. At 1115 were bombed by enemy planes, one of which was shot down by AA fire. At 1220 Col Whaling returned with his patrol and reported that the patrol had cut its way almost to the Matanikau River and had spent all of the night and part of the following morning there. Some contact with the enemy was reported and several prisoners were brought in. At 1420 a submarine fired on the camp but it submerged when the D Co 3 inch gun opened up. At 1700 a submarine was sighted moving out to sea, giving off considerable smoke. The rest of the 3rd Bn rejoined the Regiment and took up position on the left of the Regt'l area. 3-5 secured left flank by organizing palm grove and ridge 1500 yards W and SW of Kukum Creek.

August 15, 1942 -

Continued to consolidate all positions. Several submarines sighted off the coast during the day. Three air warnings sounded. One flight of planes bombed Division positions. Four A.P.D.'s arrived bringing aviation ground crew personnel.

August 16, 1942 -

Continued to consolidate all positions. Several submarines reported off the coast.

ANNEX J (CONT)

August 17, 1942 -

Enemy airplanes flew over several times, but dropped no bombs. 2 APD's docked and began unloading. Col Hunt went to Division and received orders to attack enemy entrenched on Matanikau River. Bn Commanders and Co Commanders who will participate were called into Regt'l C.P. for instructions. Plans called for L Company to work its way through jungle to back of enemy positions, B Company to attack along beach starting at the river mouth, and I Company to land near Kokumbona to cut off the enemy if they attempt to retreat along the beach.

August 18, 1942 -

0800 Col Whaling left with L-3-5 to cut their way through jungle to position in back of the enemy. 0930 Artillery started firing on enemy positions near mouth of the Matanikau River. Artillery fired several hundred shells during the day into the Japanese Village and surrounding area. At 1115 were bombed by 8 twin engined planes. At 1400 Capt Hawkins, B-1-5, reinforced, started for the northwest bank of the Matanikau River to be in position to attack by morning. At 2200 enemy naval gunfire fell in regimental area but no damage was done.

August 19, 1942 -

At 0430 Col Whaling left by boats with I-3-5, under Capt Hardy, to land southwest of the Matanikau River and to attack toward the river at about 0900. At 0800 two Jap cruisers and a submarine shelled the beach. At 0830 I-3-5 landed on the beach near Kokumbona, some of the shells from the Jap ships having hit close, but there were no casualties. The landing boats were under machine gun and rifle fire while moving parallel to and landing on the beach. From 0830 to 0900 artillery fired on the village and surrounding area. From 0900 to 1600 L-3-5 fought its way through the jungle and took the Jap village by close rifle and bayonet fighting. B-1-5 was prevented by MG fire from crossing the mouth, but engaged the enemy across the river thereby forcing the enemy to defend his rear as well as his front. There were 65 known enemy dead in or near the village. Many were wounded but escaped into the hills. No prisoners were taken. L-3-5 lost 4 killed, including one officer, all wounded. At about 1600, on orders from Division, L Co. was returned to camp by boat, B Co returning by the beach road. I-3-5 having landed in the morning fought their way against machine gun

ANNEX J (4)



ANNEX J (CONT)

and rifle fire and took the village of Kokumbona, which was occupied by Japanese soldiers. As I Co entered the village, the Japanese took their machine guns and retreated to the hills. I Co on orders from Division, was returned to the Kukum area by boats at about 1700. Total casualties in I-3-5 /: 1 killed.

During the night all guns and defensive stations were manned in expectation of an attempt by the Japanese to retake the Island, but during the night all continued quiet.

August 20, 1942 -

Continued to consolidate all positions. Several enemy planes and one cruiser sighted, but no damage was done.

G. D. CAYLE,  
Capt., U.S.M.C.  
R - 3.

ANNEX K

COMMUNICATIONS  
PHASE III

The tactical organization of the LUNGA POINT defense system required telephone service beyond the materiel capacity of all units. Fortunately Japanese switchboards, telephones, and cable systems were found and placed in operation to augment the regular equipment of units. A standard Air Warning System was placed in effect on 13 August. (Copy Attached). External radio communication established during this period was subject to many delays due to low power of the available portable radio equipment, power supply failures, limited coding facilities and personnel, and overcrowded condition of radio circuit. A Japanese receiving station was placed in operation early in this phase. A Japanese transmitting station was commissioned near the end of the phase after power equipments were found, moved, overhauled, and set up for operation. The higher power of the Japanese transmitters greatly increased external radio communication reliability. Characteristics of the Japanese radio equipment have been reported. During this and following phase progress was made toward placing Japanese radar installations in operation but was suspended.

1990-5-30  
066/293

Headquarters, First Marine Division  
Fleet Marine Force  
C/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

13 August, 1942.

DIVISION CIRCULAR)

: Air Warning System.

NUMBER.....12a-42)

1. Any unit observing approaching aircraft shall immediately report the fact to Division Headquarters by means of an AIR FLASH DIV message. AIR FLASH DIV messages shall be transmitted, with priority over any other calls, by telephone whenever possible, to the TEXAS operator who will make immediate connection to the air lookout (PAGODA) station. In event telephone service is not available the AIR FLASH DIV message shall be transmitted by radio with urgent classification as an AIR FLASH DIV message in the Div Command Net. The words AIR FLASH DIV serve as the call and address. The Div. Warning Net has been discontinued.

2. Division shall send out warnings of impending or actual air attack to units, preferably by telephone, otherwise by radio in the Div Command Net, as a DIV AIR FLASH message. The words DIV AIR FLASH shall serve as the call and

ANNEX K (CONT)

address. Transmissions shall be to all units to which the division switchboard is connected, or which are in the Div Command Net. Units shall take necessary action to pass warnings to subordinate units.

3. AIR FLASH DIV and DIV AIR FLASH messages shall have priority over all circuits, transmissions in progress being interrupted when necessary.

4. The following warning signals shall be used in making AIR FLASH DIV and DIV AIR FLASH reports:

YELLOW - Unidentified aircraft approaching. Gun crews on alert, all personnel not required to continue duties during air raid, take cover.

RED - Enemy aircraft overhead. Open fire when in range.

BLUE - Approaching aircraft identified as friendly aircraft. (Only when positively identified).

GREEN - All clear. Resume normal operations.

5. The above code words shall be preceded by a numeral to indicate the number of planes and followed by numerals to indicate the magnetic bearing from the observers position.

6. Part I, par. E. g5, of SOPCOM 4 is modified accordingly.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

W. C. JAMES  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

O F F I C I A L:

J. C. MURRAY, JR.  
Captain, U.S.M.C.  
Adjutant.

LIBRARY  
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

83 204 84 85 86 87 88 89 204 90 204 91 92 93 94 95 96 204 97

MAP 104  
Sheet 4 of 12 Sheets

MAP 104  
Sheet 5 of 12 Sheets

KOLI POINT  
MALIMBIU RIVER



GAIMALI

MAKILE

TENERU RIVER

BLOCK FOUR RIVER


ILU RIVER






MAP 104  
Sheet 9 of 12 Sheets

MAP 104  
Sheet 8 of 12 Sheets

MAP 104  
Sheet 7 of 12 Sheets






Overlay Showing Storage  
Dumps Established and utilized  
by First Marine Division  
During Phases III, IV, V  
Map Reference D-2 Map 104

Legend

1ST. MARINE DIVISION DUMPS -  
JAPANESE DUMPS - INSTALLATIONS -

- ① Co. Qtrs. Cement, Tires, Eng. Supplies (N.O.B)
- ② Radio (1st. Signal) { Steel
- ③ Cement Compressor (Torpedo) { Lumber
- ④ Rations, Ice { Machines
- ⑤ Hq. (5th. Marine Hq.)
- ⑥ Shops (5th. Marines)
- ⑦ 100 KVA Powerhouses (Cub 1)
- ⑧ Radio (1st. Signal)
- ⑨ Aviation Barracks (Hospital)
- ⑩ Aviation Control (Mar. Air Wing)
- ⑪ Labor Camps & Rations
- ⑫ Aviation Hangars & Shops
- ⑬ Radar ((Incomplete))



SITUATION OVERLAY  
 As of August, 20, 1942  
 Map Reference: D-2 Map 104