

**Rise from Chaos:
An Approach to Stability in Somalia**

**A Monograph
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Should U.S. conventional forces intervene in Somalia, how could they best support the Transitional Federal Government in stabilizing the country? In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government assumed the role of governing Somalia. The situation in Somalia could lead to the intervention of U.S. conventional forces to supplement the African Union Mission in Somalia. They could support the Somali Transitional Federal Government as part of a comprehensive approach that connects Somali citizens with the Transitional Federal Government, fosters economic development, reforms the security sector, and implements a program to deradicalize al-Shabaab extremists to restore stability to Somalia. The traditional model of state building does not address the specific problem of violent extremist organizations that constitute one or more of the belligerent parties in the conflict. In the case of Somalia, traditional demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs have been ineffective because they did not address the problem of extremism. A focused examination of two case studies will show how a traditional model of state building failed in Somalia, whereas a refined model, including deradicalization, succeeded in Somaliland. The case studies demonstrate that an approach to state building similar to that in Somaliland may lead to success in stabilizing Somalia.

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Abstract

Rise from Chaos: An Approach to Stability in Somalia by LTC William J. Shavce, U.S. Army, 46 pages.

In the event of an intervention, how could U.S. conventional forces operating in Somalia best support the Transitional Federal Government in stabilizing the country? Somalia stands as the greatest example of state failure and collapse in the world today. Since the overthrow of Siyad Barre's dictatorship in 1991, the country has witnessed civil war and several humanitarian crises, including drought and famine. The international community responded with several unsuccessful interventions to attempt to alleviate the human suffering and to restore order. In 2004, the Transitional Federal Government assumed the role of governing Somalia. Today's worsening humanitarian situation, along with al-Shabaab's insurgency against the Transitional Federal Government, could lead to the intervention of U.S. conventional forces to supplement the African Union Mission in Somalia. U.S. conventional forces could support the Somali Transitional Federal Government as part of a comprehensive approach that connects Somali citizens with the Transitional Federal Government, fosters economic development, reforms the security sector, and implements a program to deradicalize al-Shabaab extremists to restore stability to Somalia.

Current state building theories identify three interdependent sectors where the sovereign state serves its citizens: governance, development, and security. Earlier approaches focused on delivering international aid within each of these sectors, with little appreciation of the interdependencies between them. Programs to improve governance are likely to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the central government, while maintaining accountability of the state to both its citizens and the international community. Development programs could help the state provide the essential services its citizens require, while creating the conditions for sustainable economic progress. Security sector reform may include the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of combatants, while building professional military and police forces to maintain security within the state. Success in all these areas requires building the capacity of the local and national governments to sustain and build upon these reforms once the international community completes its mission.

The traditional model of state building does not address the specific problem of violent extremist organizations that constitute one or more of the belligerent parties in the conflict. In the case of Somalia, traditional demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs have been ineffective because they did not address the problem of extremism. In Somaliland, specific conditions addressed the problem of radicalization, which has led to greater stability as compared to Somalia.

A focused examination of two case studies will show how a traditional model of state building failed in Somalia, whereas a refined model, including deradicalization, succeeded in Somaliland. The case studies demonstrate that an approach to state building similar to that in Somaliland may lead to success in stabilizing Somalia.

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Introduction

Impetus for Action

Anarchy, chaos, death, and destruction—the mere mention of Somalia conjures up such terms. Since 2008, Somalia has led the worldwide Failed States Index.¹ The 2010 U.S. *National Security Strategy* identifies failing states as a threat to global security, serving as recruiting grounds and safe havens for transnational terrorist groups. Al-Shabaab, an organization affiliated with al-Qaeda, has waged a civil war against Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia since 2006. In addition to this war, Somalia is experiencing one of the worst droughts and famines in the history of the Horn of Africa, creating a humanitarian disaster of unprecedented proportions. The war has made it virtually impossible for aid groups to deliver much-needed humanitarian assistance to thousands of Somalis. These two factors, civil war and a worsening humanitarian crisis, could lead the U.S. government to decide to intervene in Somalia with conventional military forces to assist the TFG in establishing stability. In the event of such an intervention, how could these conventional forces best support the TFG in stabilizing the country?

The Solution

U.S. conventional forces could support the Somali Transitional Federal Government as part of a comprehensive approach that connects Somali citizens with the Transitional Federal Government, fosters economic development, reforms the security sector, and implements a program to deradicalize al-Shabaab extremists to restore stability to Somalia. This comprehensive approach involves the cooperation of all agencies of the U.S. government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector partners, oriented

¹ Fund for Peace, *The Failed States Index 2011 Interactive Grid*, <http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?=fsi-grid2011> (accessed 9 September 2011).

towards the common goal of stability in Somalia.² Stability in Somalia includes a representative governmental structure that secures and provides for its citizens, enforces the rule of law, and addresses the threat of violent extremism within its borders.

Possible Intervention Scenarios

U.S. Joint Doctrine provides for a number of possible types of operations that U.S. conventional forces could carry out if policy-makers decide on a military intervention. Factors within the strategic context in the U.S. would dictate the nature and scope of any intervention. The range of possible military operations could include raids, strikes, or foreign humanitarian assistance. The U.S. could also choose to assist the TFG with longer-term security cooperation activities such as counterterrorism operations, foreign internal defense, or counterinsurgency support. A final option would be a lengthier peace building operation. A number of considerations would factor in to policy makers' decisions when determining the types of intervention operations for Somalia.

Raids and strikes offer quick, potentially high impact options to policy makers. One likely scenario would be an operation against Somali pirates' bases of operations to disrupt their activities against commercial shipping in the region. This option would be most suitable where the strategic context is such that policy makers seek to address the scourge of piracy while not engaging in long-term operations within Somalia. These operations would not likely end the piracy problem, but could disrupt it for some period of time, possibly discouraging future actions by the pirates. Similarly, conventional forces could carry out raids or strikes against al-Shabaab bases of operations in an attempt to disrupt their terrorist activities. Raids and strikes would provide options that do not require large conventional forces or lengthy operations within

² U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 1-4–1-5.

Somalia. They would be less risky than longer operations and could deliver high impact results. Their primary drawback is that they fail to address the underlying causes that enable piracy and terrorism in Somalia.

The use of conventional forces to provide foreign humanitarian assistance is also a possible option. In this scenario, forces would enter Somalia to support various non-governmental organizations and aid groups to alleviate the human suffering resulting from drought and famine in the region. This provides the ability to communicate that the United States remains genuinely concerned for the well being of the Somali people, while not creating the image that military forces are engaging in an occupation. This type of operation would be similar to the United Nations Mission in Somalia in the early 1990s, and would most likely achieve success in reducing the amount of human suffering. The downside to a pure humanitarian assistance intervention is that it would not likely enhance the capacity of the Somali government to provide for its own people, as the military and other organizations would be providing the aid. The Somalis may become dependent on their aid, thus creating conditions where the situation reverts to a humanitarian crisis once military forces depart Somalia.

Policy makers may decide to engage in security cooperation activities supporting the TFG, including counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, or support to counterinsurgency. These operations would likely require a lengthy presence on the ground in Somalia, but with a small number of forces acting in an advisory capacity. Although security cooperation would likely increase the risk to U.S. military personnel, they would probably achieve some degree of success in improving the capacity of Somali security forces. This approach, however, may not address the weaknesses in governance and economic development that could create a stable environment in the country.

Another option available to address the situation in Somalia is a peace building operation. This operation would involve the rebuilding of Somali infrastructure and governmental institutions to lessen the likelihood of further conflict.³ Of the options above, peace building would likely be the lengthiest, riskiest, and costliest in terms of required resources and personnel. With this option, U.S. conventional forces could partner with the Somali government, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and all other stakeholders in the country. The amount of time necessary to carry out such an operation may create the image of an American occupation of Somalia. Peace building would likely require engaging in combat operations against al-Shabaab, which could produce American casualties. The benefit to such an operation is that it would strengthen the TFG to the point where it would become a permanent government, able to govern effectively, provide for its people, secure itself against foreign and external threats, and create the conditions for long-term, sustainable development and prosperity. Peace building, or state building in political science terminology, would be most likely to solve the problems facing Somalia and bring a sense of stability to the region.

Assumptions

This monograph assumes that the United Nations would direct a more robust intervention than the current African Union Mission in Somalia. The U.S. could deploy conventional forces into southern Somalia to support the TFG; the African Union Mission in Somalia; other interorganizational partners, such as the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development; and various non-governmental organizations. The specific policy goals of such an intervention might be the establishment of a stable and secure environment throughout Somalia, increased Somali government and economic development capacity at local, regional, and national

³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Defense, 2011), 271.

levels, and alleviation of the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Additionally, Somaliland and Puntland would likely remain as autonomous regions within the boundaries of the internationally recognized state of Somalia.

Conditions in Somalia that could support the policy goals might include the marginalized influence of extremist organizations, increased capacity of the TFG to provide essential services to its citizens, violence minimized to negligible levels, increased freedom of movement for international aid organizations and Somali citizens, and increased legitimacy of the TFG. Operational objectives leading to these conditions could include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia elements; neutralization of extremist organizations; establishment of civil security; restoration of basic services, including power, water, and sanitation; and the provision of security to interorganizational partners to allow them the freedom to operate throughout Somalia.

These assumptions allow the development of an approach to stabilize Somalia. Appropriate operational objectives derive from focused strategic policy and end state conditions. This monograph will demonstrate operational art by linking policy goals to specific tactical actions on the ground by conventional military forces.

Research Methodology

This monograph tests the argument through a focused case study comparison between Somalia and Somaliland. It compares and contrasts a traditional state building model in Somalia with a refined model in Somaliland. It discusses the successes and failures of the models. The strength of this methodology lies in the fact that Somalia and Somaliland consist of a largely homogenous population sharing a common culture, religion, and history, maximizing the likelihood that the conclusions inferred from the case studies depend on variables such as rule of law, security, and disruption of extremist organizations, therefore avoiding bias. Inclusion of

cases other than Somaliland would likely introduce bias due to differences in culture, religion, and history.

The monograph begins with an overview of the events leading to the present situation. It then examines current literature regarding traditional state building. It examines the case of attempted state building in Somalia. The monograph then presents a refined state building theory and presents the case study of state building in Somaliland, demonstrating the validity of the refined model. Finally, it discusses a possible operational approach for U.S. conventional forces in Somalia based on the refined model.

The Collapse of Somalia: An Overview

Understanding the present situation in Somalia requires an examination of the Somali society as well as a survey of recent Somali history.⁴ Somali society, with its nomadic pastoral heritage and strong clan identity, makes any attempt to build a unifying government structure difficult, at best. Somalia became an independent state in 1960, following over a century of colonial rule. The governance patterns of the European powers set the conditions for many of Somalia's defective post-independence institutions. These patterns also set the stage for the political success in Somaliland. Corruption, poor governance, and repression since independence ultimately gave rise to the chaos and anarchy of the 1990s. From this chaos came several peace conferences that sought to build Somalia into a viable state. The latest effort resulted in the 2004 formation of the Transitional Federal Government and the intervention of an African Union-sponsored peacekeeping force, the African Union Mission in Somalia. Peace-making efforts prior to 2004 proved ineffective, while the success of the Transitional Federal Government remains in

⁴ For detailed discussions of the Somali people, clan identity, and the history of Somalia refer to Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam, and Peacebuilding* (New York: Pluto Press, 2010) and Ioan M. Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

doubt. Despite several attempts, the international community has been unable to solve the puzzle of building a viable state in Somalia.

Somalia and Its People

Located on the Horn of Africa, the internationally recognized state of Somalia encompasses nearly 640,000 square kilometers of mostly arid land. It borders Djibouti in the northwest, Ethiopia in the west, Kenya in the southwest, and the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean in the north and east. Its location allows it to dominate the southern approaches into the Red Sea. Nearly ten million people live in the area enclosed by the recognized Somali border.⁵ Within those borders there are two autonomous regions, Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland in the northeast.

The Somali people are an ethnically homogeneous nation, made up of six primary clans residing in distinct geographic regions: the Isaq clan in the northwest, the Darod in the northeast and southwest, the Dir in the northwest and Djibouti, the Hawiye in central and southern Somalia, and the Digil and Rahanweyn clans in south-central Somalia.⁶ Clan identity stems from genealogical descent on the fathers' sides. Within each clan, there are a number of sub-clans, further providing identity to the people. The clan structure provides the political framework for much of the Somali population. In general, Somalis do not identify with a specific village, town, or region; rather, they identify with specific clans or sub-clans.⁷ Clan elders serve as the policy makers within society, making decisions concerning justice and conflict resolution.⁸ A historical

⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook: Somalia*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html> (accessed 25 October 2011).

⁶ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, vii.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 51.

lack of central governance throughout much of rural Somalia has strengthened clan identity and legitimized clan governance.

Proximity to the Arabian Peninsula facilitated the spread of Sunni Islam to Somalia. Somalis are almost entirely Sunni Muslims. Islam provides a significant source of identity for Somalis, supplanting their own clan identities when the two come into conflict.⁹ In sum, the Somali people, while ethnically homogeneous, are widely diverse in terms of clan identity. Muslim identity is the only real unifying force for the population of Somalia. State builders must consider the issue of identity when determining how to rally the entire population around a common cause.

Colonialism and Independence

In the nineteenth century, France, Great Britain, and Italy partitioned the Somali nation based on economic considerations, often bisecting traditional Somali clan homelands.¹⁰ The British claimed northern Somalia as British Somaliland, while Italy colonized the remainder of modern Somalia, including Mogadishu. During this period, outside powers divided the Somali people into five regions, under four different flags. Following independence, only British and Italian Somaliland formed the new Somalia, with the other three regions becoming incorporated into Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

British Somaliland gained its independence on 26 June 1960, followed by Italian Somaliland on 1 July 1960. Both regions then unified as the state of Somalia. The leaders of this new Somali state were more concerned with consolidating power for personal advantage than

⁹ Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration*, 50.

¹⁰ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 28–9.

with building effective institutions for governance of the incipient Somali state.¹¹ Plagued by corruption, this new democratic Somali state existed for only nine years before the military coup that brought General Siyad Barre to power.

Barre's Military Regime

Siyad Barre's military dictatorship began on 21 October 1969, following a bloodless coup. The Somali people welcomed the new regime, seeing it as a positive alternative to the prior political order that demonstrated little interest in the plight of the Somalis.¹² This enthusiasm would become short-lived, however, as the government began to implement a series of unpopular reforms.

Scientific Socialism replaced democracy as the political system in Somalia, resulting in government control of nearly all aspects of the nomadic economic system. Consequently, much of the local knowledge of the land and its ability to support livestock and agriculture became lost during the 1970s and 80s.¹³ The Barre regime moved to outlaw tribalism and clanism, making socialism and pan-Somali nationalism the central themes of Somali identity. Barre consolidated his power by abusing the various clan rivalries. In doing so, he prevented any one clan from acquiring enough power to threaten his rule.¹⁴

By the late 1970s, Barre's power began to erode. His defeat in the 1977–8 war with Ethiopia began demonstrating his weakness. Barre continued to manipulate clan dynamics, relying on repression of opposition groups to cling to power. By the late 1980s, the command

¹¹ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*, Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 12.

¹² *Ibid.*, 14.

¹³ Ben Wisner, "Jilaal, Gu, Haggaa, and Der: Living with the Somali Land, and Living Well," in *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?*, ed. Ahmed I. Samatar (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 57.

¹⁴ Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia*, 14–5.

structure within the Somali Army and the bureaucratic structure of the Somali government began to break down.¹⁵ Somalia's economic collapse in the 1980s further strained his rule, setting the stage for formation of clan-based militias that eventually drove him from power in January 1991.¹⁶

Transition to Civil War

Barre's flight from Mogadishu in early 1991 created a power vacuum that no militia group could fill. The various clan-based militias were unable to defeat each other militarily or reach a political agreement and fought for control of resources, including weapons and foreign humanitarian assistance.¹⁷ This led to the complete collapse of the Somali state and a civil war that would continue for over a decade.

United Nations Intervention in the Early 1990s

During the early 1990s, the United Nations attempted to bring stability to Somalia. The United Nations Missions in Somalia I and II, from 1992 to 1995, achieved little success in disarming local warlords, or creating a safe and secure environment. The missions were able to ameliorate the humanitarian disaster in Somalia by delivering relief supplies to areas impacted by famine. Ultimately, the warlords regained power and began targeting United Nations' forces. This led to the U.S. electing to withdraw from Somalia in 1994, followed by the other countries participating in the United Nations Mission.¹⁸ Following the withdrawal of international forces, the security situation continued to deteriorate as militias continued to fight each other to secure power.

¹⁵ Patrick Gilkes, "Descent into Chaos: Somalia, January 1991-December 1992," in *The Horn of Africa*, ed. Charles Gurdon (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 47.

¹⁶ Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia*, 14–21.

¹⁷ Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration*, 18.

¹⁸ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 77–80.

The TFG and the African Union Mission in Somalia

After four unsuccessful peace conferences from 1991 onwards, a fifth conference took place from 2002-4, in Mbagathi, Kenya. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, sponsored the conference, which resulted in the creation of Somalia's TFG. The TFG structure was a power-sharing arrangement between the clans and warlords and never addressed the underlying grievances that led to the civil war.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the TFG has become the longest-lived governmental body in Mogadishu since the fall of Siyad Barre.

The Rise of Islamic Extremism and al-Shabaab in Somalia

The influence of Islam found its way into Somali politics during the brutality and corruption of the Barre regime. The first major group to espouse political Islam was al-Itihad al-Islamiya, which formed in the 1980s. Following the collapse in 1991, al-Itihad al-Islamiya established itself in certain areas of Somalia, imposing *shari'a* law. Throughout the 1990s, elements of the organization carried out terrorist attacks in Somalia and Ethiopia, leading the U.S. Department of State to label it a terrorist organization in 1996.²⁰ The organization eventually dissolved with many members going on to form similar movements elsewhere in Somalia.

The absence of rule of law throughout Somalia facilitated the growth of many Islamic *shari'a* courts in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These courts maintained militias that provided security at the local level. The courts' ability to guarantee local security and to resolve disputes among locals increased their popularity with many Somalis.²¹ The courts' militias tended to be

¹⁹ Kenneth J Menkhaus, "Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam, and State Collapse," in *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2005), 30.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 35–6.

²¹ Eben Kaplan, "Backgrounder: Somalia's High Stakes Power Struggle," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 7 August 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalias-high-stakes-power-struggle/p11234> (accessed 25 October 2011).

primarily hired guns and thugs seeking easy money rather than the hard-core Islamic radicals found in other conflicts around the world.²²

In 2005, several courts united, forming the Union of Islamist Courts, which succeeded in gaining control of Mogadishu, effectively removing the warlords from power. Somalis were generally satisfied with the Union as stability increased. The Union did, however, introduce a more extreme brand of Islam. Many Somalis, who traditionally practiced more moderate Islam, became dissatisfied with the Union's policies.²³ The Union also maintained a militia, the forerunner of al-Shabaab.

As the Union consolidated its power, the Ethiopian government became increasingly concerned, implicating several of its leaders in terrorist attacks on Ethiopian and Kenyan soil. Subsequently, the Union's leadership began to call for an international Muslim jihad against Ethiopia and increasingly became more hostile towards the TFG. The calls for jihad redefined the power struggle between the Union and TFG, placing it within the context of the U.S.-led War on Terror, leading to an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in late 2006.²⁴ The Ethiopians and the TFG defeated the Union, declaring victory in May 2007. The Union ceased to exist as a political organization, with many of its militants going underground, forming al-Shabaab, and initiating an insurgency against the TFG. In 2007, al-Shabaab claimed affiliation with al-Qaeda, carrying out terrorist attacks in Uganda in 2010.²⁵ Al-Shabaab continues to pose a security threat throughout much of southern Somalia.

²² Menkhaus, "Somalia and Somaliland," 37.

²³ Kaplan, "Backgrounder."

²⁴ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 88–9.

²⁵ Stephanie Hanson, "Backgrounder: al-Shabaab," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 10 August 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650> (accessed 25 October 2011).

Somaliland and Puntland

The idea of a greater Somalia is a western construct, imposed by European powers during the colonial era of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With loyalty to clans being stronger than loyalty to the Somali state, several groups never considered themselves to be part of the state created in 1960. Barre held Somalia together as one single state by exploiting clan rivalries and periodically using of force to quell rebellions. The deposition of Barre in 1991 set the conditions for several clan-based groups to establish control over different regions of Somalia. In the northwest, the former region of British Somaliland declared its independence from greater Somalia in 1991. It has unsuccessfully sought international recognition since then. Puntland, located in the northeast, also declared autonomy, although it has not sought formal recognition like Somaliland.

Both regions enjoy a considerably more stable environment than the rest of the TFG-governed Somalia. Somaliland has been most successful, establishing a democratic form of government, building an economy, and enforcing the rule of law. Puntland continues to struggle with extremism and piracy, but has improved its situation. Both regions stand in stark contrast to southern Somalia, with its lack of stability.

State Building: The Traditional Model

The Role of the Sovereign State

The sovereign state provides three basic services to its citizens—security, economic development, and governance. Security sets the conditions for good governance and development, which, in turn, promote security.²⁶ This promotion of security, development, and governance constitutes the “traditional” model of state building. In addition to being responsible

²⁶ Clarence J. Bouchat, *Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach*, Letort Paper, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 13.

to its citizens, the modern state must also behave responsibly within the international system of nations.

Fukuyama defines state building as “the creation of new governmental institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.”²⁷ This definition implies that stability operations facilitate state building. The traditional state building model suggests that long-term stability in Somalia requires strengthening the capacity of the existing TFG, while also developing new capacities to make its governance more effective.

Ghani and Lockhart propose ten functions that define the scope of the state in today’s globalized world. Within the governance sector, states enforce the rule of law, establish administrative control, maintain legitimacy and citizens’ rights, and manage public assets. Economic development includes management of public finances, investment in human capital, provision of infrastructure, creation of markets, and the borrowing of finances. From a security sector standpoint, the state establishes and maintains sole control of the legal means of violence.²⁸ State building is creating the capacity of the government to carry out these functions while also providing it an appropriate amount of strength to enforce its rules without becoming an autocratic regime.

State building requires balancing short-term fixes with longer-term capacity building. In the past, the international community often targeted aid in fragile states to specific governmental sectors.²⁹ In these situations, the lack of security, governance, and development come together in a self-reinforcing cycle, one that state builders need to break to create stability. Haims et al. argue that the way to break this cycle is to invest in the human capital present in the state to address the

²⁷ Francis Fukuyama, "The Imperative of State Building," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (April 2004): 17.

²⁸ Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 125–63.

²⁹ Marla C. Haims, et al., *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 3–4.

challenges lying at the interdependencies between security, governance, and development, by building the capacity of the indigenous population to govern itself.³⁰ The international community could respond with an aid program that addresses the immediate problematic conditions while also strengthening the local governance through building capacity. International donors should resist the urge to assist the local population too much or so quickly so that they undermine the ability of a local government to provide for its people, creating a dependency on foreign aid known as the “aid complex.”³¹ Conversely, the international community should not move too slowly or wait until the local government is fully capable to provide for itself to assist, as this could likely worsen an already dire humanitarian situation.

Developing Responsible Governance

Proper governance derives from building transparent state institutions that serve the state’s citizens, while behaving responsibly in the regional and global arenas. Local ethnic identity should be a consideration in developing any governmental structure. An inclusive government is essential to stability in that individuals or groups who feel that it does not represent their interests may become disenfranchised and resort to violence to achieve power.³² Reconciliation is an important aspect of governance. Any attempt to form a permanent government should work towards addressing the population’s grievances and promoting reconciliation between the different identity groups within that population. This reconciliation effort is necessary to fostering long-term stability.

Developing responsible governance requires strengthening the accountability of the government at all levels and encouraging participation in local government.³³ This will only

³⁰ Ibid., 6–7.

³¹ Ghani and Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States*, 107–112.

³² Haims, et al., *Breaking the Failed-State Cycle*, 17.

³³ Ibid.

happen if the governed population views the national and local governments as having legitimacy, which, in turn, requires the people to be part of the mechanism that creates the government institutions. States also gain legitimacy through their ability to maintain order and to provide public services.³⁴ This is where the international community must avoid contributing to the aid complex described above.

Fostering Sustainable Development

Fostering sustainable economic development as part of a state building effort can reduce the likelihood of a country regressing to instability.³⁵ Bouchat claims that, in Africa, general instability stems from two basic challenges that are within the peoples' ability to control. These are the lack of good governance and a sustainable economic system.³⁶ The international community should assist a nascent government in formulation of policies to stimulate economic growth at all levels.

To help stimulate economic growth and development, a transitional government could implement policies that favor a return to pre-conflict levels. It must also make a heavy investment in human capital by strengthening its secondary education system.³⁷ This investment, along with repatriation of those who left the country, can help offset the intellectual drain from the country.

Economic recovery in failed states generally progresses in three phases. The first is financial stabilization, where the transitional government enacts policies to reduce the inflation caused by conflict and revive the private economy in the country. Rehabilitation and

³⁴ Katia Papagianni, "Participation and State Legitimation," in *Building States to Build Peace*, ed. Charles T. Call (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 55–6.

³⁵ U.S. Agency for International Development, "A Guide to Economic Growth in Post-Conflict Countries," *U.S. Agency for International Development*, January 2009, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO408.pdf (accessed 3 November 2011), 1.

³⁶ Bouchat, *Security and Stability*, 13.

³⁷ Donald R. Snodgrass, "Restoring Economic Functioning in Failed States," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 260.

reconstruction follows, with the establishment of security, resettlement of displaced citizens, and rebuilding of infrastructure. The third phase of economic recovery involves the development of the country's human capital and natural resources. This development allows the recovering state to sustain itself over the long run.³⁸

Economic recovery takes time and requires resources from external donors. It may take two to five years to complete the reconstruction of the infrastructure necessary to sustain growth.³⁹ International donors could introduce large amounts of capital to stimulate small business growth. The state should establish a means to generate revenue for national-level projects. Economic development should not exceed the capacity of the national government. In the short run, quick liberalization of markets may outpace the capability of the government to build effective institutions to manage the growth. State building efforts should consider the proper sequencing of economic and governmental reforms to avoid one outpacing the other, leading to further chaos.⁴⁰

Reforming the Security Sector

Security is a prerequisite for any substantial improvement in stability and its establishment should be the first priority of any state building effort.⁴¹ Several different components constitute security sector reform, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; recruiting, training, and employing military and police forces; establishing an effective corrections system; and implementing arms control.

State builders should pursue disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants to improve the security situation. Following a negotiated political settlement between

³⁸ Ibid., 260–2.

³⁹ Ibid., 262.

⁴⁰ Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State Building,” 27.

⁴¹ Bouchat, *Security and Stability*, 87.

the groups, the state builders face the task of implementing disarmament.⁴² As groups disarm, the potential for power imbalances and “score settling” could exist. Following disarmament and demobilization, the former fighters would need to reintegrate into society, which should have a corresponding economic program to provide work for these individuals. Sequencing disarmament and development activities in such a way to offer former combatants opportunities other than a return to fighting are critical to building stability.

Building new security institutions, such as defense and police forces, is another critical aspect of security sector reform. In many cases, no effective national-level security mechanism exists in fragile or failing states. Building these new institutions often becomes the responsibility of conventional forces operating in support of the stability operation.

Another essential aspect of security sector reform is the establishment of a functioning corrections system. The corrections system supports the maintenance of rule of law by adjudicating legal cases and providing places to hold those guilty of legal violations. It also provides a means of rehabilitation, preparing former criminals to become productive members of society.

Arms control is necessary to curb access to weapons, promoting a more secure environment. An availability of weapons undermines a government’s ability to secure its people by giving militias the means to provide that service, especially in isolated regions.⁴³ It also creates tension between armed factions and government security forces. For these reasons, arms control, much like disarmament and demobilization, becomes an important component of security sector reform.

⁴² Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers, and the Termination of Armed Conflicts*, Adelphi Paper, International Institute for Strategic Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9–11.

⁴³ Kiflemariam Gebrewold and Siobhan Byrne, "Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn: Reducing the Demand," in *East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance*, ed. Dorina A. Bekoe (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 25.

Assessment of the Traditional Model: Somalia

The “traditional” model for state building is thorough and appears to be a plausible solution for most cases. In Somalia, however, stability did not result from application of this model. State building efforts included attempts to improve governance and development, as well as security sector reform, but still fell short of achieving appreciable stability.

Most state building efforts since 1991 sought to accommodate existing power holders, the warlords. However, in some instances, the conditions in Somalia were more conducive to pursue a strategy of encouraging formation of new political institutions. These two tracks of building governance do not necessarily complement each other. When high-level diplomats met with militia leaders and warlords, they bestowed legitimacy on those actors and reinforced their power base. However, the international community has also engaged other local leaders, including clan elders, businessmen, and women’s groups to encourage development of a more grassroots governance. Militia leaders saw this other interaction as a threat to their power and attempted to prevent its success. Similarly, local leaders felt intimidated by the warlords. In the early 1990s, the presence of foreign troops in Somali further weakened the militia leaders’ power. These contradictory situations had the effect of preventing any form of effective governance from taking shape in Somalia.⁴⁴ The approach of encouraging the formation of new government institutions works best for building an inclusive government that is more legitimate in the eyes of its citizens. The Somali challenge is that the TFG, in its current form, is largely a power-sharing institution that consists of many former warlords, thus making the structure unpopular with many Somalis. Somali citizens should be part of any process that creates a new governmental structure to replace the TFG.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia*, 61–2.

⁴⁵ Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration*, 26.

Economic development leads to better opportunities for the largely unemployed population, many of whom participate in criminal activity as a means to survive. Development also leads to improved physical infrastructure and educational opportunities, both of which are necessary for sustained stability and prosperity. Years of war wrecked Somalia's infrastructure and economy, allowing criminal elements and militias to provide basic services normally provided by the state. Small business owners find themselves paying exorbitant fees to these groups for protection. Moving goods and products between the urban centers is difficult because of the threat of banditry in the countryside. No educational or job opportunities and an overabundance of weapons forced many young Somalis to join criminal groups and militias to support themselves and their families. These poor conditions led to emigration by many professionals, such as engineers, doctors, and educators from Somalia. State building efforts have not addressed the dire economic situation in Somalia.

The traditional state building model falls short when considering security sector reform. It does not take into account scenarios where one or more of the belligerents is a violent extremist organization, such as al-Shabaab. Current disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration models recognize the need to include all combatant parties in the peace process. Extremist organizations generally have no role in the future of a nascent state. Their presence, extremist ideology, and lack of willingness to see other points of view make them a source of instability that the new government needs to counter. In these cases, the state should undertake a deradicalizing program, in addition to reforms across the three governmental sectors. The traditional state building model described above may not work for Somalia, unless it is coupled with an effective deradicalization program for Islamic extremists.

A Refined State Building Model

The current state building model does not solve the problem of creating stability in Somalia and needs further refinement. The international community should assist the TFG in

deradicalizing the al-Shabaab extremist organization while also enabling the TFG to connect with the Somali citizens, fostering economic development, and establishing lasting security. The al-Shabaab threat creates a security environment hostile to both development and effective governance. Deradicalization requires a comprehensive program across all three governmental sectors. Within the security sector, the TFG should disrupt al-Shabaab operations. Effective governance would address the Somali grievances that al-Shabaab exploits to recruit new members. The TFG should work to create economic opportunities to both reduce the base from which al-Shabaab recruits and to offer employment to those members who wish to reform and become productive members of Somali society.

The Importance of Deradicalization

Deradicalization refers to the manner in which individuals or groups cease to adhere to extremist ideologies, leave extremist organizations, and conclude that it is unacceptable to use violence to attempt to achieve social change.⁴⁶ A truly deradicalized individual undergoes a change in his or her underlying beliefs.⁴⁷ Disengagement is an alternate process whereby a radical ceases to engage in radical behavior without changing the core radical beliefs.⁴⁸ Clearly, it is more desirable to deradicalize an extremist, since mere disengagement leaves that individual susceptible to returning to radical behavior. Long-term stability in Somalia requires the deradicalization of the “true believers” in extremism, preventing their return to violence. The two processes are not mutually exclusive; a deradicalization program may include disengagement as its first step.

⁴⁶ Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy J. Ghez, and Christopher Boucek, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 1.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

Extremists generally follow a particular path towards deradicalization. Some triggering event becomes the entry point into the process. This event is often traumatic and leads to the individual questioning the radical ideology. The introspection and questioning leads the person to turn away from the radical organization, resulting in disengagement. Disengagement allows the person to develop a new worldview and identity and begin reintegrating into society. Upon reintegration, the former radical may or may not return to extremism. If a significant social support network exists, as well as employment opportunities, and society accepts the individual's commitment to reform, then there is a high likelihood that deradicalization would succeed.⁴⁹ A possible approach to deradicalization includes employing moderate imams within the corrections system to convey mainstream Muslim ideologies to incarcerated extremists.

Islamic extremism poses a major challenge for deradicalization. First, religious ideology is the primary driver behind the radicals' use of violence. Because of this, extremists feel that they have divine endorsement to use violence to achieve social change. They believe they will receive rewards for their violent behavior in the afterlife.⁵⁰ The underlying religious base for radicalism requires an ideological counter that must be a component of the deradicalization program. A legitimate Muslim authority should provide that ideological counter. In the case of Somalia, the TFG could reach out to moderate Somali Muslim scholars and imams to participate in the program, providing more mainstream interpretations of Islam in an effort to encourage the radicals to abandon their previous beliefs.

Several deradicalization programs have resulted in varied degrees of success around the world, including in Saudi Arabia and Singapore. These programs have had success in reducing extremism in those countries and could work in Somalia as well.⁵¹ Although there is no guarantee

⁴⁹ Ibid., 12–26.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 28–9.

⁵¹ Susan Mohammed, "To Deprogram a Jihadist," *Maclean's*, (February 2009): 10.

of success, a deradicalization program, focused on al-Shabaab, could be instrumental in putting Somalia on a trajectory towards stability.

Another aspect of deradicalization involves providing economic opportunities to individuals to dissuade their turn to extremism. Radical ideology requires a population susceptible to adopting the extremist narrative in order to recruit and sustain its existence. This alternate ideology often exploits the population's grievances, offering an alternate worldview more appealing than its current situation. In Somalia, with its large disenfranchised population, extremists are easily able to recruit new members by offering means of economic opportunity. The radical movement can pay individuals to fight for them, while the TFG has been unsuccessful in creating an environment conducive to economic growth. Because of this, any deradicalization effort should include efforts to provide opportunities more appealing to individuals than violence.

Somaliland: A Model of Grassroots State Building

Somaliland provides an ideal case study to test the validity of the refined state building model. Although no conventional military forces intervened in Somaliland, it is still a useful example to demonstrate how government reforms, economic development, security sector reform, and deradicalization can lead to stability.

Background

The region of northwestern Somalia formerly under British control during the colonial era constitutes present-day Somaliland.⁵² People from all major clans live in the area. However, the Isaq clan makes up the majority of the population. Although Somaliland's drive for independence has roots in the colonial era, the major push occurred throughout the 1980s.

⁵² For a detailed account of the events that preceded Somaliland's declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991 refer to Mark Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland* (London: Progressio, 2008).

Following independence and union with Somalia in 1961, the people of Somaliland became dissatisfied with the central government. Throughout the 1960s, the Somali government adopted policies that many Somalilanders saw as unfair. These included lesser investment in development of the north, underrepresentation in the central government, and economic policies that favored the clans in southern Somalia. Disenfranchisement continued throughout the 1970s, during which time the government did little to assist northerners during the drought period of 1974-5.⁵³

During the Somali war with Ethiopia in the late 1970s over the disputed Ogaden region, many Somalilanders hoped that Somalia would recover the rich pastoral lands of the region to support their livelihoods. Unfortunately, Somalia's defeat during the conflict did nothing to help the northerners. This, compounded by the large number of refugees that moved from Ethiopia to the northwestern regions of Somalia, further exacerbated their disaffection with the regime. The Somali government settled most of the refugees, who were not from the Isaq clan, into camps on historic Isaq territory. The government provided assistance to the refugees at the expense of not assisting the native population. Furthermore, the Barre regime recruited many of the refugees to maintain security in the north.⁵⁴ By the end of the 1970s, the Somalilanders were reaching a breaking point.

In 1981, a group of northwestern Somali expatriates, consisting largely of educated professionals living in London, announced the formation of the Somali National Movement, a political-military organization with the goal of overthrowing the Barre regime. The following year, the Somali National Movement relocated to Ethiopia to begin an insurgency, focused on the region of Somaliland. Through 1988, the Movement's military actions consisted primarily of small cross-border raids against Somali government facilities, and political assassinations in

⁵³ Ibid., 54.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 54-5.

Somaliland.⁵⁵ In May 1988, they launched a large-scale attack against Somali forces in the northern cities of Burco and Hergeysa. By military standards, the assault was a failure. It did provide a strategic victory by generating a response from the Somali government that led to the northern population supporting the Somali National Movement. The government's response included the indiscriminate bombing of the two cities, the lack of differentiation between civilian and military targets, and the arming of refugees to fight the Isaq clan. The actions by the Somali government were more effective in raising support for the Somali National Movement than all of the Movement's activities prior to 1988.⁵⁶

In 1990, the Somali National Movement formed an alliance with other major insurgencies throughout Somalia to fight against Barre's regime. As the militias in the south ousted Barre in January 1991, the Movement defeated the remnants of the Somali military in northwest Somalia. At this point, the situation in northern and southern Somalia diverged in a dramatic way. The northwestern region of Somalia became the state of Somaliland, declaring independence in May 1991, while the remainder of the country slipped further into chaos and civil war.

Governance in Somaliland

One of the key differences between the Somali National Movement and other clan-based organizations in Somalia in 1991 is its members shared vision of the future. The Somali National Movement published a manifesto outlining its political vision. It recognized that the clan system in Somalia was essential to maintaining stability and that any Somali government should blend the functions of governance with traditional Somali social values. The manifesto called for representative democracy, human rights, free speech, a mixed economy, neutral foreign policy,

⁵⁵ Ibid., 61.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 62.

and the removal of foreign military influence from the region. Somalilanders accomplished this by instituting a bicameral legislature with the upper house occupied by elders of the different clans.⁵⁷ In contrast, no other militia groups developed a vision for a post-Barre stable Somalia.

Throughout the 1980s, the Somali National Movement underwent a number of peaceful rotations of leadership, which further reinforced the organization's adherence to democratic principles. The Movement used consensus between the elders, another aspect of traditional Somali society, to make decisions. Through leadership rotations and consensus building, the Movement avoided becoming an autocratic organization. Another key factor in the democratic nature of the Somali National Movement was the fact that civilian politicians led the organization instead of military strongmen. Additionally, the Movement's tactical forces organized along clan lines and operated in those clans' regions, reducing the likelihood of clan violence and abuses. The clan elders played key roles in the oversight of the fighting forces, which facilitated demobilization following Barre's ouster.⁵⁸ The Somali National Movement, largely supported by the Isaq clan in northwestern Somalia, would play a key role in establishing the new government of the nascent Republic of Somaliland.

As the civil war continued unabated in southern Somalia, the Somali National Movement set to the task of building effective government institutions. Their new legislative structure guaranteed democratic representations while retaining traditional Somali societal forms of governance. They also established an office of the Presidency, elected by the people. Somaliland developed its own constitution. Despite numerous difficulties during its first few years, including the threat of civil war, Somaliland has maintained a rather stable, effective form of governance, largely based on the democratic practices of the Somali National Movement. Given the socio-

⁵⁷ Ibid., 63–4.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 67–9.

cultural realities of Somalia, Somaliland adopted a form of government best suited for balancing traditional state functions with Somali cultural considerations.⁵⁹

Economic Development in Somaliland

Somaliland has struggled economically since its inception, but has been able to sustain itself through a system of taxation and reliance on diaspora remittances. Its lack of international recognition severely restricts the amount of foreign aid that it receives compared to Somalia. Somaliland has had success in operating the port of Berbera, which Ethiopia uses for international trade as well. The port generates funds for Somaliland as well as providing the node for the export of livestock to the Arabian Peninsula. The Republic's capital of Hargeysa has seen an increase in small business, along with supermarkets and other economic opportunities. Hargeysa has also seen a large influx of citizens from the countryside, seeking work in the city. By all standards, Hargeysa is now one of the safest capitals in Africa.⁶⁰

Somaliland has also rebuilt much of its infrastructure damaged during the civil war. In addition to the seaport, it reopened its airport to international flights. Educational opportunities continue to improve with two universities and an increasing number of other schools. Somaliland's ability to provide adequate health care to its citizens continues to improve as well.⁶¹

Security Sector Reform in Somaliland

Security sector reform in Somaliland has been instrumental in creating the security and stability that allowed governance and development to grow and improve. Militias operated in Somaliland until 1993, when the country pursued an aggressive demobilization program. Clan elders, rather than politicians, agreed to and supervised the demobilization of militias in their

⁵⁹ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 94.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 98–9.

areas, which prevented them from coming under the control of strongmen following their own personal agendas.⁶² The organization along clan lines made it difficult to establish a unitary military after independence, although many former militiamen did join police forces in the major cities.⁶³

In addition to clan elder oversight of the demobilization process, a key factor in preventing former militiamen from returning to violence was economic opportunity. Former soldiers were able to find employment to support themselves and their families. Some joined the newly formed Somaliland military as well.

Deradicalization in Somaliland

Although extremist elements have a presence in Somaliland, they have been unable to become a destabilizing force in the Republic. This is due, in large part, to the fact that the stability and security present in Somaliland create an environment that is inhospitable to extremism. The Somaliland government and security apparatus has become effective in monitoring and curbing radical activity. Additionally, strained relations with countries on the Arabian Peninsula have created a general perception among Somalilanders that extremism is an “un-Somali” form of Islam. Somalilanders also view their work to prevent radicalism in support of the U.S.-led War on Terror as a step to achieving recognition as a sovereign state.⁶⁴

Somaliland offers an example of the interdependent relationship between stability and reduced extremist activity. The government’s reconciliation activities and its ability to address the citizens’ grievances created an environment that prevented radical elements from carrying out operations or recruiting effectively. The economic opportunities available to Somalilanders

⁶² Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland*, 69.

⁶³ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 95–6.

⁶⁴ Menkhaus, “Somalia and Somaliland,” 38.

reduce the base from which extremist organizations can recruit new members. Although some terror incidents have occurred within Somaliland, they are nowhere near as widespread as in Somalia.⁶⁵ This shows that effective governance, supporting economic opportunity, with professional security services are essential elements to neutralizing the threat of radicalism and promoting stability.

Conclusions from the Case of Somaliland

Somaliland serves as a useful case study to validate the refined state building model. It demonstrates that stability results from responsible governance, economic development, security sector reform, and deradicalization. The Somaliland government's commitment to democratic practices ensures that it can effectively perform the roles of the state while also including traditional Somali institutions. The government built institutions for oversight of economic development. Governance and development mutually support each other, creating opportunities for Somaliland's citizens to improve their quality of life.

Security is a prerequisite for instituting effective governance and, by extension, economic development. Clan elders served a key role in the demobilization process in Somaliland. Former militia became part of the Somaliland Security Forces and worked to prevent the emergence of extremism. Deradicalization is a key component of preventing the threat of extremism. Somaliland shows that, even though extremists are present, governance, development, and security can make the area too hostile for their continued operations. Extremist groups will be unable to recruit new members or to exploit grievances to propagate their ideologies. In the end, Somaliland demonstrates that the refined model, including deradicalization efforts, can lead to stability.

⁶⁵ For a description of some of the terrorist attacks that occurred in Somaliland refer to Menkhaus, "Somalia and Somaliland" and Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*.

Applying the Lessons of Somaliland to Somalia

Why did the traditional model of state building fail in Somalia? The case study shows that weak governance and lack of deradicalization are the primary causes. Colonial forms of governance created the capacity, or lack thereof, of the Somalis to govern themselves after independence. The Italians and British both used forms of “indirect rule” to govern their colonies, but to different extents. A large expatriate Italian population in Italian Somaliland required more Italian involvement in administering the region. The Italians rewarded local chiefs who governed and maintained order according to Italian desires. Local administrators became reliant on external support to govern. The British, on the other hand, had very few expatriates in British Somaliland, allowing the local population to govern themselves with little outside intervention.⁶⁶ This governance model ultimately led to a situation where modern Somaliland has the experience and institutional knowledge for effective governance, while former Italian possessions do not.

After the collapse, the international community undertook several efforts to broker an end to the civil war in Somalia. Some efforts failed simply because the warlords were not interested in securing a power sharing arrangement. They sought to defeat one another through military means, which proved impossible, prolonging the fighting.⁶⁷ Foreign meddling also prevented stability. In one case, Ethiopian officials convinced several key Somali figures to quit one peace conference and denounce its agreements, further preventing consensus between the factions in Mogadishu on how to move forward.⁶⁸ Foreign meddling also prevented the success of the Transitional National Government, formed in 2000, which collapsed after two years of unpopular rule.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 30.

⁶⁷ Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration*, 21–2.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 22–3.

⁶⁹ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 82.

As with the Transitional National Government, foreign meddling played a part in the creation of the TFG. The two most influential Intergovernmental Authority on Development members, Ethiopia and Kenya, favored a settlement that did not result in a too-powerful Somali government. Both countries control areas occupied by ethnic Somalis and feared a new sense of pan-Somali nationalism that could pose a threat to their internal securities. Additionally, Ethiopia needs access to the sea through Somali territory, where it is easier to deal with relatively weak clans rather than a strong Somali state.⁷⁰ The resulting TFG, while better than previous arrangements, remained weak, with little capacity to effectively perform state functions.⁷¹ This continued governmental weakness was unable to put a stop to clan violence, eventually enabling the rise of the Islamic Courts in Somalia.

Efforts to build governance in Somaliland proved more effective than in Somalia. From the start, reconciliation was a critical component of Somaliland's governance efforts. Their model of governance would likely work in Somalia. The Somaliland bicameral model ensures representation of the various clans, while also instituting traditional Somali cultural norms. A similar form in Somalia could help in creating consensus better than the current power-sharing arrangement among former warlords.

In Somalia, a number of factors combine to make disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration the most challenging aspect of security sector reform, including the widespread availability of weapons, the "alternative economy" created by conflict, and the ongoing violence between the TFG, al-Shabaab, and clan-based militias.⁷² The demand for small arms derives from individuals and groups providing their own security because of the inability of the Somali government to do so. Regional approaches to curb the demand for weapons have proven

⁷⁰ Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration*, 23–4.

⁷¹ Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 83–5.

⁷² Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation*, 11–20.

unsuccessful, as proliferation remains a considerable problem.⁷³ A vast supply of weapons moved into the region through black market networks, fed by the unregulated export of weapons from the former Communist Bloc following the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ Many weapons are simply leftovers from Somalia's previous internal and external conflicts, dating back to the 1970s.

The prolonged fighting in Somalia has created a firmly entrenched social and economic order compounding the difficulties of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Some clan-based militias rose to power through violence. Disarming and demobilizing may force some of these groups to cede power, thus giving them an incentive not to participate in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Additionally, the nonexistent economic system in Somalia provides no viable alternative for earning a living and encourages people to join militias for economic, rather than ideological reasons. Possession of weapons not only provides physical security, it provides economic security as well.⁷⁵

There have been virtually no deradicalization efforts in Somalia. In Somaliland, effective governance and economic development fostered conditions unfavorable to Islamic extremist recruitment. There is little incentive for Somalilanders to turn to violence as a means of employment. Somaliland enjoys "deradicalization thru development." Lack of strong governance and development in Somalia would likely not create these conditions. State builders would likely need to institute a more aggressive form of deradicalization.

Saudi Arabia uses a prison-based deradicalization model that may be effective in Somalia. Saudi Arabia has experienced success in implementing deradicalization programs. The well-funded Saudi program uses Islamic scholars to provide more mainstream interpretations of

⁷³ Gebrewold and Byrne, "Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn," 21–5.

⁷⁴ Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation*, 18–20.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 14–7.

Islam to the former extremists. In addition to religious instruction, detainees receive exposure to more progressive culture, including video games, sports, and room service.⁷⁶ Of the 3000 detainees that volunteered for the program, only nine graduates have since been arrested for returning to extremism, with another 35 arrested for other security-related crimes.⁷⁷ Although the program is only eight to twelve weeks in length, it has provided an overall success rate of 98.5 percent.

The Saudi prison-based deradicalization model is a holistic program that involves the families of the inmates. To graduate, the detainees and the heads of their families must sign documentation renouncing extremism. The program emphasizes dialogue and discussion to manage conflict and, most importantly, is sanctioned by the Saudi religious order.⁷⁸ The Saudis provide grants to the graduates to help them start new lives. One participant, jailed for a botched suicide attack in Iraq, claims to have begun questioning radical ideology after exposure to the moderate clerics' teachings.⁷⁹ The Saudi program assumes that improper religious education played a role in the radicalization process, a deficiency that the program seeks to correct.⁸⁰ A similar program may achieve success in Somalia.

In the event of a military intervention in Somalia, U.S. conventional forces could support the efforts of the TFG-led coalition to stabilize Somalia, as part of a comprehensive approach that connects Somali citizens with the Transitional Federal Government, fosters economic development, reforms the security sector, and deradicalizes al-Shabaab extremists to restore

⁷⁶ Mohammed, "To Deprogram a Jihadist," 9–10.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 10.

⁷⁸ Kimberlyn Leary, "Engaging Extremists: Diplomacy through Deradicalization," *Harvard Kennedy School Review* 9 (Spring 2009): 114.

⁷⁹ Mohammed, "To Deprogram a Jihadist," 10.

⁸⁰ Leary, "Engaging Extremists," 115.

stability. The ultimate outcome of this stability operation would likely be a stronger Somali state. Thus, state building and stability operations are complementary with respect to Somalia.

The Role of U.S. Conventional Forces

There are a number of functions that the U.S. Joint Force performs that would support the process of creating stability in Somalia. First and foremost, U.S. forces would operate in support of the TFG, most likely as a Joint Task Force coordinating directly with the Department of State Special Envoy to Somalia, if serving, or with the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya. This senior representative from the State Department would provide the strategic connection between U.S. forces and the TFG in Mogadishu. Additionally, U.S. forces would coordinate with the African Union Mission in Somalia, possibly becoming part of the African Union Mission's command and control structure. This linkage between the U.S. conventional forces, the African Union Mission in Somalia, the TFG, and the U.S. Department of State would create the unity of effort necessary to ensure a successful stability operation.

The Operational Approach

The operational approach would begin with an understanding and appreciation of the U.S. policy goals for the intervention in Somalia. These goals could be the establishment of a stable and secure environment throughout Somalia, increased Somali government and economic development capacity at local, regional, and national levels, and alleviation of the ongoing humanitarian crisis. The goals should not attempt to redraw Somalia's borders to exclude Somaliland and Puntland. With this in mind, the Geographic Combatant Commander for the region, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, would develop specific end state conditions that should exist at the end of military operations supporting the policy goals.

The military end state conditions could include the marginalized influence of extremist organizations, increased capacity of the TFG to provide essential services to its citizens, violence minimized to negligible levels, increased freedom of movement for international aid

organizations and Somali citizens, and increased legitimacy of the TFG. Once these conditions become present in Somalia, the conventional military mission may terminate based on the recommendation of the Combatant Commander.

Specific operational objectives leading to these conditions could include the delivery of humanitarian assistance; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia elements; neutralization of extremist organizations; establishment of civil security, including development of a corrections system; restoration of basic services, including power, water, emergency services, and sanitation; and the provision of security to interorganizational partners to allow them the freedom to operate throughout Somalia.

In accordance with the refined state building theory, the mission to stabilize Somalia would likely proceed along four separate lines of effort: Governance, Development, Security, and Deradicalization. U.S. conventional forces would have a role to play along all four lines, but the bulk of their effort will focus on the Security line of effort. These lines of effort work in concert with one another to pursue the set of end state conditions that support the U.S. policy goals for the mission in Somalia. A constant dialogue between the military command, the TFG, the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the senior State Department representative would be necessary to ensure that all these stakeholders synchronize their efforts along these lines. Ultimately, all agencies would support the TFG, who should be the approval authority for actions geared towards stability in Somalia. However, in practice, it is likely that the national interests of the different participating nations could play a role in shaping the activities along the four lines of effort. The Combatant Commander would need to maintain a balance between the competing national interests and the overall goals of the mission to ensure success.

Along the four lines of effort would be a sequence of activities that the forces should perform to achieve the policy goals. Of these activities, some will be critical to the overall accomplishment of the operational objectives. These decisive points will likely include the establishment of an initial operational capability of some portion of the Somali security forces;

the dismantling of the al-Shabaab command and logistics structure; the demobilization of militias; the establishment of a corrections system; and the restoration of basic services to the Somali citizens.

The Comprehensive Approach

Any stability operation requires unity of effort between all stakeholders, including U.S. military forces, other U.S. governmental agencies and departments, international forces in the area of operations, and, most importantly, the indigenous government and its peoples, a concept as the “comprehensive approach.” State building in Somalia is a form of stability operation and the command and control and cooperation structures should reflect the comprehensive approach. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams of Afghanistan and Iraq offer a useful model for incorporating this approach into operations in Somalia.

A possible model for Somalia could include a primary coordination center in Mogadishu to facilitate unity of effort between all stakeholders at national level, including the TFG, the top-level U.S. and African Union military commands, the other U.S. and international governmental agencies, and the non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations. To complement this, there could be coordination centers at each of Somalia’s eighteen administrative subdivisions, or *gobolka*.⁸¹

To be most effective, the structure of each coordination center requires military and civilian components.⁸² The leader of each center could be an appointed representative of the TFG. This ensures that the center operates within the framework of the Somali government. Other key personnel would include liaison officers from the U.S. force operating in the area, the African

⁸¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World Factbook: Somalia*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html> (accessed 25 October 2011).

⁸² *Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations*, Appendix F, provides an overview of the roles, operations, and organization of Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Union Mission force, and the Somali security force. The center could also have subject matter experts to oversee economic, agricultural, governance, and security programs.

These coordination centers could become the focal point for all stability operations in Somalia. U.S. conventional forces would need to coordinate operations with the appropriate center. This coordination achieves “buy in” from the relevant stakeholders, most importantly the TFG, avoiding the image of an occupying force. Somali leadership within the center ensures that all operations support the policies of the TFG.

Support to Governance

Support to governance entails those operations that facilitate the TFG’s strengthening of its legitimacy, promoting reconciliation, providing basic services to the Somali citizens, and building the state institutions that ensure the government will be able to sustain itself in a responsible manner in the international arena. Legitimacy arises from the TFG’s ability to provide critical services to its people, including humanitarian assistance, medical and emergency services. Here, conventional forces would be most effective in establishing security for the humanitarian assistance transportation and distribution efforts of the TFG. Conventional forces could also assist in providing medical assistance to the Somali citizens, in conjunction with local physicians.

Throughout the stabilization operation, U.S. forces should operate in a supporting role to the TFG to best support its governance. It is essential to connect the TFG to local forms of governance throughout Somalia. The U.S. should ensure that it does not become the sole face of authority in the Somali hinterlands, further widening the gap between Somali citizens and the central government. U.S. roles would likely consist of securing key government officials and government sites, supporting any elections, and operating local coordination centers, where the TFG, local leaders, non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations, and military forces synchronize their actions.

Support to Economic Development

U.S. forces would likely have a role to play in supporting economic development in Somalia. Initial efforts could focus on securing key market places to allow the small-scale economy to function effectively. Military forces may play a role in initial engineering efforts to build new or repair existing infrastructure, including roadways, airports and seaports, water and electricity distribution networks, and telecommunications infrastructure. As private companies begin to take over the engineering efforts, U.S. conventional forces would likely participate in providing security at their work sites.

Support to Security Sector Reform

U.S. conventional forces would be most useful in supporting the TFG by carrying out activities along the Security line of effort. It is useful to subdivide the Security line of effort into several sub-lines of effort, including Somali Security Force Development; Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration; Arms Control; Corrections; and Combat Operations. Counterterrorism is a possible additional sub-line of effort, but U.S. Special Operations Forces are more likely to carry out these missions than conventional forces.

The African Union Mission currently conducts Somali Security Force Development. U.S. forces may find themselves supporting the African Union Mission in this role. Likely activities could include recruiting and initial entry training of Somali Security Forces, the fielding of and training on new equipment, and professionalism, including operating leader development institutions.

U.S. forces would likely play a significant role in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. To avoid upsetting the balance of power between armed factions in Somalia, there should be a detailed program calling for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts in an orderly manner. Conventional forces will likely play a role in carrying out a census of former fighters, collecting and safeguarding weapons, and providing security of former combatants until

they fully reintegrate into Somali society. In addition to the weapons collected through the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process, U.S. forces could participate in arms control, including seizing weapons caches, registering serviceable weapons for transfer to Somali Security Forces, and destruction of excess weapons.

Somalia needs a functioning corrections system to support rule of law and civil security. The U.S. role in supporting corrections could include securing courts, collecting evidence on criminal elements for prosecution by the Somali court system, and training Somali corrections officers on the procedures for operating an internment facility. The corrections system would become a key aspect of the deradicalization effort, as many former al-Shabaab fighters are likely to become part of the system.

Finally, U.S. conventional forces could carry out limited combat operations, ranging from simple cordon and search operations to detain militants to larger operations to defeat al-Shabaab elements and other militia forces. The U.S. may conduct these operations unilaterally, or in conjunction with the African Union and Somali Security Forces. They may also support Special Operations Forces in conducting counterterrorism operations.

Support to Deradicalization Efforts

Deradicalization is a key component of the state building and stabilization process in Somalia. U.S. conventional forces could play a role in this process, supporting the TFG in carrying out its deradicalization efforts. American support to deradicalization is similar to the support to the corrections system and governance. The Somalis could engage local moderate Muslim leaders to provide alternative interpretations of Islam to extremists. This would most likely take place upon incarceration of al-Shabaab fighters. U.S. forces could provide security for these moderate Muslims. They could also assist in securing the facilities where the programs take place. Because of the nature of the program and its intent to deprive al-Shabaab of a base of fighters, the program would likely be a direct threat to the extremist organization's existence. Al-

Shabaab would likely target the moderate clerics for assassination and the corrections facilities for attack. Security throughout this process becomes paramount.

U.S. conventional forces would likely have the intelligence assets at their disposal to identify the al-Shabaab leadership, command, and logistical structures for targeting. Operations to kill or capture radicals would rely, in part, on U.S.-supplied intelligence. While many of the rank and file of al-Shabaab fight as a means of employment and are likely susceptible to deradicalization, many of the core leadership have fully subscribed to the radical ideology and will most likely not respond to deradicalization.⁸³ In these cases, U.S. forces can expect them to fight to the death and should prepare to engage in combat with those individuals.

Sequencing Tactical Actions in Time and Space

Activities that support governance, development, security sector reform, and deradicalization illustrate actions linked in purpose. Additionally, planners should sequence these activities in time and space along the four lines of effort to build an effective operational approach to stabilize Somalia.

In the summer of 2011, al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu, citing that it was altering its strategy to focus on other areas of Somalia.⁸⁴ Despite the group's claims, it is likely that the African Union and Somali Security Forces are achieving success in their fight against the organization. Regardless, Mogadishu has become a more secure city than in recent years and could serve as a suitable base of operations for a U.S. conventional force intervention. Its international airport provides access to strategic lines of communication, and proximity to the

⁸³ Hanson, "Backgrounder."

⁸⁴ United Press International, "Al-Shabaab Leaves Mogadishu," http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2011/08/06/Al-Shabaab-leaves-Mogadishu/UPI-82931312641929/ (accessed 12 January 2012).

TFG allows for better coordination and unity of effort. Thus, maintaining the security of Mogadishu becomes the first decisive point of the operation.

Operations could then proceed along three general axes out of Mogadishu. The decisive operation should proceed along an axis that extends northwest from Mogadishu into the Juba and Shebelle River Valley. The fertile land here is critical to promoting Somalia's agricultural industry. This area contains the bulk of the arable land in the country and could support the Somali population by reducing reliance on external food aid.⁸⁵ Additionally, the Juba and Shebelle River Valley is also the primary base of operations for al-Shabaab. U.S. conventional forces would likely undertake the majority of their combat operations in this region where improved security would facilitate progress along all four lines of effort.

One shaping operation could extend along an axis from Mogadishu to the port city of Kismaayo, south of Mogadishu. Securing this city is important to maintaining control of the port facilities, which historically have been a primary export point for goods from Somalia. Securing Kismaayo would support efforts to promote economic development. A second shaping operation could extend along an axis north from Mogadishu into the interior of Somalia. Operations along this particular facilitate the extension of governance and essential service into the Somali hinterland.

The lack of improved road networks in the interior of Somalia necessitates the synchronization of operations with the climatic cycles of the country. Rain degrades cross-country mobility, particularly in the Somali interior. Operations into the Somali interior, particularly the valley between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers, should occur in the dry season. The dry season in Somalia is between the months of October and March.⁸⁶ Beginning operations in October or November allows forces maximum time to conduct operations while also creating

⁸⁵ Wisner, "Living with the Somali Land," 39–41.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

enough time for farmers to plant their crops prior to the next rainy season. The six-month dry season should be the time to carry out operations against al-Shabaab in the Juba and Shebelle River Valley as well as to establish security for agricultural activities. The regions north of Mogadishu typically do not experience a rainy season so timing of operations should not be as much of a consideration as they are further south.⁸⁷ Figure 1 depicts the sequencing of the three major operations in time and space. The decisive operation into the Juba and Shebelle River Valley would begin in October or November, followed by, or simultaneously with, a shaping operation to secure Kismaayo. Lastly, conventional forces could conduct shaping operations to extend security into the Somali hinterland north of Mogadishu.




Figure 1: The Operational Approach.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Ibid., 36–9.

⁸⁸ Map courtesy of Nations Online, <http://www.nationsonline.org/maps/somalia-political->

The Primacy of the Somali Government

U.S. conventional forces in Somalia could operate in support of a Somali-led effort. In many cases, U.S. forces would have better training and the necessary equipment to carry out these operations than do the Somali or African Union forces, but it is critical for the Somalis to take the lead at all times. In doing so, the Somali government increases both its capacity to provide for its citizens while also increasing the perception of legitimacy among the population. The people should see their government as much as possible to understand that it is there as the one legitimate central authority in the country. As the government increasingly becomes capable of carrying out the roles of the state, Somalia will become more stable.

Conclusion

Should U.S. conventional forces intervene in Somalia to assist in providing stability, they should support the Somali Transitional Federal Government in a comprehensive approach that connects Somali citizens with the TFG, fosters economic development, reforms the security sector, and implements a program to deradicalize al-Shabaab extremists. This comprehensive approach ensures unity of effort between the TFG, the U.S. military, the African Union Mission in Somalia, the U.S. government, as well as all non- and inter-governmental organizations operating in Somalia. U.S. forces could play a primary role in the security sector reform line of effort. They could also support all other lines of effort. U.S. forces can expect to carry out security force assistance, training and advising the Somali Security Forces, conducting combat operations against al-Shabaab, securing key government and economic infrastructure, and assisting the TFG in providing basic services to its citizens.

map.jpg (accessed 13 January 2012).

The example of Somaliland shows how stability is possible through reformed governance, development, deradicalization, and security sector reform. Although there was no external military intervention in Somaliland, the refined theory presented here is valid for Somalia. The primary difference is the presence of al-Shabaab, which necessitates a greater reliance on military forces to provide civil security. The presence of the extremist group also demands implementation of a deradicalization program, similar to the one in Saudi Arabia, to turn its rank and file members away from radical ideology and diminishing the organization's ability to recruit new members. By reducing the al-Shabaab threat to negligible levels, security returns to Somalia. Security is a key element to stability. The future stability of Somalia depends on the creation of a secure environment in which the Somali government can build its institutions to support economic development, giving hope and opportunity to its citizens.

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