

SOLLIMS SAMPLER

Targeting Peace & Stability Operations Lessons & Best Practices

Volume 3

Issue 2



Civ-Mil Cooperation



U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

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FOREWORD

Welcome to the April 2012 edition of the Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System (SOLLIMS) Lessons Learned “Sampler”. The general structure of the “Sampler” includes (1) an **Introduction** that provides an operational or doctrinal perspective for the content, (2) the Sampler “**Quick Look**” that provides a short description of the topics included within the Sampler and a link to the full text, (3) the primary, topic/issue-focused Stability Operations (SO)-related **Lessons Learned report***, and (4) links to **additional reports or other references** that are either related to the “focus” topic or that address current, real-world, SO-related challenges.

This lessons-learned compendium contains just a sample – thus the title of “sampler” – of the observations, insights, and lessons related to **Civ-Mil Cooperation** available in the SOLLIMS data repository. These observations are worth sharing with military commanders and their staffs, as well as civilian practitioners with a Stability Operations-related mission / function – those currently deployed into conflict environments, those planning to deploy, the institutional Army, policy makers and other international civilian and military leaders at the national and theater level.

Lessons Format. Each lesson is provided in the form of an Observation and Recommendation (O&R). The “O & R” follows a standard format:

- Title (Topic)
- Observation
- Discussion
- Recommendation
- Implications
- Event Description

Occasionally you may see a “Comments” section. This is used by the author of the “O&R” or a Lesson Manager to provide additional personal perspective or to identify related references on the Observation. The “Event Description” section provides context for the Observation in that it identifies the source or event from which the content was developed.

You will also note that a number is displayed in parentheses next to the title of each lesson / observation. This number is hyper-linked to the actual O&R within the SOLLIMS database; click on the highlighted O&R number to display the O&R entry and access any attachments (references, images, files) that are included within SOLLIMS for this O&R. **Note, you must have an account and be logged into SOLLIMS in order to display the SOLLIMS data entry and access / download attachments.**

If you have not registered on SOLLIMS, the links in the reports will take you to the login or the registration page. Take a few short minutes to register for an account in order to take advantage of the many features of SOLLIMS and to access the stability operations related products referenced in the report. We encourage you to take the time now to provide us with your perspective as related to a single observation / lesson in this report, or to the overall value of this “Sampler” as a reference or guide for you and your unit/organization and staff. **By using the “Perspectives” text entry box that is found at the end of each O&R – seen when you open the O&R in your browser – you can enter your own personal comments and observations on this O&R.** We welcome your input. We encourage you to become a regular contributor to the SOLLIMS Community of Interest !!!

>>>>|<<<<

At PKSOI we continually strive to improve the services and products we provide the global stability operations community. We invite you to use our web site at [<http://pksoi.army.mil>] and the many functions of the SOLLIMS online environment [<https://sollims.pksoi.org>] to help us identify issues and resolve problems – we welcome your comments and insights.

****All reports in the “Sampler” are generated by the SOLLIMS Lessons Report Builder tool.***



U.S. Army Major Loren Adams of New Liberty, Iowa, Iowa National Guard's 734th Agribusiness Development Team veterinary officer, encourages Dr. Roshan, a licensed veterinarian who is part of a team directed by the Kunar provincial veterinarian. (U.S. Air Force photo by Captain Peter Shinn, 8 January 2011)

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the April 2012 edition of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Lessons Learned “Sampler”. The focus for this edition is on **Civ-Mil Cooperation**.

Civil-military cooperation needs to be understood in three ways: cooperation between civilian and military actors of official government and inter-governmental institutions, between the military and NGOs (among international actors), and between the military and host nation government and its population. The size and strength of the military, with its own command and control structure, creates a unique impact that requires specific forms of cooperation.

([Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction](#), United States Institute of Peace [USIP] and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute [PKSOI], 2009)

Civ-mil cooperation is a strategic imperative. In order for stability operations to be successful, there must be effective civ-mil cooperation. Attaining effective civ-mil cooperation, however, has proven to be a formidable challenge for the many actors involved – for a vast number of reasons. For starters, according to the Army’s self-assessment on stability operations:

Despite increased collaboration between DOD and other USG agencies, interagency integration remains challenging for two reasons. First, other USG agencies lack authority, funding and capacity to identify, train and deploy large numbers of its permanent workforce. Second, there is no directive assigning responsibilities and authorities for whole-of-government conduct of Stability Operations training. As a result, the Army is challenged to fully integrate non-DOD civilian expertise into planning and execution of Stability Operations. uilding partnership capacity.

([Army Stability Operations Self Assessment: Report on Implementation of DoDI 3000.05](#), Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 2011)

What other shortfalls and roadblocks exist with regard to civ-mil cooperation? What mechanisms have proven effective at overcoming shortfalls and building degrees of civ-mil cooperation? What lessons have we learned with respect to civ-mil cooperation on recent stability operations?

This Sampler seeks to explore these and other questions. Key thoughts and lessons are captured in the [Conclusion](#) paragraph.

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Sampler “Quick Look” – Civ-Mil Cooperation

Click on [\[Read More ...\]](#) to go to Sampler topic.

- Published guidelines covering the relations between the U.S. armed forces and non-governmental humanitarian organizations are impractical as written in certain regards... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Despite recognition by USG civilian agencies, the military, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of each other's importance in achieving peace and stability in conflict zones, significant obstacles to cooperation remain. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The military's desire to achieve short-term objectives in order to reach a final goal of withdrawal has the potential to impede sustainable development as defined by USAID. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- The experience of one Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) over an 18-month period (Sep 2008 through Mar 2010) highlights a number of shortfalls, challenges, and miscues... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Through a deliberate “unity of effort” approach, a certain Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a certain Brigade Task Force in Iraq were able to attain tremendous success.... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- Application of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) is an essential component of Stability Operations – in Afghanistan and elsewhere. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- During the 2010 earthquake relief operation in Haiti, a myriad of organizations carried out disaster relief roles, but no collective command and control structure was in place to manage the whole effort. [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- During the response to the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, various new information & communication technologies, new information providers, and a new community of interest emerged... [\[Read More ...\]](#)
- In post-conflict environments, getting children back into schools can be an important component of humanitarian assistance – to help restore a degree of normalcy to conflict-affected communities. When civil-military operations (CMO) are conducted for this purpose... [\[Read More ...\]](#)

3 Apr 2012

Subject: SOLLIMS REPORT – CIV-MIL COOPERATION

1. GENERAL

Because a wide array of players – U.S. Government (USG) civilian and military actors, coalition civilian and military actors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other international actors, and host nation (HN) government civilian and military actors – all have various roles, responsibilities, and interests in the conduct of stability operations, civ-mil cooperation is, by nature, difficult to achieve.

In spite of this difficulty/challenge, civ-mil cooperation is recognized as crucial for achieving success on stability operations (i.e., stability and security, restoration and sustainment of services, economic stabilization, transition to HN control, etc.). Reports from civilian and military practitioners involved on recent stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provide a great number of valuable insights on civ-mil cooperation. Reports from Haiti disaster relief participants likewise provide insightful lessons. Just a small sample are presented here.

2. OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

a. TOPIC. Ambiguity in Guidelines for Relations between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations ([735](#))

Observation.

Published guidelines covering the relations between the U.S. armed forces and non-governmental humanitarian organizations (NGHOs) are impractical as written in certain regards and are cause for complaint by some NGHO personnel. These guidelines addressing interactions between the military and NGHOs in hostile/potentially hostile environments are not uniformly understood throughout the NGHO community.

Discussion.

The 2007 "[Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments](#)" – a 2007 document put together by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the Department of Defense (DoD), and InterAction (an alliance of

U.S.-based international development and humanitarian non-governmental organizations) – has proven to be impractical as written. For instance, these guidelines state that the U.S. armed forces should coordinate all visits to NGHO sites. This is not practical in many military operations – when considering military necessity and operational security. Second, the guidelines state that the U.S. armed forces should respect NGHO views on the bearing of arms within NGHO sites. To disarm is not practical – in consideration of basic military security measures. Third, the guidelines state that U.S. armed forces should avoid interfering with NGHO relief efforts – a statement that can create the perception that the military must provide "humanitarian space" for NGHO activities. Finally, although the guidelines do provide various recommendations for NGHOs' actions, there is no mention that NGHOs should be understanding of military necessity or military security measures.

Because of these guidelines, as they are currently written, there is a perception among some NGHOs that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is violating their "humanitarian space" and denying them access to needy Afghans. For instance, a representative from the Agency Coordinating Board for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) asserted that NGHOs have lacked access to many parts of Afghanistan due to ISAF's operations. When asked, however, if ISAF had actually delayed or blocked movements of NGHO staffs, the ACBAR representative stated that ISAF had not done so, but that ISAF had caused armed opposition groups (AOGs) to perceive that NGHOs were supporting ISAF, thereby causing AOGs to either deny NGHO access to areas or make NGHO staffs feel insecure. The ACBAR representative, however, stated that ACBAR is considering simplifying its own civil-military guidelines.

Overall, the 2007 "Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments" have proven to be impractical in hostile/potentially hostile environments, as seen in operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. During door-to-door security sweeps as were conducted during the surge in Baghdad and during the clearing of Marjah, it was not practical or possible for the U.S. military to attempt to notify all NGHOs in advance –without compromising security. In the course of such sweeps, the military would have entered not only NGHO offices, but also private homes, businesses, etc., out of military necessity as part of the operation.

Recommendation.

1. USIP, InterAction, and DoD should update the 2007 "Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments." Updated guidelines should include mention of "military necessity" and "military security measures."

2. InterAction should encourage understanding by NGHOs of "military necessity" and "military security measures."

Implication.

If the USIP/InterAction/OSD Guidelines were to gain greater currency in their current form, they may cause greater misperception/confusion among NGHOs – since these guidelines do not specifically recommend that NGHOs shall recognize military necessity and military security measures, and they create unrealistic expectations that the military shall coordinate with NGHOs in advance of military operations

Event Description.

This observation is based on the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) bimonthly Civil-Military Working Group on Civil-Military Relations in Non-Permissive Environments seminar, held 7 January 2011 in Washington, D.C.

Comments.

Documents related to this observation are:

- [“Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments,”](#) USIP, InterAction, and DoD, 23 July 2007.
- The ACBAR civil-military guidelines, found at: <http://www.afgana.org/showart.php?id=323&rubrica=223>



b. TOPIC. Ensuring Civ-mil Integration & NGO Input in USG Peace & Stability Operations ([423](#))

Observation.

Despite recognition by USG civilian agencies, the military, and NGOs of each others' importance in achieving peace and stability in conflict zones, significant obstacles to cooperation remain. Understandable differences in mission and culture lie behind these obstacles. Nonetheless, given the emerging consensus that none of these actors operates in a vacuum (when in a Peace and Stability Operations context), practitioners at all levels should strive to cooperate across communities, whenever doing so does not compromise their core principles. Developers of training and doctrine especially can set a strong example, by

ensuring civil-military integration and understanding of NGO roles in their products and processes.

Discussion.

The civilian, military, and NGO communities may in theory agree on cooperation, but in practice, differences between their respective cultures and missions can intervene, especially in the field. Within the USG, civilian agencies coordinating with the the military face the handicaps of fewer resources, lower float capacity, and lack of a planning culture. In the field, an NGO's interaction with the USG – especially the military – has the potential to compromise the NGO's neutrality and safety. Thus in Peace and Stability Operations (P/SO), a coordinated effort among external actors is often hampered by complex relationships and the fear of putting a "uniformed" face on civilian and NGO activity.

Developers of training and doctrine should recognize these as challenges to overcome. Leveraging interagency contributions and accepting NGO concerns are critical to the USG's success in P/SO, in which the U.S. military continues to bear most of the burden for planning and implementation. "Nothing in the Army's roles and missions for SO is as challenging as the need to integrate civilian and interagency expertise into planning and operations, and that integration is critical to the Army's capacity to fulfill almost all of its other missions." (CPT A. Heather Coyne, "Army Stability Operations Roles and Missions," [PKSOI Bulletin, Volume I, Issue 3](#)). Likewise, "the existing and emerging U.S. government and military policy and doctrine reflect an appreciation of both the tangible as well as the intangible benefits of NGO community contribution to the stabilization efforts. Security permitting, they are an essential part of the reconstruction and stabilization process, especially at the local level." (Roy Williams, "Stability Operations and NGOs: What's in a Name?," [PKSOI Bulletin, Volume I, Issue 2](#)).

Cooperating across communities early – well before civilians, the military, and NGOs deploy to a given crisis – is one approach to addressing civil-military and USG-NGO differences. Two examples are instructive in this regard. First, exercising the Interagency Management System (IMS) (a framework for whole-of-government planning and implementation of P/SO) teaches military and civilian officials to work jointly. "The IMS systems are gradually earning acceptance as a way to manage interagency collaboration for SO, and – in their modular form – may become a more common phenomenon in 21st century conflict. In the meantime, testing and validation of the whole IMS system, including aspects that have not yet been implemented in a real-world contingency, would increase familiarity with and confidence in the system." (Coyne)

Second, a recent United States Institute of Peace (USIP) initiative contributed to improved USG-NGO relations in the field. USIP, InterAction (the largest consortium of U.S.-based NGOs), and DoD developed guidelines for relations

between NGOs and the military: “[Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments](#).” These guidelines attempt to meet both sides' requirements, by suggesting how to mutually improve situational awareness and how to safeguard NGO neutrality. Copies of the document can now be found at many Combatand Commands and NGO field offices.

Recommendation.

1. Developers of military exercises should recognize and seize opportunities to include interagency partners. When a whole-of-government planning scenario is appropriate, the IMS should be incorporated and all relevant agencies should be represented.
2. By extension, the owners of the exercise should provide sufficient context to supervisors of individuals receiving these invitations. In civilian agencies, low float capacity can make individuals reluctant to take time off for an exercise/ training.
3. On the military side, relevant commanders should set the tone that interagency participants are necessary partners; on the civilian side, relevant team leads should set the tone that the military, whether as a supported or a supporting partner, is also necessary.
4. Developers of doctrine, whether military or USG in general, should recognize and seize opportunities to incorporate input from interagency partners and from the NGO community. Precedents include [FM 3-07](#), the U.S. Army's Field Manual for Stability Operations, as well as the [Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction](#), co-authored by USIP and PKSOI.
5. Practitioners on the ground should be aware of existing doctrine, and use relevant guidance to improve cross-community interactions. Conversely, if said guidance is unrealistic, they should make this known in after action reporting.

Implication.

Civil-military integration and USG-NGO relations in the field will not improve on their own. Without sufficiently exercising tools like the IMS, the military and civilian agencies will never learn to fully leverage interagency assets. Only through significant, visible socializing of such tools will the large USG institutions involved in P/SO be able to utilize them in actual operations. Similarly, frequent collaboration between the USG and NGOs in Washington will build confidence and knowledge of each other's roles and limitations, which can greatly improve relations in the field. Trainers in these various organizations who take the time to recognize such partnerships are therefore key to ensuring that preliminary progress gained by the IMS and USIP projects continues to grow.

Event Description.

This observation is extracted from the following articles:

- “Army Stability Operations Roles and Missions, by CPT A. Heather Coyne,” [PKSOI Bulletin, Volume I, Issue 3](#), April 2009.
- “Stability Operations and NGOs: What's in a Name?,” by Mr. Roy Williams, [PKSOI Bulletin, Volume I, Issue 2](#), February 2009.



c. TOPIC. Coordination Between Civ and Mil Participants in Development Activities ([457](#))

Observation.

The military's desire to achieve short-term objectives in order to reach a final goal of withdrawal has the potential to impede sustainable development as defined by USAID. This can lead either to the military's efforts cancelling those of USAID or other civilian actors working in the same environment, or to strife, lack of cooperation, disengagement, or at least generate bad feelings among those working in the area.

Discussion.

An example cited to illustrate the observation noted relates that the military leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) located in Panjshir had planned a program to bring American veterinarians to immunize and treat Panjshiri animals. However, USAID had simultaneously initiated a program to establish a private sector in veterinary services by training and equipping Afghan veterinary field units. The USAID project's objective was both to create jobs where unemployment hovers around 40 percent and to create an indigenous and sustainable service provider for veterinary needs.

Although providing veterinary services for the rural Panjshiri population was necessary, the military's program, as designed, undermined the USAID economic growth initiative. USAID believed that the military's providing of free veterinary services cannibalized the USAID program. The military's position was that the goal of their project was not development, but to win friends and push into areas they had not yet reached. USAID's view was that unlike many places in Afghanistan, Panjshir is neither a hostile environment for Americans nor is it characterized by lethal activity. This tactical military objective aimed at "hearts

and minds” was inappropriate as it undermined the longer-term development objective of establishing a sustainable veterinary system.

Recommendation.

1. Participants in a PRT need to actively coordinate and deconflict development activities. This deconfliction should address not only projects that overtly overlap or conflict, but also should address developmental goals. For example, the military might be conducting developmental activities to gain influence with key leaders and/or win the "hearts and minds" of the local population. This might engender projects with easily articulable benefits that can be easily measured. A civilian agency frequently takes a longer view and looks at projects that may not have a short-term or easily measured benefit. These goals may not be in conflict with those of the military, although as the example cited suggests, there is a potential that the effort to obtain short-term results can undermine another agency's program. At a minimum, lack of coordination can prevent achieving the highest benefit for a given expenditure, in that it might result in unrelated outcomes that do not bolster or catalyze other agencies' development activities.

2. Military participants in a PRT should receive training in development theory to at least an intermediate skill level. Otherwise, they will not be able to engage USAID counterparts on their own terms – unable to direct military development resources, such as CERP, to maximum advantage, and possibly also unable to help to align USAID activities to mutual goals.

Implication.

Continued lack of effective coordination, rather than rudimentary deconfliction, will prevent development activities from achieving their maximum benefit. It will also generate friction and possibly a lack of professional respect that can undermine cooperation.

Event Description.

This observation is extracted from “[Equipping USAID for Success: A Field Perspective](#),” by Amy B. Frumin, Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 2009.



d. TOPIC. Lessons from an Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Southern Baghdad ([677](#))

Observation.

The experience of one Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) over an 18-month period (Sep 2008 through Mar 2010) highlights a number of shortfalls, challenges, and miscues in reconstruction planning and execution in Southern Baghdad Province, and perhaps more broadly. This ePRT lacked clear operational guidance, which resulted in a haphazard approach to reconstruction projects, which in turn resulted in greater instability within the province. This ePRT also lacked having unity of effort with the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in which it was embedded, resulting in friction between the two organizations and mixed signals to local leaders. Along these same lines, the BCT's establishment of short-term timelines for project completion, as well as its use of funds to gain short-term effects, often competed with long-term goal-setting by the ePRT (which was focused more so on host nation capacity building).

Discussion.

The ePRT operating in Southern Baghdad Province, Sep 2008 - Mar 2010, reported a number of problems/issues with regard to reconstruction planning and execution, owing primarily to shortfalls/differences with both the State Department and the BCT operating in this region.

This ePRT – the "Baghdad South" ePRT – like 13 others in Iraq, had the following roles: to support counterinsurgency operations by bolstering moderates, to promote reconciliation and dialogue across Iraqi society, to foster economic and agricultural development, and to build governmental capacity (primarily the ability to deliver essential services to the population). The "Baghdad South" ePRT also focused on seven thematic areas: governance, economics, infrastructure, rule of law, public diplomacy, agricultural development, and women's social equality. In covering these areas, the ePRT emphasized engagement with local councils and governmental officials (whom the ePRT was charged to train and mentor), ethnic leaders, business leaders, and informal powerbrokers. The "Baghdad South" ePRT consisted of 20+ personnel – mostly State Department employees, plus representatives from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Public Health Service-Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and also several bilingual, bicultural advisors (BBAs), contracted local national interpreters, and subject matter experts.

The 13 ePRTs were in addition to the 31 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), whose missions were: to assist Iraq's provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economic

development, and to provide the necessary provincial administration for meeting the needs of the population. PRT Baghdad, one level above the "Baghdad South" ePRT, consisted of approximately 100 personnel who worked within the International Zone.

The "Baghdad South" ePRT's area of operation was expansive and possessed significant challenges. This area encompassed a predominantly rural region referred to as the "Sunni Triangle of Death." Large portions of the area had been devastated by sectarian violence, starting with the bombing of the Al Askari mosque in Al Samarya in January 2006, and continuing through the Baghdad Surge of 2007-2008. Within the area, Yusifiyah and Latifiyah were relatively homogenous Sunni enclaves, occupied by staunch Ba'athist and previously overt supporters of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath resurgence movement. The Mahmudiya region, on the other hand, had populations that were split between supporters of Moqtada al Sadr (and his Mahdi Army) and the Badr Organization (formerly called the Badr Corps). Another portion of the area, the Al Rashid District, had been a hotbed of Sunni and Shiite tensions and had seen extensive damage from insurgent activity / sectarian violence, with entire villages being leveled. The Doura and Rashid neighborhoods of Baghdad city were also part of this area of operation, presenting various urban reconstruction challenges. Overall, the "Baghdad South" ePRT had responsibility for an expansive area, rural and urban, earlier decimated by sectarian violence, and almost totally lacking in local governmental capacity to provide even the most basic essential services.

That said, the less than optimal performance of the "Baghdad South" ePRT (during the Sep 2008 - Mar 2010 timeframe) was due primarily to shortfalls and divergent paths presented by the State Department and the BCTs (three BCTs cycled through this province in the 18 months covered by this ePRT assessment). Although comments in this ePRT assessment are critical of the State Department, the BCTs, and even its own ePRT leadership, this ePRT assessment also gives credit to the service, sacrifices, and bravery of the deployed personnel of these same organizations.

The first problem confronted by the "Baghdad South" ePRT was lack of operational direction (i.e., lack of State Department leadership and planning). No definitive guidance was provided to ePRT team members by way of the Embassy, the higher echelon Baghdad PRT, or the "Baghdad South" ePRT's leadership. The ePRT went through three leadership changes - State Department Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) – over the 18-month timeframe discussed, and none of the three ePRT leaders/FSOs possessed the requisite skill set to plan, execute, and lead stability and reconstruction operations. Above the ePRT were the Baghdad PRT and also the Embassy's Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA). The OPA ran the whole PRT program, and it was responsible for planning and coordinating with Multi-National Corps-Iraq to develop a Unified Common Plan. However, this Plan and the guidance disseminated by OPA

lacked any degree of specificity needed by the "Baghdad South" ePRT to guide operations, or to ensure operations were in line with overarching strategic and operational goals. Moreover, rarely did anyone from the OPA staff spend time with the "Baghdad South" ePRT to gain an understanding of conditions on the ground, and the needs of local leaders and citizens. The primary interest of the OPA seemed to be requesting information for reports and disseminating reports back to the State Department, as opposed to providing any sort of plans, operational concepts, goals, or desired end-states to support the PRTs and ePRTs. The "Baghdad South" ePRT took it upon itself to plan various projects it believed could increase local governmental capacity to deliver essential services (water for drinking and irrigation, agricultural support, electricity services, sanitary methods of sewage disposal, access to health care, access to education, and trash removal).

Without being able to dovetail operations into a larger, more comprehensive operational plan, the resulting effect was to support a number of "look good" projects touted by the BCT – projects that would show some tangible example of American good works (typically showcased with a VIP event and media coverage). Unfortunately, these projects did more to destabilize this fragile region than to stabilize it. The ePRT found itself supporting a number of projects designed to improve local agriculture, however, the net effect was to increase the wealth and prestige of a few select sheikhs – to the detriment of others. The sheikhs and areas not receiving American assistance invariably felt slighted and often became publicly critical of, if not overtly hostile toward, what they perceived to be American favoritism and undue intervention. This pattern of aiding select sheikhs, while not building governmental capacity nor equity in service delivery, was continuous from September 2008 to February 2010. One such project, completed in February 2008, was the grand opening of a local chicken processing plant – a project which exceeded the original budget by \$2 million, went a year over schedule, lacked full operational capability, and which grossly benefited a certain sheikh – yet was grandly showcased with an opening ceremony and extensive media coverage.

The second problem faced by the "Baghdad South" ePRT was lack of "unity of effort" between itself and the BCT in which it was embedded. In the eyes of ePRT members, the BCT had its own separate agenda and it failed to keep the ePRT informed. The BCT allegedly viewed the ePRT as a "brigade enabler" – expecting the ePRT's efforts to always follow, and contribute to, the brigade's concept of operation. However, communication of the BCT's concept and intent to the "enablers" was not always accomplished. Brigade leadership oftentimes developed plans, set agendas for meetings with local officials, held the meetings, and never informed the eBCT. The eBCT would unwittingly meet with local officials days later about the same, or different, topics/projects, and local officials were left confused as to whom to work with or what to believe. This frustrated the eBCT, whose role was to engage, train, and mentor those officials.

The third problem experienced by the "Baghdad South" ePRT was disagreement between itself and the BCT on the regional situation – as to where it stood on the "operational continuum" and how best to influence it. The BCT allegedly justified many of its reconstruction-related "nonlethal" actions as security measures – to further counterinsurgency objectives. Most of the ePRT members, however, viewed the situation in the communities as having, for the most part, matured past the counterinsurgency point and fitting more so into a timeframe for building governmental capacity and sustainability. Instead of attempting to build capacity, however, the BCT engaged in a myriad of simultaneous projects focused on improving short-term quality of life, but not the means to sustain it. This was done primarily by providing funds to buy goods/services for this or that local leader, without setting up an administrative system to manage the sustained delivery of services. Local Iraqi leaders then tended to forego developing budgets for Iraqi funding, and instead sought American funding for everything first. Iraqi leaders consistently approached BCT leaders asking for hand-outs, and the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) checkbook was frequently used. In one case, the commander purchased \$300,000 worth of tractors to allegedly benefit agricultural associations. However, the tractors were delivered in Spring 2009 to a select number of sheikhs in a small area, who had allied themselves with Sheikh Ammash Khadim Sari al Robaei. Word of mouth of the "big tractor giveaway" spread quickly, and soon sheikhs from other several areas and allegiances were clamoring to get their own supply of tractors, or to complain that America owed them something else. The qada-wide agricultural cooperative actually refused to work with the Americans until they were supplied with equivalent support. Negative repercussions from this tractor giveaway were felt for a full year afterward.

The fourth and last problem reported by the "Baghdad South" ePRT was a disconnect (between itself and the military, once again) on setting timelines for reconstruction projects. The ePRT tended to look at longer term, often multiyear projects. The BCT, on the other hand, tended to look at getting anything/ everything done within a few months, benchmarked to its end-of-tour. The BCT usually focused on "brick and mortar" projects that could be done quickly, and that could show some visible progress – such as making additions or improvements to schools, clinics, and roadways. These short-term projects generally would indeed help the Iraqi people (for an immediate need or benefit), and they would bring media attention to the accomplished project, but they would in no way build capacity for the government to sustain the education, medical, or transportation services.

Recommendation.

1. Military leaders should be provided more training on interagency reconstruction and capacity-building operations. According to this ePRT assessment, most of the military leaders of the three BCTs that cycled through

this 18-month period with the "Baghdad South" ePRT lacked a fundamental understanding of the ePRT's roles and how to leverage "interagency" capabilities to support stability and reconstruction operations (nor did they work with the ePRT as a partner). Interagency players and processes should be incorporated into major pre-deployment training events for stability operations.

2. The lead federal agency (State Department) should provide clear operational guidance for PRTs and ePRTs, ensuring that the efforts of PRTs and ePRTs correspond with strategic and operational goals. A Unified Common Plan with no specific reconstruction goals or tasks for provinces/teams, and minimal visits to the provinces/teams to assess reconstruction needs/projects/impacts, may result in PRTs and ePRTs misinterpreting what needs to be done. Guiding and right-sizing the efforts and footprints of PRTs and ePRTs over time should be included in the overarching plan, and in subsequent communication.

3. The BCT/military turnover rate should be reduced (or otherwise addressed) for the purpose of continuity with local leaders and PRT/ePRTs. If tour lengths cannot be lengthened, the early introduction of the incoming team's leadership with the PRT's leadership and with key local leaders, as well as a good hand-off of reconstruction plans/progress may otherwise improve continuity.

4. The use of money, such as CERP funds, should be carefully reviewed on a case-by-case basis – to assess whether its use will contribute to governmental capacity-building, or whether other less desired effects will more likely occur (e.g., promoting the status/influence of a given sheikh, fostering resentment among other sheikhs/groups, encouraging appeals for more American money, negating the need for Iraqi local officials to develop budgets for Iraqi funding, etc.).

Implication.

- If the State Department does not consistently provide clear operational guidance to PRTs and ePRTs, then those teams could inadvertently promote and conduct reconstruction projects that are not consistent with strategic and operational goals. Additionally, inconsistency of projects may lead to ethnic frictions, mistrust, and instability.

- If military leaders are not provided comprehensive training on interagency capabilities, interagency processes, and capacity-building operations, then they might miss opportunities to leverage interagency capabilities, or they may operate at cross-purposes with State Department and interagency efforts during stability operations.

- If the use of funds (such as CERP funds) for reconstruction projects/services does not undergo thorough review, money may be wasted on people and

projects that do not serve governmental capacity building, sustainment of services, or long-term stability.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Blind Ambition: Lessons Learned and Not Learned in an Embedded PRT](#)" by Blake Stone in PRISM, Volume 1, Number 4, September 2010.



e. TOPIC. PRT & Brigade Task Force Unity of Effort ([749](#))

Observation.

Through a deliberate "unity of effort" approach, a certain Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and a certain Brigade Task Force in Iraq were able to attain tremendous success at fostering economic growth, building civil capacity, and supporting governance efforts within their province. This PRT and Brigade Task Force employed three primary measures in pursuit of "unity of effort": (1) acting as one team, (2) focusing on income-generating "small" projects/enterprises, and (3) demanding local "buy in." Through these measures, the PRT-Brigade "team" was able to continuously strengthen civil capacity and facilitate sustainable economic growth across the province

Discussion.

Operating in Ninewa Province, Iraq, during the 2009-2010 timeframe, "Team Ninewa" was both an unofficial organization and a deliberate approach for "unity of effort" of reconstruction operations. "Team Ninewa" consisted of two primary organizations – the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (Ninewa PRT) (led by the State Department) and Task Force Spartan (TF Spartan) (the 2nd Advise and Assist Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division). Also, the 130th Engineer Brigade's Ninewa Reconstruction Cell (NRC) – responsible for U.S. engineering projects in the province – rounded out the team. These three organizations established "unity of effort" by coming to agreement on a clear vision:

". . . the vision of Team Ninewa was to work in partnership with the Ninewa Provincial Government and local associations to build economic and governance capacity at the provincial and local levels with an end state of a legitimate, transparent, and representative government capable of delivering essential services, fostering sustainable economic growth, respecting and bolstering rule of law, and providing security for its people" (text from article cited in [Event Description](#) paragraph below).

The challenges to achieving this vision were considerable. Ninewa Province was arguably the most diverse and unstable province in Iraq. Arabs and Kurds had been divided along ethnic lines, and external players had exercised significant influence in the politics of the province. In the southern portion of Ninewa, Sunni Arabs had endured four years of severe drought. Agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources were very limited here. In the northern portion, Kurds had greater water resources, numerous oil fields, sufficient supplies of kerosene, and better agricultural conditions and crop yields. Recognizing these challenges and differences, Team Ninewa worked diligently to build host nation governance capable of delivering essential services and security for all. Team Ninewa opened its aperture for economic development recipients, seeking out new local partners across the province, such as agricultural associations, women's groups, and small businessmen/entrepreneurs.

Three main tenets were followed by Team Ninewa's members throughout their reconstruction operations: (1) ***acting as one team***, (2) ***focusing on income-generating "small" projects/enterprises***, and (3) ***demanding local "buy in"***.

Acting as one team. Ninewa PRT, TF Spartan, and the Engineering NRC held a meeting every week to discuss, assess, and de-conflict all U.S. government assistance and program-spending within the province. At these "Team Ninewa" meetings, Ninewa PRT had the lead role of articulating U.S. policy and development goals for Ninewa Province. TF Spartan had the lead role in communicating security-related goals and in assessing security impacts of reconstruction initiatives. Together, Ninewa PRT and TF Spartan worked to resolve any conflicts between goals and to set priorities. Besides the weekly "Team Ninewa" meetings, Ninewa PRT and TF Spartan also participated in each other's re-occurring meetings. Such participation/inclusion ensured transparency and enhanced "unity of effort."

TF Spartan wrote the following directive within its mission statement: "provide support to the PRT." In practice, whatever was needed by Ninewa PRT, TF Spartan would help provide. An entire field artillery battalion was placed in "direct support" of Ninewa PRT by TF Spartan. That field artillery battalion's "direct support" included dedicated movement teams, logistical support, security, communications support, and even staff augmentation for the PRT. TF Spartan itself provided the Ninewa PRT with helicopter lift support, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) surveillance support, intelligence updates, Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, and assistance in CERP project packet development.

Additionally, to ensure that the Iraqi government and citizens knew that the U.S. organizations were speaking as one, TF Spartan's leadership no longer held independent meetings with the Ninewa Governor, Ninewa provincial councilmen, or the Mosul Mayor. Instead, TF Spartan would participate in such engagements only through and with PRT Ninewa.

Focusing on income-generating "small" projects/enterprises. Team Ninewa's strategy for economic development was to place emphasis on income-generating "small" projects (vice large infrastructure targets), as well as to push such projects into rural areas. In the village of Tawajena, for instance, where farmers had been engaging primarily in government-subsidized grain production and had also been involved in insurgent support/smuggling, Team Ninewa introduced an inexpensive drip irrigation system, which allowed farmers to switch to various cash crops such as eggplant, melon, tomatoes, and squash. Farmers now had direct control over the price and the market demand for their produce. Results were exceedingly positive – convincing farmers to continue in this line of work, vice their former activities. Another good example of the "small" rural focus was Team Ninewa's frequent provision of greenhouses to small agricultural associations/cooperatives in rural communities. Given one or two greenhouses, an Iraqi agricultural association would lease the greenhouse(s) to its members, and then later purchase additional greenhouses once enough income was received from the leases. Both the agricultural association and its members quickly learned to manage, and benefit from, market-driven incentives and profits. These greenhouse projects created lasting jobs and expanded managerial capacity.

Another small-enterprise program pursued by Team Ninewa was the Ninewa Women's Initiative Program. In this program, Team Ninewa utilized Department of State Quick Response Funds (QRF) to provide training to women's groups on business planning. These women's groups then developed plans for various small businesses, such as catering, laundry, sewing, and internet businesses. Once the women's groups had also developed market studies and budget plans, CERP funds would be utilized to help them establish those businesses, which ranged in value from \$7,000 to \$10,000.

Large infrastructure targets were not totally eliminated, however, they were carefully scrutinized by the NRC and nested within Team Ninewa's goal setting/prioritization process. Such projects had historically been non-sustainable by and large.

Demanding local "buy in". Team Ninewa demanded local "buy in" for all reconstruction projects. All projects were based upon the ideas and goals of local Iraqis. Due to weak relationships, processes, and communications between local governments and the Ninewa provincial government, however, as well as between the provincial government and Baghdad, local Iraqis often needed U.S. support to gain necessary Iraqi governmental approval and resourcing for projects. Team Ninewa would then help influence the process and the responsiveness of Iraqi governance in such cases – by engaging key leaders/officials at the local and provincial levels and by coordinating higher as necessary to get officials to work the actions.

In all cases, however, if a project did not truly have Iraqi "buy in" – in the form of Iraqi vision, financing, labor, or supplies – then Team Ninewa would not approve any CERP or QRF funding. Team Ninewa insisted that Iraqis provide their "fair share" of resources for all projects. For instance, Team Ninewa would provide materials but not labor, or Team Ninewa would provide training but not financing. In the many instances where Team Ninewa provided greenhouses to agricultural cooperatives, the Iraqi contribution - from the Ninewa Directorate General (DG) of Agriculture – was to provide all training for managing and operating the greenhouses. This "buy in" and fair share methodology helped to ensure that all projects were sustainable.

Overall, the "unity of effort" approach practiced by Team Ninewa led to tens of millions of dollars in savings on projects over the course of the year and to effective use of Defense and State Department funding programs. Moreover, Team Ninewa's "unity of effort" approach translated to exceptional results with regard to economic growth and to capacity building within Ninewa Province.

Recommendation.

1. PRTs and Brigade Task Forces/Brigade Combat Teams should act in consonance. They should build "unity of effort" from the outset through a common vision. They should act as "one team" in the planning and execution of reconstruction projects. Weekly "team" meetings and participation in each other's meetings can facilitate this teamwork/unity.
2. PRTs and Brigade Task Forces/Brigade Combat Teams should focus reconstruction operations on income-generating "small" projects/enterprises, vice large infrastructure projects. More groups/communities can be reached, and "small" projects are generally more sustainable.
3. PRTs and Brigade Task Forces/Brigade Combat Teams should demand local "buy in" on all projects. When local groups/communities become fully involved in the planning and the resourcing of a project, they gain a vested interest in that project's success and sustainment

Implication.

If PRTs and Brigade Task Forces/Brigade Combat Teams do not operate with "unity of effort", and if they do not emphasize income-generating "small" projects and local "buy in" for projects, then the end-result may be wasted resources on non-sustainable projects. Also, economic growth and governance capacity building may suffer.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Team Ninewa Models Successful Civilian-Military Unity of Effort](#)," by Mark Schapiro and Stephen Petzold, Small Wars Journal, 21 October 2010. The article is made available from Small Wars Journal (<http://smallwarsjournal.com>) per the Creative Commons license.

Comments.

- Related O&Rs which highlight the benefit of small-scale vice large-scale reconstruction projects are: [693](#), [745](#), and [748](#).
- Related O&Rs which advocate targeting economic reform efforts at the grassroots level / local businesses / entrepreneurs are [685](#) and [686](#).
- A related article which discusses the development of a vision statement for reconstruction in Ninewa Province is "[Iraqis Organize Civil Project Plans for Ninewa](#)," by Sgt. Chad Nelson, Operation New Dawn, 28 March 2010.



f. TOPIC. Civil-Military Cooperation, Comprehensive Approach, and Force Protection ([734](#))

Observation.

Application of a Comprehensive Approach (CA) is an essential component of Stability Operations (SO) – in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and NATO organizations have come to recognize the criticality of CA for SO success and are pursuing several new concepts to enhance CA efforts

Discussion.

The comprehensive approach (CA) is particularly important in Afghanistan, where a coalition of 48 nations is working alongside approximately 4,000 NGOs to help stabilize Afghanistan and/or deliver humanitarian relief and development aid. A JFCOM/NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Concept, Development & Experimentation (CD&E) Conference has laid the groundwork for further development of doctrine and TTPs to enable NATO, allied civilian agencies, international organizations (IOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to pursue CA in Afghanistan and elsewhere. JFCOM/NATO ACT had previously approved three concepts for development and experimentation: Civil-Military Interaction Contributing to a Comprehensive Approach, Interagency and

Multinational Information Sharing Architecture and Solutions (IMISAS), and Cyberspace Defense of Critical Infrastructure.

Presenters from SHAPE, the EU, and the UK Stabilisation Unit discussed efforts by their organizations to adopt the Comprehensive Approach. These included the creation of CA organizations (e.g., the Stabilisation Unit) and dual command with civilians and military leadership at the top of an organization (e.g., TF Uruzgan).

A presenter from the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) discussed his recent survey of over 1,500 Afghans, summarized in a report titled "[Afghanistan Transition: Missing Variables](#)." The results reveal that there is a continued "relationship gap" between the Afghan people and the international community and NATO-ISAF. The report cites the lack of a political integration plan for dispelling misguided and negative perceptions surrounding the international presence in Afghanistan

A second ICOS report discussed was "[Operation Moshtarak: Lessons Learned](#)." The report analyzed NATO's Operation Moshtarak, launched in February 2010 in Helmand Province, and concluded that military operations were much improved in terms of scope and conduct; however, they were undermined by a lack of planning and sufficient measures in the political and humanitarian campaigns. Particular failures were the lack of timely and effective delivery of emergency aid and refugee assistance, as well as weak NATO engagement with Afghan local communities.

Additionally, the concept of NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) was discussed and generally assessed as insufficient to enable CA. According to many speakers, the purpose and focus of CIMIC has been to gain force protection by enhancing relations with the local population, rather than to support stability operations. Definite short-term force protection benefits have been afforded by CIMIC, yet longer term stability impacts have not been realized. Additionally, CIMIC has often been criticized for the "militarization" and "politicization" of humanitarian and development aid, interfering with the humanitarian space needed/desired by NGOs. Civil-Military Interface (CMI) was offered as a new term to describe how ISAF and NATO could interact with government agencies, NGOs and international organizations (IOs) to support CA, stability operations, and humanitarian assistance.

Recommendation.

1. The U.S. Government and international partners should support follow-on experiments in CA and IMISAS.
2. Professional Military Education and training should stress that CIMIC quick impact projects may provide some short term force protection benefits.

3. Occupying military forces should recognize their obligations to protect civilian populations in geography that they control, and they should develop plans accordingly.

Implication.

- If the Comprehensive Approach is not employed, then stability operations will be more apt to failure. For NATO, this implies gaining political will, support, and resources for the Comprehensive Approach.

- If CIMIC and force protection efforts are overly concentrated on units, facilities and projects, then civilian populations displaced by military operations may be neglected.

Event Description.

This observation is based upon the JFCOM/NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Concept, Development & Experimentation (CD&E) Conference, 6-9 December 2010. Over 450 senior military and civilian staff from 30 countries participated in this event.

Comments.

- A related event was the 19-20 November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, at which allied nations made commitments to adopt a comprehensive approach to support SO in Afghanistan and to deal with non-traditional threats such as improvised explosive devices, theater ballistic missiles, cyber attack, and cyber terrorism. Various texts, audio, video, and photos of this summit are available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/events_66529.htm

A related document is the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) report "[Afghanistan Transition: Missing Variables](#)," November 2010. This report cites some progress in ISAF military operations, but calls for focusing international efforts in three key areas: (1) slowing Taliban recruitment, (2) improving refugee and aid response and capacity, and (3) addressing grassroots political dynamics.



g. TOPIC. “Whole of International Community” for Foreign Disaster Relief (700)

Observation.

During the 2010 earthquake relief operation in Haiti, a myriad of organizations carried out disaster relief roles, but no collective command and control structure was in place to manage the whole effort. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) served as the lead agent for the United States, however, it relied heavily on the supporting effort provided by the U.S. military to manage the effort. The U.S. military's Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti) was the driving force for planning and delivering relief in the initial/emergency phase of the operation. Additionally, JTF-Haiti took a lead role in organizing and synchronizing a large part of subsequent (post-emergency) relief efforts through a number of innovations in partnering, coordinating, communicating, and building unity of effort among the participating organizations. In a disaster relief operation of this magnitude, such work to gain a "whole of international community" approach is invaluable in gaining efficiencies, saving lives, and mitigating suffering

Discussion.

The devastation in Haiti resulting from the 7.0 magnitude earthquake of 12 January 2010 prompted the longest and largest U.S. military effort in a foreign disaster relief operation. At the peak of Operation Unified Response, in February 2010, JTF-Haiti was comprised of over 22,000 service members, 58 aircraft, and 23 ships. Within just two days of the disaster, on 14 January, the headquarters for JTF-Haiti was established by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) – to conduct humanitarian assistance and foreign disaster relief operations in support of the lead federal agency, USAID.

JTF-Haiti assumed responsibility for all U.S. forces and began directing activities to assist in providing timely relief. The Department of Defense ordered elements of the Global Response Force (the XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post, 2nd Brigade/82nd Airborne Division, 58 rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft) and the USS Carl Vinson, USS Bataan, USS Nassau, and USS Carter Hall to the JTF-Haiti mission. These forces, along with personnel from the SOUTHCOM staff, the Joint Force Special Operations Component, and the 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command, provided the crux of JTF-Haiti assets.

In the initial emergency phase, the 2nd Brigade/82nd Airborne, under the direction of the JTF-Haiti headquarters (the core of which was the XVIII Airborne Corps assault command post) conducted and supported continual humanitarian aid distribution missions (interagency missions) in the heaviest impacted areas of Port-au-Prince. 16 distribution sites were established to provide food, water, and medical care – for well over 1 million people. On 20 January, the hospital ship

USNS Comfort, equipped with surgical operating teams and orthopedic surgeons, arrived and began conducting round-the-clock medical support.

Because of the rapid deployment of the DoD Global Response Force, JTF-Haiti helped avert a major food and water crisis. Although more than 230,000 people died from the earthquake, the abundant and superior medical assistance provided by the U.S. military and the international community saved thousands of lives.

From the outset, JTF-Haiti planners and leaders worked alongside counterparts from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), USAID, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Together they developed plans for protecting internally displaced persons (IDPs) in makeshift camps – who were at great risk of further disaster due to the impending hurricane season and potential flooding. In February and early March, JTF-Haiti elements conducted comprehensive infrastructure assessments and then executed engineering projects – with the UN and NGOs – to mitigate the risk and reduce the number of people requiring relocation. Then, from mid-March through mid-May, JTF-Haiti supported the Haitian government, UN, USAID, and NGO partners by relocating IDPs from sites still at risk to transitional resettlement sites.

JTF-Haiti's Maritime Component Command, comprised of the 22nd and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, conducted relief missions outside Port-au-Prince, to the west and to the north. Using the flexibility inherent in amphibious forces, these units brought relief to thousands of Haitians in the outlying regions.

Although the deployment of U.S. military forces and U.S. resources was quick and effective, it was not always efficient. The most significant challenge to the U.S. military – and to the international community – was logistics. Three specific areas presented major challenges to JTF-Haiti's logistical operations (to those of the international players):

- "Incomplete situational awareness" at the outset made it difficult to determine requirements and priorities for providing relief and delivering supplies.
- The "lack of a unified and integrated logistics command and control structure" led to gaps in reception, staging, and movement of forces, equipment, and supplies into Haiti. Logistics staffs were not always aware of many non-military activities and cargos.
- The "initial reliance on the one single airport" (Toussaint Louverture International Airport) for throughput, created the need to validate and prioritize all flights (including international flights) to ensure that only the most critical cargo landed.

JTF-Haiti had a proven logistical system to manage its own requirements; however, it was not designed for managing external flights, requirements, cargo, etc. In spite of this challenge, however, JTF-Haiti's airmen were able to increase flights at the international airport from 13 per day (pre-quake) to a peak of 150 per day. However, even this capacity fell short of the demand. SOUTHCOM's 12th Air Force, in coordination with the UN, then developed a system of time-slots and priorities – driven by the Haitian government – that at least served to meet Haiti's major requirements on a day-to-day basis.

The earthquake had rendered both of the two main piers of the Port-au-Prince seaport as "unusable". JTF-Haiti, with assistance from U.S. Transportation Command, quickly established a Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore capability to bring supplies in from the sea. This doubled the number of shipping containers received in Haiti from pre-quake numbers. Also, JTF-Haiti established a temporary port capability at the Port-au-Prince seaport through the use of two contracted Crowley barges. This further enhanced the flow of supplies into Haiti and reduced some pressure on the international airport.

From the beginning, the focus of JTF-Haiti was to save lives and mitigate suffering. Security – to protect the people from gangs, looting, and acts of violence – was also an initial concern. However, JTF-Haiti's close working relationship with MINUSTAH and the cooperation and professionalism by MINUSTAH in conducting security operations enabled the JTF to focus its efforts on humanitarian assistance operations. In the first few days following the earthquake, General Keen and the MINUSTAH force commander, Major General Peixoto (Brazil), discussed the necessity and a concept for a safe and secure environment. Bringing their staffs together on this issue ensured that priorities and workloads were aligned. It enabled MINUSTAH to provide the requisite security, while JTF-H could then focus on delivery of food, water, and emergency medical care. Regular meetings between forces contributed to unity of effort and mission accomplishment.

Another excellent example of partnering was in the development and execution of the first major food distribution plan for Operation Unified Response. JTF-Haiti, the World Food Program, MINUSTAH, and various UN agencies contributed to this effort through joint and combined planning. The locations for 16 food distribution sites throughout Port-au-Prince and its surrounding communities were mapped out, requirements determined, and concepts of operation written, and then these critical sites were rapidly established and supported – for initial deliveries and sustained distribution. Through these nodes, and through the teamwork and communication between these partners (prompted and facilitated by JTF-Haiti), more than two million Haitians received much-needed food and water on a regular basis.

JTF-Haiti's "Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center" was the key node for facilitating the coordination and collaboration between JTF-Haiti and its partners.

This coordination center pulled together, and tracked, the efforts of JTF-Haiti, MINUSTAH forces, the UN humanitarian community, USAID, and numerous NGOs. This coordination center was manned by a 30 military personnel, including one general officer. This center, and the bulk of JTF-Haiti, operated on unclassified information systems and used commercially available programs/tools to build a humanitarian assistance common operating picture – shared with all participants.

On the information front, Facebook and Twitter were also used, not only to collect and disseminate information, but also to counter possible misinformation. JTF public affairs personnel used cameras on their cell phones to "Twitpic" key activities and then post them on Twitter and on JTF's Facebook page. The JTF-Haiti's Joint Information and Interagency Center also contributed to the JTF's information management and communication efforts. One of the key products from this center was daily talking points – which provided the overall communication goal, target audiences, themes, and top-line messages.

Although the U.S. administration had issued guidance that the Haitian relief effort was to be a unified whole-of-government effort, with USAID as the federal lead agency, the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and required capabilities of USAID and other players were not clearly defined. There were no specifications on subordinate relationships or divisions of labor. USAID had too few personnel on the ground to form and lead the robust planning that was required early on, for a crisis of this size and scope. Therefore, JTF-Haiti provided a number of planners to USAID to assist on this complex initial planning effort.

The close proximity of JTF-Haiti to the U.S. Embassy was a key factor for facilitating the desired whole-of-government response. The JTF established its headquarters next to the American embassy, which was also close to the MINUSTAH headquarters, and this physical co-location greatly simplified coordination, collaboration, and communication. Staff working relationships were quickly developed, and these relationships paid dividends throughout the operation. Additionally, liaison officers provided to/from JTF-Haiti also greatly benefited communication and unity of effort.

Initially, the JTF commanders and staff did not fully appreciate the number of humanitarian organizations that had been in Haiti since before the earthquake. There had been over 1,000 NGOs working with the UN Office of Coordination and Humanitarian Assistance in Haiti. However, within the first couple weeks, the JTF worked closely with the UN (the UN Coordinating Support Committee in Haiti) to develop UN-approved coordination processes to fulfill perceived requirements – in which requirements were raised, validated, and passed to the appropriate organizations. The JTF additionally worked to coordinate requirements and activities within the UN "cluster system" to ensure unity of effort.

In the first few weeks, it became apparent that the biggest challenge facing the Haitian government was the IDPs – especially those who had set up spontaneous settlements in areas prone to flooding. At the strategic level, the JTF and USAID worked closely with the UN and the Haitian government to develop an IDP strategy. Upon agreement to this strategy, JTF engineering projects were accomplished – which mitigated the risks for those camps (9 major camps) that had been assessed as being likely to experience flooding during the rainy season. Then, approximately 6,000 people at other camps/sites still needed to be moved to safer ground. To complete the operation, the JTF provided the requisite engineering support, transportation assets, and civil affairs teams to the UN, and the endangered people were moved to safety. Various relief efforts continued well after this IDP protection/relocation project – and the partnering and unity of effort prompted by JTF-Haiti's innovations continued to enhance success.

Recommendation.

The authors of this article, General P.K. (Ken) Keen and three Army officers who served in JTF-H, provide the following recommendations that the U.S. military, interagency, the UN, and the international community can apply for future disaster responses:

1. Develop a more robust and capable disaster response assessment and initial life-saving response team. (The Global Response Force was invaluable, but greater situational awareness was needed to set priorities and drive logistics.)
2. Have combatant commands maintain a JTF capable force (with Joint logistics capabilities adaptable to external requirements), trained and ready to deploy in support of a foreign disaster relief operation with the Global Response Force.
3. Develop an international disaster response framework for nations to deploy civilian and military capability to respond to disasters (a framework that allows inclusion in planning, logistics, and information systems).
4. Conduct exercises (with U.S. agencies, partner nations, and the UN) to develop relationships and refine processes and systems.
5. Codify the use of coordination centers like the U.S. JTF-Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and UN coordinating support committee; make them adaptable to any existing partner-nation center.
6. Develop and codify unclassified information-sharing tools like JTF-Haiti's humanitarian assistance common operating picture; make them adaptable to any partner-nation's existing system.

7. Examine how best to integrate and support the NGOs and public/private sector in support of humanitarian assistance/foreign disaster relief. (Consider integration in both assessment teams and response teams.)

8. Tackle the internally displaced persons challenge immediately. (Identify IDP issues and develop appropriate solutions.)

Implication.

If a disaster response framework is not developed to accommodate a "whole of international community" approach, and if exercises (involving U.S. agencies, partner nations, and the UN) are not conducted to clarify and develop relationships and to refine processes and systems, then USAID, DoD, State Department, and others will be building support in an ad hoc manner, rather than in a systematic/practiced manner to quickly deliver and efficiently sustain relief to disaster victims.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations](#)," by Lieutenant General P.K. (Ken) Keen and Lieutenant Colonels Matthew G. Elledge, Charles W. Nolan, and Jennifer L. Kimmey (U.S. Army), Military Review, November-December 2010.

Comments.

- A related article, which discusses the use of new (unclassified) information systems to improve information-sharing and management during disaster relief operations is "Haiti Earthquake: Breaking New Ground in the Humanitarian Information Landscape," U.S. Department of State - Humanitarian Information Unit, July 2010. See O&R [681](#) for article and lessons.

- SOLLIMS should be taken under consideration by combatant commands and JTFs for meeting Recommendation #6 above (Develop and codify unclassified information-sharing tools like JTF-Haiti's humanitarian assistance common operating picture; make them adaptable to any partner-nation's existing system).



h. TOPIC. Haiti Earthquake Response – Information Collection, Sharing, and Management ([681](#))

Observation.

During the response to the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, various new information & communication technologies, new information providers, and a new community of interest emerged – all of which impacted the volume, collection, sharing, and management of humanitarian information. During the Haiti relief effort, humanitarian responders employed the latest social networking media, mobile phone text messaging, open source software applications, and commercial satellite imagery to a far greater extent than ever before. Academics/researchers, ICT professionals, relief volunteers, media members, and other reporters from the affected population became new sources of data and information. These new information participants & developments are likely to impact future disaster relief operations, presenting both opportunities and challenges for the response agencies.

Discussion.

During the Haiti earthquake response, the humanitarian information environment included unprecedented availability of raw data in many forms, greater usage of new information communication technology (ICT), and the presence of three loosely-connected humanitarian communities of interest. Those three communities of interest were as follows: (1) U.S. Government (USG) community of interest, (2) United Nations (UN) and international community of interest; and, (3) an emergent group of ICT "volunteers" – consisting of humanitarians, corporate foundations, virtually-connected academics, and ICT professionals. All three communities were involved in the collecting and sharing of digital information made available on web portals, platforms, and popular social networking media such as Twitter, Facebook, and Short Message Service (SMS) feeds.

For the U.S. Government community, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was the lead agency for the humanitarian response effort. USAID committed over \$650 million in supplies, grants, and support over a 6-month period beginning in mid-Jan 2010. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) was the lead command for the Department of Defense (DoD). At the height of the disaster response effort, it had committed 22,000 personnel, 130 aircraft, and 33 ships to support the operation (Operation Unified Response Haiti). U.S. Department of State (USDOS) played a major role in assisting refugees and host families, and supported repatriation and resettlement programs for displaced persons. Other USG agencies – including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) – also provided technical and other assistance for the USG response.

To collect and manage information useful to strategic and programmatic decision-making, coordination centers were established at USSOUTHCOM in Miami and at both USAID and USDOS in Washington, D.C.

The use of liaison officers contributed significantly to the implementation of a "Whole of Government" approach to the response effort. USAID, DoD, and USDOS assigned liaison officers to each other's coordination centers. Additionally, several UN agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) provided liaison officers to these coordination centers, as well as to USG teams operating in Haiti. These liaison officers greatly facilitated inter-organizational information sharing, fostered relationships and teamwork, and provided greater understanding of cross-community practices.

The DoD/USSOUTHCOM decision to promote the use of unclassified information whenever possible, along with greater use of public domain platforms for information sharing, aided the USG response effort. Much of DoD's/ USSOUTHCOM's humanitarian-related data and information, which in previous instances resided on classified systems inaccessible to the public, were kept unclassified and allowed to be shared widely for the Haiti response effort. USSOUTHCOM used the All Partners Access Network (APAN) to share unclassified information and to enhance collaboration and coordination. In the first three weeks of the operation, APAN had approximately 1,800 registered users and became the main platform for USSOUTHCOM to share information outside DoD. Imagery products, maps, photos, assessments, situation reports, common operational pictures, requests for information, etc. were made available on APAN and facilitated U.S. civilian-military collaboration and information sharing.

In the UN/international community, the key players were the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Program (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Red Cross, international NGOs, World Bank, and European Commission (EC). UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) teams and international search and rescue teams were dispatched to Port-au-Prince. They established Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centers (VOSOCC) to provide situation reporting and coordination. The UN also activated its UN humanitarian Cluster System (first tested in the 2005 Pakistan earthquake response), to coordinate international relief activities dealing with food, water, sanitation, health, logistics, shelter, and camp management. However, the Cluster System proved to be inefficient in managing information during such a large-scale emergency, due to a lack of dedicated cluster coordinators, information managers, and technical support capacity.

Several new information systems and tools were employed by the UN – a new OneResponse portal for the UN Cluster System, Who is Doing What Where (3W)

database, Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment methodology, Displacement Tracking Matrix, and Post Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework, among others – with the intent of improving coordination and information management. However, these new information systems/tools did not improve the effectiveness of coordination/management, as they had not been fully accepted/integrated into the decision-making processes and practices of UN clusters and community members.

In the ICT community of "volunteers," some of the many players were: InSTEDD, Fortius One/GeoCommons, OpenStreet Map, Tufts University, Harvard University, Frontline SMS, ICT4Peace, Sahana, Thompson Reuters Foundation, Microsoft, Google, and volunteer members of the Haitian community. Portals and platforms used were: CrisisMappers.net, SMS 4636, Ushahidi, STAR-TIDES, Haiti Voices, ICT4Peace Inventorization Wiki, CrisisCamp Haiti, CrisisCommons Wiki, crisescomm.ning.com, and blogs.

This new community of virtually connected "volunteers" affiliated with ICT consulting companies, private corporations, open source software proponents, academic/research institutions, and NGOs, as well as Haitian community members and reporters, applied various new ICT applications to the earthquake response effort. "Web 2.0" social network media was used extensively for data collection, information sharing, and collaboration. Google adapted various tools for applications to support the response effort and helped develop a Person Finder application. ICT companies, with support from USDOS, collaborated to establish SMS 4636 code that allowed the free transmission of text message information to and from Haiti.

A new virtual CrisisMappers network utilized an open source interactive mapping platform, Ushahidi, to collect, extract, and plot geo-referenced data on a public domain website. Ushahidi and its supporting volunteers/translators received over 80,000 text messages, of which 3,000 were utilized to facilitate response activities. Ushahidi messages and other geo-referenced data – from Twitter, blogs, the media, and humanitarian reporters – helped provide situational awareness for various operational responders. The USCG, the 22nd U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit, and other first responders reported using these social media platforms to help carry out emergency assistance operations.

Additionally, geospatial data and satellite imagery were made much more available during the Haiti earthquake response effort than in previous disaster relief operations. GeoEye and Digital Globe – the two largest U.S. commercial satellite vendors – provided vast amounts of pre- and post-earthquake high resolution satellite imagery at no cost, and Google made it available on platforms such as GoogleEarth and GoogleMaps. UNOSAT, iMMAP, MapAction, ITHACA, and other specialized organizations also provided customized Geographic Information System (GIS) and satellite imagery products to humanitarian relief organizations. InterAction, the NGO consortium, launched a new interactive

website/database for mapping NGO projects as they were initiated and progressing in Haiti. Overall, the vast amount of geospatial data and imagery from contributing organizations was widely used during the initial relief efforts, and likewise had applications for reconstruction and recovery.

Recommendation.

1. USAID, DoD, and USDOS should continue the practice of assigning liaison officers to each other's coordination centers in future disaster relief operations, as this practice facilitates information sharing and the "Whole of Government" approach.
2. DoD should continue to promote the use of unclassified information and public domain platforms, in future disaster relief operations, as this greatly enhances collaboration and operational coordination with other responders. Besides APAN, the Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information Management System (SOLLIMS) would be an ideal candidate for this purpose.
3. The UN should allocate additional resources to its humanitarian Cluster System (particularly coordinators/decision-makers) in future disaster relief operations and should take steps to better integrate its latest information management systems/tools into decision-making processes on the ground.
4. The USG and UN/international communities should recognize the emergence of the ICT "volunteer" community in disaster relief operations and identify tools, techniques & procedures for best working with ICT "volunteer" organizations/personnel. As a starting point, the USG (DoD) could use virtual "Communities of Practice" (COP) – utilizing a public domain website – and encourage ICT "volunteers" to join it to discuss and collaborate on information systems, tools, techniques, & procedures for future disaster relief operations. Additionally, participants in this COP could address how to incorporate information from social network participants and commercial imagery organizations in future disaster relief operations.
5. DoD should include ICT "volunteer" community players, along with Interagency and UN/international community members, in disaster relief training events/exercises.

Implication.

If USG lead agents (USAID and DoD) do not collaborate with UN/international community members and ICT "volunteers" in humanitarian relief – through their inclusion in "Communities of Practice" and training events/exercises – then those USG lead agents may lose opportunities and efficiencies with regard to collecting, managing, sharing, and leveraging critical data/information during future disaster relief operations.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Haiti Earthquake: Breaking New Ground in the Humanitarian Information Landscape](#)," U.S. Department of State Humanitarian Information Unit, July 2010.



i. TOPIC. Rebuilding Schools and Communities in Post-conflict Kenya ([772](#))

Observation.

In post-conflict environments, getting children back into schools can be an important component of humanitarian assistance – to help restore a degree of normalcy to conflict-affected communities. When civil-military operations (CMO) are conducted for this purpose, establishing close relations upfront with provincial and community leaders, as well as with other U.S. Government and non-governmental organizations operating in the area, is imperative to CMO success.

Discussion.

In the aftermath of Kenya's December 2007 to January 2008 post-election violence, Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) deployed U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) teams to Kenya's Rift Valley to engage in a series of school rehabilitation projects. Kenya had experienced wide-scale ethnic clashes following its national elections, resulting in over 1,000 casualties and 300,000 displaced personnel. Most of the residents of the Rift Valley had been displaced, countless markets and public places had been destroyed, and numerous schools burned to the ground or severely damaged.

Over the April 2008 - July 2010 timeframe, four different U.S. Army Reserve CA teams supported the rehabilitation/reconstruction of 14 schools in the Rift Valley. During the early part of this timeframe, community/ethnic relations in the Rift Valley were still tense, and most people lacked confidence in their government's ability to provide security and restore services. The U.S. military, however, was warmly welcomed by Rift Valley residents. They were generally receptive to all who came to help, and they especially viewed the U.S. military as a trusted presence in this insecure situation. The fact that the U.S. military had come to rebuild highly visible structures for communities – namely, school buildings – meant a great deal to a society in disarray. Interviews of Kenyans in the Rift Valley revealed that they viewed new schools as an opportunity for peace-building among their communities (where multiple ethnic groups had formerly

attended the same schools), an important step toward stability, an overall public good, and a means to positively impact the future.

The first U.S. Army Reserve CA team to arrive was instrumental in rebuilding/repairing schools in the most heavily devastated areas of the Rift Valley. Key to the team's success was its deliberate effort to establish relations upfront with key stakeholders in the area: provincial administrators, village leaders, church leaders, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) – which was providing education for children within the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps – and several other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). With so many families living in IDP camps, the stakeholders agreed that returning children to schools would take precedence over various other reconstruction projects. The CA team was then able to smoothly facilitate the provision of resources for, and engage in the process of, building new classrooms, school administration buildings, teachers' quarters, and school storage areas. Throughout this process, synergy was maintained from those initial contacts and the early prioritization of efforts.

Over the course of the CA teams' 2-year tenure in the Rift Valley, maintaining clear lines of communication with key host nation (HN)/local stakeholders proved imperative for maintaining community support/assistance. When CA teams had to conduct multiple assessment visits at a certain site before beginning work, it was important to convey to community leaders the necessity of these visits and when work could actually begin. On any given school project, if there were a lag in construction due to resource delays, as long as the community leaders were given timely explanations, they remained supportive. The same went for delays or diversions of funds. Being open and transparent with local leaders precluded disappointment or discontent, and they then willingly provided support/assistance for the work when it could resume. Upon completion of project, upon the team's departure from the area, a closure discussion with local village leaders allowed them to realize that the team was departing and to understand the status of the project – completed or pending additional work from another team.

Interviews with Kenyans in the Rift Valley did reveal a degree of disappointment with their own military. Although the Kenyan military was actively engaged in certain post-conflict work within the Rift Valley – such as securing major roadways and providing support for local police activities – there was only brief collaboration with the U.S. CA personnel during the initial phase of school reconstruction. Afterwards, the Kenyan military was largely absent. This was a lost opportunity for the Kenyan military to do something visible and meaningful for the community, as well as a lost opportunity for citizens to gain some trust and confidence in their military - which a great number of Kenyans had mistrusted, or even feared. If "partnering" with the Kenyan military would have been an objective for the CA teams, local civilian views of the Kenyan military and government could have been positively impacted. Kenyan military units could have profited professionally from the experience of working with the U.S.

military teams. Also, greater Kenyan "ownership" of the projects could have been promulgated – from start to finish.

Recommendation.

1. U.S. military teams engaged in civil-military operations / humanitarian assistance should establish contacts and relationships upfront with key stakeholders throughout their area of operations – to set a tone of cooperation and promote synergy of efforts where possible.
2. U.S. military teams engaged in civil-military operations / humanitarian assistance should endeavor to maintain direct communication with the HN/local stakeholders throughout operations, with an emphasis on transparency – to preclude false expectations, misunderstandings, or dissatisfaction. Upon completion of work, or upon departure from the area, teams should provide a status on all projects to local stakeholders.
3. U.S. military teams engaged in civil-military operations / humanitarian assistance should endeavor to partner with HN security forces where feasible – to promote HN participation and ownership in projects, as well as to build civilian trust in their military. Furthermore, partnering with HN security forces on projects may allow them to gain/improve knowledge on certain tasks or skills.
4. School reconstruction/rehabilitation projects should be considered during U.S. military planning of civil-military operations / humanitarian assistance missions – as a course of action (or component thereof) to help restore normalcy to conflict-affected communities.

Implication.

If direct, transparent communication with local stakeholders is not emphasized during civil-military operations from start to finish, then local communities may develop false expectations or conclusions regarding the status of projects in their areas. They may lose interest in supporting or taking ownership of those projects.

Event Description.

This observation is based on the article "[Civil-Military Operations in Kenya's Rift Valley: Sociocultural Impacts at the Local Level](#)," by Jessica Lee and Maureen Farrell, Prism, Volume 2, Number 2, March 2011.



3. CONCLUSION

Civ-mil cooperation is absolutely critical to achieving success on stability operations. It is therefore imperative that all players – USG civilian and military actors, coalition civilian and military actors, NGOs and other international actors, and HN government civilian and military actors – understand authorities, roles, and relationships among one another, as well as ways to strengthen relationships between one another.

Key takeaways for building civ-mil cooperation are:

- Senior leaders of civilian and military organizations should set a tone in their organizations that civ-mil cooperation is necessary for success. Senior leaders should endeavor to establish good personal relationships with key leaders of other organizations/stake-holders throughout their area of operation (U.S./coalition forces and agencies, NGOs/international organizations, and HN government actors).
- The Comprehensive Approach should be stressed by senior leaders and planners in preparation for stability operations:

Comprehensive Approach: An approach that brings together the efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities based on commonly understood principles and collaborative processes, towards a shared goal.

(Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, United States Institute of Peace [USIP] and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute [PKSOI], 2009)

- Information management systems/architectures should be utilized – whereby interagency, NGO, and multinational participants openly share unclassified information.
- Civilian leaders (Department of State, USAID, USDA) preparing to deploy on stability operations should receive extensive training on working with military partners – with an emphasis on integrated planning, problem-solving, and relationship-building – as well as training on working with HN and international actors.
- Military leaders preparing to deploy on stability operations should receive extensive training on working with civilian partners – with an emphasis on integrated planning, problem-solving, and relationship-building – as well as training on working with HN and international actors.

- Training for military leaders on economic development (e.g., terminology, theory/principles, and practice) would serve to aid their coordination/ collaboration with USAID counterparts.
- Civilian agencies and military organizations operating within the same area need to actively coordinate and deconflict development activities.
- Military training events/exercises (with stability operations scenarios) should emphasize full participation of interagency partners – covering the planning conferences and the exercise itself.
- In the execution of stability operations, PRTs and Brigade Task Forces/Brigade Combat Teams operating in the same area need to act in consonance.
 - They should build “unity of effort” at the outset of operations through a common vision and mutually agreed upon objectives.
 - They should maximize information-sharing – formal and informal – between their organizations.
 - They should act as one integrated team in the planning and execution of development, governance, and security actions.
 - They should involve local officials in planning, resourcing, and sustaining all development projects.
- Military teams engaged in civil-military operations should maintain direct contact with local/HN stake-holders – ensuring all players are on the same sheet of music with regard to development projects, resources, and timelines.
- DoD should continue to collaborate with interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners on doctrine development for stability operations.
- USIP, InterAction, and DoD should update the 2007 “Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments” to improve understanding and coordination with regard to humanitarian space, military necessity, and military security measures.
- For disaster relief operations, codify the use of coordination centers like the JTF-Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center and UN coordinating support committee.
- For disaster relief operations, continue the practice of assigning liaison officers to partners’ coordination centers (DoD, Department of State, and USAID).

- For disaster relief operations, designate unclassified information systems and public domain platforms (e.g., SOLLIMS or APAN) for information-sharing/collaboration among responders.
- For disaster relief training events/exercises, include the participation of interagency partners, the UN/international community, and Information Communications Technology (ICT) players (such as those who were engaged during the 2010 Haiti disaster relief effort).

Through wider dissemination of such lessons, through their inclusion in training events and leader education programs, and through senior leader endorsement, it is envisioned that future stability operations and disaster relief operations can benefit significantly.


4. COMMAND POC

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SOLLIMS SAMPLER

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