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**THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF U.S. BASES IN
POLAND: A POLITICAL-MILITARY ANALYSIS**

by

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MILITARY ANALYSIS**

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ABSTRACT

The present study treats Polish-American bilateral relations in the past and present, with special concern for contemporary themes of armaments. This work seizes upon the author's experience in the U.S. Embassy, Warsaw, as well as scholarly analysis. Together with NATO allies, the United States has begun the fielding of an anti-missile system directed against Iran. By dint of policy and geography, the Republic of Poland's status as one of closest allies to the United States put it at the forefront of the candidates to host the interceptor portion of the system. In addition to the U.S. anti-missile installation, the Polish government wants significant U.S. forces stationed in Poland as a symbol of collective defense. As in other cases of the politics of forward defense in NATO in the past and present, the Poles desire an unshakable commitment to forward defense at a time of strategic retrenchment and shifts in the international system.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BBN	Biuro Bespieczenstwa Narodowego [Polish National Security Bureau]
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BMDS	Ballistic Missile Defense System
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
DoD	Department of Defense
EPAA	European Phased Adaptive Approach
GMD	Ground-based Mid-course Defense
GDPR	Global Defense Posture Review
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles
MDS	Missile Defense System
MON	Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej [Polish Ministry of National Defense]
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PAP	Polska Agencja Prasowa [Polish Press Agency]
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PiS	Prawo I Sprawiedliwosc [Truth and Justice – Polish populist-nationalist political party]
PO	Platforma Obywatelska [Civic Alliance-Polish (two) political party coalition]
SDR	Strategic Defense Review
WP	Wojsko Polskie [Polish Armed Forces]

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“Without freedom of choice there is no creativity.”* The Naval Postgraduate School allows us this freedom, and therefore awakens our creativity. This, in turn, transforms us and enriches us allowing us to share our knowledge and experiences with each other, for “the *whole* is *greater than the sum* of its parts.”**

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* Captain Kirk, "The return of the Archons", stardate 3157.4, <http://iheartquotes.com/tags/kirk?page=2>

** Aristotle, <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/20103-the-whole-is-greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts>

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The present study embodies a case study of bilateral security and defense relations between the U.S. and one of its leading European allies. The work assesses the intersection of domestic politics, the international system, armaments, and trans-Atlantic relations influx during the past decade and a half. How did the ongoing negotiations for deployment of the U.S. missile defense system (MDS) and military personnel, and the creation of military bases in the Republic of Poland affect the politics and policies of Poland and its neighbors? Did the agreement and following reversals of the decision to place American military assets, including MDS, cause any policy changes in Poland, and was there any political fallout associated with the two reversals by the U.S.? What were political, diplomatic and policy consequences of this chain of events over the past four years?

How did Poland's eastern neighbor, the Russian Federation, react to the agreement and subsequent ratification of the plans for MDS and other U.S. military installations in Poland? What were the policy changes and reactions to the U.S.-Poland agreement? How did the U.S. and NATO try to approach the possible discontent of Russia that resulted from proposed MDS and American military installations so close to Russian soil?

What were the results of the shifting U.S. position about the deployment of MDS and American servicemen and women on the territory of Poland? How did the Polish leadership and general population react to these changes and what were perceived reasons for the reversal of this decision? What are the current trends in the U.S.-Poland relationship?

Is the relationship between Poland and the United States as strong as it was at the beginning of the century, before the idea of MDS and U.S. bases in Poland was introduced? What events affected this relationship the most, and were they positive or negative in nature? What is the future direction of these two longtime allies? Will the

MDS and U.S. military presence solidify the relationship, or will it cause a rupture between the United States and Poland?

How did the unforeseen complications caused by the global economic crisis affect the projects of MDS and American military bases in Poland? Is the future of the missile defense and U.S. presence in Poland in question?

This thesis will explore the political and policy implications in various realms created by the proposed MDS and reinforced and deepened by U.S. military basing plans in Poland in the immediate past and present. In addition, it will examine the Polish-American relationship in the past and present, and identify the latest trends caused by proposed U.S. bases and other interactions between these long-time allies. Finally, the regional aspects of the proposed permanent American presence in Poland will be examined to include both political and military implications of the MDS and conventional bases.

Outstanding in connection with the fate of Poland in the cosmos of U.S. defense interests is the theme of missile defense; anti-missile missiles are but a sub-theme in the grander question of trans-Atlantic defense relations and geopolitics in central Europe and beyond. As the global security situation deteriorates and more possible problems and challenges loom in the near future, the importance of national security and protection of the continental United States against threats from intercontinental ballistic missile with nuclear, chemical, or biological payload become a primary concern. The MDS will be the primary means of defense against this threat. The technical aspects of this system are being finalized, and tests assessing its effectiveness are currently being conducted by the United States military. Technical obstacles, which can be overcome with modifications and improvements of equipment, are only a portion of problems facing this project. Diplomatic agreements securing the optimal placement of this defensive weapons system were finalized in 2008, providing for placement of U.S. military bases in central and Eastern Europe. This thesis will address the impact of such a proposed military installation in the Republic of Poland. Despite the assurances of the U.S. government about the benefits of this system and its purely defensive capabilities, many politicians

and citizens of Poland question the need for U.S. bases in their country. The politics of such bases in Polish domestic and international debate, as well as that of the United States amid a reorientation to Asian security, provide a fertile area for inquiry, as does an analysis of leading Polish parties, press, and National Security documents concerned with national defense.

B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

U.S. military bases around the world are a hot topic both domestically and internationally. The very existence of such installations is interpreted, by many, as American expansionism and colonialism. These arguments are being perpetuated by foreign organizations and governments, as well as domestic non-government organizations and many politicians alike. Additionally, the global financial crisis is forcing the U.S. government and military to evaluate the cost and justification for overseas bases.

Given the current situation and attitudes toward overseas bases, the plans for creating additional installations abroad, such as the base in Poland that will be a primary installation for the Missile Defense System, are even more questionable at this time. The greatest justification for this project is the threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles, with nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads, capable of striking the continental United States or Europe from a hostile nation or terrorist organization in the Middle East or Asia. As states such as Iran and North Korea attest, either in possession or close to development of such a weapon, the necessity is evident for a viable defense against this type of threat becomes a priority in the realm of national defense.

Additionally, the concerns of our longtime ally and partner, the Republic of Poland, regarding its own defense and ability to stand up to the potential threat from its eastern neighbors creates a need, as described by Polish military and civilian leadership, for a continuous presence of U.S. military personnel in Poland. This presence will generate additional security assurance for Poland, and by its very existence, create a deterrent to those who might want to challenge its sovereignty.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Polish position toward the proposed U.S. military bases is mostly positive on the political and military level but somewhat mixed among its population. As a fairly new member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Poland is eager to participate in projects, exercises, and military actions alongside its new allies, especially the United States. The question of the Missile Defense System and the required facilities on the territory of Poland became a hot topic between Poland, NATO, the United States, European Union, Russia, and China. The biggest point of contention on the subject exists between the United States and Poland, and its one time Cold War adversary, Russia. In addition, Poland's history of Soviet occupation and the existence of Red Army military bases in the past brings about caution and suspicion among many Poles.

Additionally, the current economic crisis in the United States and in other regions of the world is forcing American policy makers to re-evaluate foreign basing policies and priorities. Many argue that the current number of overseas bases is financially unsustainable, while others add that it is harming America's image, associating it with former imperialist regimes and empires.

In his book "Occupation in the Name of Alliance. The Red Army in Poland 1944-1956,"¹ Mariusz Krogulski describes previously unknown details of secret agreements between the Soviet Union and Communist Poland; despicable acts of Russian officers and troops, and their contribution to the creation of Communist system in Poland; and the elimination of any existing opposition. He describes the abuse and exploitation of Poland and its citizens by the alleged ally. His books cover the time period ending in 1993, the year in which Soviet military forces left Poland, presenting complete picture of the occupation and its socio-political consequences.

In contrast, the books describing the U.S. military overseas base system are concentrated on the national security aspect of the external presence of American military forces as well as the nature of this presence. The initial reasons for the overseas bases

¹ Mariusz Krogulski, *Okupacja w imię sojuszu. Armia Radziecka w Polsce 1956–1993* (Wydawnictwo von borowiecky, 2001)

and evolving motives for the continuous presence are being studied by many authors and scholars in the fields of national security and international relations. Finally, the societal aspects and public reactions to the continuous post of U.S. military personnel in their countries are examined, and an attempt to predict the future of U.S. overseas basing policies is made.

“United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma,”² by James R. Blaker, describes a brief history and overview of the current basing system. Next Blake examines, in detail, the framework of the system and argues that in the future, the importance of the individual base and its location, as pertaining to national security, will diminish and the efficiency of those bases and the ability of this network to deploy and use the military forces will be the most important aspect of the system. He also tries to address possible changes in the future due to advancements in technology, changing geopolitical situation, financial constraints, and other circumstances, but in the end, advocates that in the foreseeable future we will need and use the overseas bases in order to project power and protect national interests.

C. T. Sandars, in his book “America’s Overseas Garrison: The Leasehold Empire,”³ introduces the idea of the leasehold empire as an American substitution for a traditional colonial empire. He addresses the political and social problems as well as the negative image the current overseas base system creates. The negotiations and agreements between the United States and the host countries are the staple of this leasehold empire, and detailed description of those bilateral arrangements is presented. The invitational status of the U.S. military forces is in his opinion the main differentiator between colonialism and the American overseas presence. Sandars also mentions that the increasing demands for the foreign aid, which the U.S. government does not consider “rent” for the above mentioned facilities by the host countries, may jeopardize the future

² James R. Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma* (Praeger Publishers, 1990)

³ Christopher T. Sandars, *Americas Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire* (Oxford University Press Inc., 2000)

existence of those installations. He also discusses the strategic utility of various U.S. bases around the world.

In his book “Base Politics – Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas,”⁴ Alexander Cooley took a more scientific approach to the United States’ global presence. He examined the overall causes for support, indifference, or expulsion of American military bases overseas since World War II. He showed a major correlation between the type of a regime in a country and its relationship toward the U.S. military presence on its territory. Emphasis was placed on internal political situations and transitional political systems as well as the element of unpredictability in the base policies of the host nations. He addresses another major factor affecting the U.S. basing around the world, which is the overall image of America and its international policies. This issue can be directly linked to the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Historically, this is similar to other conflicts involving the United States. According to Cooley this was, is, and will be one of the issues the United States will not have much control over since all military conflicts have a negative stigma attached to them. In closing, he discussed the existing policies of the United States toward host countries and addressed the need for reforms of the American overseas military base policy in correlation with Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR). The new approach he suggests would decrease the physical footprint of new bases while updating their location to reflect the new military and political centers of gravity around the world. This new kind of base would emphasize bilateral security relations and possibly include an economic stimulus in addition to increased military cooperation.

The official government document pertaining to national security and military establishment will be examined for any changes in policy or defense trends caused by the announcement of the intentions of creation of missile defense site and U.S. military bases in Poland and subsequent two reversals of the decision.

⁴ Alexander Cooley, *Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas* (Cornell University Press 2008)

Various reports, studies, and press articles from the United States, the Republic of Poland and the region will present political positions, public opinions, future options, and other aspects of the politics and policies related to the establishment of permanent U.S. military bases in Poland and following decisions to abandon the project, and one more reversals of official position. Subjects such as the enhancement of the Polish military, size and type of the U.S. footprint, Status of Forces Agreement, and Missile Defense System, as well as political impact of such endeavor on the relationship with Russia and other countries in the region will be investigated and presented.

D. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis will review the historical and current information available in official Polish documents, books, studies, and press in order to form a clear and concise view of the past and present attitudes toward foreign bases on the territory of Poland. Additionally, the author will analyze the bilateral relationship between Poland and the United States since the end of the Cold War with emphasis on the period since the announcement of the intentions of the creation of U.S. military bases in Poland.

Government documents pertaining to the national security, defense strategy, and other related subjects will be examined for changes or additions related to the U.S.-Poland agreement's about the MDS and American military presence in Poland.

This thesis will also examine the impact of the announcement of the agreement between the Polish government and the U.S. government creating the base in Poland which will house the Missile Defense System. Special attention will be given to Polish-Russian and U.S.-Russian relations since the aforementioned agreement was signed and ratified by both the U.S. and the Republic of Poland.

The present study emerges from this writer's recent service in U.S. Embassy, Warsaw as well as in the interest of strategic studies focused on salient issues of policy germane to Polish-U.S. relations, which in the year 2012 have lost some of the shine that adhered to them just a few years ago.

E. **THESIS OVERVIEW**

This thesis is organized into nine chapters which examine the history of American overseas bases, foreign military presence on territory of Poland, contemporary issues associated with proposed presence of U.S. military in Poland as well as politics and policy implication of such presence. The regional implications with emphasis on Poland-Russia and U.S.-Russia relations as well as the position of NATO will be examined. The complications arising from the global economic crisis and the impact will be addressed in later chapter. Chapter IX offers the conclusion.

II. POLISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: THE ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

A. POLISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE HISTORY

The Republic of Poland in the 21st century signifies a venerable nation with vibrant and turbulent history. Its location and geography have made it a battleground between Western Europe and the Eastern lands the latter of which open to the steppes of Asia. Poland also forms a major gateway between East and West. Considered the most powerful nation in Europe before the 17th century, Poland halted the invasions of Tartars, Turks, Swedes, and many other invaders and protected the western portions of the continent, for instance at the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1683. However, after internal disputes and turmoil as the European dynasties reorganized in the 17th and 18th centuries, this great country "...disappeared from the map of Europe in 1795..."⁵ only to be reborn after the World War I. The rebirth of Poland has been fostered first by the Germans against the Romanovs and then, in turn, by the U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson, and his Fourteen Points mandate which stipulated that: "An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant."⁶ After its short-lived existence in the years 1918-1939, Poland once more fell victim to the machinations of its powerful neighbors. The German and Soviet occupation of Poland in the years 1939-1945 was one of the most brutal and horrific in Europe. Millions of Poles lost their lives, targeting the extermination of Polish intelligentsia, military, and all of the highly educated population as well as the nation's Jews. This episode in Polish history left a lasting scar of mistrust toward Germany and Russia. Furthermore, the creation of Communist government after WW II by the Soviet

⁵Jeffrey Simon, *Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2004), 4.

⁶ Mieczyslaw B. Biskupski, *The History of Poland*, (Greenwood Press 2000), 49.

authorities and continued elimination of the “undesirable” Polish upper and middle class, created additional resentment toward Poland’s eastern neighbor. All of these events created a high emphasis on security and national independence among the Polish population and government.

1. HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The relationship between the United States and Poland has always been a positive one because of the international system and immigration. Americans, just like Poles, were under the oppression of a foreign power and fought against overwhelming odds to secure their independence. Polish national heroes like General Tadeusz Kosciuszko and General Kazimierz Pulaski joined the Revolutionary war of 1776 and fought valiantly, ensuring the creation of the United States of America. Additionally, the ideal of democratic government and constitution was equally strong among those nations and their populations. As the situation in Europe, and especially in Poland, deteriorated in the 19th century the Polish citizens began to emigrate en-mas to the newly formed United States, becoming one of the largest ethnic groups in the U.S. The addition of President Wilson’s mandate to create Poland cemented the status of the two nations as partners, friends, and allies. Even the Cold War did not change this view among the populations of both countries, despite the official position as enemies on two different sides of the Iron Curtain. “Many Poles perceived the system imposed by the Soviet Union and led by the Polish Communist government since World War II as contrary to the interests of Poland and its citizens.”⁷ This special relationship between the peoples of Poland and the United States became truly evident after the fall of communism and Soviet Russia in the 1989-1991 time period and the subsequent inclusion of Poland, under the strong U.S. patronage, into NATO. Since then, Poland has been a strong supporter of the United States and its foreign policy, even against some of its neighbors and partners in European Union; it supported the Operation Iraqi Freedom and

⁷ Jeffrey Simon, *Poland and NATO: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2004), 7.

contributed its military to the “Coalition of Willing”.⁸ This support, although more cautious today, is still evident by Poland’s backing of the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan, and agreement to allow the positioning of the U.S. Missile Defense System (MDS) on the territory of Poland.⁹

2. POLAND AND NATO

“The North Atlantic Treaty was designed to counter Soviet expansion and military power. But the Treaty itself was based on common values, identified no enemy, protected the sovereign decision-making rights of all members, and was written in sufficiently flexible language to facilitate adjustments to accommodate changing international circumstances.”¹⁰ These values and the protection of sovereign identity of the member countries were the most attractive parts of the alliance to Poland. Therefore, the NATO’s Article 2, which states that: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”¹¹ This became the main driving force for Poland to join the organization. The decades of forced compliance and oppression, instituted by the Soviet Union made the Polish desire for independence and the ability to decide their own national destiny a driving force in the political world. At the same time the Polish political class wanted to be a part of modern system of governments and economies which would allow them to realize their potential in Europe and beyond.

Almost at the same level of importance was Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in

⁸ Stanley R. Sloan, *Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama* (The continuum International Publishing Group Inc. 2010), 263.

⁹ Sloan, *Permanent Alliance*, 122/141.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 292.

Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”¹² The fact that the last Russian soldier left Poland “...on 17 September 1994 [which] coincided with the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939...”¹³ was an additional motivation for the Republic of Poland to join NATO and dramatically raise the cost of the future aggression, by any foe, against Poland.

Despite nearly five decades and two generations of Poles raised under Soviet control, the perception of the United States and NATO was overwhelmingly positive among Polish population. The Poles were often considered the most resilient among all the nations of the Soviet controlled Eastern Block. They lived up to this reputation and eventually exceeded it by creating the Solidarity movement against the totalitarian political and economic system forced by the Soviet Union which culminated in the similar instance throughout the region and the eventual collapse of the whole communist system and the emergence of new democratic countries in Eastern Europe.

Once free and democratized since 1989, and a member of NATO and European Union, Poland remained a strong ally of the United States. Although more mature and experienced on the international arena, in the year 2012, after having acquired ample experience of collective defense and international relations in fact in the two decades of its national freedom, Poland does not instinctively follow the lead of the United States as

¹² Sloan, *Permanent Alliance*, 293.

¹³ Simon, *Poland and NATO*, 24.

it did during its democratic “infancy”. However, possessing similar values, principals, and ideals the decisions and interests of the two countries are similar on many levels. The effects of the Iraq war as well as the Afghan campaign, as well as the efforts by the President Barack Obama to “reset” the relationship with Russia put some additional strain on Poland-U.S. relations but the long relationship is very resilient and it will take much more to weaken the bond between those two long-time allies.

From the initial moment of freedom and independence, Poland understood the importance of joining NATO even in the middle of transition, which was happening due to dissolution of Soviet Union and drastic changes in the strategic balance in Europe and the World. This was emphasized by the former deputy chief of the Polish mission to NATO, Witold Waszczykowski, at the round-table discussion at the Euro-Atlantic Association, in Warsaw on April 9, 1999 when he said: “Speaking honestly, we have rather mixed feeling [concerning the 1999 Strategic Concept], because we really would like to enjoy membership in “traditional” NATO. For half a century, we in Poland were denied stability and security that was enjoyed, for example, in the U.S. At least for a few years we would like to enjoy peace and security and simply feel confident under the nuclear umbrella...”¹⁴ The process which enabled Poles to achieve that goal was laid before them earlier via the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative and strict guidance and requirements which were presented and monitored by the member countries.¹⁵ Poles did not waste any time and within short period became involved in numerous NATO actions and initiatives. Their presence, alongside NATO forces, in Balkans and Iraq signaled their commitment to the alliance. Once Poland became a full NATO member, on 12 March 1999¹⁶ its contribution to the alliance did not diminish, and in fact increased in value and importance. The greatest example of this can be seen in Afghanistan, where the Polish contingent is in charge of Ghazni province since 30 October 2008¹⁷, with a

¹⁴ Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000–2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping* (RAND, 2001), 25.

¹⁵ Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000–2015*, 44.

¹⁶ Simon, *Poland and NATO*, 97.

¹⁷ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, “Przejęcie odpowiedzialności za prowincję Ghazni,” October 30, 2008. <http://www.wp.mil.pl/pl/arttykul/6019>

standing strength of more than 3000 troops at its peak. In addition, the aggressive modernization of Polish military which included transfer of two FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates from the U.S. Navy and five “Kobben” class-207 submarines from the Norwegian Navy, acquisition of 128 Leopard 2A tanks from the Germany army, transfer of twenty-three NATO interoperable MiG-29s from the German Air Force, transfer of five overhauled C-130s from U.S. Air Force, modernization of Polish MiG-29s, and culminated in the procurement of forty-eight new Block-52 F-16s from the Lockheed-Martin corporation.¹⁸ All the actions taken by the Polish government and military signal a very serious approach and commitment to the alliance. Poland is at the very front of NATO not only in principle but also in its actions.

¹⁸ Simon, *Poland and NATO*, 132–135.

III. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN POLISH HISTORY

A. HISTORY OF OCCUPATION OF POLAND

1. EARLY PERIOD

The geopolitical reality of central Europe forms the key to Poland's stormy history and frequent conflict with other Slavs, Swedes and Germans. As the organization of the state system and the balance of power was shifting at the end of the 18th century, the Prussian, Austrian and Russian dynasties made common cause against Poland and the Kingdom of Poland ceased to exist as a state.¹⁹ Poland was erased from the map of Europe until the end of World War I. This period of occupation was also the longest period of foreign troops on Polish soil. The Austrian, Prussian, and Russian military forces were re-sent throughout Polish cities and country side. Generations of Poles were born under this system of oppression, and the foreign military presence was one of the major remainders of this reality. Poles in exile also fought in the Napoleonic wars on the side of French. Napoleon was sympathetic to the "Polish cause" and after defeating Prussian forces in 1806, after negotiations with Czar Alexander I, Bonaparte established the Warsaw Principality on 14 June 1807.²⁰ After Napoleon's defeat in 1814, the Vienna Congress redrew the map of Europe and restructured political situation. The Warsaw Principality was transformed into Polish Kingdom in 1815, which was a fraction of former Polish state.²¹ Many uprisings and smaller skirmishes occurred in the following decades on the occupied territories of former Poland. With each unsuccessful attempt at reestablishment of former borders of Poland the occupiers diminished the freedoms in the Polish Kingdom. In the course of the 18th and 19th centuries the territories of Polish Kingdom were reabsorbed as provinces by former occupiers, Prussia, Austro-Hungary, and Russia and the population subjected to nationalization measures of the dominant dynasty, in which the German and the Russian cases were more draconian.

¹⁹ Witold Sienkiewicz, *Ilustrowany Atlas Historii Polski* (Demart SA, 2007), 171.

²⁰ Sienkiewicz, *Ilustrowany Atlas Historii Polski*, 177.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 181.

After the reestablishment of Polish sovereignty on November 11, 1918, Poland enjoyed its independence for period of 21 years.²² The new Poland was integrated within the French security system of the interwar period, which the nation left in 1934 with the pact with Germany. This diplomacy failed Poland especially after 1938, at which time the Germans actively began to revise the Versailles system with bloodless conquests. This diplomatic revolution reached its climax with the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact at the end of August 1939, the prelude to war and the new partition of Poland. On September 1, 1939, the German military forces invaded Polish territory and proceeded to move east leaving destruction and atrocities in their wake.²³ On September 17, 1939, the Soviet Union fulfilled its promises to Germany described in Pact and began its invasion of Poland from the east.²⁴ The Polish military fought valiantly but against superior forces and faced with two fronts it was destroyed in a matter of weeks. This event marked the beginning of the second dissolution of the Polish State in modern history and a period of occupation by foreign Powers. The fighting during 1939 was the most brutal and vicious episode in the recorded history of Poland. The occupation that followed was supervised by military and internal security units from both Germany and the Soviet Union. These forces were above the law and could conduct unrestricted warfare against Polish citizens. On the German side the greatest atrocities were committed against Poles, Jews, Romas, Gypsies, and other “undesirable” ethnicities and individuals in concentration camps. Additionally, other methods of eliminating the Polish population and forced hard labor resulted in deaths of more than six million Poles, a 17.2% of the total Polish population by the Nazis.²⁵ Soviets did not have concentration camps, per se, but Stalin’s anti Polish policies of the Terror were extended in practice, as millions of Poles were sent to Siberia and other locations where they perished in forced labor camps. Additionally, thousands of intelligentsia, prisoners of war, clergy, and other undesirables were murdered by Soviet secret police and military in Katyń and many other places. In total Soviets eliminated

²² Sienkiewicz, *Ilustrowany Atlas Historii Polski*, 227.

²³ *Ibid.*, 271.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 281.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 291.

more than million and a half of Poles, a 4.3% of total Polish population, between 1939 and 1945.²⁶

2. POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD

The events of the two time periods described above would have fostered a culture that is totally and categorically opposed to foreign military presence on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Poland. However, the events that followed the end of World War II did not give Poles the luxury of rejecting, opposing, or even denouncing the presence of tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers on its territory. Unlike the previous two episodes of the occupation and presence of foreign military in Poland, in 1944-45, the occupiers were supposed to be friends. After the defeat of the Nazi Germany the Soviet Union proclaimed itself a friend and ally of Poland among other countries in Eastern Europe. With the promises of free elections, economic assistance, and common defense, the Soviets tried to sway Polish population to support the leadership of the Communist Party in Poland. Despite the message of friendship, the Soviets conducted secret purge in Poland (and in other Eastern Bloc countries) eliminating opposition and free-thinking elements from Polish populace.²⁷

Between 1945 and 1956 the Soviet military stationed on the territory of Poland did not have any form of legal permission from the government of Poland and was a de-facto occupation force.²⁸ Poland and other Eastern European countries were not only forced to accept the presence of Soviet military forces on their territory but they had to provide for their needs (in addition to other resources which the Soviet ally demanded). In 1957, following the death of Josef Stalin, negotiation about the status of Soviet military forces in Poland was initiated. The initial posture of the Russian delegation was very negative, with an attitude of a big brother who knows what is good for the younger sibling. Most of the Polish initiatives were dismissed and eventually the talks were abruptly stopped at the end of September. However, just as abruptly, the negotiations

²⁶ Sienkiewicz, *Ilustrowany Atlas Historii Polski*, 291.

²⁷ Mariusz Krogulski, *Okupacja w imię sojuszu. Armia Radziecka w Polsce 1956–1993*, 7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

resumed on October 14 and on October 23 both sides signed an agreement which delineated among other things the number of Soviet personnel to be stationed in Poland (maximum of 66,000), locations (39 sites) for the aforementioned personnel, and movement (a system of roads between bases, airports, and training areas) of the Soviet forces. In addition, it classified the Soviet military presence in Poland as temporary. The agreement was classified and only the top echelon of Polish government was permitted to access it.²⁹ Separate negotiations were taking place at the same time pertaining to a “status of forces agreement,” which detailed procedures and jurisdiction over the crimes committed by Soviet soldiers stationed in Poland.³⁰ Additional delegations were working on agreements pertaining to use by Soviets of Polish national forests, Polish rail, and other lesser issues. Finally, the lease of the land and infrastructure and services rendered were discussed. The Soviet side insisted that Soviet Union should be responsible for 50% of the combined costs which were based on the costs of Polish military forces and like those forces the use of training areas, airports, and bombing/firing ranges was free of charge.³¹ During the mid and late seventies the Polish government tried to renegotiate the agreements with less than successful results. The Soviets used the argument that “...thousands [of Russian soldiers] are buried in Poland [which they liberated], and you [Poles] are sending us bills!”³² Until 1993, when the last Soviet soldier left the territory of Poland, more than 100 documents and agreements about the “temporary” presence of Soviet military forces in Poland were signed and all of them heavily favored the “occupier.” Even with the agreements greatly favoring the Soviet forces, they did not comply or fulfill the legal promises they made.³³ At the peak of the Soviet presence in Poland (since 1957) its military was using, over 70,000 hectares, 1,157 housing units (totaling about 9,100 apartments), 332 military buildings, 805 warehouses, 240 houses, and 1,340 other type buildings. Also, 201 aircraft, 85 helicopters, 598 tanks,

²⁹ Mariusz Krogulski, *Okupacja w imię sojuszu. Armia Radziecka w Polsce 1956–1993*, 21–22.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 23.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 25–26.

³² *Ibid.*, 28.

³³ Krogulski, *Okupacja w imię sojuszu.*, 30.

1,108 armored personnel carriers, 345 heavy artillery (over 100mm) and many other types of Soviet equipment including nuclear weapons.³⁴

3. POST COMMUNIST PERIOD

The departure of Soviet military forces from Poland in the 1990s combined with the change of political system paved the way for declassification of the 48 years of documents pertaining to Soviet military presence in Poland. Among them the list of 615 Poles killed by Soviet soldiers³⁵ and thousands of documents detailing other crimes committed by Russian servicemen against people and property in Poland was released. Toward the end of Soviet presence in Poland, from the 1970s until the end of the 1980s the organized crime type of activities were common among the soldiers including high ranking individuals. The black market around Soviet installations was booming and consisted of common items as well as weapons, munitions, and other military equipment.

In addition, the condition of grounds, infrastructure, and buildings left behind by Soviet forces was reminiscent of a war zone. The departing occupants made sure that the buildings that they left behind would not be usable. In many cases the roofs have been torn off the building, the doors and door jams were destroyed or removed, windows and other glass items were broken, the sinks, toilets, and other bathroom equipment were removed or broken, and even electric cables were ripped out of the walls. Everything of value was removed or destroyed.³⁶ As for the payment of leases, utilities, and other bills Poland recouped only a fraction of what Soviet Union was supposed to pay. Additionally, between 1991 and 1993 Soviet forces stationed in Poland refused to make any payments.³⁷ The scale of ecological damage was never declared, especially because until 1981, there were no records of this kind. Finally, during the negotiations with the newly formed Russian Federation in 1992 about money Soviet Russia owed to Poland for

³⁴ Ibid., 55.

³⁵ Ibid., 224–238.

³⁶ Ibid., 181.

³⁷ Krogulski, *Okupacja w imię sojuszu*, 130, 134.

various outstanding services and damages caused by Soviet military forces in Poland, the Russians once more reminded Poles that they sacrificed so much to liberate Poland from the clutches of Nazi Germany, and this time they put a price tag on the liberation! In a gesture not atypical of the reigning mentality and sense of wrong that dominates bilateral relations, the Russian Federation's General Staff calculated that during the liberation of Poland from July 1944 to March 1945, more than 3,246,000 Soviet soldiers took part in combat operations. During that time the Red Army incurred the following losses:

1. 477,295 dead and 1,636 wounded
2. 2,692 aircraft lost (963,620,000 rubles)
3. 2,966 tanks and self-propelled artillery (688,557,000 rubles)
4. 3,960 pieces of artillery (714,896,000 rubles)
5. 7,605 wheeled vehicles (100,385,000 rubles)

In addition Soviet army incurred following expenditures:

1. 69,161 rail cars of ammunition (10,319,000 rubles)
2. 24,792 aircraft munitions (137,196,000 rubles)
3. 992,906 tons of petroleum products (697,666,000 rubles)
4. Medical equipment and supplies (150,000,000 rubles)

Baltic Navy lost:

1. 560 sailors
2. 129 aircraft (167,700,000 rubles)
3. 10 torpedo boats (13,000,000 rubles)
4. 1 submarine (18,000,000 rubles)

The Soviet Union's expenditures used in liberation of Poland to 26,720,959,000 rubles. Surely, such an assessment is one way to shift the burden and to assess the costs of alliance. Additionally, the reconstruction of railways during the WW II and sustainment of Red Army during that period was estimated to be 12,211,335,000

rubles.³⁸ Final negotiations pertaining to relocation of Russian troops from the territory of Poland took place on April 13-15, 1992. The Russian side estimated the value of Soviet build structures to be 400,000,000 dollars and subtracted 100,000,000 dollars for repairs of those structures, demanding payment of remaining 300,000,000 dollars. This sum became the major point of contention between the two sides. In the end, after 15 unsuccessful attempts at resolution, Polish president Lech Walesa persuaded Russian president Boris Yeltsin to accept the “zero option.” On May 22, 1992, both sides signed the agreement in Moscow resolving the problems of movement of Russian forces from the territory of Poland and financial matters pertaining to ex-Soviet structures and transportation of Russian military forces.³⁹ On September 17, 1993, “ fifty-four years after the Red Army swept across Poland's eastern border, the final 24 Russian soldiers retreated unceremoniously into Belarus, leaving Poland free of foreign interveners for the first time since Nazi Germany invaded to ignite World War II.”⁴⁰

4. THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE IN POLAND

The above events created certain reservation in Polish government and society about foreign military presence. Many Polish citizens see any permanent military presence in Poland as a remainder of the past. However, they are in the minority when it comes to NATO and/or United States military forces. The threat from the East is still the number one concern among Poles, and many see the possible future presence of allied military forces on the territory of the Republic of Poland as a guarantee of the common defense described in the Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “At the same time, the American soldier has formed a theme in much of European politics and society since the beginning of the 20th century, if not earlier. A united Europe that has

³⁸ Krogulski, *Okupacja w imię sojuszu*, 166–167.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 166–168.

⁴⁰ Dean E. Murphy, “Last Russian Troops Depart From Poland : Military: The Red Army arrived to battle Nazis 54 years ago. Its successors' exit leaves the nation free of foreign interveners for the first time since then,” *Los Angeles Time*, September 19, 1993. http://articles.latimes.com/1993-09-19/news/mn-36939_1_red-army

gone from self-destruction in the age of total war to prosperity and peace is unthinkable without American defense policy as well as soldiers and arms.”⁴¹

⁴¹ Donald Abenheim, “The U.S. and Europe Military Power: Ideas, Institutions, Society, Policy, and Strategy from the 18th century until the 21st century” *Naval Postgraduate School*.

IV. U.S. BASES IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, HISTORY, BASIC ISSUES AND POLICY, AND FUTURE

A. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES

1. THE BEGINNING OF OVERSEAS PRESENCE

Since the advent of the United States as a global power in the mid-20th century, defense forces beyond the continental United States and the hemisphere became a central feature of policy. “For nearly half a century, the security and foreign policy of the United States has rested on an overseas basing system that was extensive, robust, and cheap. This system was not the only reason the United States has been the world’s dominant military and political power since the end of World War II, but it certainly has been one of the major symbols of that status, garnering respect, envy, and resentment abroad and sometimes complacency from those in the United States charged with maintaining superpower status.”⁴² This view of the U.S. military posts around the world was a major change from the previous position of the United States toward world politics and international involvement in the 18th and 19th centuries. Based on unhappy experiences with the French and European war of the era, President George Washington in his farewell address on 1796 called for America “...to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”⁴³ Many politicians and Americans shared that view which changed gradually from the end of the 19th century through the era of the world wars. The first overseas bases, per se, were in the Philippines. But, even after intervention in Europe in 1917 , “the war to end all wars” ended, the United States quickly withdrew its garrison from the Rhineland and therefore limited its involvement in the World, especially European affairs, to monetary power and no troops of any kind, whereas these were on station in Asia in token size. Unfortunately, this withdrawal from Europe in the 1920s proved to be a disastrous decision which, in part, led to another conflict on the “old” continent and eventually intensified and started World War II.

⁴² Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, 1.

⁴³ Web Guides, “Primary Documents in American History- George Washington’s Farewell Address” (n.d.) <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/farewell.html>

The geography of the United States allowed it to remain somewhat isolated from the global conflict of World War II, until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. U.S. bases existed in the Philippines, on Hawaii, and the Panama Canal, and, in 1941, were extended to Iceland. These, however, were only a shadow of the post war system. But even prior to this event, President Roosevelt, the government, and the military of the United States were faced with a high probability, if not certainty, that the U.S. will have to get involved in the war at some point in time. This prompted the buildup of industry, military, and the establishment of a network of overseas military bases on a small scale in preparation for future conflict and as a preemptive denial of strategically important location to the enemy. “This initial expansion into Latin America was driven by a concept of hemispheric defense that sought to establish barriers against air assault by German long range dirigibles and to exclude German submarine operations.”⁴⁴ Such a policy was a continuation of goals put in hand with the decision for the first steps of mobilization ca. 1938. Additionally, the United States began establishment of bases to facilitate the “bridge across the Atlantic” including northern and southern routes and expansion of the military footprint throughout Pacific. However, the Pacific theater was considered secondary to the European, as evident in the statement of the Secretary of the Navy in November 1941 against fortification of the island of Guam in order to avoid provoking the Japanese.⁴⁵

2. POST WORLD WAR II ERA OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ABROAD

The overseas networks of bases created during the World War II were on a vast scale and augmented by planning for postwar bases in wartime contributed greatly to the defeat of the Axis Powers and were an integral part of the future plan in which the U.S. emerged as the leader of the free world and a global “policeman,” guarding peace and democracy, which was clearly stated by the President Harry S. Truman in the following

⁴⁴ Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing*, 11.

⁴⁵ Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 24–25.

statement: “Though the United States wants no profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.”⁴⁶ Additionally, the economic position of the United States, “...accounting for some 50 per cent of world economic output...”⁴⁷ enabled it to fulfill its plans and maintain the aforementioned network of “essential” bases. Nonetheless, FDR planned for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe within two years of war’s end, a contingency which went aglimmering with the rise of the Cold War. Initially, this resulted in reduction of American overseas military facilities as U.S. forces were demobilized from their wartime strength. However, with the advent of the Korean War and subsequent “Cold War,” the policy of contraction of the overseas bases was revised and somewhat reversed. “The U.S. committed itself to the construction of democracy, prosperity, and security for western and central Europe and the containment of the Soviet Union in the atomic age. This diplomatic revolution meant that the U.S. soldier had to remain in Europe in a phase of neither war nor peace that portended challenges of policy and strategy that derived in part from the former epoch, but on a new scale and fateful potential that was quite without precedent.”⁴⁸ In *Pax Americana*, Ronald Steel described the U.S. security structure as “...an Empire that rests upon the pledge to use American military power to combat communism, not only as a form of imperialism, but even as a social doctrine in the under-developed states.” continuing “Although the desire to defend other nations against communism is not an imperial ambition, it has led our country to use imperial methods; establishment of military garrisons around the globe, granting of subsidies to client governments and politicians, application of economic sanctions and

⁴⁶ “Public Papers of Harry S. Truman. Cited in Converse, op.,” quoted in Sandars, *Americas Overseas Garrisons* (Oxford University Press Inc. 2000), 5.

⁴⁷ Sandars, *Americas Overseas Garrisons*, 7.

⁴⁸ Donald Abenheim, “The U.S. and Europe Military Power: Ideas, Institutions, Society, Policy, and Strategy from the 18th century until the 21st century” *Naval Postgraduate School*.

even military force against recalcitrant states, and employment of a veritable army of colonial administrators...”⁴⁹

3. THE CONTEMPORARY DILEMMA OF U.S. OVERSEAS PRESENCE

In 2012, the United States has about 860 military facilities in 46 foreign locations throughout the world.⁵⁰ The U.S. military uses those bases for various reasons, ranging from data-gathering to launching drone attacks against terrorists. However, most of these installations are support-type facilities. Additionally, a large percentage of bases are shared with the host nation’s military. The placement of U.S. military personnel abroad has always been very controversial both in the domestic and international realms. James Carafano, in his article in the San Francisco Examiner titled “Without ample overseas bases, US will lose significant power”⁵¹ argues that, as a global power, the United States needs overseas bases in order to quickly project its power and defend its interests around the world. He counters recent popular claims that the global mission of the United States military can be accomplished from within the U.S. by the use of new weapon systems by arguing that to maintain similar deployable forces and overall capability the U.S. military would have to drastically increase the number of its warships and aircraft which, in turn, would require additional bases in the U.S. and a huge increase in military spending. His arguments show a definite need for the basing of American servicemen and women, as well as equipment, abroad in order to maintain global reach and the ability to participate in long-term military actions away from U.S. mainland. Additionally, he cites the expansion of locations of bases since the end of Cold War and shows the necessity of additional adjustments in basing policy. Proposed bases in the Republic of Poland are a prime example of such an adjustment.

⁴⁹ R. Steel, *PAX Americana* (New York: Viking 1976), 17.

⁵⁰ Office of the Secretary of Defense Report to Congress, *Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture*, (September 2004)

⁵¹ James Carafano, “Without ample overseas bases, U.S. will lose significant power,” *The Examiner*, June 18, 2011, <http://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/2011/07/without-ample-overseas-bases-us-will-lose-significant-power#ixzz1VhwL64t4>

4. THE IMPACT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

The post 2007 economic crisis in the United States is forcing the Obama Administration to reduce spending across the board. As always, many military programs, including maintaining of overseas bases, are at forefront of the items proposed to be reduced. Of those proposed cuts in the overseas presence of U.S. military, the American forces in Europe would be the most affected. Presently, the United States has approximately 80,000 troops in Europe, "...spread across 28 main operating bases primarily in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain."⁵² Many believe that those bases are leftovers from the Cold War era and that they outlived their usefulness. However, "the U.S. military presence in Europe helps to achieve American policy aims in the broader Eurasia and Middle East regions. From Arctic to Levant, from the Maghreb to the Caucasus, Europe is at one of the most important crossroads of the world. U.S. military bases in Europe provide American leaders with flexibility, resilience, and options in a dangerous world. Today, the garrisons of American service personnel in Europe are no longer the fortified of the Cold War but the forward operation bases of the 21st century."⁵³ The latest round of proposed defense cuts announced on January 26, 2012, included the following European Commands resources:

- The Air Force A-10 squadron from Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany
- 603rd Air Control Squadron from Aviano Air Base in Italy
- V Corps Army headquarters from Wiesbaden, Germany
- 170th Brigade Combat Team from Baumholder, Germany
- 172nd Brigade Combat Team from Grafenwöhr, Germany
- Reduction of 2,500 Army personnel from support units in Germany

⁵² Luke Coffey, "Shrinking America's Global Reach," *The Heritage Foundation*, December 4, 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/us-military-bases-in-europe-remain-vital>

⁵³ Luke Coffey, "Shrinking America's Global Reach," *The Heritage Foundation*, December 4, 2012.

All together, more than 11,000 troops out of the 80,000 currently stationed in Europe 80,000.⁵⁴ Those reductions will be offset by the rotational deployment of troops from continental United States into the European theater. This plan will save money in the short run; however, the cost of new infrastructure needed for the abovementioned units in the U.S. combined with the logistics costs of the rotations may quickly erase any savings achieved by decreasing of the American military footprint in Europe. Additionally, the reductions can upset the balance of power in Europe and around the World as “the U.S. military presence in Europe deters American adversaries, strengthens allies, and protects U.S. interests. Whether it is preparing and deploying U.S. and allied troops for Afghanistan or responding to a humanitarian crisis in the region, the U.S. is able to project power and react to the unexpected because of its forward-bases military capabilities in Europe. Reducing this capability will only make America weaker on the world stage.”⁵⁵

5. THE MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

The last aspect of the U.S. military presence in Europe is the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The agreements signed by the Bush Administration with Republic of Poland and Czech Republic and later modified by Obama Administration will create new U.S. installations in Eastern Europe. In addition to these sites, the U.S. Air Force will established small permanent presence in Poland combined with a larger rotations comprised of F-16 and C-130 aircraft.⁵⁶ This new concept of rotational presence combined with small permanent footprint, collocated with host nation’s military assets may be the future of new U.S. overseas presence.

⁵⁴ John Vandiver, “Pentagon lays out significant cuts to U.S. forces in Europe,” *Stars and Stripes*, February 16, 2012, <http://www.stripes.com/news/pentagon-lays-out-significant-cuts-to-u-s-forces-in-europe-1.168861>

⁵⁵ Luke Coffey, “Shrinking America’s Global Reach,” *The Heritage Foundation*, December 4, 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/us-military-bases-in-europe-remain-vital>

⁵⁶ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet: U.S.-Poland Bilateral Defense Cooperation*, Washington, DC: White House May 28, 2012. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/28/fact-sheet-us-poland-bilateral-defense-cooperation>

V. POLISH DEFENSE POLICIES AND BASES

A. THE MODERN HISTORY OF POLISH NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The national security of the Republic of Poland in the year 2012 emerges in three major statements of policy and many supporting documents. The three main documents examined in this paper will be in order: The Constitution of Poland,⁵⁷ National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (approved by the president and cabinet members in 2007),⁵⁸ and the National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2009).⁵⁹ In addition, the latest Polish Strategic Defense Review (2011)⁶⁰ and Strategic Report of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland (2012) will be analyzed in the lines that follow. These documents in their present form represent the transformation of Poland from its role in the Warsaw Pact in the years until 1989 and its, at times, twisted path to Euro-Atlantic integration in the decades since.

After the end of World War II, Poland was included by force by the Soviet Union into the Eastern Bloc and became one of the Central European countries under the rule of a Communist government, and perhaps the most restive of such nations. This fact was then and is still seen today, as a formal occupation of territory of Poland by the Soviet Union, despite the existence of the internationally recognized People's Republic of Poland during that time. After the revolutionary events of 1991 and subsequent fall of the Soviet Empire, Poland declared its re-birth as a democratic country and amended the existing constitution of the People's Republic of Poland to reflect new character of the nation and established legal basis for the democratic Polish State. The new Polish Constitution was adopted on 2 April 1997, approved by a national referendum on 25 May 1997, and was fully implemented on 17 October 1997.

⁵⁷ Sejm, *Constitution of Poland*, <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>

⁵⁸ Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, *The National Security Strategy*, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/porta1/pl/475/1144/Strategia_Bezpieczenstwa_Narodowego_RP.html

⁵⁹ Wojsko Polskie, *National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, http://www.wp.mil.pl/pliki/File/English/strategia_obronnosci_eng.pdf

⁶⁰ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, *Polish Strategic Defense Review*, http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF POLAND

The following articles of the Constitution of Poland outline the role of Polish military, define the national chain of command, and mandate civil control over the armed forces. Granted the role of the armed forces in the state in the interwar period, as well as in the final phase of life in the socialist bloc, the formulation of such clauses on more or less the western pattern symbolized a major undertaking of statecraft fraught with its own challenges.

Article 26

1. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the State, and shall ensure the security and inviolability of its borders.
2. The Armed Forces shall observe neutrality regarding political matters and shall be subject to civil and democratic control.

Article 134

1. The President of the Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.
2. The President of the Republic, in times of peace, shall exercise command over the Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defence.
3. The President of the Republic shall appoint, for a specified period of time, the Chief of the General Staff and commanders of branches of the Armed Forces. The duration of their term of office, the procedure for and terms of their dismissal before the end thereof, shall be specified by statute.
4. The President of the Republic, for a period of war, shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on request of the Prime Minister. He may dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in accordance with the same procedure. The authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as well as the principle of his subordination to the constitutional organs of the Republic of Poland, shall be specified by statute.
5. The President of the Republic, on request of the Minister of National Defence, shall confer military ranks as specified by statute.

6. The authority of the President of the Republic, regarding his supreme command of the Armed Forces, shall be specified in detail by statute.

Article 135

The advisory organ to the President of the Republic regarding internal and external security of the State shall be the National Security Council.

Article 136

In the event of a direct external threat to the State, the President of the Republic shall, on request of the Prime Minister, order a general or partial mobilization and deployment of the Armed Forces in defence of the Republic of Poland.⁶¹

Despite the broad character of the above articles, the content represents a radical departure from the Communist civil military customs of party dictatorship which were the guiding principal for the post-World War II Poland and its military. The enforcement of the communist ideology was not only limited to civilian population and government, but the indoctrination was even more present in the Polish military as an army of the socialist type pioneered by Trotsky in the 1920s and adapted to the Polish nation in the years after 1945. Almost all of the officers and 100% of the high ranking officers were members of the Communist party; additionally a large portion of national budget and production was subjected to or supported by the military. After the change of the political system in Poland, the military was subjugated to civilian democratic government and the political influence of military was diminished, but not without contradictions and setbacks. Additionally, military related expenditures were decreased dramatically and set not to go below 1.95% of national gross product of previous year.⁶² In reality the level of 1.95% became somewhat of a target for the military budget in Poland. The legacy ideology of one-way communications from the Ministry of Defense is the only remaining

⁶¹ Sejm, *Constitution of Poland* , <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>

⁶² Sejm, DEFENSE MODERNIZATION Act of 2001. [Ustawa z dnia 25 maja 2001 r. o przebudowie i modernizacji technicznej oraz finansowaniu Sił Zbrojnych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (tekst pierwotny: Dz. U. 2001 r. Nr 76 poz. 804) (tekst jednolity: Dz. U. 2009 r. Nr 67 poz. 570)]

aspect of that system and it is slowly being altered and replaced by the new, western style, system.

2. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF POLAND

The national security strategy of the Republic of Poland is a product of turbulent history and its unique geo-political situation. Over centuries Poland and its citizens suffered many defeats and experienced horrible atrocities from the hand of its eastern and western neighbors. In addition, the European allies of Poland rarely fulfilled their promises of assistance in time of war. Those two realities combined with the geography of Poland, which is not favorable for territorial defense, created a need for a strong and constant security posture for the Polish nation. As a modern democratic State in heart of Europe, Poland is aware of the need for global cooperation and partnership in common defense. Because of this need, Poland was one of the first countries from the former Eastern Bloc to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and subsequently European Union. Within this statecraft, Polish policy additionally includes a strong bilateral relationship with the United States. Granted the legacy of the Ribbentrop-Stalin pact as well as the hesitation of France and Britain to rally to the Polish cause in the fall of 1939, Poland relies heavily on the transatlantic relations for security and stability, though this statecraft has undergone its own sobering up in the past decade. This is evident by the level of importance which Poland ascribes to the global significance of the United States as can be seen in the paragraph 19 which is a part of section 2 (Condition of national security of the Republic of Poland) of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland from 2007 and states that “Globally, the United States which guarantees international security plays a key role.” And in paragraph 48 of section 3.1 (External Security) in which continues with the statement “Bilateral relations with the United States occupy a special place in Polish security policy. Poland acknowledges their strategic nature and shall seek to develop them further in the spirit of solidarity and sustainable partnership. Poland shall act to preserve American presence in the European continent, also in non-military dimension.” Subsequently, in paragraph 41 it states that “The North Atlantic Alliance is for Poland the most important form of multilateral cooperation in a

political and military dimension of security and a pillar of stability on the European continent, as well as the main ground of transatlantic relations.” This view is reinforced in paragraph 42 with statement that “Poland shall seek to increase NATO’s role as a forum of strategic transatlantic dialogue. [And that] This will reinforce Allied bonds and add to NATO’s greater cohesion.” Paragraph 44 emphasizes the “...membership in the European Union [which] determines, to a significant extent, the foundations of Poland’s security. [Also] It radically increased the possibilities of implementation of the Polish security policy and [Poland’s] ability to act internationally. It has strengthened Poland’s position in the world and at the same time increased its responsibility for international order. It is evident that as a border country of the European Union, Poland understands the significance of robust system of military, economic, and political alliances and treaties as a deterrent and multilateral assistance in case of conflict.

The sections pertaining to military security (3.2) and national defense (subsection of 4.3 Executive Subsystems) emphasize the reliance on as well as the readiness to participate in Article 5 actions of the North Atlantic Treaty and collective defense and support of UN, NATO, and EU policies including crisis response, stability operations, peacekeeping operations, and stability operations. In addition, the national defense section defines near-term size, composition, general direction of the modernization, and national reserve forces. It also mandates continuous improvement of long term planning in research and development of advanced military, communication, and acquisition of new technology and equipment. Reforms in military education and training of civilian personnel are also designated as one of key tasks.⁶³

3. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF POLAND

The National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland is the most in-depth document of all three documents presented in this paper, and in a way, it is an expansion of the National Security Strategy with comprehensive definitions, explanations, and plans

⁶³ Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, *The National Security Strategy*, http://www.bbn.gov.pl/portal/pl/475/1144/Strategia_Bezpieczenstwa_Narodowego_RP.html

for general defense, structure of military forces, industry, and civilian organizations. It acknowledges the evolution of national defense and the inclusion of non-military aspects of national security including but not limited to political crisis, energy, terrorism, cyber terrorism and crimes, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as expansion of the area of operation for Polish military from local to regional and global. As in the prior document the national security is being directly linked to NATO, EU, and the United States. In paragraph 11 the low probability of local large scale military conflict is highlighted but smaller conflict like the Russian incursion into Georgia, and other regional engagements in Balkans, Middle-East, with special attention given to highly stressed relationship between West and Muslim world. Because of this, emphasis is put on global presence, deployability, and the creation of a highly mobile military force in paragraph 18. In paragraph 21, the improvement of relations with Poland's eastern neighbors is mentioned as an additional way to improve national security and regional stability.

The document also distinguishes between peacetime and wartime strategies of defense. Section 2.3 is dedicated to peacetime national defense. Readiness, preparations, and training are the main points of this section. The readiness of the civil and defense industries is also addressed as well as expansion of defensive infrastructures, which is somewhat contrary to the earlier emphasis on a highly mobile military force. The education of the general population in the field of defense and patriotism is somewhat of a throw-back to citizen soldier days and conscription service. In addition, constant emphasis is put on the allies / NATO inclusion in military and civil training, and planning for possible crisis.

Section 2.4 addresses the other than peacetime situations. First, the crisis management takes place under the peacetime chain of command and it is seen as the main tool in de-escalation and prevention of war between Poland and possible aggressor, or any of the allies and possible aggressors. On the territory of Poland the National Crisis Response Plan allows the regional public administrations to take action to raise the level of civil readiness. This also includes prevention or reaction to a terrorist attack. If the situation escalates the Government of Poland can institute martial law, initiate

mobilization of reserves, and switch to wartime chain of command and appointing of supreme commander.

If the situation described in section 2.4 deteriorates and attack is imminent, the general mobilization for the purpose of expansion of military will be initiated and movement of existing military forces into strategic locations initiated. At that time military forces of allied nations will enter Poland and take up strategic positions alongside Polish forces. In case of war outside Poland but within the jurisdiction of Article V, the Polish military may deploy the units which were allotted to the defense of the NATO allies in time of crisis.

Chapter III describes in-depth the Polish defense system, including military forces, civil element, chain of command, responsibilities of each elements of the system, responsibilities of the President, cabinet members, and MoD during peacetime and wartime. It is followed by descriptions of responsibilities of the Polish military in various situations and missions. In case of conflict between Article V operations and defense of Poland, the Polish military will defend Poland. The overall guidance pertaining to modernization and transformation of various aspects of the Polish military such as C4ISR, medical units, logistics, air defense, military education, civ-mil relations and others is presented in chapter IV. Next the structure of Polish military forces is broken down in section 4.3. Further analysis of the chain of command during peacetime and wartime is conducted in section 4.4. Chapter V describes overall defense preparation of the Polish nation with all the military and non-military parts of the system. Chapter VI addresses the direction of transformation of the national defense system.⁶⁴

4. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY IN POLAND

The above described document addresses all the aspects of the National Defense Strategy. However, not all the parts fit together well. In fact some of the ideas, projects, and/or guidelines contradict each other, other documents, or actions taken by the military

⁶⁴ Wojsko Polskie, *National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, http://www.wp.mil.pl/pliki/File/English/strategia_obronnosci_eng.pdf

leadership or political leadership or defense budget allocations. Additionally, the future plans of a grand scale change much too often with major restructuring happening every few years. This lack of continuity on the part of planners is taking a heavy toll on Polish fighting forces which have to move the headquarters back and forth and restructure itself for deployment and then again for return to home base.

5. THE POLISH STRATEGIC DEFENSE REVIEW

The latest Polish Strategic Defense Review from 2011 is a very robust document that addresses most of the future problems of Polish military. However, this document fails to identify the current reasons for the problems existing now and possibly in the future. Another major change in this Strategic Defense Review is the starting point of the assessment. The authors decided to not project the future needs of the military, the next 25 years, from the date of this report but rather from the point of completion of the last cycle which will end in 2018. By doing this, they feel the continuity of the programs and actions will be preserved and overall direction of the Polish military will not be changed mid-course. Of course, the possibility of corrections to ongoing programs is still allowed under this new system.⁶⁵

The SDR identifies the professionalization of the Polish military forces as the greatest change and most significant undertaking for the future of national defense. It also states that the effective fighting force in today's conflicts must be mobile, independent, highly trained, and ready for action on short notice. This can only be achieved by a professional military force. The professionalization process forced changes of all aspects of Polish military. Training, sustainment, logistics, mobilization, reserves, housing, acquisitions of equipment, and many other aspects of military had to be attuned to this new and progressive way of staffing the national fighting forces. This is a drastic departure from the old system of conscription and security policy based in large on national self-reliance and the cult of the citizen-soldier. However, given the limited national resources and size of Polish population, as well as modern realities of military fighting forces, which require highly skilled, professional soldiers, trained in

⁶⁵ Wojsko Polskie, *National Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, 7–8.

modern tactics, and equipped with the latest weapons, communications, and protective equipment, the operational leadership of Polish military realized that the citizen-soldier can no longer fulfill the role of main fighting force. The professionalization of the military in Poland is based on the military structure of the United States with strong non-commissioned officer corps, smaller but more agile, highly skilled and fitted with modern weapons and equipment, trained in NATO procedures, tactics, and strategies, and fully incorporated into the alliance. In addition the ratio of combat troops to support troops is on the rise increasing the Polish military's operational strength without increasing the cost.⁶⁶

The reduction of personnel, due to professionalization, allowed the Polish military to decrease the physical size of its infrastructure and transform the remaining fixed forces and bases. In addition, this reduction flattened the administrative chain-of-command by eliminating the purely legacy bureaucratic element of military districts. Unfortunately, this reduction stopped short of elimination of the old fix-defense elements and is still draining limited resources away from the, much needed, modernization of Polish military. Some of the examples of these legacy systems are: investments in fixed communications and purchase of short range small military transport M-28, Bryza, aircraft, and many other such endeavors.

Chapter Two of the Strategic Defense Review titled "Military Forces of Republic of Poland 2035: Tasking, Requirements, Operational Capabilities", projects future needs and possible engagements as well as describes the desired end-state of Polish military in the year 2035. The described possible operations are divided into three geopolitical areas. First, and most important, are the operations on the territory of Poland. The defense of Poland is seen as the defense of NATO and assumption is made that NATO and European Union allies will play a significant role in this scenario. The next scenario addresses the possibility of unilateral military defense against military aggression. The subcategories of this section address the entire spectrum of operations needed to preserve

⁶⁶ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, *Polish Strategic Defense Review*, http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf, 9.

the integrity of Poland and it is also looking ahead to new aspects of Polish National Security such as advanced cyberspace warfare and space operations. In addition, internal security and stability operations to include but not limited to acts of terrorism and response to natural and/or manmade disasters is addressed. Second, are the operations on the territory of any NATO member-nation. Again, all major aspects of operations are listed including prospective stability and peace-keeping operations. Last are the operations out of area described in the NATO treaty. This is mainly a mediation type operations mandated by United Nations, European Union, NATO, or as a part of a coalition. Those operations include peace keeping/making/enforcement, conflict prevention, humanitarian relief and operations, disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations, extraction operations, search and rescue, military aid to civilian authorities, enforcement of sanctions/embargo, and counter/anti-terrorism operations.

The following section describes the defense planning process in detail. It states that the national defense planning is closely tied to the national development planning system. The overall defense planning is dictated by desired end-state capabilities of Polish military. The system which is used to achieve this goal is based on United States' system of PPBS which is comprised of: Planning, Programing, and Budgeting. Additionally, emphasis is placed on professionalization and human assets. The need for attracting highly skilled and motivated young men and women into the ranks of Polish military as well as emphasis on investment in education and future technologies is present in this section and throughout the whole document.⁶⁷

The structure of future Polish military is described as modular, highly mobile, well educated, and fast acting. The command system of Polish military will be a part of an integrated management system of state protection and it will ensure continuous and efficient command of the military in various states of readiness of national defense and in all possible security environments. Additionally, the improvement of the image of the military forces and reshaping of the relationship and acceptance by civilian population will be a parallel task during the next 25 years. Finally, the continuation of participation

⁶⁷ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, *Polish Strategic Defense Review*, http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf, 89.

in NATO, EU, and multi-national coalition operations is identified as a major element needed to improve the level of efficiency and combat readiness as well as maintenance of interoperability within NATO structure.⁶⁸

In chapter three titled “Military Forces 2011: analysis TOWS/SWOT”, an examination of current state of Polish military is conducted based on western system TOWS/SWOT where T stand for threats, O stands for opportunities, W stands for weaknesses, and S stands for Strengths. TOWS Analysis is an effective way of combining a) internal strengths with external opportunities and threats, and b) internal weaknesses with external opportunities and threats to develop a strategy.⁶⁹ This system was used to: identify the initial state of the Polish armed forces in relation to the development requirements in the long-term planning, to indicate in a systematic way possible variants of the strategic direction of the military forces, and to obtain the data necessary to make a decision regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces. It was not an assessment of the current operational state and readiness of Polish military but to identify the conditions pertaining to and causing that state.⁷⁰ The most significant statement pertaining to the readiness concluded that, unfortunately, at the present time the strategic defense planning in Polish armed forces is based on equipment capabilities instead of total force capability which should include: doctrine, organization, training, armaments and military equipment, personnel, leadership, infrastructure, and interoperability.⁷¹ Also, the participation in NATO/EU/Coalition military actions was cited as the key element in testing and modernizing the armaments and military equipment as well as training compatibility with NATO standards. The most negative aspects of the current state of readiness were identified as: incomplete equipping of the units, incompatibility of the command structure with highly dynamic and constantly

⁶⁸ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, *Polish Strategic Defense Review*, http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf, 90–91.

⁶⁹ Shahzad Trading and Consulting FZE, “SWOT & TOWS Analysis” October 4, 2012 <http://www.shahzadtc.com/pdf/SWOTTOWS.pdf>

⁷⁰ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, *Polish Strategic Defense Review*, http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf, 98.

⁷¹ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, *Polish Strategic Defense Review*, http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf, 99.

changing environment of today's conflict, and low level of armaments and military equipment readiness caused by backlog of periodic maintenance and repairs. The most significant restriction causing reduction of progress was identified as the continuous rotation of concepts of development and desired end-state of Polish armed forces, which in turn are changing the requirements of future acquisitions of armaments and military equipment, often during mid-cycle.⁷² The last chapter presented the two variants of strategic direction of the transformation. Variant 1: "Use of all available opportunities for development...[by] adapting military forces of the Republic of Poland to the challenges of the modern world with a proactive approach to all opportunities". Variant 2: "Counter the emerging threats...[by] improvement of the functioning of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland while reactively avoiding the threats."⁷³ The variant 1 was selected as it "...allows for a greater realization of the missions of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland, [it] is a part of a developmental state action, to a greater extent, allows for progress..." advancement and growth. In addition, the commission found that the current Polish military forces culture is one of risk-aversion systematic elimination of weaknesses. It indicates the introverted nature of the organization and it can lead to situations where external opportunities may be missed. It also addresses the minimalistic attitude and policy of just-survival which can affect overall success rate of the force.

The Strategic Defense Review of 2011 is a very progressive document with honest findings and good methodology for finding deficiencies, discrepancies, and identification of trends. The somewhat algorithmic approach to the strategy of national defense is reminiscent of legacy procedures but sufficiently modernized to reflect the fundamental changes that took place in the Polish military since 1989. It is evident that the cadre responsible for creation of this document is very familiar with western military doctrine, tactics, procedures, and overall direction of military progress.

⁷² Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, *Polish Strategic Defense Review*, http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf, 100.

⁷³ Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, *Polish Strategic Defense Review*, http://www.mon.gov.pl/pliki/File/Raport_SPO_14042011.pdf, 123.

B. CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, none of the recent documents mentioned above reflect any changes pertaining to Ballistic Missile Defense agreement or the agreements for permanent U.S. military presence in Poland---issues of the recent past. This lack of acknowledgement and adjustment of defense policy to reflect this new defense posture could have been caused by announcement of those agreements during mid-lifecycle of these documents or cautious approach to so far unfulfilled promises.

The only significant document that reflected the possibility of establishment of U.S. military base in Poland was the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The negotiations between U.S. and Polish side took significant amount of time but in the end the agreement was signed by both countries ministries of foreign affairs and subsequently ratified by the Polish Sejm (parliament of Poland) on 2 December 2010.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Sejm, Official record of ratification of SOFA (December 2, 2010).
<http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/SQL.nsf/ustawyall?OpenAgent&6&100>

VI. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF POLISH-U.S. DEFENSE AFFAIRS AND BASES.

A. POLITICS OF MISSILE DEFENSE

Although in bilateral agreements pertaining to Ballistic Missile Defense there is next to no mention of the ongoing U.S. military presence in Poland, this aspect of defense cooperation, in official defense, national security, and policy forms a theme of high importance to both governments. This question of bases and bi lateral defense assumed greater importance yet still with the role of missile defense as a theme of strategy and military posture in the new century. Missile defense had been an issue of Atlantic defense in the 1980s, and emerged in the new century once more as a topic of debate and controversy, bound to be doubly so with the German and Russian neighbors, whose skeptical views of such weapons were well known in Warsaw and Washington DC. This fact notwithstanding, the U.S. pursued a new policy of missile defense, including Europe and making likely a typical NATO missile crisis as in former times. In this connection, Polish bases played a significant role within the strategic compact and extended deterrence and security guarantees between the U.S. and Poland.

1. THE BUSH-ERA PLANS

The Bush administration (2001-2009) continued the policy of the Reagan administration placing a high strategic value on missile defense. In the new century these systems were directed against an Iranian threat, and thus in need of a European theater for strategic effectiveness of said program. “In 2002 the Bush Administration began informal talks with the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic over the possibility of establishing missile defense facilities on their territory.”⁷⁵ During the initial announcement in 2007, “the Bush Administration proposed deploying a ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) element of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in Europe to defend against an Iranian missile threat. The system would include

⁷⁵ U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. *Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe* by Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek. CRS Report RL34051. Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, January 21, 2009, 6.

10 interceptors in Poland, Radar in the Czech Republic, and another radar deployed in a country closer to Iran, all to be completed by 2013 at a reported cost of at least \$4 billion.”⁷⁶ Formal negotiations began in early 2007 but were paused due to elections in Poland and a subsequent change of leadership. The populist-nationalist party of Law and Justice (PiS) led by Jarosław Kaczyński, was pro BMDS; however, the incoming two-party coalition led by Civic Alliance (PO) party under the leadership of Donald Tusk was more reserved in the bilateral relationship with the U.S. and would re-evaluate the initial talks pertaining to BMDS. The BMDS talks resumed in early 2008. The major argument presented by Polish side was the need for U.S. assistance in the modernization of Poland’s air defenses in order to protect the BMDS site and Poland from a possible attack. The PAC-3 Patriot missile batteries were the desired equipment for this role. President Bush responded to this request with a declaration that stated: “Before my watch is over we will have assessed [Poland’s] needs and come up with a modernization plan that’s concrete and tangible.”⁷⁷ Despite the strong effort the deal was not reached at that time. However, “in a surprise move on 14 August 2008, Polish and U.S. government officials initialed an agreement; the formal accord was signed six days later by Rice and Sikorski [Polish Secretary of State].”⁷⁸ There is no doubt that this rapid pace of events was caused by the Russia’s military operation against the Republic of Georgia which was seen as a blow to U.S. policy in the former USSR and NATO enlargement, which had proceeded more or less without serious hindrance since the middle of the 1990s.

2. OBAMA-ERA PLANS

After the 2008 elections in the United States, the new Barack Obama administration put on hold the BMDS talks and subsequently canceled the program on

⁷⁶ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, *Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe*, CRS Report RL34051., Summary.

⁷⁷ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, *Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe*, CRS Report RL34051., 7.

⁷⁸ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, *Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe*, CRS Report RL34051., 8.

September 17, 2009. The reactions and emotions in Poland created by the decision to cancel the BMDS program were only amplified by the date of the announcement, which coincided with the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Russia's invasion of Poland in 1939. The tone-deaf treatment of such a significant date by the U.S. administration betrayed, at least in the minds of its critics, a disregard for the goals and hopes of central Europeans, and bespoke a revival of Yalta statecraft. This announcement combined with the Obama Administration's proclamation of the "reset" of the relations with Russia, created a wave of negative feeling toward the United States among Poles fearful of a sellout. Such persons either knew nothing or had forgotten the character of other missile crises in NATO, i.e. the abandonment by the Kennedy administration in the face of Soviet *va banque* in Cuba of the Jupiters in Turkey in 1962 or the cancellation of Skybolt in the same year as a burden on U.S.-U.K. relations. Rather, perceptions of U.S. policy were exacerbated by the ill effects of prolonged Polish service in the Iraq operation and fear of a more aggressive, revanchist Russia as visible after the Georgian war in 2008. "Later US pledges to place a Patriot missile battery in Poland, and elements of the SM-3 interceptors which will replace the Bush system, failed to eradicate the perception in Warsaw that Polish interests had been sacrificed for the benefit of Washington-Moscow relations."⁷⁹

The new Ballistic Missile Defense System, proposed by President Obama, shifted its objective from intercepting Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) aimed at the United States to protection of Europe and Middle East with a more engaged statecraft of multi-lateral security and collective defense versus the bottom up, service oriented approach put in hand under the Bush administration. President Obama himself explained: "To put it simply, our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's allies. It is more comprehensive than the previous program; it deploys capabilities that are proven and cost-effective; and it sustains and builds upon our commitment to protect the U.S.

⁷⁹ The Telegraph, "Polish President accuses Obama of Betraying Poland," August 6, 2012, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/poland/9456610/Polish-president-accuses-Obama-of-betraying-Poland.html>

homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats; and it ensures and enhances the protection of all our NATO allies.”⁸⁰ This will be accomplished by continuing the program in Poland and Czech Republic as well as adding additional SM-3 interceptor site in Romania and an additional radar site in Turkey.⁸¹ However, “By wishing to avoid another “mistake,” Mr. Komorowski [Polish President] has questioned the long-term viability of the US made SM-3 system, which is intended to secure NATO's eastern flank from missile attacks launched from the Middle East.”⁸²

President Obama’s visit to Poland in 2011 improved the relations between two allies, but this statecraft came well short of reaching the level of good feeling and comity of the Bush era. Both, “President Obama and President Komorowski welcomed the conclusion of a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding, a key step toward the establishment of a U.S. Air Force Aviation Detachment in Poland. The Aviation Detachment will strengthen joint interoperability through regular training exercise rotations in Poland, largely with U.S. F-16 or C-130 aircraft, beginning in 2013. F-16s from the California Air National Guard will also participate in the July 2011 SAFE SKIES training exercise with Polish F-16s as part of Poland’s security preparations for the EURO 2012 soccer tournament.” Additionally, “President Obama discussed with President Komorowski and Prime Minister Tusk the next steps in the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense, including recent progress in implementing Phases I and II of the new missile defense architecture. The United States welcomes Poland’s May 2011 ratification of our Missile Defense Agreement, and the U.S. European Command and Polish military leaders will jointly inaugurate a series of consultations to take necessary actions to implement this agreement, leading to the

⁸⁰ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe*, Washington, DC: White House September 17, 2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Strengthening-Missile-Defense-in-Europe/

⁸¹ The New York Times, “Missiles and Missile Defense System,” December 4, 2012,” http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/m/missiles_and_missile_defense_systems/index.html

⁸² The Telegraph, “Polish President accuses Obama of Betraying Poland,” August 6, 2012.

deployment of the EPAA's land-based interceptor site in Poland in 2018.”⁸³ In an effort further to improve the relationship between the United States and Poland the Obama Administration maintains annual high-level meetings between Polish Ministry of Defense and U.S. Department of Defense as well as Department and Ministry of foreign affairs. The continuous presence of Polish military forces in Afghanistan is a testament to Poland's commitment to bilateral relationship with the United States, as well as to NATO.⁸⁴

3. THE RUSSIAN POSITION

Another problem generated by the plans to create the missile defense system and the presence of the U.S. military in Poland has been the deterioration of relationship between Poland and Russia as the Putin regime has grown more assertive and the Euro-Atlantic vibrancy has waned in the face of the world economic crisis. “The Russians are deeply upset and suspicious of what appears to be a lack of candor, understanding and realism with regard to U.S. plans for missile defenses. U.S. political leaders relentlessly deny basic technical facts that show that the current U.S. missile defense might well affect Russia.”⁸⁵ Despite the fact that the initial negotiations pertaining to the missile defense system were conducted solely between United States and Russia, Poland managed to interject itself into the process as a mediator as is typical for matters of arms and Euro-Atlantic security. Throughout all the variants of the proposed missile defense system the Polish position to host the interceptors has not changed. This strong desire to host the missile defense system and U.S. military forces angered Russia's civilian and military leadership. In May 2012, General Nikolai Makarov, Russia's most senior military commander said that “A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will be taken if the [missile defense] situation worsens,” and that Russia would counter NATO

⁸³ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet: U.S.-Poland Bilateral Defense Cooperation*, Washington, DC: White House May 28, 2011. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/28/fact-sheet-us-poland-bilateral-defense-cooperation>

⁸⁴ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet: U.S.-Poland Bilateral Defense Cooperation*, Washington, DC: White House May 28, 2011.

⁸⁵ George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “European Missile Defense: The Technological Basis of Russian Concerns,” (n.d.), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_10/LewisPostol

deployment by stationing short-range Iskander missiles in the Russian Kaliningrad exclave near Poland, creating the worst military tensions since the Cold War.⁸⁶ Russian President, Vladimir Medvedev, also stated that "... [he has] set the task to the armed forces to develop measures for disabling missile-defense data and control system," as well as that the new Russian strategic ballistic missiles "will be equipped with advanced missile defense penetration systems and new highly effective warheads"⁸⁷ He also reiterated the possibility of deployment of tactical missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave, which borders Poland. The perception of the Russian leadership is that the "...missile-defense system will rob their nuclear deterrent of its credibility and destabilize the balance of mutually assured destruction that has persisted since the Cold War."⁸⁸ Eventually the missile defense negotiations stalled and the Russian Defense Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, declared that: "We have not been able to find mutually acceptable solutions at this point, and the situation is practically at a dead end."⁸⁹

B. CONCLUSION

The proposed missile defense system and ongoing presence of the U.S. military personnel in Poland can be described as at least problematic. The changes in leadership of both countries caused a plethora of different variants of the plans for the missile defense system as well as the size, composition, and mission of the proposed American military presence in Poland. This seemingly secondary issue proved to be a main reason for the deterioration of U.S.-Polish relations as well as a cause of contention between members of European Union who embrace no single, unitary security policy towards Moscow and who, since 2007, have embarked on unilateral policies to their particular

⁸⁶ Bruno Waterfield, "Russia threatens Nato with military strikes over missile defence system," *The Telegraph*, May 3, 2012. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/9243954/Russia-threatens-Nato-with-military-strikes-over-missile-defence-system.html>

⁸⁷ David M. Herszenhorn, "Russia Elevates Warning About U.S. Missile-Defense Plan in Europe," *The New York Times*, November 23, 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/24/world/europe/russia-elevates-warning-about-us-missile-defense-shield-plan.html>

⁸⁸ S. Smithson, "Russia threatens to strike NATO missile defense sites," *The Washington Times*, May 3, 2012. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/3/russia-threatens-strike-nato-missile-defense-sites/?page=all>

⁸⁹ S. Smithson, "Russia threatens to strike NATO missile defense sites," *The Washington Times*, May 3, 2012.

benefit. Russia's strong opposition to both ideas only increases tension between all parties involved in the negotiations as well as the other countries in the region. The diametrically opposed positions of Poland and Russia about this issue mean that any decision pertaining to the missile defense system and stationing of the U.S. troops in Poland will alienate one of the parties involved, despite the reason for the choice.

VII. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF POLISH-U.S. RELATIONSHIP

A. CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF POLISH-U.S. RELATIONS

For various reasons analyzed in this work, the diplomatic and strategic relationship between United States and Poland has been deteriorating. As Poland matures as a democratic country in the international realm and in NATO the “honeymoon” period is over and some of Polish politicians, media, and a portion of general population misinterpret this conduct as a decline in relationship between U.S. and Poland. Additionally, since the departure of President George W. Bush and the introduction of new policies of President Barack Obama the deterioration of the relationship between those two allies accelerated somewhat. The golden age of Polish-American relations started in 1989 with the collapse of the Communist regimes in Russia and Eastern European countries and the statecraft that followed in the past decade. Poland was a major force in the process which led to the revolution of the European order supported by the United States along the way. In part, the policies of President Ronald Reagan and later President George H.W. Bush, as well as forces within society and state in central Europe accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Regime and supported the move toward independence among the Soviet Republics and what soon became in the 1990s the ex-Warsaw Pact nations. These policies included political, diplomatic, and economic assistance to the young governments eager to shake off the Soviet legacy. Poland was one of the primary recipients of this aid and in a short time became the strongest ally of the U.S. in the region along with the Czechs and less so other central European countries. During that time the security relationship between the two countries was growing steadily. Clinton Administration at first pushed for the creation of Partnership for Peace in 1994 (despite Polish skepticism) and in 1995 embraced the principle of NATO enlargement. Poland reciprocated this support by backing the United States in the international arena not only politically, but also by taking part in U.S.-led military actions around the world especially in the wake of the Sept. 11 terror assault on the U.S. and the Iraqi campaign of 2003.

Many times this support met with somewhat negative reception among Poland's European neighbors and allies whose interests diverged as was especially the case after Sept. 11. Poland's participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) and Operation Enduring Freedom (2002) in Afghanistan combined with the agreement to host the interceptor elements of the U.S. missile defense system were the main causes of this rift especially between Poland and the Russian Federation. Despite of this, the Polish government, general population, and military supported the longtime ally of their country, the United States of America. At the same time, as the years passed the burdens of expeditionary operations as well as the mixed fortunes of Western strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan became manifest, as did a Russian resurgence after years of quietude in the face of NATO enlargement with the offensive against Georgia in 2008. Added to this fact has been the onset of the world economic crisis, an event which contrasts sharply with the mood and posture of the mid and late 1990s.

B. DETERIORATING RELATIONSHIP

The election of President Barak Obama was not only a turning point in the U.S.-Poland relationship but also in the U.S.-Europe and especially in the U.S.-Russia relationships. The shifting of the priorities away from Europe, as well as to the so called "reset" of the relationship with Russia left many Poles feeling somewhat abandoned by the new U.S. administration. Additionally, the new policies introduced by President Obama pushed Poland further away from the U.S. and replaced the feeling of abandonment with a feeling of betrayal. "The shift in views is already becoming apparent. While during the presidency of George W. Bush, Poles were more supportive of the U.S. leader than almost any other country in the world, including the United States, a new survey shows a distinct cooling. Western Europe, which had shuddered at Bush, is strongly pro-Obama, while central Europe is more wary of the new U.S. leader's overtures to Russia.

[In 2009], the Transatlantic Trends poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund and other think tanks found that 44 percent of Poles backed Bush, one of the highest levels of support he had in Europe, while the controversial Texan had the favor of only

11 percent of the French. This year, only 55 percent of Poles support Obama, the lowest level in Europe, while 88 percent of the French like Obama.”⁹⁰

1. POLICY

Some of the policy missteps that contributed to this decline were the cancelation of the Bush-era missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic which “President Obama formally announced [on September 17, 2009, the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland]...with little notice given to either European capital. Both Warsaw and Prague had spent considerable political and diplomatic capital on the [MDS] third-site deal, and the perception was that the Kremlin had achieved a significant strategic victory.” Additionally, “In November 2009, it was reported that Moscow had simulated a war game in which Russian armed forces invaded Poland and nuclear missiles were fired. The deafening silence in Washington once again left Warsaw with the impression that the resetting of relations with Moscow was a greater priority for the U.S. than its traditional alliances, particularly NATO.”

2. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy between the United States and Poland was not immune to missteps and blunders. September 1, 2009, commemorated the 70th anniversary of outbreak of World War II. The absence of President Obama was noticed not only by Poles but also by rest of Europe as presented in the following article titled “Poland’s commemoration in the shadow of the presence” in German paper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. “On September 1 Gdańsk became the “world center” [while hosting] commemoration of the beginning of World War II 70 years ago...Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Vladimir Putin[and many other leaders] – were all supposed to come to the ceremony [70th anniversary of the beginning of World War II] . Such was the concept. Thus not only to show appreciation of Poland’s role as a participant in the war and [its] sacrifice, but also [to acknowledge] its new political

⁹⁰ Sally McNamara and Morgan Lorraine Roach, “President Obama Should Advance the Polish-American Relationship,” *The Heritage Foundation*, May 25, 2011. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/president-obama-should-advance-the-polish-american-relationship#_edn1

position: reconciled with enemies, Russia and Germany, surrounded by its allies, protected by America.”⁹¹ Also the Polish President, Lech Kaczyński declared that: “I cannot say that I am happy [about the level of the U.S. delegation].”⁹²

Perhaps the most significant misstep occurred on March 26, 2012, during a summit in Seoul where an unscripted moment between President Obama and Russian President Medvedev was captured by camera crews; the American president was recorded making a statement: “On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this, this can be solved, but it’s important for him [Vladimir Putin] to give me space...This is my last election,” Obama interjects. “After my election, I have more flexibility.”⁹³ Many critics interpreted the remark as a promise by President Obama to give in to Russian demands once the political danger of doing so during an election campaign had passed. Finally, in May 2012, during Medal of Freedom Ceremony for Jan Karski, President Obama stated: “Before one trip across enemy lines, resistance fighters told him [Jan Karski] that Jews were being murdered on a massive scale and smuggled him into the Warsaw Ghetto and a Polish death camp to see for himself.”⁹⁴ The President referred to the concentration camps run by Nazis in Poland during World War II as “Polish death camps.” The entire country of Poland was soon in an uproar, with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk publicly expressing his outrage in nationally televised remarks: “Yesterday’s words by President Obama offended all Poles...We always react the same way when ignorance, lack of knowledge, or ill will lead to such distortions of history.”⁹⁵

⁹¹ Konrad Shuller, “Polens Gedenken im Schatten der Gegenwart,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 29, 2009. <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/zweiter-weltkrieg-polens-gedenken-im-schatten-der-gegenwart-1839769.html>

⁹² Polska Agencja Prsowa, “Prezydent o delegacji USA: nie powiem, że się cieszę,” August 27, 2009. <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Prezydent-o-delegacji-USA-nie-powiem-ze-sie-cieszę,wid,11436202,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=1fa3a&ticsrn=3>

⁹³ David Nakamura and Debbie Wilgoren, “Caught on open mike, Obama tells Medvedev he needs ‘space’ on missile defense,” March 26, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-tells-medvedev-solution-on-missile-defense-is-unlikely-before-elections/2012/03/26/gIQASoblBS_story.html

⁹⁴ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President at Presidential Medal of Freedom Ceremony, Washington, DC: White House May 29, 2012. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/29/remarks-president-presidential-medal-freedom-ceremony>

⁹⁵ Polskie Radio, “Tusk: słowa Obamy dotknęły Polaków,” May 30, 2012. <http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/614684.Tusk-slowa-Obamy-dotknely-Polakow>

3. OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT OBAMA

The weakening of the relationship between Poland and the United States caused by the above mentioned policies and diplomatic missteps created a negative image of the United States in Poland and the region and was best summarized by the open letter to President Obama published in one of the major newspapers in Poland, *Gazeta Wyborcza* on July 16, 2009, which was signed by Central and Eastern European intellectuals and policy makers under the leadership of Lech Walesa, former leader of Solidarity movement and President of Poland, and Vaclav Havel, former Czech President. The main points of the letter stated that the “Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are no longer at the heart of American foreign policy,” and that abandoning the missile defense plan or giving Russia too big a role in it could “undermine the credibility of the United States across the whole region.” The letter is “Praising America’s historic support for liberal democratic values, the authors compare the widely different and unfortunate outcomes when America stood up for those values and how the region suffered when it did not, citing the “reality of Yalta,” a reference to the post-World War II division of Europe and the Iron Curtain that descended upon Central and Eastern Europe for nearly 50 years. If the “realist” view had prevailed in the 1990s, they would not be members of NATO or the EU. Similarly, they express the nervousness permeating their capitals today warning of their concern that under the Obama administration the United States and the major European powers might embrace a new contemporary division embodied in what they refer to as the “Medvedev plan for a ‘Concert of Powers’ to replace the continent’s existing, value-based security structure.” The authors conclude their Open Letter with a very nuanced but prophetic statement: “We, the authors of this letter, know firsthand how important the relationship with the United States has been. In the 1990s, a large part of getting Europe right was about getting Central and Eastern Europe right. The engagement of the United States was critical to locking in peace and stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Today the goal must be to keep Central and Eastern Europe right as a stable, activist, and Atlanticist part of our broader community.”⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Nicholas Dima, “Lech Walesa-Vaclav Havel: Leaders of Central-Eastern Europe Lament Rise of Revisionist Russia,” *Selous Foundation*, <http://www.sfppr.org/page.aspx?pid=395>

4. THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD

Following the open letter the Administration has slowly sought to repair relations with Poland and the CEE nations. President Obama completed in January 2010 the initiative begun by President Bush to extend NATO's Article 5 contingency plans for the defense of Poland and Baltic States countries. He also reestablished the plans for creation of somewhat reduced missile defense base in Poland which would protect not only the United States but also Poland and other NATO countries. The United States will also create a permanent aviation detachment in Poland which will be augmented with F-16 and C-130 assets on rotational basis. "The stationing of NATO and U.S. assets in Poland has been a long-term goal of successive Polish administrations as a tangible demonstration of the U.S.-Polish defense relationship."⁹⁷ Although the early policies and diplomatic miss-steps of his Administration strained the relationship between the United States and Poland, President Obama has an opportunity to repair the relations with Warsaw and reaffirm the America's commitment to Poland, the CEE region and NATO. Some of the U.S. initiatives in Poland such as exploration of the potential shale gas fields, possible cooperation in the construction of a nuclear power plant, and military cooperation and exchange programs are examples of the mending of the Polish-American relationship.

⁹⁷ Sally McNamara and Morgan Lorraine Roach, "President Obama Should Advance the Polish-American Relationship," *The Heritage Foundation*, May 25, 2011.

VIII. DEFENSE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES DURING GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND AUSTERITY.

A. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND NATO

In 2007, the world financial system endured a near fatal collapse that is reminiscent of the stock market crash of 1929. This event quickly left its mark on war and peace as well as the European order of states and the trans-Atlantic link. The shadow of a depression also had grave implications for the people of central Europe, whose fate in the world wars had been tied with the failure of the liberal world order and the rise of totalitarianism at their expense. “The creation of the Organization in NATO under Articles, III, IV, V, and IX of the treaty in the years 1949-1954 was guided by the principle of thrift and the equitable sharing of the burden under Article III in which strictures of economy and savings reigned uppermost even in the attempt to create a NATO battle collective defense.”⁹⁸ Therefore, “austerity has been a constant feature of the lives of cabinets, treasuries and general staffs, especially in the leading NATO nations, for a very long time in their democratic civil military relations. It is hardly the exception, but more the norm.”⁹⁹ This global quasi-depression affected all aspects of the government in the United States and E.U., including the military spending overstretched by the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns as well as a decade of alliance cohesion and burden sharing dynamics of questionable merit. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen called the financial crisis and the tight budgets it caused the biggest problems the alliance will face in coming years”. During a meeting of NATO defense ministers in April 2012 he concluded that: ‘We have to set the right priorities, specialize and concentrate on what we can do best and what is most urgently needed’”, adding that a “‘smart defense’ policy was needed to spend money more intelligently...[In one of the examples] the military planners put together a list of 20 to 30 top projects they want political leaders to sign off on. Another example of ‘smart defense’ is the alliance’s

⁹⁸ Donald Abenheim, “The Democratic Civil-Military Relations of Austerity: Thoughts About the Past and Present” *Naval Postgraduate School*, 10.

⁹⁹ Donald Abenheim, “The Democratic Civil-Military Relations of Austerity: Thoughts About the Past and Present” *Naval Postgraduate School*, 13.

European missile defense system. The United States provides the defensive system, which Europeans contribute to paying for over the long-term.”¹⁰⁰ Retrenchment in defense spending is a normal process in episodes, made more telling by the endurance of the world financial crisis as well as the more than ten years of high spending in the U.S. because of the Iraqi and Afghan campaigns. In the same way, “The decade of the 1990s, which began in a recession connected with the 1990-1991 Gulf War, was a time of relative austerity, and it, too, saw fights within the U.S. government and defense department over the shape of budget, strategy, and alliance statecraft in the years leading up to 11 September 2001...”¹⁰¹

B. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND U.S. POLICY ON MISSILE DEFENSE

The economic crisis in the United States contributed, in part, to the cancellation of the Bush-era missile defense program and later on to significant cost-reductions of the system to be deployed in European theater. The expensive development and interceptor missiles in the previous system were replaced with less costly missiles based on the U.S. Navy SM-3 missiles. In view of the 2012 NATO summit, “US President Barack Obama declared during the Western military alliance’s summit meeting in Chicago that the missile shield had an ‘interim capability’.” The operational first stage of the shield consists of a radar facility in Turkey and US ships with anti-missile interceptors in the Mediterranean Sea. The command and control center is located in Ramstein, Germany. The missile defense shield is scheduled to be fully operational by 2020, with SM-3 missile facilities to be stationed in Poland and Romania.”¹⁰²

Because of the double reversal of the decision regarding deployment of the missile defense system in Poland and mixed signals sent by the United States by the deployment of “unarmed” Patriot missile batteries to Poland, the Polish President Mr.

¹⁰⁰ Deutsche Welle, “Crisis leaves NATO counting its pennies,” May 20, 2012. www.dw.de/crisis-leaves-nato-counting-its-pennies/a-15964322

¹⁰¹ Donald Abenheim, “The Democratic Civil-Military Relations of Austerity: Thoughts About the Past and Present” *Naval Postgraduate School*, 13.

¹⁰² Deutsche Welle, “NATO declares first stage of missile shield operational,” May 21, 2012. www.dw.de/nato-declares-first-stage-of-missile-shield-operational/a-15964619

Komorowski in a magazine interview said: “Our mistake was that by accepting the American offer of a shield we failed to take into account the political risk associated with a change of president,” and “We paid a high political price. We do not want to make the same mistake again. We must have a missile system as an element of our defences.” Such a statement reveals the normal process of learning about statecraft that goes with alliance membership and echoes insights had by older allies over the decades.¹⁰³ “President Komorowski’s call for the creation of Polish missile defense is not about Polish-American relations, but about the future of Poland’s security. Poland needs stronger anti-aircraft and anti-short and medium missile defenses independent of any proposed American MD system. The two systems are complimentary, not competing. The Polish MD system is to be financed from the savings of winding down the war in Afghanistan, and from the growth of military budget over the coming years related to Poland’s economic growth (Polish law mandates that 1.95 percent of GDP is spent on defense). According to initial estimates, it would be a pricy program, costing zł.8 billion to zł.15 billion over the next 10 years.”¹⁰⁴

In addition to the missile defense site in Poland, the United States Air Force will maintain a small detachment of personnel and rotate F-16 and C-130 aircraft to Poland. “Despite the small scale of the U.S. operation, “this is an extremely significant development,” said Andrew Michta, senior trans-Atlantic fellow and director of the Warsaw office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “This is regarded here as mostly a political signal” that the United States “is serious about the security of Poland and its neighbors, (the other) NATO allies in the region.”¹⁰⁵ This small and less expensive solution is the new “lily-pad” type of base that many of the U.S. experts see as the future model for the overseas presence. In addition to the small footprint the U.S. forces will be collocated with the host nation’s military forces and share infrastructure,

¹⁰³ The Telegraph, “Polish President accuses Obama of Betraying Poland,” August 6, 2012.

¹⁰⁴ Warsaw Business Journal, “Polish missile defense plan puts Poland first,” August 13, 2012. <http://www.wbj.pl/article-60050-polish-missile-defense-plan-puts-poland-first.html>

¹⁰⁵ Jennifer H. Svan, “USAFE to establish first U.S. aviation detachment in Poland this year,” *Stars and Stripes*, February 14, <http://www.stripes.com/news/usafe-to-establish-first-u-s-aviation-detachment-in-poland-this-year-1.168576>

conduct combined training, and operations. The base requires only a fraction of funding comparing to the traditional military installation and it accomplishes the goals of forward presence and more important shows the political commitment.

C. BURDEN SHARING IN TIMES OF AUSTERITY

“The pooling and sharing of security, defense, military forces and weapons symbolizes a plainly urgent and eminently sensible policy. It is the only real way for the future.”¹⁰⁶ The uncertain outcomes of the initial economic policies implemented by the Obama administration at the beginning of the financial crisis are holding hostage funding for many government programs and departments. The Department of Defense consumes the largest portion of the U.S. discretionary budget.¹⁰⁷ As the need for austerity and reduction in government spending becomes inevitable, proposed cuts place the military at the front of future spending reductions.¹⁰⁸ Since the United States is the largest single contributor, both militarily and financially, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,¹⁰⁹ the reduction of its budget will significantly reduce NATO’s funding and readiness; therefore, the “Smart Defense as outlined by the NATO Secretary General at the Chicago Summit this year [2012] plainly indicates the way ahead in the face of diminished treasure and the need to employ mutual aid and self-help for the ends of the Alliance.”¹¹⁰ The disproportion of the contributions was and still is seen by many as the shortcoming of the NATO. The criticism of this imbalance most often originated on the American side of the alliance, but lately, some of the Europeans are voicing a similar rhetoric as evident in the following statement made by the United Kingdom Defense Secretary, Liam

¹⁰⁶ Donald Abenheim, “The Democratic Civil-Military Relations of Austerity: Thoughts About the Past and Present” *Naval Postgraduate School*, 16.

¹⁰⁷ Congressional Budget Office, *The U.S. Federal Budget*, Washington, DC: CBO, n.d. <http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/budgetinfographic.pdf>

¹⁰⁸ White House, *OMB Budget FY 2012*, Wahington, DC: White House 2012. www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/hist03z2.xls

¹⁰⁹ U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. *NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and Current Issues* by Carl Ek. CRS Report RL30150. Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, April 22, 2009, 8. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142718.pdf>

¹¹⁰ Donald Abenheim, “The Democratic Civil-Military Relations of Austerity: Thoughts About the Past and Present” *Naval Postgraduate School*, 16.

Fox: “When we look at the sometimes pathetic contributions being made by some countries inside NATO, the European elements of NATO cannot expect the US to come to our aid on every occasion. Far too many of our partners are still trying to get a free ride and they should regard Libya as a wake-up call. The U.S. will not always be there to bail them out and if they want an insurance policy they should think about paying the premium.”¹¹¹

D. THE FUTURE

All of the problems created by the global economic crisis will directly affect the future policies and strategy of the American armed forces as well as the NATO alliance. The creation of additional overseas bases is hard to justify in this age of austerity. “Since debt debates heated up last summer and with the Pentagon soon to release the details of budget reductions, a growing group of prominent politicians across a broad political spectrum has called for reducing U.S. military installations and forces overseas to produce significant savings.”¹¹² This sentiment is also growing among the general population in the United States. The MDS and U.S. bases in Poland are currently being created as planned, but the full implementation of the project is closely tied to economic recovery and global security situation.

¹¹¹ Joel Shenton, “UK’s Fox criticises European NATO contribution,” *Public Service Europe*, July 14, 2012. <http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/611/uks-fox-criticises-european-nato-contribution>

¹¹² Raymond DuBois and David Vine, “Bipartisan Strategy Takes Shape To Close Overseas U.S. Bases, January 29, 2012. <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120129/DEFPEAT05/301290001/Bipartisan-Strategy-Takes-Shape-Close-Overseas-U-S-Bases>

IX. CONCLUSION

The Polish–American security relationship is based on shared values and common interests that nonetheless are embedded within the realities of alliance cohesion and international politics. The present day bilateral relationship is further an expression of the place of Poland in the European system of the past and the dictates of burden sharing in present, that is, how NATO works. The latter is a subject arcane even to experts. In this connection, advocates of Polish security remind all critics that Poland was one of the four leading countries in the coalition present in Iraq from the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom. More than 2,500 Polish soldiers continue to stand alongside the United States and other coalition forces in Afghanistan—significantly, with no national caveats imposed by Warsaw.¹¹³ As one of the closest allies of the United States, Poland has been and still is relying on the bilateral nature of this relationship for legitimacy and protection. Despite being a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Poland is seeking additional security assurances and defense cooperation from the United States, because of the concerns that the international system of great powers on its borders will shift against it. Such fear may well be of greater gravity in the year 2012, granted the cosmos of forces at work in Europe and beyond.

A. SUMMARY

1. INITIAL PLANS

After the announcement by the Bush administration in 2007 of plans to create a missile defense system in Eastern Europe with an anti-missile interceptor site in Poland and later on possibility of additional U.S. military bases on Polish territory, the negotiations between Polish and U.S. government began in the final phases of the Bush administration and the on the eve of a Russian offensive against NATO enlargement. The various aspects of the system, as well as increased in bilateral cooperation between United States and Poland were discussed. After the election of Donald Tusk as Prime

¹¹³ Sally McNamara and Morgan Lorraine Roach, “President Obama Should Advance the Polish-American Relationship,” *The Heritage Foundation*, May 25, 2011.

Minister of Poland on November 9, 2007, the new cabinet insisted on additional concessions that included U.S.-made PAC-3 Patriot missile batteries and other modernization aspects associated with the advancement of the Polish Armed Forces. The American side was not eager to deploy this expensive weapons system to the Poles and instead, after lengthy negotiations, agreed to a rotational presence of U.S. Army PAC-3 Patriot missile units in Poland and other concessions. These additional negotiations further delayed the signing of the agreement. Finally, on August 14, 2008 the United States and Poland signed a preliminary accord allowing the placement of 10 U.S. interceptors on Polish territory.¹¹⁴ In the meantime, the Russian war against Georgia marked the climax of NATO enlargement, together with the onset of the global economic crisis and the advent of a new administration in the U.S. Such changes of context and policy are the norm in Atlantic security, but such changes proved especially noteworthy in the U.S. Polish relation focused on alliance cohesion in the form of anti-missile defenses.

2. THE NEW PLAN

Delays in negotiations pushed the project very close to the presidential elections in the United States. Additionally, the Polish Sejm (the legislative branch of Polish government) did not ratify the agreement until after the election of President Obama. With this change, the future of the missile defense system in Eastern Europe became uncertain and on September 17, 2009, the Obama administration announced the cancellation of the Bush-era MDS and the creation of scaled-down system at a significantly later date of 2015-2018. Later, the creation of a permanent U.S. Air Force in Poland with rotations of F-16 and C-130 aircraft was finalized in 2012.

3. POLICY AND POLITICS

Despite the great importance assigned to this endeavor by the Polish side no changes to the official policy were made by the Polish government for their own reasons. None of the national security documents mention any present or future changes in policy,

¹¹⁴ Katya Andrusz, "U.S., Poland Reach Agreement on Missile Defense (Update2)," Bloomberg, August 14, 2008. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aakWCWAS_u34

strategy, or tactics caused by the agreement to host this high-tech defensive weapon system of the presence of U.S. Air Force personnel and assets within borders of Republic of Poland. The reason for this fact lies outside the analysis of this study, but might well be the result of Polish internal politics.

In lieu of the absence of any policy changes pertaining to the MDS and/or American military presence in Poland, one would expect a minimal political significance associated with the project or none at all. However, that would be a very wrong assumption about policy and strategy. The Polish international position in internal politics is very cognizant of the U.S. bases in Poland. Any announcements from the U.S. Administration about the MDS and U.S. military bases in Poland are likely to cause a debate among political parties, main stream media, and Polish citizens. The Political capital associated with this endeavor is very significant and is often used by both the ruling coalition and the opposition in parliamentary debates, TV, radio, and press interviews, and political campaigns.

In part, the changing of positions regarding the future and scope of the project of MDS and the U.S. military presence in Poland contributed to the instability of U.S.-Polish relations. Scaling back the scope of MDS amidst the criticism of the project by Russian leadership combined with the announcement of a “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations created a perception of catering to Russia by the Obama Administration. This caused further decline of the diplomatic relations and overall rapport between Poland and the United States. .

4. REACTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Russian Federation was strongly opposed to missile defense system and placement of U.S. troops in Eastern Europe and especially on territory of Poland. The announcement of the establishment of the MDS site and U.S. military base(s) in Poland triggered criticism among Russian politicians and military leaders with strongest statement coming from the Russian Federation’s senior military commander, General Nikolai Makarov, who insinuated the possibility of the use of destructive pre-emptive action in the event of a worsening situation pertaining to missiles and the deployment of

short-range Iskander missiles in the Russian Kaliningrad exclave near Poland, possibly creating the worst military tensions since the Cold War. The assurances of the purely defensive-nature of the missile defense system by both United States and NATO eased some of the tensions between these former Cold War adversaries. Nevertheless, the subject of missile defense system and American military bases in Poland is a “live-wire” in the Polish-Russian and American-Russian relations.

5. THE WAY FORWARD

The political and diplomatic difficulties in securing the existence of MDS and U.S. military bases in Poland were only exasperated by the global economic and financial crisis. The deteriorating economic situation in the United States and around the world put additional financial, political, and policy strain on the MDS and creation of another overseas base in Poland. As the domestic economic situation worsened the justification for this expensive project became harder. However, revisions to the plan made it more affordable while achieving the desire political, military, and diplomatic goals. The expansion of the area protected by modified missile defense system to all NATO-member countries further contributed to the support of the system both in the U.S. and in Europe.

Despite the increasing difficulties between the two allies and some public diplomacy missteps on the American side, the Polish government has fulfilled its commitment to the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan and in other areas. As time passed and both sides continued the dialogue, the diplomatic situation has improved and the relationship is moving in a similar direction. The initial actions taken by the Obama administration to further improve the relationship were, in the wake of the Caucasus war in 2008, the completion of the NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause to include defense of Poland and other Baltic states; followed by the creation of U.S. Air Force detachment in Poland, and the reaffirmation of the creation of the MDS site. Those were soon followed by other initiatives such as the exploration of potential shale gas fields, possible cooperation in the construction of a nuclear power plant, and military cooperation and exchanges. The improvement of the relationship between Poland and the United States signifies the ongoing realities of alliance cohesion and burden sharing, a

process that will take some time to reach the level it once had, but a process well worth the effort to strengthen a bilateral security bond that helps assure peace and freedom for the peoples of Europe and North America.

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