



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

THE DIVISIVE THREAT OF IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE

by

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December 2012

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| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE | | | <i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i> |
|--|---|--|---|
| Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. | | | |
| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) | 2. REPORT DATE December 2012 | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Divisive Threat of Immigration in Europe | | 5. FUNDING NUMBERS | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) Lars W. Lilleby, Andrew J. Sheehan | | 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 | | 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A | | 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number _____N/A_____. | |
| 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited | | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A | |
| 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines immigration's political effects in Europe over the past several decades. In many countries, immigrants are not integrating well. One result is the growing political strength of nationalist right-wing parties. Tensions have risen between those immigrants who refuse to adopt European values and European natives who consider their identity to be at risk. European governments have essentially two methods by which to control the impact of immigration—they can limit the number of legal immigrants and/or they can insist on integration. This thesis makes the case that integration is key to preventing further political strife over immigration policies in Europe. By examining the performance of immigrant integration policies across twelve European countries, we identify shortfalls and argue on behalf of the need for a standard European Union approach to measure integration performance. | | | |
| 14. SUBJECT TERMS Immigration, Europe, political order, integration, | | | 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 81 |
| | | | 16. PRICE CODE |
| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU |

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THE DIVISIVE THREAT OF IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE

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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines immigration's political effects in Europe over the past several decades. In many countries, immigrants are not integrating well. One result is the growing political strength of nationalist right-wing parties. Tensions have risen between those immigrants who refuse to adopt European values and European natives who consider their identity to be at risk. European governments have essentially two methods by which to control the impact of immigration—they can limit the number of legal immigrants and/or they can insist on integration. This thesis makes the case that integration is key to preventing further political strife over immigration policies in Europe. By examining the performance of immigrant integration policies across twelve European countries, we identify shortfalls and argue on behalf of the need for a standard European Union approach to measure integration performance.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|-------|--|
| EU | European Union |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. |
| WBG | The World Bank group |
| WGI | The World Governance Index |
| SSB | Official governmental Statistics Norway (Statistisk Sentral Byrå) |
| MIPEX | Migration Integration Policy Index |
| MPI | Migration Policy Institute |
| IMDi | The Directorate of Integration and Diversity, Norway (Integrerings og mangfoldsdirektoratet) |
| NSD | Norwegian Social Science Data Service |
| EED | European Election Database |
| SCB | Official governmental Statistics Sweden. (Svenska Central Byrån) |
| FPO | Freedom Party of Austria |
| FN | National Front |
| SD | Sweden Democrats |
| PVV | Party for Freedom |
| CBP | Common Basic Principles |
| LPF | Lijst Pim Fortuyn |

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We wish to thank our thesis advisors from the Defense Analysis Department, Dr. Gordon McCormick and Dr. Anna Simons.

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I. INTRODUCTION

According to politicians in most European countries, immigrants will seek economic opportunity and political protection in Europe for decades to come. To an extent, this fills a need in Europe for labor. But the integration of these immigrants is proving more difficult than the politicians had planned. In May 2012,

David Cameron, Britain's PM, launched a scathing attack earlier this month on 30 years of multiculturalism in Britain warning that it fostered extremism. His damning verdict came just months after German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that multiculturalism in Germany had failed. Now Sarkozy has joined the growing number of European leaders who have adopted identical views on multiculturalism.¹

Several studies show increasing problems with integrating many immigrants into European society, and the solution is far from easy. The concept of integration is vaguely defined across Europe. In this study, we will develop the concept of integration at length. Integration will be defined as equal participation in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres of life.² Some politicians maintain that integration will eventually happen over time and the population will coalesce eventually. Studies and events in Europe suggest that native Europeans are far from happy with immigration and the governments' immigration and integration policies. In France, the UK, Holland, Germany and the Scandinavian countries, a growing undercurrent of tension exists toward immigrants and the governments' failure to integrate them. A report from the Directorate of Integration and Diversity in Norway, published in 2009, states, "Around half of the population believes that integration is not working well. Those who believe that integration is failing miserably make up only a small part of the population, but this group is steadily growing; from 6 per cent in 2005 to 12 percent in 2009."³ The same tendencies can be seen in reports across Europe.

¹ <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1355961/Nicolas-Sarkozy-joins-David-Cameron-Angela-Merkel-view-multiculturalism-failed.html>, 14 May 2012.

² Martiniello, Marco, "Towards a coherent approach to immigrant integration policy(ies) in the European Union," www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/38295165.pdf

³ IMDi-report 4–2010 Integration barometer 2009

“Immigration is unlikely to abate in the near future. Confronting declining fertility rates, ailing pension systems, and pressing labor markets, advanced industrialized economies provide the pull factors that drive international migration, while economic hardship and political unrest in less developed countries furnish the necessary push factor.”⁴ The history of migration to Europe goes back to the post World War period. During World War II Europe lost a large percentage of its working force that has had long lasting consequences on its labor force. Colonial powers then turned to their colonies for this manpower. “France imported labor from Algeria, the British from South Asian countries and the Germans from Turkey.”⁵ These male immigrant workers lived in inexpensive, crowded lodgings. Frequently they traveled back to their home country to visit family, but returned to Europe to work. After a quarter of century immigrants in Europe were encouraged to return home when Europe suffered the effect of the 1978 oil price shock which dried up employment opportunities.⁶ Governments then tightened immigration policies, but the immigrants didn’t want to leave due to even worse economic conditions at home. Many European countries then applied rules that encouraged family reunification. This resulted in the workers wanting to bring their families to Europe. This overall failure to tighten immigration led to an explosion in immigration in the ‘70s and ‘80s into Europe.⁷ These new immigrant families demanded mosques and schools. European governments then started implementing different integration policies. The results of these social experiments can be found “in the many immigrant neighborhoods, surrounding major cities, declared “no-go” zones by the local police.”⁸ Problems can be seen in the Paris suburbs, in pockets of immigrants in England who are in direct opposition to the state, and in German third generation immigrants who convert to Salafi Islam. All are the result of failed integration policies.⁹ No European country has developed a good integration policy and some have even turned their back on

⁴ *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Rafaela M. Dancygier, 2010, Cambridge University Press

⁵ Sageman, M. *Leaderless Jihad*, 2008, 99

⁶ *Ibid*, 99

⁷ *Ibid*, 100

⁸ *Ibid*, 103

⁹ *Ibid*, 102–103

the issue with wishful thinking that it might solve itself. The flow of immigrants to Europe is steadily increasing. Here are a few examples of the European immigration flow.¹⁰

- Italy: 254,000 immigrants in 2006 and 424,000 immigrants in 2010.
- The Netherlands: 67,000 immigrants in 2006 and 110,000 immigrants in 2010
- Germany: 558,000 immigrants in 2006 and 683,000 immigrants in 2010
- Denmark: 24,000 immigrants in 2006 and 33,000 immigrants in 2010.

Today, as in the '70s and '80s, European governments still lack a sufficient policy to integrate new immigrants. This failure leads to a division among citizens in many European countries. Both integrated immigrants and locals express hostility toward immigrants and governments over integration and immigration policies. Since 2005, many countries' European nationalistic and right-wing parties have gained strength in response to these failed policies. The values and cultural norms between locals, immigrants and the government are diverging.

This thesis will examine the potential for latent divisions over values and cultural norms to give rise to political disorder. What effect do immigration and integration policies have on political order? How can a government influence the immigration and integration process to maintain order?

The following events in Europe highlight the growing tension between immigrants, locals, and governments over the past decade.

A. 2004: THE KILLING OF FILM DIRECTOR THEO VAN GOGH IN HOLLAND.

Theo van Gogh was a Dutch filmmaker. He worked together with the Somali-born writer Ayaan Hirsi Ali to produce a film that criticized the treatment of women in Islam. The film aroused controversy among Muslims and, in November 2004, a Dutch-Moroccan Muslim assassinated van Gogh. Implanted in van Gogh's body with a knife, the assassin left a five-page note threatening Western countries. Van Gogh's murder led

¹⁰ OECD Migration Database

to a series of protests and marches by Dutch citizens outraged over the death.¹¹ “At the same time, starting with four attempted arson attacks on mosques on the weekend of 5–7 November, numerous apparently retaliatory violent incidents and arson attacks took place against Muslim targets. The Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia recorded a total of 106 violent incidents in November against Muslim targets.”¹²

B. 2005: RIOTS IN THE SUBURBS OF PARIS.

“The death of two teenagers in 2005 set suburban France ablaze by immigrant youth. Despite government promises to invest in the run-down estates, little has changed at Clichy-sous-Bois, the focal point of the 2005 riots.”¹³ In 2007 new riots started again in the immigrant district when two North African kids were killed by the police. Immigrants in the suburbs demand equal rights and accused the police of racism. Jeffrey Reitz, a University of Toronto sociology professor who studies ethnicity and immigration, offered this explanation for the Paris riots, “It’s not the immigrants, but their children, who are a very different group of people.” Reitz says that, in general, when immigrants compare the situation in their adopted country to the life they left behind, they usually find things are better, even if they are discriminated against. If things don’t improve, they often have the option of returning home. “The second generation can’t go back as easily and have been told in school they should be treated equally. When it doesn’t happen, there’s disappointment,” Reitz said.¹⁴

C. 2005: PRINTING OF THE MUHAMMAD CARTOONS IN JYLLANDS POSTEN NEWSPAPER, DENMARK.

In September 2005, one of Denmark’s biggest newspapers printed cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. One of the cartoons showed the Prophet with a bomb in his turban. Alltogether there were 12 different drawings in the newspaper. According to *Jyllands*

¹¹ “The Democratic Contradictions of Multiculturalism.” Eriksen & Stjernfelt, 2011, 329

¹² “Bombing of Muslim school linked to murder of film-maker,” Castle, Stephen November 9, 2004. London: Independent.co.uk.

¹³ <http://www.france24.com/en/20101027-2005-riots-paris-suburbs-neglected-powder-keg-clichy-sous-bois-france>

¹⁴ http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/paris_riots/

Postens cultural editor, Flemming Rose, “there is a long Danish tradition of biting satire with no taboos, and that Muhammad and Islam are being treated no differently to other religions or religious figures.”¹⁵ These drawings have sparked riots and violence by Muslims in Europe and around the world. Many Europeans contend that these drawings constitute free speech, and Muslims must tolerate these expressions when they live in a society with liberal views and values. This incident highlights the potential for violence due to conflicting values. As one article states on the BBC’s webpage, “In many European countries there is a sense of secular values being under fire from conservative Islamic traditions among immigrant communities. Many commentators see the cartoons as a response to this.

D. 2008: ROSENGAARD IN SWEDEN.

Rosengård is a city district in Malmö, Sweden. Malmö faces challenges with its immigrant population which “occupies” the district city of Rosengård. The Swedish police are afraid to enter the city. If immigrants need medical assistance, the ambulances demand police protection to enter this part of town. Swedes are no longer welcome there. In 2008, 86% of the population was of foreign background. “Malmö suffered from a significant shortage of cheap housing and when immigrants arrived in the 1960s and 1970s they frequently were offered housing in Rosengård. It was at this time (and, particularly in the late 70’s and 80’s) that many Swedish nationals left the area. In 1972, the percentage of immigrants leveled briefly at around 20% of the local population, in 1998 this figure had risen to around 80%.”¹⁶ According to the official governmental statistical bureau, (SCB) over 70 percent of the children in Rosengård are living in relative poverty.

¹⁵ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4677976.stm>, 14.May 2012

¹⁶ Landes, D. “*Rosengård firefighters call it quits.*” *The Local.* (Sweden’s News in English.) 28 April 2009. <http://www.thelocal.se/19130/20090428/> (accessed June 2012).

E. 2011: THE BOMBING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL OFFICE AND THE MASSACRE AT UTØYA, NORWAY.

On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, a radical right-wing sympathizer, set off a fertilizer bomb in Oslo, collapsing the building holding the office of Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg (Labor Party), killing 8 people. He then proceeded to the Labor youth camp at Utøya where he massacred 69 persons, some as young as 14 years of age. His justification for this killing spree was the integration policy of the Norwegian government over the last 20 years, the failure of multiculturalism, and what he saw as an Islamic invasion of Europe. Recent statements in the European media indicate that Breivik is not completely alone in his extreme views. His actions reflect an increased willingness by right-wing nationalists to use violence to make their point publicly. Even if few Europeans support Breivik's extreme actions and logic, right-wing political parties in Europe are on the rise. Such an increase in right-wing movements and political parties has not been seen in Europe since the mid-1930s when Nazism and Fascism were on the rise. This trend is polarizing political discourse, and it should concern Europeans.

F. A THREAT TO POLITICAL ORDER

In recent years the new radical right's political discourse has struck a chord with voters across Europe and experienced a substantial increase in electoral support, allowing it to enter into coalition governments in Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, and Denmark. In 1994 Gianfranco Fini's "post-fascist" National Alliance entered a coalition government presided over by Silvio Berlusconi in Italy. In 1998, in France, Jean Marie Le Pen, leader of the Front National, achieved a significant result in the French regional election and four years later obtained enough votes in the first round of the French election to become president of the Republic, had he won the second round. In 2000 Jörg Haider, then leader of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria), joined a coalition government, and Geert Wilders' Freedom Party in the Netherlands, which according to recent polls is likely to become the second biggest party in the country, might achieve a similar position after the elections taking place in June (2010).¹⁷

¹⁷ Montserrat Guibernau, "Migration and the rise of the radical right," Policy Network, www.policy-network.net, March 2010

The increasing vigor of rightwing parties involves several factors; immigration and integration are two of the major factors. Montserrat Guibernau, a professor of politics at Queen Mary University of London and a visiting fellow at the Centre for Global Governance, London School of Economics examines the problem in her paper, “Migration and the rise of the radical right.”

The most popular item in the new radical right’s political agenda concerns its opposition to immigrants. With the ongoing process of globalization, many European countries have experienced a sharp rise in the number of immigrants and outbreaks of hostility towards foreigners who are perceived as a threat to precarious jobs and livelihoods but also as posing a challenge to national cultures and identities. These developments have promoted the emergence of a unique and unsettling environment for some individuals unprepared, unable or unwilling, to adjust to a novel situation; individuals who regard the new radical right as an alternative to mainstream politics.¹⁸

Recent elections in France, Holland, the Scandanavian countries and Greece support this statement.

These cases exemplify a few of the ways in which immigration and failed integration policies can cause disorder in Europe. The governments in Europe don’t want immigration to be a source of political disorder and want to mitigate the turbulence immigration causes. There are also issues of integration - how much should the host society compromise to accommodate immigrant populations, and how much should immigrants integrate into the society they are making home? Governments in Europe therefore need to do a better job of integrating immigrants or they need to reduce/ prevent immigration altogether. But to do so governments need to do a better job of collecting and measure what effects immigration and integration will have on society.

Our contention in this thesis is that such data is scarce and not collected in a consistent way over time. This shortfall makes measuring integration difficult, which makes policies difficult to develop. We will thus suggest how this evaluation might be done, what data should be collected and why this is important.

¹⁸ Ibid

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II. EUROPE TODAY

A. EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY

The European Union (EU) represents a collection of democratic countries. People within their own country control the government through a system of free elections. As a collective Union, the EU provides a framework for members to address regional economic, political and security issues as a unified body. Since WWII, the European Union has evolved into a powerful economic force in the world. However, the strength of the EU is still fundamentally based on the strength and stability of its member nations and their willingness to support each other. Since the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, the Union dealt with a number of economic crises that threatened the Union. A more serious threat to the Union is developing from non-EU immigration into Europe.

Assuming citizens have a reasonably uniform set of values and expectations, democracy is a historically stable political institution. John Locke and Thomas Hobbes believed the fundamental requirement for a functioning political society was that each member of the society would relinquish his natural rights and powers and place them in the hands of the community. This community, represented by either a sovereign or elected assembly, is vested with the power to arbitrate disputes and protect the community in accordance within an established set of laws. Thus, the source of any government's power resides in the willingness of the people to submit to the will of the sovereign or assembly appointed to adjudicate conflicts among community members. In his book *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, Gene Sharp writes that all sources of political power “depend on acceptance of the regime, on the submission and obedience of the population, and on the cooperation of innumerable people and the many institutions of the society.”¹⁹ According to Sharp, all governments are inherently vulnerable to the collective will of the population. So, regardless of the type of government, the key requirement for political order is the population's willingness to submit to the decisions of the government.

¹⁹ Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, originally published in 1993 in Bangkok, reprinted 2012

The genius of democracy resides in the mechanism that enables the people to control the policy decisions and administration of the government. Of course, it is unrealistic to assume that the government meets every expectation or that society's values and expectations are perfectly uniform. We assume that a certain percentage of unfulfilled expectations within society is to be expected and normal. However, if the values and expectations of the people sufficiently diverge, then no government policy can meet all groups' needs. In such a case, one group will dominate the government and develop policy while the other group will reject not only the policy, but also the authority of the government and actively oppose it.

Clearly, there must be significant divergences in values and expectations among citizens to reach a threshold where no government policy can achieve a compromise between opposing groups. This threshold is characterized by citizens who lose faith in the government to provide security, administer justice, or exercise the legitimate use of force. Citizens may then seek to change the government through force rather than via the democratic process. This sort of division in society is not only theoretically possible, but likely in the absence of proactive government policy to prevent or mitigate differences over sensitive issues. Acts of violence and rejection of government authority undermine the stability of each European government individually and the EU as a collective.

B. IMMIGRATION THEORY

“The European Union is and will continue to be a region of immigration.”²⁰ As such, a brief summary of the immigration policy; its purpose, conditions, components, and methods of implementation follows. Existing immigration policy in all EU countries reflects the mainstream value that immigration, up to a certain level, is good for society.

Immigration policy is based on economic and moral motives. Society accepts many immigrants based on their potential to provide economic benefits to society. Young educated immigrants and low-income labor immigrants both add to the labor market in society and represent an economic benefit. Other immigrants, such as refugees and asylum seekers, are accepted on moral grounds. In all cases, immigration policy is

²⁰ Martiniello, Marco, “Towards a coherent approach to immigrant integration policy(ies) in the European Union,” www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/58/38295165.pdf

expected to generate a net non-negative impact on society. No rational government would intentionally implement an immigration policy that would harm its society.

There are two components to immigration policy. The first component involves authorization regarding how many immigrants? from where? with what skill sets? etc. Establishing the proper rate of immigration requires a collective government decision based on motives and an enforcement mechanism to deny illegal immigration. While there may be widespread debate about the correct number of immigrants permissible or the types of immigrants desired, once decided, this component of policy can be clearly articulated, measured, and enforced.

The second component of immigration policy involves the immigrant integration process. This component facilitates the immigrant inclusion in the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres of life in his/her new country. Each European country has recognized the need for an effective immigrant integration process. However, there is little agreement regarding the methods to achieve this integration or measure its success. In 2004, the EU adopted the Common Basic Principles (CBP) for Immigrant Integration Policy.²¹ This document is widely considered to be the cornerstone of European Immigration policy despite the fact that the concept of integration remains strictly undefined. The CBPs emphasize “respect for the basic values of the EU,” employment, native participation with immigrants, education, language training, religious freedoms, political participation, and a need to develop clear indicators for integration,²² but these principles do not define the characteristics of an “integrated immigrant.” Subsequently, each member state has enacted laws and enforced those regulations to improve its own integration process.

Each European nation maintains ultimate responsibility for its immigration policy. However, individual states lost some immigration control mechanisms when the EU became a zone of open borders. The immigration policy of one country invariably impacts the rest of the EU. For example, many European nations fiercely criticized the

²¹ Council of the European Union, 2618th Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration Policy, 14615/04, Brussels, 19 Nov 2004.

²² Ibid.

Spanish government for adopting a policy of “normalization” toward illegal immigrants. This policy effectively granted more than a million immigrants European citizenship and authorized them to relocate throughout the EU. Likewise, a failure to integrate immigrants by one country creates collective problems for others. Immigrants without respect for EU values, language skills, or education will be isolated from the rest of society, regardless of their country of residence. Such isolation is inherently counter-productive to integration, economic prosperity and societal participation.

C. EUROPE’S RIGHT-WING

At elections in Vienna in 2010, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) increased its share of the vote to more than 25 per cent and so continued its electoral resurgence. In fact, polling indicates that the party is now the most popular option for young Austrians. Meanwhile, regional elections in France saw the National Front (FN) bounce back from the 2007 presidential elections to attract almost 12 per cent of the vote. Further north, the Sweden Democrats (SD) polled more than 5 per cent and entered the national parliament for the first time with 20 seats. In the Netherlands, support for the Party for Freedom (PVV) increased almost three-fold to 1.5 million votes, or 15.5 per cent of the vote.²³

The electoral success of the radical right reflects a growing rift in the political order of Europe.²⁴ The main political issues attracting people to the radical right are grievances over immigration policy, and enforcement and integration processes.²⁵ For example, the Austrian right-wing party calls for an end to all immigration and wants all foreigners and asylum-seekers who commit crimes expelled.²⁶

Tensions between locals, immigrants, and governments are rising in many European countries. “European societies are experiencing troubling tendencies, marked by the fragmentation of ethnically-mixed populations, the spread of extremist ideologies, a growing willingness among radicals to engage in violence, and the propensity of

²³ “Europes Radical Right: Support and Potential.” Mark Goodwin, <http://www.politicalinsightmagazine.com/?p=792>

²⁴ Goodwin, 2011

²⁵ See for example Ford and Goodwin 2010, (Oesch 2008), (Dancygier mk, 2010)

²⁶ http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/

politicians to instrumentalize racial and ethnic anxieties for electoral purposes.”²⁷ This latent discord is reflected by increased electoral support for the new radical right parties.

A growing amount of the native European population view the growth of immigrant communities as a worrying prospect. They fear that the strengthening and growing size of these communities with a radical different set of values and culture, has the capacity to progressively transform traditional majority-minority relationships as migrants organize themselves politically, culturally and economically.²⁸

In some countries, where the radical right has less electoral support, it nevertheless contributes to the mainstreaming of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim ideas and discourse. This in turn helps create a broader climate conducive to radical right thinking.²⁹ “Europe is riven by ethnic tensions and is fragmenting along multicultural lines. On the extremes, tragic violence is becoming familiar: Amsterdam, Utoya, Zwickau, Toulouse—and in the background, there is the “home-grown” terrorism of the bombings in London and Madrid. It is no wonder then that voters are looking for candidates who promise effective security measures and counter-terrorism policies.”³⁰

1. Radical Right Agenda

In this section we will examine the radical right’s agenda, the reasons for its rise in support, and the implications for this shift on European governments. We will present statistics that show that radical right groups in the European political sphere have grown in numbers and political strength over the last ten years. This growth in popularity has transformed radical right parties from negligible minorities to considerable stakeholders in certain parliaments.

In France, the right-wing populist party National Front (FN) has grown substantially in the past decade. In the 2007 presidential election, the FN leader, Le Pen,

²⁷ “Race and Violence the European Way,” Russell Berman, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/115601>

²⁸ Ibid, 11

²⁹ “The new radical right: Violent and non-violent movements in Europe.” Goodwin, Ramalingan and Brigg, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, January 2012

³⁰ “Race and Violence the European Way,” Russell Berman, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/115601>

received 10.44% of the votes. In the Parliamentary elections the same year, FN garnered 4.29% of the votes. FN was then rated the fourth largest party in France. In the 2009 EU Parliamentary elections, FN received 6.34% of the votes and three seats in the EU Parliament. In the recent 2012 French presidential election, Le Pen's daughter, Marine Le Pen the new FN leader, received 17.9% of the votes, roughly 10% behind Nicolas Sarkozy and the winner Francois Hollande. Additional, smaller extreme right-wing political parties in France received 2.86% of the votes in the 2007 parliamentary elections. In the 2009 EU elections, the same extreme groups received 11.19% of the votes.³¹

Marine Le Pen, leader of the FN in France, warns about the growing number of immigrants. She demands social welfare systems for the French instead of for the immigrants. The National Front argues in favor of: stopping all immigration to France, revitalizing French nationality, applying the national preference principle, and protecting national identity.³² Party members are staunch advocates of "France for the French" principle and promote the complete transformation of immigrants into French citizens.³³

In Holland, a similar right-wing development can be seen. The killing of film director Theo van Gogh in 2004 challenged the Dutch population to take a stand on behalf of freedom of speech; the killing of van Gogh resulted in a spiral of violence that left churches and mosques in flames.³⁴ In the 2003 Dutch Parliamentary elections, the right-wing party "Lijst Pim Fortuyn" (LPF) received 5.7% of the votes. LPF was the dominant right-wing party until Gert Wilders established the Party for Freedom (PVV), in 2005 with a strong anti-immigration agenda. The party believes Judeo-Christian and humanist traditions should be those dominant in the Netherlands, immigrants should

³¹ http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/

³² "Migration and the rise of the radical right", Montserrat Guibernau, Social malaise and the failure of mainstream politics, Policy Network, www.policy-network.net, 2010, 11

³³ Ibid, 12

³⁴ "The Democratic Contradictions of Multiculturalism." Eriksen & Stjernfelt, 2011

adapt accordingly, and the government should halt immigration from non-Western countries.³⁵

The PVV has enjoyed a rise similar in popularity and membership as that of its ideological counterparts in France. Today, the PVV is the dominant right-wing party in Holland. Hence, the PVV election results can be used to track the popularity of Dutch right-wing parties. In the 2009 EU Parliamentary elections, PVV received 16.97% of the votes. In the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary elections, the PVV garnered 15.5% of the votes. The PVV had a setback in this year's (2012) recent Dutch elections; it only managed to retain 15 seats, losing 9. But none-the-less, the PVV managed to influence Dutch politics and force a discussion about the problem that the rest of Europe is experiencing--regarding growing concerns about immigrants and failed integration. "The PVV has had a profound effect on Dutch politics. Mainstream parties terrified of bleeding votes have taken many of its ideas on board. A recent minority government that was supported by the PVV adopted a ban on burkas, a ban on double citizenship and other anti-immigrant policies."³⁶

France and Holland not only have two of the biggest right-wing parties in Europe, but the two countries also have some of Europe's largest immigrant populations. Yet, the rise of right-wing politics is not unique to countries with a large immigrant population or with a colonial history and long immigrant traditions. Denmark and Austria have experienced the same rise in right-wing political parties. The Danish People's Party, Denmark's largest right-wing party, received 6.80% of the votes in the 2004 EU Parliament elections. In the 2005 Danish Parliament election, support for the party jumped to 13.25% of the votes, making it the third largest political party in Denmark. In the 2007 Danish Parliament elections the Danish People's party received 13.86% of the votes. In the 2009 EU Parliament election, the party received 15.28% of the vote, an increase in 8.5% over the 2004 EU elections. No other party in Denmark had such a boost in electoral support. In the 2011 Danish Parliament election, the party experienced a minor dip back to 12.32%. Yet, overall the right-wing trend in Denmark remains strong

³⁵ Freedom Party program, 2009

³⁶ <http://www.economist.com/node/21560294>, 09/19/2012

and the Danish People's Party has established itself as one of the top three political parties.³⁷ According to the 2011 Danish People's Party's political program, "Denmark is not an immigrant-country and never has been. Thus, we will not accept transformation to a multi-ethnic society. Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, which develops along the lines of Danish culture."³⁸

Austria has three right-wing populist parties: the "Alliance for the Future of Austria," "The Freedomites in Carinthia," and the "Freedom Party of Austria." Since 2000, the "Freedom Party of Austria" (FPO) has been in a coalition government with the Christian Democrats. The 2004 Presidential elections saw a voter turnout of 71.6%--an all-time low in the history of Austrian presidential elections. The FPO abstained from nominating any candidates in these elections. The Social Democrats candidate, Heinrich Fischer, won. In the 2004 EU Parliament elections, the FPO received 6.31% of the votes. In the 2006 Austrian Parliament elections, Jorg Haider's party, "Alliance for the Future of Austria," received 4.11% of the votes. The Alliance for the Future of Austria had a strong anti-immigration platform. It's leader, Haider was previously a FPO politician, but internal differences led him to establish his own right-wing party. With a platform that called for expulsion of foreigners from Austria, the FPO received 11.04% of the vote in the 2005 elections. Together, these two right-wing parties received 15.15% of the total votes, constituting the third largest electoral block.

The 2008 Austrian Parliament elections were the worst elections since World War II for the two largest Austrian political parties, the Social Democrats and the Austrian Peoples Party. Meanwhile, the two right-wing parties had their best elections ever. The Freedom Party received 17.54% of the votes and Haider's party received 10.70%. Both parties campaigned to end immigration and called for the expulsion of foreigners and asylum-seekers who committed crimes.³⁹ In the 2009 EU parliament elections, the

³⁷ http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/

³⁸ "Nine European Countries Where Extreme Right-Wing Parties Are On The Rise." Vincent Trivett, 2011, <http://www.businessinsider.com/rise-of-far-right-populist-parties-can-derail-the-eu-2011-6?op=1>

³⁹ http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/

Freedom Party received 12.71% of the votes, almost a 7% increase from the 2004 EU elections. Jorg Haider's Alliance for the future of Austria party only received 4.58%. In the 2010 Austrian Presidential elections, the candidate representing the FPO, Barbara Rosenkranz, received almost 500,000 votes--15.24% of the total --placing her two out of three. Many believed that one of the two right-wing parties would then have to be invited into a new government, but the Social Democrats and the Austrian People's Party refused to go into a coalition with either of the two right-wing parties. This rejection must have been disappointing to the right-wing voters who accounted for almost 20% of all the voters in Austria.

Austria, with a population of almost 8.5 million (according to a 2011 estimate), 5.5% of whom are foreigners, is a European country that has had a significant increase in the number of right-wing voters over the last 10 years. If this trend continues, it is likely that there will be a right-wing government or at least a new right-wing party in a coalition government in Austria in the future. Consequently, ignoring and rejecting the large number of right-wing voters in Austria will potentially have negative effects. For instance, these voters may be inclined to coalesce with others who have even more extreme right-wing views in order to create a block big enough to be recognized. Secondly, arrogance and ignorance about the views of a significant percentage of the electorate by mainstream political parties could lead to more forceful expressions of political will outside the voting booth, including protests and political violence.

Governments ignore the new radical right's electoral successes and its anti-immigration policy to their peril. If mainstream parties don't ignore right-wing messages outright, they demonize them and conflate them with old-style fascism.⁴⁰

Rather than analyzing the conditions which have brought about the emergence of the new radical right and seriously examining the reasons why their discourse is well received by significant sections of the public, the traditional parties of Europe seem more eager to delegitimize these parties and to rule them out as "respectable" political options. By emphasizing the "politically incorrect" and "un-presentable" discourse and ideology of the new radical right, mainstream parties have underestimated

⁴⁰ "Migration and the rise of the radical right," Montserrat Guibernau, 17

the extent to which their arguments resonate with the public and have tended to reject the possibility of these parties becoming real contenders for political power. Of course, such assumptions are beginning to change as new radical right parties have entered into coalition governments in various European countries, have gained a significant number of seats in the European Parliament, and are making progress at the local level in countries where they previously had no support, such as in the UK.⁴¹

What, meanwhile constitutes a right-wing party? Right-wing parties lean toward extreme conservatism and anti-socialism, and promote extreme steps to achieve their anti-immigrant and anti-government views.⁴² The right-wing's central objection to immigrants is the problems they cause society in terms of unemployment, reduced health services, a rise in crime statistics, etc.⁴³

Some researchers argue that Europe's economic turbulence, and the recent crises in the Eurozone overshadow the factor responsible for the surge in popularity of right-wing parties. But this view ignores the fact that the rise of radical right occurred during a period of unprecedented economic prosperity. In fact, we should submit that this prevailing view purposely overlooks the structural factors explaining the new radical right's success in many European countries.⁴⁴ For instance, Kai Arzheimer, professor at political science from the University of Mainz and an expert on political extremism, writes in his article "Who votes for the Extreme Right and why and when?" that "Around the turn of the century, the view that immigration (usually operationalized by the number of refugees or asylum seekers applying or actually taking residence in a country) has a substantial positive effect on right-wing voting was firmly established, whereas the effects of inflation and of (aggregate) unemployment appeared to be much less consistent."⁴⁵ Several independent researchers support his findings.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Ibid, 16–17

⁴² <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/extreme+right-winger>, 08/05/2012

⁴³ "Rechtspopulismus in Europa. Vergängliches Phänomen oder auf dem Weg zum politischen Mainstream." Bauer, T. Werner (2010): Internationale Politikanalyse, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 16

⁴⁵ Arzheimer, K, "Who Votes for the Extreme Right and why – and when?" Electoral Sociology, Internet 08/05/2012, pg 1

⁴⁶ See for example: Guibernau 2010; Arzheimer 2009; Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000; Mudde 2007.

Others mistakenly attribute right-wing success to a collection of uneducated and unskilled voters in the population. Yet,

While men were always overrepresented amongst the French Front National's voters, it is well-documented that its electoral base has changed considerably over time. Initially, the Front appealed primarily to the petty bourgeois, but it quickly transformed itself into a non-traditional workers' party. In between, it managed to attract occasional support from segments of the middle classes.⁴⁷

This means that radical right parties attract their support in the same way established parties do across various social boundaries. Moreover, what a deeper look at the FN reveals is that support for radical right parties is motivated by the same kind of ideological and pragmatic considerations as support for established parties.⁴⁸

The new radical right has captured popular concerns about the importance of maintaining Western values.⁴⁹ "In a nation, people are born and socialized into a specific culture with its own language, customs and traditions capable of fostering a sense of belonging among those sharing a distinctive national identity. It follows that only those who belong can attain citizenship."⁵⁰ The right-wing parties in Europe have managed to obtain significant electoral support by presenting themselves as the defenders of this view, and draw on a growing group of conservative nationals who consider western European culture and values to be under threat.

The new radical right defends the idea of a "fortress Europe," which they argue is compatible with the protection of national cultures and identities as well as economic prosperity. It exploits the fears and anxieties of citizens who feel threatened by socio-economic changes and resent a rise in the number of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees entering their countries. For many citizens it is only when their national identity is threatened that they begin to take action to reclaim their sense of self-esteem. For them, identification with the nation offers a source of pride,

⁴⁷"Electoral Sociology: Who Votes for the Extreme Right and why – and when?" Arzheimer, 12

⁴⁸"The support base of radical right parties in the enlarged European Union." Van der Brug & Fennema, University Of Amsterdam, 2006, pg 3, See for example: Guibernau 2010; Arzheimer 2009; Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2000; Mudde 2007.

⁴⁹"Migration and the rise of the radical right," Montserrat Guibernau, 12

⁵⁰ Ibid, 14

which they do not experience as a result of supporting any of the mainstream parties.⁵¹

Other observers suggest that these developments are not new and that the rise in the right-wing politics is more cyclical than anything else (e.g., one saw the same thing in the 1930's, 1960s and 1980s). But these arguments fail to consider the differing causes of earlier right-wing movements. The rise of nationalism in the 1930's was not a response to immigration, but rather a response to the Allied administration of post-WWI Europe. Right-wing movements of the 60's and 80's were a response to an existential threat during the Cold War rather than an internal threat. Further, even a cyclical rise in right-wing political demands that specific cases be taken into account. Otherwise it is impossible to counter them and efforts to delegitimize radical right-wing proposals and ameliorate the grievances of right-wing constituencies remain unaddressed.

D. A PATH FORWARD

In some cases, latent tension between immigrants and European local populations has already erupted into violence. The founder of "Lijst Pim Fortuyn" (LPF), Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn, was assassinated during the 2002 Dutch electoral campaign by a Moroccan immigrant. Fortuyn's assassination sparked further tension and support for the right-wing movement and led to the establishment of Gert Wilder's "Freedom Party." Tellingly, Pim Fortuyn's main concern was not the protection of national identity, but the establishment of some kind of "welfare chauvinism" granting priority to Dutch nationals. This discourse was directed toward the democratic right advocating radical measures against immigration.⁵²

On July 22, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik, a radical right-wing sympathizer, set off a fertilizer bomb in Oslo, collapsing the building holding the office of PM Jens Stoltenberg (Labor Party), killing eight people. He then proceeded to the Labor youth camp at Utøya where he massacred 69 more. Breivik's attacks were the largest national tragedy in Norway since World War II. His justification for these actions was the failure

⁵¹ Ibid, 15

⁵² Montserrat Guibernau, "Migration and the rise of the radical right," Social malaise and the failure of mainstream politics, Policy Network, www.policy-network.net, March 2010, 17

of multiculturalism and what he considered to be an Islamic invasion of Europe. Essentially, the Norwegian government's integration policies had failed. Even if Breivik's actions are totally beyond reason, no one would think of openly supporting him, many European right-wing sympathizers do support his "political view" about how Europe is being effected by immigrants.

The rise of right-wing parties should concern Europe as a whole. Even if the differences in their political platforms are large, there are certain issues of common agreement that appeal to a large nationalistic population. Economic tensions in the Eurozone are fueling anti-immigration attitudes and criticism of the government's policies and laws regarding them. Still, the main concern is the number of immigrants entering Europe and the threat immigrants pose to existing national cultures and traditions. In many countries, the right-wing parties have been neglected, ignored and in some cases not taken seriously enough. Consequently, their members are offended by the dismissal of their ideas by mainstream political parties and leaders. If these people and their ideas are not acknowledged as legitimate in public discourse, some of these voters will move further right and will use violent means to gain the attention they believe they and their issues deserve. Herein lies the profound threat that poor immigration and integration policy possess to western European governments.

Failure to address the roots of this problem might, in some countries or regions, lead to internal violence and unstable democracies. Two main methods to counter the advancement and growth of right-wing parties and sentiments include establishing good, enforceable immigration policies and executing successful integration of immigrants. One of the first steps toward achieving these objectives is evaluating the performance of government in these areas. In the next chapter we will discuss the techniques and statistics currently used to evaluate government performance; we will offer an analysis of the value of these methods.

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III. DATA ANALYSIS

The rise of right-wing parties suggests that current immigration policies across Europe are negatively impacting society and therefore violating the principle requirement of immigration policy. At the extreme of the right-wing, proponents suggest immigration should be abolished completely. However, existence of immigration policy clearly demonstrates a mainstream desire to permit immigration in the proper amounts. Given that the preponderance of criticism from the right-wing targets legal immigration policy, we will assume that enforcement of legal immigration requirements is not the central source of conflict. Rather, the growing divisions in European society are a function of both the number of immigrants granted entry and poor integration of those immigrants. Our analysis will seek to explain: How serious is this division in society? Is the right-wing right? If so, what should be the consequences? For instance, what policy adjustments are needed to address new concerns and/or reduce divisions over this issue?

A. ANALYSIS

This section analyzes the data available on immigration flows into and out of Europe and the quality of immigrant integration.

B. IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION VOLUME ON INTEGRATION EFFORTS:

First, we evaluated the volume of immigrants, the first component of immigration policy. We obtained data from the OECD Migration Outlook reports. This data is plotted from 2000–2010. One can immediately see that there is a significant difference in the volume of immigrants accepted each year by each country. Europe's larger economies accept more immigrants than smaller economies. Second, though it may be obscured due to the scale of the chart, each nation is increasing its immigrant acceptance rate. Given this data, we split the group of 12 nations into two groups (high and low volume immigration nations). High volume nations include: Germany, Spain, Italy, and the UK. Each of these nations accepts more than 200,000 immigrants per year. Low volume

nations include: France, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Austria, Ireland, Portugal, and the Netherlands. Each of these nations accepts fewer than 200,000 immigrants per year.




Figure 1. Immigration Volume in Europe

The volume of immigrants cannot be considered a critical variable in successful integration. Eight of the twelve countries evaluated accepted fewer than 200,000 immigrants per year since 2000. Of those countries, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Holland, and Austria reported poor integration performance similar to the performance of countries accepting large volumes of immigrants such as Germany, Spain, and Italy. It should also be noted that the UK, the country which accepted the second highest volume of immigrants over this time period, is also one of the most integrated societies in Europe. This data suggests strongly that controlling the volume of immigration may be less critical than administering an effective integration program.

C. INTEGRATION DATA

Data on integration is scarce. “There is a widely acknowledged lack of comparable statistics on immigrant immigration.”⁵³ Our review of the literature found only one study which objectively collected and compared integration indicators within Europe. We selected the twelve European countries to study: Austria, United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Finland, Germany, and Portugal. These countries were selected because they represent a majority of the European Union countries into which immigrants are moving. They have a variety of historical backgrounds from colonialism to imperialism to communism and include founding members of the EU.

D. DATA SOURCES

In June 2010, the EU approved a pilot study to “examine proposals for common integration indicators and to report on the availability and quality of the data from agreed harmonized sources necessary for the calculation of these indicators.”⁵⁴ Eurostat collected the initial study data from 2009 records and published its pilot study report in 2011.⁵⁵ After an exhaustive search of the literature, we found no other similar study.

Since only 2009 data is reported, further analysis over time remains limited. The 2011 pilot study collected data in four areas--employment, education, social inclusion, and active citizenship. The report compares each government’s performance against each indicator. Table 1 presents the integration indicators used from the 2011 pilot study. Each of these indicators is presented as a percentage point difference between the total population and the immigrant group. For example, in Austria unemployment is reported as “-7.” This record can be interpreted as “The immigrants in Austria trail the total population unemployment rate by 7 points.” So, while unemployment for the total Austrian population is 4%, immigrants in Austria are averaging 11% unemployment. The separation between the local population and the immigrants is reported directly.

⁵³ Martiniello, M., p. 8

⁵⁴ Eurostat, *Indicators of Immigrant Integration: A Pilot Study*, 2011

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Our analysis re-organizes the data to illustrate the status of integration in each country in each of the four areas listed above. The following charts yield some insights into which integration policies have been effective and where policy and resource adjustments may be needed.

| Integration Indicators: | |
|--|--|
| 1: Activity Rate..... | (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population) |
| 2: Unemployment | (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population) |
| 3: Employment..... | (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population) |
| 4: Over-qualification Rate..... | (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population) |
| 5: Self Employment..... | (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population) |
| 6: Primary or less than primary education..... | (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population) |
| 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading) | (Foreign-born, Reference group: total population) |
| 8: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Math) | (Foreign-born, Reference group: total population) |
| 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science) | (Foreign-born, Reference group: total population) |
| 10: Tertiary education..... | (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population) |
| 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24) | |
| | (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population) |
| 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to median disposable income of the total population | |
| 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion | (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population) |
| 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... | (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population) |
| NOTE: A sign change was made on the data such that: | |
| - Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population; | |
| - Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and | |
| - Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population. | |

Table 1. Integration Indicators⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Ibid.

E. AUSTRIA





Figure 2. Austria Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population.
- 2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total population
- 3) In education, immigrant children are more than 20% points behind the total population in reading, math, and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 29% more low-achieving 15 year olds than does the native population.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 25% less than that found in the native population and the risk of poverty is 15% greater than that found in the total population.
- 5) All of these indicators reflect very poor integration in Austria in 2009.

F. DENMARK



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 8: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Math)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 10: Tertiary education..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24)
..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)

NOTE: A sign change was made on the data such that:

- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Figure 3. Denmark Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every indicator except self employment.
- 2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total population.
- 3) In education, immigrant children are more than 15% points behind the total population in reading, math, and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 16% more low-achieving 15 year olds than does the total population.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 23% less than that found in the native population and the risk of poverty is 17% greater than that found in the total population.
- 5) All of these indicators reflect very poor integration in Denmark in 2009.

G. FINLAND





Figure 4. Finland Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every indicator except self-employment.
- 2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total population. Unemployment among immigrants is 9% greater among immigrants than the total population
- 3) In education, immigrant children are more than 15% points behind the total population in reading and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 18% more low-achieving 15 year olds than does the total population.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 32% less than that found in the total population and the risk of poverty is 24% greater than that found in the total population.
- 5) All of these indicators reflect very poor integration in Finland in 2009.

H. FRANCE



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 8: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Math)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 10: Tertiary education..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24)
..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)

NOTE: A sign change was made on the data such that:


- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Figure 5. France Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every indicator except self-employment.
- 2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total population. Unemployment among immigrants is 8% greater among immigrants than total population.
- 3) In education, immigrant children are more than 14% points behind the total population in reading, math and science. In reading and math, the immigrant population has 15% more low-achieving 15 year olds than does the total population.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 25% less than that found in the total population and the risk of poverty is 21% greater than that found in the total population.
- 5) All of these indicators reflect very poor integration in France in 2009.

I. GERMANY



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 8: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Math)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 10: Tertiary education..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24)
..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)

NOTE: A sign change was made on the data such that:


- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Figure 6. Germany Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every indicator.
- 2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 5% behind the total population. Unemployment among immigrants is 7% greater among immigrants than total population. The over-qualification rate for immigrants is 14% higher than the rate for total population.
- 3) In education, immigrant children are more than 12% points behind the total population in reading, math and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 15% more low-achieving 15 year olds than the total population.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 21% less than that found in the total population and the risk of poverty is 8% greater than that found in the total population.
- 5) All of these indicators reflect very poor integration in Germany in 2009.

J. IRELAND



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
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- 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
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- 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24)
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- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)

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
- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Figure 7. Ireland Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) Unemployment among immigrants is 6% greater than in the total population.
- 2) In education, immigrant children are less than 5 percentage points behind the total population in reading, math and science.
- 3) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 20% less than that found in the total population.
- 4) All indicators suggest that integration is working relatively well in Ireland in 2009.

K. ITALY



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
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- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)

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
- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Figure 8. Italy Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population.
- 2) The first three economic indicators show better than average integration, but the fourth indicator reflects that immigrants have a 41% higher over-qualification rate. So, on average, immigrants are finding employment, but their jobs are not commensurate with their education or training.
- 3) In education, immigrant children are more than 20 percentage points behind the total population in reading, math and science.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 29% less than that found in the total population and the risk of poverty is 13% greater than that found in the total population.
- 5) All of these indicators reflect very poor integration in Italy in 2009.

L. NETHERLANDS



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 8: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Math)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 10: Tertiary education..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24)
..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)

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
- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Figure 9. Netherlands Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population.
- 2) All economic indicators show the immigrants lag more than 4% behind the total population. The over-qualification rate for immigrants is 11% higher than the rate for total population.
- 3) In education, immigrant children are more than 12 percentage points behind the total population in reading, math and science.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 13% less than that found in the total population and the risk of poverty is 18% greater than that found in the total population.
- 5) All of these indicators reflect poor integration in Netherlands in 2009.

M. PORTUGAL



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 8: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Math)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 10: Tertiary education..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24)
..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)

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
- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Figure 10. Portugal Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) The economic indicators show that immigrants are reasonably well integrated. Unemployment among immigrants is only 4% greater than among immigrants the total population, though the over-qualification rate for immigrants is 20% higher than the rate of the total population.
- 2) In education, immigrant children are within 5% of the total population, and immigrants show a higher rate of higher education.
- 3) All of these indicators reflect good integration in Portugal in 2009.

N. SPAIN



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 8: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Math)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 10: Tertiary education..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24)
..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)

NOTE: A sign change was made on the data such that:


- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Figure 11. Spain Integration Indicators

Observations:

- 1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every indicator except activity rate.
- 2) Two key economic indicators show that immigrants lag behind the total population. Unemployment among immigrants is 11% greater than among the total population. The over-qualification rate for immigrants is 25% higher than the rate for the total population.
- 3) In education, immigrant children are more than 19 percentage points behind the total population in reading, math and science.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 23% less than that found in the total population and the risk of poverty is 14% greater than that found in the total population.
- 5) All of these indicators reflect very poor integration in Spain in 2009.

O. SWEDEN



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 8: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Math)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 10: Tertiary education..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24)
..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)


NOTE: A sign change was made on the data such that:

- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Observations:

- 1) All indicators reflect that immigrants are lagging behind the total population in every indicator except self-employment.
- 2) All economic indicators show that immigrants lag more than 10% behind the total population. Unemployment is 11% greater among immigrants than that found among the total population. The over-qualification rate for immigrants is 23% higher than the rate for the total population.
- 3) In education, immigrant children are more than 20 percentage points behind the total population in reading, math and science. In reading, the immigrant population has 22% more low-achieving 15 year olds than does the total population.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 21% less than that found in the total population and the risk of poverty is 24% greater.
- 5) All of these indicators reflect very poor integration in Sweden in 2009.

P. UNITED KINGDOM



Integration Indicators:

- 1: Activity Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 2: Unemployment(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 3: Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 4: Over-qualification Rate..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 5: Self Employment..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 6: Primary or less than primary education.....(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 7: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Reading)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 8: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Math)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 9: Low achieving 15 yr olds (Science)(Foreign-born, Reference group: total population)
- 10: Tertiary education..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 11: Early leavers from education and training (persons age 18-24)
..... (Foreign Born, 30-34 yr olds, Reference group: total population)
- 12: Median disposable Income of Foreign Born population compared to
median disposable income of the total population
- 13: Risk of poverty or social exclusion(non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)
- 14: Risk of poverty after social transfer..... (non-EU born, age 20-64, Reference group: total population)

NOTE: A sign change was made on the data such that:

- Negative values reflect immigrant performance behind the population;
- Zero represents the ideal condition (i.e. no difference between the immigrants and the total population; and
- Positive values indicate immigrant performance above the population.

Observations:

- 1) All economic indicators show that immigrants lag behind the total population. Unemployment among immigrants is 3% greater among immigrants than among the total population. The over-qualification rate for immigrants is 9% higher than the rate for total population.
- 3) In education, immigrant children are 5–10 percentage points behind the total population in reading, math and science.
- 4) Socially, immigrant median disposable income is 19% less than that found in the total population and the risk of poverty is 12% greater than that found in the total population.
- 5) These indicators reflect poor integration in the UK in 2009.

Q. INTEGRATION OBSERVATIONS

First, the indicators only measure immigrant participation in two of the four spheres of participation envisioned by the EU--social and economic. The Eurostat indicators fail to measure progress in the cultural and political spheres of society.

Second, if successful integration is defined as suggested by “similar participation patterns as non-immigrant citizens,”⁵⁷ as suggested by Marco Martiniello, then all countries with any substantial level of immigration are failing. Even Ireland, with the lowest rate of immigration among evaluated countries, is failing to integrate immigrants successfully. Immigrants lag behind the total population in employment, education, and social inclusion. Since this data set is limited to 2009, we can only conclude that policies and processes up until 2009 were not effective in integrating immigrants at the rate of immigration. The impact of any policy changes since then cannot be measured or evaluated.

Third, the data suggests several trends. In all countries evaluated, unemployment was between three and eleven percentage points higher for the immigrant population than the total population. In all countries evaluated, the over-qualification rate for immigrants was an average of 16 percentage points higher than that for the total population. Immigrant children were behind their peers in reading, math, and science. In all countries, the median disposable income for immigrants was less than the median disposable income of the total population. In nine of the 12 countries evaluated, the difference in median disposable income was more than 20%.

Fourth, the data suggests that education, employment, and disposable income are not directly correlated. For example, in Ireland, immigrants were 16 points ahead of the total population in completing tertiary education and 20 points ahead in primary education, but immigrants were three points behind in unemployment and had 20% less disposable income. A similar trend existed in the UK where immigrants were one point ahead in tertiary education and four points ahead in primary education, but immigrants were three points behind in unemployment and had 19% less disposable income.

⁵⁷ Martiniello, p.9

Fifth, across Europe, immigrant children consistently underperformed in reading. This disparity suggests that immigrant children will have lower literacy rates, less overall education, reduced employment opportunities, and therefore lower incomes and higher poverty rates. While no integration indicator is singularly responsible for success or failure of integration, most observers would probably agree that improving young immigrant education would have a lasting positive impact on immigrant communities and society overall.

Given that we only have figures up till 2009, further conclusions about the relative importance of each factor are not possible. Similar data over time is needed to identify key indicators of integration and their corresponding impacts on levels of political violence, crime, GDP, inflation, etc.

R. IS THE RIGHT-WING MOVEMENT CORRECT?

If proponents of right-wing movements are correct, then there ought to be a measurable negative impact on society from immigrants and the failure of government to successfully integrate them. In conducting research for this thesis, we found no causal link between immigration and political order. However, we cannot rule out such a link either. The rise of right-wing parties and the polarization of Europe remain real and represent a source of serious division and divisiveness within many countries in Europe.

Many European countries are beset by problems with their immigration policy. Our concern is not with the state of the immigrants or the total population per se, but rather with the maintenance of a functional democracy in an environment of rapid population change and subsequent changes in values. Failure to maintain this functional democracy could potentially result in dangerous and economically devastating political disorder, to include violent protests, riots, and even civil war. While the data presented above indicate no definitive correlation between political order and immigration integration in Europe, the concern remains: if increased immigrant populations appear to threaten people's sense of social or cultural identity, the ramifications may affect the economic and political spheres of life next. Political unrest can only be withstood by aloof governments for so long.

IV. ROAD MAP TO MEASURE INTEGRATION

To measure integration or the lack of integration requires that consistent and coherent longitudinal data be collected according to consistent standards by governmental institutions. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the rise of right-wing parties is a European wide challenge. Immigration and integration should be evaluated in Europe as a whole, not by individual countries.

As the Zaragoza pilot study indicates there are ways to effectively and coherently measure integration. The challenge in Europe is to establish a methodology to evaluate integration whereby each country can be measured against the same standard. “Member States differ in relation to the different views, goals and regulatory frameworks of integration policies in the respective Member States.”⁵⁸ Without proper data, the success of immigration and integration is difficult to measure. The Zaragoza Study is a good starting point from which to collect data over time. This data would illuminate problems with current immigration and integration policy and funding. Having established the policy shortfalls, the data would point to areas requiring policy adjustment to achieve integration goals. Further, precise, deliberate measurements of integration can be published to inform the public about government policy effectiveness or lack thereof. Published reports would provide, the public has an alternative means by which to evaluate societal problems as opposed to emotionally reacting out of fear and misperception.

So, what might be the criteria most useful for measuring integration?

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

1) Continue collection and reporting of the data indicators gathered during the 2009 pilot study on integration indicators. This report is the only publicly accessible source for integration indicators in Europe. Continued collection of this data over time is

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crucial for evaluating the impact of policy changes and for guiding future policy decisions.

2) Measure integration in four domains: Political, Cultural, Social, and Economic

1. Political Domain:

Voter Registration. This indicator reflects immigrants' understanding of the democratic process and the role of individuals as participants (e.g., as voters)

Voter Activity: This indicator reflects active participation in elections, and reflects whether immigrants are willing to express their political will at the voting booth.

Government Participation: This indicator reflects immigrants' participation in civil discourse. Are immigrants working as government employees or elected officials? Immigrant participation in government reflects investment by immigrants in working to build a better community for all citizens.

2. Cultural Domain:

Language: Knowing the native language is the basis for communicating and understanding national laws, rules, regulations, rights of citizens, and methods of peaceful resolution. Good communication skills are critical for success in the marketplace. Beyond knowing the spoken language, this indicator should also measure literacy rates.

Education: In order for immigrants to be integrated across the workforce, immigrants should have education levels similar to those of the rest of the population. Education typically permits immigrants to obtain their desired level of employment based on their skills. Additionally, measuring education rates should point to future social, economic and political trends.

Native Acceptance: The first Common Basic Principle (CBP) of integration is that immigration is a 2-way process of accommodation between the population at large and immigrants. Hence, a regularly measuring of the native acceptance of immigrants is needed. We propose as one measure the intermarriage rate between native born citizens

and foreign-born first generation immigrants. This would be one indicator of broad acceptance of immigrant culture by the local population.

3. Social Domain:

Crime: This indicator reflects immigrant respect for the rule of law in the country. It also reflects respect for national values. Statistics for crime should be readily available. In a well-integrated society, crime rates for immigrants should be similar to crime rates those rates for the population as a whole.

Median Income: This measure gauges the level of equality in economic opportunity across communities.

Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion: This indicator reveals discrimination by the population against immigrants by measuring levels of acceptance by the total population economically and culturally.

4. Economic Domain:

Unemployment: This indicator reflects immigrant participation in the economy, native acceptance of immigrants in the marketplace, equality in job training received, and availability of employment opportunities. Employment is fundamental to participation in society.

Over-Qualification rate: This indicator measures equality and respect from the total population. A high over-qualification rate suggests a low degree of respect by the total population and an unwillingness to hire or trust immigrants. Alternatively it can sometimes reveal that highly educated immigrants have low communication skills. Means of redress are considerably different in both cases.

Public Assistance: It is vital to record the percentage of immigrants accepting welfare, especially since this is usually a flashpoint political issue.

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V. CONCLUSION

Current immigration policy assumes incorrectly that all immigrants want to integrate into Europe and adopt European values. To maintain aspects of identity many Europeans consider critical and even fundamental, and to prevent the rise of right-wing extremism, immigration and integration policy must be adjusted to inform immigrants that to settle in Europe they need to integrate and to clearly define that standard. Countries should consider developing consequences for immigrants who fail to integrate within an established timeframe.

Some immigrants are entering Europe with values diametrically opposed to European values. European values are very permissive of those from other cultures, but new immigrants must follow the laws of the country to which they are emigrating. Nor is the integration problem necessarily limited to first generation immigrants. To prevent further self-segregation, for instance, a well-constructed, measurable integration process must be put in place to inform immigrants about the law, citizens rights, and the values that are important to the host nation.

Divided societies have the potential to threaten the stability of European democracies. If the values of two groups within a democracy diverge to the point where government policy cannot satisfy both groups, there may be conflict. Integration does not require that immigrants change their identities, but rather its goal is to get people to adopt the values of their new nation.

Integration must be a priority task for every government in Europe. People react emotionally to issues associated with immigrants. Fear of the unknown remains a powerful obstacle to successfully integrating new immigrants. Governments do not want immigration to be a source of political disorder. They also want to mitigate the turbulence immigration causes. Yet this is impossible to do without addressing immigrants as a potential source of political dissent. The only viable course of action to prevent further politicization of immigration as an issue is to focus more resources and attention on integrations effects.

Failure to assess and correct shortfalls in immigrant integration policy performance may produce several negative results. First, there is the likelihood society will become divided along racial and/or socio-economic lines. Immigrants will likely band together for economic, social, and security reasons, further insulating themselves from the country and natives with whom they need to integrate. Natives will similarly band. Corollary to this, one must assume that a divided society in which people have opposing values will generate more conflict between immigrants and natives.

The size of the immigrant group is also a key factor. All other things being equal, larger immigrant groups are harder to integrate than smaller groups. They are more prone to isolate themselves because their group is large enough not to have to interact with natives. This process becomes self-reinforcing because it reduces the inclination of follow on waves of immigrants to have to integrate. Immigrants who do not learn the national language will create further communication barriers between themselves and native society. Worse, once different standards are allowed, they will displace native standards and cause immigrants to further insulate themselves from the host country population.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

The rate of integration should exceed the rate of immigration. Any policy which permits a flow of immigrants without properly integrating them is likely to lead to segregated immigrants and negative impacts on native citizens. In the long-run, taking a measured integration approach is the only sustainable immigration strategy for enduring political order.

Integration policy and procedures should be developed country by country. Every country has unique cultural and economic circumstances. Each country is best suited to determine the most efficient, most effective methods by which to integrate new immigrants.

Integration performance should be measured consistently according to a common set of integration indicators established by the EU. If the mainstream perception is that immigration is a problem, then even if it is not, *that's* a problem. Carefully measured

statistics over time of certain integration indicators will provide a valuable measurement tool for evaluating integration performance and re-adjusting policies. Integration should be measured as equal participation by the immigrants in the political, economic, social, and cultural domains in the host country. The Zaragoza study from 2011 offers an excellent first step in the right direction. It now needs to be extended.

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