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**EVOLVING THE LOCAL FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE
ENTERPRISE IN NEW YORK STATE: IMPLEMENTING A
THREAT LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM**

by

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December 2012

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ENTERPRISE IN NEW YORK STATE: IMPLEMENTING
A THREAT LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM**

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ABSTRACT

Eleven years after the attacks of 9/11, the local fire departments in New York State (excluding New York City) have made limited progress toward increasing their involvement in the homeland security intelligence enterprise. The New York State (NYS) fire service, however, has underutilized potential to be effective contributors, consumers and collaborators with regards to intelligence and information sharing. As the threats facing the fire service and the citizens it protects continue to evolve, the local NYS fire service must build upon NYS's intelligence strengths and overcome existing gaps.

This thesis recommends developing and implementing a locally initiated, statewide fire service inclusive Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program. Based on four factors (effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility, and adaptability), a systematic policy options analysis compares three nationally recognized TLO programs to determine a recommended NYS TLO program model. A detailed implementation strategy is developed to address key stakeholder challenges. This thesis demonstrates that instituting a NYS fire service inclusive TLO program will be a catalyst for evolution. Increasing the local fire service's involvement with the homeland security intelligence enterprise is a natural evolution of the fire service's existing public safety mission.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

9/11	September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks
ACTIC	Arizona Counterterrorism Intelligence Center
AD	Adaptability
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CHDS	Center for Homeland Defense and Security
CIAC	Colorado Information Analysis Center
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CT	Counterterrorism
CTZ	Counterterrorism Zones
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DHSES	Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice
E1	Effectiveness
E2	Efficiency
EMR-ISAC	Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and Analysis Center
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EMT	Emergency Medical Technician
ESS	Emergency Service Sector
FASNY	Firemen’s Association of the State of New York
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDNY	Fire Department, City of New York
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIO	Field Intelligence Officer
FLO	Fusion Intelligence Officer
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FSIE	Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise
FSIFC	Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers
FY	Fiscal Year
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HDB	Homeland Defense Bureau
HMRT	Hazardous Material Response Team
HSIN	Homeland Security Information Network
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive

I&A/SLPO	Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office
IAFF	International Association of Firefighters
IC	Intelligence Community
IGFR	Intelligence Guide for First Responders
ILO	Intelligence Liaison Officers
ISSR	Information Sharing Strategy Report
ITACG	Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group
JRIC	Joint Regional Intelligence Center
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LAFD	Los Angeles City Fire Department
LE	Law Enforcement
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NDA	Non-Disclosure Agreement
NFA	National Fire Academy
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
NYC	New York City
NYFR	New York State Fire Resources
NYS	New York State
NYSAFC	New York State Association of Fire Chiefs
NYSHSS	New York State Homeland Security Strategy
NYSIC	New York State Information Center
NYSP	New York State Police
NYSPFFA	New York State Professional Fire Fighters Association
OCT	Office of Counter Terrorism
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OFPC	Office of Fire Prevention and Control
OHS	Office of Homeland Security
OI&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
OR	Overall Rating
PL	Political and Legal Feasibility
POST	Peace Officer Standards and Training
PUASI	Phoenix-Maricopa County Urban Areas Security Initiative
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report
SLTP	State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics

TAC	Terrorism Advisory Committee
TEW	Terrorism Early Warning Group
TLO	Terrorist Liaison Officer
TLU	Terrorism Liaison Unit
U.S.	United States
UASI	Urban Area Security Initiative
USFA	United States Fire Academy
USFA	United States Fire Administration
VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices

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Education is Not the Filling of a Pail, but the Lighting of a Fire

- William Butler Yeats

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I. INTRODUCTION

State, local, and tribal governments are critical partners in securing and defending the United States from terrorism and other threats to the United States and its interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into account the responsibilities and requirements of State, local, and tribal governments and, as appropriate, private sector entities, when undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to protect the United States.¹

- President Ronald Reagan (1981)

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

1. Overview

Traditionally, the local fire service in New York State (NYS) has not been an effective producer or consumer of intelligence information^{2,3}. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), however, the fire service, “suddenly found itself on the front row of the war on terror.”⁴ Yet, the evolution of NYS’s local fire service into the world of intelligence has been slow and challenging. Thirty-one years after President Ronald Reagan delivered the above quote and 11 years after the attacks of 9/11, local fire departments in New York State (excluding New York City)⁵ have made limited progress toward increasing their involvement in the homeland security intelligence enterprise.

¹ *Intelligence Guide for First Responders*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, 2011), iii.

² NOTE: For the purpose of this thesis, intelligence will be based on the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) definition: “All-hazard information that has been gathered and vetted through the intelligence cycle in order to generate products that can be used to guide Fire Service decisions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Also information provided by the Fire Service to the intelligence community to support the production of finished intelligence products.”

³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office, *Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise—Executive Briefing*, 2007, 3.

⁴ Thomas A Robson, “A Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in the Fire Service” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 1.

⁵ NOTE: Due to the complex nature of the homeland security environment in New York City, this analysis will focus on New York State only.

In 2004, *The 9/11 Commission Report* recommended a unity of effort among government agencies related to intelligence programs. The commission recognized the importance of using an integrated all-source analysis to connect the dots and prevent future attacks.⁶

On the national level, the federal government asserts that improvements have been made in intelligence sharing with locals. In July 2011, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released *Implementing 9/11 Commission Report Recommendations: Progress Report 2011*. The report highlights homeland security changes that have been made in the United States (U.S.) since the release of the *9/11 Report* in 2004. Regarding information sharing, the report states, “Terrorism related information sharing across the intelligence community has greatly improved, and through the establishment of the DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), we have strengthened the ability to convey intelligence on threats to the homeland in a context that is useful and relevant to law enforcement and homeland security officials at the state and local level.”⁷

On the state level, New York State asserts that improvements have been made in intelligence sharing with the locals. In 2010, The Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES) was created. “DHSES and its five offices (Counter Terrorism, Cyber Security, Emergency Management, Fire Prevention and Control, and Interoperable and Emergency Communications) provide leadership, coordination and support for efforts to prevent, protect against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorism and other man-made and natural disasters, threats, fires and other emergencies.”⁸ The *DHSES Strategic Plan* lists, “sharing information and intelligence

⁶ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 426.

⁷ Department of Homeland Security, *Implementing 9/11 Commission Report Recommendations: Progress Report 2011* (Washington, DC, 2011), 11.

⁸ New York State, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, “About DHSES,” (n.d.), www.dhSES.ny.gov/about/index.cfm.

with our stakeholders,” and “enhanced customer service” as two of its primary strategic goals.⁹

On the local level in New York State, however, the fire service (as a major DHSES stakeholder) has yet to become a systemic partner in the homeland security intelligence enterprise, which is a disservice to the fire service, the intelligence community (IC) and the public they strive to protect. The NYS fire service has the potential to be effective contributors, consumers and collaborators with regards to intelligence and information sharing.

Across the state, approximately 140,000 fire service personnel respond to over 1.6 million incidents annually.^{10,11} As potential contributors of intelligence, each incident is an opportunity for fire service personnel¹² to interact with the public, and be in private homes and businesses. These interactions are unplanned and provide unique opportunities for fire service personnel to observe potential signs of terrorist and other illegal activities.¹³

As potential consumers of intelligence, any of the 1.6 million incidents could prove to be a threat to fire service responders or the community at large. Dissemination of intelligence to the fire service will guide preparedness activities and increase safety during response and recovery operations.¹⁴

⁹ *New York State Homeland Security Strategy* (Albany, NY: New York State, 2009), 11.

¹⁰ New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, “New York State Fire Resources,” (n.d), <http://www.dhSES.ny.gov/ofpc/documents/fire-resources-list.pdf>.

¹¹ New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, in *New York 2009 Summary*,” January 13, 2011, <http://www.dhSES.ny.gov/ofpc/fire-incident-reporting-system/fire-in-new-york/2009summary.pdf>.

¹² NOTE: For the purpose of this thesis, fire service personnel is inclusive of all aspects of the discipline (firefighters, fire inspectors, emergency medical technicians, etc.).

¹³ The Department of Justice, *Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers* (Washington, DC, 2010), 3.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

As potential collaborators, the fire service brings resources and unique subject matter expertise (SME) to the intelligence community. The fire service can advise the IC on issues ranging from hazardous materials to critical infrastructure.¹⁵ The results would be beneficial to all involved.

2. Current and Evolving Threats

The fire service has a long history of evolving to meet the needs of the communities it serves. The very formation of the formal fire service in the United States stemmed from community leaders recognizing the need for a more organized approach to fighting building fires. Throughout the decades, specialty programs (emergency medical services, technical rescue, hazardous materials response, etc.) were adopted so the fire service could better protect itself and the citizenry from traditional threats (fire, life threatening medical problems, entrapment, chemical spills, etc.).

In 2012, the NYS fire service faces a myriad of challenges associated with these traditional services. From 1998 to 2009, total responses increased from 905,610 to over 1.6 million.^{16,17} Observational data suggests this trend for increasing demands for services continues. While the incidents of actual fires have decreased, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), for example, have dramatically increased.¹⁸ In addition, New York State has seen a marked increase in natural disasters. In 2011 alone, New York State experienced a record tying four Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) major disaster declarations (severe weather events).¹⁹

In addition to other deviations in these traditional threats, terrorism is the primary threat focus of this thesis. The “Future Role of the Fire Service in Homeland Security”

¹⁵ The Department of Justice, *Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers*, 3.

¹⁶ New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, “Fire in New York 1998,” (n.d.), <http://www.dhSES.ny.gov/ofpc/fire-incident-reporting-system/fire-in-new-york/98annual.pdf>.

¹⁷ New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, “Fire in New York 2009 Summary.”

¹⁸ NOTE: Statement based on trends observed in the Fire in New York Summary statistics from 1998 and 2009.

¹⁹ “FEMA: Annual Major Disaster Declarations Totals,” *FEMA | Federal Emergency Management Agency*, (n.d.), http://coop.fema.gov/news/disaster_totals_annual.fema.

determined, “The future role of the fire service in homeland security will demand the need for progressive leadership, effective collaboration, intelligence engagement, and the adoption of a shifting mission that supports preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery of terrorist attacks.”²⁰

The fire service has not been quick to adapt to the evolving threat of terrorism. On February 26, 1993, a 1,500-pound bomb placed in a rental truck was detonated in the parking garage under the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. Six people were killed and approximately 1,000 were injured.²¹ This detonation was the first occurrence of Islamic fundamentalists unleashing an attack on American soil.²²

On April 19, 1995, a former United States Army soldier, Timothy McVeigh, parked a Ryder truck in front of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. At 9:02 a.m., the homemade explosives detonated, killing 168 people (including 19 children) and injuring several hundred.²³ McVeigh was labeled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a, “prototypical lone wolf terrorist” who is responsible for the most successful and deadliest domestic terrorist event in the history of the United States.²⁴

While both these events were recognized as major singular incidents, few in the fire service identified them as an increasing trend that would soon alter the course of U.S. history. For most fire service personnel, an optional three-hour terrorism awareness class was the most noticeable outcome of these terrorist attacks.

²⁰ Rosemary R. Cloud, “Future Role of Fire Service in Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), V.

²¹ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 280.

²² Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI 100—1993 Trade Center Bombing,” February 2008, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608.

²³ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Oklahoma City Bombing,” (n.d.). <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing/>.

²⁴ Nathan R. Springer, “Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in Our Midst” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 13.

The events of September 11, 2001, however, have profoundly impacted the fire service. At 8:46:40 a.m., when American Airlines Flight 11 struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City, the response from the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) began five seconds later.²⁵ By the end of the day, the FDNY had lost 343 firefighters and the American fire service found terrorism to be a threat it could no longer underestimate.

While the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are the deadliest to date, national assessments indicate threats from domestic and international terrorism remain and are changing. While it is not the purpose of this thesis to provide a comprehensive analysis of all sources of threats to the United States, it is important to put the current threats into context.

In his July 2012 testimony to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Rand's Brian Jenkins presented *New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts: An Assessment of Current Terrorist Threats*. Jenkins stated, "The United States confronts a more diverse terrorist threat in 2012 than it has in the past."²⁶ While he noted a lack of consensus on the current threat posed by al Qaeda, he asserted that, "al Qaeda is many things at once—an ideology of violent jihad, a universe of like-minded fanatics, a global enterprise—and it operates on a number of fronts in both the physical and virtual worlds." While its ability to execute a 9/11 scale attack is reduced, it is focused on, "its ability to inspire and activate homegrown terrorists."²⁷

Jenkins continues to outline another terrorist threat of particular concern to the local fire service in New York, the anarchist. Inspired by the economic crisis and an ever-increasing political divide, the number of legitimate protests is increasing in the United States. These protests will often, "attract violence-prone anarchists who see them as opportunities to escalate confrontations with police and foment riots." For example,

²⁵ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 289.

²⁶ Brian M. Jenkins, *New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts An Assessment of the Current Terrorist Threat*, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate, July 11, 2012, 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

“Investigators in New York have linked anarchists to a series of small bombings in the city in 2005, 2007, and 2008.”²⁸

In 2010, the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) produced *The Vigilant Project: An Analysis of 32 Terrorist Cases Against the Homeland*. To gain a better understanding of the current terrorist threat, the NYSIC reviewed 32 post 9/11 terror plots and attempted attacks against the United States. Four key findings are relevant to the evolving role of the local fire service in New York State. First, one-third of the cases in the report involved terrorist attacks within New York State, or from a terrorist cell based within.²⁹ Since New York City (NYC) continues to be a symbolic target, local communities in and around it will be staging areas or targets of convenience.

Second, the threat of homegrown terrorism is significant. Half the individuals studied in the Vigilant Project report were U.S. citizens (70% were natural born).³⁰ Whether inspired by an outside group or self radicalized, the origin of the next attack in the United States could come from any house on the block.

Third, transportation systems and military installations remain valuable targets. Of the cases studied, two-thirds fall into these categories.³¹ New York State has several major military installations within its borders and all methods of transportation systems crisscross the state.

Lastly, the use of explosives remains a common tactic in U.S.-based terrorist plots.³² Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) and other forms of explosives are effective terrorist tools. Fire service personnel will be among the first responders post-blast or when preparations go awry.

²⁸ Jenkins, *New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts An Assessment of the Current Terrorist Threat*, 8.

²⁹ *The Vigilant Project: An Analysis of 32 Terrorism Cases Against the Homeland* (Albany, NY: New York State Intelligence Center, 2010), 5.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

All these evolving threats, along with more routine fire, rescue and medical calls, provide NYS's 140,000 fire service personnel an opportunity to interact with the public, and be in private homes and businesses.³³ Each of the 1.6 million incidents is an unplanned interaction that provides unique opportunities for properly trained fire service personnel to observe potential signs of terrorist and other illegal activities.³⁴

3. The Core Problem

While the NYS fire service has underutilized potential to be contributors, consumers and collaborators with the intelligence community, in a time of competing priorities and shrinking budgets, it is unlikely that increasing the intelligence capabilities of the local fire service in New York State will occur from top-down (federal or state) initiatives. For the local fire service in New York State to be a more effective partner in the homeland security intelligence enterprise, a locally initiated solution must be proposed. Each day, 140,000 fire service personnel are responding to incidents across New York State, but lack the training and connection to the IC to protect themselves and the populations they serve fully from the multitude of threats they face.

B. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This thesis addresses the question: how should the local NYS fire service's role within the IC evolve?

While considering the evolving threats, this thesis explores the need for an increased local fire service involvement in the intelligence enterprise through a top-down and bottom-up approach.^{35,36} The top-down approach is reflected in relevant federal and NYS doctrine presented in the literature review that builds the basic foundation for the need for information sharing (specifically with local partners).

³³ New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, "New York State Fire Resources."

³⁴ The Department of Justice, *Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers*, 3.

³⁵ NOTE: It is not the intent of this document to consider information that would be "classified" by the United States *Presidential Executive Order 13526* (Classified National Security Information).

³⁶ *E.O. 13526* of 12/29/10, 75 FR 1013.

The bottom-up needs are explored through a review of current surveys of fire service practitioners. The primary sources are Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) thesis survey results and a 2012 Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG) fire service intelligence survey.

For the local fire service in New York State to evolve its role in the homeland security intelligence enterprise, existing efforts in New York State are first identified and examined. Strengths and gaps are incorporated into the analysis and recommendations.

As an effective and efficient way to build upon NYS's strengths and overcome gaps, developing and implementing a locally initiated, statewide fire service inclusive Terrorism Liaison Officer³⁷ (TLO) program is the primary recommendation. Three established TLO programs that contain a fire service component are identified and examined to determine good practices. Practices analyzed include program structure, administration, roles and responsibilities, costs, and training requirements. Based on proposed NYS factors (effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility and adaptability), a systematic policy options analysis compares the three TLO programs to determine their areas of strength and weaknesses as related to the New York experience. Based on the evaluation, one existing TLO program is recommended as a model for New York State to use to develop its own statewide fire service inclusive TLO program. A detailed implementation strategy is developed to address key stakeholder challenges.

C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Three research methods are used to explore the evolving intelligence role of the New York State local fire service in the homeland security intelligence enterprise: document analysis, participant observer information gathering, and policy option analysis. Document analysis is used to examine federal, New York State, and academic documents that discuss the role and establish the need for local fire service involvement.

³⁷ NOTE: As illustrated by the thesis title, a final recommendation of this thesis is to name the NYS program: *Threat Liaison Officer*. To reduce confusion and based on the names of the three programs used in the program options analysis, this thesis will use the term Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) until the final recommendation is made.

As a participant observer in the local fire service in New York State for over 20 years, personal observations and communications supplement documentation in various areas of research. Since 2004, this author has held a leadership role in a county Hazardous Material Response Team (HMRT). Through this role, the author has frequent contact with state and national homeland security representatives. In this capacity, the author identified an intelligence gap and began exploring methods and systems to increase the role of the local fire service in the intelligence community. This thesis has allowed professional and academic endeavors to support and complement one another.

As a participant observer, the author identified three good practice TLO programs that have enabled other local fire service organizations to connect with the intelligence enterprise. Policy option analysis is used to evaluate these programs.

Practices to be examined include program structure, administration, roles and responsibilities, cost, and training requirements. Specific factors—effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility and adaptability—are compared critically across programs because of their importance to NYS’s interest and ability in adopting a TLO program. Based on this analysis, an individual TLO program is identified as a recommended framework of a TLO program for New York State. Implementation recommendations based on NYS institutional (state and local) structures and the current fiscal climate are included.

This thesis is written in a manner to allow it to be published as an open source document. The author feels the benefits of unrestricted distribution to a wide range of stakeholders outweigh a slightly more in-depth exploration of sensitive documents that may reveal a minutely clearer picture of fusion center or TLO program’s inner workings.

D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter II is the literature review for this thesis. Homeland security as a field of study is relatively new. The depth of the material related to the role of the fire service is shallow but growing. The focus of the literature review is relevant government

documents and CHDS academic theses. Federal and NYS doctrine that build the basic foundation for the need for information sharing, specifically with local partners, are identified.

Academic works that examine the evolving role of the fire service in the intelligence enterprise are outlined using the FBI intelligence cycle as a guide. Few academic works examine TLO programs in any depth.

Chapter III begins with an introduction of the TLO concept. The intra-disciplinary desire for fire service involvement in the intelligence enterprise is gauged. The chapter continues with an assessment of the existing NYS fire intelligence enterprise. Federal and state organizations and initiatives that currently interact with the local fire service are identified and critiqued to determine strengths and gaps with current practices. The asserted impact of instituting a TLO program is previewed.

Chapter IV proposes the development of a TLO program as a policy initiative to build upon strengths and address gaps in the existing NYS fire intelligence enterprise. Three nationally recognized TLO programs (Arizona, Colorado and Los Angeles) undergo a formal program analysis. Each program is examined via the four evaluation factors of effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility, and adaptability. Each of the four factors is divided into five criteria. Each criterion is then rated low, medium or high based on the developed matrix. The results are scored, weighted and used to rank the three programs. A detailed explanation of the policy options analysis process is included.

Chapter V outlines specific recommendations and implementation strategies. Based on the policy options analysis, this chapter provides a recommended framework for a TLO program for local fire service in New York State. Included are specific implementation recommendations based on NYS institutional (state and local) structures, and the current fiscal climate. The chapter closes with the thesis conclusion.

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II LITERATURE REVIEW

We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.

- Albert Einstein

A. OVERVIEW

This literature review focuses on evolving the local fire service intelligence enterprise in New York State by examining related policy and research initiatives. Specifically, it identifies and analyzes relevant U.S. and NYS government documents that discuss the current and potential role of the local fire service in the intelligence enterprise.³⁸ Secondly, the review examines relevant academic research that examines the evolution of the fire service in the intelligence enterprise. Lastly, the review identifies areas in which knowledge gaps remain and future research should be considered.

B. DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE

While several definitions of intelligence exist, for the purpose of this thesis, the term “information sharing or intelligence” is acquired from the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE):

All-hazard information that has been gathered and vetted through the intelligence cycle in order to generate products that can be used to guide Fire Service decisions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Also information provided by the Fire Service to the intelligence community to support the production of finished intelligence products.³⁹

³⁸ NOTE: Several NYS and federal entities are briefly introduced in the literature review. Many are reviewed in greater depth in Chapter III.

³⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office, *Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise—Executive Briefing*, 3.

It is not the intent of this document to consider information that would be “classified” by the United States *Presidential Executive Order 13526* (Classified National Security Information).⁴⁰

C. REVIEW OF FEDERAL DOCUMENTS

The *9/11 Report* is the foundation from which modern U.S. homeland security initiatives and literature have been born. The report recommends a unity of effort among government agencies to collect intelligence information. The commission recognized the importance of using an integrated all-source analysis to connect the dots and prevent future attacks.⁴¹The *9/11 Report* fell short, however, in making specific recommendations regarding the role of the fire service in the intelligence enterprise.

Several federal documents describe the overall architecture of the current homeland security initiative in the United States. Each plays a part in creating a foundational argument that the fire service should expand its mission and be a partner in the intelligence enterprise. As illustrated, however, all fall short of making a direct mandate.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8) is one of the first post-9/11 directives to provide structure to the homeland security project. Although devised as a reaction to terrorism, *HSPD-8* takes an all-hazard approach to preparation. A significant aspect of its purpose is, “establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to state and local government, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State and local entities,”⁴² which led to the development of the *National Preparedness Guidelines* and *Target Capabilities List*. While these documents are an attempt to synchronize the national effort toward preparedness, one of its most significant impacts is its goal to,

⁴⁰ *E.O. 13526* of 12/29/10, 75 FR 1013.

⁴¹ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 426.

⁴² George W. Bush, *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2003), 1.

“Guide national investments in national preparedness.”⁴³ The *Target Capabilities List* is the standards by which grants funds are disseminated to state and local partners. As is illustrated in the review of NYS documents, grant funds based on these target capabilities had the largest impact on the development of homeland security response capabilities and policy development on the state and local levels. Intelligence and information sharing is a capability considered to be a common mission area and multi-disciplinary.⁴⁴

The executive branch, to outline for Congress the major national security concerns for the United States, periodically produces the *National Security Strategy*. In the latest version (May 2010), the threat of international terrorism is a major theme. The document focused on the need for a whole government approach to national security. Specifically, it emphasizes the need for an evolution and integration of the intelligence capacity of the United States. In addition, it states, “And we must integrate our approach to homeland security with our broader national security approach.”⁴⁵ No fire service specific references are mentioned.

The National Intelligence Strategy comes from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). It describes the DNI’s plan for overhauling the U.S. intelligence community. The document speaks indirectly to the intelligence needs of the fire service through the strategy’s enterprise objectives. The first involves enhancing community mission management. The DNI is looking to develop products that meet needs on the operations level.⁴⁶ Secondly, the strategy states the need to, “Establish new partnerships. Build mutual trust and a shared understanding of needs, capabilities, and missions with partners, particularly those with whom the IC has traditionally not had a

⁴³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Guidelines* (Washington, DC, 2007), 1.

⁴⁴ *Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the National Preparedness Guidelines* (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2007), 69.

⁴⁵ *National Security Strategy* (Washington: White House, 2010), 14.

⁴⁶ *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America* (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2009), 11.

relationship.”⁴⁷ Again, *The National Intelligence Strategy* does not specifically mention the fire service as a potential collaboration partner.

In the *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland (QHSR)*, the DHS executed its congressional mandate to outline homeland security priorities, “for the homeland security enterprise as a whole.”⁴⁸ The *QHSR* discusses the need for shared intelligence and information throughout the document. Specific references illustrate the need for intelligence to be shared to enhance mission readiness.⁴⁹ While falling short of specifically mentioning the need for the fire service to be included, it uses inclusive language, such as, “homeland security partners.”⁵⁰ It is emphasized at the beginning of the document that local government (which the fire service is a key component) is an important partner in the homeland security enterprise.⁵¹

In addition to the *QHSR*, DHS developed a separate *Information Sharing Strategy Report (ISSR)*. A key principal in the *ISSR* is that “fostering information sharing is a core DHS mission.”⁵² Similarly, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence also developed a guideline entitled, *Strategic Intent for Information Sharing*. A key philosophy in the document is the goal developed by the DNI to transition the IC from a “need-to-know” to a “need to share” environment.⁵³ Both documents develop a tone of inclusiveness, but do not mention the fire service as a specific partner in information sharing.

In July 2011, the U.S. DHS released *Implementing 9/11 Commission Report Recommendations: Progress Report 2011*. The report highlights homeland security

⁴⁷ *National Intelligence Strategy*, 13.

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland* (Washington, DC: 2010), V.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, iii.

⁵² Department of Homeland Security, *Information Sharing Strategy Report*, 2008, 5.

⁵³ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Strategic Intent for Information Sharing* (Washington, DC, 2011), 5.

changes made in the United States since the release of the *9/11 Report* in 2004. Regarding information sharing, the report states: “Terrorism related information sharing across the intelligence community has greatly improved, and through the establishment of the DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), we have strengthened the ability to convey intelligence on threats to the homeland in a context that is useful and relevant to law enforcement and homeland security officials at the state and local level.”⁵⁴

In a specific reference to the fire service, the report states that implementation of fusion centers have increased front-line personnel (including fire) to understand better the implications of national intelligence to better protect communities.⁵⁵

Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers (FSIFC) creates a detailed outline on how to integrate the fire service successfully into a fusion center. Most importantly, it is a significant document in that it creates a detailed picture of how the fire service can both contribute to and be a consumer of intelligence: “The integration of fire service organizations and personnel into the fusion process enhances the efforts of all homeland security partners across all mission areas.”⁵⁶ Unlike the previous mentioned documents that made indirect references, *FSIFC* makes a coherent and cohesive argument that the fire service is an active member of the intelligence enterprise.

The last federal documentation comes from the ITACG, which is part of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The mission of the NCTC is to, “Lead our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”⁵⁷ As part of the NCTC, ITACG’s mission is to, “...facilitate the production and timely issuance of terrorism-related interagency products for distribution

⁵⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *Implementing 9/11 Commission Report Recommendations: Progress Report 2011*, 11.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵⁶ The Department of Justice, *Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers*, 2.

⁵⁷ National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), “NCTC: Strategic Intent,” (n.d.), http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/strategic_intent.html.

to State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector (SLTP) partners.”⁵⁸ To facilitate this mission, the ITACG publishes the *Intelligence Guide for First Responders (IGFR)*. The *IGFR* is a guidebook to introduce first responders to the world of intelligence. It covers the basic terminology and the elements of the intelligence cycle.⁵⁹ In addition to teaching first responders (including fire service) basic intelligence information, it also legitimizes them as part of the intelligence enterprise.

D. REVIEW OF NEW YORK STATE DOCUMENTS

Four documents illustrate the evolution of homeland security and the fire service in New York State since 9/11. All four documents illustrate the fire service’s potential impact on the intelligence and information sharing enterprise.

The *New York State Homeland Security Strategy (NYSHSS)* “provides a comprehensive framework to guide, organize and unify homeland security efforts in New York State, including strategic planning and the investment of federal homeland security grants and other applicable local, State or federal funding sources.”⁶⁰ As mentioned in the federal document section, federal grant funding is a major driving force in the development of state strategies. New York State is no exception. The *NYSHSS* references and reflects the *National Preparedness Guidelines* and *Target Capabilities List*. Subsequently, intelligence and information sharing is a capability highlighted in the *NYSHSS* as a common mission area and multi-disciplinary.⁶¹

The *New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services Strategic Plan (DHSES Strategic Plan)* defines the strategic plans for the newly formed (July 2010) state agency. By combining and creating relevant homeland security agencies, DHSES centralized and focused the homeland security mission in New York State. Specific to the intelligence needs of the fire service, DHSES contains the Office of

⁵⁸ National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), “Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG),” (n.d.), http://www.nctc.gov/itacg/itacg_roles_and_responsibilities.html.

⁵⁹ *Intelligence Guide for First Responders*, 18.

⁶⁰ *New York State Homeland Security Strategy*, 1.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

Counter Terrorism (OCT) and the Office of Fire Prevention and Control (OFPC). These two agencies are central to the current and future role of the NYS fire service's role in the NYS intelligence community. The *DHSES Strategic Plan* lists, "sharing information and intelligence with our stakeholders," and "enhanced customer service" as two of its primary strategic goals.⁶² The *NYSHSS* and the *DHSES Strategic Plan* both create a philosophical environment in which an expanded fire service role would be welcome and strategically supported. As similarly noted in the federal documents, philosophical support without legal mandate is a clear theme in the New York State literature as well.

The last two documents to reference are OFPC publications entitled *New York State Fire Resources (NYFR)* and *Fire in New York* that are updated annually to reflect the situational status of the NYS fire service (call type and number, personnel, etc.). As noted in Chapter I, the fire service has the potential to be a force multiplier in the intelligence enterprise.

The first two NYS documents show the strategic and philosophical support for increasing the fire service involvement with intelligence and information sharing. The last two documents illustrate the incredible potential.

E. REVIEW OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH

The primary source of academic research related to fire service involvement with the intelligence enterprise comes from the CHDS at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). CHDS theses illustrate the evolution of academic thinking on the topic. Early works, as illustrated with the first three citations below, focused on asking the question—should the fire service be involved with the information and intelligence sharing enterprise. Later works focus on how. While CHDS is a multi-disciplinary program, only fire service officers authored the following fire-themed contributions. Since the academic discipline of homeland security is in its infancy, most authors have focused their research on topics that complement their area of expertise and meet the emergent demands of their agencies.

⁶² *New York State Homeland Security Strategy*, 11.

The most comprehensive study of the role of the fire service in the intelligence and information-sharing environment is “Terrorism Prevention and Firefighters: Where Are the Information Sharing Boundaries?” The work provides a broad based analysis of the larger question of should the fire service expand its role to include intelligence. The major conclusion is, “... U.S. firefighters have legal, moral, and ethical responsibilities to gather and share potential terrorist-related information that could assist the homeland security community in preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks.”⁶³ The work continues to make recommendations on implementation strategies and best practices.⁶⁴

The *Future Role of the Fire Service in Homeland Security* uses the Delphi method (structured questions to a panel of experts) to also examine the question of fire service evolution. The work determines, “The future role of the fire service in homeland security will demand the need for progressive leadership, effective collaboration, intelligence engagement, and the adoption of a shifting mission that supports preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery of terrorist attacks.”⁶⁵

The need for intelligence engagement is also a conclusion of “Strategic Changes for the Fire Service in the Post 9/11 Era.” Specifically, it uses formative evaluation and policy analysis to reach its recommendations. One main recommendation is, “...the fire service must engage in intelligence activities in order to maximize situational awareness, and be effective at planning and budgeting.”⁶⁶

While the need for fire service involvement is briefly reinforced in the next academic works, the major focus is on how the fire service should implement the various steps of the intelligence cycle.^{67, 68}

⁶³ Bryan Heirston, “Terrorism Prevention and Firefighters: Where Are the Information-Sharing Boundaries?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 105.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 107.

⁶⁵ Cloud, “Future Role of Fire Service in Homeland Security,” V.

⁶⁶ Douglas M. Weeks, “Strategic Changes for the Fire Service in the Post- 9/11 Era” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), V.

⁶⁷ NOTE: The FBI Intelligence Cycle contains the following six steps: Requirements, Planning, Collection, Processing, Analysis and Dissemination.

⁶⁸ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Intelligence Cycle,” (n.d.), <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle>.

“Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in the Fire Service” presents a limited overview of a shortened intelligence cycle (Requirements–Collection–Analysis–Dissemination). Basis intelligence requirement issues are examined, with each fire department needing to develop its own requirements being the main conclusion.⁶⁹ Elements of the other three steps in the shortened intelligence cycle are overviewed. As the title implies, the major focus of the work is incorporating and training fire service members to utilize open source intelligence.

In addition, a thesis in process at CHDS is entitled “Intelligence Requirements of the Fire Service for Tactical and Strategic Decision Making,” but is not currently published.⁷⁰ As a baseline of needs (and the first step in the intelligence cycle), this is a very important topic for future research.

Limited academic information is available for the second step of planning. General policy directives could be obtained on this step from the ITACG at the NCTC or the NYSIC. The NYSIC is NYS’s fusion center, and it is also an area in which future research is needed.

“Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as Intelligence Gatherers” asserts that despite legal, cultural and training challenges, firefighters as intelligence gatherers are an, “opportunity for firefighters to act as ‘first preventers’ in the war on terrorism.”⁷¹ The work provides a detailed analysis and a coherent argument that all the challenges can be overcome. Unlike the first thesis that advocated the use of open source information only, this work advocates training firefighters to collect intelligence actively during the course of their regular duties.

The next steps of processing and analyzing data have received limited academic attention as it relates to the fire service. Much of the research work done on fusion

⁶⁹ Robson, “A Burning Need to Know: The Use of Open Source Intelligence in the Fire Service,” 36.

⁷⁰ “Intelligence Requirements of the Fire Service for Tactical and Strategic Decision Making,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, forthcoming), (n.d.).
<https://www.chds.us/?thesiscenter/summary&done=current&keyword=fire&best=Any&cohort=Any>.

⁷¹ Richard J. Blatus, “Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as Intelligence Gatherers” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), V.

centers and general intelligence analysis is transferable to fire service members who may be assigned to the ITACG or a fusion center.

The final step in the intelligence cycle is dissemination. “Identifying Best Practices in Dissemination of Intelligence to First Responders in the Fire and EMS Services” does an excellent job of presenting and analyzing the various methods available and preferred. The work uses structured interviews and a survey to answer the question, “how can information and intelligence be better disseminated to local first responders to enhance situational awareness, provide a higher degree of responder safety, and better protect the public?”⁷²

While no CHDS thesis is dedicated to examining a TLO program, several theses present the TLO concept as a mechanism for increasing fire service involvement in the intelligence enterprise. Two go to greater depth. “Identifying Best Practices in Dissemination of Intelligence to First Responders in the Fire and EMS Services” surveys select fire service representatives regarding a TLO program. Ultimately, fire service organizations instituting a TLO program is a key recommendation.⁷³

“Terrorism Information Management within the New York City Fire Department: Past, Present and Future” discusses the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) TLO program history and real world success stories. In addition, TLO lessons learned are outlined.⁷⁴

F. CONCLUSION

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, homeland security organizations in the United States have been developing and evolving to meet the demands of the varied threats. The documents produced by the federal and NYC governments provide strategic goals and operational structure for much of this evolutionary process. Eleven

⁷² Thomas J. Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to First Responders in the Fire and EMS Services” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), V.

⁷³ Ibid., 60.

⁷⁴ John P. Flynn, “Terrorism Information Management within the New York City Fire Department Past, Present and Future” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).

years after the 9/11 attacks, however, the local fire service is still struggling to evolve. The literature reinforces its response role and creates a strong philosophical foundation for the need for an expanded role into areas, such as intelligence and information sharing. The lack of clear and direct language or a legal mandate, however, is limiting forward movement.

Academic research is creating a cogent argument for an expanded fire service role, but progress has been slow and incremental. As illustrated by the examination of the intelligence cycle research, gaps still remain as to how the fire service can fulfill an intelligence mission. The pending thesis on intelligence requirements for the fire service will be vital in identifying intelligence needs specific to the fire service (the first step in the cycle). Academic research on the fire service's role in planning, processing and intelligence analysis is still needed to fill the knowledge gap related to the intelligence cycle alone.

Chapter III introduces the TLO concept and an overview of the need for a program in New York State. The chapter discusses a myriad of NYS and federal agencies that impact the fire service role in the intelligence enterprise. This thesis asserts that gaps exist between the services these agencies provide, and the locals who may or may not be connected to those services. While the proposed TLO program is one solution to increase the local connection to existing federal programs (FSIE, ITACG etc.), other possible resolutions are an additional area for future study. Research must continue to fill the knowledge gaps and expand the fire service role in the intelligence enterprise.

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III ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR A TLO PROGRAM

The first responders of today live in a world transformed by the attacks on 9/11. Because no one believes that every conceivable form of attack can be prevented, civilians and first responders will again find themselves on the front lines. We must plan for this eventuality. A rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to honor the memories of those we lost that day.⁷⁵

- 9/11 Commission Report

A. OVERVIEW

As outlined in the literature review in Chapter II, relevant federal and NYS doctrine construct the basic foundation of need for increased information sharing with the local fire service. This chapter builds upon this foundation by examining the current information-sharing environment for the local fire service in New York State. The chapter begins with a brief introduction of the TLO concept. Survey instruments are examined to assess local fire service interest in increased information sharing. Lastly, pertinent NYS and federal homeland security entities are evaluated to identify strengths and gaps related to information sharing. While Chapter IV explores the TLO program in depth, the impact of the proposed TLO plan is previewed in this chapter.

B. TERRORISM LIAISON OFFICER (TLO) INTRODUCTION

The TLO concept was first developed in the South Bay area of southern California in 2002. Redondo Beach leadership brought together area police chiefs to form a Terrorism Advisory Committee (TAC). Goals of the TAC were, “First, it should integrate with and fully complement existing or emerging efforts at the federal, state and

⁷⁵ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 323.

local levels—avoiding duplication of effort. Second, it should be capable of examining and developing a response to Redondo Beach’s unique needs.”⁷⁶

One of the early programs developed by the TAC was the country’s first TLO program. The TAC recognized it was essential to designate and train qualified individuals to address the unfolding threat. “The Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) serves as the key link for each agency in all matters related to terrorism.”⁷⁷ The program quickly spread to other law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles County. The California Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission identified the program as a best practice for the entire state. The emerging TLO concept, touted in professional journals and national conferences, was soon introduced across the nation. To the credit of the TAC and the benefit of the fire service, they recognized early on that the TLO program should be multi-disciplinary.⁷⁸

The TLO initiative has spread and advanced through various jurisdictions across the country. As first envisioned by the TAC, each new authority that adapted the concept has modified the program to meet its collective needs. Typical TLO duties and responsibilities include the following.

- “The collecting, reporting, retrieving, and sharing of materials related to terrorism.
- The source person for internal or external inquiry.
- The contact for communicating with community stakeholders in matters related to terrorism.
- The contact person for community and private sector relationships.
- The person who conducts, coordinates, and/or facilitates departmental training with regard to terrorism and terrorist related subjects.
- The person who conducts, coordinates, and/or facilitates community meetings, conferences, and other information sharing activities.

⁷⁶ Gregory C. Hill. “U.S. Mayor Article | Best Practices: Redondo Beach Mobilizes After 9-11 for Possible Terrorist Threat,” *The United States Conference of Mayors—usmayors.org*, September 8, 2003, http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/us_mayor_newspaper/documents/09_08_03/Redondo_BP.asp.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

- The designated agency representative to the JTTF, Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), or Fusion Center.”⁷⁹

As illustrated by the list of typical duties, a TLO program is a recognized mechanism to better connect an agency with the IC.

C. FIRE SERVICE SELF-ASSESSED NEEDS

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. fire service has recognized its need to become more involved in the intelligence enterprise. Initial inroads were sporadic and often based on personal versus systemic relationships. One of the first comprehensive attempts to formalize the fire service’s involvement was the formation of the FSIE. “The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A)-coordinated FSIE initiative is a national strategic approach to information sharing between the U.S. fire service and homeland security community.” The FSIE is a, “strategic extension and formal expansion of the current informal fire service information-sharing environment between the fire service and homeland security communities.”⁸⁰ While the current status of the FSIE is discussed in the next section, its formation illustrates the desire of the local fire service to be more involved in the intelligence enterprise.

Two CHDS theses used survey instruments to assess the fire services needs related to intelligence. The picture they create is one of a first response partner that desires intelligence, but is often lacking the means to obtain it.

In a 2008 survey of 32 fire chiefs who considered firefighters as potential intelligence gatherers, 81% felt, “training firefighters to recognize non-conventional, potential terrorist threats during the performance of their duties would enhance the homeland security of the United States.”⁸¹ In addition, 92% of this same group would be willing to utilize their own resources to initialize and complete the process.⁸²

⁷⁹ Joint Regional Intelligence Center, “What is a TLO?” *Terrorism Liaison Officer Information Network*, (n.d.). http://www.tlo.org/what_is_tlo.html.

⁸⁰ Bryan Heirston, “Firefighters and Information Sharing: Smart Practice or Bad Idea?” *Homeland Security Affairs* 6, no. 2 (May 2010), <http://www.hsaj.org/?article=6.2.6>.

⁸¹ Blatus, *Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as Intelligence Gatherers*, 13.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 20.

In a 2010 survey of 30 fire chiefs, “All of the respondents answered they would benefit from regular intelligence briefings.”⁸³ Specifically, 90% indicated intelligence briefings would affect their daily operations.⁸⁴ As to the reason, “eighty-three percent (83%) of the respondents are interested in receiving intelligence that can assist them in preparation activities. Receiving information on specific threats, the types of materials used, and the modalities and tactics used, allows responders to develop appropriate training programs and purchase equipment that enables them to minimize risks to responders and the public.”⁸⁵

In a 2012 nationwide survey, the FSIE and the ITACG, “initiated the First Responder Field Survey to gauge the effectiveness of current intelligence production and dissemination in meeting the needs of US fire and Emergency Medical Service (EMS) departments.” They surveyed 491 fire/EMS departments in nine targeted regions on their “level of familiarity with commonly used intelligence products.” The conclusion of the survey is, “a strong need to increase awareness of available intelligence products among the fire/EMS services.” In addition, it “indicated a strong interest in a fire-centric intelligence product.”⁸⁶

The CHDS, FSIE and ITACG survey results illustrate the need for evolution in the local fire service. The fire service has a desire for intelligence information, but is unaware of existing methods to obtain it. The TLO program provides a mechanism for the fire service to engage its homeland security partners as contributors, consumers, and collaborators of intelligence.

D. ASSESSING NEW YORK STATE FIRE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

An assertion of this thesis is that the evolution of the local fire service in the intelligence enterprise must be a bottom-up initiative. Consequently, it is essential to have

⁸³ Richardson, “Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to First Responders in the Fire and EMS Services,” 36.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁸⁶ ITACG Survey.

an understanding of the existing state and federal systems that currently facilitate fire service involvement in the intelligence enterprise.

The 2010 establishment of the NYS DHSES, “represents one of the most significant public safety reorganizations in New York State history.”⁸⁷ By combining and creating relevant homeland security agencies, DHSES centralized and focused the homeland security mission in New York State. Specific to the intelligence needs of the fire service, DHSES contains the OCT and the OFPC. These two agencies are central to the current and future role of the NYS fire service’s role in the NYS IC. The *DHSES Strategic Plan* lists “sharing information and intelligence with our stakeholders,” and “enhanced customer service” as two of its primary strategic goals.⁸⁸ While the *DHSES Strategic Plan* creates a philosophical environment in which an expanded fire service role would be welcome and strategically supported, gaps remain.

In conjunction with DHSES, the New York State Police (NYSP) holds primary responsibilities for intelligence related activities in New York State. In addition to street level operational interactions, the NYSP operates NYS’s fusion center and coordinates statewide counterterrorism initiatives through 16 Counterterrorism Zones (CTZ).

The New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) is the primary fusion center for New York State.⁸⁹ Established in 2003, the NYSIC coordinates all statewide intelligence activities.⁹⁰ Based in the state capital of Albany, the “all-crimes” versus “all-hazards” fusion center is predominantly law enforcement-centric. NYSP (uniformed and civilian) and DHSES intelligence analysts primarily staff the NYSIC. As illustrated by Table 1, other agencies have representation privileges in the center.

⁸⁷ *DHSES Strategic Plan* (Albany, NY: New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, 2011), 3.

⁸⁸ *New York State Homeland Security Strategy*, 11.

⁸⁹ NOTE: This does not include any Fusion Center initiatives in New York City.

⁹⁰ Joseph D’Amico, *New York State Police—2010 Annual Report* (Albany, NY: New York State, 2010), 103.

NYSIC AGENCY REPRESENTATION	
Albany Police Department (NY)	Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Metropolitan Transportation Authority	New York State Police (NYSP)
NYC Dept. of Environmental Protection	NY Air National Guard
NY Metropolitan Transportation Authority PD	NYS Banking Department
NYS Dept. of Correctional Services	NYS Department of Motor Vehicles
NYS Division of Parole	NYS Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Services
Schenectady County Probation Department	Social Security Administration
U.S. Attorney's Office (Northern District of NY)	U.S. Border Patrol
U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
U.S. Department of Homeland Security	U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement	NY Army National Guard

Table 1. NYSIC Agency Representation⁹¹

Table 1 illustrates how minimal fire service representation is in the NYSIC. Currently, it is represented through DHSES. In October 2007, prior to the creation of DHSES, the OCT created a Fire and EMS Coordinator position. The position acted as a liaison between OCT and OFPC (then part of the NYS Department of State). The position also represented the interests of the two disciplines (fire and EMS) within the NYS homeland security community. A component of the position was to educate traditional members of the IC (law enforcement, intelligence analysts, etc.) on the needs of the fire service and EMS. The Coordinator and an OFPC Deputy Chief (who was assigned as the liaison to the OCT) were the first fire service representatives assigned to the NYSIC.⁹²

In December 2011, the individual who held the Fire and EMS Coordinator position was appointed Deputy State Fire Administrator for OFPC. Since OCT and OFPC

⁹¹ D'Amico, *New York State Police—2010 Annual Report*, 103.

⁹² Briefing at 2011 NYS Hazardous Materials Leadership Forum, Lake Placid, NY, October 22, 2011.

are now in the same division of state government (per the 2010 establishment of DHSES), the need for an OCT liaison was no longer needed. A second order effect of the elimination of this position is a 50% reduction in fire service representation in the NYSIC. The current NYSIC liaison responsibilities continue to be held by the OFPC Deputy Chief first assigned. While this individual recognizes the importance of fire service representation, his NYSIC assignment is among a myriad of other homeland security and hazardous material responsibilities, which limits the amount of time spent on fire service intelligence related matters. While DHSES shows a conceptual commitment to the intelligence needs of the local fire service, limited fire service representation to the NYSIC is a major gap. The creation of a TLO program will eventually lead to additional fire service resources becoming available to the NYSIC.

Of particular interest to the fire service are the NYSIC's development of Safeguard New York, the production of *CrossFIRE*, and the implementation of a Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) course.

Safeguard New York is NYS's version of the national See Something Say Something program. Similar to the national program, Safeguard New York is intended to educate residents on how to report suspicious activity to law enforcement. "The New York State Office of Homeland Security, in conjunction with law enforcement agencies throughout New York State, is reaching out to businesses, organizations, and communities to create a better public awareness of potential terrorist indicators and suspicious activities. This outreach promotes the recognition and reporting of potential terrorist activities within the community."⁹³ To date, no specific training program exists for fire service personnel on the Safeguard New York initiative. A major component of a TLO program is providing terrorism awareness training to line fire service personnel. An element of this training will include procedures for reporting observed suspicious activities.

CrossFIRE (Public Safety & Health Field Intelligence Report) is NYS's initiative to share unclassified intelligence information with first responders (fire, EMS, health,

⁹³ New York State Police Counter Terrorism Zone 6, "About Counter Terrorism Zone 6," (n.d.), <http://ctz6.org/aboutl.html>.

Hazmat, emergency management and law enforcement) through an electronically distributed intelligence-sharing document. “*CrossFIRE* is a new intelligence product to support the Fire and EMS communities, developed by the NYSIC, that communicates important information, timely, ‘need to know’ information to NYS’s first responders via county fire and EMS coordinators. This focused NYS perspective supported by analysis and application of relevant information from other first responders resources, educates New York’s Fire, EMS and health communities with information to confront emerging threats.”⁹⁴

This joint effort between the NYSIC and DHSES is distributed on an as-needed basis with the intent to “make information concerning terrorism trends and responder safety available to all first responders.”⁹⁵ While the “unclassified/for official use only” (FOUO) information is primarily a collection of open-source intelligence, it provides a foundation from which to build a stronger relationship between the NYS IC and the fire service.

CrossFIRE provides an excellent, although sometimes sporadic, vehicle to disseminate intelligence information to NYS fire service members. However, no corresponding training program to educate fire service members on how to implement and act upon the information they receive exists. The TLO program provides a cadre of trained individuals who will know how to act upon *CrossFIRE* information. In addition, the training the TLOs provide to line fire service personnel will increase their individual level of awareness. Lastly, an active TLO program will help develop more accurate fire service intelligence requirements (the first step in the intelligence cycle) that will lead to a more effective *CrossFIRE* product.

The NYSIC currently has a Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) program specifically designed for law enforcement. The FIO program is a four-hour awareness training that focuses on connecting local law enforcement with the analytical capabilities of the NYSIC. The FIO program is centered on the “all-crimes” aspect of the NYSIC, so it

⁹⁴ D’Amico, *New York State Police—2010 Annual Report*, 103.

⁹⁵ *CrossFIRE Bulletin*, Distributed June 16, 2011.

would not directly transfer to the needs of the fire service. It does, however, demonstrate a willingness for the NYSIC to provide training to local responders to improve information sharing. Elements of the FIO program structure and training will also prove useful for developing the NYS TLO program. In addition, as outlined in the proposed NYS program in Chapter V, current FIOs will be designated as mentors for the new TLOs.

The second key NYSP counterterrorism (CT) effort is the coordination of the NYS CTZ. In the months following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the NYS Office of Homeland Security (OHS), a predecessor to DHSES, led a coordinated effort among New York law enforcement agencies to address terrorism. The New York State Executive Law Enforcement Committee on Counter Terrorism divided New York State into 16 separate areas to encourage regionalization and cooperation among state and local law enforcement agencies. “These 16 Counter Terrorism Zones were created by the Office of Homeland Security in conjunction with the New York State Police, the New York State Association of Chiefs of Police, and the New York State Sheriff’s Association.”⁹⁶ In 2010, the Fire and EMS Coordinator facilitated a movement to increase fire service involvement in the CTZ system. In January 2011, CTZ 6 held a meeting that included fire service representatives. The meeting was designed to evaluate the value of fire service participation in the CTZ program and, if warranted, recommend a template to expand the concept to other CTZs. While the “experiment” has been met with positive feedback from CTZ 6 members, the expansion into other CTZs has been very limited. The initiation of the TLO program will act as a catalyst to continue the integration of the fire service into the CTZ system.

Each of the aforementioned NYS agencies works with corresponding or complementary federal agencies that help support their intelligence mission. While the list is extensive, two federal departments and one office bear mention in relation to fire service intelligence: The U.S. DHS, The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

⁹⁶ New York State Police Counter Terrorism Zone 6, “About Counter Terrorism Zone 6.”

The U.S. DHS was formed in November 2002 with the passage of the Homeland Security Act. The mission of the cabinet-level department is to, “ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards.”⁹⁷

As mentioned in an earlier section, the FSIE is an initiative to incorporate the fire service in the IC. Several agencies within DHS are involved. “The FSIE represents a collaborative initiative of several U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) entities—the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, State and Local Program Office (I&A/SLPO), and the U.S. Fire Administration, with support from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Directorate.”⁹⁸ While the FSIE concept plan is sound, the initiative stalled in 2010. In 2012, however, efforts have been made to rejuvenate the FSIE. As stated by one of the founding FSIE members, “Through the passage of time and a maturing of the fusion process, which was in its infancy during the operation of the FSIE, the opportunity now exists for a renewed commitment from I&A and the fire service to revisit the FSIE.”⁹⁹ A NYS TLO program will provide individuals to assist in this renewed FSIE program.

The second DHS agency to be covered by this thesis is the United States Fire Administration (USFA), which was established in 1974 with a litany of responsibilities. Germane to this thesis are two USFA initiatives. First, the USFA founded the United States Fire Academy (USFA) whose mission is to, “advance the professional development of fire service personnel.”¹⁰⁰ The USFA is currently in the early development stage of a fire intelligence curriculum. Education and professional development will be an invaluable part of the fire service evolution into the intelligence

⁹⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS | What We Do,” Mission and Responsibilities,” (n.d.), <http://ipv6.dhs.gov/xabout/responsibilities.shtm>.

⁹⁸ The Department of Justice, *Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers*, 15.

⁹⁹ Joshua M. Dennis, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Where Do We Go From Here to Bring the Fire Service into the Domestic Intelligence Community?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 5.

¹⁰⁰ United States Fire Administration, *America’s Fire and Emergency Services Leader: Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2010–2014* (Emmitsburg, MD: United States Fire Administration, 2009), 3.

community. Once the new curriculum is on-line, it will be a valuable source for TLO continuing education.

The USFA-housed Emergency Management and Response—Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EMR-ISAC) has a three-part mission:

- “Collect critical infrastructure protection and resilience information having potential relevance for Emergency Services Sector departments and agencies.
- Analyze all collected information to ascertain the importance and applicability to Emergency Services Sector organizations.
- Synthesize and disseminate emergent and consequential infrastructure protection and resilience information to the leaders, owners, and operators of the emergency services.”¹⁰¹

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) has always been part of the fire service mission. The EMR-ISAC produces INFOGRAMs and CIP Bulletins published and disseminated to keep the Emergency Service Sector (ESS) informed on CIP issues.¹⁰² As the fire service is tasked with responding to incidents involving critical infrastructure, it will prove to be valuable sources of intelligence for the TLO.

The second federal department that impacts the local fire services intelligence capabilities is the U.S. DOJ. Specifically within the DOJ, the FBI’s national security mission is to, “lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive actions to protect the United States.”¹⁰³

As America’s lead federal law enforcement agency, the FBI is involved with a wide variety of CT initiatives. The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), a 1980 FBI program, has expanded greatly since 9/11. The FBI considers the JTTF to be the nation’s, “front line on terrorism: small cells of highly trained, locally based, passionately committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from

¹⁰¹ U.S. Fire Administration, “USFA CIP/EMR-ISAC Factsheet,” March 2009, <http://www.usfa.fema.gov/fireservice/subjects/emr-isac/factsheet.shtm>.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Mission,” (n.d.), <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/mission>.

dozens of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies.”¹⁰⁴ JTTFs are based in 103 cities across the United States and many, but not all, include representatives from the fire service. A TLO with a security clearance will be a valuable SME (hazardous materials, CIP, etc.) if needed for a JTTF investigation.

The last federal entity to review is the ODNI. Created through the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, the ODNI, “serves as the head of the Intelligence Community, overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program and acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security.”¹⁰⁵

Among the several functions of the ODNI that impact the local fire service, the one outlined in this thesis is the ITACG. “Enacted at the direction of the President and the *Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007*, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) consists of federal intelligence analysts, and state, local, and tribal first responders, working at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to enhance the sharing of intelligence with our state, local, tribal, and private sector (STLP) partners through established mechanisms within DHS and FBI.”¹⁰⁶ The mission of the NCTC is to, “Lead our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”¹⁰⁷ As part of the NCTC, ITACG’s mission is to, “...facilitate the production and timely issuance of terrorism-related interagency products for distribution to State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector (SLTP) partners.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” (n.d.), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jtfts.

¹⁰⁵ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Organization,” (n.d), <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization>.

¹⁰⁶ National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). “Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG).”

¹⁰⁷ National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). “NCTC: Strategic Intent.”

¹⁰⁸ National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). “Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG).”

To enable this mission, the ITACG publishes the *Intelligence Guide for First Responders (IGFR)*. The 2011 *IGFR* is a guidebook to introduce first responders to the world of intelligence. It covers the basic terminology and the elements of the intelligence cycle.¹⁰⁹ The *IGFR* will be an excellent reference and teaching tool for a NYS TLO.

In addition to the *IGFR*, in July 2012, the ITACG (in conjunction with DHS and the FBI) introduced FIRE LINE. “The FIRE LINE is the first federally coordinated intelligence product written specifically for the fire, rescue and EMS community. It’s an unclassified/for-official-use-only counterterrorism product developed from U.S. Intelligence Community reporting and open-source information on potential targets, preattack indicators and major international and domestic events.”¹¹⁰ If this product proves to be regularly produced with timely information, it will complement *CrossFIRE* and be a very valuable tool for the NYS TLOs.

E. CONCLUSION

The current threats facing the fire service and the citizens it protects are complex and evolving. The expansion of the local fire service’s role in New York State in the intelligence enterprise is a key component of meeting the demands of these current and emerging threats. Research shows that the fire service has an interest in expanding its involvement, but is not well connected to the current tools available. New York State and the federal government have intelligence agencies tasked with connecting to the local fire service, but those relationships are often sporadic and underdeveloped. In addition, with competing priorities and shrinking budgets, the fire service is losing ground on many fronts since the initial post-9/11 surges.

¹⁰⁹ *Intelligence Guide for First Responders*, 18.

¹¹⁰ Ken LaSala, “New FIRE LINE Provides Intelligence to State and Local Fire and Emergency Service,” *IAFC, International Association of Fire Chiefs*, July 1, 2012, <http://www.iafc.org/MemberCenter/OnSceneArticle.cfm?ItemNumber=6070>.

As introduced in this chapter, a TLO program provides a well-trained cadre of fire service personnel to refocus NYS efforts to improve the fire service intelligence enterprise. Chapter IV delivers a detailed program analysis of three nationally recognized TLO programs and proposes the implementation of a locally initiate statewide TLO program for New York State.

IV EVALUATING SOLUTIONS

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

- Benjamin Franklin

A. OVERVIEW

The previous chapter outlines the need to progress NYS local fire service involvement in the intelligence enterprise. This thesis asserts that commencing a locally initiated, statewide TLO program will provide the necessary structure and means. New York State is in the envious position of learning by the experience of other jurisdictions. Three nationally recognized TLO programs (Arizona, Colorado and Los Angeles) are presented as possible models for a NYS system. A brief synopsis of each precedes a formal program analysis. Each TLO program is examined via four evaluation factors: effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility, and adaptability. Each of the four factors is divided into five criteria. Each criterion is rated low, medium or high based on the developed matrix. The results are scored, weighted and used to rank the three programs. A detailed explanation for each factor and criteria is provided as part of the program analysis.

B. OVERVIEW OF TLO PROGRAMS TO BE EVALUATED

The three programs chosen for evaluations spawned from the TAC TLO initiative. Each program, however, adapted to meet the needs of the agencies and communities it strives to protect. Several national and international programs were researched as potential candidates for inclusion in this thesis. The three selected programs were chosen for evaluation for two key reasons.

First, all three systems are well established (five years or longer). Despite the later described recommendation for an incremental approach to implementing NYS' program

(crawl–walk–run), looking to an established model incorporates the benefits of longevity. Each of these programs have evolved since inception and successfully proven its worth when evaluated by its sponsor agencies.

Second, programs were chosen based on availability of research materials. Fusion centers and TLO programs are an example of a government paradox. As public agencies and programs, accountability is crucial. With this comes certain public knowledge related to functions performed. Concurrently, each deals with matters related to active criminal investigations, terrorism, and sensitive information. Consequently, publicly available information is often limited. Information for the TLO evaluations is based on review of FOUO documents and participant observer-based conversations with program leadership.

1. Arizona: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC)

Founded in 2004, the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) operates the Terrorism Liaison Unit (TLU) that houses the Arizona TLO program. “The mission of the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center is to protect the citizens and critical infrastructures of Arizona by enhancing and coordinating counter terrorism intelligence and other investigative support efforts among local, state and federal law enforcement agencies.”¹¹¹

The ACTIC is a progression of an effort first began in the City of Phoenix in 2003. The multi-discipline Homeland Defense Bureau (HDB) was formed in October of that year with the goal of, “Being an all-hazards approach to impacting major incidents including terrorist events.” During the remainder of 2003, the first TLOs from Phoenix police, fire and health were trained in awareness and response.¹¹²

The focus of this thesis’ evaluation is the Phoenix-Maricopa County Urban Areas Security Initiative (PUASI) TLO program.¹¹³ This program is a descendant of the HDB

¹¹¹ Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), “Mission/Vision,” (n.d.), http://www.azactic.gov/About/Mission_Vision/.

¹¹² *2003 Annual Summary* (Phoenix, AZ: Phoenix Police Department, 2003), 9.

¹¹³ *Terrorism Liaison Officer Standard Operating Procedures* (Phoenix, AZ: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), 2012), 2.

program started just the year before. For the purpose of this analysis, it is referred to as the ACTIC TLO. To date, the ACTIC TLO program has trained approximately 809 personnel.

2. Colorado: Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC)

Founded in 2005, the Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) is a “multi agency fusion center created to help prevent terrorism incidents in Colorado.” Its mission is “To link all stakeholders in Colorado, from local and federal law enforcement officers, to bankers and school teachers. It emphasizes detection, prevention, and information-driven response to protect the citizens and critical infrastructure of Colorado.” The CIAC is a centralized effort, designed to, “enhance interagency cooperation and expedite information flow.”¹¹⁴

The CIAC TLO program began in 2007. “The TLO is an identified person within a law enforcement agency, fire service, or public safety sector who is responsible for coordinating terrorist and other criminal intelligence information between the CIAC and their agency.” Specific to information sharing, the CIAC TLO program is, “A critical pathway for formalizing procedures and processes for more efficient information sharing exchange between Fusion Centers, Federal and State agencies and local communities.”¹¹⁵ To date, the CIAC TLO program has approximately 600-trained personnel.

3. Los Angeles: Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC)

Founded in 2006,¹¹⁶ the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) is, “a collaboration between federal, state, and local law enforcement and public safety agencies to integrate criminal and terrorism threat intelligence and provide intake,

¹¹⁴ State of Colorado—Homeland Security, “Colorado Information Analysis Center,” (n.d.), <https://www.ciac.co.gov>.

¹¹⁵ *TLO Training: Module 1* (Denver, CO: Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC), 2012).

¹¹⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, “Hand-to-Hand Cooperation Intel Sharing Without Walls,” August 2006, <http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2006/august/jric081406>.

analysis, fusion, synthesis, and dissemination of that information.” The JRIC operates within the seven counties of FBI’s Los Angeles field office jurisdiction.¹¹⁷

The JRIC is another excellent example of an evolutionary process. In 1996, the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW) was established to fill a void in information about terrorism. “Local law enforcement and public safety agencies—fire service, medical, and public health agencies—all play roles in anticipating, pre-planning for, preventing and responding to potential terrorist attacks.”¹¹⁸ Many aspects of the JRIC evolved from the TEW. After the 2006 creation of the JRIC, the two are now co-located and are working to reduce duplication of efforts.

The JRIC TLO program began with the JRIC’s foundation. In his 2006 testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy D. Baca stated, “[The TLO] program seeks to create a network of trusted agents within each law enforcement, fire and health agency in Los Angeles County that provides the vehicle to exchange valuable information to and from the JRIC.” Sheriff Baca continued to state, “This level of intelligence-based connectivity between field personnel is unprecedented and has enhanced the level of situational awareness in the region.”¹¹⁹

Due to the size and complexity of the JRIC TLO program, the Los Angeles City Fire (LAFD) is the JRIC TLO participating agency of focus for this thesis. As the largest fire service JRIC participant, LAFD has the most extensive and well-documented programs available for evaluation. To date, the JRIC TLO program has approximately 185-trained personnel.

¹¹⁷ Joint Regional Intelligence Center, “Welcome Page,” (n.d.), <http://www.jric.org/default.aspx>.

¹¹⁸ John Sullivan, *Resource Guide, Book One: TEW Concept and Overview* (Washington, DC: National TEW Resource Center, 2005), vii.

¹¹⁹ Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Testimony of Leroy D. Baca, Los Angeles County Sheriff, September 12, 2006.

C. TLO EVALUATION MATRIX

Although the three TLO programs share a common ancestry, each has unique characteristics that were developed to meet the needs of the individual jurisdictions it serves. The approach of this thesis is to weigh the shortcomings and benefits of each program systematically based on a set of evaluation factors. The factors were chosen to reflect the viability of implementing a TLO program in New York State that advances the needs of the local fire service. The factors are weighted to reflect their level of importance in reaching this end goal.

Four factors are used to evaluate the alternative TLO programs: effectiveness (E1), efficiency (E2), political and legal feasibility (PL), and adaptability (AD). Each of the four factors is comprised of five criteria. Twenty criteria are used to evaluate the three TLO programs. Each criterion is rated low, medium or high based on the developed matrix. Each rating is assigned a numerical value. The point values are assigned in Table 2.

Points	
Rating	Assigned Points
Low	1
Medium	2
High	3

Table 2. Point Values

Once a factor's criteria for all three programs are given a rating (and corresponding numeric), the numerical values for each individual program are summed (receiving a score between 5 and 15). This process is repeated for each factor (E1, E2, PL and AD). The summed values of each factor are then placed in the following formula to determine the overall rating (OR) for each individual TLO program. Each factor is weighted to indicate the level of influence it has on the overall ranking. Each of the four weights is assigned a fractional value that adds up to 1. Based on this overall rating, the

programs are ranked (first, second and third) to indicate which program would be the best model for a NYS TLO initiative.

The OR formula is applied to each of the three TLO programs.

$$\text{Overall Rating (OR)} = .35(\text{E1}) + .30(\text{E2}) + .25(\text{PL}) + .10(\text{AD})$$

The subsequent descriptions provide a detailed overview of each of the four factors (E1, E2, PL and AD) and their corresponding criteria. They are presented in the order in which they are weighted (highest to lowest).

1. Effectiveness (E1)

The first factor is Effectiveness (E1) that measures how well the program meets the goal of increasing the information-sharing environment for the local fire service in New York State. Effectiveness is measured based on the criteria outlined in Table 3 and given the highest weight of .35.

Description of Standards for Rating of TLO Effectiveness (E1)			
Evaluation Criteria	Low	Medium	High
Fusion Center Based	Little to no interaction with State or local fusion center	Primary interaction with Intelligence Community is through Fusion Center	Interact with Fusion Center and other Intelligence Agencies as needed
Multi-Discipline	Single Discipline Based	Includes Traditional Intelligence Community Disciplines Only (Intelligence Agencies, Law Enforcement, etc.)	Includes “Non-Traditional” Disciplines (Fire, EMS, Public Health, etc.)
Multi-Jurisdictional	Single-Jurisdiction (Local)	Regional-Based Jurisdiction	State-Wide Jurisdiction
Outreach	No Outreach to community or response partners	Some outreach to community or response partners	Significant outreach to community or response partners

Description of Standards for Rating of TLO Effectiveness (E1)			
Evaluation Criteria	Low	Medium	High
Information Sharing	Information Sharing limited and untimely	Information Sharing limited or untimely	Information Sharing robust and timely

Table 3. Description of Standards for Rating of TLO: Effectiveness (E1)

The first E1 criterion queries if the TLO program is fusion center-based. Since one of the needs identified in Chapter III is the local fire service’s necessity to have a closer connection to state-based intelligence networks, a fusion-based system is an effective way to facilitate that requirement.

The second E1 criterion queries if the program is multi-disciplinary. While being multi-disciplinary was the vision of the original TLO program, not all jurisdictions have embraced this approach. Some programs choose to remain law enforcement-centric. This thesis asserts that a multi-disciplinary approach leads to a stronger and more effective program. Specific to the parameters of this inquiry, this criterion evaluates whether the fire service is an active partner. In addition to being a force multiplier in sheer numbers, the fire service brings subject matter expertise (CIP, Hazmat, etc.) to a TLO program that is unique. For the fire service in New York State to evolve in the intelligence enterprise, the best NYS TLO model is based on a program that recognizes and embraces this assertion.

The third E1 criterion queries if the program is multi-jurisdictional. Since this thesis is proposing a statewide program, one that has proven successful beyond a single jurisdiction will provide a better model.

The fourth E1 criterion queries if the program has an outreach component. This criterion measures outreach and interaction with both the community and response partners. If a TLO program simply provides an information flow to and from the fusion center, notable benefits do happen. However, if outreach to the community and response partners occurred (law enforcement, public health, etc.), the benefits would increase.

The final E1 criterion queries if the program has robust and timely information sharing. If information sharing is sporadic or untimely between the TLOs and the fusion center and/or its local partners, then the usefulness of the program is greatly diminished.

2. Efficiency (E2)

The second factor is Efficiency (E2) that measures the cost of the program and the lasting benefits if the current funding was removed. It proved challenging to extrapolate the cost of many of the criteria because of limited data and multiple funding streams. Due to the importance of cost analysis, however, the criteria were developed and best estimates used. Efficiency is measured based on the criteria outlined in Table 4 and given the weight of .30.

Description of Standards for Rating of TLO Efficiency (E2)			
Evaluation Criteria	Low	Medium	High
Initial Training Cost	High Cost per TLO	Moderate Cost per TLO	Low Cost per TLO
Continuing Education Cost	Program contains high continuing education costs. Available training is off-site only.	Program contains moderate continuing education costs. Available training is on-site only.	Program contains low continuing education costs. Training has distance-learning components.
Technology Support	Program has high technology support costs.	Program has moderate technology support costs.	Program has low technology support costs.
Administration	Program has high administrative support costs.	Program has moderate administrative support costs.	Program has low administrative support costs.
Sustainability	Few benefits of program would continue without external funding streams.	Moderate benefits of program would continue without external funding streams.	Many benefits of program would continue without external funding streams.

Table 4. Description of Standards for Rating of TLO: Efficiency (E2)

The first E2 criterion examines the cost of initial TLO training. The cost was evaluated from the perspective of the agency sponsoring a participant. If all costs are born by the locals, that program is rated low. If the fusion center or state homeland security agency covers the cost of the training, for example, a medium rating is given. If backfill and overtime costs for paid personnel are covered in addition to the cost of the training, it is given a high rating.

The second E2 criterion examines the cost of continuing TLO education. Continuing education is an important and necessary feature of any program. Keeping costs low to the sponsoring agency will increase program buy-in. A low rating is for continuing education only available off-site (out of jurisdiction). A medium rating is for continuing education available on-site only. A high rating is given to programs that incorporate distance learning (self-paced) for a portion of the continuing education requirements.

The third E2 criterion examines the cost of technology support. In today's world, a great deal of TLO related information is transmitted and accessed electronically. The associated costs (hardware and software) impact the overall cost of the program.

The fourth E2 criterion examines the cost of administering the TLO program. This cost relates to the number of paid staff assigned to manage the program. While the size of the program (number of TLOs and coverage area) will impact this number, it is an important consideration for New York State. A high cost equates to a low score, and conversely, a low cost is given a high score.

The final E2 criterion estimates the sustainability of the program benefits if the current external funding streams were reduced or eliminated. Some TLO programs, like many homeland security initiatives, are partially to fully grant funded. This criterion aims to evaluate the relationship between program benefits and external funding.

3. Political and Legal Feasibility (PL)

The third factor is Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) that measures five buy-in benchmarks from key stakeholders. While Chapter V goes into greater depth regarding

stakeholder issues to be considered with program implementation, these criteria are intended to impact the initial evaluation. PL is measured based on the criteria outlined in Table 5 and given the weight of .25.

Description of Standards for Rating of TLO Political and Legal Feasibility (PL)			
Evaluation Criteria	Low	Medium	High
Legal Contract	Program has no legal contract between members and sponsoring agency	Program has limited legal contract between members and sponsoring agency	Program has well defined legal contract between members and sponsoring agency
All Hazards Approach	Program has all crime approach only	Program has all crimes focus with all hazards elements	Program is all hazards based
Fire Service Mission Creep	Fire service based TLO spends little time dedicated to traditional fire service issues	Fire service based TLO spends moderate time dedicated to traditional fire service issues	Fire service based TLO spends majority time dedicated to traditional fire service issues
Privacy Component	Program has no privacy component	Program has moderately developed privacy component	Program has well developed privacy component
Combination Staffing	Program explicitly excludes volunteer members	Program does not exclude volunteer members	Program designed to include career and volunteer members

Table 5. Description of Standards for Rating of TLO: Political and Legal Feasibility (PL)

The first PL criterion examines the legal relationship between a TLO and the sponsoring program agency. Due to the sensitive nature of intelligence, the sponsoring agency must have a mechanism to hold a TLO accountable if information is mishandled or other program rules and regulations are not followed. If a program only involves

sworn uniformed members, then a TLO could be disciplined using employment rules. If a TLO is a member of a volunteer organization, for example, such rules may not exist.

The second PL criterion evaluates the degree to which the TLO program is all-crimes versus all-hazards based. An all-hazards approach to homeland security “is a concerted national effort to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks, protect against man-made and natural hazards, and respond to and recover from incidents that do occur.”¹²⁰ An all-crimes based program is less desirable to fire service organizations than one that looks at a broader hazard spectrum.

The third PL criterion evaluates the level of fire service mission creep. Implementing a TLO program could meet with resistance from opponents who think fire service involvement with the intelligence enterprise is beyond its mission scope. Chapter III builds the case that the fire service must change to meet the evolving threats. In recognition of the crawl-walk-run approach, however, this thesis asserts that a TLO program that focuses on more traditional fire service mission elements will garner more support from a broader foundation. Consequently, the three existing TLO programs are rated based on how much they drift from traditional missions.

The fourth PL criterion evaluates the privacy component. One of the potential opponents mentioned above are privacy advocates. This author concurs that maintaining an individual’s privacy rights is an essential element of any TLO program. This criterion rates the degree to which each program incorporates a privacy element into its program.

The final PL criterion examines if the program incorporates volunteers. NYS’ fire service is approximately 84% volunteer.¹²¹ Rural areas of the state have limited career fire service coverage. Consequently, if NYS’s TLO program is going to meet the needs of the fire service across the state, inclusion of volunteer TLOs must be considered. A TLO program inclusive of the volunteer firefighters will increase the number of trained personnel better equipped to “See Something, Say Something” within their communities.

¹²⁰ Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?” *Homeland Security Affairs* 4, no. 2 (June 2008), <http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.2.1>

¹²¹ New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness, “Fire Protection in New York State,” (n.d.), http://www.nyslocalgov.org/pdf/Fire_Protection_in_NYS.pdf.

Their newfound expertise could result in the acquisition of preemptive intelligence about potential terrorists, which could save lives.

4. Adaptability (AD)

The final factor is Adaptability (AD) that measures criteria focused on a TLO program’s ability to be initiated in another area of the country. Since all three programs are located in other regions of the country, it is essential to evaluate whether a program can be adapted in NYS. AD is measured based on the criteria outlined in Table 6 and given the weight of .10.

Description of Standards for Rating of TLO Adaptability (AD)			
Evaluation Criteria	Low	Medium	High
NIMS Based	Program is not NIMS based	Elements of program are NIMS based	Entire program is NIMS based
Agency Specific Program	Few program elements would transfer to another jurisdiction	Some program elements would transfer to another jurisdiction	Most program elements would transfer to another jurisdiction
Legislative Requirement	Program would require major legislative enactment in new jurisdiction	Program would require moderate legislative enactment in new jurisdiction	Program would require limited or no legislative enactment in new jurisdiction
Scalable	Program cannot be scaled to work in smaller or larger jurisdictions	Elements of program can be scaled to work in smaller or larger jurisdictions	Entire program can be scaled to work in smaller or larger jurisdictions
Tiered Training	None of the training program can be tiered to meet the needs of the participating local jurisdiction	Elements of the training program can be tiered to meet the needs of the participating local jurisdiction	Entire training program can be tiered to meet the needs of the participating local jurisdiction

Table 6. Description of Standards for Rating of TLO: Adaptability (AD)

The first AD criterion rates if the program is based on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which was developed by the United States Secretary of Homeland Security at the direction of the President of the United States, per HSPD-5. The NIMS integrates effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national framework for incident management. The NIMS enables responders at all levels to work together to manage effectively, “domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size or complexity.”¹²²

In addition to ensuring a TLO program will work effectively with the national incident management framework, NIMS compliance is required to be eligible for federal grant funds.¹²³ While recommendations for funding streams have yet to be put forth, it is likely some element of a TLO program would be impacted by federally initiated grant funding. Each TLO program is rated on its level of NIMS compliance.

The second AD criterion evaluates whether a program is agency specific. As previously mentioned, programs were chosen for evaluation based on a variety of factors. Since this thesis advocates for a statewide program in New York State, existing systems that have a proven record of statewide implementation are rated higher. This is not to say other programs would not translate to a larger jurisdiction, but that potential would be captured in the other criterion.

The third AD criterion evaluates legislative requirements. While state law will vary greatly, the level of legislative process a program has undergone is a potential indication of a NYS implementation challenge. The higher the level of legislation involvement required, the lower the rating.

The fourth AD criterion is scalability. While discussed further in Chapter V, a proposed NYS TLO program entails the crawl-walk-run approach that is applicable to both program size and function. If an evaluated program cannot be scaled to meet the needs of New York State, it is rated low. If it is very scalable, it is rated high.

¹²² *National Incident Management System (NIMS)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, 2004), iii.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, ix.

The final AD criterion evaluates if the TLO program has tiered training. While this thesis asserts that all TLOs should be trained to a predetermined basic level, additional training should be available to meet the individual needs of the participating agency. A program that takes this approach across all elements is rated higher than one that does not.

D. TLO PROGRAM EVALUATION

Based on the factors detailed in the section above, each of the three nationally recognized TLO programs is evaluated below. The final results are used to determine which of the three programs ranks the highest based on NYS specific criteria.

1. Effectiveness (E1)

Table 7 provides the rating of effectiveness (E1) criteria as outlined in the previous section.

TLO Program	Fusion Center Based	Multi-Discipline	Multi-Jurisdictional	Outreach	Information Sharing
ACTIC	Medium	High	High	High	High
CIAC	Medium	High	High	High	High
JRIC	Medium	High	Medium	High	High

Table 7. Rating of Effectiveness (E1) Criteria

a. E1 Analysis

All three programs scored well in effectiveness (E1). All programs incorporate multi-disciplines and have outreach programs to the community. The JRIC scored slightly lower with the multi-jurisdictional category because the other two programs are statewide and the JRIC is regional.¹²⁴ All three are fusion center based programs and TLOs are encouraged to funnel all interactions with outside intelligence

¹²⁴ NOTE: California has three fusion centers to cover the state.

community agencies through their centers. Most importantly, each is able to increase information sharing between the local fire service and the intelligence community.

Table 8 shows the summation of the E1 scores and provides an E1 factor ranking.

E1 Quantitative Evaluation			
TLO Program	Effectiveness (E1) Evaluation		(E1) Rank
ACTIC	E1=2+3+3+3+3	E1=14	1
CIAC	E1=2+3+3+3+3	E1=14	1
JRIC	E1=2+3+2+3+3	E1=13	3

Table 8. E1 Quantitative Evaluation

2. Efficiency (E2)

Table 9 provides the rating of efficiency (E2) criteria as outlined in the previous section.

TLO Program	Initial Training Cost	Continuing Education Costs	Technology Support	Administration	Sustainability
ACTIC	High	High	Low	Medium	Medium
CIAC	Medium	High	High	Medium	High
JRIC	Medium	High	High	Medium	Medium

Table 9. Rating of Effectiveness (E2) Criteria

a. E2 Analysis

The efficiency (E2) factor showed both core commonalities and some stark differences in the programs. One of the major differences is the level of services provided by the TLOs. In the ACTIC, the TLOs are much more involved in analysis functions. They are trained to use a wide variety of intelligence analytical tools (in the fusion center and the field). Many are law enforcement databases that require additional training and technology support. With these capabilities comes an increase in cost. Since

the ACTIC program is completely grant funded, however, for this analysis, it scored high in initial training cost (no cost to the sponsoring agency). The CIAC and JRIC programs have non-grant funding sources, which means higher initial costs to sponsoring agencies that also leads to programs with more sustainability.

All three programs have distance-learning components to their continuing education that helps manage costs. The need to maintain the technology tools translates to a low score for the ACTIC. All three programs require administrative support from the fusion centers, which translates to increased personnel costs and a medium rating.

Table 10 shows the summation of the E2 scores and provides an E2 factor ranking.

Efficiency (E2) Quantitative Evaluation			
TLO Program	Efficiency (E2) Evaluation		(E2) Rank
ACTIC	E2=3+3+1+2+2	E2=11	3
CIAC	E2=2+3+3+2+3	E2=13	1
JRIC	E2=2+3+3+2+2	E2=12	2

Table 10. Efficiency (E2) Quantitative Evaluation

3. Political and Legal Feasibility (PL)

Table 11 provides the rating of PL criteria as outlined in the previous section.

TLO Program	Legal Contract	All Hazards Approach	Fire Service Mission Creep	Privacy Component	Combination Staffing
ACTIC	High	High	Medium	High	Low
CIAC	High	High	Medium	High	High
JRIC	High	High	Medium	High	High

Table 11. Rating of Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) Criteria

a. PL Analysis

The PL evaluation factor shows similarities between the programs, but also illustrates important differences. All three programs are housed in fusion centers that embrace an all-hazards approach. In addition, each has well-defined privacy policies based on 28 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 23 privacy standards.^{125, 126}

A major difference between the programs is TLO membership. The ACTIC is unique in that it only allows sworn uniformed personnel (law enforcement, fire or military) to be TLOs. It maintains its legal contract through employment agreements. The other two programs allow non-sworn personnel to participate. It maintains a legal contract through a signed non-disclosure agreement (NDA). The NDAs allow criminal prosecution if the terms of the contracts are broken.

Regarding mission creep, all three scored medium because they each allow fire service TLOs to support non-traditional fire services missions, which is typical of seasoned programs.

Table 12 shows the summation of the PL scores and provides a PL factor ranking.

Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) Quantitative Evaluation			
TLO Program	Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) Evaluation		(PL) Rank
ACTIC	PL=3+3+2+3+1	PL=12	3
CIAC	PL=3+3+2+3+3	PL=14	1
JRIC	PL=3+3+2+3+3	PL=14	1

Table 12. Political and Legal Feasibility (PL) Quantitative Evaluation

¹²⁵ NOTE: From the ACTIC website: “28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 is a guideline for law enforcement agencies that operate federally funded multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems. 28CFR provides the foundation for gathering, analyzing, disseminating and storing intelligence information.”

¹²⁶ Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), “Definitions,” (n.d.), <http://www.azactic.gov/About/Definitions/>.

4. Adaptability (AD)

Table 13 provides the rating of adaptability (AD) criteria as outlined in the previous section.

TLO Program	NIMS Based	Agency Specific Program	Legislative Requirement	Scalable	Tiered Training
ACTIC	High	High	High	High	Medium
CIAC	High	High	High	High	Medium
JRIC	High	Medium	High	High	High

Table 13. Rating of Adaptability (AD) Criteria

a. AD Analysis

All three programs are NIMS based and did not require special legislation to be created. As programs established through their fusion centers, each is bound by the rules and regulations of the center. Each overall program is scalable, but the JRIC has a more tiered training structure (especially for entry-level training). The JRIC TLO program materials, however, are more agency-specific. This specificity slightly reduces its adaptability.

Table 14 shows the summation of the AD scores and provides an AD factor ranking.

Adaptability (AD) Quantitative Evaluation			
TLO Program	Adaptability (AD) Evaluation		(AD) Rank
ACTIC	AD=3+3+3+3+2	AD=14	1
CIAC	AD=3+3+3+3+2	AD=14	1
JRIC	AD=3+2+3+3+3	AD=14	1

Table 14. Adaptability (AD) Quantitative Evaluation

5. Overall Rating (OR)

The following three tables (Tables 15–17) plug in the values from each of the four evaluation factors into the weighted formula to determine the OR for each of the three TLO programs.

Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) TLO
ACTIC OR=.35(E1)+.30(E2)+.25(PL)+.10(AD)
ACTIC OR=.35(14)+.30(11)+.25(12)+.10(14)
ACTIC OR=4.9+3.3+3+1.4
ACTIC OR=12.6

Table 15. Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) TLO

Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) TLO
CIAC OR=.35(E1)+.30(E2)+.25(PL)+.10(AD)
CIAC OR=.35(14)+.30(13)+.25(14)+.10(14)
CIAC OR=4.9+3.9+3.5+1.4
CIAC OR=13.7

Table 16. Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) TLO

Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC) TLO
JRIC OR=.35(E1)+.30(E2)+.25(PL)+.10(AD)
JRIC OR=.35(13)+.30(12)+.25(14)+.10(14)
JRIC OR=4.55+3.6+3.5+1.4
JRIC OR=13.05

Table 17. Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC) TLO

Table 18 reports and ranks the three TLO programs Overall Rating (OR).

TLO Program	TLO Overall Rating (OR)	Rank
ACTIC	OA=12.6	3
CIAC	OA=13.7	1
JRIC	OA=13.05	2

Table 18. Three TLO Programs Overall Rating (OR)

Based on the policy options analysis performed, the CIAC TLO program is the best model for New York State to use to develop its own TLO program. The CIAC TLO is a fusion-center based, statewide program that has increased information sharing between the fire service and the intelligence community. “The TLO program creates an expansive statewide network of personnel by combining local fire and law enforcement resources linked to federal and state assets to provide an effective and viable two-way flow of information.”¹²⁷ The next chapter outlines specific elements of CIAC TLO duties and training as part of the recommended NYS program.

E. CONCLUSION

While Chapter III established the need to evolve the NYS local fire service’s involvement in the intelligence enterprise, Chapter IV evaluated solutions. Four factors, each containing five criteria, were used to evaluate three nationally recognized TLO programs to determine which one provides the best model for New York State. While all three programs share a common ancestry, the CIAC TLO program proves to be the best model for New York State.

Based on the program option analysis results, Chapter V outlines a detailed recommendation for a NYS TLO program. The chapter also provides a comprehensive analysis of implementation considerations and concludes with thoughts on ways to continue to evolve the fire service intelligence enterprise.

¹²⁷ *Terrorism Liaison Officer Handbook* (Lakewood, CO: Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC), 2011), 3.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION AND CONCLUSION

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.

- Abraham Lincoln

A. OVERVIEW

This chapter recommends evolving the local NYS fire service involvement in the intelligence enterprise through the development of a NYS TLO program based on the CIAC TLO program. A program overview is provided and a Fiscal Year One (FY1) budget is projected. This chapter examines the strategy considerations for implementing a fire service-inclusive TLO program in New York State, identifies stakeholders (proponents and opponents), potential concerns and presents an implementation methodology for success. The conclusion presents final thoughts on the future of the local NYS fire service intelligence enterprise.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Program Overview

Based on the CIAC TLO model, the locally initiated NYS TLO program is statewide and multi-discipline. The program is designed to meet the needs of the local fire service, but is inclusive of other disciplines (law enforcement, public health, etc.). The multi-discipline approach to the program breaks down communication barriers on the local level and increases stakeholder support as it works to increase lawful information sharing between all governmental levels. Since all disasters (natural or manmade) begin and end on the local level, one of the greatest benefits of the NYS TLO program will be a more cohesive working relationship between local responders.

As a fusion center-centric program, the TLO program will be based out of the NYSIC. The NYSIC will provide a consistent platform for information flow to and from the TLOs. The NYSIC will need to develop specific TLO protocols for dissemination and reporting activities. The TLO program will be under the direction of NYSIC personnel who are in the DHSES chain of command.

The TLO will be a direct point of contact for the NYSIC at the local level and will serve as a point of contact and a reference for the region. Based on the CIAC model, the NYS TLO daily and weekly operational duties will include the following.

- Collect and report relevant field intelligence from the local area to the NYSIC
- Assist with terrorism awareness training
- Disseminate information to field personnel during roll call or team meetings
- Disseminate information to the field units
- Provide intelligence briefings to agency executive staff
- Provide intelligence briefings to regional representatives¹²⁸

Any information collected and reported to the NYSIC by fire service personnel will be obtained in the course of their regularly assigned duties.

Based on the crawl-walk-run approach, initial fire service TLO participants will not operate at the classified level per United States *Presidential Executive Order 13526* (Classified National Security Information).¹²⁹ In Fiscal Year Two (FY2), select fire service TLOs will be vetted to the secret level to expand operational capacity. A vetted fire service TLO, for example, could provide valuable SMEs for a JTTF investigation. (Hazmat, CIP, etc.)

A multi-discipline working group is recommended to develop a detailed implementation plan based on the TLO program model outlined above. The details of the group are discussed in the implementation section.

¹²⁸ *Terrorism Liaison Officer Handbook*, 4.

¹²⁹ *E.O. 13526* of 12/29/10, 75 FR 1013.

2. Participants

For the initial phase, TLO participants will be members of law enforcement or the fire service (career or volunteer).¹³⁰ After the program is established, it will be branched out to include more disciplines (public health, etc.). Participants must be endorsed by their agency head, undergo a criminal background check, sign a non-disclosure agreement and complete the required initial training. Based on DHS/DOJ recommendations, attributes of a desirable candidate include the following.

- “Possessing a wide network of contacts in their agency
- Interest in fulfilling the role
- Respect of peers and supervisors
- Record of being trustworthy
- Good judgment
- Responsiveness
- A subject-matter expert (SME) on a needed topic
- A desire to make a long-term commitment to the program
- Available time and support from the supervisor
- Ability to pass security clearance, if required
- Understanding of the [TLO] roles and responsibilities
- Strong interpersonal communication skills”¹³¹

The TLO is the information conduit between the IC and this individual’s organization and needs to be connected to the respective organization and community to possess the networks to assess and act upon emerging threats. The TLO requires the trust and respect of peers and supervisors to be given information to pass onto the NYSIC. The same trust and respect is necessary to receive intelligence from the NYSIC and the good judgment to know to whom to share that information with and what actions to consider. The information sharing and the training responsibilities will demand strong

¹³⁰ NOTE: A volunteer firefighter TLO’s vocation may add additional value to program via added skill sets.

¹³¹ *Establishing a Fusion Liaison Officer Program: Development and Implementation Considerations*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2010), 27.

communication skills. The program will benefit by initially recruiting participants who will be committed and enthusiastic advocates the TLO concept.

3. Program Training

Each TLO participant will receive 24 hours of initial training. Based on the CIAC model, the curriculum includes the following.

- Domestic and international terrorism trends specific to New York
- Intelligence cycle
- CFR 28 compliance
- Threat vulnerabilities
- Vulnerability assessments
- Critical infrastructure protection
- Situational recognition
- TLO and responder safety
- Information analysis and dissemination
- Incident response to terrorist bombings
- Prevention and response to suicide bombing incidents
- Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)^{132, 133}
- NYSIC operations¹³⁴

The training should be delivered by SMEs who represent the various disciplines that incorporate the program.

4. Pilot Project

Based on the crawl-walk-run approach, this thesis recommends the TLO program be initiated as a pilot program (crawl). While the end goal is to have TLO participants in

¹³² NOTE: “The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) is a national secure and trusted web-based portal for information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and international partners engaged in the homeland security mission.”

¹³³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Information Network,” (n.d.), <http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-information-network>.

¹³⁴ *Terrorism Liaison Officer Handbook*, 4.

all areas of New York State (walk), a pilot project will allow the program to be developed and evaluated on a manageable scale. Based on efforts already underway in CTZ-6 to be more inclusive of the fire service, it is recommended to be the area to undertake the pilot program that will incorporate seven (Broome, Chenango, Cortland, Delaware, Otsego, Tioga and Tompkins) of NYS’s 62 counties. The working group will determine future initiative (run). Expanding the TLO analysis capabilities and NYSIC role are examples of future initiatives.

5. Projected FY1 Budget

Table 19 is a projected FY1 Budget for a TLO pilot project.

NYS TLO Projected Budget (FY1)¹³⁵	
Item	Cost
Initial Training	\$5,000
Continuing Education	\$2,000
Technology	\$2,000
Administration	\$5,000
Supplies	\$1,000
Projected FY1 Budget (Total)	\$15,000

Table 19. NYS TLO Projected Budget (FY1)

This thesis recommends that existing NYSIC grant funds for the Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) program and other identified homeland security initiatives be used to support the pilot project. For FY1, personnel cost (salary, travel, etc.) for TLO candidate training will be covered by the participating agency. As a locally initiated program, it is important for local governments to provide a commitment to the TLO concept with local funds.

As presented, the FY1 pilot program has minimal program costs. As the program develops, consideration will be given to additional program financial elements (awareness training, travel, computer requirements, etc.). A program budget for FY2 will

¹³⁵ NOTE: It is possible that existing NYSIC personnel and budget lines can absorb Technology and Administrative costs.

be created during the pilot for inclusion in the DHSES budget. In addition, grant funding will be sought to further develop the TLO programs' size and scope. Both funding avenues will address training cost and operational costs.

C. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS

No new program is created in a vacuum. The recommended NYS TLO program will be developed within an existing complex environment. Many stakeholders are involved and their input to the TLO program will shape the final TLO structure and implementation. This thesis describes the stakeholders, their roles and recommends strategies for successful implementation.

1. Stakeholders

The first step is to identify the stakeholders who will impact the TLO program. The stakeholders will be divided into four categories. The primary stakeholder for the purpose of this analysis is the fire service. Secondary stakeholders (for the analysis and not a reflection on importance) are law enforcement (LE), IC and the public. Each group will be described and analyzed to recognize prevalent attitudes and issues related to the proposed TLO program.

a. Primary

Several organizations represent the fire service in NYS. The principal is the state fire agency, the New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control (OFPC). In addition, three membership organizations best reflect the overall diversity of the fire service: the New York State Association of Fire Chiefs (NYSAFC), the New York State Professional Fire Fighters Association (NYSPFFA), and the Firemen's Association of the State of New York (FASNY).

Introduced in Chapter III, the OFPC is a department within the NYS DHSES. Per its mission statement, "The New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control strives to be the nationally recognized leader in fire services, delivering the highest quality, state of the art, and most comprehensive training, response, and technical

assistance programs and services to emergency responders, local entities, and the citizens of New York State.”¹³⁶

The NYSAFC has the widest representation of fire service members. According to its website, “Any member of an emergency service organization or a business that serves the emergency service field can become a member of this Association.”¹³⁷ Within the overall organization, committees exist that represent the interests of the career and volunteer members. To date, no separate committee addresses the issue of the fire service’s involvement in the intelligence enterprise. Executive Director Thomas L. LaBelle states, “The Association has considered and is interested in the issue, but has made limited progress to date.”¹³⁸

The NYSPFFA contains approximately 16,500 (5,500 excluding the Fire Department of New York) members and represents union fire fighters across New York State. While the primary function of the NYSPFFA is to support worker’s rights and benefits, the union will often engage in political efforts to support fire service-related initiatives. For example, the NYSPFFA is an affiliate of the International Fire Fighters Association (IAFF), which represents career firefighters across the United States and Canada. In 2007, the IAFF met with congressional leaders and endorsed the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation and the 9/11 Security Bill. Among several items, the bill provided funding to increase information sharing between federal, state and local officials. “The time is now to act on this important legislation,” says [IAFF] General President Schaitberger. “Our members play a crucial role in terrorism response and Homeland Security, yet so many first responder needs remain unmet.”¹³⁹

¹³⁶ New York State, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, Office of Fire Prevention and Control (OFPC), “Our Mission, Our Vision,” (n.d.), <http://www.dhSES.ny.gov/ofpc/>.

¹³⁷ Firemen’s Association of the State of New York, “Membership,” (n.d.), <http://www.fasny.com/index.php/membership/>.

¹³⁸ Thomas L. LaBelle, personal correspondence with author, June 22, 2012.

¹³⁹ International Association of Fire Fighters, “IAFF Endorses Remaining 9/11 Commission Recommendations,” February 28, 2007, <http://www.iaff.org/07News/22807Reid.htm>.

FASNY boasts over 40,000 members and represents volunteer fire fighters' interests across New York State.¹⁴⁰ While FASNY has no direct committee that reviews intelligence issues, the group is politically active and engages regularly in new fire service initiatives.

As a stakeholder group, the fire service is not in total agreement as to the need for an increased role in the homeland security intelligence enterprise. Overall, however, the majority agrees that it would benefit the fire service. As stated in Chapter III, in a 2010 survey of fire chiefs (career and volunteer), 90% stated that receiving regular intelligence briefs would affect their daily operations.¹⁴¹ In addition, 83% want information that would help them with preparation activities.¹⁴² In recognition that not all fire service leaders buy into the concept; the USFA is in the process of developing short training programs to encourage executive fire officers to embrace an expanded view of their homeland security role. The need for intelligence and information sharing is a component of the program.¹⁴³

Recognizing the fire service as the major stakeholder in this initiative, one of the primary strategic considerations is the divide between the career and volunteer fire service. On average across the nation, 80% of firefighters are volunteers and they protect 20% of the population (with the inverse for the career firefighters). New York State has approximately 114,000 firefighters, and 96,000 (or 84%) are volunteers.¹⁴⁴ The career/volunteer fire fighter "gap" is often considered the third rail of the fire service. Many fire service initiatives are hampered due to intra-stakeholder friction. Implementation recommendations will consider this unique stakeholder characteristic.

¹⁴⁰ Firemen's Association of the State of New York, "Membership."

¹⁴¹ Richardson, "Identifying Best Practices in the Dissemination of Intelligence to First Responders in the Fire and EMS Services," 40.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁴³ Keith Henke, personal communication with author, June 18, 2012.

¹⁴⁴ New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness, "Fire Protection in New York State."

b. Secondary

In New York State, the law enforcement community consists of both state and local agencies. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on the NYSP and its 4,600 sworn personnel. The NYSP are located throughout New York State and has primary responsibility to coordinate law enforcement counterterrorism efforts within the state. As outlined in Chapter III, one of the primary NYSP CT efforts is the coordination of the CTZ.

In New York State, similar to across the nation, the fire service and law enforcement's relationship is complicated. The two services are often accused of having a sibling rivalry. On one hand, they are often 'brothers-in-arms', working side by side in very difficult street-level operations. At other times, however, they are in competition for control of limited resources. While the depths of this complex relationship could be a stand-alone thesis topic, for this analysis, it is important to recognize that each service is protective of its jurisdiction and functional responsibilities. While public safety is clearly the purview of each, NYS LE has been the leader in the local intelligence enterprise. As the fire service expands its role in this area, it will be important to do so with sensitivity to law enforcement's existing foundation.

The third stakeholder is the IC. For the purpose of this thesis, the uniformed and civilian NYSP and DHES intelligence analysts who work out of the NYSIC represent the IC. As outlined in Chapter III, current interaction between the fire service and the IC is limited. Through the efforts of past and current fire service representatives assigned to the NYSIC, however, inroads have been made. The IC does recognize NYS' 140,000 fire service personnel as an underutilized resource in its efforts to collect intelligence on potential terrorism and other illegal activities.

The final stakeholder is the public. The fire service holds a unique public trust not held by other government agencies. If the public perceives that the fire service is "spying" on them during emergency calls, their trust may be violated. In a 2008 survey of 32 fire chiefs, 84% felt that training fire fighters to recognize non-traditional forms of

terrorist threats would diminish their standing in the community.¹⁴⁵ This public trust must be weighed against the potential benefits gained from an increased involvement of the fire service in the IC.

In addition, in a time of shrinking budgets and competing interests, the public demands fiduciary responsibility. The fire service must consider the budgetary impact of the proposed TLO program.

D. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

Implementing a fire service TLO program in New York State is not without challenges. In addition to choosing the CIAC TLO program model, the implementation process must work to address as many of the stakeholder concerns as feasible. The following section outlines the recommended implementation plan and then delineates special considerations for each stakeholder group.

1. The Strategy

With the CIAC TLO model as a framework, it is recommended that a working group be formed to fine-tune the model and develop an implementation plan specific to the needs of New York State. The working group should consist of the following sector stakeholders.¹⁴⁶

- Homeland Security (NYS DHSES)
- Fire and Emergency Medical Services (NYS OFPC, NYSAFC, NYSPFFA and FASNY)
- Law Enforcement (NYSP)
- Intelligence Community (NYSIC)

Two DHSES officials assigned to the NYSIC will co-chair the working group, the aforementioned OFPC Deputy Chief and an IC representative. They will report to the DHSES Commissioner with detailed recommendations and implementation strategies.

¹⁴⁵ Blatus, “Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as Intelligence Gatherers,” 18.

¹⁴⁶ NOTE: Once the TLO program begins to expand from its pilot stage, this working group can expand to include additional stakeholders (public health, national guard, etc.)

The fire service becoming a more prominent partner in the NYS IC is going to be a disruptive change. An inter-disciplinary group will minimize acceptance problems outlined above and provide buy-in through representation. Legitimate concerns expressed by various discipline members will have a venue for discussions. Once the system is in place, each discipline will have an informed member(s) to assist its individual agencies with implementation.

A key component of the process will be the need for collaboration. Collaboration, “takes a new mind-set, one that says, ‘we can achieve more together than we can alone.’ A mind-set that looks across boundaries of departments, companies, and nations, and sees people as partners and change as opportunity, not threats.”¹⁴⁷

2. Fire Service

Beyond the implementation issues listed above, the unique aspect for the fire service perspective will be the career/volunteer gap. The first step for success is to ensure the vision of the TLO program includes both career and volunteer members. A combined program will minimize debate as individuals and organizations self-assess to determine their level of buy-in.¹⁴⁸ It is also important to assert that “combined” does not mean “equal” representation. It is the goal of this thesis to have TLO representation in all areas of NYS. Large population centers, however, may promulgate more representation. Since career fire personnel typically cover populous areas, it is likely that TLO representation will reflect this distribution.

The second aspect to bridging the gap will be strong leadership.¹⁴⁹ The chairpersons of the working-group will have to demonstrate strong leadership and commitment to shepherding the process. When gap issues arise, they must encourage

¹⁴⁷ William J. Bratton and Zachary Tumin, *Collaborate or Perish!: Reaching Across Boundaries in a Networked World* (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 95.

¹⁴⁸ Michael T. Love, *Improving Work Relations Between Career and Volunteer Fire and Rescue Members of the Montgomery County, Maryland Fire and Rescue Service* (Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy, 1999), 46.

¹⁴⁹ Glen Widener, *Closing the Personality Gap Between Career and Volunteer Firefighters* (Emmitsburg, MD: National Fire Academy, 2002), 28.

open communications. Providing a transparent system for feedback and decision making will help facilitate this process.

3. Law Enforcement

As stated earlier, local homeland security intelligence activities have been the primary responsibility of local LE. Evolving the role of the fire service will be seen as disruptive to many members of LE community. In addition to the inter-disciplinary approach outlined above, it is essential that the fire TLO program work to merge with the existing LE organizational matrix. For this reason (among others outlined in the recommendation section of the thesis), the TLO structure will be developed to work within the existing CTZ. Working within the existing CTZ will help provide both structure and LE buy-in. Since LE already contains subject matter experts in intelligence (FIO), a mentor program will be part of the implementation process. Allowing LE FIOs to mentor fire service TLOs will help develop personal relationships that can translate to institutional acceptance.

4. Intelligence Community

As noted above, in NYS the IC is primarily composed of members of LE. Many of the special considerations outlined in the LE section are applicable to the IC. A distinctive consideration for the IC, however, is training. For the fire service to interact with the IC, it is essential that it understands how the IC functions. As outlined in the beginning of this chapter, it is crucial that the TLO training focus on how to blend transitional skills with IC specific systems, language, protocols and culture.

5. Public

It should be noted that the public is clearly identified as a stakeholder, but is not represented as a separate member of the working group. Public interest is a lens through which all public policy should be examined. As the working group develops and implements the TLO plan, it will consider potential public issues.

As the TLO program is initiated, the fire service must be careful not to violate the public's trust. Consequently, it is crucial that the operating procedures and activities of the TLO be within the legal and ethical confines of the fire fighter's traditional role. For example, if a TLO was involved with information gathering (taking a report of a suspicious activity from a line fire fighter), it is important that the information gathering be an extension of activities already being performed by fire service personnel (fire, rescue, medical, etc.). Under no circumstances will fire service personnel be solely tasked with gathering intelligence information outside their normal duties. A fire fighter reporting illegal activities, however, is not without precedent. In New York State, fire fighters routinely perform scheduled inspections of businesses to assure compliance with the NYS building code. Violators are issued citations or taken to court. In addition, if violations are found during unplanned emergency situations, fire fighters have a legal and ethical responsibility to take action.

While a financial component to this proposal exists, the overall cost will be shared between the locals and the state. For example, local responders will absorb some of the cost for training. In the 2008 survey of fire chiefs, 92% stated that they would support intelligence gathering training from their local budgets.¹⁵⁰ Intelligence gathering training is a component of the TLO program. In addition, one estimate of the cost of the 9/11 attacks on the United States was \$2 trillion.¹⁵¹ The cost of instituting a fire service TLO program pales by comparison.

While the cost for the TLO pilot program is affordable, the working group must recognize that initiating a new program during the current economic climate will have its challenges. It is essential that the various stakeholder groups communicate the value of the program to their constituents. In addition, educating local leadership (mayors, counsels, etc.) on roles, responsibilities and need for the TLO program will be essential to marshaling support.

¹⁵⁰ Blatus, "Altering the Mission Statement: The Training of Firefighters as Intelligence Gatherers," 20.

¹⁵¹ Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, "How Much Did the September 11 Terrorist Attack Cost America?" (n.d.), <http://www.iags.org/costof911.html>.

The working group and the local fire service will listen to public concerns and thoughtfully reflect upon the issues. If modifications to the program can be made to address reasonable concerns, they will be considered.

E. PROGRAM NAME

Prior to this point, the proposed NYS program is referred to as a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program, which was an intentional act to not cause confusion with the three TLO programs used for evaluation or the CIAC TLO chosen as the NYS model. As outlined in Chapter I, however, the NYS fire service is facing many threats (natural and manmade). To incorporate “terrorism” within the title of the NYS program may limit the vision of the program and provide a potential barrier for stakeholder acceptance. Potential titles for the proposed statewide program include: Field Intelligence Officer (FIO), Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO), Intelligence Liaison Officer (ILO), etc. To encourage the all-hazard element of the proposed NYS program, Threat Liaison Officer is the recommended title for this new initiative. This thesis asserts that this title most accurately reflects the goal of the program while still encompassing the objectives of its ancestry.

F. CONCLUSION

He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils;
for time is the greatest innovator.

- Sir Francis Bacon

Traditionally, the local fire service in New York State has not been an effective producer or consumer of intelligence information. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, homeland security organizations across the United States have developed and progressed to meet the demands of the varied threats. Eleven years after the 9/11 attacks, however, the local fire service in New York State is still struggling to evolve.

The NYS fire service has the potential to be effective contributors, consumers and collaborators with regards to intelligence and information sharing. Across the state,

approximately 140,000 fire service personnel respond to over 1.6 million incidents annually.^{152,153} As potential contributors of intelligence, each incident is an opportunity for fire service personnel¹⁵⁴ to interact with the public, and be in private homes and businesses. These interactions are unplanned and provide unique opportunities for fire service personnel to observe potential signs of terrorist and other illegal activities.¹⁵⁵

As potential consumers of intelligence, any of the 1.6 million annual incidents could prove to be a threat to fire service responders or the community at large. Dissemination of intelligence to the fire service will guide preparedness activities and increase safety during response and recovery operations.¹⁵⁶

As potential collaborators, the fire service brings resources and unique SME to the IC. The fire service can advise the IC on issues ranging from hazardous materials to critical infrastructure.¹⁵⁷ The results would be beneficial to all involved.

Government doctrine (federal and state) reinforces the local fire services' post-9/11 response role and creates a strong foundation for the need for an expanded responsibility into the area of intelligence and information sharing. Academic research also creates a cogent argument for an expanded fire service role, but progress has been slow and incremental.

The current threats facing the fire service and the citizens it protects are complex and evolving. The demands for traditional fire services are changing and the threat of domestic and international terrorism remains. The expansion of the local fire service's role in the intelligence enterprise in New York State is a key component of meeting the demands of these current and emerging threats. Research shows that the fire service has an interest in expanding its involvement, but is not well connected to the current tools

¹⁵² New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, "New York State Fire Resources."

¹⁵³ New York State Office of Fire Prevention and Control, "Fire in New York 2009 Summary."

¹⁵⁴ NOTE: For the purpose of this thesis, fire service personnel is inclusive of all aspects of the discipline (firefighters, fire inspectors, emergency medical technicians, etc.)

¹⁵⁵ The Department of Justice, *Fire Service Integration for Fusion Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers*, 3.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

available. New York State and the federal government have intelligence agencies tasked with connecting to the local fire service, but those relationships are often sporadic and underdeveloped.

As an effective and efficient way to build upon NYS's intelligence strengths and overcome gaps, this thesis recommends developing and implementing a locally initiated, statewide fire service inclusive Threat Liaison Officer program.

In an effort to build a program based on the lessons learned from other jurisdictions, three established fire service inclusive TLO programs (Arizona, Colorado and Los Angeles) were examined to determine good practices. Elements analyzed include program structure, administration, roles and responsibilities, costs, and training requirements. Based on four proposed NYS factors (effectiveness, efficiency, political and legal feasibility and adaptability), a systematic policy options analysis compared the three TLO programs to determine their areas of strength and weaknesses as related to the New York experience. Based on the evaluation, Colorado's CIAC TLO program is recommended as a model for NYS to use to develop its own statewide fire service inclusive TLO program. The CIAC TLO program model proved to be the best match for NYS' needs in both size and scope.

A detailed implementation strategy is developed to address key stakeholder (fire service, law enforcement, intelligence community and the public) challenges. A working group is proposed to adapt and implement the CIAC TLO model to meet NYS needs while addressing NYS' institutional (state and local) structures and the current fiscal climate.

This thesis has demonstrated that instituting a NYS fire service inclusive TLO program will be a catalyst for evolution. The evolutionary process for the local fire service will not occur without challenges. A strategic inter-disciplinary approach that works to address the unique perspective of key stakeholder will increase the probability of success. Increasing the local fire service's involvement with the homeland security

intelligence enterprise in New York State is a natural evolution of the fire service's existing public safety mission. People and organizations are often slow to accept change, but disruptive thinking that works toward the common good will triumph.

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