

**For the Record:
All U.S. Forces' Responses to
Situations, 1970-2000
(with additions covering 2000-2003)**

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Strategic
Studies**



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Summary

In the Spring of 2001, OPNAV N816 requested that CNA expand upon its December 2000 *U.S. Naval Responses to Situations, 1970-1999* study.¹ In that work, we had examined U.S. naval forces' responses to situations over a thirty year period from 1970 onward, not including the operations in Vietnam and in Caribbean drug traffic patrols. Our new tasking asked that we consider the record of U.S. Navy contingency response in the context of overall American military response activity over the last three decades. This report summarizes our examination of all services's responses, not just those of U.S. naval forces, with an extension through the year 2002.

The basic text of this study is divided into five sections:

- We commence with a very brief discussion of the study's assumptions and approach.
- We then present a section addressing the risks of numerology. Despite limitations in the scope of our examination, we were nonetheless presented with nearly 700 discrete events and over 60,000 response days of service activity over more than 30 years. While such numbers may be significant, there is a tendency in some quarters to draw conclusions primarily from the raw counts: number of cases, number of assets employed, the relative length of responses, etc. However, not all events are alike in their intensity, duration, or strategic significance (and these major factors are also not necessarily correlated). Some qualitative analysis is required if we are to understand the salience and importance of all these cases. We also had to be careful in

1. H. H. Gaffney, Eugene Cobble, Dmitry Gorenburg, Adam Moody, Richard Weitz, and Daniel Whiteneck, *U.S. Naval Responses to Situations, 1970-1999* (The CNA Corporation, CRM D0002763.A2/Final, December, 2000).

examining the apples-and-oranges comparisons inherent in cross-service comparisons. The section on numerology explains how we used quantitative analysis in our research with due regard for its limitations.

- Next, we follow with a review of the historical record of all responses to situations, excepting the humanitarian ones (in which U.S. forces did not go into harm's way).
- Fourth, we look at general trends that we have gleaned from the data, including the changing nature of U.S. military responses to situations, and variances in responses across time and between regions.
- We conclude with some key observations.

The spread sheets for all these non-humanitarian responses then follow.


After that, in an appendix, we present a more thorough analysis of the days each response entailed, for each service, in each decade. This analysis does cover the humanitarian responses. As we discuss in the "approach" in the next section, "days" are only one measure. They do not reveal the intensity of given operations and the gross numbers of forces the U.S. applied, and they are distorted by such routinized responses as the Maritime Interception Operation (MIO) in the Gulf before and after Desert Storm. As a matter of fact, the very few instances of real combat across the three decades (aside from Vietnam, which we don't cover) are very short.

Then we attach the spread sheets covering the humanitarian responses. As will be noted in those spread sheets, the U.S. Air Force has perhaps ten times as many humanitarian responses as the other services.

The U.S. military responded to international situations, including humanitarian responses, roughly 170 times in the 1970s (that's not 170 situations, but 170 responses), increasing that total by approximately one-third in the 1980s (to roughly 230 cases) and then again by approximately one-fifth (up to approximately 280 cases) in the 1990s. Add that altogether and you have a grand three-decade total

of just under 700 responses, with roughly 40 percent of the responses occurring since the end of the Cold War. This growth represents a significant increases in response totals, but when these cases are weighted in terms of cumulative duration of response by each service, one gets the sense of a far greater increase in U.S. military operations overseas in the 1990s. However, close examination shows that most of the increases in responses are for only four situations: Somalia, Haiti, the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo), and the Gulf, mostly to do with Iraq.

Figure 1 below displays the combined response-day totals for the four services by decade. Using the 1970s as a baseline (10,415 days), we see close to a doubling of response days in the 1980s (17,382 days), but then a three-fold increase beyond that level in the 1990s (66,930 days, or an increase of 285 percent).



What we saw in the 1990s was the routinization of operations in and around the former Yugoslavia and over and around Iraq. These were accompanied by the now-terminated operations in Haiti and Somalia,

which also stretched out longer than the kind of punctuated operations of, say, Grenada and Panama, in the 1980s. Did this constitute a big strategic change for the U.S.? We think not, notwithstanding the end of the Cold War—it has been the particular situations that have demanded the routinization of responses that we have seen. The Navy and Air Force maintained Southern Watch and Northern Watch over Iraq, and the Navy maintained (along with U.S. allies) the Maritime Interception Operation in the Gulf. The Army rotated personnel in and out of Kuwait for exercises. The Army continued to provide forces to SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo, but the Navy no longer has a particular response mission in the Adriatic once the peacekeepers were installed in Kosovo. Haiti and Somalia have not entailed “responses” since U.S. forces left those said countries, though if Osama bin Laden were to flee to Somalia, U.S. forces would be back in there—after 9/11, some U.S. forces have been stationed in and around Djibouti for this contingency, while U.S. allies (e.g., Germany and Spain) have patrolled the waters. These four situations took all the increased activity in the 1990s. It is hard to make strategic connections among them.

Department of Defense Responses to Situations, 2000-2003

Background

In previous analyses of DOD (i.e., all services) responses to situations across three decades—the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s—upon being ordered by the President/Secretary of Defense, we at CNAC established a baseline of “days” of the forces being deployed for such responses. We had noted a great increase in the 1990s above the baseline of such days, but almost all the increase was accounted for by interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia/Kosovo, and the containment of Iraq.

(It should also be borne in mind that simply counting “days” of operations tells us little about the size of an operation, its intensity, or its strategic importance. Indeed, the nine combat situations in which U.S. forces engaged from 1989 to 2003 (Panama to OIF), during which actual fighting took place (or almost did in the case of Haiti), took only 6 percent of the total days of the period.)

The pattern of responses 2000-2003

We at CNAC have extended the compilation and analysis of responses to situations across the first 3.5 years of the 21st century. The list is attached. We find that the patterns of the 1990s persist.

- Peacekeeping continues in Bosnia and Kosovo, with U.S. allies providing the greater part of the peacekeepers, and the U.S. Army providing the U.S. contribution.
- Operation Enduring Freedom in pursuit of al Qaeda, which began right after 9/11, continues, with continuing operations in Afghanistan, continuing LIO/MIO operations in the Indian Ocean, Gulf, and Med by the U.S. Navy and allied navies, which can be accomplished during routine deployments (the navies have only caught two al Qaeda people, but perhaps they serve as a deterrent), includes the contingent positioning of forces in Djibouti, and also an intermittent U.S. involvement in the Philippines-legally constrained as training, but coming close to combat. The occasional combat air patrols over U.S. cities are also part of Enduring Freedom.
- Operation Iraqi Freedom, while representing a short period of major combat, now promises to drag on as an occupation, perhaps for years. There was an associated deterrent operation directed at North Korea during Operation Iraqi Freedom, to include the deployment of the USS Carl Vinson to cover for the deployment of the USS Kitty Hawk to the Gulf, and the deployment of bombers to Guam.
- Operation Iraqi Freedom did have the benefit of terminating the Iraqi containment operations that had dragged on across the 1990s, consuming most of the days of responses in that decade. These operations included Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch to enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq, and the MIO in the Gulf to intercept Iraqi smuggling of oil and other goods.

These were the major operations.

Otherwise, the smaller responses to situations were few and occupied few days. The small U.S. presence in East Timor in support of the Australians terminated last December after three years. There were three shows-of-force/contingent positionings lasting a total of 23 days. There were two NEOs, lasting for a total of 20 days. There were three successive contingent positionings in anticipation of the movement of Cubans emigres commemorating losses of boat people, lasting a total of 8 days, and three humanitarian relief responses lasting a total of 103 days, including Venezuelan relief that had extended from 1999 into 2000. We may not have accounted for some U.S. Air Force humanitarian deliveries that may have taken place.

These small responses are the kinds that typically characterize the baseline, but so far in this decade they appear to be lower in number than the baselines of the previous 30 years.

In sum, the operation in Afghanistan and its associated operations in pursuit of al Qaeda (especially in Djibouti), and the likely long occupation of Iraq dominate the scene of the early 21st century, along with the continuing small U.S. Army contingents in Bosnia and Kosovo. Whether additional ground force personnel would be needed in Iraq or Afghanistan remains to be seen, depending as well on what contributions from other countries the U.S. can muster. The demands for U.S. forces for responses to other situations in this decade have been small so far. As of August 2003, three amphibious ships with 2,000 U.S. Marines embarked hovered off the coast of Liberia, but the Administration had made no decision to land them to keep the peace. Instead, a Nigerian force took the role.

Approach and Assumptions

The initial goal of this study was to compare the record of U.S. naval forces' responses with that of the other Services for the period between 1970 and 2000. After compiling these other cases, however, it became clear that the patterns across time and in regional locations of all service responses are not different from the patterns of U.S. naval forces responses. This is not surprising, since we had noted in our earlier report that the proportion of joint and coalitional responses had been growing across the decades.

Thus we constructed a comprehensive portrait of U.S. military response activity. As we identified cases, we assumed that they were all ordered by the President and Secretary of Defense, as the naval forces responses had been. That is, we assumed they were not initiated by the Combatant Commanders, and certainly not by the services themselves. We classified the responses as closely as possible to the classifications into which we had put the naval forces responses, e.g., show of force, combat, non-combatant evacuation, etc. The fit was pretty good, with the following exceptions:

- We found an additional category of responses done by the Air Force, that of transporting other countries' peacekeepers to situations. The other services did not do that.
- We found an overwhelming number of Air Force responses to humanitarian situations (e.g., natural disasters, not into harm's way). The Air Force had something like ten times the number of cases than the Navy, for instance. But we must remember that the naval responses we had analyzed entailed the movement of ships, whereas most of these Air Force responses entailed one or a few cargo aircraft. For the sake of comparisons and merging of all the services' responses, we have excluded these Air Force (and other services) humanitarian responses from our general strategic analysis, and treated them in an appendix.

As a final caveat, the President and Secretary of Defense have tended to “contingently position” naval ships across time, that is, moving them nearer a situation or holding up their redeployment until they had made a decision on how to use them or not. There is no apparent equivalent of “contingent positioning” for the other services. The closest may be the alerting of other services’ forces, e.g., of the 82nd Airborne Division, at their bases.²

“Numerology”

In analyzing responses to situations, there is a tendency to become bogged down in sheer numbers. One can lose sight of the tendency of numerical analysis to simplify and therefore to possibly distort reality. In conducting our analysis, we have been sensitive to several levels of numerology:

Numerology Level I: The simple number of cases

It has been customary in discussing patterns of operations to simply count the total number of cases. We found 660 total cases where U.S. military forces were diverted from their regular schedules in order to respond to situations during the 1970-2000 time period. Of these, the vast majority were humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. The complete breakdown is as follows:

- Combat—22
- Show of force—65
- Support of peacekeeping and military supply—64
- Contingent positioning and reconnaissance—50
- Protection of non-combatants (including evacuations)—83
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief—366

2. The Air Force may have been directed from time to time to move bombers to Guam or Diego Garcia—we have not been able to compile and analyze those instances in the data that was available to us.

The problem with looking at just these numbers is that short and low-impact responses are given the same value as long-term multi-service operations. But all cases are not equal. Even within the above categories, they vary enormously in terms of the size of the forces involved, the operation's duration, the resources (including munitions) expended, the extent to which forces are sent into harm's way, etc. Furthermore, some situations appear as multiple cases in the databases because of name changes during the course of continuing operations.

Numerology Level II: Days on operations

One possible way of correcting for the sheer numbers of incidental operations is to analyze the number of days these operations have lasted. Such an analysis solves part of the problem introduced by counting operations as single units. This data is addressed in some detail in the discussion below. At the same time though, focusing exclusively on the length of operations introduces new distortions. That is, very long, low-intensity operations, such as multinational interception operations (MIOs), count disproportionately. Recent experience has shown that the most significant operations, ones involving combat and with greater strategic implications—like Operation Allied Force about Kosovo, which lasted 78 days—may be much shorter than small routinized operations—such as a few U.S. Army personnel contributing to observation of the border treaty compliance between Ecuador and Peru, which lasted almost four years.

Numerology Level III: Number of units involved

The best way to measure the size and intensity of an operation is to take into account the number of units involved. This type of analysis would ensure that larger operations that are brief are given proportional weight to small but long-lasting operations. At the same time, it introduces the difficulty of creating a measure of operation size by comparing unlike types of equipment and units. How does one equate a Navy destroyer with an Air Force F-16 squadron or an Army engineering battalion?

While we have gathered some data in this area, we have not been able to gather enough to put together a complete record of the units

involved for all services. We have a virtually complete record of the ships used by the Navy in its operations, a partial listing of aircraft used by the Air Force, and sporadic listings of Army and Marine Corps units. The incomplete nature of this database precludes us from making an analysis at this level of numerology.

Numerology Level IV: What else do the forces do with their days?

Even if we use all of these different methods of measuring military responses to situations, we are left with the question of what do they do with the rest of their time. We may count 17,000 total days on operations in response to situations, as ordered by the President and Secretary of Defense, in the 1980s, but what is this a proportion of? In addition to unscheduled responses, there are scheduled deployments for the Navy, scheduled rotations abroad for the Army and Marine Corps, scheduled flights for the Air Force (e.g., MAC Channel flights), and regular exercises for all the services. Then there is the time spent on base or in port while training and preparing for the next deployment. We had started an effort to compile what else ships do with their days when deployed, but there was no interest in that at this time. Moreover, “when deployed” applies to ships, but ground and air units presumably return to their home bases, mostly in CONUS, after they conduct an operation or exercise.

Numerology Level V: Relating responses to what else is going on in the world

Altogether, the information on cases, their duration, and the forces, units, or numbers of ships and aircraft involved that we have compiled give us some ideas about the trends in responses across the decades. Perhaps more important in strategic considerations have been the places and regions in which the responses have taken place and the types of responses that have occurred. But all the information on responses only maps the responses of the U.S. services, not the resolutions of the situations or the strategic impacts the responses may have had.

We thus find that while tracking military operations provides a useful window on how the international political environment affects the

U.S. military and is in turn affected by the U.S. military, this kind of analysis cannot provide a complete picture of either the international environment or the overall impact of the U.S. armed forces on either individual situations or the world. This makes it difficult to describe U.S. foreign policy or to derive force structure needs from an examination of U.S. military responses to situations over the last 30 years.


U.S. military responses: 1970-1979

The 1970s, after Vietnam, were altogether quiet years for responses. They formed a kind of deceptive base for the business of responses. The war in Southeast Asia had dominated U.S. military activity from the mid 1960s onwards. Its end—at least, the conclusion of American involvement in 1973—marked the return of the Services to their routine deployment of forces to balance the Soviets, whether in the Mediterranean or in reconstituting U.S. forces in Europe after the Vietnam drawdowns.

This is not to say, however, that Cold War priorities “crowded-out” potential U.S. responses to situations through the decade. Indeed, in many instances, U.S. activities carried dual objectives: first, satisfy the local mission, and second, to counter Soviet forward presence and to deny them the opportunity to capitalize upon minor instability. Similarly, the so-called “Vietnam Syndrome”—the anti-interventionist reaction to the traumas of loss and defeat in Asia—did not divorce the United States from the world. Simply put, there was little for U.S. forces to do in the way of responses throughout the decade; in the meantime, modernization proceeded, exercises were conducted, and the Cold War deterrent posture maintained.

The charts shown in the following pages are expansions of those we used in the previous study of just U.S. naval responses. We have included all four services (we did not compile a separate data base for Special Forces), and we have added the category of support to peace-keeping operations cited earlier. We have divided them by regions. Note that the dominant picture in these charts is that of duration. The particular situations are derived from the data base at annex.

Europe-Africa, 1970s



In the Europe-Africa area, there were only short, scattered responses. While the 1973 Arab-Israeli war was a shattering event, rippling through the global economy and heightening Cold War tensions at sea in the Mediterranean, the main U.S. effort was to resupply Israel by air and sea. The Navy and the Air Force performed this mission while concurrently positioning to interpose themselves against the possible intervention of Soviet naval forces or other into the conflict. In the event, the Soviets did not interfere, though they provided resupplies to the Syrians and Egyptians, transiting Turkey in the process.


The 1973 war demonstrated the dependence of the developed world upon Middle Eastern oil supplies. This newly recognized sensitivity would become manifest in U.S. military responses mostly at the decade's end, and even then, it would be centered in the Persian Gulf, rather than the Mediterranean. There were only minor

responses by U.S. forces along the Mediterranean's Southern and Eastern littorals later in the 1970s, associated with Cyprus and Lebanon as those countries began their downward spirals into internecine conflict. The U.S. responses amounted only to contingent positioning—it did not introduce forces into Cyprus, and not into Lebanon until 1982.

- None of the Services played a significant role in the Cyprus war of 1974, though the Navy did employ an impressive array of forces to execute a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) and to signal U.S. concern to its NATO allies in Athens and Ankara—not that it made much difference.
- The first glimmers of trouble in Lebanon were appearing in this period, but all we show for the U.S. are some contingent positionings and NEOs. The civil war, whose origins extend back to the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, exploded in 1975. Within a few years, Lebanon was transformed from a thriving, cosmopolitan entrepot into a failed state shaped by sectarian violence, foreign occupation, and a loss of sovereignty that it has not recovered. The Navy deployed three times through the late 1970s to extract westerners from the anarchy, with Air Force support for one operation in 1976.

Outside of Europe and the Levant, there was even less activity. The Air Force had to transport peacekeepers to Zaire, and remove them from Rhodesia. There was also the first hint that the new Libyan republic led by Mohammar Qaddafi would be troublesome when two Libyan Mirages fired upon an Air Force C-130 conducting reconnaissance in 1973.

Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf, 1970s




In the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area, there really wasn't much response activity until the end of the decade, with the war in Yemen and U.S. need to reassure the Saudis and the fall of the Shah all happening in late 1978-early 1979. In fact, the region was devoid of any U.S. response activity until late 1973 when the U.S. deployed the Navy to prevent Yemeni intervention in the Bab el Mandeb Strait from threatening shipping through the Red Sea during the Yom Kippur War. Moreover, the presence of U.S. forces there also functioned to ease Saudi fears of Yemeni adventurism across their difficult-to-defend southern frontier. That said, the U.S. response consisted of rotating solitary surface combatants on station for 13 months. Later, the Navy conducted a few minor operations around the Horn of Africa and in response to Israel's Entebbe hostage crisis. The most significant U.S. engagement in the region through the mid-1970s was low key: the 1973-1974 Navy contingent positioning to signal U.S. displeasure with the Arab oil embargo. The Navy kept a single carrier battlegroup in the Indian Ocean for six months for this purpose. But

it did mark the beginning of episodic deployments of carriers in that ocean.

Finally, the U.S. conducted a combined Air Force and Navy response in 1979 to reassure the Saudis about the war in Yemen spilling over in their country. The U.S. deployed F-15s for an exercise there (rather than provide prematurely from its own inventory the F-15s the Saudis had bought), AWACS (so the Saudis would feel less blind), and the USS Constellation to nearby waters. The AWACS stayed there for a long time.

Strategically, however, the main U.S. responses in the 1970s in the Gulf area (and Yemen) were the massive U.S. security assistance and sales to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and even to Yemen, all of which were meant to assist the countries to defend themselves.

East Asia/Western Pacific, 1970s



In the East Asia/Western Pacific region, aftershocks from the Vietnam War required attention even as the area quickly ceased to be a locus of U.S. military activity. Half of all service responses in the region—8 of 14—through the decade dealt with the process of extracting ourselves from Indo-China, principally repatriating U.S.


citizens and soldiers from the war-zone, although the Air Force also conducted a lengthy operation transporting peacekeepers to Cambodia. This set of events also presented the one instance of combat (post-war) in the whole of the 1970s—the Mayaguez affair of 1975, a truly joint operation, but something of a cock-up.

The remaining cases are scattered. The Air Force provided air defense support to Taiwan for nearly three years while the Navy responded to interstate conflict in South Asia (i.e., the rather futile deployment of the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 India-Pakistan war) and Indo-China. Two North Korean provocations also figure prominently and were settled jointly with forces present in the area.

While U.S. responses in the region were unremarkable in their conduct (that is, no combat, except for the Mayaguez) and impact on national strategy, their duration and frequency ensured that the Pacific Command (PACOM) registered 45 percent of all U.S. responses in the decade.

Western Hemisphere-1970s

As shown on the chart on the following page, there were really no responses worth mentioning in the Western Hemisphere, except that the first signs of the troubles in Nicaragua appeared at the end of the period. The show of force with regard to the “discovery” of Soviet troops in Cuba—they had been there for a long time—was mostly a matter of internal U.S. politics.



Summary of the 1970s

The 1970s may have been a quiet time with regard to U.S. forces' responses, but those years were hardly quiet times, except for the Western Hemisphere. There were the two huge oil shocks attendant on the 1973 war and the fall of the Shah, accompanied by intense U.S. activity on Middle Eastern affairs (DOD practically discovered the Middle East for the first time in these years), and eventful evolutions of relations with the Soviet Union (through SALT, detente, Helsinki, MBFR, force improvements, etc.), the final lose of Vietnam after U.S. forces were withdrawn, and the disintegration of Lebanon. There were changes in the Horn of Africa, too—the Soviets gained Ethiopia and the U.S. gained Somalia, while diplomatically damping down the Ogaden War, but these events were not reflected in the responses of U.S. forces.

The military responses to situations that did occur during the decade were relatively minor affairs, primarily short-duration operations with little prospect for violent confrontation. Of the 60 events during the

during the decade, 29 involved either non-combatant evacuations or the transport of peacekeepers. There were two combat operations—the Mayaguez debacle and the one-day dust-up with the USS Liberty in 1973. There were 13 “shows of force,” or acts of overt signalling in which U.S. authorities positioned forces so as to convey American concern or interest. The remaining events were contingent positionings of U.S. forces, principally naval but sometimes incorporating Air Force and Army units. These cases involved U.S. forces placed on alert and relocated in order to better respond to a developing situation if called upon. Generally, they were not.

Finally, the bulk of other U.S. military activity remained concentrated along the traditional Cold War centers of gravity in Western Europe and the Northeast Asia. In both areas, the primary mission for the military was to deter the Soviets. That said, the responses show that while the U.S. was extricating itself from Southeast Asia, there was a concurrent movement of U.S. activity toward the Mediterranean’s southern and eastern littorals, particularly regarding Lebanon.

U.S. military responses: 1980 - 1989


In the 1980s, the U.S. forces' responses became more energized. The responses were longer relative to those in the 1970s, and there was greater likelihood of violent action. There were emergent concentrations of responses in both Southwest Asia and in the Eastern Mediterranean as the processes of state collapse (Lebanon) and social revolution (Iran) peaked. Significantly, the Middle East became a center of gravity for U.S. forces represented institutionally by the creation of first, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), which became Central Command in 1983. In the response record, however, this shift was manifest in high level of activity extending from the Gulf of Sidra to the Straits of Hormuz.

The decade was also marked by the onset of simultaneity of events. Not only was the United States doing more in the 1980s relative to the 1970s, it was responding to situations concurrently, particularly in the Europe-Africa and Persian Gulf regions.

Europe, Mediterranean, and Africa, 1980s

We see a response pattern for forces assigned to the European Command (EUCOM) that was focused on the long-term instability of just one country—Lebanon. Lebanon's status as center of gravity of conflict in the Middle East elevates the country to almost two-thirds of EUCOM's total response days for the decade and just over half of all U.S. responses in the region.

This concentration on Lebanon began in earnest with Israel's invasion in the summer of 1982, and then only expands through 1984, peaking at five simultaneous responses near the end of 1983—a series of events that included the insertion of a Marine battalion in Beirut for peacekeeping duties. U.S. engagement in Lebanon also generated some combat response activity, which occurred from mid-1983 to the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces in early 1984. That said, the vast bulk of U.S. response days involved contingent positioning by naval ships and some shows of force.



The extraction of the Marines, following their slaughter by the Hezbollah terrorist, led to a rapid decline of all U.S. response activity in the area. Nonetheless, Lebanon would continue to draw U.S. forces until decade's end as American citizens taken hostage in Beirut were gradually released, or in case of Marine Lt. Colonel William Higgins murdered, by Islamic radicals.

Ultimately, the United States accomplished very little for its troubles in the Levant. American participation did not curb the worst excesses of the Israeli invasion, nor did it prevent Lebanon from falling under Syrian suzerainty in 1989. Further, U.S. military forces played no role in the Taif Accords that ended the civil war.

American efficacy was somewhat better with regards to Libya in the 1980s. U.S. responses were more decisive than the frustrating operations in Lebanon. The United States responded to Libyan provocations eight times during the first half of decade, first positioning naval forces in 1981 to prevent Tripoli from capitalizing upon Anwar

Sadat's assassination that year. The Air Force was engaged in supply operations to Chad in response to Libyan adventurism there. (The Chad war was of intense interest in Washington, even though the resources applied to it were small and it generally escaped public notice).

The big dust-ups occurred in 1986 when Libya reacted to U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in the Gulf of Sidra, and later carried out the terrorist bombing of a disco in West Berlin favored by U.S. service personnel. The first event involved the U.S. Navy neutralizing immediate Libyan air, ground, and maritime threats. The second, named *El Dorado Canyon*, was a joint Navy-Air Force operation with a larger target set that included Qaddafi's residence. The Libyans managed one last bout of terrorism with the Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, in the early 1990s, but have been remarkably quiet since then.


Libya was not alone in the Mediterranean region in its attempts to use terrorism as a means of striking out against the West in general and the United States in particular. The 1980s were also the zenith of internationally-oriented Palestinian terrorism. The Navy alone responded to two air-liner hijackings in 1985 and 1986, while it was accompanied by Marine and Air Force units in two others.

Responses in Lebanon, coupled to troubles with Libya and terrorism, accounted for three-fourths of all U.S. responses in the EUCOM area in the 1980s. The remaining cases were short-duration, low-salience events. There were three situations in Sub-Saharan Africa: two peace-keeper transport operations involving Air Force units and a joint Air Force-Navy show-of-force off Liberia. The Cold War continued with a handful of cases scattered from Morocco to Poland. The Navy conducted contingent positionings in the Baltic and the Adriatic in case the Soviet Union were to take some action there, with some Air Force support in the former instance.

Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf-1980s

In the Gulf and Indian Ocean, the repercussions of the Islamic revolution in Iran continued to draw U.S. forces deeper into the region. This was immediately manifest in the disastrous *Desert One* joint rescue

operation conducted in late 1980. Following that debacle, the U.S. focus shifted to containing the Iraq-Iran war, preventing it especially from spilling over into Saudi Arabia. The vast bulk (77 percent) of the response days involving Naval and Air Force shows of force were designed to reassure Saudi Arabia that the U.S. would protect it against the combined threats of both Islamic revolutionary fervor in Iran and the aggressions of Saddam Hussein.




A good example of that reassurance effort is seen in the Air Force's lengthy show of force operation in Saudi Arabia from late 1980 until mid 1989, effectively during the length of the Iran-Iraq War. The service conducted an eight-year surveillance and deterrence operation over the kingdom with tanker and AWACS aircraft. For naval forces, it looked like a series of disconnected escort operations, culminating in the joint operation Earnest Will escorting of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers.

Earnest Will was one of only two harm's way operations conducted during the period in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (the second was Praying Mantis, which one could regard as a component of the first). The Iran-Iraq war that necessitated both of them triggered a long-term response pattern by the U.S. focused on preserving the stable flow of OPEC oil from the Persian Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz, which the United States continues to pursue today.

Thus the 1980s saw the Persian Gulf even further dominate CENTCOM's share of response days (97 percent), although joint operations dropped from roughly one-half of all response days to less than one-fifth. This was due—again—to individual efforts by the Air Force and Navy in lengthy shows-of-force operations which accounted for roughly three-quarters of all response days.

East Asia/Western Pacific, 1980s



The East Asia-Pacific region was quiet during the period—some quick reactions upon events in Korea, and upon the shooting down of KAL

007. The Philippines was in turmoil across the period, but this hardly shows up in U.S. responses.

If one removes Vietnam/Cambodia and Taiwan from the picture in the 1970s, you would end up with a pattern very much in line with the subsequent 1980s: completely scattered responses dominated only by recurring brief situations. Moreover, what does occur in the region places only a marginal burden on U.S. forces.

The vast majority of responses in the region—approximately 87 percent—were joint. This was due to fact that the two concentrations of U.S. responses in the area, 6 events pertaining to Korea and two in Philippines—utilized forward-deployed forces based in the countries, where there were continuous and diversified U.S. military presences.

No combat operations occur in the Pacific theater in this decade. In fact, PACOM accounts for extremely few combat response days for the entire three-decade period (a mere 4 days, all for the response to the Mayaguez hijacking). This measure, of course, ignores the bloody conflict in Vietnam, but points up the fact that, outside of that one conflict, U.S. response activity in the region has been amazingly “pacific,” in addition to being infrequent, sporadic, and typically of very short duration.


In short, the 1980s were a very quiet decade in Asia, at least as far as U.S. forces’ responses to situations go.

Western Hemisphere, 1980s

In the Western Hemisphere, there was considerably more activity than in the previous decade. Indeed, Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM) heyday was clearly the 1980s, when it accounted for almost one-third of all U.S. response days in the world. Three situations account for this increased prominence:

- U.S. efforts to destabilize the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua (i.e., the support of the so-called Freedom Fighters operating out of El Salvador)
- The invasion of Grenada in 1983 to topple a pro-Marxist regime

- The intervention in Panama in 1988 to apprehend Manuel Noriega.



While the combat operations in Grenada and Panama were strategically significant in themselves, the main Cold War strategic story was the support to El Salvador against the Communist guerrillas there and the support of the Contras in their guerrilla war in Nicaragua. Aside from some naval shows of force, the main U.S. forces effort—the rotation of forces “for training” in Honduras—does not show up as “responses.”

Absent those three key situations, one could reasonably assume that Latin America would have retained the same pattern of infrequent interventions as the 1970s.

Grenada and Panama accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total response days for the decade, with much of those activities involving

joint responses (although joint responses accounted for less than a majority of the total response days).

Despite the two well-publicized combat operations in those states, the vast bulk of the decade's response days centered on shows of force (Nimrod Dancer in Panama) and peacekeeping operations (follow-on operations by the Army in Grenada). All three operations were designed to bring stability to the countries following the U.S. rapid-fire interventions.

Summary of the 1980s

What we see in the 1980s is somewhat more concentrated and sequential responses—Lebanon, Libya, Central America—but the central strategic change was in the Persian Gulf, with near-continuous operations, but still short of routine. Again, combat situations were quite short.


Operations in harm's way, however, are only one measure of U.S. response activity. The quantitative surge in events meant greater simultaneity in the 1980s. This was particularly true in the Mediterranean where concurrent crises in the Levant and the Maghreb kept both the Sixth Fleet and the United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) busy through most the decade. Simultaneity in the SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM AORs was less pronounced, occurring largely due to lengthy surveillance and peacekeeping support operations in those areas.

Strategically, the 1980s witnessed growing U.S. involvement in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The conflicts generated by turmoil in Libya, Lebanon, and Iran kept the Navy and the Air Force quite busy. This level of activity did not preclude forward forces from also pursuing traditional Cold War missions of deterrence and surveillance against the Soviets. Nonetheless, containing the spillover-effects from these events dominate U.S. responses in both the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean areas.

U.S. military responses: 1990 - 1999

The 1990s were a period of considerable response activity for the U.S. military. The end of East-West tensions in the early years of the decade were accompanied by turmoil in the South. Events in Korea, Haiti, Liberia, the Balkans, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf kept U.S. forces busy—so much so that, at first glance, one might conclude that the United States was overburdened during the decade.

Europe and Africa, 1990s



In the EUCOM area of responsibility, persistent problems in the Balkans from the early 1990s onwards led to joint U.S. military activity in the region which continues to the present day. For the most part, U.S. operations in the area have been peacekeeping and peace-enforcement actions in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo, with five lengthy operations accounting for the overwhelming majority of the days. That said, there were a number of punitive airstrikes in mid-decade and a major regional contingency over Kosovo in 1998.

Serbian and Croatian irredentism fueled the wars which necessitated the long series of connected responses that characterized U.S. and allied involvement in the area. While the more rabid strains of nationalism are subsiding, there is enough ill-feeling and residual violence (particularly in Kosovo and Macedonia) to necessitate a continued U.S. and allied presence for the foreseeable future. One must remember that the U.S. has never contributed more than one-third of the forces on the ground for these continuing operations.


This pattern denotes a substantial reorientation of U.S. military responses along the Mediterranean littorals, ending a three-decade trend of response day loads largely concentrated outside of the European area. In terms of the category of responses, EUCOM's reorientation over the study period was pronounced. While the 1970s featured a lot of EUCOM NEO activity in the Middle East (that is, in Lebanon), the 1990s was dominated by peacekeeping activities in the Balkans.

Beyond the Mediterranean, state collapse in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and in Central Africa produced a string of NEOs, conducted principally by the Navy if the U.S. military were involved at all, though sometimes in coordination with other services. Most evacuations of civilians from troubled countries didn't involve U.S. forces.

Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf, 1990s

U.S. military responses reached a new level of simultaneity beginning with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Following the "short" 40-plus days of Desert Storm, the U.S. was tied down containing Iraq continuously in the Persian Gulf. From 1990 on, the U.S. engaged in three to six coterminous operations for almost the entire length of

the decade. This involved the continuous MIO (Maritime Interception Operation) and Northern Watch and Southern Watch operations (even though Northern Watch was run out of EUCOM, it was about a Middle Eastern situation; we have not analyzed responses strictly from some UCP standpoint, but only as it might have been convenient). They became so routine that the Air Force devised its AEF concept to provide for predictable rotation of its wings. Rotation had not been necessary back in the 1980s—the responses were disconnected.



U.S. response activity in the Persian Gulf region followed four distinct phases:

- The original plusing-up occurs with the Desert Shield/Storm response cluster of 1990-1991.
- Following a slight lull after the conclusion of Desert Storm, responses accumulate over the 1991-1993 timeframe as the U.S.

progressively involves itself in various UN-sanctioned denial activities (such as the southern no-fly-zone) and begins retaliating for Iraq's non-compliance regarding UN efforts to locate and destroy storehouses and manufacturing facilities for WMD.

- The third and highest frequency wave of activity begins in 1996, when the U.S. launches a series of combat strikes against Iraq, especially with cruise missiles.
- That burst of response activity gives way, starting in late 1997, to a lower level of involvement more in line with the early 1990s, a pattern that continued right to the retaliation in Afghanistan after 9/11/2001 and the final overthrow of Saddam's regime in April 2003.


The growth of U.S. response activities across the 1990s was characterized by joint operations, largely due to the lengthy no-fly-zone activities, which we classified as combat responses.

Further South in the CENTCOM AOR, a minor response cluster emerged concerning Somalia during the first half of the decade—minor, that is, in terms of days as compared to the Balkans and the Gulf, but highly traumatic for U.S. self-esteem and U.S. reputation around the world.

East Asia/Western Pacific, 1990s

Only in the East Asia-Pacific region were the patterns of the previous two decades continued. That is, there were only a few short "responses." Compared to the voluminous response activity in CENTCOM and EUCOM (and even the heightened activity in SOUTHCOM), PACOM's pace of response activity in the first post-Cold War decade was irrelevant to the strategic picture of the area.


Over the 1990s, PACOM accounted for one percent of all contingency response days, down from two percent in the 1980s, and down from nearly half (45%) in the 1970s. No combat responses occurred, and the lengthiest operation by far involved the minor support provided to Australian peacekeepers in East Timor.



The sole U.S. response involving China in the entire decade was the show of force in 1996 upon China’s “testing” missiles into waters near Taiwan’s ports in order to influence the outcome of the Taiwanese presidential elections. It was also the first response since a mere contingent positioning during China’s short invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (the only other response involving China in the entire three-decade period). That said, one cannot deny the event’s strategic impact. The U.S. response in 1996 affirmed American support for Taiwan’s security and has not had to be repeated.

Elsewhere in the theater, North Korean intransigence and Indonesia’s long downward spiral drew a little U.S. attention. These events, like nearly all the rest the region were split between the Navy and the Air Force. East Timor provided the only joint operation in the region for the entire decade.

Western Hemisphere, 1990s



The main series of events in the Western Hemisphere was the largely Navy operations around Haiti. Indeed, this roughly two-and-a-half-year response cluster (mid 1993 through 1995) accounted for almost half of all response days in the region. There have been no more responses involving Haiti since 1996, though boat people could require some Navy activity in the future.

One single and very lengthy (1,334 days)—albeit low strategic significance—Army response in South America, where a small contingent contributed to the overall OAS effort to maintain the truce along a disputed section of the border between Ecuador and Peru, distorts the SOUTHCOM picture for the decade. Absent this one operation:

- Haiti would have accounted for nearly 90 percent of all response days.


- Peacekeeping operations would have accounted for just over one-third of all response days, not just over two-thirds.
- Just over half of the response days would have been joint, instead of only one-quarter.

Taking that distortion in account, it is clear that Haiti essentially defined the U.S. responses in the Western Hemisphere in the 1990s, along with the several hurricane-related humanitarian responses not captured here.

Summary of the 1990s

The U.S. military responded to international situations roughly 170 times in the 1970s (that's not 170 situations, but 170 responses), increasing that total by approximately one-third in the 1980s (to roughly 230 cases) and then again by approximately one-fifth (up to approximately 280 cases) in the 1990s. Add that altogether and you have a grand three-decade total of just under 700 responses, with roughly 40 percent of those responses occurring since the end of the Cold War. This growth represents a significant increases in response totals, but when these cases are weighted in terms of cumulative duration of response by each service, one gets the sense of a far greater increase in U.S. military operations overseas in the 1990s. **However, close examination shows that most of the increases in responses are for only four situations: Somalia, Haiti, the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo), and the Gulf, mostly to do with Iraq.**

Figure 1 below displays the combined response-day totals for the four services by decade. Using the 1970s as a baseline (10,415 days), we see close to a doubling of response days in the 1980s (17,382 days), but then a three-fold increase beyond that level in the 1990s (66,930 days, or an increase of 285 percent). Note: these day totals include purely humanitarian operations.



To compare this growth pattern with that of response cases, we see that cases increased roughly two-thirds from the 1970s to the 1990s (from 172 to 283), while combined response days grew more than six-fold (from 10,415 to 66,930). Whereas less than half of the responses of the last three decades took place in the 1990s (or 40%), more than two-thirds of the response days conducted during that same three decades took place since the end of the Cold War (66,930 of 94,727, or 71 percent).

While these numbers are impressive, one must remain careful to not draw inappropriate conclusions about the nature of the post-Cold War security environment and U.S. military responses to that environment. Although there were more events in the 1990s relative to past decades, the record actually shows a continuing pattern of response “clusters” which we first saw in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. In the 1990s, this phenomenon becomes more diffuse. EUCOM, CENTCOM, and SOUTHCOM all witness prolonged U.S. involvement regarding specific “problem” states: Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti respectively. These states

generated either continuous or sequential U.S. operations spanning years. Not only do these cases dominate the response record, American military activity regard some of them has become so routinized that it has arguably become difficult to class certain situations as contingencies.

What we saw in the 1990s was the routinization of operations in and around the former Yugoslavia and over and around Iraq. These were accompanied by the now-terminated operations in Haiti and Somalia, which also stretched out longer than the kind of punctuated operations of, say, Grenada and Panama, in the 1980s. Did this constitute a big strategic change for the U.S.? We think not, notwithstanding the end of the Cold War—it has been the particular situations that have demanded the routinization of responses that we have seen.

The Navy and Air Force maintained Southern Watch and Northern Watch over Iraq, and the Navy maintained (along with U.S. allies) the Maritime Interception Operation in the Gulf. The Army rotated personnel in and out of Kuwait for exercises. The Army continued to provide forces to SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo, but the Navy no longer has a particular response mission in the Adriatic once the peacekeepers were installed in Kosovo. Haiti and Somalia have not entailed “responses” since U.S. forces left those said countries, though if Osama bin Laden were to flee to Somalia, U.S. forces would be back in there—after 9/11, some U.S. forces have been stationed in and around Djibouti for this contingency, while U.S. allies (e.g., Germany and Spain) have patrolled the waters. These four situations took all the increased activity in the 1990s. It is hard to make strategic connections among them.




Trends in responses across the decades

As we looked across the three decades 1970-2000, there were a number of trends that became evident. First, the responses have become increasingly joint and coalitional over time. This largely reflects the characteristics of the four dominant series of operations: Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia/Kosovo, and Iraq. While the 1970s and 1980s saw just over one-third of total response days characterized as joint (and coalitional) operations, that percentage jumped to over half in the 1990s.


Most of that increase was due to the several lengthy operations mentioned above—most specifically the two no-fly-zones centered on Iraq and the various peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia and the failed states of Somalia and Haiti. In general, shorter-duration responses, which constitute the vast bulk of responses in terms of absolute numbers of separate operations, are characterized by single-service responses. PACOM features the lowest level of jointness, which fits with its overall pattern of very short-duration, scattered responses. In contrast, the two regions that featured the lengthiest and largest cluster of responses (Europe with former Yugoslavia and the Gulf with Iraq) registered the highest percentage shares of joint and coalition cooperation.

Second, there has been the ascendance of the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region as a center of gravity for U.S. response activity, especially since the fall of the Shah in 1979, but also reflecting Saudi Arabia's insecurity with regard to Yemen. As reflected in the following chart, the region has a near majority share of total response days over the three-decade period. If we consider that a fair portion of EUCOM's total response days likewise represent operations focused on the Middle East (e.g., regional terrorism, Arab-Israeli conflicts, Lebanon's lengthy civil war), then it is fair to say that roughly two-thirds of all U.S. response activities since 1970 have been centered in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

While this might seem obvious to observers who have tracked such responses since the Persian Gulf war of 1991, it is important to remember that the Cold War with the Soviet Union extended over two-thirds of the era in question. In effect, while the U.S. military may have spent the majority of the last three decades preparing for a major land war in Europe, it spent the bulk of its incidental response operations as an intervention force within the Southwest Asian theater.



If we breakdown U.S. activity by AOR, the emergence of Middle East dominance becomes even clearer:



While the share of response days in PACOM rapidly fell, albeit not necessarily in strategic salience over the past thirty years, CENTCOM expanded its share to almost 50 percent in the 1990s, up from a roughly one-third share for the region in the 1970s.


SOUTHCOM's percentage share had its heyday during the 1980s, when the Reagan Doctrine focused a lot of U.S. military response attention on the Communist threat represented by Nicaragua's Sandinista government and the guerrilla movement in El Salvador.

EUCOM's share of response days grew steadily and dramatically over the past two decades, with the bulk of the growth represented by the single case of the former Yugoslavia.

A third trend, or rather set of trends, in the data can be seen in the types of responses executed over the study period. As we see below, shows of force operations account for the lion's share of response days. This is largely due to the fact that we have categorized most sanctions-oriented responses (e.g., maritime interdiction efforts) as shows of force. Likewise, the vast bulk of combat-related responses are

accounted for by the two no-fly-zones currently maintained over northern and southern Iraq.


Adding up the shows of force share with peacekeeping and that portion of combat operations related to no-fly-zones, one can legitimately argue that over four-fifths of all response days involve rule enforcement against so-called rogue states (e.g., Serbia, Iraq) or failing states (Somalia and Haiti).



Examining how category shares have changed over the three decades, we see a number of distinct currents:


- The general decline of NEOs from almost one-fifth of response days in the 1970s to just over one-twentieth in the 1990s
- The relatively steady/modest increase in the role of peacekeeping operations
- The clear and absolute decline in contingent positioning
- The clear and absolute increase in show of force operations

- The growing increase in the relative share of combat operations.



As we see in the chart above, the profile of U.S. military responses does not feature growing percentage shares of the rescue of U.S. nationals. The U.S. spent less time in contingent positioning. Instead, it spent far more time enforcing rules: peacekeeping, sanctions, and episodic applications of combat force.

We also observe that certain response types are more prevalent in specific regions:



In terms of NEOs, Europe and Africa dominates by far, accounting for over half of all U.S. response days since 1970. This is explained by frequent activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, and most specifically, West Africa. In peacekeeping operations, Europe likewise dominates with almost a 50 percent share—that is, the Balkans.

We would add that of all the AORs, EUCOM's profile is the most evenly spread, reflecting the wider variety of roles it has played both within Europe (enforcement operations against Serbia) and outside Europe (shows of force in the Middle East and lots of NEOs in Sub-Saharan Africa)

Like EUCOM, SOUTHCOM's profile is dominated by the peacekeeping operations in Haiti, part of the post-Cold War concern with failed states.

In contingent positioning, PACOM accounts for the largest share at roughly one-third. This suggests that response activity in that region of the world is dominated by deterrence rather than actual conflict.

In shows of force, the CENTCOM region overwhelmingly dominates (roughly two-thirds), as one might expect given the constant operations to contain Iraq—which won't be necessary now (June 2003) after the regime change in that state.

Finally, in combat operations, CENTCOM also dominates in an overwhelming fashion (again, roughly two-thirds). This is explained primarily by the U.S. long-running effort to contain Iraqi aggression and to enforce inspections on Iraq.

Overall, it is clear that CENTCOM dominated the high-end response operations (show of force and combat), while EUCOM dominated the low-end response operations (NEOs and PKOs).

A Conclusion

There was a tremendous growth in the U.S. Military's total response days in the 1990s, but it was concentrated, as we have described, in only four situations. The growing average duration of what had previously been experienced as short responses and the super-elongation of operations focused on rules-enforcement signals a routinization of U.S. military response activity. The events of 11 September 2001, however, show that, no matter how institutionalized U.S. military activity becomes in managing the international system, bolts-from-the-blue can still occur. That said, this is not an uncertain world where the U.S. can't predict beforehand the nature of its likely responses. We know how we respond, the only question is where and when.

The routinization of responses boosts the overall prominence of show of force responses (violence containment) and diminished the overall role of contingent positioning. The U.S. Military is less in the business of preventing war among the world's advanced economies and more about dealing with instability in backward regions.

Indeed, once you strip away the three main response clusters of the past two decades (roughly 20 years in the Middle East, one decade in

the Balkans, and a brief five-year stint in failed states), you discover an underlying collection of chronic lesser-included situations that have resulted in U.S. responses:

- NEOs arising from internal flare-ups of conflict—but they have now practically disappeared off the scope. There has been only one case so far in the 21st century: Ivory Coast, where the French took most of the action.
- Rebel activity in Central and South America—which has essentially disappeared, except in Colombia; and yet Colombia itself does not show up in the lists of responses, mostly because the U.S. has been following the pattern of the 1970s and 1980s, as in El Salvador, of providing security assistance to the local government rather than intervening itself.
- Civil strife in Sub-Saharan Africa—to which the U.S. has not been inclined to respond anyway, except for the rare NEOs.
- Boat people in the Carriibbean—the activity of which has died down for the most part, though Cuban and Haitian stragglers continue to make their way to America.
- Terrorism in the Middle East—which used to be “in the Middle East” and around the Mediterranean, but now constitutes a worldwide movement by people originating in the Middle East and South Asia.
- Border disputes—which are now few and far between; that’s what caused “the last two-state war” between Ethiopia and Eritrea, now under international truce supervision as the border is demarcated.

All of these lesser-included are more or less permanent features of the international security landscape, likely to flare up at any time. They all existed before the Cold War, and they all continue after the Cold War. They do not necessarily threaten the international system, except for the terrorists.

The U.S. responses to these lesser-included tend to be rare and subject to deliberate decision-making. Before 9/11, the U.S. had not really reconciled itself to being “policeman of the world.” They repre-

sent no significant operational stress when the responses are made. They are easily made off of the U.S. existing global posture and deployment pattern.

Moreover, they have not changed in frequency since the Cold War's end. Indeed, a number of the internal conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa are under control, even though Ivory Coast and Zimbabwe may have joined the ranks of failing states. The conclusions we reached in our previous study, of U.S. naval forces' responses, that one cannot deduce the pattern of conflict in the world simply from those the U.S. has chosen to respond to, still holds. The U.S. simply does not police the world, nor has it ever since 1970.

When we look at the regions, the one point standing out was the emergence of U.S. responses in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region following the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979. This region is not only the center of gravity for the U.S. Navy, but it is the operational center of gravity for the entire U.S. military. Its dominance of should only increase over the coming years after 9/11 and assuming a long occupation of Iraq. The region is the center of violence containment within the overall pattern of U.S. responses. It dominates the high-end categories of show of force and combat, because it encompasses a largely dysfunctional portion of the global political community that is nonetheless extremely important to the process of continued economic globalization.






Following the end of the Vietnam War, the Pacific region basically fell off the map of U.S. responses. In the 1990s, it accounted for approximately one percent of total response days. There is no evidence from the past thirty years to suggest that Asia will become the future center of U.S. military responses—incidental as they are, as opposed to maintaining a general deterrent posture and engaging in diplomacy to moderate the threat of North Korea and the possible emergence of China as a military power.



Appendix I

Tables of all Services' Responses, except humanitarian, 1970-2000

The operations in the following spread sheets are coded by color as follows:

Operation types	
 NEO	 Show of force
 Peace ops	 Combat
 Contingent positioning or reconnaissance	



ALL SERVICES MAJOR OPERATIONS
(not including humanitarian)

Mission Name	M. Type	AOR	Country	Event Date	End Date	Duration	Navy	MC	AF	Army	svcs.	svc. days
Trinidad mutiny	NEO (plans only)	SOU	Trinidad	21-Apr-70	28-Apr-70	8	Y	Y	Y	N	3	24
Jordan hostages	Contingent positioning	EUR	Jordan	11-Jun-70	17-Jun-70	7	Y	Y	Y	N	3	21
Jordanian Civil War	Show of Force	EUR	Turkey	2-Sep-70	1-Nov-70	61	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	244
Hostage Evac	NEO	SOU	Uruguay	1-Mar-71	1-Mar-71	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Haiti succession	Contingent positioning	SOU	Haiti	22-Apr-71	28-May-71	37	Y	Y	N	N	2	74
Indo-Pak war	NEO (plans only)	PAC	Bangladesh	10-Dec-71	8-Jan-72	30	Y	Y	N	N	2	60
Bahama Lines	Show of Force	SOU	Cuba	15-Dec-71	4-Feb-72	52	Y	N	N	N	1	52
Commando Domino	Contingent Positioning	PAC	Taiwan	6-Nov-72	30-May-75	936	N	N	Y	N	1	936
Operation Homecoming	NEO	PAC	Vietnam	12-Feb-73	28-Feb-73	17	N	N	Y	N	1	17
Sudan hostage crisis	NEO	EUR	Sudan	1-Mar-73	1-Mar-73	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Libyan conflict	combat	EUR	Libya	21-Mar-73	21-Mar-73	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Eagle Pull Alert	NEO (plans only)	PAC	Cambodia	1-Apr-73	31-May-73	61	Y	N	N	N	1	61
Scoot	Military Supply	PAC	Cambodia	11-Apr-73	17-Apr-75	737	N	N	Y	N	1	737
Lebanon	Contingent positioning	EUR	Lebanon	3-May-73	10-May-73	7	Y	Y	N	N	2	14
End Sweep	Peace ops	PAC	Vietnam	1-Jul-73	1-Aug-73	32	N	N	Y	N	1	32
Middle East War	Contingent positioning	EUR	Syria	6-Oct-73	22-Nov-73	48	Y	Y	Y	N	3	144
Middle East Force	Show of Force	CENT	Yemen	24-Oct-73	13-Nov-74	386	Y	N	N	N	1	386
Oil Embargo-IO Ops	Contingent positioning	EUR	IndOcean	25-Oct-73	1-Apr-74	159	Y	N	N	N	1	159
Night Reach	Peace ops	EUR	Sinai	14-Nov-73	14-Nov-73	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Nimbus Star/moon	Peace ops	EUR	Egypt	10-Apr-74	10-Jun-74	62	N	N	Y	N	1	62
Cyprus Coup	NEO	EUR	Cyprus	22-Jul-74	25-Jul-74	4	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	16
Ethiopia instability	NEO (plans only)	CENT	Ethiopia	1-Jan-75	10-Jan-75	10	Y	N	N	N	1	10
Cyprus Unrest	NEO (plans only)	EUR	Cyprus	18-Jan-75	21-Jan-75	3	Y	Y	N	N	2	6
Eagle Pull, Cambodia	NEO	PAC	Cambodia	1-Feb-75	12-Apr-75	71	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	284
Ethiopia civil war	NEO (plans only)	CENT	Ethiopia	3-Feb-75	5-Feb-75	3	Y	N	N	N	1	3
Frequent Wind	NEO	PAC	Vietnam	4-Apr-75	30-Apr-75	27	Y	Y	Y	N	3	81
Mayaguez rescue	Combat	PAC	Cambodia	12-May-75	15-May-75	4	Y	Y	Y	N	3	12
Somalia overflights	Reconnaissance	CENT	Somalia	1-Jun-75	1-Jun-75	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Lebanon civil war	NEO (plans only)	EUR	Lebanon	01-Aug-75	28-Jul-76	363	Y	Y	N	N	2	726
Polisario Rebels	Show of Force	EUR	Morocco	5-Jan-76	22-Jan-76	18	Y	N	N	N	1	18
Lebanon	NEO	EUR	Lebanon	20-Jun-76	21-Jun-76	2	Y	Y	Y	N	3	6
Kenya-Uganda	Contingent positioning	EUR	Uganda	8-Jul-76	27-Jul-76	20	Y	N	N	N	1	20
Libya-Tunisia	Show of Force	EUR	Libya	27-Jul-76	20-Aug-76	25	Y	N	N	N	1	25
Lebanon	NEO	EUR	Lebanon	27-Jul-76	27-Jul-76	1	Y	Y	Y	N	3	3

ALL SERVICES MAJOR OPERATIONS
(not including humanitarian)

Paul Bunyan	Show of Force	PAC	S. Korea	18-Aug-76	21-Aug-76	4	Y	N	Y	Y	3	12
Uganda	Contingent positioning	EUR	Uganda	25-Feb-77	2-Mar-77	6	Y	N	N	N	1	6
Shaba I	Peace ops	EUR	Zaire	1-Mar-77	30-May-77	91	N	N	Y	N	1	91
Canary Isl. air collision	NEO	EUR	Canary Is.	27-Mar-77	30-Mar-77	4	N	N	Y	N	1	4
US personnel evac	NEO	CENT	Ethiopia	27-Apr-77	30-Apr-77	4	N	N	Y	N	1	4
Vietnam	Show of Force	PAC	Vietnam	8-Jan-78	13-Jan-78	6	Y	N	N	N	1	6
Ogaden War	Contingent positioning	CENT	Somalia	1-Feb-78	23-Mar-78	51	Y	N	N	N	1	51
Lebanon peace ops	Peace ops	EUR	Senegal/ Lebanon	1-Apr-78	1-Apr-78	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Shaba II	Peace ops	EUR	Zaire	16-May-78	16-Jun-78	32	N	N	Y	Y	2	64
Sea of Japan	Show of Force	PAC	Soviet Union	15-Jun-78	24-Jun-78	10	Y	N	N	N	1	10
Afghanistan unrest	Contingent positioning	CENT	Afghanistan	1-Jul-78	31-Jul-78	31	Y	N	N	N	1	31
UN Namibian planning	Peace ops	EUR	Namibia	1-Aug-78	1-Aug-78	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Nicaragua civil strife	Contingent positioning	SOU	Nicaragua	16-Sep-78	30-Sep-78	15	Y	N	N	N	1	15
Israeli invasion of Lebanon	Peace ops	EUR	Lebanon	21-Sep-78	30-Sep-78	10	N	N	Y	N	1	10
Iran Revolution	NEO	CENT	Iran	6-Dec-78	1-Mar-79	86	Y	Y	Y	N	3	258
Prize Eagle	Show of Force	CENT	Saudi Arabia	1-Jan-79	30-Jan-79	30	N	N	Y	N	1	30
China invasion of Vietnam	Contingent positioning	PAC	China	25-Feb-79	3-Mar-79	7	Y	N	N	N	1	7
Flying Star	Show of Force	CENT	Saudi Arabia	1-Mar-79	6-Jun-79	98	Y	N	Y	N	2	196
Strait of Hormuz Patrol	Reconnaissance	CENT	PersGulf	9-Jun-79	28-Jun-79	20	Y	N	N	N	1	20
Nicaragua civil war	NEO	SOU	Nicaragua	12-Jun-79	31-Aug-79	81	Y	Y	Y	N	3	243
Zaire airlift	Peace ops	EUR	Zaire	8-Aug-79	17-Aug-79	10	N	N	Y	N	1	10
Soviet troops in Cuba	Show of Force	SOU	Cuba	2-Oct-79	16-Nov-79	46	Y	Y	Y	N	3	138
Afghan/Iran Hostages	Show of Force	CENT	Iran, Afghanistan	9-Oct-79	23-Jan-81	472	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	1888
Park assassination	Show of Force	PAC	S. Korea	26-Oct-79	26-Dec-79	62	Y	N	Y	Y	3	186
Bolivia civil unrest	NEO	SOU	Bolivia	7-Nov-79	7-Nov-79	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Zimbabwe ceasefire	Peace ops	EUR	Zimbabwe	19-Dec-79	27-Dec-79	9	N	N	Y	N	1	9
Soviet intercept	Show of Force	PAC	Philippines	25-Feb-80	28-Feb-80	4	N	N	Y	N	1	4
Rhodesia airlift	Peace ops	EUR	Zimbabwe	5-Mar-80	7-Mar-80	3	N	N	Y	N	1	3
Arabian Sea overflight	Show of Force	CENT	Middle East	12-Mar-80	14-Mar-80	3	N	N	Y	N	1	3
Desert One	Combat	CENT	Iran	24-Apr-80	26-Apr-80	2	Y	Y	Y	N	3	6
Korean air	Contingent Positioning	PAC	S. Korea	27-May-80	30-Jun-80	35	Y	N	Y	Y	3	105
US hostage evac	NEO	CENT	Iran	1-Jul-80	1-Jul-80	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Thailand assistance	Military Supply	PAC	Thailand	5-Jul-80	5-Jul-80	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1

ALL SERVICES MAJOR OPERATIONS
(not including humanitarian)

Iran-Iraq War	Show of Force	CENT	Iraq	30-Sep-80	1-Feb-81	125	Y	N	N	N	1	125
Elf One	Show of Force	CENT	Saudi Arabia	1-Oct-80	15-Apr-89	3119	N	N	Y	N	1	3119
Creek Sentry	Reconnaissance	EUR	Poland	9-Dec-80	1-May-81	144	Y	N	Y	N	2	288
El Salvador airlift	Military Supply	SOU	El Salvador	1-Jan-81	1-Jan-81	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Iranian hostages	NEO	EUR	Algeria	20-Jan-81	25-Jan-81	6	N	N	Y	N	1	6
Morocco show of force	Show of Force	EUR	Morocco	29-Jan-81	7-Feb-81	10	Y	N	N	N	1	10
Liberia	Show of Force	EUR	Liberia	1-Apr-81	15-Apr-81	15	Y	N	N	Y	2	30
Tito dies; Yugo unrest	Contingent positioning	EUR	FRY	5-Apr-81	11-Apr-81	7	Y	N	N	N	1	7
Egypt	Contingent Positioning	RDJTF	Egypt	1-May-81	1-May-81	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Syria	Contingent positioning	EUR	Syria	3-May-81	14-Sep-81	135	Y	Y	N	N	2	270
Libya	Contingent positioning	EUR	Libya	1-Aug-81	20-Aug-81	20	Y	N	N	N	1	20
Gambia unrest	NEO	EUR	Gambia	8-Aug-81	8-Aug-81	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Elf Sentry	Contingent Positioning	RDJTF	Egypt	6-Oct-81	31-Oct-81	26	Y	Y	Y	N	3	78
Central America	Surveillance	SOU	Nicaragua	16-Oct-81	19-Aug-82	308	Y	N	N	N	1	308
Chad civil war	Peace ops	EUR	Chad	16-Nov-81	7-Jun-82	204	N	N	Y	N	1	204
Korean crisis	Show of Force	PAC	Korea	1-Dec-81	1-Dec-81	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Elf Sentry	Contingent Positioning	RDJTF	Egypt	19-Mar-82	31-Dec-82	288	N	N	Y	N	1	288
Project ELSA	Military Supply	SOU	El Salvador	31-Mar-82	31-May-82	62	N	N	Y	N	1	62
Peace Rapid	Military Supply	SOU	Argentina	1-May-82	1-Jun-82	32	N	N	Y	N	1	32
Israeli invasion of Lebanon	NEO	EUR	Lebanon	8-Jun-82	22-Jul-82	45	Y	Y	N	N	2	90
El Salvador	Military Supply	SOU	El Salvador	21-Jun-82	1-Aug-82	42	N	N	Y	N	1	42
Chad withdrawal	Peace ops	EUR	Chad	23-Jun-82	2-Jul-82	10	N	N	Y	N	1	10
Somalia	Military Supply	CENT	Somalia	2-Jul-82	30-Aug-82	60	N	N	Y	N	1	60
Sinai PK	Peace ops	RDJTF	Egypt	6-Aug-82	5-Sep-82	31	N	N	Y	N	1	31
Evac. Of PLO--Leb.	NEO	EUR	Lebanon	10-Aug-82	9-Sep-82	31	Y	Y	Y	N	3	93
Palestinian Massacre	Show of Force	EUR	Lebanon	22-Sep-82	26-Feb-84	515	Y	Y	N	N	2	1030
Early Call/Libya	Show of Force	CENT	Egypt	14-Feb-83	28-Feb-83	15	Y	N	Y	N	2	30
Burmese invasion	Military Supply	PAC	Thailand	1-Apr-83	1-Apr-83	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
US embassy bombing	NEO	EUR	Lebanon	18-Apr-83	18-Apr-83	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Turks	Military Supply	ACOM	Bahamas	1-May-83	1-May-83	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Honduras	Show of Force	SOU	Honduras	14-Jun-83	22-Oct-83	131	Y	N	N	Y	2	262
Senior Look	Reconnaissance	CENT	Egypt	2-Jul-83	19-Aug-83	49	N	N	Y	N	1	49
Libya/Chad	Military Supply	EUR	Chad	25-Jul-83	31-Dec-83	160	Y	N	Y	N	2	320

ALL SERVICES MAJOR OPERATIONS
(not including humanitarian)

Beirut	Peace ops	EUR	Lebanon	1-Aug-83	1-Aug-83	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Arid Farmer	Contingent Positioning	CENT	Sudan	2-Aug-83	28-Aug-83	27	N	N	Y	N	1	27
Target Acquisition Battery to Lebanon	Combat	EUR	Lebanon	13-Aug-83	15-Dec-83	125	N	N	N	Y	1	125
Marine Barracks Bomb	Contingent positioning	EUR	Lebanon	29-Aug-83	25-Feb-84	181	Y	Y	Y	N	3	543
KAL 007 shot down	Show of Force	PAC	Soviet Union	1-Sep-83	6-Nov-83	67	Y	N	Y	N	2	134
Rubber Wall	Peace ops	EUR	Lebanon	3-Sep-83	25-Sep-83	23	N	N	Y	N	1	23
El Salvador	Military Supply	SOU	El Salvador	1-Oct-83	1-Oct-83	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Iran-Iraq War	Show of Force	CENT	Iran	8-Oct-83	7-Jan-84	92	Y	Y	N	N	2	184
Korea-Burma	Show of Force	PAC	N. Korea	11-Oct-83	13-Oct-83	3	Y	N	Y	N	2	6
Urgent Fury	Combat	SOU	Grenada	20-Oct-83	14-Dec-83	55	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	220
Beirut Bombing evac	NEO	EUR	Lebanon	23-Oct-83	9-Dec-83	48	N	N	Y	N	1	48
USMILSUPE	peace ops	SOU	Grenada	3-Nov-83	11-Jun-85	587	N	N	N	Y	1	587
Turkey	Contingent Positioning	EUR	Turkey	1-Dec-83	1-Dec-83	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Lebanon	Peace ops	EUR	Lebanon	1-Dec-83	1-Dec-83	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Syria	Combat	EUR	Lebanon	3-Dec-83	8-Jan-84	37	Y	N	N	N	1	37
Grenada	Peace ops	ACOM	Grenada	1-Jan-84	6-Jun-85	523	N	N	Y	N	1	523
Syria	NEO	EUR	Syria	3-Jan-84	3-Jan-84	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Lebanon withdrawal	Combat	EUR	Lebanon	21-Feb-84	26-Apr-84	66	N	Y	Y	N	2	132
Central America CV presence	Show of Force	SOU	Nicaragua	13-Mar-84	26-Nov-84	259	Y	N	N	N	1	259
Eagle Lift	Show of Force	CENT	Egypt	19-Mar-84	9-Apr-84	22	N	N	Y	N	1	22
Persian Gulf	Show of Force	CENT	Iraq	1-Apr-84	30-Nov-84	244	Y	N	N	N	1	244
Chadian insurgency	Reconnaissance	CENT	Sudan	1-Aug-84	1-Sep-84	32	N	N	Y	N	1	32
Red Sea Mines	Response to terrorism	CENT	PersGulf	3-Aug-84	2-Oct-84	61	Y	N	Y	N	2	122
Beirut Embassy	Show of Force	EUR	Lebanon	21-Sep-84	1-Nov-84	42	Y	N	N	N	1	42
Lebanon	Military Supply	EUR	Lebanon	24-Sep-84	24-Sep-84	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Indira Gandhi	Peace ops	PAC	India	23-Oct-84	23-Oct-84	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Saudi hijacking	Response to terrorism	CENT	Iran	6-Nov-84	6-Nov-84	1	Y	N	N	N	1	1
Colombia	Military Supply	SOU	Colombia	19-Nov-84	19-Nov-84	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Rescue of US vessel off coast of Cuba	Contingent Positioning	SOU	Cuba	30-Nov-84	30-Nov-84	1	Y	N	Y	N	2	2
Kuwait	NEO	CENT	Kuwait	11-Dec-84	12-Dec-84	2	N	N	Y	N	1	2
Embassy Evacuation in Lebanon	NEO	EUR	Lebanon	1-Mar-85	31-Mar-85	31	Y	N	N	N	1	31
Operation Bahamas	Military Supply	ACOM	Bahamas	5-Apr-85	20-Apr-85	16	N	N	Y	N	1	16
TWA 847 hijacking	Response to terrorism	EUR	Lebanon	14-Jun-85	23-Jul-85	40	Y	Y	Y	N	3	120

ALL SERVICES MAJOR OPERATIONS
(not including humanitarian)

Persian Gulf Escorts	Show of Force	CENT	Iran	13-Sep-85	2-Oct-85	20	Y	N	N	N	1	20
Display Determination	Show of Force	EUR	Turkey	23-Sep-85	22-Oct-85	30	N	N	Y	N	1	30
Achille Lauro	Combat	EUR	Italy	7-Oct-85	10-Oct-85	4	Y	Y	Y	N	3	12
Egypt Air hijacking	Response to terrorism	EUR	Malta	23-Nov-85	25-Nov-85	3	Y	N	N	N	1	3
Yemen Civil War	NEO	CENT	Yemen	1-Jan-86	31-Jan-86	31	Y	N	N	N	1	31
Persian Gulf Escorts	Show of Force	CENT	Iran	12-Jan-86	31-May-86	140	Y	N	N	N	1	140
OVL-FON Ops	Response to terrorism	EUR	Libya	26-Jan-86	28-Apr-86	93	Y	N	N	N	1	93
Lebanon Hostages	NEO	EUR	Lebanon	1-Mar-86	1-Mar-86	1	Y	N	N	N	1	1
El Dorado Canyon	Combat	EUR	Libya	9-Apr-86	19-Apr-86	11	Y	Y	Y	N	3	33
Blast Furnace	Military Supply	SOU	Bolivia	1-Jul-86	15-Nov-86	138	N	N	Y	N	1	138
Syria	NEO	EUR	Syria	27-Jul-86	27-Jul-86	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Pakistan hijacking	Response to terrorism	EUR	Cyprus	1-Sep-86	1-Sep-86	1	Y	N	N	N	1	1
Pakistan hijack evac	NEO	CENT	Pakistan	6-Sep-86	6-Sep-86	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Korea	Show of Force	PAC	Korea	20-Sep-86	5-Oct-86	16	N	N	Y	N	1	16
Hostages in Lebanon	NEO (plans only)	EUR	Lebanon	2-Feb-87	27-Feb-87	26	Y	N	N	N	1	26
USS Stark	NEO	CENT	Saudi Arabia	26-May-87	26-May-87	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Earnest Will	Combat	CENT	Persian Gulf	24-Jul-87	17-Nov-88	483	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	1932
Haiti unrest	Contingent positioning	SOU	Haiti	1-Jan-88	31-Jan-88	31	Y	Y	N	N	2	62
Jittery Prop	Contingent positioning	SOU	El Salvador	8-Jan-88	14-Dec-88	342	Y	N	N	N	1	342
Golden Pheasant	Show of Force	SOU	Honduras	17-Mar-88	31-Mar-88	15	N	N	Y	Y	1	15
Nimrod Dancer	Show of Force	SOU	Panama	18-Mar-88	20-Dec-89	643	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	2572
Issue Forth	Military Supply	CENT	Pakistan	1-Apr-88	30-Apr-88	30	N	N	Y	N	1	30
Valiant Boom	Show of Force	SOU	Panama	5-Apr-88	11-Apr-88	7	N	Y	Y	N	2	14
USS Roberts mine strike	NEO	EUR	Bahrain	8-Apr-88	8-Apr-88	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Praying Mantis	Combat	CENT	Iran	17-Apr-88	17-Apr-88	1	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	4
Pakistan	Military Supply	CENT	Pakistan	23-Apr-88	24-Apr-88	2	N	N	Y	N	1	2
Post Road	Peace ops	CENT	Iraq	15-Aug-88	28-Aug-88	14	N	N	Y	N	1	14
Summer Olympics	Show of Force	PAC	Korea	1-Sep-88	30-Sep-88	30	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	120
Burma unrest	Show of Force	PAC	Burma	1-Sep-88	30-Sep-88	30	Y	Y?	Y	N	3	90
Hostage Release	NEO	EUR	Damascus	3-Oct-88	3-Oct-88	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Maldives coup	Contingent positioning	PAC	Maldives	17-Nov-88	17-Nov-88	1	Y	N	N	N	1	1
Lebanon civil war	Contingent positioning	EUR	Lebanon	1-Feb-89	17-Mar-89	45	Y	Y?	N	Y	3	135
Election District	Peace ops	EUR	Namibia, Angola	5-Mar-89	31-May-89	88	N	N	Y	N	1	88
Blade Jewel	NEO	SOU	Panama	16-May-89	29-Jun-89	45	N	N	Y	N	1	45

ALL SERVICES MAJOR OPERATIONS
(not including humanitarian)

Lebanon-Higgins Killed	Contingent positioning	EUR	Lebanon	30-Jul-89	31-Aug-89	33	Y	Y?	N	N	2	66
Anchor Mark	Reconnaissance	ACOM	Mexico	24-Aug-89	5-Sep-89	13	N	N	Y	N	1	13
Colombia transport	Military Supply	SOU	Colombia	1-Sep-89	1-Sep-89	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Joint Task Force	Show of Force	PAC	Philippines	1-Dec-89	9-Dec-89	9	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	36
Just Cause	Combat	SOU	Panama	17-Dec-89	14-Feb-90	60	N	Y	Y	Y	3	180
Lebanon/Syria	NEO	EUR	Leb/Syria	1-Apr-90	1-Apr-90	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Sharp Edge	NEO	EUR	Liberia	28-Apr-90	8-Jan-91	256	Y	Y	N	Y	3	768
Iraqi pressure on Kuwait	Show of Force	CENT	Iraq	24-Jul-90	31-Jul-90	8	Y	N	N	N	1	8
Desert Shield	Show of Force	CENT	Saudi Arabia	7-Aug-90	15-Jan-91	162	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	648
Iraq MIO	MIO	CENT	Iraq	17-Aug-90	31-Dec-99	3424	Y	N	N	N	1	3424
Jordan NEO	NEO	CENT	Jordan	1-Sep-90	1-Sep-90	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Sudan	NEO	CENT	Sudan	1-Jan-91	1-Jan-91	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Eastern Exit	NEO	CENT	Somalia	2-Jan-91	11-Jan-91	10	Y	Y	Y	N	3	30
Patriot Defender	Show of Force	EUR	Israel	15-Jan-91	28-Feb-91	45	N	N	N	Y	1	45
Desert Storm	Combat	CENT	Iraq	17-Jan-91	5-Apr-91	79	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	316
Provide Comfort	Show of Force	CENT	Iraq	6-Apr-91	31-Dec-96	2097	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	8388
Iraq	NEO	EUR	Iraq	28-Apr-91	6-May-91	9	N	N	Y	N	1	9
Lebanon	NEO	EUR	Lebanon	1-Aug-91	1-Dec-91	123	N	N	Y	N	1	123
Desert Falcon/ Desert Vigilance	Show of Force	CENT	Saudi Arabia	1-Sep-91	15-Sep-97	2207	N	N	N	Y	1	2207
Quick Lift	NEO	EUR	Zaire	27-Sep-91	3-Oct-91	7	N	N	Y	N	1	7
Victor Squared (Haiti unrest)	NEO	SOU	Haiti	2-Oct-91	11-Nov-91	41	Y	Y	N	N	2	82
Promote Liberty	Show of Force	SOU	Panama	01-Feb-92	01-Mar-92	30	N	Y	N	N	1	30
Silver Anvil	NEO	EUR	Sierra Leone	3-May-92	4-May-92	2	N	N	Y	N	1	2
Colombia	Reconnaissance	SOU	Colombia	1-Jul-92	4-Jul-92	4	N	N	Y	N	1	4
Sharp Guard/ Decisive Enhancement	Show of Force	EUR	Yugoslavia	01-Jul-92	20-Dec-96	1634	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	6536
Intrinsic Action	Show of Force	CENT	Kuwait	2-Aug-92	20-Aug-92	19	N	N	Y	N	1	19
Provide Transition	Peace ops	EUR	Angola	12-Aug-92	9-Oct-92	59	N	N	Y	N	1	59
Southern Watch	No fly zone	CENT	Iraq	19-Aug-92	31-Dec-99	2691	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	10764
Impressive Lift I	Peace ops	CENT	Somalia	13-Sep-92	2-Oct-92	20	Y	N	Y	N	2	40
Liberia	NEO	EUR	Liberia	23-Oct-92	25-Oct-92	3	N	N	Y	N	1	3
Tajikistan	NEO	EUR	Tajikistan	25-Oct-92	25-Oct-92	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Maritime A445Guard/ Sharp Guard/ Decisive Enhancement	Show of Force	EUR	FRY	1-Nov-92	18-Dec-96	1509	Y	N	N	N	1	1509
Restore Hope/ Continue Hope	Peace ops	CENT	Somalia	9-Dec-92	1-Mar-95	813	N	N	Y	Y	2	1626
Iraqi nuclear facility strike	Combat	CENT	Iraq	17-Jan-93	17-Jan-93	1	Y	N	N	N	1	1
Deny Flight/ Decisive Edge/ Deliberate Guard/ Deliberate Forge	No fly zone	EUR	Yugoslavia	12-Apr-93	18-Jul-98	1924	Y	Y	Y	N	3	5772

ALL SERVICES MAJOR OPERATIONS
(not including humanitarian)

Ecuador	Reconnaissance	SOU	Ecuador	19-Apr-93	24-Apr-93	6	N	N	Y	N	1	6
Continue Hope	Peacekeeping	CENT	Somalia	4-May-93	23-Mar-94	324	Y	Y	Y	N	3	972
Cambodia	Peace ops	PAC	Cambodia	17-May-93	29-May-93	13	N	N	Y	N	1	13
Bolivia	Reconnaissance	SOU	Bolivia	26-May-93	30-May-93	5	N	N	Y	N	1	5
Iraq TLAM strikes	Combat	CENT	Iraq	26-Jun-93	26-Jun-93	1	Y	N	N	N	1	1
Able Sentry	Peace ops	EUR	Macedonia	5-Jul-93	12-Jul-93	8	N	N	Y	N	1	8
Able Sentry	peace ops	EUR	Macedonia	12-Jul-93	1-Mar-99	2059	N	N	N	Y	1	2059
Provide Transition	Peace ops	EUR	Angola	12-Aug-93	12-Aug-93	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Somalia	Show of Force	CENT	Somalia	25-Aug-93	27-Aug-93	3	N	N	Y	N	1	3
Shutdown VII	Reconnaissance	SOU	Bolivia	26-Aug-93	30-Aug-93	5	N	N	Y	N	1	5
Support Democracy	Show of Force	SOU	Haiti	1-Sep-93	18-Oct-94	413	Y	Y	N	N	2	826
Restore Hope II	Peace ops	CENT	Somalia	5-Oct-93	13-Oct-93	9	N	N	Y	N	1	9
Paraguay	Reconnaissance	SOU	Paraguay	7-Oct-93	11-Oct-93	5	N	N	Y	N	1	5
Somalia	Peace ops	CENT	Somalia	24-Oct-93	30-Oct-93	7	N	N	Y	N	1	7
UK	Peace ops	EUR	UK	26-Oct-93	26-Oct-93	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Distant Runner	NEO	EUR	Rwanda, Burundi	9-Apr-94	16-Apr-94	8	Y	Y	Y	N	3	24
Liberia	NEO	EUR	Liberia	1-May-94	1-May-94	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Yemen NEO	NEO	CENT	Yemen	7-May-94	9-May-94	3	N	N	Y	N	1	3
Korea tensions	Show of Force	PAC	N. Korea	1-Jun-94	31-Jul-94	61	Y	N	N	N	1	61
Uganda	Peace ops	EUR	Uganda	22-Jun-94	30-Jun-94	9	N	N	Y	N	1	9
Dominican Republic	security	ACOM	Domin Repub	7-Aug-94	23-Oct-94	78	N	N	Y	N	1	78
Distant Haven	Contingent positioning	SOU	Surinam	19-Aug-94	31-Oct-94	74	N	N	N	Y	1	74
USLO Somalian Withdrawal	NEO	CENT	Somalia	8-Sep-94	17-Sep-94	10	Y	N	N	N	1	10
Uphold/Restore Dem.	Show of Force	ACOM	Haiti	8-Sep-94	17-Apr-95	222	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	888
Greece/Turkey reaction	Show of Force	EUR	Greece	1-Oct-94	1-Oct-94	1	Y	N	N	N	1	1
Vigilant Warrior	Show of Force	CENT	Kuwait	7-Oct-94	31-Dec-94	86	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	344
Maintain Democracy (Haiti)	Peacekeeping	SOU	Haiti	1-Nov-94	30-Mar-95	120	Y	Y	N	N	2	240
United Shield	peace ops	CENT	Somalia	7-Jan-95	25-Mar-95	78	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	312
Haiti PK transport	Peace ops		Nepal, Haiti	3-Feb-95	10-Feb-95	8	N	N	Y	N	1	8
Safe Border	peace ops	SOU	Ecuador, Peru	1-Mar-95	24-Oct-98	1334	N	N	N	Y	1	1334
UNMIH	Peacekeeping	SOU	Haiti	31-Mar-95	15-Apr-96	382	N	Y	N	N	1	382
N. Korea reactor negs	Contingent positioning	PAC	N. Korea	1-Apr-95	30-Apr-95	30	Y	N	N	N	1	30
Bosnia airstrikes	Combat	EUR	Bosnia	25-May-95	26-May-95	2	N	N	Y	N	1	2
Quick Lift	Peace ops	EUR	Bosnia	30-Jun-95	10-Aug-95	42	Y	N	Y	N	2	84
Vigilant Sentinel	Show of Force	CENT	Iraq	1-Aug-95	22-Mar-96	235	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	940
Deliberate Force	Combat	EUR	Bosnia	29-Aug-95	21-Sep-95	24	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	96
Joint Endeavor	Peace ops	EUR	Bosnia	5-Dec-95	20-Dec-96	382	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	1528
Sentinel Lifeguard	Show of Force	SOU	Cuba	1-Feb-96	29-Feb-96	29	Y	N	N	N	1	29

ALL SERVICES MAJOR OPERATIONS
(not including humanitarian)

Taiwan Flexible Deterrent	Show of Force	PAC	China	1-Mar-96	17-Apr-96	48	Y	N	N	N	1	48
Assured Response	NEO	EUR	Liberia	8-Apr-96	3-Aug-96	118	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	472
Quick Response	NEO	EUR	CAR	20-May-96	29-Jul-96	71	Y	Y	N	N	2	142
NAVCENT security	Security	CENT	Bahrain	03-Jul-96	15-Dec-96	166	N	Y	N	N	1	166
Desert Focus	NEO	CENT	Saudi Arabia	01-Aug-96	15-Sep-97	411	N	Y	Y	Y	3	1233
Desert Strike	Combat	CENT	Iraq	3-Sep-96	4-Sep-97	367	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	1468
Burundi NEO	NEO	CENT	Burundi	4-Sep-96	4-Sep-96	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Kurdish evac	NEO	CENT	Iraq, Guam	16-Sep-96	19-Sep-96	4	N	N	Y	N	1	4
Joint Guard	Peacekeeping	EUR	FRY	20-Dec-96	20-Jun-98	548	Y	Y	N	Y	3	1644
Northern Watch	Combat	EUR	Iraq	1-Jan-97	31-Dec-99	1095	N	Y	N	N	1	1095
Assured Lift	Peace ops	EUR	Liberia	18-Feb-97	3-Mar-97	14	N	N	Y	N	1	14
Operation Monitor	Contingent positioning	SOU	Cuba	24-Feb-97	24-Feb-97	1	Y	N	N	N	1	1
Silver Wake	NEO	EUR	Albania	13-Mar-97	14-Jul-97	124	Y	Y	N	N	2	248
Guardian Retrieval	NEO	EUR	Zaire	22-Mar-97	5-Jun-97	76	Y	Y	Y	N	3	228
Noble Obelisk	NEO	EUR	Sierra Leone	27-May-97	5-Jun-97	10	Y	Y	Y	N	3	30
Firm Response	NEO	EUR	Congo	8-Jun-97	18-Jun-97	11	N	N	Y	N	1	11
Passive Oversight (Cuban flotillas)	Contingent positioning	SOU	Cuba	1-Jul-97	31-Jul-97	31	Y	N	N	N	1	31
Bevel Edge/Cambodia unrest	NEO (plans only)	PAC	Cambodia	1-Jul-97	31-Jul-97	31	Y	Y	N	N	2	62
Desert Thunder	Show of Force	CENT	Iraq	1-Oct-97	27-May-98	239	Y	Y	Y	N	3	717
Silent Assurance	Contingent positioning	CENT	Qatar	4-Nov-97	17-Nov-97	14	Y	Y	N	N	2	28
Phoenix Scorpion	Show of Force	CENT	Iraq	19-Nov-97	25-Nov-97	7	N	N	Y	N	1	7
Noble Safeguard	Show of Force	EUR	Israel	16-Feb-98	13-Apr-98	57	Y	N	N	Y	2	114
Bevel Incline/Indonesia unrest	NEO (plans only)	PAC	Indonesia	15-May-98	24-May-98	10	Y	Y	N	N	2	20
Safe Departure	NEO	CENT	Eritrea	6-Jun-98	17-Jun-98	12	Y	Y	N	N	2	24
Shepherd Venture	NEO (plans)	EUR	Senegal	10-Jun-98	17-Jun-98	8	N	N	Y	N	1	8
Determined Falcon	Show of Force	EUR	FRY	13-Jun-98	17-Jun-98	5	Y	Y	N	N	2	10
Joint Forge	Peacekeeping	EUR	FRY	20-Jun-98	31-Dec-99	560	Y	Y	N	Y	3	1680
Balkan Calm	Peacekeeping	EUR	Kosovo	03-Jul-98	15-Nov-98	136	N	Y	N	N	1	136
Resolute Response	security	CENT	Kenya, Tanzania	7-Aug-98	18-Oct-98	73	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	292
Autumn Shelter	NEO (plans only)	EUR	Zaire	10-Aug-98	16-Aug-98	7	Y	Y	N	Y	3	21
Silver Knight	NEO	EUR	Albania	14-Aug-98	23-Aug-98	10	Y	N	N	N	1	10
Resolve Resolute	embassy security	EUR	Albania	17-Aug-98	15-Nov-98	91	N	Y	N	N	1	91
Sudan/Afghanistan Strikes	Combat	CENT	Sudan/Afghanistan	20-Aug-98	20-Aug-98	1	Y	N	N	N	1	1
Shadow Express	NEO	EUR	Liberia	24-Sep-98	13-Oct-98	20	Y	N	N	N	1	20
Phoenix Duke	Contingent Positioning	EUR	Kosovo	11-Oct-98	7-Nov-98	28	N	N	Y	N	1	28
Eagle Eye	Reconnaissance	EUR	Kosovo	1-Nov-98	23-Mar-99	143	N	N	Y	N	1	143

ALL SERVICES MAJOR OPERATIONS
(not including humanitarian)

Eritrea	NEO	CENT	Eritrea	3-Nov-98	19-Nov-98	17	Y	N	N	N	1	17
Desert Viper	Contingent Positioning	CENT	Iraq	4-Nov-98	19-Nov-98	16	Y	Y	N	N	2	32
Phoenix Scorpion III	Show of Force	CENT	Iraq	12-Nov-98	15-Nov-98	4	N	N	Y	N	1	4
Shining Presence	Show of Force	EUR	Israel	10-Dec-98	6-Jan-99	28	N	N	Y	N	1	28
Desert Fox	Combat	CENT	Iraq	16-Dec-98	20-Dec-98	5	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	20
Christmas Island	NEO	PAC	Christmas Island	9-Jan-99	10-Jan-99	2	N	N	Y	N	1	2
Noble Anvil	Combat	EUR	Kosovo	20-Feb-99	2-Jul-99	133	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	532
Skopje embassy security	embassy security	EUR	Macedonia	26-Mar-99	25-Jul-99	122	N	Y	N	N	1	122
Joint guardian	Peacekeeping	EUR	Kosovo	4-Jun-99	20-Jul-99	47	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	188
Stabilise	Peace ops	PAC	Indonesia	10-Sep-99	1-Mar-00	174	Y	Y	Y	Y	4	696
Antarctica airlift	NEO		Antarctica	16-Oct-99	16-Oct-99	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Balkan Calm II	NEO	EUR	FRY	16-Oct-99	18-Nov-99	34	Y	Y?	N	N	2	68
Kosovo Force	Peace ops	EUR	Kosovo	17-Apr-00	20-Apr-00	4	N	N	Y	N	1	4
Eastern Access	Security	SOU	Puerto Rico	21-Apr-00	17-May-00	27	N	Y	N	N	1	27
Sierra Leone	Peace ops	EUR	Sierra Leone	12-May-00	12-May-00	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Japan medevac	NEO	PAC	Japan	19-Aug-00	19-Aug-00	1	N	N	Y	N	1	1
Determined Response	Security	CENT	Yemen	12-Oct-00	15-Oct-00	4	N	Y	Y	N	2	8

DOD Responses, 2000-2003: Abbreviated List*

I. Responses that were ongoing from the 1990s:

A. Terminated by successful ousting of the regime in Iraq:

- Iraq MIO (13 years)
- Operation Southern Watch (11 years)
- Operation Northern Watch (6 years; preceded by Kurdish relief)

B. Continuing peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo:

- SFOR in Bosnia (now going on for 8 years)
- KFOR in Kosovo (now going on for 4 years)

C. Other terminated operations that had begun before 2000:

- Operation Stabilise: East Timor (3 years-very small operation)
- Fundamental Response: Humanitarian assistance to Venezuela (63 days)

II. Responses beginning in the 2000s

- Determined Response: Response to the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen (22 days)

A. The set of responses to 9/11:

- Noble Eagle: CONUS and OCONUS response to the terrorist attack of 9/11 (ongoing for nearly 2 years)
- Enduring Freedom (OEF): Afghanistan (ongoing for nearly 2 years)
- OEF-Active Endeavor: STANAVFORMED AND STANVAVFORLANT in Med (ongoing for nearly 2 years)
- OEF- Freedom Eagle/Balikatan: Philippines (7 months)
- OEF-Horn of Africa (Djibouti) (ongoing for over 6 months)

- OEF-Iraq (the build-up against Iraq; name of operation not clear) (4 months)

B. The war in Iraq:

- Operation Iraqi Freedom (ongoing since March 2003)

C. Associated with the war in Iraq:

- Deterring North Korea (3.3 months)

D. Shows of force (and one contingent positioning):

- Focus Relief: Show of Force off Sierra Leone (16 days)
- Yugoslav Presidential Election: US/UK show of force (5 days)
- EP-3 Crisis (response lasted 2 days; rest was diplomacy)

E. Two NEOs

- Ivory Coast (6 days)
- Deployment of US forces to Liberia to assist in NEO of US citizens (14 days)

F. Several small contingent positionings in anticipation of clashes between Cuban emigres and Cuba:

- Passive Oversight 02-00 (3 days)
- Passive Oversight 01-01 (4 days)
- Passive Oversight 02-01 (1 day)

G. A couple of humanitarian responses:

- El Salvador Earthquake (15 days)
- Indian Earthquake (25 days)

DOD Responses, 2000-2003: More Details

I. Responses that were ongoing from the 1990s:

A. Terminated by successful ousting of the regime in Iraq:

- Iraq MIO
 - Maritime sanctions enforcement against Iraq
 - Dates: 17 August 1990 - May 2003
 - USN/USCG (plus other nations)
- Operation Southern Watch
 - Enforcement of no-fly zone over southern Iraq
 - Dates: 19 August 1992 - May 2003
 - Participation: USN/USMC/USAF (plus UK)
- Operation Northern Watch
 - No fly-zone enforcement over northern Iraq
 - Dates: 1 January 1997 - May 2003
 - Participation: USN/USMC/USAF

B. Continuing peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo:

- SFOR in Bosnia (continual changes of names of operations)
 - Peacekeeping in Bosnia.
 - Dates: 20 December 1995 - ongoing
 - Participation: essentially only USA now, but USN/USMC in past (plus many other nations)
- Operation Joint Guardian
 - KFOR implementation in Kosovo
 - Dates: 11 Jun 1999 - ongoing

- Participation: USN/USMC/USA/USAF, but essentially USA now (plus many other nations)

C. Other terminated operations that had begun before 2000:

- Operation Stabilise (US Support Group East Timor (USGET))
 - Peacekeeping/peace-enforcement support in East Timor
 - Dates: 19 September 1999 - 16 December 2002
 - Participation: USN/USMC, possibly some USA in communications group (in support of a mostly Australian effort)
- Operation Fundamental Response
 - Humanitarian assistance to Venezuela
 - Dates: 27 December 1999 - 09 March 2000 (63 days)
 - Participation: USN/USMC/USA/USAF

II. Responses beginning in the 2000s

- Determined Response
 - Response to the terrorist attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen.
 - Dates: 12 Oct 2000-2 Nov 2000 (22 days)
 - Participation: USN/USMC/USA/USAF

A. The set of responses to 9/11:

- Noble Eagle
 - CONUS and OCONUS response to the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 (especially CAP over CONUS cities)
 - Dates: 11 September 2001 - ongoing (pending confirmation)
 - Participation: USN/USMC/USAF/USA/USCG
- Enduring Freedom (OEF)

- US campaign to annihilate Al Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan
- Dates: 16 September 2001 - ongoing
- Participation: USN/USMC/USAF/USA/USCG, plus some units from other countries
- OEF-Active Endeavor
 - Following the invocation of the mutual defense clause (Article 5) of the Washington Treaty, the NATO's North Atlantic Council commanded STANAVFORMED and STANFORLANT to operate in EMED to provide presence and to conduct MIO/ LIO operations in the area.
 - Dates: 26 October 2001 - ongoing
 - Participation: USN and allied naval vessels
- OEF- Freedom Eagle/Balikatan
 - An extension of Operation Enduring Freedom to the Philippines (OEF-P). The mission focused on US support and training operations in the Philippines to assist the Filipino military to neutralize the Abu Sayyaf terrorist gang, but U.S. personnel were accidentally engaged in battle in one instance.
 - Dates: 21 January 2002 - 31 July 2002
 - USN/USMC/USAF(?)/USA
- OEF-Horn of Africa
 - Part of the OEF counter-terrorism campaign to conduct surveillance of potential terrorist operations and support LIO in the Horn of Africa region. Based in Djibouti. Command for a while was on the Mt. Whitney, but has been moved ashore and the Mt. Whitney has returned to Norfolk.
 - Dates: 15 December 2002 - ongoing
 - USN/USMC/USAF(?)/USA

- OEF-Iraq (the build-up against Iraq; name of operation not clear)
 - Beginning in late 2002, the United States and the United Kingdom began a buildup in SWA to prepare for contingency operations.
 - Dates: November 2002 - 19 March 2003
 - Participation: USN/USMC/USAF/USA, plus UK, Australia, Poland

B. The war in Iraq:

- Operation Iraqi Freedom
 - Campaign to oust the Hussein dictatorship from Iraq and stop WMD programs
 - Dates: 19 March 2003 - continuing (major combat was over by 16 April)
 - USN/USMC/USAF/USA/USCG, plus UK, Australia, Poland
- Associated with the war in Iraq: Deterrence of North Korea
 - Joint operation in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom to deter North Korea from exploiting US actions in Southwest Asia
 - Dates: 6 February 2003 - 17 May 2003 (102 days)
 - Participation: USN/USMC/USAF/USA (USS Carl Vinson deployed to cover for USS Kitty Hawk deployed to Gulf; USAF bombers to Guam)

C. Shows of force (and one contingent positioning):

- Focus Relief
 - Show of Force off Sierra Leone
 - Dates: 1 May 2000 - 15 May 2000 (16 days)
 - Participation: USN (lone PC)

- Yugoslav Presidential Election
 - US/UK show of force targeting the presidential election
 - Dates: 25-29 September 2000 (5 days)
 - Participation: USN/USMC, plus UK
- EP-3 Crisis
 - USN contingent positioning in response to Chinese internment of forced-down EP-3 crew in Hainan
 - Dates: 2-3 April 2001 (2 days)
 - Participation: USN (three destroyers held up in area)

D. Two NEOs

- Ivory Coast
 - USAF and SOF deployed to airport to evacuate Americans rescued by French from up-country
 - Dates: 24 September 2002 - 30 September 2002 (6 days)
 - Participation: USAF/SOF (French did most of the effort)
- Shining Express
 - Deployment of US forces to Liberia to assist in NEO of US citizens
 - Dates: 12-25 June 2003 (14 days)
 - USN/USMC/USAF (French had done the initial evacuation)

E. Several small contingent positionings in anticipation of clash between Cuban emigres and Cubans:

- Passive Oversight 02-00
 - USN/USAF operational support to USCG for anticipated Cuban Exile Group (CEG) flotillas in the Florida Straits.
 - Dates: 14 July 2000 - 16 July 2000 (3 days)

- Participation: USN/USAF/USCG
- Passive Oversight 01-01
 - USN/USAF operational support to USCG for anticipated Cuban Exile Group (CEG) flotillas in the Florida Straits.
 - Dates: 21-24 February 2001 (4 days)
 - Participation: USN/USAF/USCG
- Passive Oversight 02-01
 - USN/USAF operational support to USCG for anticipated Cuban Exile Group (CEG) flotillas in the Florida Straits.
 - Dates: 14 June 2001 (1 day)
 - Participation: USN/USAF/USCG

E. A couple of humanitarian responses:

- El Salvador Earthquake
 - Humanitarian assistance to El Salvador following a massive earthquake
 - Dates: 13 - 27 January 2001 (15 days)
 - Participation: USN/USA
- Indian Earthquake
 - Provision of humanitarian assistance to earthquake victims in Gujarat, India
 - Dates: 27 January 2001 - 19 February 2001 (25 days)
 - Participation: USN/USAF, plus other countries

Appendix II: Further Discussion of Days

The expansion in combined service response days in the 1990s: what does it represent?

I. Why focus on response day totals vice response case numbers?

All four U.S. military services saw a significant rise in response cases in the 1990s, with roughly half of those cases being concentrated in four clusters: Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Somalia. But counting up cases only captures a thin slice of the larger reality of the U.S. military's increased workload in the years following the end of the Cold War. With the average duration of responses growing dramatically, a better way to measure U.S. military response activity may be to weight each case in terms of the total of response days each service (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines) conducts as part of the overall Department of Defense involvement.

Obviously, it is a little crude to equate the participation of any service with another, because in any one response one may devote significantly more resources (e.g., personnel, platforms, logistics) than another. However, the rates of service participation may provide a reasonable proxy for the level of U.S. involvement and interest in any particular situation. For example, it is reasonable to say that a single-service involvement (e.g., Air Force delivery of relief supplies) is less burdensome than a complex humanitarian emergency to which all four services respond.

By counting up each service's cumulative response day totals, we gain a rough sense of DoD's workload in responses—in effect, weighting individual responses by both duration and service involvement. As such, a 100-day response by the Marines to a single situation is weighted far less than a joint 100-day response involving all four services, which yield a combined response day total of 400. Naturally, it


would be facile to assume the latter response is “four times” more significant than the former in any sort of abstract foreign policy calculation. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the latter case represented a workload for the U.S. military that was significantly higher—roughly four times more burdensome. Clearly, a number of other factors need to be considered in judging the overall difficulty (e.g., distance covered, area covered, level of threat, weather, warning time) or “significance” (e.g., effect on stability in the world) of any one response.

II. The growth of U.S. military response day totals in the post-Cold War era

The U.S. military responded about 170 times in international situations in the 1970s. That total increased by approximately one-third in the 1980s (to roughly 230 cases) and then again by approximately one-fifth (up to approximately 280 cases) in the 1990s. Add that altogether and you have a grand three-decade total of just under 700 cases, with roughly 40 percent occurring since the end of the Cold War (i.e., after 1989). This growth represents a significant increase in response totals, but when these cases are weighted in terms of cumulative duration of response by each service, one gets the sense of a far greater increase in U.S. military operations overseas in the 1990s.

Figure 1 below displays the combined response-day totals for the four services by decade. Using the 1970s as a baseline (10,415 days), we see close to a doubling of response days in the 1980s (17,382 days), but then a three-fold increase beyond that level in the 1990s (66,930 days, or an increase of 285 percent).

To compare this growth pattern with that of response cases, we see that cases increased roughly two-thirds from the 1970s to the 1990s (from 172 to 283), while combined response days grew more than six-fold (from 10,415 to 66,930). Whereas less than half of the responses of the last three decades took place in the 1990s (or 40%), more than two-thirds of the response days conducted during that same three decades took place since the end of the Cold War (66,930 of 94,727, or 71 percent).



What does the growth in combined service response days tell us about the nature of the post-Cold War security environment and U.S. military responses to that environment? Was the world simply more “busy” in terms of instability and crisis, or was the U.S. simply choosing to involve itself more in the world? If the latter is true, did the U.S. choose to involve itself more in the world because it became more concerned about that world over time (e.g., a matter of U.S. perception of threats, valid or not), or because the declining Soviet threat simply allowed us to “shape” the international security environment with greater confidence, more resources, etc.?

Finally, what does this growth pattern tell us about the current decade? Was this great increase in the 1990s simply the Clinton Administration’s desire to intervene abroad more frequently and at greater length, or was it indicative of the “cost of doing business” in the era of globalization? In short, in a world without peer competitors, does the last decade give the U.S. a reasonable sense of the continuing international security workload it faces as the world’s sole military superpower? And if so, how fluid are these responsibilities

likely to be? Will they shift dramatically over time (e.g., Balkans today, somewhere else tomorrow?) or are they likely to drag on for decades, much like U.S. overseas commitments during the Cold War, most of which continue to this day, albeit at reduced levels in Europe?

These are some of the questions we sought to address with this analysis.

III. The grand hypothesis: the U.S. took on three major clusters of responses in the 1990s for which the opportunities had not existed before

Our grand hypothesis is that basically all of the growth in combined service response-day totals since the 1970s can be explained in terms of the U.S. government *choosing* to involve itself in three major efforts starting in the early 1980s:

1. Stability in Southwest Asia starting with the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 and continuing throughout the 1990s with a particular focus on Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq
2. Stability in the Balkans starting with our first response in 1992 to Serbia's aggression against then fellow (and now former) republics of former Yugoslavia and the resulting humanitarian disasters.
3. Humanitarian responses in two of the poorest countries of the South—namely Haiti and Somalia—in the 1992-1996 time period, a policy not pursued elsewhere (e.g., Rwanda) by the second Clinton Administration and similarly eschewed by the current Bush Administration.

These three efforts account for virtually all of the additional response days conducted by the four services in the 1980s and 1990s, with "additional" defined as any days above the baseline established by the 1970s, or 10,415 combined service response days.

No such efforts were pursued by the United States during the baseline decade of the 1970s, preoccupied as this country was with extricating itself and recovering from the Vietnam War, which had been a major part of containment of Soviet expansion in the previous decade, and

given a lack of opportunities. By describing the 1970s as a baseline against which to plot the emergence of these three key intervention efforts (two still ongoing and one concluded), we assert that no significant pattern exists in U.S. military responses around the world during that decade. Thus we label that decade's total of roughly ten-thousand response days as a "scattergram" with no appreciable strategic connections from one to the other. In effect, this baseline scattergram of ten-thousand response days represents the U.S.'s "autonomic" involvement with the outside world, i.e., its typical work load of responses to crises and situations, pursued with minimal debate and little strategic agonizing.

IV. Parameters for distinguishing between the baseline scattergram responses and the clustered efforts

We selected three basic criteria for deciding which response cases would be included in the baseline scattergram of response-day totals and which would be designated as belonging to response clusters:


1. The clusters feature continuous response operations by two or more services lasting longer than 365 days.
2. The clusters feature one or more significant operations (i.e., greater than 90 days in length) in which all four services jointly participate
3. The only responses counted as belonging to clusters are those longer than 90 days in duration. Those responses that clearly belong to the cluster but are less than 90 days in length are "tossed back" into the scattergram pool under the assumption that absent a sustained effort by the U.S. in a particular region or country, a certain number of small responses would have normally occurred. Therefore, in order to avoid artificially inflating the relative importance of the clusters, we count only lengthy operations that signal a significant commitment of time and resources indicative of some larger strategic approach.

We selected these three criteria to avoid counting such one-time and non-sequential overseas interventions such as Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), as well as frequent but non-continuous interventions

in situations such as Lebanon in the early 1970s and around Nicaragua in the early 1980s.

To sum up: response clusters are those that, while stretching over several years, represent a concerted U.S. effort to shape some particular regional environment (or national environments in the case of humanitarian efforts in Haiti and Somalia). By choosing to ignore related responses that register a duration less than 90 days, we assert that shorter responses belong better to the scattergram baseline category of “responses to the rest of the world,” rather than conscious strategic efforts by the U.S. to shape that outside world (a grand exception is the strategic show of force to offset the Chinese “testing” of missiles toward Taiwan meant to affect the Taiwanese presidential election).

Again, our hypothesis is that all of the growth in combined service response-day totals since the baseline decade of the 1970s (which set the baseline scattergram mark at approximately ten thousand days) can be explained by the U.S. *choosing* to engage in a very limited set of situations. We likewise assert that there is no significant pattern in the baseline scattergram response-day total of ten thousand days for each of the three decades; the baseline category has not grown significantly in size over time. Our grand hypothesis is displayed in Figure 2 below.



V. Proving the Grand Hypothesis (A): does a Southwest Asia cluster account for the 1980s' increase in response days?

Using the selection criteria already set forth, we identify a Southwest Asia (SWA) mini-containment cluster in the 1980s that focuses on three key but greatly interrelated lines of regional instability:

1. The Iran-Iraq War and the related threat to shipping in the Persian Gulf.
2. The Israel-Arab conflict as it focused on Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and subsequent chaos in Lebanon.
3. International acts of terrorism with pro-Arab and anti-Israeli/Western motives.

This mini-containment cluster consisted of 17 separate service responses of 90-days or longer

The 1980s combined service response-day total of 17,382 represents an increase of 6,967 days beyond the 1970s' baseline scattergram total

of 10,415 days. The combined total of these 17 clustered responses is 7,141 days (averaging 420 days per response), meaning the Southwest Asia cluster of the 1980s accounts for 103 percent of the growth in combined service response days in that decade, effectively proving our hypothesis as far as the 1980s are concerned.

The baseline scattergram response-day total for the 1980s is 10,241, or a decrease of 174 days (two percent) from the 1970s' baseline. Hidden within the 1980s' baseline scattergram total are numerous short responses that would logically fall within the SWA cluster if they had stretched on for more than 90 days. We choose not to count these shorter responses on the assumption that the U.S. would naturally have some portion of short responses in the SWA area whether or not a strategy to contain Iraq and Iran was being pursued.

The individual service response-day totals are as follows:

- Air Force: 3,890 days (55 percent of total)
- Navy: 1,698 days (24 percent)
- Marines: 956 days (13 percent)
- Army: 597 days (8 percent).

While the Navy accounts for the greatest number of individual operations (10 of the 17), the Air Force registers the highest number of response days, largely on the basis of its one extremely long response in Saudi Arabia, which actually had much to do with Yemen as well as the Gulf ("Elf One" response).

VI. Proving the Grand Hypothesis (B): the trio of response clusters in the 1990s accounts for that decade's increase in response days beyond the 1970s' baseline total

Using the selection criteria already set forth, we identify a trio of clusters in the 1990s:

1. Iraq sanctions regime (basically a follow-on to the SWA mini-containmentment of the 1980s).

2. Interventions into the former Yugoslavia republics of Bosnia and Kosovo (and, to a lesser extent, Serbia and Macedonia) to stem Serbian aggression.
3. Humanitarian responses in Haiti and Somalia.

The Iraq mini-containment

The Iraq mini-containment cluster of 33 responses (90+ days in duration) yields a combined service response-day total of 24,383 days, with an average of 739 days per response. The Iraq cluster represents a more than three-fold increase in response days from the SWA cluster of the 1980s, indicating a dramatic increase in U.S. military activity in the region.

The four services contributed to the Iraq mini-containment in the following manner:

- Navy: 7,011 days (29 percent)
- Air Force: 6,350 days (18 percent)
- Army: 6,258 days (26 percent)
- Marines: 4,764 days (20 percent).

Of the quartet, the Marines participated in the greatest number of responses at 12, followed by the Army with eight, the Navy with seven and the Air Force with six.

The former Yugoslavia cluster

The Balkans cluster consists of 34 separate service responses of 90-days or longer. It yields a combined service response-day total of 21,027 days, with an average of 618 days per response.

The four services contributed to the former Yugoslavia cluster of responses in the following manner:

- Marines: 7,087 days (34 percent)
- Navy: 5,789 days (27 percent)
- Army: 5,102 days (24 percent)

- Air Force: 3,049 days (15 percent).

Of the quartet, the Navy and Marines participated in the greatest number of responses at 12, followed by the Air Force with six and the Army with four.

The responses to failed states in Haiti and Somali

The failed states cluster of 27 responses (90+ days in duration) yields a combined service response-day total of 10,855 days, with an average of 402 days per response.

The four services contributed to the failed states responses in the following manner:

- Army: 3,385 days (31 percent)
- Marines: 3,177 days (29 percent)
- Navy: 2,637 days (25 percent)
- Air Force: 1,656 days (15 percent).

Of the quartet, the Marines participated in the greatest number of responses at 9, followed by the Navy with 8, and the Air Force and Army with five each.

These clusters account for the entire 1990s increase

The combined service response-day total for the 1990s was 66,930 days. When we subtract the 1970s' baseline scattergram sub-total of 10,415, we must account for a total of 56,515 days to prove our hypothesis. The trio of efforts in the 1990s yield the following grand total:

- Iraq: 24,383 days
- Former Yugoslavia: 21,027
- Failed states: 10,855
- Total for all three clusters: 56,265.

Choosing to cite only responses of 90 days or longer, we are therefore able to account for virtually 100 percent (0.995) of the response days

above and beyond our established “baseline scattergram” total of 10,415. The three clusters thus account for over four-fifths (84 percent) of all service response days in the decade, signalling just how concentrated U.S. response activity became in the first decade following the Cold War.

For the trio of clusters, Iraq took 43 percent of the days, the Balkans 38 percent, and Haiti and Somalia only 19 percent.

Despite all the criticism leveled at the Clinton Administration for getting “bogged down” in Haiti and Somalia, this cluster accounted for less than one-fifth of the total of the clusters of responses and a mere 16 percent of the decade’s total response days.¹ If the decade did indeed mark a period of great operational stress for the military services, then eliminating the few efforts to intervene in failed states would not result in a significant reduction in overall activity, since the great bulk of U.S. efforts in the 1990s focused on the two situations that have proven quite long-lasting—the Balkans and Iraq.

Service shares across the clusters

Table 1 below displays the percentage shares of the four services in the clusters of the 1990s:

Table 1. Service shares by response cluster

	Iraq	Fmr Yugoslavia	Haiti/Somalia	All
Navy	28%	28%	24%	27%
Marines	20%	33%	29%	27%
Air Force	26%	15%	16%	20%
Army	26%	24%	31%	26%

Three interesting observations ensue from the table:

1. Some people refer to the operations in Somalia and Haiti as “nation-building,” but the U.S. undertook practically no activities that might be described as such, and certainly not compared to the vast efforts of nation-building that it is undertaking in Iraq.

- In two instances, conventional wisdom about the “leading service” appears to be contradicted:
 - The containment of Iraq is considered the most “naval” response cluster, and yet it is the one in which the combined naval share is lowest among the three (48 percent compared to 61 percent in former Yugoslavia and 53 percent in Haiti/Somalia).
 - The Balkans cluster is often cited as the proving ground for air supremacy strategies, and yet it represents the Air Force’s lowest percentage share (15 percent) and the highest one for the Marines (33 percent)
- The conventional wisdom about needing “boots on the ground” does seem confirmed by the Haiti/Somalia breakdown, where the two ground services (Marines and Army) registered their highest combined total (60 percent).
- Notice how evenly spread the workload is overall: the combined percentage shares all reside in a fairly narrow range from 20 to 27 percent, meaning all four services were deeply involved in these few efforts with no one left “holding the bag.”

Comparing the clusters of the 1990s with the SWA response cluster of the 1980s

The first thing to notice about the clusters of the 1990s is the lengthening duration of the average response. A comparison of the two decades’ clusters is displayed below.

Table 2.

Iraq	Fmr Yugoslavia	Haiti/Somalia	Avg. of 1990s’ trio of clusters	1980s SWA cluster
24,383 days	21,027 days	10,855 days	18,755 days	7,141 days
33 responses 90+ days	34 responses	27 responses	31 responses	17 responses
739 days avg.	618 days avg.	402 days avg.	599 days avg.	420 days avg.

Responses in the 1990s averaged just under 600 days, compared to a bit over 400 days in the 1980s, or an increase of roughly 45 percent. Moreover, notice how the MidEast cluster (Iran-Iraq War, Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorism) in the 1980s yielded only half as many responses as the more narrowly focused Iraq cluster of the 1990s.

The 1990s' trio also represented a far greater concentration of each service's response days over the decade than did the MidEast cluster of the 1980s. Table 3 below displays a comparison of the two decades.

Table 3. Service concentration of response days in the Middle East

	1980s	1990s
Navy	47%	92%
Marines	75%	91%
Air Force	38%	80%
Army	27%	83%
All	41%	86%

In effect, the efforts of the 1990s in the Middle East consumed twice as high a percent of the services' combined response days when compared to the previous decade.

Examining the baseline scattergram response totals by decade

To remind: we generate the baseline "scattergram" (meaning, no pattern) response-day pools for each decade as follows:

- 1970s: we simply take the entire pool of response days to establish a baseline number of 10,415 days, as there is no discernible pattern in the decade that conforms to our selection parameters (i.e., leaving the Vietnam War to a separate category).
- 1980s: subtract the MidEast cluster subtotal of 7,141 days from the decade total of 17,382 days to reach a scattergram total of 10,241.

- 1990s: subtract the trio subtotals (56,265 days in all) from the decade total of 66,930 days to reach a scattergram total of 10,665.

Table 4 below compares the three decades’ scattergram response profiles.

Table 4. Comparing response scattergrams by decade

1970s	1980s	1990s	3-Decade Avg
10,415 days	10,241 days	10,665 days	10,440 days
“baseline”	-174 days	+250 days	+25 days
index = 100	98	102	100
220 cases	248 cases	313 cases	260 cases
48 days per response	41 days	34 days	40 days

These baseline “scattergrams” represent—in effect—the “lesser included” of the post-Cold War security environment. They do not fit into any larger pattern of clustered activity and hence cannot be considered anything more than this country’s minimum “cost of doing (security) business” as the world’s sole remaining military superpower. Because our military is deployed worldwide, these responses are nothing more than the U.S. acting as a “good global neighbor” in times of instability and hardship. However, no one has calculated the totality of situations in which the U.S. and other countries might have considered intervening. We do not have that population. Our general impression is that the U.S. was extremely selective in its interventions and was not really engaged in setting the whole world straight.

What is interesting about these baseline scattergrams is:

- How easy they are to uncover once you strip away the obvious concentrations of response activity in the 1980s and 1990s
- How stable this pool is over time.

If the outside world is “increasingly” full of “chaos” and “uncertainty,” then it is kind enough to present these instances of instability in

rather discrete packages—at least as they are defined by our willingness to react to them. In reality, little has changed for U.S. responses to situations since the end of the Cold War, with the exception of the major clusters. Thus:

- The baseline scattergram remained the same across the three decades (but those kind of activities dropped off to nearly zero in the first three years of the 21st century).
- The Persian Gulf has remained the single strongest focus of concerted attention. Whether this changes following the U.S. occupation and reform of Iraq will take some time to realize, considering that the occupation itself will take a long time.
- The U.S. added the additional—and seemingly rather permanent—burden of the Balkans, but the U.S. contribution now is much smaller than the combined contribution of our allies and friends.
- The U.S. had a brief flirtation with rescuing failed states, but left them before it could undertake any serious nation-building. It has thus eschewed the nation-building business until now with Afghanistan and Iraq, and it remains to be seen how serious it is about Afghanistan.
- A new scattering may take place with the pursuit of the global war on terror, since the terrorists have been ranging from the U.S. to the Philippines.

What has really changed in the post-Cold War environment is U.S. involvement in containing or resolving major sources of instability outside the functioning core of the advanced post-industrial societies. In effect, the U.S. ratcheted up its commitment to the energy-rich region of the Persian Gulf and added a new one in the Balkans. The first was clearly strategic, becoming more so as the problems of WMD and terror were aggravated (though neither were eventually found in Iraq). The second was simply an appalling humanitarian situation in close proximity to the advanced core, for which a single person (Milosevic) appeared to hold the keys (as opposed to Rwanda, which was distant and chaotic and had the misfortune of occurring after the U.S. experience in Somalia).

Comparing the 1990s's baseline scattergram with the clusters

Service shares

Table 5 below compares the service shares within the trio of response clusters and within the baseline scattergram sub-total.²

Table 5. Comparing service shares in the 1990s

	Trio of Clusters	Baseline scattergram	Total 1990s response-day pool
Navy	27%	18%	26%
Marines	27%	18%	26%
Air Force	20%	30%	21%
Army*	26%	34%	27%

My preferred analysis is would be as follows: Clearly the Air Force dominates the category of humanitarian responses. This is true because the vast majority of these cases involve short-term and often one-time responses to humanitarian disasters. In effect, here the U.S. government is playing a role equivalent to that of the UPS or Fedex—namely, when you positively and absolutely want to respond quickly to a foreign disaster, the quickest way is to have the Air Force deliver the needed supplies, both to the country and within the country (e.g., Mozambique). The NGOs take care of the rest.

Duration of response

Table 6 compares the average duration of response in the trio of clusters versus the baseline scattergram subtotal.

Clearly, not all U.S. military responses were “equal” in the 1990s. Those associated with the clusters represented significant concentra-

2. The percentage for Army in the scattergram category is probably too high. I have several cases where we had to use the Army's average 1990s duration because of lack of information, and that probably inflates its numbers. Our guess at the true percentage shares is Navy, Marines, and Army all 20% and the Air Force 40% (all those 1-day responses add up!)

Table 6. Comparing average duration of response in the 1990s

	Clusters	Baseline scattergram
Total days	56,265	10,665
Total responses	94	313
Average duration	599	34 days

tions of resources and time, while—numerically speaking—the large bulk of the individual cases involved very little effort.

As the situations in the Balkans and about Iraq dragged on for several years, it had to become apparent to each Administration that any response associated with them was going to constitute a far greater commitment of resources beyond that of the norm that perhaps they had come to expect had been established in such situations as Grenada or Panama or even the Mayaguez incident.

In short, it is hard to argue that the extremely lengthy “responses” associated with these efforts were—in effect—*imposed* upon the U.S. by circumstances beyond its control. Once the U.S. decided to engage in the Balkans and to contain Iraq, one “response” (i.e., an operation with a name) may flow from another in terms of both sequence and commitment even if the names of the operation may change. In a way, the problem has been the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, which said that the U.S. should have an exit strategy, a rule that was promptly misinterpreted as requiring the setting of a deadline to get out, whatever the conditions. But the problem for the U.S. is more deeply cultural and historical: the U.S. expects to fight a war and then go home. But the “responses” in the Balkans and about Iraq were neither classic wars nor were their resolutions to be easily achieved. Iraq has finally taken the cutting of the Gordian Knot through invasion and ousting of Saddam’s regime—and yet now requires a long occupation. And yet again, we see the same pressures to set deadlines that prompted Clinton to say that the U.S. would be out of Bosnia in a year.

It took a fair amount of time for the services—Navy, Air Force, and Army (the U.S. at least did not let the Marines stay very long in one place, even though in the Liberian NEO of 1990 they let them lan-

guish off the coast for seven months, and now both Special Forces and Marines are languishing in the Horn of Africa region on a routine mission in anticipation that al Qaeda might set up in Somalia or for raids into Yemen)—to realize that the old custom of 1970s and 1980s short “responses” had been superseded by the realities of the situations in the Balkans and Iraq. The Navy treated the Gulf as an “episodic” matter for years. The Air Force finally realized that it had to establish regular rotations to cover Northern Watch; hence the AEF concept. The Army complained endlessly about the rotations supporting around 10-15,000 troops in Bosnia and Kosovo, despite having a total of 480,000 military personnel at the end of the period.

Distribution by region

Table 7 below compares the percentage shares by region in the 1990s.

Table 7. Regional shares of clusters and baseline “scattergram” response-day totals

	Clusters	Baseline “scattergram”
EUCOM	41%	30%
CENTCOM	45%	24%
SOUTHCOM/ ACOM	14%	24%
PACOM	0%	22%

First off, we confirm the lack of any particular regional focus in the baseline scattergram pool. What most obviously jumps out in this table is the relative unimportance of Asia as a source of response days. To date, Asia has not served as a focal point of in terms of actual responses, even though it may emerge in the future as the focal point of political-military planning and strategizing about future international deterrence of conflict, i.e., the most critical region in which to maintain stability and avoid balance-of-power arms races. Even in the baseline scattergram Asia receives the least amount of response “attention.” In short, if a case is to be made regarding Asia as the future center of global conflict, for now this argument remains unsubstantiated by the post-Cold War historical record of responses.

This probably says more about the irrelevance of “responses” as some clue to the U.S. managing the world—except in the Gulf. The future of American military strategy does not lie in the record of “responses,” except with regard to Iraq.

What is most interesting about this regional distribution is that one could argue that the United States’ “imperial profile” of “imposing its will upon the world” through military interventions appears to center on those areas of the world where no near-peer exists—namely in Europe (where U.S. forces are surrounded by allies and had to join them in extirpating a cancer in their midst) and the Middle East (where no power comes close to challenging U.S. hegemony). U.S. responses are lacking in the very regions where one might expect an “imperial” U.S. would seek to counter serious challengers—the only one actually mentioned is China in East Asia. And yet, these are two areas where our response pattern is almost non-existent compared to our foci in the Balkans and the Middle East.

By category of response (low, medium and high threats)

We will divide the response cases into three very simple categories:

- Low threat: peacekeeping operations, NEOs, and humanitarian responses
- Medium threat: contingent positioning and shows of force (considered “medium” because of the possibility of ensuing conflict involving U.S. troops)
- High threat: actual instances of combat or operations that clearly put U.S. forces in harm’s way.

Table 8 below displays a distribution by response days across these three threat categories.

The sole observation here is the concentration of higher-threat response days within the cluster category, which, for example, encompasses roughly 95 percent of the high-threat response days in the 1990s (approximately 14,000 out of 14,500 response days occurring in cases designated as high-threat).

Table 8. Comparing threat profiles of the clusters of efforts and baseline scattergram responses in the 1990s (by percent of response days)

	Clusters	Baseline scattergram
Low-threat situations (PKO/NEO/HADR)	40%	80%
Medium-threat situations (Contingent positioning/SOF)	35%	15%
High-threat situations (combat/in harm's way ops)	25%	5%

The routine responses of the baseline scattergram are associated with situations that are overwhelmingly low-threat in nature, which should not be surprising.

Four cosmic conclusions

1. The baseline of U.S. military responses has been very stable since the Vietnam War

Once you strip away the three clusters of response of the past two decades (roughly 20 years in the Middle East, one decade in the Balkans, and a brief five-year stint in failed states), you discover an underlying collection of chronic lesser-included:

- Weather-related disasters
- Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions
- NEOs arising from internal flare-ups of conflict
- Rebel activity
- Civil strife in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Boat people in the Caribbean
- Incidents of terrorism in the Middle East

- Border disputes.

All of these lesser-included are more or less permanent features of the international security landscape, but float around from place to place. They all existed during the Cold War, and they all pop up from time to time after the Cold War. The Cold War did not change the weather (but global warming may).

The United States faces no great challenges in responding to these lesser-included, except perhaps for the usual problem of distance. They represent no significant operational stress. They are usually handled from the existing global posture and deployment patterns (responses in the Caribbean are handled from CONUS).

Moreover, they have not changed in frequency after the Cold War's end. We have not analyzed their absolute frequency in the world outside of U.S. responses, but in terms of our actual responses, this pool has remained amazingly stable over recent decades. We suspect that U.S. forces have responded to only a small portion of such situations.

2. The entire growth of U.S. military response days since the Vietnam War is explained by Iraq, the Balkans, Somalia, and Haiti

The United States decided, shortly after the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, that it had to be more directly involved in stabilizing the Middle East and deterring any Soviet aggression in the area, rather than relying on the surrogate of the Shah's Iran or self-defense by the other countries. In part this strategy was pursued to support our main allies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia. But the main reason for this long-term focus has been the region's central importance to the global economy in terms of providing oil and natural gas.

Of the roughly 63,000 response days the U.S. conducted in operations since 1981 above and beyond the baseline scattergram, the containment of Iraq has accounted for approximately half. The other half represents the decade-long and ongoing effort by the U.S. and its allies together to stabilize the Balkans and the relatively brief fling with "saving" just two failed states—Somalia and Haiti—in the mid-1990s.

In the case of the Balkans, the U.S. was long reluctant to intervene itself. The U.S. said it was “Europe’s problem.” But conflict raged on in the former Yugoslavia for a lengthy period of time, causing huge humanitarian disasters, prior to the U.S.’s much agonized decision to finally enter the fray. During the period before U.S. involvement, the conflict in the Balkans had no appreciable impact on the global security environment, other than political embarrassment for the European nations, and perhaps the NATO alliance, given their inability to agree on any significant course of action to resolve the situation. During the same rough time period, Central Africa dissolved into a plethora of regional conflicts that have since claimed the lives of several million citizens there. This cluster of conflicts has likewise raged without any appreciable impact on the global security environment, and the U.S. has chosen not to involve itself to any serious degree. Clearly, the U.S. intervenes where it wants to and avoids those conflicts it finds of insufficient strategic importance—until the humanitarian costs bear in on the President. But the U.S. did not actually engage in nation-building itself—not even in Haiti.

In sum, all of the growth in U.S. response activity in the past two decades represents a shift in military posture from one of providing overarching stability to the system as a whole (from our strategic stand-off with the former Soviet Union) to that of “exporting” security services to key regions or states of our own choosing. In short, during the Cold War the U.S. provided war prevention services, but now the U.S. provides largely conflict resolution services.

3. The 1990s’ trio of clusters reflects the changes in the post-Cold War security environment

The main difference between, on the one hand, the two efforts in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf and, on the other hand, the efforts in Haiti and Somalia, is that the former cases presented the U.S. with the danger of strategic spillovers while the latter cases did not.

By strategic spillovers, we mean that the instability in both the Balkans and the Persian Gulf had the potential to damage international political or economic structures/processes of strategic interest to the United States. In the case of the Balkans, it may have been the func-

tioning of our most important political and military alliance, NATO, whereas in the case of the Persian Gulf, it was the functioning of the global economy. In the end in the Balkans, however, it was a humanitarian interest rather than some fear of spillover (except to Albania and Macedonia); moreover, the agonizing Kosovo affair had no impact on countries' desire to join NATO, as witness the scene at the celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary in Washington in April 1999.

In contrast to these potential structural spillovers, the situations in both Haiti and Somalia presented the United States with merely the potential for disease, refugees, and political instability. In neither instance did any possible potential for wider damage warrant a permanent U.S. presence to prevent subsequent eruptions of humanitarian travail, conflict, or instability. In short, the U.S. "fixed" the Haiti situation and abandoned Somalia, knowing that it was likely to have to return under similar circumstances, as we have, for example, to Haiti over the last century. The U.S. seemed to have forgotten Somalia entirely until the prospect of al Qaeda lodging there arose in 2002, and even now, the U.S. and its allies merely hang around the fringes of Somalia.

The United States and its allies have chosen to stay and provide stability in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf. In the Gulf it is because the potential for structural spillovers is deemed sufficiently large to warrant (essentially) permanent efforts by the U.S.

4. Effect on service shares?

The even spread among the services of the workload in the 1990s demonstrates the utility of each of them, while offering no good arguments that any one service should be favored with a larger budget share. There is nothing in the historical record of post-Cold War military responses to suggest that any one service is pulling a dramatically larger share of the load than any other.







Appendix III

Humanitarian Responses, 1970-1999

The spread sheet that follows covers all the humanitarian responses we could compile. We have defined these as responses that are not into harm's way—the U.S. units and personnel involved did not face hostile fire.

The cases are coded per service as follows:

- Air Force 
- Navy 
- Army 
- Marine Corps 

In many cases, several services are shown responding, but in separate rows.



ALL U.S. SERVICES HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES 1970-1999

Mission Name	M. Type	AOR	Country	Event Date	End Date	Duration	Assets	Comments
Legend: Navy Army Air Force Marines								
Central American Floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Costa Rica, Panama	10-Jan-70	11-Jan-70	2	2 C-47, 2 C-123, 2 CH-3	State dept request, 576 people evac
Moroccan Floods	Disaster Relief	EUR	Morocco	20-Jan-70	20-Jan-70	1	1 C-141	
Biafran Refugee Relief	Human. Assist	EUR	Nigeria	27-Jan-70	10-Feb-70	15	6 C-141	
Turkish Earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	28-Mar-70	6-Apr-70	10	Airlifters	
Peruvian Earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Peru	2-Jun-70	3-Jul-70	32	6 c-130, 4 c-123, 3 c-133, 2 c-141, 2 c-118, 1 vc-137	501 evac
Peru earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Peru	08-Jun-70	28-Jun-70	21	32 MEU	transport of medical teams and relief supplies (CIM334 says 6/9 to 6/22)
Peru earthquake	Disaster relief	SOU	Peru	9-Jun-70	21-Jun-70	13	11	
Typhoon Georgia	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	14-Sep-70	23-Sep-70	10	3 MARDIV	set up water purification units
Fig Hill	Human. Assist	EUR	Jordan	27-Sep-70	28-Oct-70	32	1 c133, 23+ c130, 1 c141	airlift of 2 hospitals and other relief supplies after civil war
Puerto Rico Floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Puerto Rico	7-Oct-70	30-Oct-70	24	3 C-124	
Italian Floods	Disaster Relief	EUR	Italy	18-Oct-70	18-Oct-70	1	1 C-130	Genoa flood
Typhoon Joan	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	19-Oct-70	27-Oct-70	9	12 c130, 1 c-47, 1 c54, c118s	453 evac, Navy, MC involved
Typhoon Joan	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	21-Oct-70	25-Oct-70	5	HMM-164, Det of BLT 2/9	Reliefs ops
Typhoon Kate	Disaster Relief	PAC	S. Vietnam	21-Oct-70	26-Oct-70	6	1 MAW helos	9000 evac
Typhoon Kate	Disaster relief	PAC	Vietnam	21-Oct-70	25-Oct-70	5	1arg	
Colombian Floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Colombia	16-Nov-70	24-Nov-70	9	C-130, CH-3	army involved
Pakistan Aid	Disaster Relief	CENT	East Pakistan	18-Nov-70	18-Dec-70	31	5+ c130, 12 c-141	cyclone relief, army involved

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Typhoon Patsy	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	21-Nov-70	24-Nov-70	4	2 c130	
Costa Rica floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Costa Rica	5-Dec-70	15-Dec-70	11	1 C-123, 1 CH-3	army involved
Ecuador earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Ecuador	11-Dec-70	18-Dec-70	8	3 C-130	army involved
Malaysian Floods	Disaster Relief	PAC	Malaysia	7-Jan-71	11-Jan-71	5	2 c141, 2 c-124, 1 c130	army involved
Bolivian Floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Bolivia	13-Feb-71	28-Feb-71	16	2+ C-130	
Okinawa Typhoon	Disaster Relief	PAC	Japan	4-Mar-71	5-Mar-71	2	1 c5, 1 c141	
Project Volcan	Disaster Relief	SOU	Nicaragua	18-Mar-71	28-Mar-71	11	2 c-123, 2+ c-130	855 evac
Truk Island Typhoon	Disaster Relief	SOU	Truk Island	1-May-71	1-May-71	1	2 C-130	
Soviet ship accident	Human. Assist	PAC	Pacific	1-May-71	1-May-71	1	Rescue Units	medical personnel parachuted to Soviet freighter to assist burned sailor
Turkish Earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	25-May-71	25-May-71	1	1 C-130	relief flight from Incirlik to Ankara
Coronet Roundup	Disaster Relief	SOU	Puerto Rico	1-Jun-71	10-May-75	1440	2 u-10, 2 c-7, c123s, c130s	Screwworm eradication
Bonny Jack	Human. Assist	PAC	India	17-Jun-71	17-Jul-71	31	7 C-130, 6 c-141	cholera vaccine delivery and refugee transport (23,000 evac)
Chilean disasters	Disaster Relief	SOU	Chile	1-Jul-71	21-Jul-71	21	4 c-130	earthquake + winter storm
Mexican Floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Mexico	1-Jul-71	2-Jul-71	2	2 HH-43	19 evac
Cholera Outbreak	Disaster Relief	EUR	Chad	7-Jul-71	11-Jul-71	5	1 C-130	
Hurricane Edith	Disaster Relief	SOU	Nicaragua	12-Sep-71	17-Sep-71	6	3 c130, 1 c123	army involved
Tropical Storm Fern	Disaster Relief	SOU	Mexico	15-Sep-71	16-Sep-71	2	2 HH-43	
Earthquake, floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Peru	25-Mar-72	3-Apr-72	10	2 C-130	
Turkish medical aid	Human. Assist	EUR	Turkey	12-May-72	12-May-72	1	1 c130	
Operation Saklolo	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	21-Jul-72	15-Aug-72	26	c130, h3, h43	flood relief in Luzon, Army, Navy, MC involved

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Philippine typhoon	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	22-Jul-72	07-Aug-72	16	HMM-165	2000 evac
Philippines Typhoon	Disaster relief	PAC	Philippines	22-Jul-72	6-Aug-72	16	11	
Typhoon Celeste	Disaster Relief	PAC	Johnston Island	17-Aug-72	29-Aug-72	13	3 c141	524 evac, Navy involved in runway rebuilding, AF evacuated and returned island residents
Korean floods	Disaster Relief	PAC	S. Korea	19-Aug-72	20-Aug-72	2	2 hh3, 1 hh43	748 evac
Korean floods 2	Disaster Relief	PAC	S. Korea	1-Nov-72	1-Nov-72	1	4 helos	763 evac
Nicaragua earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Nicaragua	23-Dec-72	30-Jan-73	39	28 c141, 3 c5, 8 c130, 2 uh1, 1c118, 1c123	900 evac, army involved
Nicaragua earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Nicaragua	23-Dec-72	30-Jan-73	39	1 tactical hosp, segment of 21 evac hospital	end date from AF
Iceland volcano	Disaster Relief	EUR	Iceland	23-Jan-73	27-Mar-73	64	2 c130, 1 c5, 3 c141, 2 hh3	33 people and 275 sheep evac, Navy and MC involved
Tunisian flooding	Disaster Relief	EUR	Tunisia	28-Mar-73	31-Mar-73	3	helos from Forrestal	729 evac
Tunisia Flood Relief	Disaster relief	EUR	Tunisia	28-Mar-73	30-Mar-73	3	1cv 2l 1sc	
Medfly infestation	Disaster Relief	SOU	Nicaragua	2-Apr-73	19-May-73	48	3 c123, c130s	
Authentic assistance	Disaster Relief	EUR	Mali, Chad, Mauritania	15-May-73	10-Nov-73	180	9 C-130	Drought relief
Guatemalan flood	Disaster Relief	SOU	Guatemala	29-Jun-73	30-Jun-73	2	1 c-130	
Hemorrhagic fever	Disaster Relief	PAC	Vietnam	1-Jul-73	1-Jul-73	1	C-130	
Encephalomyelitis epidemic	Disaster Relief	SOU	Panama	14-Jul-73	26-Jul-73	13	1 c123, 1 uh1, 1 c130	
Flooding and borer worm	Disaster Relief	PAC	Pakistan	20-Aug-73	22-Sep-73	34	2 c-47, 2 c5, 12 c141	flood relief and insecticide spraying
Frontier development	Human. Assist	SOU	Paraguay	1-Sep-73	1-Sep-73	1	1 c-130	assistance in drilling for water
Philippine floods	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	1-Oct-73	1-Oct-73	1	1 c130	relief supplies
Colombia floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Colombia	12-Oct-73	12-Oct-73	1	2 c-130	

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Panama floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Panama	19-Nov-73	21-Nov-73	3	2 uh1	
Tunisia Flood Relief	Disaster Relief	EUR	Tunisia	14-Dec-73	17-Dec-73	3	helos from Iwo Jima	
Tunisia Flood Relief	Disaster relief	EUR	Tunisia	14-Dec-73	16-Dec-73	3	1l	
Bolivian Floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Bolivia	9-Feb-74	10-Feb-74	2	2 c130	
Australian floods	Disaster Relief	PAC	Australia	15-Feb-74	23-Mar-74	37	1 c-141	fuel system and fuel supplies
King Grain	Disaster Relief	EUR	Mali, Chad, Mauritania	13-Jun-74	21-Oct-74	131	19 c-130	Drought relief
Chilean floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Chile	3-Jul-74	6-Jul-74	4	1 c-5, 1 c-141, 1 c130	
Colombian landslide	Disaster Relief	SOU	Colombia	10-Jul-74	31-Jul-74	22	1 c-130	
Cyprus Crisis	Human. Assist	EUR	Cyprus	25-Jul-74	6-Aug-74	13	10 c-130	recheck hao for dates and craft
Bangladesh floods	Disaster Relief	PAC	Bangladesh	1-Aug-74	1-Aug-74	1	3 c-141	
Philippines Flood Relief	Disaster relief	PAC	Philippines	18-Aug-74	24-Aug-74	6	31 MAU	helos assisted
Philippines Flood Relief	Disaster relief	PAC	Philippines	18-Aug-74	23-Aug-74	6	1l 1aux	
Burmese floods	Disaster Relief	PAC	Burma	26-Aug-74	27-Aug-74	2	2 c-141	
Hurricane Fifi	Disaster Relief	SOU	Honduras	19-Sep-74	15-Oct-74	27	12 c130, 1 c54, 2 uh1, 2 c123	flooding relief
Virgin Islands floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Virgin Islands	1-Nov-74	1-Nov-74	1	airlifters	
Bangladesh famine	Disaster Relief	PAC	Bangladesh	3-Dec-74	18-Dec-74	16	1 c130	food supplies for flood victims
Cyclone Tracy	Disaster Relief	PAC	Australia	26-Dec-74	3-Jan-75	9	3 c-141	1122 evac
Thai floods	Disaster Relief	PAC	Thailand	12-Jan-75	27-Jan-75	16	2+ c130, 2 uh-1, 2 ch53	
Singapore oil spill	Disaster Relief	PAC	Singapore	14-Jan-75	16-Jan-75	3	1 c-141	oil cleanup equipment airlift, CG involved
Mauritius Cyclone	Disaster relief	PAC	Mauritius	9-Feb-75	3-Mar-75	23	1cv	

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Mauritius cyclone	Disaster Relief	CENT	Mauritius	13-Feb-75	13-Feb-75	1	1 c-141	
Nuclear reactor shutdown	counterprolifer	PAC	Vietnam	1-Mar-75	1-Mar-75	1	2 c-130	evacuation of nuclear fuel from S. Vietnam reactor
New Arrival, New Life, Baby Lift	Human. Assist	PAC	various?	4-Apr-75	16-Sep-75	166	251 c-141, 349 civil	Indochinese refugees moved to US, Navy involved, 121562 evac
New Life	Human. Assist	PAC	Guam	22-Apr-75	1-Nov-75	194	25th Infantry, medical units	
Dengue Fever outbreak	Disaster Relief	PAC	Guam	13-May-75	30-Jun-75	49	2 uc123	spraying for disease control
Brazilian floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Brazil	26-Jul-75	29-Jul-75	4	3 C-130	State and JCS ordered
Romanian floods	Disaster Relief	EUR	Romania	7-Aug-75	7-Aug-75	1	2 c-141	
Angola civil war	Human. Assist	EUR	Angola	7-Sep-75	3-Nov-75	58	civil	
Jamaica civil unrest	Human. Assist	SOU	Jamaica	25-Jan-76	25-Jan-76	1	1 c130	provided shelter supplies for victims
Guatemalan earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Guatemala	4-Feb-76	30-Jun-76	148	2 c5, 29 c141, 33 c130, 1 U2	
Guatemalan earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Guatemala	4-Feb-76	30-Jun-76	148	105 med det, 47 field hospital	end date from AF
Guatemala Earthquake	Disaster relief	SOU	Guatemala	20-Feb-76	18-Apr-76	59	3I	
Lion Assist	Disaster Relief	EUR	Italy	11-May-76	13-May-76	3	1 c-141	Aviano personnel participated in relief, + supplies brought in by air
Lion Assist	Disaster Relief	EUR	Italy	11-May-76	13-May-76	3	1 bat/509 airborne inf, 167 signal co	end date from AF
Guam Typhoon	Disaster relief	PAC	Guam	20-May-76	29-May-76	10	1I 2aux	
Philippines Typhoon	Disaster relief	PAC	Philippines	21-May-76	30-May-76	10	1cv 3aux	
Guam typhoon	Disaster Relief	PAC	Guam	23-May-76	9-Jun-76	18	7 c141, 6 c5, 1 c130	Navy and Army involved
Philippine typhoon	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	26-May-76	31-May-76	6	4 h3	734 evac by AF, 1244 by Navy
Ontario Forest Fire	Disaster Relief		Canada	9-Jun-76	10-Jun-76	2	2 C-141	brought firefighting equipment

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Venezuela Drought Relief	Disaster relief	SOU	Venezuela	1-Jul-76	31-Jul-76	31	1aux	
Indonesian earthquake	Disaster Relief	PAC	Indonesia	21-Jul-76	26-Jul-76	6	1 c-141, 2 c-130	
Bolivian airliner crash	Human. Assist	SOU	Bolivia	15-Oct-76	21-Oct-76	7	1 c-141	delivered and returned burn team
Turkish Earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	26-Nov-76	29-Nov-76	4	1 c-5, 15 c-130, 14 c-141	
Turkish Earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	20-Jan-77	22-Jan-77	3	3 c141, 7 c-130	
Romanian earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Romania	7-Mar-77	7-Mar-77	1	1 c130	
Refugee Relief	Human. Assist	CENT	Djibouti	14-Oct-77	14-Oct-77	1	1 c-141	
Eniwetok Cleanup	Human. Assist	PAC		15-Nov-77	1-Dec-80	1113	84th Engineering battalion	
Marshall Isl. Typhoon	Disaster Relief	PAC	Marshall Is.	26-Dec-77	29-Dec-77	4	4 c141	830 evac
Soviet satellite crash	Disaster Relief		Canada	1-Jan-78	1-Jan-78	1	c-141	search for radioactive remains
Sudan flood relief	Disaster Relief		Sudan	2-Aug-78	16-Aug-78	15	2 c-141	German troops and US Army involved
Hurricane Greta	Disaster Relief	SOU	Honduras, Belize	24-Sep-78	5-Oct-78	12	2 c-130	
Costa Rica floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Costa Rica	23-Oct-78	26-Oct-78	4	2 uh1, 1 O2	23 evac
Jonestown body recovery	Human. Assist	SOU	Guyana	18-Nov-78	3-Dec-78	16	Graves registration units	
Jonestown Body recovery	Human. Assist	SOU	Guyana	19-Nov-78	22-Dec-78	34	21 c141, c-130s, 3 hh-53, 2 hc-130	
Medical aid to Algerian pres.	Human. Assist	EUR	Algeria	22-Nov-78	22-Nov-78	1	1 c-5, 1 c-141	At request of Sec State, 6 medpersonnel and equipment transported
Sri Lanka typhoon	Disaster Relief	PAC	Sri Lanka	27-Nov-78	29-Nov-78	3	5 c-141	
Tropical Storm Alice	Disaster Relief	PAC	Marshall Is.	6-Jan-79	9-Jan-79	4	3 c141	

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Typhoon Meli	Disaster Relief	PAC	Fiji	3-Apr-79	6-Apr-79	4	2 c-141	
Zaire drought relief	Disaster Relief	EUR	Zaire	9-Apr-79	12-Apr-79	4	1 c-141	
St. Vincent volcano	Disaster Relief	SOU	St. Vincent	14-Apr-79	22-Apr-79	9	2+ c-130	
Yugoslav earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Yugoslavia	18-Apr-79	20-Apr-79	3	7 c-141, 3 c-130	
Liberia relief	Human. Assist	EUR	Liberia	18-Apr-79	18-Apr-79	1	1 c-141	medical supplies after riots
Hurricane David relief	Disaster Relief	SOU	Caribbean	31-Aug-79	21-Nov-79	83	15+ c130, 5+ c-141, c5s	1358 evac
Hurricane David	Disaster Relief	SOU	Caribbean	01-Sep-79	?		KC-130s, helos from Cherry Pt, other troops	recon, logistics, 60 evac
Thai refugee aid	Human. Assist	PAC	Thailand	1-Oct-79	1-Oct-79	1	airlifters	
Panama floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Panama	15-Nov-79	16-Nov-79	2	2 uh1, 1 O2	27 evac
Project Valentine Assist	Disaster Relief	PAC	Marshall Is.	2-Dec-79	28-Dec-79	27	35 c141, 5 c-130	Typhoon relief
Cambodian famine relief	Disaster Relief	PAC	Singapore	3-Dec-79	9-Dec-79	7	2 c5	relief equipment sent to Singapore for sealift to Cambodia
Colombian earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Colombia	14-Dec-79	17-Dec-79	4	4 c-130	
Nicaragua floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Nicaragua	16-Dec-79	12-Mar-80	88	3+ c-130	
Belize floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Belize	19-Dec-79	19-Dec-79	1	1 c-130	
Azores Earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Azores	2-Jan-80	4-Jan-80	3	2 c-141	
Cyclone Claudette	Disaster Relief	CENT	Mauritius	10-Jan-80	11-Jan-80	2	1 c-141	airlift of tents to Port Louis
Thai refugee aid	Human. Assist	PAC	Thailand	1-Apr-80	1-Apr-80	1	airlifters	
Mariel boatlift	Human. Assist	SOU	Cuba	1-May-80	1-May-80	1	airlifters	support establishment of refugee processing centers
Hurricane Allen	Disaster Relief	SOU	Haiti, St. Lucia	7-Aug-80	16-Aug-80	10	2 c130, 1 c5, 2 c141	marines involved

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Algerian earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Algeria	12-Oct-80	23-Oct-80	12	1 c-5, 14 c-141, 1 c130	
Algerian Earthquake	Disaster relief	EUR	Algeria	12-Oct-80	12-Oct-80	1	helos	
Algerian Earthquake	Disaster relief	EUR	Algeria	12-Oct-80	12-Oct-80	1	11	
Nicaragua floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Nicaragua	20-Oct-80	23-Oct-80	4	1 c-130	
Typhoon Dinah	Disaster Relief	PAC	Saipan	1-Nov-80	1-Nov-80	1	airlifters	
Italian earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Italy	26-Nov-80	2-Dec-80	7	11 c130, 1 u-2, 1 c141	U-2 assessed damage, MAC flew relief
Greece earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Greece	6-Mar-81	6-Mar-81	1	1 C-130	Earthquake relief
Peru earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Peru	14-Jul-81	14-Jul-81	1	1 C-130	Transport of 15,400 lbs of supplies after earthquake
Sadat assassinated	Human. Assist	RDJTF	Egypt	8-Oct-81	8-Oct-81	1	C-5,C-9,C-141	Transport of wounded & US envoy to Sadat funeral
Turkey earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	1-Nov-81	1-Nov-81	1	C-130	Earthquake relief
Dakar	Human. Assist	EUR	Senegal	8-Dec-81	15-Dec-81	8	C-141	Humanitarian supplies to Senegal
Yemen earthquake	Disaster Relief	RDJTF	Yemen	13-Dec-81	13-Dec-81	1	6 C-141	Earthquake relief
Panama bridge collapse	Disaster Relief	SOU	Panama	21-May-82	26-May-82	6	C-130s	Bridge collapse response
Chad famine	Disaster Relief	EUR	Chad	6-Jul-82	14-Jul-82	9	1 C-130	Refugee relief during civil war
Beirut Airlift	Human. Assist	EUR	Lebanon	23-Aug-82	24-Aug-82	2	1 c130	Refugee relief , Navy involved
Beirut Airlift	Human. Assist	EUR	Lebanon	17-Oct-82	17-Oct-82	1	1 c130	Refugee relief
Tunisia floods	Disaster Relief	EUR	Tunisia	1-Nov-82	1-Nov-82	1		Flood relief
Typhoon Iwa	Disaster Relief	PAC	Hawaii	25-Nov-82	28-Nov-82	4	2 c5, 1 c141	Hurricane relief, Navy, army involved
Yemen earthquake	Disaster Relief	RDJTF	Yemen	17-Dec-82	26-Dec-82	10	4 C-141	Earthquake relief
Italy forest fires	Disaster Relief	EUR	Italy	1-Jan-83	1-Jan-83	1	C-130s	Forest fire

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Nigeria telecom fire	Disaster Relief	EUR	Nigeria	28-Jan-83	30-Jan-83	3	1 C-141	Transport of telecommunications equip after fire
Lebanon snowstorm	Disaster Relief	EUR	Lebanon	21-Feb-83	24-Feb-83	4	BLT	PK force assisted in DR
Fiji typhoon	Disaster Relief	PAC	Fiji	1-Mar-83	1-Mar-83	1		Hurricane relief
Colombia earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Colombia	1-Apr-83	8-Apr-83	8	C-130s	Earthquake relief
El Salvador	Human. Assist	SOU	El Salvador	1-Jun-83	1-Jun-83	1	2 C-130s	Transport medical relief
Peru floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Peru	26-Jun-83	1-Jul-83	6	3 C-130	Flood relief with Panamanian forces
Ecuador floods	Disaster Relief	SOU	Ecuador	24-Jul-83	6-Aug-83	14	2 uh-1	Flood relief
Truk Isl. Cholera	Disaster Relief	PAC	Truk Island	1-Sep-83	1-Sep-83	1	airlifters	Medical supplies for Cholera
Turkey earthquake	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	1-Nov-83	5-Nov-83	5	4 c141, 6 c130	Earthquake relief
Ahuas Tara II	Human. Assist	SOU	Honduras	1-Jan-84	29-Feb-84	60	C-130	Exercise and transport of food and medical supplies
El Salvador	Human. Assist	SOU	El Salvador	17-Jan-84	17-Jan-84	1	C-130	Repair of bridge destroyed by rebels
Typhoon Keli	Disaster Relief	PAC	Johnson Is	19-Aug-84	20-Aug-84	2	2 c141	382 evac
South Korea floods	Disaster Relief	PAC	South Korea	2-Sep-84	2-Sep-84	1	1 ch3, 2 hh3	Flood rescue operation. 96 evac, army involved
AIDS airlift	Human. Assist	EUR	Zaire, Gambia	19-Sep-84	21-Sep-84	3	C-141	Support for US NIH AIDS project, medical supplies airlifted
Pines Hotel Fire	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	23-Oct-84	24-Oct-84	2	1 c130, 1 h3	58 evac
Ethiopia famine relief	Disaster Relief	EUR	Ethiopia	1-Dec-84	31-Mar-85	121		African famine relief
Mercy Airlift	Disaster Relief	CENT	Sudan	22-Dec-84	29-Dec-84	8	1 C-141	Supplies to Ethiopian refugees
Mercy Airlift	Disaster Relief	CENT	Sudan	18-Jan-85	23-Jan-85	6	2 C-141	African famine relief
Typhoon Eric	Disaster Relief	PAC	Fiji Islands	19-Jan-85	21-Jan-85	3	2 c5, 1 c141	Typhoon relief
Mozambique	Human. Assist	EUR	Mozambique	1-Feb-85	1-Feb-85	1	1 C-141	Humanitarian relief, blankets sent as goodwill gesture
Argentina	Disaster Relief	SOU	Argentina	3-Feb-85	3-Feb-85	1	1 C-141	Earthquake relief

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African famine relief	Disaster Relief	EUR	Mali, Niger, Sudan	3-Mar-85	11-Mar-85	9	4 c141	Famine relief and support for Bush visit
Chile	Disaster Relief	SOU	Chile	15-Mar-85	18-Mar-85	4	1 C-5	Delivery of supplies to earthquake victims
Project Raft	Human. Assist	EUR	Mali	1-May-85	11-Nov-85	195	3 C-141, 2 C-130	Construction of bridge to aid relief effort. Nov retrieval of Army engineers
Sudan	Disaster Relief	CENT	Sudan	12-Aug-85	5-Dec-85	116	1 C-5	Transport of helos to be used in famine relief effort and their return in December
Mexico	Disaster Relief	ACOM	Mexico	19-Sep-85	30-Sep-85	12	5 c130,4 c5, 2 c-21, 11 c141	Earthquake relief
Mud slides	Disaster Relief	ACOM	Puerto Rico	9-Oct-85	16-Oct-85	8	5 c5, 3 c-130, 2 c141	Delivery of humanitarian goods after flooding, army and Navy involved
Colombia	Disaster Relief	SOU	Colombia	15-Nov-85	28-Nov-85	14	4+ C-130	Humanitarian and S&R supplies after volcano, army involved
Ponape	Human. Assist	PAC	Ponape Island	21-Nov-85	21-Nov-85	1	C-141	Medical evacuation
Arrow air crash	Disaster Relief	ACOM	Canada	12-Dec-85	20-Jan-86	40	C-5,C-130	Airlift of victims and remains of plane crash
Task Force Crosby	Human. Assist		Canada	12-Dec-85	12-Jan-86	32	medical and combat service support detach	
Haiti	Human. Assist	ACOM	Haiti	7-Feb-86	7-Feb-86	1	C-141	Transport of Jean-Claude Duvalier to France
Philippines	Human. Assist	PAC	Philippines	26-Feb-86	28-Feb-86	3	1 C-141, 1 C-9	Transport of Marcos to Hawaii *DFI and mobility have wrong year (87)
Afghan Relief	Human. Assist	CENT	Pakistan	1-Mar-86	1-Jul-93	2680	c5, c141, c9	Food, mules, tents, patients
Combat Catch	Disaster Relief	EUR	Ukraine	1-Apr-86	31-May-86	61	C-141	Chernobyl nuclear accident/air sampling missions
North Yemen	Human. Assist	CENT	North Yemen	6-Apr-86	7-Apr-86	2	C-141	Transport of Deputy PM to FRG for medical svcs
Solomon Islands	Disaster Relief	PAC	Solomon Is	23-May-86	30-May-86	8	4 c130	Typhoon relief
Jamaica	Disaster Relief	ACOM	Jamaica	8-Jun-86	10-Jun-86	3	2 C-130	Flood relief
Musk Oxen	Human. Assist	ACOM	Greenland	11-Jul-86	11-Jul-86	1	C-141	Delivery of musk-ox calves to rebuild extinct herd
Cameroon	Disaster Relief	EUR	Cameroon	27-Aug-86	29-Aug-86	3	1 c130	Cameroon lake disaster

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Philippines	Human. Assist	PAC	Philippines	18-Sep-86	23-Sep-86	6	2 c5	Humanitarian relief
El Salvador	Disaster Relief	SOU	El Salvador	10-Oct-86	7-Nov-86	29	3 c5, 5 c-141, 10 c-130	Earthquake relief
Typhoon Kim	Disaster Relief	PAC	Saipan	7-Dec-86	7-Dec-86	1	1 wc130	
Dupont Plaza Hotel fire	Disaster Relief	SOU	Puerto Rico	3-Jan-87	4-Jan-87	2	1 c141	burn victim transport
Typhoon Uma	Disaster Relief	PAC	Vanuatu	13-Feb-87	15-Feb-87	3	2 c141, 2 c-130	Typhoon Uma relief
Ecuador earthquake	Disaster Relief	SOU	Ecuador	8-Mar-87	13-Mar-87	6	2 C-141s, 4 C-130s	Earthquake relief , army involved
Chad	Human. Assist	EUR	Chad	1-Sep-87	1-Sep-87	1		Humanitarian supplies
Thailand	Human. Assist	PAC	Thailand	1-Sep-87	1-Sep-87	1		Humanitarian supplies
Typhoon Nina	Disaster Relief	PAC	Truk Isl, Philippines	5-Dec-87	5-Jan-88	32	6 c130	Navy, MC involved
Philippines Medical Airlift	Human. Assist	PAC	Philippines	25-Jan-88	28-Jan-88	4	2 c5	
Mexico	Human. Assist	ACOM	Mexico	1-Feb-88	1-Feb-88	1		Transported Medical team
Typhoon Roy	Disaster Relief	PAC	Marshall Is	19-Feb-88	22-Feb-88	4	1 c141	construction materials
Pakistan	Human. Assist	CENT	Pakistan	19-Apr-88	20-Apr-88	2	C-141	Transport of injured Pakistanis to US for treatment
Sled Dog Lift	Human. Assist	ACOM	Greenland	19-Apr-88	20-Apr-88	2	C-130	Airlift of healthy sled dogs after epidemic
Sudan	Disaster Relief	CENT	Sudan	2-Jun-88	11-Aug-88	71	2 c141, 1 c5	Flood relief (2 missions: 6/2, 8/10-11)
Somalia	Human. Assist	CENT	Somalia	25-Aug-88	31-Aug-88	7	1 c141	Medical supplies
Sao Tome medical airlift	Human. Assist	EUR	Sao Tome	28-Aug-88	3-Sep-88	7	1 c141	medical supplies
Bangladesh	Disaster Relief	PAC	Bangladesh	10-Sep-88	15-Sep-88	6	1 C-5,1 c141	Transport of humanitarian supplies after flood
Hurricane Gilbert relief	Disaster Relief	ACOM	Jamaica, Haiti	13-Sep-88	7-Feb-89	148	6 c5, 1 c141, 7+ C-130	Transport of humanitarian supplies after hurricane
Typhoon Ruby	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	25-Oct-88	25-Oct-88	1	2 hh3	27 evac

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Niger medical airlift	Human. Assist	EUR	Niger	9-Nov-88	9-Nov-88	1	1 c5	medical assistance
Senegal	Disaster Relief	EUR	Senegal	16-Nov-88	30-Nov-88	15	14 C-141	Delivery of insecticide for use against locusts
Cameroon/Chad	Human. Assist	EUR	Cameroon, Chad	29-Nov-88	30-Nov-88	2	1 C-5	Medical supplies, dates uncertain (end of Nov)
Armenia	Disaster Relief	EUR	Armenia	9-Dec-88	9-Feb-89	63	4 c5, 12 c141, 1 c9	Earthquake relief to Armenia, 37 evac
Kenya	Human. Assist	CENT	Kenya	20-Dec-88	21-Dec-88	2	1 C-141	Transport of humanitarian materials for refugees
Honduras	Human. Assist	SOU	Honduras	1-Jan-89	31-Dec-89	365	C-130,C-141	Humanitarian aid to Contra rebels and refugees
Jamaica	Disaster Relief	ACOM	Jamaica	1-Feb-89	1-Feb-89	1		Hurricane relief
Senegal	Disaster Relief	EUR	Senegal	1-Feb-89	1-Feb-89	1	2 c141	Delivery of insecticide for use against locusts
Armenia	Human. Assist		USSR	2-Feb-89	9-Feb-89	8	C-141	Transport of earthquake victims to US
Africa 1	Human. Assist	EUR	Gambia, Chad	7-Apr-89	12-Apr-89	6	1 C-5	Transport of food supplies to Gambia,Chad,E.G.
Afghan Relief	Human. Assist	CENT	Pakistan	30-May-89	6-Jun-89	8	C-141	Delivery of bomb-detecting dogs to Afghan rebels
Soviet fire	Disaster Relief	EUR	USSR	9-Jun-89	11-Jun-89	3	2 C-141	Transport of USA doctors to treat burn victims after rail/gas pipeline explosion
Afghan Relief	Human. Assist	CENT	Pakistan	7-Jul-89	11-Jul-89	5	C-5	Delivery of supplies to build needed bridge
Liberia	Human. Assist	EUR	Liberia	31-Aug-89	1-Sep-89	2		Medical Airlift
Hurricane Hugo	Disaster relief	SOU	Puerto Rico	1-Sep-89	1-Oct-89	31	4l 6sc 3aux	
Hurricane Hugo	Disaster Relief	ACOM	Caribbean	21-Sep-89	1-Nov-89	42	51 C-5, 53 C-141, 23 C-130, 1 KC-10	Support of humanitarian relief efforts
Africa 2	Human. Assist	EUR	Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Liberia, Sierra Leone	29-Sep-89	15-Oct-89	17	1 C-5	Humanitarian supplies: Chad,Niger,Cameroon,S.L, Navy involved
Hurricane Hugo	Disaster Relief	SOU	Puerto Rico	1-Oct-89	30-Oct-89	30	HMH-363, MTACS-18, VMGR-252	
Armenia	Human. Assist	EUR	USSR	29-Dec-89	29-Dec-89	1	1 C-5	Delivery of humanitarian supplies

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Romanian medical airlift	Human. Assist	EUR	Romania	29-Dec-89	31-Dec-89	3	2 c130	Medical supplies after Ceausescu overthrow
Ivory Coast	Human. Assist	EUR	Ivory Coast	1-Jan-90	30-Jan-90	30		Medical supplies, clothing
Paraguay/Argentina	Human. Assist	SOU	Para/Argen	1-Feb-90	1-Feb-90	1		Humanitarian assistance
Typhoon Ofa	Disaster Relief	PAC	Samoa	6-Feb-90	10-Feb-90	5	3 c5, 3 c141	Typhoon Ofa relief
Typhoon Ofa	Disaster Relief	PAC	Samoa	6-Feb-90	10-Feb-90	5		
Tunisia	Disaster relief	EUR	Tunisia	15-Feb-90	19-Feb-90	5	1l	
Afghan apple seedlings	Human. Assist	CENT	Pakistan	1-Mar-90	1-Mar-90	1	C-5	seedlings for Afghan relief
Antigua Hurricane Relief	Disaster relief	SOU	Antigua	26-Apr-90	29-Apr-90	4	1sc	
Philippine earthquake	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	16-Jul-90	30-Jul-90	15	5 C-130, 2 c-141	MC involved
Philippine earthquake	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	16-Jul-90	30-Jul-90	15	MAGTF 4-90, 13 MEU	assisted in rescue ops
Philippine flooding	Disaster Relief	PAC	Philippines	03-Sep-90	18-Sep-90	16	MAGTF 4-90	transport supplies, 453 evac
Philippines typhoon relief	Disaster relief	PAC	Philippines	26-Nov-90	6-Dec-90	11	1l	
Guam	Disaster Relief	PAC	Guam	1-Dec-90	1-Dec-90	1		Typhoon Owen relief
Korea	Disaster Relief	PAC	South Korea	1-Dec-90	1-Dec-90	1		Flood relief (afhist says 9/90)
Balm Restore	Disaster relief	PAC	Samoa	1-Dec-90	12-Jan-91	43	1sc	
Laos	Human. Assist	PAC	Laos	1-Feb-91	1-Feb-91	1		Excess DoD property
Liberia	Human. Assist	EUR	Liberia	1-Feb-91	1-Feb-91	1	1 c130, 1 c5	Relief support after coup
Nicaragua	Human. Assist	SOU	Nicaragua	1-Feb-91	1-Feb-91	1	C-130	Medical supplies
Sierra Leone	Human. Assist	EUR	Sierra Leone	21-Feb-91	21-Feb-91	1	1 c141	Relief supplies

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Armenia	Human. Assist	EUR	Armenia	1-Mar-91	1-Mar-91	1	C-130	Food and clothing
Romania	Human. Assist	EUR	Romania	1-Mar-91	1-Mar-91	1	1 C-5	Medical supplies
Kuwait	Disaster Relief	CENT	Kuwait	8-Mar-91	30-Jul-91	145	42 c5, 3 c141	Firefighting equipment
Peru	Disaster Relief	SOU	Peru	1-Apr-91	7-Apr-91	7	2 c5	Cholera epidemic
Provide Comfort	Human. Assist	EUR	Iraq	5-Apr-91	24-Jul-91	111	94 eng bat, 2 MP cos, 3-325 airborne combat team, 10 special forces group, aviation brig, sig bat, maint bat	
Provide Comfort	Human. Assistance	CENT	Iraq	5-Apr-91	23-Jul-91	110	24 MEU, CMAGTF 1-91	establish refugee camps, assist Kurds, multinational
Provide Comfort	Human. Assistance	CENT	Iraq	5-Apr-91	23-Jul-91	110	1cv 1arg	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Human. Assist	EUR	Bosnia	1-May-91	31-May-91	31	C-130,C-5,C-141	Humanitarian relief
Ecuador	Human. Assist	SOU	Ecuador	1-May-91	1-May-91	1	1 C-5	Medical supplies
Romania	Human. Assist	EUR	Romania	1-May-91	1-May-91	1	1 c5	Food and medical supplies
Safe Harbor/GTMO	Human. Assist	ACOM	Haiti, Cuba	1-May-91	1-Jun-93	763	c141, c130, c5	Airlift refugees, Navy & army involved (HAO says 11/91 to 9/94, 410+ missions)
Sea Angel	Disaster relief	PAC	Bangladesh	9-May-91	12-Jun-91	35	1arg+ 1aux	
Sea Angel	Disaster Relief	PAC	Bangladesh	10-May-91	13-Jun-91	35	6 c5, 2 c130, 2 hc130, 13 c141	Cyclone Marion relief, army, Navy, MC involved
Sea Angel	Disaster relief	PAC	Bangladesh	11-May-91	7-Jun-91	28	5 MEB, CMAGTF 2-91	relief of cyclone damage
Sea Angel	Disaster Relief	PAC	Bangladesh	12-May-91	13-Jun-91	33	25 Inf Div, helo detach	
Ethiopia	Disaster Relief	CENT	Ethiopia	1-Jun-91	30-Sep-91	122	c5	Medical supplies and food after drought
Ecuador	Human. Assist	SOU	Ecuador	1-Jun-91	1-Jun-91	1	C-130,C-141	Medical supplies
Kuwait	Human. Assist	CENT	Kuwait	1-Jun-91	1-Jun-91	1	C-5	Relief supplies

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Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	1-Jun-91	1-Jun-91	1	C-141	Medical supplies
Peru	Human. Assist	SOU	Peru	1-Jun-91	1-Jun-91	1		?Medical supplies.??
Fiery Vigil	Disaster relief	PAC	Philippines	8-Jun-91	24-Jun-91	17	15 MEU, MAGTF 4-90	Mt. Pinatubo eruption, provided security, relief, and evac 21,000
Fiery Vigil	Disaster relief	PAC	Philippines	8-Jun-91	29-Jun-91	22	2cv 1arg	Philippines volcano
Kenya	Disaster Relief	CENT	Kenya	25-Jun-91	25-Jun-91	1	1 c5	food for drought
Kuwait	Human. Assist	CENT	Kuwait	1-Jul-91	1-Jun-91	-29		2nd relief delivery since war
Romania	Human. Assist	EUR	Romania	1-Jul-91	1-Jul-91	1	1 c5	Medical supplies and blankets
Chad	Disaster Relief	EUR	Chad	7-Jul-91	7-Jul-91	1	1 c5	Drought relief
Albania	Human. Assist	EUR	Albania	20-Jul-91	10-Aug-91	22	1 c5, 1 c141	Humanitarian relief
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	22-Jul-91	22-Jul-91	1	1 C-141	Medical supplies
Mongolia	Disaster Relief	PAC	Mongolia	1-Aug-91	1-Aug-91	1	1 C-5	Medical supplies for flood relief
Djibouti	Human. Assist	PAC	Djibouti	1-Aug-91	1-Aug-91	1		Relief supplies
PRC	Disaster Relief	PAC	PRC	6-Aug-91	9-Aug-91	4	1 C-5	Relief to Shanghai due to floods
FSU	Human. Assist		FSU	1-Sep-91	1-Oct-91	31		Relief supplies
Romania	Human. Assist	EUR	Romania	1-Sep-91	1-Sep-91	1	1 c5	Humanitarian relief
Angola	Human. Assist	EUR	Angola	1-Oct-91	30-Nov-91	61	c5s	Recovery from civil war
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	2-Oct-91	2-Oct-91	1	1 c5	3rd delivery of relief supplies
Ukraine	Human. Assist	EUR	Ukraine	23-Oct-91	30-Oct-91	8	2 C-5	Blankets etc. to Kiev
Guam	Disaster Relief	PAC	Guam	1-Nov-91	1-Nov-91	1		Typhoon Yuri relief
Somalia	Disaster Relief	CENT	Somalia	1-Nov-91	1-Nov-91	1		Relief supplies
Pakistan	Human. Assist	CENT	Pakistan	1-Nov-91	1-Nov-91	1		Humanitarian relief

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Sierra Leone	Human. Assist	EUR	Sierra Leone	14-Nov-91	14-Nov-91	1	1 c5	Relief supplies
Safe Harbor	Human. Assistance	SOU	Haiti	22-Nov-91	30-Jun-93	587	2 FSSG, 2 MAW, 2 MarDiv	migrants from Cuba and Haiti: human aid, helped screen migrants
Safe Harbor	Migrant interdiction	SOU	Haiti	25-Nov-91	30-Jun-93	584	1L	
Safe Harbor	migrant interdiction	SOU	Haiti	27-Nov-91	1-Oct-94	1040	504 MP Bat, 96 Civil affairs bat	Haitian migrants
Liberia	Human. Assist	EUR	Liberia	1-Dec-91	1-Dec-91	1		Relief supplies
Romania	Human. Assist	EUR	Romania	1-Dec-91	1-Dec-91	1	1 c5	Humanitarian relief
Typhoon Yuri	Disaster Relief	PAC	Micronesia	1-Dec-91	?			
Tropical Storm Zelda	Disaster Relief	PAC	Marshall Is.	7-Dec-91	7-Dec-91	1		army involved
Typhoon Val	Disaster Relief	PAC	Samoa	7-Dec-91	5-Jan-92	30	9 c5, 3 c141	
Typhoon Zelda	Disaster Relief	PAC	Marshall Isl	7-Dec-91	7-Dec-91	1		
Cyclone Val	Disaster Relief	PAC	Samoa	7-Dec-91	5-Jan-92	30		
Soviet shortages	Human. Assist	EUR	Russia, Belarus, Armenia	17-Dec-91	22-Dec-91	6	3 c5, 1 c141	70 tons of humanitarian supplies to FSU
Water Pitcher	Disaster relief	PAC	Micronesia	5-Jan-92	4-Feb-92	31	4aux	
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	20-Jan-92	25-Jan-92	6	1 c5	4th humanitarian aid mission, State dept request
Snow Eagle	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	2-Feb-92	28-Feb-92	27	hc-130, mh-60, uh-60	relief for avalanche victims
Lithuania relief	Human. Assist	EUR	Lithuania	6-Feb-92	6-Feb-92	1	4 c130	food and medicine
Provide Hope	Human. Assist	EUR	FSU	10-Feb-92	1-May-93	447	C-5, C-141, c130	Relief to 11 NIS of the FSU, continued throughout 1990s as an ongoing routine operation
Turkey	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	13-Mar-92	14-Apr-92	33	2+ c130, 3 c5	Earthquake relief
El Salvador	Human. Assist	SOU	El Salvador	1-Apr-92	1-Apr-92	1		Humanitarian relief
Uzbekistan	Disaster Relief	EUR	Uzbekistan	13-Apr-92	13-Apr-92	1	5 c141	Fire fighting equipment for oil field fires

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Hot Rock (Italy volcano)	Disaster relief	EUR	Italy	13-Apr-92	13-Apr-92	1	HMM-266, 24 MEU	2 CH-53Es carried concrete slabs to alter course of lava flow
Hot Rock (Italy volcano)	Disaster relief	EUR	Italy	13-Apr-92	24-Apr-92	12	1arg	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Human. Assist	EUR	Bosnia	16-Apr-92	19-Apr-92	4	c-141s	Sarajevo disaster relief
Bolivia cholera epidemic	Disaster Relief	SOU	Bolivia	23-Apr-92	23-Apr-92	1	1 c141	Humanitarian relief
Water Pitcher	Disaster relief	PAC	Micronesia	1-May-92	1-Jun-92	32	3 FSSG, III MEF units, MPS Lummus	Chuuk Isl drought relief, Navy says 1/92-2/92
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Human. Assist	EUR	Bosnia	16-May-92	16-May-92	1	c141s	Sarajevo disaster relief
Nicaragua	Disaster Relief	SOU	Nicaragua	21-May-92	21-May-92	1	1 c5	Relief after volcano eruption
Drought relief	Disaster Relief	PAC	Micronesia	1-Jun-92	?			
Provide Promise	Human. Assist	EUR	Bosnia	3-Jul-92	9-Jan-96	1286	C-130,C-141, c17, c5, c9	Humanitarian relief
Provide Promise	Human. Assist	EUR	Bosnia	3-Jul-92	9-Jan-96	1286	5 Quartermaster detach, special forces, mobile hospital	
Provide Promise	Human. Assistance	EUR	FRY	3-Jul-92	15-Mar-96	1352	SPMAGTF, various MEUs	TRAP, CSAR, contingency ops, security for naval hosp in Zagreb
Provide Promise	Human. Assistance	EUR	FRY	3-Jul-92	13-Mar-96	1350	1cv 1arg	
Provide Relief	Disaster Relief	CENT	Somalia	14-Aug-92	28-Feb-93	199	41 C-130, 5 C-141	Humanitarian aid to Somalia for drought
Provide Rellief	Human. Assist	CENT	Kenya, Somalia	14-Aug-92	28-Feb-93	199	5 Special Forces Group	
Provide Relief	Human. Assistance	CENT	Somalia	17-Aug-92	27-Feb-93	195	I MEF Det	airlift food supplies
Lithuania medical airlift	Human. Assist	EUR	Lithuania	26-Aug-92	29-Aug-92	4	1 c141, 2 c130	medical equipment for Lith. Hospitals
Typhoon Omar	Disaster relief	PAC	Guam	28-Aug-92	19-Sep-92	23	1 MEB, BSSG1 M/V Lummus	
Typhoon Omar	Disaster relief	PAC	Guam	28-Aug-92	18-Sep-92	22	1sc 13aux	

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Typhoon Omar	Disaster Relief	PAC	Guam	29-Aug-92	25-Sep-92	28	c5, c141, c130	
Typhoon Omar	Disaster Relief	PAC	Guam	29-Aug-92	25-Sep-92	28	corps of engineers, national guard	
Belarus	Human. Assist	EUR	Belarus	31-Aug-92	31-Aug-92	1	1 C-141	Evacuated Chernobyl children to Belgium for medical treatment
Hawaii typhoon relief	Disaster relief	PAC	USA	12-Sep-92	5-Oct-92	24	1arg-	
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	13-Sep-92	17-Sep-92	5	1 c5	5th humanitarian aid mission, State dept ordered
Georgia medical relief	Human. Assist	EUR	Georgia	26-Oct-92	28-Oct-92	3	1 c141	equipment for hospitals
Armenia	Human. Assist	EUR	Armenia	1-Nov-92	11-Nov-92	11	4 C-5, 1 C-141	Flour
Military Hospital Support	Human. Assist	EUR	Croatia	10-Nov-92	22-Nov-92	13	C-5, C-141	
Pakistan	Disaster Relief	CENT	Pakistan	6-Dec-92	20-Dec-92	15	c5	Flood relief
Sea Signal	migrant interdiction	SOU	Haiti	1-Jan-93	1-Feb-96	1127	MPs, support personnel	
Able Manner	migrant interdiction	SOU	Haiti	1-Jan-93	26-Nov-93	330	DET FAST CO	migrant interdiction, PPO says ended in Sept
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	1-Feb-93	2-Feb-92	-364	C-141	6th humanitarian aid mission
Bosnia	Human. Assist	EUR	Bosnia	3-Feb-93	3-Feb-93	1	C-141	Transport of wounded Bosnians to US hospitals
Provide Refuge	migrant interdiction	PAC	Marshall Isl	4-Feb-93	5-Mar-93	30	MPs	Chinese migrants detained
Provide Refuge	Human. Assist	PAC	Marshall Is.	13-Feb-93	9-Mar-93	25	5 c141, 1 c5	Relief for 535 shipwrecked Chinese , CG involved
Continue Hope/ JTF Somalia	Human. Assist	CENT	Somalia	5-May-93	25-Mar-94	325	KC-135, C-5, C-130	Relief aid to Somalia
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	30-May-93	1-Jun-93	3	C-141	7th humanitarian aid mission
Tunisia fire	Disaster Relief	EUR	Tunisia	01-Aug-93	?		BLT 3/8, MSSG 26	
Guam earthquake	Disaster Relief	PAC	Guam	08-Aug-93	19-Aug-93	12	?	assisted in damage cleanup

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Nepal	Human. Assist	PAC	Nepal	11-Aug-93	15-Aug-93	5	3 C-5	Transport of UK Bailey Bridge after floods
Provide Hope II	Human. Assist	EUR	Georgia	26-Aug-93	19-Dec-93	116	C-141	transport of military hospitals to Georgia
India	Disaster Relief	PAC	India	2-Oct-93	4-Oct-93	3	2 C-5	Earthquake relief
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	2-Oct-93	3-Oct-93	2	C-141	8th humanitarian aid mission
Fiji	Human. Assist	PAC	Fiji	1-Nov-93	1-Nov-93	1		Medevac of Fiji president
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	ACOM	Dominican Republic	9-Nov-93	9-Nov-93	1	C-5	Delivery of 42,000lbs to Mexico, Grenada, DR
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Venezuela/Equator	12-Nov-93	12-Nov-93	1	C-130	Delivery of 6,000lbs to Venezuela&Equador
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	ACOM	Virgin Islands	19-Nov-93	19-Nov-93	1	C-130	Delivery of 25,000lbs of building supplies
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Honduras	7-Dec-93	7-Dec-93	1	C-5	Delivery of 80,000 lbs of humanitarian equip
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Guatemala	15-Dec-93	15-Dec-93	1	C-130	Delivery of 25,000lbs of humanitarian equip
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Belize	17-Jan-94	17-Jan-94	1	C-141	Delivery of 42,000lbs of humanitarian equip
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	30-Jan-94	2-Feb-94	4	C-141	9th humanitarian aid mission
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Nicaragua	1-Feb-94	1-Feb-94	1	C-141	Delivery of 27,000lbs of med supplies
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Guatemala	4-Feb-94	4-Feb-94	1	C-141	Delivery of 40,000lbs to Guatemala and Honduras
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	1-Apr-94	2-Apr-94	2	C-141	10th humanitarian aid mission
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Nicaragua	22-Apr-94	22-Apr-94	1	C-130	Delivery of 26,000lbs of humanitarian equipment
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Guatemala	6-May-94	6-May-94	1	C-5	Delivery of 56,000lbs to Guatemala&Honduras
Rwanda/Burundi	Human. Assist	EUR	Rwanda	11-May-94	31-May-94	21	C-130, C-141, C-5	Humanitarian relief
Support Hope/Provide Assistance	Human. Assist	EUR	Zaire, Uganda	11-May-94	17-Sep-94	130	kc10, kc135, c-130s, 28 c141, 15+ c5	Humanitarian relief for Rwanda refugees
Tanzania	Human. Assist	EUR	Tanzania	11-May-94	17-May-94	7	4 C-130	Relief supplies for Rwanda

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Sea Signal	Migrant interdiction	SOU	Cuba	11-May-94	18-Feb-96	649	II MEF	security.
Sea Signal	Human. Assist	ACOM	Cuba	26-May-94	28-May-94	3	C-130	Transport Cuban refugees
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	30-May-94	31-May-94	2	C-141	11th humanitarian aid mission
Sea Signal	Migrant interdiction	SOU	Cuba	9-Jun-94	17-Jan-96	588	1arg 1aux	
Chernobyl	Human. Assist	EUR	Ukraine	26-Jun-94	26-Jun-94	1	C-5	Transport MRI equipment to aid Chernobyl victims
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Honduras	1-Jul-94	2-Jul-94	2	C-5	Delivery of 19,000lbs of farming equipment
Distant Haven	Human. Assist	ACOM	Surinam	1-Jul-94	31-Dec-94	184	C-5,C-130	Transport of Haitian refugees to Surinam
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	ACOM	Puerto Rico	8-Jul-94	8-Jul-94	1	C-5	Delivery to Puerto Rico & Jamaica to 15,000lbs
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Honduras	15-Jul-94	15-Jul-94	1	C-5	Delivery of 27,000lbs of irrigation equipment
Support Hope	Human. Assist	CENT	Rwanda	17-Jul-94	6-Oct-94	82	MPs, transport, supply	Rwanda refugees
Support Hope	Human. Assistance	EUR	Rwanda	22-Jul-94	18-Aug-94	28	1arg	
Support Hope	Human. Assistance	EUR	Rwanda	1-Aug-94	1-Oct-94	28	15 MEU, HMH-466	heavy lift for relief.
Denton Amendment	Human. Assist	SOU	Honduras	15-Aug-94	15-Aug-94	1	C-5	Delivery of 90,000lbs to Guatemala & Honduras
Able Vigil	Migrant rescue	SOU	Cuba	15-Aug-94	21-Sep-94	38	Fastco, 2 Mardiv, CMFL	security detachments on CG cutters
Able Vigil	Migrant rescue	SOU	Cuba	15-Aug-94	21-Sep-94	38	1l 5sc	
Hurricane John	Disaster Relief	ACOM	Johnston Is	24-Aug-94	31-Aug-94	8	1 C-130, 6 C-141, 2 DC-8	Evacuation due to Hurricane
Safe Haven	Human. Assist	SOU	Panama	31-Aug-94	10-Sep-94	11	2 C-130	Lift Cuban refugees to Panama. Navy involved
Safe Haven	Human. Assist	SOU	Panama	1-Sep-94	1-Feb-95	154	MPs, infantry	transport and secure Cuban refugees
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	1-Oct-94	2-Oct-94	2	C-141	12th humanitarian aid mission
Vladivostok	Disaster Relief	PAC	Russia	30-Oct-94	30-Oct-94	1	1 C-141	Humanitarian relief for flood victims
Egypt floods	Disaster Relief	CENT	Egypt	6-Nov-94	8-Nov-94	3	2 c141	

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Project Sapphire	Human. Assist	EUR	Kazakstan	21-Nov-94	23-Nov-94	3	3 c-5	Weapon grade uranium to USA, Clinton ordered
Safe Passage	migrant interdiction	SOU	Panama	1-Dec-94	20-Feb-95	82	inf, airborne inf	transport and secure Cuban refugees from Safe Haven to GTMO
Albanian relief	Human. Assist	EUR	Albania	17-Dec-94	21-Dec-94	5	1 c130	Denton supplies for orphanages
Kobe earthquake	Disaster Relief	PAC	Japan	01-Jan-95	?		II MEF	delivery of relief supplies
Kobe earthquake	Disaster Relief	PAC	Japan	19-Jan-95	?		c130	help for earthquake victims
Safe Passage	Human. Assist	ACOM	Cuba	1-Feb-95	20-Feb-95	20	c5, c141, c130	Transport Cuban refugees from Panama to GTMO
Provide Hope	Human. Assist	EUR	Ukraine	7-Apr-95	7-Apr-95	1	1 c141	medical assistance to Ukraine
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	11-Apr-95	12-Apr-95	2	1 DC8	13th mission
Ebola outbreak	Disaster Relief	EUR	Zaire	10-May-95	17-May-95	8	1 C-141, 1 C-5	medical supplies
Prompt Return	migrant interdiction	PAC	Wake Isl	1-Jun-95	1-Aug-95	62	25 Inf	intercept and repatriation of illegal Chinese migrants
Quick Lift	PK Support	EUR	FRY	30-Jun-95	11-Aug-95	43	2aux	
Belarus	Human. Assist	EUR	Belarus	23-Jul-95	23-Jul-95	1	1 c5	
Tajikistan	Human. Assist	CENT	Tajikistan	17-Aug-95	17-Aug-95	1	1 DC8	IRC food delivery, Denton?
Croatia	Human. Assist	EUR	Croatia	20-Aug-95	21-Aug-95	2	1 c5	food supplies for war victims
Croatia	Human. Assist	EUR	Croatia	6-Sep-95	6-Sep-95	1	1 DC8	medical supplies for war victims, Denton
Rwanda	Human. Assist	EUR	Rwanda	6-Sep-95	6-Sep-95	1	1 747	shelter for refugees
Kurdish refugees	Human. Assist	EUR	Turkey	7-Sep-95	7-Sep-95	1	2 c5	generators for Kurds
Caribbean Express	Disaster Relief	SOU	Virgin Islands	16-Sep-95	10-Oct-95	25	c5, c141, c130, c17	response to Hurricane Marilyn (hao says 9/15 to 9/21)
Caribbean Express	Disaster Relief	SOU	Puerto Rico/ VI	16-Sep-95	10-Oct-95	25	medical	Hurricane Marilyn relief
Vietnam	Human. Assist	PAC	Vietnam	3-Oct-95	4-Oct-95	2	1 DC8	medical supplies (hao says 9/14 to 9/30), Denton
Israel terrorism	Human. Assist	EUR	Israel	5-Mar-96	6-Mar-96	2	1 c-141	delivery of explosive detection devices to Israel, ordered by president

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Weedeater	drug interdiction	SOU	Jamaica	1-May-96	31-May-96	31	3 Inf Div	marijuana eradication
Mongolia	Human. Assist	PAC	Mongolia	2-Aug-96	2-Aug-96	1	1 c-141	14th mission
Operation Marathon	migrant interdiction	SOU	Bermuda	29-Sep-96	20-Nov-96	53	x 3/8	Chinese migrant operation, security at GTMO, repatriated to PRC
Guardian Assistance	Human. Assist	EUR	Zaire	14-Nov-96	27-Dec-96	44	1 kc10, 1 c-141, 1 c5, 2 c17	relief for Rwandan refugees in Zaire
Pacific Haven	Human. Assistance	PAC	Guam	04-Dec-96	18-Mar-97	105	III MEF	shelter for Kurdish nationals
Present Haven	Migrant security	SOU	GTMO	07-Feb-97	16-Feb-97	10	x 2/2	Guyanese migrants held at GTMO until repatriated to Guyana
Bolivia aid	Human. Assist	SOU	Bolivia	2-Apr-97	2-Apr-97	1	1 c141	medical assistance under Denton amendment
Guam plane crash	Disaster Relief	PAC	Guam	5-Aug-97	9-Aug-97	5	3 c141, 1 kc135	medical assistance for crash survivors and evac
Bulgaria aid	Human. Assist	EUR	Bulgaria	3-Oct-97	3-Oct-97	1	1 c141	medical supplies
Typhoon Paka	Disaster Relief	PAC	Guam	18-Dec-97	4-Jan-98	18	c5, c130, c141, kc135, 747	
Operation Recuperation	Disaster Relief		Canada	10-Jan-98	14-Jan-98	5	c-17	relief for winter storms in eastern Canada
Chinese earthquake	Disaster Relief	PAC	China	16-Jan-98	16-Jan-98	1	1 c-17	
Noble Response	Disaster Relief	CENT	Kenya	21-Jan-98	25-Mar-98	64	VMGR-352	flood relief
Ecuador explosion	Disaster Relief	SOU	Ecuador	2-Mar-98	2-Mar-98	1	1 c141	medical assistance after oil pipeline explosion
Resolute Response	Human. Assist		Kenya, Tanzania	7-Aug-98	1-Oct-98	56	medical	response to embassy bombings
Fund. Relief	Disaster Relief	SOU	Caribbean	21-Sep-98	12-Oct-98	22		relief in Dominican Rep, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands
Fund. Relief	Disaster relief	SOU	Puerto Rico	26-Sep-98	29-Oct-98	34	1I 1aux	
Fund. Relief	Disaster relief	SOU	Puerto Rico	28-Sep-98	27-Oct-98	30	L 3/6, HMM-461, CSSD-61	
Strong Support	Disaster Relief	SOU	Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras	6-Nov-98	11-Dec-98	36		

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Strong Support	Disaster Relief	SOU	Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala	7-Nov-98	12-Mar-99	126	CSSD-68, 69	Hurricane Mitch relief
Shining Hope	Human. Assist	EUR	Albania, Macedonia	4-Apr-99	8-Jul-99	96		assistance to refugees
Shining Hope	Human. Assistance	EUR	Albania	4-Apr-99	30-Dec-99	271	11	
Shining Hope	Human. Assist	EUR	Albania	7-Apr-99	present	635	tactical psyop co	assist refugees
Shining Hope	Human. Assistance	EUR	Albania	7-Apr-99	8-Jul-99	93	24, 26 MEU	assistance for Kosovo refugees
Antarctica airdrop	Human. Assist	PAC	Antarctica	11-Jul-99	11-Jul-99	1	1 c-141, 1 kc-135	airdrop of medical supplies to ill physician at South Pole
Avid Response	Earthquake relief	EUR	Turkey	17-Aug-99	9-Sep-99	24	1arg	
Avid Response	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	18-Aug-99	10-Sep-99	24	1 c5, 2 kc10, others	Izmit earthquake
Avid Response	Disaster Relief	EUR	Turkey	22-Aug-99	10-Sep-99	20	26 MEU	relief for victims of Izmit earthquake
Macedonia aid	Human. Assist	EUR	Macedonia	12-Dec-99	12-Dec-99	1	1 c-17	Denton assistance for children
Fundamental Response	Disaster Relief	SOU	Venezuela	17-Dec-99	1-Mar-00	76	water purification units	landslide relief
Fundamental Response	Disaster Relief	SOU	Venezuela	23-Dec-99	23-Dec-99	1	1 c5	delivered water purifying equipment
Fundamental Response	Disaster Relief	SOU	Venezuela	12-Jan-00	12-Mar-00	61	II MEF Det	flooding relief
Atlas Response	Disaster Relief	EUR	Mozambique	29-Feb-00	30-Mar-00	31	12 Aviation brigade	flooding relief
Atlas Response	Disaster Relief	EUR	Mozambique	1-Mar-00	16-Apr-00	47	c17, 1 c5, 9 c-130, 3 mh-53, 2 hh-60	flood relief
Atlas Response	Disaster Relief	EUR	Southern Africa	05-Mar-00	30-Mar-00	26	MARFOREUR Det	flooding and cyclone relief

Legend: Navy Army Air Force Marines

Vertical line

