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REPORT

# Optimizing the Defense Language Institute English Language Center

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## Preface

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The United States has an important policy interest in training foreign nationals in English because the English language serves as a foundation for aviation and international military operations and because much of the information highway is in English. U.S. operations with foreign nationals are greatly enhanced if those foreign nationals understand English. The Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) trains foreign nationals in English prior to their attending U.S. military education and training courses and plays a critical role in building partnerships. RAND was asked to evaluate demand, supply, pricing models, and other options to optimize DLIELC's output.

The research described in this report extended over five months, from September 2010 through January 2011.

The study was sponsored by the Air Force Language, Region and Culture Program Office, Policy (AF/A1DG), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Defense Language Office (OSD (P&R)/(DLO)). The research was conducted within the Manpower, Personnel, and Training Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE as part of a fiscal year 2010–2011 study, “Optimizing the Defense Language Institute English Language Center to Meet Current and Future Requirements.”

This report should be of interest to military leaders and staffs concerned with increasing the effectiveness of English language training of foreign military personnel and those responsible for programs related to building partnerships with other nations' militaries.

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## Summary

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### Introduction

The Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) plays an important role in the broad spectrum of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) security cooperation objectives as a key enabler and strategic engagement tool by training U.S. military and foreign students in English. However, the U.S. Air Force (USAF)—which is the organization's executive agent—needs a better understanding of DLIELC's cost structure and a capability to measure the mid- and long-term demand<sup>1</sup> for English language training (ELT) across the DoD and foreign partners.

In September 2010, the Air Force Language, Region and Culture Program Office, Policy (AF/A1DG), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Defense Language Office (OSD(P&R)/(DLO)) asked PAF to examine DLIELC to ensure that it is appropriately tasked, organized, operated, resourced, and managed to produce the ELT capability needed to effectively and efficiently meet DoD mission requirements.

To accomplish those objectives, the study included four broad tasks: (1) review prior studies, authorities, and governing documents pertaining to DLIELC; (2) develop a requirements process to identify and predict all the sources of student throughput, in sufficient detail to program resource needs; (3) consider options to improve the organization, reporting, and resourcing structure; and (4) assist DLIELC in its strategic planning.

To accomplish these tasks, we relied on student data from DLIELC from 2001 to 2010. To gather data from DLIELC, we used a question-and-answer process in which the team submitted a question to a designated DLIELC official, the question was then researched, and the answer and accompanying data were provided to the study team in a timely manner. In addition, we interviewed relevant officials. To identify best practices, we also reviewed pertinent regulations, directives, instructions, and policy documents. Finally, we conducted a comparative analysis with 12 similar organizations that had a security cooperation focus.

### Key Recommendations

Based on our analysis, we identified problems in eight critical management areas, which can be thought of in terms of the elements of effective organizations to which they correspond:

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<sup>1</sup> Mid-term demand is defined as Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) years. Long-term demand would start near the end of the FYDP and continue beyond.



1. **Policy.** DLIELC is governed by a maze of guidance. Additionally, that guidance does not necessarily reflect the reality of the circumstances within which it must operate and consequently inhibits effective oversight.
2. **Business Model/Requirements.** DLIELC lacks a robust requirements determination process, and the organization's business model is unable to meet variable demand.
3. **Financial Risk.** Current financial management practices expose ELT clients to need-less financial risk.
4. **Technology.** DLIELC should introduce new technologies at a quicker rate; their successful use could lower fixed and variable costs.
5. **Identity.** DLIELC has conflicting priorities that have led to contradictory views on the institution's identity (i.e., is it an academic, military, or government/policy institution?).
6. **Assessment.** The lack of a formal and functioning assessment/evaluation process inhibits DLIELC from being able to define and assess its own performance.
7. **Manpower.** The hiring process is unable to respond quickly to short-term and cyclical demand.
8. **Organization/Advocacy.** Importantly, the organization has had no clear institutional advocate, resulting in a lack of focused oversight within the DoD as it relates to ensuring the effective and efficient execution of ELT.

Our recommendations in each of these eight areas are listed in Table S.1.

## Implementation

Implementing changes in the above management areas will not only promote organizational effectiveness but will also help to ensure that DLIELC is provided with the resources it needs to fulfill its mission. An implementation plan is needed to integrate all the recommendations in a way that informs the leadership of Headquarters Air Education and Training Command (HQ AETC) and the DLIELC management of the implications of change throughout the organization (the matrix in Appendix C is provided for this purpose).

The implementation plan, shown in Table S.2, translates the study's key recommendations into 13 general outcomes. The key organization for most outcomes is DLIELC, but other agencies—the 37th Training Wing, HQ AETC, AF/A1DG, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)—are responsible for specific inputs to achieve the outcomes. Chapter Ten discusses the implementation plan in more detail, while Appendix C provides a guiding matrix. We summarize the 13 key outcomes in terms of the critical area and priority in Table S.2.

**Table S.1**  
**Recommendations**

Critical Area	Recommendations
Policy	<p>Fully review all applicable rules and regulations to ensure currency and appropriateness</p> <p>Create two instructions, a governing DoD instruction and a consolidated AF instruction, covering everything needed to grade, audit, govern, cost, and direct the organization</p> <p>Consider leveraging existing AETC processes and procedures where they may create opportunities to fully tap into AETC's resources and expertise</p> <p>Review existing rules and regulations to look for underutilized authorities and provisions that could be exercised to enhance DLIELC's effectiveness</p>
Business model/ requirements	<p>Institute a process to enable more accurate depiction of demand using the proposed model</p> <p>Reduce seasonal peaks by delaying certain categories of students</p> <p>Improve utilization of existing instructors by restricting leave during peak season</p> <p>Create "breathing space" within existing supply via possible relocation of U.S. Army students or by the creation of a "finishing class"</p> <p>Increase supply by utilizing proposed supply strategy</p>
Financial risk	<p>Form a task force of senior leadership from the 37th Training Wing, HQ AETC, and DLIELC to implement cost recovery reform</p> <p>Have the task force review proposed costing models to ensure methodological accuracy</p> <p>Once validated, fully cost DLIELC's activities</p> <p>After costing library is developed, review and reissue financial management policies and procedures as they relate to DLIELC</p>
Technology	<p>Explore where there may be cost-effective means to deliver some ELT through distance learning</p> <p>Explore computerized methods, such as OPlc®</p> <p>Consider using a collaborative platform approach to update SET textbooks</p> <p>Provide all students (not just SET students) with laptops</p> <p>Buy additional commercial bandwidth for Internet usage; add costs to fixed cost of operating schoolhouse</p>
Identity	<p>Deemphasize the academic character of the organization</p> <p>Look beyond ELT credentials in teacher recruitment process</p> <p>Have more military personnel interact with IMSs</p> <p>Consider creating an alumni program</p> <p>Consider involving IMSs in self-assessment for placement, progression, or curriculum</p> <p>Collaborate with Defense Language Testing Advisory Board to fully review the validity and reliability of the ECL</p> <p>Expand faculty PST to provide basic skills and understanding in security cooperation</p> <p>Reemphasize and develop field trips and cultural activities</p>
Assessment	<p>Leverage AETC's existing training assessment process including conformance to training development and evaluation policies</p> <p>Explore standard processes for training development and assessment, gaining access to lessons from similar training organizations</p> <p>Improve assessment of the FSP and coordinate with the Air Force Culture and Language Center to develop measures for assessing knowledge and comprehension of U.S. culture</p> <p>Reexamine balanced scorecard to fully represent each of the four performance measure perspectives</p> <p>Reevaluate current metrics to ensure they are clearly written, relevant, inclusive of academic, military, and building partnerships (BP) objectives, and primarily under DLIELC's control</p> <p>Include specific metrics geared toward measuring the long-term BP impact</p>

**Table S.1—Continued**

Critical Area	Recommendations
Manpower	<p>Utilize U.S. Code, Title 10, civilian academic hires provisions</p> <p>End the current practice of curriculum development, which unnecessarily consumes faculty manpower</p> <p>Establish a dedicated contracting vehicle to purchase English language instruction and support</p> <p>Have specialized military/technical language curricula requirements executed by knowledgeable experts in those fields</p> <p>Emphasize the importance of building partnerships by obtaining more military department personnel</p> <p>Use experts and consultants as a ready pool of language professionals who could be brought on to quickly fill gaps because of unforeseen student load fluctuations</p>
Organization/ advocacy	<p>Ensure that OSD and USAF leadership agree on clarified oversight responsibilities and functions for DLIELC</p> <p>Ensure that an advocate or champion in DoD is actively involved in the requirements process</p> <p>Fully implement principles, practices, and norms established by AETC to ensure DLIELC becomes more responsive and accountable to DoD policies and priorities</p>

NOTES: SET = Specialized English training; IMS = international military student.

**Table S.2**  
**Recommendations to Address Problems in the Critical Areas Identified**

Outcome (Critical Area)	Priority
1. Clarified mission statement/priorities in conformance with USAF, DSCA, OSD policies and priorities (M/P; O/A)	Immediate
2. Enhanced policies/procedures, implemented to increase managerial effectiveness (M/P; O/A)	Immediate
3. Policy to improve prediction of ELT demand (R; I; M)	Immediate
4. Policy to prioritize student flow by reducing seasonal demand peaks (R)	Mid-term
5. Policy that expands teaching capacity by existing labor supply and that introduces greater flexibility in managing labor to meet peak demand periods (FM/M)	Mid-term
6. Policy to manage increase in supply of ELT (R)	Long-term
7. Policy that overhauls existing management of finance system, practices, and key supporting tools (MP; FM)	Immediate
8. Policy that establishes that curriculum development will be undertaken only when reimbursable (FM; I; M)	Immediate
9. Policy that better exploits technology in support of ELT, with clear objective of reducing costs wherever possible (FM; T; M)	Long-term
10. Policy that clearly establishes that DLIELC is ELT organization and essential BPC instrument (I; O/A)	Long-term
11. Effective assessment process (A)	Mid-term
12. Policy to expand DLIELC's labor flexibility (R; FM; I; M)	Long-term
13. Policy that seeks to improve advocacy for DLIELC by senior sponsors (O/A)	Mid-term

NOTES: M/P = Mission/Policy; R = Requirements; FM = Financial Management; T = Technology; I = Identity; M = Manpower; O/A = Organization and Advocacy. Immediate refers to execution years. Mid-term refers to the FYDP. Long-term refers to FYDP and beyond.

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## Abbreviations

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AELIC	Advanced English Language Instructor Course
AETC	Air Education and Training Command
AETCI	Air Education and Training Command Instruction
AF/A1DG	Air Force Language, Region and Culture Program Office, Policy
AFH	Air Force Handbook
AFI	Air Force Instruction
AFJI	Armed Forces Joint Instruction
AFMAN	Air Force Manual
AFPD	Air Force Policy Directive
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
AFSAT	Air Force Security Assistance Training
ALPS	advanced language proficiency skills
AMIGO	American Members of International Goodwill to Others
ASD (FM&P)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy
BALIC	Basic American Language Instructor Course
BMT	basic military training
BOS	base operating support
BP	building partnership
BPA	blank purchase agreement
BPC	building partnership capacity
CBJ	Congressional Budget Justification
CCMR	Center for Civil-Military Relations
CEA	Commission on English Language Program Accreditation
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command

COCOM	combatant command
COE-DMHA	Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
CY	calendar year
DELP	Defense English Language Program
DIILS	Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
DIMO	Defense Institute for Medical Operations
DISAM	Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
DLAB	Defense Language Aptitude Battery
DLI	Defense Language Institute
DLIELC	Defense Language Institute English Language Center
DLIFLC	Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DoDM	Department of Defense Manual
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EA	executive agent
ECHO Company	Army recruits learning English prior to entry to basic training
ECL	English comprehension level
EFL	English as a foreign language
ELT	English language training
ELTP	English language training program
EOC	end of course
ESL	English as a second language
EUCOM	European Command
FEQ	field evaluation questionnaire
FMS	foreign military sales
FOT	follow-on training
FSP	field studies program
FY	fiscal year

FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GDP	gross domestic product
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
GET	generalized English training
GPC	government purchase card
HQ AETC	Headquarters Air Education and Training Command
IAAFA	Inter-American Air Forces Academy
IDB	instructor development branch
IDIQ	indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity
IMET	international military education and training
IMS	international military student
IP	Informational Program
IT	information technology
MILDEP	military department
LOA	letter of offer and acceptance
LOR	letter of request
LTD	language training detachment
MACS	American language course and culture seminar
MASL	military article service listing
MDS	Materials Development Seminar
MELT	Managing English Language Training Course
MILCON	military construction
MILDEP	military department
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MTM	military training manager
MTT	mobile training team
NORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command
OPI	Oral Proficiency Interview
OPIc®	Oral Proficiency Interview (computerized)
OSD(P)	Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy



OSD(P&R)/(DLO)	Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Defense Language Office
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PAF	RAND Project AIR FORCE
PLTCE	Partner Language Training Center, Europe (Marshall Center)
PME	professional military education
POM	program objective memorandum (essentially the military budget)
PST	pre-service training
PT	physical training
R&D	research and development
SCO	security cooperation officer
SET	specialized English training
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
TA	teaching assistant
TDY	temporary duty
TOEFL	Test of English as a Foreign Language
TSCP	theater security cooperation program
TW	Training Wing
USAF	U.S. Air Force
WHINSEC	Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

## Introduction

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### Background

The Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC), which trains U.S. military and foreign students in English, plays an important role in the Department of Defense's (DoD's) security cooperation objectives as a key enabler and strategic engagement tool. English language training is usually required prior to foreign military entry into DoD and Service training and professional military education (PME) courses.

Despite its important role, DLIEC's mission and function have not been well understood in the Air Force. More specifically, although the Air Force is the executive agent for DLIELC, it needs to have a better capability to measure DLIELC's cost structure and the mid- and long-term demand for English language training (ELT) across the DoD and foreign partners. Resident and nonresident demand for ELT exceeds DLIELC's current staffing capacity, and there is no defined mechanism for increasing capacity or prioritizing demand. Without a capability to measure DLIEC's cost structure and demand, the U.S. Air Force is unable to determine the most efficient and effective training models to optimize foundational and surge training.<sup>1</sup>

### DLIELC Description

Very simply, DLIELC primarily trains foreign students in the English language as a precursor to attendance at a U.S. military school. This is not a complete definition because DLIELC also trains U.S. citizens enlisting in the U.S. Army. Also, not all foreign students go on to further training in U.S. military schools. Some receive only English language instruction, and some are trained to be English language instructors.

Approximately 2,400 students are trained each year, with an average peak load of 1,100 and a minimum of 500. At any one time, there can be 90 or more countries represented, although in recent years, the majority of students have been from Saudi Arabia.

Demand is primarily driven by weapon purchases and the resulting need to train foreign military personnel in how to use the weapon systems. DLIELC resides in San Antonio, Texas, on Lackland AFB. It has been in existence for 57 years. It has resident and nonresident portions.

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<sup>1</sup> While the Air Education and Training Command (AETC) has supported manpower increases, it did not support DLIELC military construction (MILCON) request and could not state whether the request was justifiable.

## Objectives

In September 2010, the Air Force Language, Region and Culture Program Office, Policy (AF/A1DG), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Defense Language Office (OSD(P&R))/(DLO), asked RAND Project AIR FORCE to examine DLIELC to ensure that it is appropriately tasked, organized, operated, resourced, and managed to produce the ELT capability needed to effectively and efficiently meet DoD mission requirements. The primary objectives of the study were completed in four months and briefed in January 2011. A cost model (Appendix B) was developed over the next four months.

To accomplish those objectives, the study included four broad tasks:

1. Review prior studies, authorities, and governing documents for DLIELC.
2. Develop a requirements process to identify and predict all the sources of student throughput in sufficient detail to program resource needs.
3. Consider options to improve organization, reporting, and resourcing structure.
4. Assist DLIELC in its strategic planning.

## Study Approach

Data used to support this study were provided primarily by DLIELC. Our study approach was examined by RAND's Human Subjects Protection Committee to ensure that human subjects were properly protected.

The study team used a rigorous approach to collecting and analyzing data relative to DLIELC. To gather data from DLIELC, we first used a written question-and-answer approach in which the team submitted a question to the designated DLIELC official, the question was then researched, and the answer and accompanying data were provided to the study team in a timely manner. DLIELC officials answered 150 separate requests for data; in only a few cases were data not provided. In this document, we identify those cases where we were unable to obtain the necessary data to make informed judgments and factually based recommendations.

As part of our data collection, we reviewed pertinent regulations, directives, instructions, and policy documents for Joint, Interservice, and Air Force, as well as previous studies (Ravens Group, 2008; Smith, 2004; Duhon and Doyle, 2010) and RAND security cooperation-related work (see Appendix A).

Second, we conducted in-person interviews on several occasions through on-site visits with officials from DLIELC, including the AETC Air and Space Operations Directorate Requirements Division (AETC/A3R), International Affairs office (AETC/IA), and the Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron (AFSAT). We also spoke extensively with policy officials in Washington, D.C., from the Defense Language Office and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The primary purposes of the interviews at this stage were to gain official understanding of processes, to uncover potential issues to investigate, and to discover data sources for validation.

Third, by way of telephone and in-person interviews in several cases, we conducted a comparative analysis with other, similar organizations that have a security cooperation focus. We analyzed ten DoD organizations and two foreign English/French-language training orga-

nizations relative to DLIELC's eight issue areas. The ten DoD organizations and two foreign organizations were the following:

- Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, California)
- Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (Honolulu, Hawaii)
- Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (Newport, Rhode Island)
- Defense Institute for Medical Operations (San Antonio, Texas)
- Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (Monterey, California)
- Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (Dayton, Ohio)
- Inter-American Air Forces Academy (San Antonio, Texas)
- DoD Global Center for Security Cooperation (Monterey, California)
- Partner Language Training Center Europe (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany)
- Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (Ft. Benning, Georgia)
- Canadian Forces English/French language training program
- United Kingdom Defence School of Languages/English Language Wing training program.

The comparative analysis helped the study team clarify the extent to which DLIELC's challenges are unique, identify best practices and lessons that could apply to DLIELC, and identify suitable options for implementation.

## **Organization of the Report**

Chapters Two through Nine address key findings identified in eight critical areas identified by the study: mission and policy, requirements, financial management and cost recovery, technology, identity, assessment, manpower, and organization and advocacy. In each chapter, we first highlight the key findings and then develop the underlying support for those findings in the remainder of the chapter. We close each chapter with a set of recommendations to address the issues raised in the findings.

Chapter Ten presents a summary of the findings, key recommendations, and a proposed implementation plan to address the issues in an integrated fashion. Appendix C presents the implementation plan in more detail. Appendix A addresses findings on security partnership building from other RAND research, and Appendix B lays out a proposed cost model.



## Mission and Policy

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This chapter provides a description of DLIELC, beginning with a brief overview of the organization's mission and policy. It is divided into two sections. The first section provides a brief context for the discussion about DLIELC as an institution within the broader community of security cooperation programs; the second section offers an overview of how applicable rules and regulations govern the milieu in which DLIELC operates.

Based on our analysis, we find that DLIELC is governed by a maze of guidance. Moreover, when viewed in its totality, this collection of guidance does not accurately reflect the reality of the circumstances within which DLIELC must operate. These findings are developed in the discussion that follows, and some recommendations to address these concerns are included at the end of the chapter.

### DLIELC's Security Cooperation Mission

DLIELC's official vision statement portrays the organization as: "A world-class language institute . . . Building bridges through communication and peace through understanding . . . Shaping tomorrow's future today." DLIELC's more specific mission statement describes DLIELC as the "DoD agency responsible for the management and operation of the Defense English Language Program (DELP) to train international military and civilian personnel to speak and teach English, manage the English as a second language program for the U.S. military, manage nonresident English training programs, provide for our students' health, morale and welfare, and conduct the DoD Field Studies Program."

As the mission statement suggests, DLIELC has a special role from a domestic and foreign perspective. It exists first and foremost to teach English to foreign military personnel and to train English language instructors, as well as to teach English to U.S. military personnel for whom English is a second language. DLIELC's mission statement specifies the tasks performed by the organization and is fairly simple and uninspiring. It could be changed to more sharply and distinctly connect DLIELC's role and purpose to the broader security cooperation community. A suggested statement follows:

DLIELC is the DoD agency responsible for the management and operation of the Defense English Language Program to build enduring partnerships with international military and civilian personnel and prepare them for follow-on military training. Its responsibilities include managing the English as a second language program for the U.S. military; managing nonresident English training programs; providing for students' health, morale and welfare; and conducting the DoD Field Studies Program.

As far as DLIELC's place within the broader security cooperation community is concerned, DLIELC may be viewed as an enabler to the security cooperation mission: For many countries around the world, it is a necessary first step for individuals to avail themselves of more technical training provided through the U.S. security assistance process. However, the importance of DLIELC's role could be stated in even stronger terms. Some DoD officials we spoke with described the organization as the lynchpin that enables the United States to build partner capacity, especially in the realm of education and training, in many countries of the world. In other words, education and advanced technical training for non-English speakers is simply not possible until they first acquire the appropriate English language skills. Without the critical role played by DLIELC, the entire process could fail.

## DLIELC Rules and Regulations

Beginning with a series of DoD directives and instructions, DLIELC is governed by a collection of rules and regulations covering everything from program administration to the development of training materials (see Table 2.1). The foundational documents that govern DLIELC begin with the establishment of its executive agency (the Department of the Air Force) and go on to set the primary responsibilities for its oversight. Like most DoD organizations, this oversight responsibility is distributed among several higher-level organizations. The overarching guidance document is Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5160.41E, *Defense Language Program (DLP)*, in which the Deputy Secretary of Defense assigns responsibility for overall DLP policy guidance to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and designates the Secretary of the Air Force as the DoD executive agent for DLIELC. From this document, headquarters Air Force and the other services published guidance contained in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-105, *Joint Security Assistance Training*, and Air Force Joint Instruction (AFJI) 16-103, *Managing the Defense English Language Program*.

In some cases, guidance is outdated or unworkable, a fact highlighted by the revisions under way in AFI 16-105, *Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training*, and AFJI 16-103, *Managing the Defense English Language Program (DELDP)*. These revisions will address critical areas of concern, such as institutional advocacy and organizational structure.

In other cases, DLIELC is exempt from following the rules that other similar training organizations must follow. For example, despite the fact that DLIELC is a part of AETC's technical training structure, Second Air Force (2AF) exempts DLIELC from complying with certain instructions about designing and developing training systems or evaluating training programs.<sup>1</sup> Within the community of AETC training organizations, this places Headquarters (HQ) AETC managers at a disadvantage, both in terms of being able to clearly understand DLIELC and its effectiveness and by removing access to key AETC management processes.

Finally, in some cases, existing, applicable rules and regulations are not fully complied with, or provisions are not fully exercised. For example, the lack of a course costing model and the difficulty in finding cost data suggest that the rules for reimbursement are not followed.

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<sup>1</sup> 2AF is the intermediate headquarters, subordinate to HQ AETC, responsible for managing the Air Force's technical training. The 37th Training Wing, to which DLIELC reports, is directly subordinate to 2AF.

**Table 2.1**  
**Summary of Guidance**

Level	Regulation	Title
OSD	DoDD 1400.5	DoD Policy for Civilian Personnel
	DoDD 1400.25	Civilian Personnel Management System
	DoD 1400.25-M	Civilian Personnel Manual
	DoDD 5101.1	DoD Executive Agent
	DoDD 5160.41E	Defense Language Program (DLP)
	DoDI 5160.70	Management of DoD Language and Regional Proficiency Capabilities
	DoDI 5160.71	DoD Language Testing Program
	DoDM 5105.38-M Chapter 10	Security Assistance Management Manual—International Training
	DoDM 5105.38-M Chapter 14	Security Assistance Management Manual—Forecasting, Programming, Budgeting, and Audits
DoDM 5105.38-M Chapter 5	Security Assistance Management Manual—FMS Case Development	
Joint/ Interservice	AFJI 16-103 (under review)	Managing the Defense English Language Program (DELDP)
	AFI 16-105	Joint Security Assistance Training
	AFI 16-105 (in draft)	Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training
	AFI 36-2230(I)	Inter-Service Training
Air Force	AFPD 36-2	Civilian Recruitment and Placement
	AFPD 36-22	Air Force Military Training
	AFI 16-501	Control and Documentation of Air Force Programs (PPBE)
	AFI 36-2201, Vol. 1	Training Development, Delivery, and Evaluation
	AFI 36-2616	Trained Personnel Requirements
	AFMAN 16-101	International Affairs and Security Assistance Management
	AFMAN 36-203	Staffing Civilian Positions
	AFMAN 36-2234	Instructional System Development
AFH 36-2235, Vol. 4	Information for Designers of Instructional Systems: Manager's Guide to New Education and Training Technologies	
AETC	AETCI 36-2201	Technical and Basic Military Training Evaluation
	AETCI 36-2203	Technical and Basic Military Training Development
	AETCI 36-2215	Technical and Basic Military Training Administration
DLIELC	DLIELC Instruction 1025-7	Planning and Programming Security Assistance English Language Training
	DLIELC Instruction 1025.15	English Comprehension Level (ECL) Test Guidelines
	DLIELC Instruction 1025.30	English Language Training for International Military Students
	DLIELC Instruction 1025.9	Management of the DLIELC Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) Program

### Requirements Identification

AFI 36-2230, *Interservice Training*, is a joint regulation (i.e., it is used by all Services, with each Service assigning to the document its own unique designator); this places the responsibility for requirements identification on the host Service. For DLIELC, this means that the Air Force has the burden for identifying requirements.



Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-105, *Joint Security Assistance Training*, provides detailed guidance about the oversight and day-to-day management of ELT. Because the training is an inter-Service enterprise, the instruction contains guidance for all Services. Section 4 of the instruction provides general guidance for determining security assistance–related training, including training conducted to support international military education and training (IMET) and foreign military sales (FMS) needs. In general, the process is quite formalized, and the documentation accounts for the chain of command, beginning with the in-country security assistance officer, to the combatant commands (COCOMs), and on through to Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the military departments. The process includes formal reviews and recurring meetings and conferences to ensure that training requirements are accurate and that the training infrastructure can support them.

Chapter 3 of AFI 16-105 describes how the ELT interfaces with the training requirements process. Inherent in the process described above is the development of security assistance cases, beginning with a letter of request (LOR) and ending with a letter of offer and acceptance (LOA). Paragraph 3-3a states simply, “those Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) that include provisions for ELT must be coordinated with DLIELC before negotiation.” In other words, DLIELC must be afforded the opportunity to review all LOAs to determine if it has the capacity to provide the requested training. This, along with participation in the routine training requirements processes, is intended to give DLIELC insight into the totality of the ELT requirements at any given time.

### **Financial Risk**

Two areas in which DLIELC receives guidance about financial risk are found in AFI 16-105. In Chapters 3 (requirements) and 4 (financial management), the issues of tuition pricing and reimbursement (or “forfeiture”) for missed training, or cancellations, are described. AFI 16-105 refers to DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, Volume 15, Chapter 7, which is entitled “pricing.” The general policy for determining tuition prices for the training of foreign nationals is contained in section 710, while the actual, detailed procedures for computing the tuition are contained in sections 711 and 712.

AFI 16-105 describes in detail the procedure for collecting reimbursement for expenses incurred for a variety of reasons. Paragraph 3-7, for example, allows AETC Financial Management to assess 50 percent of the tuition for late cancellations, reschedules, or no-shows. Once a student has entered training, DLIELC can also charge an additional amount if the training takes longer than expected. In the event of a late arrival, DLIELC may assess 50 percent of the tuition for the number of weeks late, up to a maximum of 50 percent of the scheduled training. Finally, DLIELC may charge for the actual number of weeks completed, but not less than 50 percent of the training time, for students who fail to pass the training.

### **Technology**

The Air Force enthusiastically embraces the use of technology in support of technical training. While acknowledging the limitations that budgets, physical facilities, and unique geographical or other circumstances may impose, the Air Force tells its training managers that:

. . . instructional design offers great potential for creativity and cost avoidance through application of state-of-the-art instructional technology and advances in management, communication, and behavioral science (Air Force Handbook 36-2235, Volume 1, 2002, p. 16).

Moreover, the Air Force routinely exhorts its training managers to entertain new and emerging technologies, evaluating how they might enhance training and more effectively produce the desired outcomes. Importantly, the Air Force reminds its commanders and training managers to

. . . maintain the focus on mission accomplishment. Evaluate the technologies in terms of the education and training of Air Force students (Air Force Handbook 36-2235, Volume 4, 2002, p. 14).

Although it is clear that DLIELC values the use of technologies in its training delivery, the study team considered additional ways in which technology could increase the school's ability to respond to fluctuations in student load and limitations on instructors and other resources. (These are discussed below in Chapter Five.)

### **Training Assessment**

The 1994 version of AFJI 16-103 requires DLIELC to evaluate ELT to

Identify strengths and weaknesses in the [English language training program, or ELTP], find out if course objectives adequately serve follow-on training needs, find out whether courses meet the stated objectives, [and] recommend changes that will improve efficiency and effectiveness of ELTP (paragraph 1.7).

Moreover, it tasks agencies to notify DLIELC when they believe that ELT training was “substandard or unsatisfactory.” However, this evaluation process is not completely clear. AETC Instruction 36-2201, *Technical and Basic Military Training Evaluation*, establishes procedures and responsibilities to assess the quality of technical training. This instruction applies to the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) and the technical training schools at Air University and under 2AF, but it does not apply to DLIELC. Instead, all inter-Service training is referred to AFI 36-2230, *Interservice Training*. AETC Instruction 36-2201, *Training Development, Delivery, and Evaluation*, makes this clear, saying (2005, p. 13):

. . . evaluate interservice courses in accordance with AFI 36-2230, Interservice Training, and applicable interservice agreements. Use caution to ensure AETC does not duplicate existing host-service evaluations that are adequate. The chief of the training evaluation unit may include or exclude other service graduates from surveys except when specifically requested to do so by officials of other services.

AFI 36-2230, which generally sets policies and procedures for inter-Service training of military and civilian personnel of the DoD, assigns responsibility for evaluation to host Services, but it does not specify how evaluations will be conducted. Instead, it states simply that the host Service will “be primarily responsible for consolidated course revisions and evaluations (AFI 36-2230, 2006, paragraph 6.b.(4)).” Therefore, DLIELC is on its own to determine how best to accomplish any evaluation of the program. As noted above, HQ AETC's evaluation processes (per AETC Instruction 36-2201) do not apply to DLIELC, and HQ Air Force (AF) passes the responsibility directly to DLIELC, per AFJI 16-103, saying that DLIELC “assesses the quality of ELT activities.” (This language is contained in both the current and draft version of the instruction.) Unfortunately, we found little evidence of assessment.

## Recommendations

As noted at the start of this chapter, DLIELC is a complex organization with a maze of guidance. Additionally, that guidance does not necessarily reflect the reality of the circumstances within which DLIELC must operate. Its mission is challenging, and the conditions under which it operates can seem unpredictable.

Given this finding, we recommend that

- DLIELC revise its mission statement to sharply and distinctly connect DLIELC's important role in the security cooperation community. A suggested statement is provided above
- HQ Air Force Language, Region and Culture Program Office, Policy undertake a full review of all applicable rules and regulations to ensure they are current, appropriate, and well-aligned. Optimally, there would be two instructions, a governing DoD instruction and a consolidated AF instruction covering everything needed to grade, audit, govern, cost, and direct the organization<sup>2</sup>
- DLIELC consider leveraging existing AETC processes and procedures where they may create opportunities to fully tap into AETC's resources and expertise
- HQ AF/A1DG review existing rules and regulations to look for underutilized authorities and provisions that could be exercised to enhance DLIELC's effectiveness in the provision of cost-efficient and content-effective ELT.

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<sup>2</sup> One of RAND's tasks was to review existing regulations. Although we compiled a list of regulations, it was far outside the scope of that task to create the two governing documents that ought to guide DLIELC.

## Requirements

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Existing guidance points to the need to fully account for ELT requirements while planning for DoD training.

According to DoD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, Chapter 10, “International Training,” the time required to conduct training must be taken into consideration when estimating delivery dates of equipment. Training programs must consider the availability of personnel; the skills to be developed (including ELT); and the time required to plan, implement, and complete the program. In other words, ELT needs to be part of the training planning process and cannot be an afterthought.

In this chapter, we discuss past and current demand trends, estimating demand, managing demand, and managing supply. To fully understand the problem, the study team conducted a rigorous analysis of current and historical trends in student load and related factors. Moreover, the team used a variety of statistical analysis techniques and explored a number of ways to more fully identify and respond to variations in requirements.

Based on our analysis, we find that DLIELC lacks a robust requirements determination process and that the organization’s business model is unable to meet variable demand—either effectively or efficiently.

Before moving on to the remainder of this chapter, we note that in addition to resident training, DLIELC provides nonresident training through in-country mobile training teams (MTTs) and language training detachments (LTDs). This nonresident activity is sizable. In fiscal year (FY) 2010, DLIELC’s MTTs trained a total of 2,995 international students in 25 countries. DLIELC’s LTDs trained 1,580 students.<sup>1</sup> Nonresident training data prior to FY10 were unavailable; therefore, we were unable to analyze the requirement process and past trends for MTT and LTD activities. As a result, the following section focuses exclusively on resident training requirements.


### Past and Current Demand Trends

Overall, DLIELC’s total student load increased steadily over the past ten years, from 2,238 students starting a course at DLIELC in FY01 to 3,119 in FY09 (Figure 3.1). The number of international military students (IMSs) increased in equal measure, with the exception of a

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<sup>1</sup> Nonresident training can also have an impact on the number of students attending DLIELC in San Antonio because MTTs occasionally suggest that host countries send some of their students to DLIELC for specialized English training (SET) (email correspondence with DLIELC, December 17, 2010).

**Figure 3.1**  
**Number of Students Starting a Course at DLIELC by Year, FY01–FY09**




RAND TR1152-3.1

brief drop in FY07. The number of U.S. students remained in the 530–620 range in FY01–07, increasing to 800 after that date.

Central Command (CENTCOM) accounted for the largest part of this increase, with numbers of students from other combatant commands (COCOMs) remaining stable or even decreasing (in the case of European Command [EUCOM]), as shown in Figure 3.2.

**Figure 3.2**  
**IMS Repartition by COCOM, Percentage of Overall IMS Load, FY06–FY09**



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
The large influx of Saudi students explains most of this increase. The percentage of Saudi students among IMSs almost doubled in ten years, from 10.6 percent of all IMSs in 2000–2004 to 19 per cent in 2005–2010. Their increase has been linear since FY05 (Figure 3.3).

More IMSs have been attending SET only, and this trend is even more salient for IMSs attending generalized English training (GET) and SET.<sup>2</sup> Their numbers almost doubled over the past ten years, from 541 in 2000 to 1,076 in 2009. The number of IMSs attending GET only also increased steadily over time, but much less so. In 2009, only 169 IMSs (7 percent of the total number) attended GET only.

### U.S. Service Demand

All Services are represented at DLIELC, but Army-sponsored students dominate the overall student load. The Air Force is still well represented among IMSs: Air Force–sponsored IMSs accounted for 32 to 51 percent of DLIELC’s international customers in FY01–07.<sup>3</sup> They were on a par with Army-sponsored IMSs (34 to 50 percent of the total IMS load). In more recent years, however, the share of Army-sponsored students among IMET and FMS-funded IMSs increased steadily, while the share of Air Force–sponsored students decreased slightly (38 percent in 2007, 37 percent in 2008, 35 percent in 2009). With the addition of ECHO Company, Army-sponsored students therefore represent a clear majority among DLIELC customers.<sup>4</sup>

**Figure 3.3**  
Percentage of Saudi Students Among IMSs, FY01–FY09



RAND TR1152-3.3

<sup>2</sup> GET teaches the basics of the English language using a common vocabulary. SET assumes a working knowledge of English and teaches a vocabulary specific to a vocational or professional occupation.

<sup>3</sup> Calculations could be made only for FY07 and prior years, because the Navy and Army started using “D” (Air Force) military article service listings (MASLs) after FY08. The reason for this change is their transitioning to the Defense Security Assistance Management System program, which only uses “D” MASLs.

<sup>4</sup> ECHO Company is a U.S. Army-only company of recruits, deficient in English, who learn English prior to attendance at Army basic training.

Overall, DLIELC has limited control and visibility over requirements, which are largely determined by other agencies—military departments, security cooperation officers (SCOs), or follow-on training (FOT) sites. FMS cases largely depend on foreign governments’ defense budgets, which can be quite unpredictable (including in cases where a country’s wealth depends largely on the price of oil and other commodities, which are susceptible to sudden changes). Examination of past trends at DLIELC shows that in 2007–2009, the number of Navy-sponsored, FMS-funded students remained stable—around 160 students per year—while the number of Air Force–sponsored and, to an even larger extent, Army-sponsored FMS students increased.<sup>5</sup>

The number of IMET-funded students has proven more stable (around 800 per year in 2007–2009), but the National Security Strategy’s increased focus on building partnership capacity (BPC) could lead to an IMET increase in the near future.

### Seasonal Peaks

Requirements vary considerably throughout the year, with DLIELC experiencing a sharp peak in student load in May and June. This peak stretches DLIELC’s resources (both staff and infrastructure) to an uncomfortable point. In FY09, this peak brought an additional 502 students above the anticipated low peak demand. The demand range in FY10 was smaller, bringing only an additional 370 students. The size of the demand range is primarily caused by multiple FOT sites beginning their training at the same time (in late summer and early fall), resulting in large numbers of students attending DLIELC simultaneously. Over the past two years, the size of the demand range has decreased, but DLIELC still had a 60 percent student load increase during the FY10 peak. Forecasting peak requirements is difficult: Seasonal peaks increased from FY07 to FY09 but decreased in FY10 (Figure 3.4). Demand range<sup>6</sup> has decreased since FY08. The English Language Center Requirements Process Panel examined the possibility of changing some FOT start dates, but this solution proved impractical.<sup>7</sup>

### Estimating Demand

In theory, processes to view the training pipeline in its entirety, including ELT requirements, exist. Every year in June, DSCA sends a tasking message on the Javits Report<sup>8</sup> and two years (budget and plan fiscal years) of FMS forecasting projections to implementing agencies and SCO. In August, SCO sends its input to implementing agencies and DSCA; implementing agencies, in turn, provide their input to DSCA. In early December, implementing agencies discuss their issues or concerns with the upcoming programming process during a programming process meeting. Issues raised include both programming cycle processes and priorities

<sup>5</sup> These observations are based on three data points only (2007, 2008, and 2009) and should therefore be treated with caution and tested against future data.


<sup>6</sup> *Demand range* is the highest number of students versus the lowest number of students.

<sup>7</sup> Focused discussions with AF/A1DG, October 22, 2010.

<sup>8</sup> In accordance with paragraph 25 of the Arms Export Control Act, the State Department is required to provide to Congress an Arms Sale Proposal (the “Javits Report”) covering all sales and licensed commercial exports of major weapons or weapon-related defense equipment for \$7,000,000 or more, or of any other weapons or weapons-related defense equipment for \$25,000,000 or more, which are considered eligible for approval.



**Figure 3.4**  
**Demand Range, FY07–FY10**



RAND TR1152-3.4

for possible inclusion in the DSCA Programming Guidance. DLIELC receives digital notification of training through the Security Assistance Network web-based database and may receive notice from the Air Force, COCOM, or DoD agency representatives involved in FMS, IMET, security force assistance, and other training programs.


In reality, DLIELC is placed in a dilemma: Although it is a provider of a service, it finds that it is not set up to be a seller of that service, thereby undermining the case for retaining its current business model. It is largely unable to forecast accurately how many students will be attending the school at a given time because of several factors. International travel orders state only “Report on or about [date],” and security assistance network/student training list projections may only indicate the quarter in which a student is due to arrive.<sup>9</sup> In some instances, there is no advance notification. IMSs can show up early or late or can be replaced at the last minute by another candidate. DLIELC does not, as a rule, turn IMSs away and has to accommodate them whether it received prior notice or not.<sup>10</sup> This has resulted in the student load at DLIELC routinely exceeding the school’s maximum capacity of 870 seats. Late arrivals (because of a variety of reasons, ranging from visa delays to personal or dependent-related issues) complicate the planning and scheduling process. The percentage of late arrivals has increased in frequency, gaining 2 to 3 percentage points each year since FY06 (Figure 3.5), and the delays have also increased an additional 0.2 to 0.7 weeks per year since FY06.

<sup>9</sup> Email from DLIELC, October 6, 2010.

<sup>10</sup> According to a DLIELC source, “Typically we make them stay off base till military department/SCO get their docs right,” but they are not turned away (DLIELC email, October 6, 2010).



**Figure 3.5**  
**Percentage of IMSs Who Start Their Training Late, FY05–FY09**



RAND TR1152-3.5

DLIELC's ability to obtain additional resources to meet increasing requirements has been hampered by its lack of a reliable demand forecasting process.<sup>11</sup> An English Language Center Requirements Process Panel was set up in 2010 to address this issue and develop a solid requirements projection process on which to base future requests. As a first step, the panel asked military departments to provide their FMS projections for (1) six months to one fiscal year; (2) one to two fiscal years; and (3) three to four fiscal years. This request to Services will be repeated every quarter, with the panel becoming permanent.

Ideally, DLIELC would know requirements two to five years ahead to have sufficient time to plan for new buildings and major infrastructure changes. Knowing requirements one to two years in advance is the minimum<sup>12</sup> for the school to be able to contract out, train instructors, etc. It may need less time if a robust contracting vehicle were already in place.<sup>13</sup> The panel is currently focusing its work on improving DLIELC's flexibility on the supply side.

### Demand Forecasting Models

Planning and forecasting student enrollment is a fundamental task for training institutions and technical schools throughout DoD. Even though the topic has been thoroughly researched over the past few decades, consensus has not been reached on an optimal model to accurately forecast enrollment. Although there is no single best approach, research suggests identifying

<sup>11</sup> DSCA's projection, for the FY12 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), of 1,400 FMS cases by FY14 called for an additional \$38 million in resources for the school, but this request was rejected by AETC during the POM process for lack of substantiating evidence of an increase in requirements.

<sup>12</sup> A proven and robust indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracting vehicle can respond to demand increases in months versus the six months to a year to hire new instructors.

<sup>13</sup> Source for the entire paragraph except IMET figures and evolution of FMS cases by services focused discussion with AF/A1DG, October 22, 2010.

both manageable and unmanageable factors. Unmanageable factors beyond the control of an institution may include competition, public policy, and economic factors. In contrast, controllable and manageable factors might include admissions policies, marketing efforts, and dismissal policies. The most notable finding is that DLIELC has few, if any, manageable factors to control enrollment.

Therefore, the variability in enrollment for ELT at DLIELC is driven primarily by one critical unmanageable factor: FMS. FMS is a challenge for DLIELC because, unlike IMET, for example, FMS cases are episodic and not predictable. For instance, the opening of an FMS case does not necessarily guarantee that students will be attending DLIELC. Nevertheless, estimates of FMS provided in Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) reports for each country may serve as indicators or predictors of student attendance.

For any given year, the CBJ provides one-year-out and two-year-out estimates for FMS. For example, for FY11, two separate FMS estimates were provided for Afghanistan: A two-year-out estimate in the FY09 CBJ and a one-year-out estimate in the FY10 CBJ. Although FMS estimates could predict student enrollment for each country, we developed a model using aggregate FMS estimates for each COCOM to provide a more robust estimate of anticipated total student load.

Because some countries have never sent students to DLIELC, only a subset of estimates was used to develop the COCOM estimates. Countries with regular FMS transactions that have never sent students to DLIELC are often English-speaking nations. Other countries are inconsistent or low-demand customers. Therefore, we computed aggregate estimates using only those countries that had sent at least 20 students to DLIELC over the previous nine years. These countries sent a total of 301 students to DLIELC over this nine-year period, resulting in an average of 1.5 students for each country each year. To account for the demand of these countries, an additional constant of 34 students should be added to the student load projection described below.

### **FMS Enrollment Lag**

Student enrollment at DLIELC does not necessarily occur during the same year as a completed FMS transaction. There is usually some unspecified time lag that occurs between the completed FMS transaction and student enrollment at DLIELC. Therefore, student enrollment may be predicted by CBJ estimates for two and three years prior to the year of student enrollment.

Based on these time-lag assumptions, we examined FMS estimates for two and three years prior to the target year of projected enrollment. For example, to predict student enrollment for FY10, we used one- and two-year-out FMS estimates for FY07 and FY08. As mentioned previously, these estimates were then aggregated for each COCOM. Bivariate correlations indicated strong positive relationships between COCOM FMS estimates and COCOM student load (Table 3.1).

The study team conducted a stepwise regression analysis to identify which set of FMS estimates explains the most variance in student load. The results of this analysis indicated that, except for the two-year-out estimate for three years prior to enrollment, all estimates contributed incrementally to the prediction of student load. Based on these results, a composite FMS estimate was computed using the following estimates, equally weighted:

**Table 3.1**  
**Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between FMS Estimates and Student Load**

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1 One-year-out estimate (two years prior to enrollment)	1.94	2.23	1				
2 Two-year-out estimate (two years prior to enrollment)	1.69	2.08	.75	1			
3 One-year-out estimate (three years prior to enrollment)	1.75	1.90	.83	.76	1		
4 Two-year-out estimate (three years prior to enrollment)	1.69	2.02	.68	.71	.80	1	
5 Student load	339	298	.89	.87	.88	.76	1

NOTES: SD = standard deviation. Means and SDs are scaled to \$1 billion. The means, SDs, and correlations were computed using estimates and student load aggregated for each COCOM. There are 35 data points. The data were from 2004–2009 for all COCOMs. Data were not available for Northern Command in 2007.

1. two-year-out estimate (two years prior to enrollment using one-year-out FMS estimate)
2. two-year-out estimate (two years prior to enrollment using two-year-out FMS estimate)
3. three-year-out estimate (three years prior to enrollment using one-year-out FMS estimate).

Linear regression was used to test how well the COCOM FMS composite estimates predicted student load at DLIELC. The results indicated that 91 percent of the variance in DLIELC student load was accounted for and that student load can be predicted up to two years in advance (see Table 3.2).

The first step in projecting student load requires aggregating FMS estimates (i.e., see list items 1–3 above) for each COCOM and dividing by 3, to provide an average. The final estimate for total student load should also account for the average 34 students each year from countries that were not included in the COCOM FMS estimates. More specifically, 34 should be added to the sum of the COCOM estimates derived from the following formula:

$$(71.22 + \text{COCOM FMS Estimate} \times 0.0001489) (\text{number of estimated students}).$$

**Table 3.2**  
**Standard Regression Model with FMS Composite Predicting Student Load**


Constant	Variable	B	SE	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	F
71.22	FMS	.0001489	.00000810	.91	337.98*

\*p < .001.

### Establish a Requirements Review Process

As previously discussed, AF/A1DG was developing a process to determine requirements at the time of this study. Newly assigned personnel were aggressively seeking to correct deficiencies in the requirement process of past years and to advocate for DLIELC resources. But a process needs to be defined in policy, and the executive agent (EA)—a role assumed by AF/A1DG—needs to have the authority to force the process. The EA is the key to making a requirements process work. The EA must lead the process. Figure 3.6 provides a simple framework for a requirements process.

**Figure 3.6**  
**A Basic Framework for Determining Requirements**



RAND TR1152-3.6

The EA provides the initial starting point. In the discussion above, we provide a formula to estimate the demand by COCOM. This is a justifiable starting point. The EA then establishes deadlines for the COCOMs and military departments to refine the estimates with justifiable arguments. The EA consolidates all the requirements and eliminates duplication to create one requirement document. DLIELC is an executing agency and not the user; therefore, it is not involved in the process up to this point. Having defined a requirement, the EA tasks DLIELC to match capacity to the demand. If there are disconnects, the EA can work with DLIELC to execute options (e.g., temporary-contracted ELT) and plan for additional capacity if warranted. The constrained requirement goes back to the COCOMs and military departments for a final look to determine if readjusting start dates or using in-house training capacity can satisfy some of the need. The EA takes the final product and develops a schedule in conjunction with DLIELC. While countries seldom seem to follow a strict schedule, they do roughly follow one to meet FOT dates.

## Managing Demand

The ability to forecast how many students will come to DLIELC at a given time is critical, but knowing how long they will remain in school and how to program their training is equally important.

### Programming Students

Students are tested in-country<sup>14</sup> for their ECL and retested during their first week of training. To ensure that students will not lose their English skills while they are waiting to come to DLIELC, there is a maximum delay of 105 days between the time a student is tested in-country and his/her arrival in San Antonio. This second score, as well as the ECL score required by their FOT, serves as the basis for programming students for an appropriate number of weeks and for placing them in the relevant class level. Although the programming wheel<sup>15</sup> is the primary tool to determine training time, the amount of funding available for individual students may also influence how much training time is ultimately programmed.

Forecasting the precise training time that students will need to achieve their target ECL has generally proved challenging. Programmed training time can be highly variable for GET

<sup>14</sup> *In-country* refers to the home nation of the student.

<sup>15</sup> The *wheel* is a table of ECL scores correlated to the required length of training, which also determines the starting book number.


students (from one to 96 weeks in FY01–09).<sup>16</sup> Programmed training time is routinely reassessed during the training, with students being granted extensions and curtailments when needed. Figure 3.7 shows that the average actual training time has increased over the past ten years but remained within a two-week range (from 13 weeks per student in FY01 to 15 weeks in FY09).<sup>17</sup> Similarly, the average length of extensions and curtailments has remained within a two-week range in FY06–09.

Averages, however, conceal important variations across individuals. Extensions ranged from one to 76 weeks (standard deviation of 9.7). The average curtailment was seven weeks but ranged from one to 80 weeks (standard deviation of 8.5). The training time is made more unpredictable by the fact that the percentage of IMSs requiring extensions and curtailments has increased over the years. In FY06, 6.9 percent of all IMSs received an extension, increasing to 11.7 percent in FY09. In FY06, 13.2 percent of IMSs received a curtailment, increasing to 16.9 percent in FY09.

To complicate planning further, not all students need to wait until they ECL-qualify (i.e., reach the necessary established standard to continue on) to go to FOT: In 2010, 96 students received a waiver that lifted this requirement. However, the percentage of IMSs who receive waivers remains limited, never exceeding 3 percent of all IMSs in 2005–2009.

Finally, although DLIELC students can graduate at any given week, they do not necessarily leave the school once they reach their target ECL, sometimes remaining at DLIELC for

**Figure 3.7**  
**Ideal, Programmed, and Actual Training Time per IMS, FY01–FY09**



NOTE: Ideal is the amount of training time that a student’s ECL scores say will be required (requires use of the wheel). The programmed training time is the amount programmed by the organization. The actual training time is what students used. The chart highlights the need to update the wheel to more accurately predict training time.

RAND TR1152-3.7

<sup>16</sup> SET and U.S. students are systematically programmed for nine and 24 weeks, respectively.


<sup>17</sup> These figures include U.S. students.

several weeks until they can move on to their FOT. In this interim period, DLIELC is responsible for the well-being of these individuals, although the school has yet to develop innovative programs to use their time constructively. Whether these incremental costs to the organization are accurately captured and reimbursed is unlikely, given the underdeveloped state of the organization's costing models. Students are sent back to classes they have already attended—sometimes several levels down from the last one they attained—to continue practicing their English language skills. Although this method does keep students busy, it consumes school resources, especially teaching time. It is also likely that rehashing a previously studied book results in poor motivation and attention in class, potentially making the work of the teaching staff more difficult. According to DLIELC, these students can be particularly problematic: “They lose their English, start having more disciplinary issues, disturb other students.”<sup>18</sup> In 2009, almost 20 percent of IMSs started their FOT four to eight weeks after they graduated (Figure 3.8).

### ELT Length for New Countries

The length of English training is another unmanageable factor. Initial and target ECL scores provide, through programming benchmarks (i.e., the “wheel”), the predicted training time a student needs to complete ELT. In cases where students of a country have attended DLIEC before, the average length of training can be estimated by the country average. When a new country requests or requires ELT, it is possible to use world modernity data<sup>19</sup> to estimate an average ECL score.

**Figure 3.8**  
Time Between Graduation and FOT



RAND TR1152-3.8

<sup>18</sup> Focused discussion with AF/A1DG, October 22, 2010.

<sup>19</sup> Modernity data attempt to measure the advancement of a country by multiple types of data. Key areas include education, the role of females, infrastructure, commerce, birth rates, poverty, literacy, Internet usage, government, and many other factors.

The eight variables in Table 3.3 were able to explain 43 percent of the variation in ECL scores by country.<sup>20</sup> While the estimate is not perfect, it is a starting point for estimating a new FMS program's required ELT costs (see Table 3.4).

**Table 3.3**  
**Standard Regression of Selected Modernity Data Predicting ECL Score**

Factor	Estimate	Standard Error	T Ratio	Prob > t
Intercept	65.11	4.19	15.54	0.0000
Outpatient visits per capita	-0.63	0.37	-1.71	0.0908
Technicians in R&D (per million people)	0.01	0.00	2.24	0.0273
International tourism, expenditures for passenger transport items (current US\$)	-0.00	0.00	-2.08	0.0407
Trained teachers in primary education, male (% of male teachers)	-0.09	0.03	-3.47	0.0008
Expenditure per student, primary (% of GDP per capita)	0.47	0.13	3.49	0.0008
Roads, paved (% of total roads)	-0.11	0.04	-2.91	0.0045
Liner shipping connectivity index (maximum value in 2004 = 100)	0.27	0.08	3.55	0.0006
Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment (%)	0.13	0.05	2.89	0.0048

**Table 3.4**  
**Analysis of Variance for Predicting ECL Score**

Sum of Squares Due to Error	DFE	MSE	R <sup>2</sup>	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	Prob > F
9956.0	103	96.7	.473	.427	<.0001

NOTES: DFE = degrees of freedom; MSE = mean square error.

### Medical Clearances

Medical clearances represent another planning and scheduling issue. Numerous types of FOT require foreign students to obtain a certificate stating that they fulfill all medical requirements for their FOT, and this process can prove particularly time-consuming, especially when the students' country of origin does not provide generalized or quality medical/dentistry care. In some cases, students are unable to obtain the required medical clearance, and their ELT time is cut short by elimination.<sup>21</sup> In other cases, students obtain the medical clearance but only after spending more time at DLIELC than required for their English language training. As of December 31, 2010, fewer than 70 percent of DLIELC students who needed a medical clearance managed to obtain one.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> More than 206 variables were used to screen for variables with some correlation to predicting an ECL score. The eight variables were found to be statistically significant predictors.

<sup>21</sup> In some instances, the FOT slot is transferred to another student who holds a medical clearance.

<sup>22</sup> DLIELC, Balanced Scorecard FY10-3, undated.



## Managing Supply

Before we can conclude that demand exceeds supply, we must carefully examine supply. Supply comprises a number of factors. Some of the more significant are classrooms, instructors, beds, parking spaces, dining capacity, and course material. There are other factors, but these are the primary ones we addressed, and among this list we focused on classrooms. We let classrooms drive the number of instructors required. Physical space (classrooms) has the longest lead time and requires MILCON funding.<sup>23</sup> Instructors are driven by the demand for classrooms.<sup>24</sup>

We did not model certain items. Beds (housing) are purchasable off base and therefore do not represent a hard constraint. Parking spaces were addressed by the schoolhouse (there is sufficient space to expand). Dining capacity had room for another shift (thus, we did not model it). Course materials were driven by demand. (We assumed these were a cost item and not a restriction.)

We created a simulation model of the schoolhouse processes. The model is a simple production model with individuals progressing in the course and week of instruction where the input is the historical entry of students. There is a stochastic entry for failures. At the end of each week (the unit of measure in the model), the students are placed in new classes (commensurate to their course's MASL and week of study), with the goal of maintaining a 6:1 ratio of students to instructors. If the requirement exceeds capacity, the ratio is increased up to a specified limit. Every effort is made to eliminate classes of one or two students. Still, we found that human intelligence can do a better job of distributing the students than the model can, which is why our model replicated overall demand but used more classrooms than were used historically. For this reason, the model represents an absolute requirement or worst case and not the actual distribution of students into classrooms. Suboptimal actions, such as holding students back (who would have proceeded) or pushing them forward can reduce the demand on classrooms, but they depend on teacher evaluations of the students.

Model results are shown in Figure 3.9; a peak demand (modeled by historical entries) occurs every year between May and July and stresses the system. The peak demand is driven primarily by professional military education (PME), which starts in the fall.

Seasonal peaks represent a major planning challenge for DLIELC. The fact that these surges in student load are not permanent makes it difficult to request additional funds based on them, because extra teaching staff and new infrastructure would only be used during this peak time—and remaining largely idle, and empty, during nonpeak times.

### Classrooms

Simulation runs suggest that delaying admittance of students without FOT can reduce the peaks that occur in May through July. This effect was less noticeable in 2010, but was noticeable in the years prior to 2010.


Prioritization is another possible approach to reducing the peak demand, although it does have negative aspects. If students could be prioritized in such a way as to leave lower-priority students out of the peak period, demand could be significantly reduced. Unfortunately, some FOT courses, such as PME, have very specific start times. Figure 3.10 shows the effect of delay-

<sup>23</sup> The analysis is not limited to in-house options. Later in the report, we look at contracted options.

<sup>24</sup> The model estimates the number of classrooms. We assumed one instructor per classroom. Therefore, the demand for instructors is driven by the demand for classrooms.




**Figure 3.9**  
**Simulated Classroom Demand, 2005–2010**



RAND TR1152-3.9

**Figure 3.10**  
**Effect of Delaying Students Without FOT**



NOTES: Input data for this figure were supplied by DLIELC. The RAND simulation model delayed entries based on the existence of FOT.

RAND TR1152-3.10

ing 30 percent of all students and half of the students without FOT. Some peaks are reduced; in other cases, the overall demand is spread out more.

The simulation model shows a requirement over the past five years of 200 classrooms. The limit is reached only three times, and only during the peak periods. Also, the model is based on an absolute requirement and does not model the hand-optimization that occurs at DLIELC when small classrooms (one to three students) are merged with other classrooms.<sup>25</sup> The simulation shows that capacity exceeds the current 150 classrooms most of the time. DLIELC's internal reorganization of space to reach 174 is also breached most of the time. For these reasons, 200 classrooms would seem to be a reasonable goal and is an increase of only 26 over the proposed 174-classroom modification.<sup>26</sup>

Another solution would be to avoid scheduling, during peak months, students who plan to attend frequently occurring FOT sessions. These students represent the next level of flexibility; they do have FOT, but they could possibly have their start times rescheduled so they would not coincide with FOT sessions that have one start date per year or that begin with the academic year.

Currently, an increase in Saudi students is being discussed that will greatly exceed the growth of the past five years, possibly doubling the size of the school. There are two problems with building to such capacity. First, the growth in DLIELC has been gradual over the past five years, with one year actually witnessing a decrease. Second, there is no guarantee that, after this expected surge in growth over the next two to three years, the demand will continue and not fall back to pre-surge conditions. The upcoming demand appears to be an exception. In that case, temporary surge options make more sense, unless a specific growth in the FMS budget is being forecast, which it is not. Therefore, we recommend the use of contracted ELT services over the next three years to cover the expected surge, as opposed to building a facility (beyond the 200-classroom requirement) that may not be fully utilized after the surge time frame has passed.

The challenge for students who cannot start FOT right after they reach their target ECL is to maintain, during this transition time, the English language skills they have acquired. The current practice of sending them to classes they have already attended consumes resources and is educationally ineffectual.

One potential solution would be to set up a "finishing school" for these students. This would isolate potentially disruptive and less-motivated students from those who are still working on trying to achieve their ECL. It would also provide an opportunity to tailor ELT to the specific needs of students who are about to start FOT, emphasizing those skills that FOT instructors have repeatedly identified as lacking among DLIELC students. Feedback from field evaluation questionnaires (FEQs)<sup>27</sup> indicates that these skills include knowledge of military jargon and acronyms, understanding of fast-paced speech, and familiarity with various regional accents. Setting up a finishing school would require fewer teaching staff than if students were put back in regular classrooms. Training could also be more self-paced, self-directed, and make

<sup>25</sup> Again, these are suboptimal allocations as students are moved forward or back to create room. Also, the merging of classrooms represents the merging of students. The rooms are fixed in size (maximum of ten students) and location.

<sup>26</sup> As of February 23, 2011, DLIELC was planning an in-house increase of 24 classrooms (DLIELC English Language Program Working Group Briefing, December 9, 2010).

<sup>27</sup> AETC sends FEQs typically to AF units to evaluate the quality of training in new airmen. In this case, FEQs are sent to the follow-on schoolhouses for evaluation of the English capability of the students.

more extensive use of computer resources instead of instructors. And a finishing class would also free up space in instructional classes, which would further support the desired 6:1 student-to-instructor ratio. These classes may even be designed with up to 20–25 students per instructor, if group-based activities are employed.

The option of a finishing school class would be a good place to use U.S. military reservists or retirees to expose IMSs to military jargon and slang.

Another option would be to turn students who are ECL-qualified into teaching assistants (TAs).<sup>28</sup> This would increase teaching staff while keeping these students busy practicing their English. The “promotion” represented by this TA position would also contribute to keeping these students motivated by putting them in the position where they are transmitting their knowledge to other students. For that same reason, it could considerably reduce discipline issues. This solution could work particularly well for students who have a relatively long waiting time before starting their FOT (two weeks or more).

### **Instructors**

While not affecting the number of classrooms available, restricting instructor leave during the peak window, as a university or technical school would do, reduces the student-to-teacher ratio by 8 percent. Figure 3.11 shows the effect of this option and others considered below.

Institutionalizing a dual-role curriculum development section in which individuals are required to teach during peak periods can reduce student-to-teacher ratios by a full student (e.g., 7:1 to 6:1).

Hiring temporary instructors during the peak period reduces the ratio significantly but is costly because the shortest currently available temporary program is six months.<sup>29</sup> A three- to four-month temporary hiring contract would work the best to reduce peak demand and would not result in overcapacity.

Nonresident training represents another way to add flexibility to planning. To retain more instructors at DLIELC when the school needs them most—i.e., during peak times—one solution would be to schedule only MTTs deemed critical to COCOM theater security cooperation program (TSCP) priorities during peak months and delay other MTTs to nonpeak months. Lack of access to nonresident training data has prevented us from examining precisely how many instructors such a measure could free up, but this possibility should be explored in case the other options fail to reduce seasonal peaks.

### **Relocating ECHO Company**


Another way to create some breathing space at DLIELC would be to focus on IMSs at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio and relocate ECHO Company.<sup>30</sup> IMSs and ECHO Company currently share some infrastructure, including classrooms, a dining facility (the Alamo Café), and a library, but they attend different classes and language labs. They are also billeted

<sup>28</sup> We note that the terms “finishing school” and “TA” might need to be defined and marketed differently to ensure that cultural and linguistic sensitivities are fully considered. The best solution to these issues will likely be determined by DLIELC.

<sup>29</sup> These results are based on a General Services Administration contract that DLIELC was using at the time. A DLIELC-initiated IDIQ contract may be able to reduce the temporary instructor time to four months.

<sup>30</sup> ECHO Company is a U.S. Army-only company of recruits, deficient in English, who learn English prior to attendance at Army basic training.

**Figure 3.11**  
**Policy Effects on Student-to-Teacher Ratio**



RAND TR1152-3.11

in separate buildings. While IMSs study in a mostly civilian environment, U.S. students experience a more military environment, where, as indicated by a DLIELC source, “every waking moment is controlled by U.S. Army drill sergeants.”<sup>31</sup> U.S. students receive a different training than IMSs: “[D]rill sergeants teach them military skills such as basic rifle marksmanship, land navigation, first aid, etc., since they do not get ‘free time’ like the IMS.”<sup>32</sup> International and U.S. students have different initial ECL scores, training times, and success rates (defined as the percentage of students who reach their target ECL).<sup>33</sup> Overall, DLIELC caters to two cohorts that have very different profiles and needs. Relocating ECHO Company would free up some teaching staff, classrooms, and dorm space at Lackland Air Force Base, which would greatly help DLIELC in absorbing increasing numbers of IMSs.

Additionally, assuming that facilities exist at such locations as Fort Jackson, relocating ECHO Company would save some costs associated with shipping graduates to their basic military training (BMT) base. If the new location is a BMT base like Fort Jackson, those students going to Fort Jackson for BMT would have no costs, but other students would have travel costs similar to those for shipping from San Antonio.

### Improve Programming by Recalibrating the Wheel

Programming is largely based on the wheel, which predicts training timelines based on initial ECL scores. However, initial ECL scores predict only 37 percent of the variance in time to ECL-qualify. The discrepancy between average programmed time and actual training time

<sup>31</sup> Email correspondence with DLIELC, January 21, 2010.

<sup>32</sup> Email correspondence with DLIELC, January 21, 2010.

<sup>33</sup> This gap, however, has been greatly reduced since FY08.

remains small (within a one-week range in FY01–09), but this conceals important variations across individuals.

Overall, in FY09, 12 percent of IMSs were underprogrammed (i.e., had their training time extended) while 17 percent were overprogrammed (i.e., their training time was curtailed). Eight percent of U.S. students received an extension; 96 percent had their training time curtailed.

Students can be underprogrammed for a number of reasons. In some instances, students turn out to be illiterate in their own language, making the learning of a second language particularly challenging. According to a DLIELC source:

We currently do not have screening in place at DLI [Defense Language Institute] to determine literacy in a student's native language, and students may or may not admit this deficiency. Once students are here, they want to save face, and most work hard, but research indicates that second language acquisition for an adult who is not literate in his/her native language is very difficult, if not impossible.<sup>34</sup>

Another reason for underprogramming is that “[l]ack of sufficient funding may preclude the student from being scheduled for the correct number of weeks according to DLIELC programming guidelines.”<sup>35</sup> In the latter case, lack of funding means that students will leave the school without having reached their target ECL.

In other instances, some students are adequately programmed based on their capabilities but are still not able to finish in time. According to DLIELC sources, “[e]ven when a student has been accurately programmed in accordance with DLIELC guidelines, external factors such as visa delays may result in a discrepancy between programmed and actual training time.” In some instances, students have difficulties studying and completing their program because of “excessive absences due to personal or dependent care.” Other factors explaining student failure include “lack of linguistic aptitude, lack of motivation, age, . . . and culture/values adjustment time.” Finally, in some instances, some students seem to try to “game the system” by purposely underperforming at tests in order to stay longer at DLIELC.<sup>36</sup>

IMSs and U.S. students who receive curtailments generally do so because they have reached their target ECL early. In the case of U.S. students, however, other factors come into play. In 2005–2010, 87 percent of U.S. students who did not ECL-qualify were curtailed by one week or more, largely because of “academic failure, disciplinary action, failure to adjust to military life or other UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] punishable offenses.”<sup>37</sup> These curtailments often occur early in the program: In 2005–2010, 11 percent of all U.S. students were curtailed by 16 weeks or more.

An initial ECL score should not be the only relevant factor to program training time. Native language literacy rate, student motivation, and other factors identified in empirical literature on learning a second language also play an important role. One option for DLIELC

<sup>34</sup> Email correspondence with DLIELC, September 16, 2010.

<sup>35</sup> Email correspondence with DLIELC, September 16, 2010.

<sup>36</sup> Focused discussion with AF/AIDG, October 22, 2010.

<sup>37</sup> Email correspondence with DLIELC, December 15, 2010. IMSs, however, are very rarely dismissed for disciplinary issues, and testing their ability to adapt to military life is not the purpose of the school for them.

would be to recalibrate its programming wheel by combining an initial ECL score with these factors to accommodate different rates of learning.

Because native language literacy rate seems to be a particularly important predictor of how well students will perform in ELT,<sup>38</sup> another option could be to screen applicants in-country by giving them a Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) test. DLAB tests measure how capable a student will be to learn another language (e.g., English)—rather than simply assessing how well he/she already speaks it. This has already been implemented for a very small subset of students: DLIELC informed us that “[c]urrently work is being done at the Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL) at the University of Maryland to develop a DLAB test for Afghan students.”<sup>39</sup> This process should be generalized to avoid sending to DLIELC students who realistically have very little chance of succeeding.

Recalibrating the wheel would require identifying (1) the factors beyond ECL initial score that impact a student’s training time, (2) whether it is practical to measure these factors, and (3) whether their effects are significant. These factors could then be integrated in a tool that would ideally be as user friendly as the current wheel. If this effort proves too complex, a simple way to improve the wheel would be to add, as a sole additional consideration, students’ literacy in their own language. This would require one additional in-country test for all students. Although this may consume resources, a wheel incorporating both factors—initial ECL score and native language literacy—is likely to provide more-accurate training times for student programming.

### **Near-Term Strategy for Supply**

A near-term strategy will require addressing classroom space, the number of instructors, and how the “peak” period is managed. It is inefficient to hire government employees for the peak workload requirement. If we assume that an IDIQ contracting vehicle can provide instructors for short periods of time (4–6 months) and that the cost of an IDIQ instructor is less than a full-time government employee (because the instructor works less than half the year), and if we also assume that a contracted option (full ELT training to include curriculum, materials, facilities, and lodging at another location) is more expensive than the current government option (utilizing the opportunity costs of some existing infrastructure), then we believe the most cost-effective option is as follows:

- Build capacity to 200 rooms and hire government instructors to meet the current low demand of 160 rooms (assuming that instructor unavailability and other requirements yield a need for 175 instructors).
- Manage the additional surge of 40 instructors via an IDIQ contract.
- Establish an off-site contract option for unforeseen demand that could handle as many as 50 additional classrooms on an as-needed basis.
- Utilize this contract at a low-demand rate (5–10 classes) to maintain its availability and rapid response.
- A final option for peak demand might be to utilize qualified reservists as instructors. It would have the added benefit of exposing IMSs to U.S. military personnel.

<sup>38</sup> This result is based on discussions with DLIELC sources. DLIELC had no data available on students’ literacy in their own language, making it impossible for the RAND team to examine how lack of literacy affects success at DLIELC.


<sup>39</sup> Email correspondence with DLIELC, September 16, 2010.

This strategy is illustrated in Figure 3.12. The solid line is the historical modeled demand for classrooms. The solid blocks are the suggested in-house instructor capacity. This keeps the main cadre of instructors sufficiently utilized at the least cost. The dashed blocks on top represent the IDIQ temporary contractors who are hired on a six-month window to meet demand requirements. For requirements outside of the blocks or above the 200-classroom requirement, outside contractors can be utilized until the demand is confirmed as a long-term demand, and additional facilities can be purchased.

### Case Study Observations: A Strategic Prioritization-Driven Approach

Several of the organizational case studies that RAND reviewed for this report have transitioned from a supply-driven approach to a strategic prioritization-driven approach to create and maintain security cooperation programs. This shift in planning and resourcing in these organizations is partly tied to new leadership and guidance, rigorous outreach efforts to the COCOMs, the institution of policy-oriented steering groups to advise and guide the organization's activities, and the recognition of the need to work more closely with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. For example, the Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (DMHA) has representatives at several geographic COCOMs and understands well that partnering with established intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations in the respective partner countries can have mutually beneficial outcomes. The Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS) has shifted from a prior business model based on "unconstrained growth" to one that emphasizes country stra-

**Figure 3.12**  
**Instructor Supply Strategy**





tegic priorities as provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, (OSD(P)) in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). DIILS has already established a Policy Oversight Council, which began work in fall 2010. Both the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA) and DIILS have close linkages to DSCA and to OSD(P), which facilitates connections to policy decisions and current guidance on country and activity prioritization. What both these organizations have found to be of critical importance in developing these new models is a flexible approach to the organization's management, access to a large labor pool of talent, and the ability to put labor overage on a viable contract vehicle.

Several organizations that RAND examined, including the IAAFA, the Defense Institute for Medical Operations (DIMO), and the Partner Language Training Center, Europe (PLTCE), have adapted their programs and activities to better align themselves with strategic guidance and to better meet the needs of the partner nations. Specifically, they have varied course structure and lengths and increased use of mobile training teams in recent years.

## Recommendations

As noted above, we find that DLIELC lacks an overall robust requirements determination process and that the organization's business model is unable to meet variable demand. The more specific findings within this larger finding and potential solutions described above can be summarized in the following set of recommendations:<sup>40</sup>

- Institute processes to enable more accurate depiction of demand.
  - Identify factors to recalibrate the training wheel and more accurately program students.
  - Use regression models to predict student load based on estimates of FMS.
  - Use regression models to predict average ELT time for new countries based on world modernity data.
- Collaborate with the Defense Language Testing Advisory Board to fully review the validity and reliability of the ECL. This review will help ensure that students are accurately programmed, placed into the right course level, and sufficiently skilled to attend FOT.
- Reduce seasonal peaks.
  - Schedule students with no FOT during nonpeak months.
  - Avoid scheduling during peak months students who plan to attend a frequently occurring FOT.
  - Schedule only MTT deemed critical to COCOM TSCP priorities during peak months and delay other MTT to nonpeak months.
- Improve utilization of existing instructors by restricting leave during peak season.
- Create “breathing space” within existing supply.
  - Train U.S. students and IMSs at separate locations to accommodate different needs.
  - Set up a finishing school for students who are ECL-qualified/waiting for SET/FOT. Training could be more self-paced, self-directed, and make more extensive use of computer resources versus instructors. Training could be more focused on preparing for upcoming SET or FOT—study of military jargon, acronyms, pace of speech, accents,

<sup>40</sup> We assume that any changes to the requirement processes will be included in any new governance documents.



- etc. Training would not require class size limitations (one large continuing running class). Training might use military reservists or retirees for instructors.
- Consider increasing supply.
    - Increase classroom capacity to 200 rooms.
    - Increase instructor capacity to 175 instructors.
    - Prepare for execution of additional surge options.
      - IDIQ temporary instructor contract (40 additional)
      - contracted ELT programs (25 or more instructors and facilities using university programs or contractors)
      - temporary rental facilities and contracted temporary instructors (temporary during building phases).

## Financial Management and Cost Recovery

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This chapter reviews HQ AETC and DLIELC's financial management, focusing on the determination of the unit cost of training. It describes our analysis of DLIELC and HQ AETC's financial management structures and procedures.

DLIELC appears to be in conformance with the provisions of the DSCA Security Assistance Manual, as implemented through various levels of regulations. For instance, the Air Force establishes tuition rates according to tuition pricing guidelines for training international students as pursuant to DoD 7000.14-R, Volume 15. Accordingly, rates are published by MASL; however, support items (subsistence, medical, and housing service charges) are not included in these prices. Moreover, the Air Force bills other military departments for tuition when international students enter training under their sponsorship. Like most other security assistance providers, DLIELC also has established procedures that govern cost recovery should students not appear for a programmed course. AFJI 16-105, paragraph 3–7, provides guidelines for forfeiture charges for IMSs at DLIELC (and is discussed in Chapter Two).

However, based on our analysis, we find that current financial management practices have not been sufficiently established, which may expose ELT clients (which we define as the agencies paying the costs of individual ELT, i.e., DoD, Department of State, and foreign countries) to additional financial risk. More specifically, we conclude that DLIELC is not in a position to explicate its methodology for determining costs and does not have cost models that could be used to determine all the costs associated with student training. This is an important financial management issue because Title 22 stipulates that certain government-incurred costs are to be recovered. This chapter proposes a set of analytical solutions and makes five recommendations to implement them.

### HQ AETC Financial Management

AFJI 16-103 establishes HQ AETC responsibilities, which include

- managing, operating, funding and providing personnel for DLIELC
- identifying to the EA all annual budget and manpower resources in its operation and maintenance budget and financial plans
- describing the DLIELC commandant's responsibilities, which include
  - sending an annual budget and financial plan for DLIELC to HQ AETC, according to HQ AETC and HQ U.S. Air Force (USAF) direction.

- preparing and submitting future-years plan through command channels to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy (ASD (FM&P)).

The commandant's plan should

- identify all planned ELT needs, approved training development needs, and major training support needs
- identify funds and personnel needed to accomplish DLIELC's mission and send the requirements through command channels to ASD (FM&P)
- address the budget year, plan year, and out-years in the POM submission.

Ostensibly, the above regulations and procedures should provide an adequate normative regime whereby all costs associated with English language training should be identified, verified, and billed promptly to ELT clients. However, we found several unmet needs: (1) the need to develop more comprehensive cost models, (2) the need to develop and document validated, data-based cost determination procedures to calculate the full, recoverable costs (as stipulated in law and regulations) incurred by both DLIELC and AETC in the execution and management of ELT to all students (U.S. and foreign), and (3) the need to establish management procedures to ensure that all eligible costs expended in the execution of ELT are recovered by the U.S. Air Force.

Even where HQ AETC has attempted to exercise proper oversight of DLIELC, its financial management office appears to be relying on dated averaged data. Based on the lack of agreed-upon cost models used by DLIELC's financial management directorate and HQ AETC's acceptance of this situation, we conclude that HQ AETC and the 37th Training Wing do not have the tools for the necessary financial oversight of DLIELC.

HQ AETC leadership and DLIELC management face a unique challenge in this regard. DLIELC is a unique DoD asset that provides formal and regular training within DoD's Security Cooperation and Security Assistance structures that is not on a marginal cost basis. In other words, with the exception of ECHO Company, DLIELC does not premise the financial basis of ELT to foreign nations on a marginal cost basis in relation to the already ongoing training for the U.S. armed forces. Thus, its financial management, and particularly its cost-recovery practices, must be carefully designed to capture all financial costs (variable, as well as fixed) associated with the execution of its mission. It should be reiterated that in the case of providing FMS, all costs associated with the purchased training, including uniform military personnel accelerated salary costs, must be recovered from the country purchasing the training. This should be included in a cost model, as well as all incremental costs associated with the 37th Training Wing and HQ AETC's overall management and financial management of DLIELC.

### **Case Study Observations: Financial Management**

In the U.S. security cooperation community, other organizations are careful to bill—fully and accurately—all costs associated with the contracting client to the degree possible. The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) and DIILS factor fixed and variable costs into their cost structure for their courses and consulting projects undertaken using Security Cooperation and Security Assistance funds. We also conducted research into two foreign defense organiza-

tions that execute ELT but use different management and organizational approaches: the UK Defence School of Languages/English Language Wing, and the Canadian Forces English/French Language Training Program. Our research found that both programs are careful to ensure that the execution of their ELT missions are based on full cost recovery or are moving quickly in that direction. Infrastructure costs are amortized and factored into the organization's cost model. These costs (fixed and variable) are billed to the requesting client. This differs from DLIELC, where infrastructure costs are not billed (by law, infrastructure costs cannot be amortized).

Additionally, DLIEC maintains a cadre of senior English language instructors whose principal tasks are curriculum development. This fixed cost is not billed either and is an instance of DLIELC exposing its clients to financial risks because the costs of these individuals are met either through the U.S. Air Force back to the DoD or as "rent" that is covered by attending students in the form of higher unit instructional costs. In either case, it is not clear that curriculum development is best done in-house, since English language training materials are abundant in the private sector. There may be a case where some SET material is best produced in-house, but that question was not researched.

### **Discerning Unit Cost**

Interviews and subsequent correspondence with DLIELC and HQ AETC have reinforced the finding that the 37th Training Wing and HQ AETC cannot determine that all reimbursable costs are recovered. Consequently, DLIELC cannot provide the Department of the Air Force with the discrete "unit cost" of its English language instruction. Unit cost can be defined in a number of different ways (total average cost per hour of instruction, total average cost to advance a student from one level to another, average fixed cost of an MTT or LTD, etc.).

Without such data on unit costs, in addition to not being able to recover the costs, the Air Force, OSD, DSCA, and the Department of State are unable to determine the cost-effectiveness of DLIELC's English language instruction. Moreover, without actual unit costs, the government cannot go to the "market" to conduct cost comparisons through price discovery. With full knowledge of the various unit costs associated with DLIELC's English language activities, DoD would be in an extremely strong position to redesign the structure and procedures of the institution in accordance with comparative costs. Such information could also enable DoD to change the management of ELT by finding other, more cost-effective providers in certain instructional or support activities.

### **Proposed Solutions**

The study sponsors requested that, as part of the study's directive to assist DLIELC in its strategic planning, we develop costing models. RAND developed the following models:

- Phase 1: Direct in-processing costs
- Phase 2: Direct fixed costs
- Phase 3: Direct variable costs

- Phase 4: Direct out-processing costs
- Phase 5: Indirect overhead costs.

The models were developed in Excel. For reference, they appear in Appendix B, with detailed explanatory notes to assist DLIELC financial management in initiating their implementation.

Once management is convinced that the models produce costing data within acceptable parameters of margin of error, the models should be used to develop a cost library to inform decisionmaking. Over time, the models can be adjusted with experience so that their accuracy and fidelity of data improve.

## Recommendations

Since DLIELC, the 37th Training Wing, and HQ AETC have not collaborated on the development of adequate costing tools, there exists a need for a systemic review of existing management procedures to ensure that cost recovery of ELT is an essential component of its management practices.

We also recommend the following actions:

- Form a task force of senior leadership from 37th Training Wing, HQ AETC, and DLIELC with the objective of implementing cost recovery reform.
- Have the task force review proposed costing models to ensure their methodological accuracy. This review should be informed by a comprehensive review of U.S. Security Assistance regulations to ascertain how much USAF management and oversight costs are fully captured in the models, as stipulated in U.S. Code Title 10, and particularly Title 22. Care needs to be exercised in the review of the cost models to ensure that there is a clear methodological relationship between DLIELC's costing methodology and HQ AETC's family of cost models.
- Once the models' methodologies have been validated and agreed upon among all three parties, fully cost DLIELC's activities. The resulting data need to be fully vetted by all three organizations; once agreement is reached, a DLIELC-specific costing library can be developed and managed, in accordance with USAF policy and AETC regulations, and used by all three parties as an essential element of DLIELC's financial management.
- After the costing library is developed, review and re-issue financial management policies and procedures as they relate to DLIELC.

## Technology

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As noted in Chapter Two, the Air Force values the smart use of available technology in instructional systems. This chapter reviews DLIELC's use of technology and contrasts it with observations on blended learning (a combination of classroom- and computer-based training) and distance learning.

Based on our analysis we find that, to date, DLIELC has not been introducing new technologies at a quick enough rate, despite the fact that their successful use could lower fixed and variable costs. More specifically, we were unable to locate a technology roadmap for DLIELC.<sup>1</sup> While we do not believe that DLIELC needs to be an early adopter of technology, there are proven educational technologies that could enhance training and possibly decrease DoD's costs. This chapter elaborates on this finding and concludes with a set of five recommendations.

### DLIELC's Use of Technology

Because new weapon systems and technology are rapidly being developed, curriculum developers must ensure that ELT materials are regularly updated. However, changes in technology will not uniformly affect curriculum in SET and GET. True to its namesake, the SET curriculum is specialized and will be more sensitive to changes in military technology. Unfortunately, the time to develop new curricula at DLIELC is quite protracted. Estimates provided by DLIELC indicate that it takes approximately 2,500 hours to develop one week of SET curriculum.<sup>2</sup> Based on these estimates, it would be difficult for curriculum development to keep pace with changes in specialized terminology.

Other specialty fields have also recognized the difficulty of maintaining pace with advancing educational methods (most often associated with technology solutions). To respond to these challenges, some researchers have advocated integrating curricula and technology. For example, textbooks using collaborative platforms (e.g., Wikis) have provided one solution for quickly updating material without having to create a new edition for publication. Because DLIELC does not sell SET textbooks, combining a collaborative platform and digital textbook technology would allow subject matter experts at FOT sites to identify and update outdated

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<sup>1</sup> The real value of a technology roadmap is the process and the resulting identification of critical technology investment decisions (Marie L. Garcia and Olin H. Bray, "Fundamentals of Technology Roadmapping," Albuquerque, N.M.: Sandia National Laboratories, 1997).

<sup>2</sup> According to feedback from DLIELC, "[f]or [curriculum development] to produce 1 module (one week of training) [it] takes a minimum of 2500 hours. This includes the development of the text, instructor guide, ancillary materials, and assessment. Producing materials that have electronic media components take at a minimum twice that amount of time."

terminology. In addition, updates could be made quickly to incorporate other stakeholders, including DLIELC instructors, students, and test developers who provide feedback about the curriculum.

DLIELC has indicated that it is using technology more in the classrooms (e.g., websites) but that not all students have access to the Internet. Currently, only certain classes are assigned to the Learning Center where Internet access is provided. Limited access to computers and the Internet may impede the introduction of potentially beneficial technology.

Although testing for skills has incorporated additional assessments for listening, there are opportunities to expand the use of the OPI. The OPI is required only for certain students and requires considerable training and resources on the part of DLIELC staff. These resource demands restrict practice opportunities for students who need to pass the OPI. Also, other students learning English may benefit from practicing listening and speaking.

Recently, the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages developed a computerized version of the OPI (OPIc®). The OPIc® has shown acceptable reliability and validity<sup>3</sup> and may provide students who need to pass the OPI with additional opportunities to practice. Furthermore, the OPIc® can be group-administered, allowing many students to take the test online at the same time. Introducing this technology could further provide opportunities for independently evaluating English-speaking skills for those students not required to take the OPI for FOT. Taking advantage of most of the technological solutions will require issuing laptops to a larger percentage of students.

## The Blended Learning Technology Approach

Figure 5.1 provides an illustration of a potential technology usage that could save money but that has not been tested. On the left-hand side of the figure is the current DLIELC approach of five to six hours of classroom instruction in a nine-hour day. The current approach leaves all classrooms at 75 percent maximum utilization, meaning that there is unused capacity that could accommodate about 300 more students.

If it was possible to substitute some of the classroom instruction, possibly two hours, with computer-based training (utilizing the current computer labs, library, or dorms/quarters), DLIELC could double its capacity from 900 students to 1,800 students with no change in the duty day. In this example, the 1,800 students would be divided into two groups, with one using the classrooms while the other gets computer-based training; after lunch, the group that got classroom instruction in the morning would get computer-based training in the afternoon so that the group that had computer-based training in the morning could make use of the classrooms in the afternoon.


The idea suggested in Figure 5.1 has not been tested for effectiveness. We recommend a small-scale pilot test to determine the effectiveness of the idea. This test would require that all students have laptops, both those in the control and those in the test group.

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<sup>3</sup> E. A. Surface, R. M. Poncheri, and K. S. Bhavsar, *Two Studies Investigating the Reliability and Validity of the English ACTFL OPIc® with Korean Test Takers: The ACTFL OPIc® Validation Project Technical Report*, Raleigh, N.C.: SWA Consulting, 2008.



**Figure 5.1**  
**Example of a Blended Learning Technology Approach**



\*Theoretical limit given 150 classrooms and 6:1 student-to-teacher ratio.

RAND TR1152-5.1

## Case Study Observations: Distance Learning

A key observation in the area of technology innovation is that DLIELC has not adopted foreign language technical support capabilities, which might reduce DLIELC's operating costs. We did not see much evidence that DLIELC has pursued innovative, commercially developed technological solutions to ELT. In contrast, for example, its sister unit, the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC), has pursued on-line instruction of alumni.

Several organizations we examined also engage in distance learning practices. The Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) is one of the best examples to highlight. Two of the four main security cooperation courses—the more junior-level courses—are conducted online. DISAM spent a year developing a database of DoD positions to identify staff in need of some kind of security cooperation/security assistance–related training. DISAM identified 11,000 relevant DoD positions, which has helped it target its course training options.

Another important lesson comes from the Canadian English/French language training program for the Canadian Forces, which has used commercial, off-the-shelf English/French language distance learning programs for students to learn the other official language of Canada. This has been found to be content-effective in terms of learning foreign languages, as well as cost-effective.

## Recommendations

As noted above, based on our analysis, we find that, to date, DLIELC has not been introducing new technologies at a quick enough rate, despite the fact that their successful use could lower fixed and variable costs. The RAND team suggests that DLIELC start with an interdisciplin-



ary team made of up leadership, technologists, instructors, and infrastructure experts and then develop a vision of what cost-effective technology can do for DLIELC. From there, it would run small pilot programs to test various technological solutions, using the Horizon reports<sup>4</sup> as a starting point. DLIELC should maintain a database of lessons learned from the pilot programs to refine the requirement. It should also involve instructors in the process so that the efforts are not top-down-directed but bottom-up-experienced. Finally, it should select full-scale programs for implementation when the vision is met and tests are cost-effective.

Given what we have found, we believe that DLIELC could use technology more effectively and should explore all possible means of using new and existing cost-effective ELT technological support tools and means, including the following:

- Explore where there may be cost-effective means to deliver some ELT through distance learning.<sup>5</sup> There are justifiable reasons why partner countries require in-person instruction, but in some cases DLIELC needs to consider web-based ELT, if not to replace, then at least to augment in-person training through a blended learning technology approach.
- Explore computerized methods such as OPIc®.
- Consider using a collaborative platform approach to update SET textbooks.
- Provide all students (not just SET students) with laptops, or use laptops as an incentive to reach some level.
- Buy commercial bandwidth needed for Internet usage and add those costs to the fixed cost of running the schoolhouse.

If implemented as part of a comprehensive roadmap, these recommendations will ensure that DLIELC is in a position to leverage current and emerging technologies to enhance its training delivery. Such a roadmap will serve as a useful tool in overcoming other challenges and free up manpower in the classroom and create greater efficiencies in study options for students, curriculum development, and training materials review.

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<sup>4</sup> The Horizon reports describe the latest in educational technologies with estimated horizons until maturity. The reports are put together by a consortium of technologists and educational experts.

<sup>5</sup> For instance, all partner countries using MTTs may not need physical ELT instruction.

## Identity

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DLIELC fulfills three broad roles. First, as a training institution, it provides students with high-quality ELT that will allow them to meet the language requirements of their FOT. Second, as a military institution, it is a first step for U.S. and international trainees toward receiving military education in the United States. And third, as a security cooperation organization, it provides U.S. partner countries with a venue where IMSs can learn about American culture, develop relationships with their U.S. counterparts, and improve their country's armed forces' interoperability with the United States. These three roles are critical to DLIELC's mission, yet they create tensions at times.

This chapter examines these three roles, focusing on the tensions among them. Based on the results of a set of case studies that examine similar training organizations, we find that *DLIELC's conflicting priorities have led to contradictory views on the institution's identity (i.e., what is its primary purpose—an academic, military, or government/policy institution?)*. As a result, DLIELC's institutional priorities appear vague, as is its definition of what would constitute achieving "success." We conclude with a set of seven recommendations for clarifying DLIELC's identity. If implemented, these recommendations will permit the organization to move forward with the proper focus.

### Critical Function Played by DLIELC

DLIELC's purpose is to teach English to international and U.S. students. The Air Force Culture, Region, & Language Flight Plan (2009) states that "[t]he end-state sought will . . . provide coalition and partner nations with the English language skills needed to maximize our ability to operate together." DLIELC plays an essential role in DoD's overall security cooperation strategy as the gateway to FMS and IMET training and education. It is often the entry point for foreign students experiencing U.S. culture directly. DLIELC can also be the first step of a longer relationship between international trainees and the U.S. staff, especially for students who return for additional courses. The type of relationships that DLIELC builds through ELT has been recognized as highly valuable. In fact, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2010) recalled that "the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has identified English language teaching as the single most powerful public diplomacy tool available to public affairs officers" (p. 20). Earlier in 2009, the Congressional Research Service warned that "reduction in such language instruction represents lost opportunity to engage foreign publics and to encourage long-lasting connections with and goodwill toward the United States" (p. 48).

To fulfill its building partnership (BP) mandate, DLIELC organizes cultural activities as part of the DoD Field Studies Program to familiarize IMSs with American institutions and values. The stated purpose of this program is to

ensure that international students return to their homelands with an understanding of the responsibility of governments, military and citizens to protect, preserve and respect the rights of every individual.<sup>1</sup>

DLIELC also put in place a sponsorship program—American Members of International Goodwill to Others (AMIGO)—through which students are able to interact on a personal basis with individuals and families in the San Antonio area to get a first-hand experience of the American way of life.

### **DLIELC’s Training Role**

DLIELC fulfills its training (or academic) objective reasonably well. The school is accredited by the Commission on English Language Program Accreditation (CEA), which is the standard in English as a second language (ESL) teaching. It received, upon inspection, “outstanding” and “excellent” evaluations. DLIELC instructors have strong training backgrounds in ESL/English as a foreign language (EFL), and most have a master’s degree. An overwhelming majority of students report being satisfied with their linguistic progress. In 2009, 88 percent of GET students “strongly agreed” or “agreed” with the statement that their English listening skills had improved during their time at DLIELC. Eighty-four percent provided a similar response for reading skills, 83 percent for speaking skills, and 71 percent for writing skills. Over the years, the percentage of IMSs who reach their ECL target score has remained relatively stable and high (91 percent on average).<sup>2</sup> The number of U.S. students who fail to ECL-qualify experienced a dramatic surge from FY03 to FY06 before decreasing from approximately 70 percent in FY06 to 13 percent in FY09 (Figure 6.1).


Still, DLIELC as a training institution has experienced challenges. A large number of students see their training cut short before they ECL-qualify: 87.3 percent of U.S. students and 28.2 percent of IMSs who did not ECL-qualify received a curtailment in 2005–2010. Some students received a waiver to move on to their planned FOT, even when they did not reach the required ECL score. It is important to note, however, that this generally happens with students who are very close to their target ECL and would likely miss the beginning of their FOT if they remained at DLIELC for the few additional weeks of ELT that they need. It also applies to a very small number of students: Only 1.3 percent of IMSs, on average, received an ECL waiver in 2005–2009.<sup>3</sup> Still, it suggests that the ECL qualification criteria to move on to FOT have limited validity and that the “wheel,” which assigns 12 weeks of English training to students with an initial ECL score of 85–89 and who need a 90, may have limited usefulness as a programming tool. There is also insufficient evidence about the validity of ECL scores as

<sup>1</sup> DLIELC website, “Field Studies (LEF),” undated.

<sup>2</sup> The annual percentage of IMSs reaching their target ECL score ranged from 86 to 94 percent in FY01–FY09.

<sup>3</sup> The annual percentage of IMSs receiving an ECL waiver ranged between 0.5 and 3 percent in 2005–2009.

**Figure 6.1**  
**Percentage of IMs and U.S. Students Who Did Not ECL-Qualify, FY01–FY09**



RAND TR1152-6.1

a metric of English proficiency.<sup>4</sup> A sample of data provided to the research team by DLIELC indicates a relationship between ECL and the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), but this sample represents only a very small subset of the students who attend DLIELC. The 2009 Annual Trend Report for Direct Mail Questionnaires (DMQs)<sup>5</sup> concluded rather alarmingly that “[t]he OPI/ECL scores were not reliable indicators of success; neither were SET assessments.” Additional issues include the fact that DLIELC students do not self-assess for placement, progression, or curriculum, although such procedures are commonly considered important elements of adult education. Finally, a number of instructors are diverted to curriculum development activities, creating a shortage of teaching staff.

Part of DLIELC’s failure may be a result of the instructor staff seeing themselves as educators and not as Air Force instructors. In an education environment, such as a college, the responsibility for learning is on the student. In a military training environment, the instructors have more of a responsibility for ensuring that individuals are trained correctly. The DLIELC staff should put less effort in curriculum development, possibly even outsourcing it, and more emphasis on assessment and improving the training.

<sup>4</sup> This is not meant to suggest that the ELT itself provided by DLIELC is not valid. On the contrary, student feedback clearly states that most students are satisfied with their instruction.

<sup>5</sup> The Annual Trend Report is a summary and analysis of the answers given by former DLIELC students and their FOT instructors to the direct mail questionnaire (DMQ). It is compiled every calendar year by the Standardization and Evaluations Division in DLIELC.

## DLIELC's Military Role

IMs' English language skills, for those who graduate, are generally sufficient to successfully attend FOT, as evidenced by their providing an overall rating of "satisfactory" from DMQs in 2009. Here too, however, DLIELC faces a number of challenges. They include the delays experienced by some students between the end of their English language training and the start of their FOT, or the difficulty of some students in obtaining the medical clearance they need for their FOT.<sup>6</sup> Another issue is the lack of preparation of IMs for the military environment they will experience during their FOT. DLIELC's environment for IMs is almost exclusively civilian, and IMs do not undergo the same drills or physical training (PT) requirements as U.S. students do. DLIELC's requirements in terms of discipline, too, are very lax compared to what will be expected of IMs during their FOT—or of what is expected of U.S. students at DLIELC. The school's limited ability to enforce discipline with IMs represents a major challenge for the teaching and administrative staff.<sup>7</sup>

A related concern is the fact that English language skills taught to IMs are not always targeted toward their FOT. Field evaluation visits, in particular, report on several occasions in which IMs are not familiar with military jargon or the extensive use of acronyms in the U.S. military. Students themselves acknowledge this shortcoming: In 2009, 62 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "I need to learn more military language/acronyms/abbreviations and slang."<sup>8</sup> Another issue relates to IMs' speaking and writing skills being weaker than their reading and comprehension skills. Yet, the former skills are critical for some FOT. The most severe judgment on DLIELC's ability to fulfill its military role came from the school itself, which stated in the conclusion of its 2009 Annual Trend Report for Direct Mail Questionnaires:

Even though the overall DMQ "trend" was satisfactory, the reasons for a satisfactory trend could not be determined. . . . Qualitatively and quantitatively, it was unclear as to the actual impact of DLIELC training on graduates' FOT success.

## DLIELC's Security Cooperation Role

The Air Force has recently called "building partnerships" one of its core functions. BP is a subset of security cooperation, and is the only organization in the AF that is strictly focused on that function. With regard to security cooperation, several elements of success suggest that DLIELC fulfills this role relatively well. DLIELC currently meets all demands from services for resident and nonresident training. DMQs, end-of-course (EOC) surveys, and reports from

<sup>6</sup> Delays in obtaining medical clearances can however hardly be imputed to DLIELC and are largely related to the quality of medical care in students' countries of origin.

<sup>7</sup> During a visit of the research team to San Antonio, DLIELC personnel mentioned that there are about 50 students who "are not really there" for training, and added that people who lose their motivation are a drag on the classroom. Yet, disciplinary action against IMs is extremely rare at DLIELC.

<sup>8</sup> Only respondents who gave a neutral or negative answer to three previous questions on language skills were asked this question. Hence, they represent 62 percent of a sample equivalent to approximately one-quarter of the initial sample of SET respondents.


field trips show that IMSs generally enjoy their experience at DLIELC, whether in the classroom or during field visits.

A large majority of IMSs are officers who may eventually come to occupy a position of influence in their country of origin. In FY06–09, 75 percent of all IMSs were officers (an additional 2 percent were warrant officers); 19 percent were enlisted. As shown in Figure 6.2, almost 75 percent of these officers were in the O-1 to O-3 pay grade range (57 percent of all military personnel), with the remaining 25 percent being O-4 to O-6.

Seven officers had a rank of O-7 and higher in 2005, 12 in 2006, 10 in 2007, 7 in 2008, 10 in 2009, and 5 in 2010.<sup>9</sup> This figure underlines the importance of DLIELC as a venue to establish relations with foreign military personnel. One might expect DLIELC would encourage the development of a professional network among its alumni, or at least maintain contact with its graduates to advance U.S. interest in fostering long-term relationships with these individuals and their institutions and governments after they return to their homeland. This should be considered an important missed opportunity.

The security cooperation objective of DLIELC is also challenged by the fact that the budget provided by AFSAT for cultural activities has not changed in the past three years and is not planned to increase any time soon, while the number of students has grown and will probably continue to grow. According to regulation<sup>10</sup> the cost of the field studies program is included in the cost of tuition.<sup>11</sup> It is unclear, however, what value or percentage of tuition this represents. Thirty-five dollars per student per week is a commonly accepted value but it does

**Figure 6.2**  
**IMS Pay Grades (Military Only), FY06–FY09**



RAND TR1152-6.2

<sup>9</sup> These figures are as of early November 2010.

<sup>10</sup> See AFI 16-105 Chapter 11, Section III IP Funding, 11-6, and DoD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, 2003, Section C10.11, Field Studies Program.

<sup>11</sup> Email correspondence with DLIELC, February 18, 2011.

not seem to have any concrete basis.<sup>12</sup> In any case, this low figure suggests that field trips are given a low priority.

An interesting DLIELC initiative to provide IMSs with a richer cultural experience is to pair them with American sponsors through the AMIGO program. The program seems highly successful: In 2009, 79 percent of students who took part in AMIGO agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: “My AMIGO helped me improve my English language skills.” Seventy-six percent agreed or strongly agreed that “I learned about the American family and community life from my AMIGO sponsor.”<sup>13</sup> However, not every student finds a sponsor: out of the 801 students who asked for an American sponsor in 2009, 303 (38 percent) could not get one.

## The Clash of Roles

DLIELC’s three roles impose very different requirements and can lead to tensions or conflicting priorities. For instance, the academic role would impose minimum entry standards, while the need to cater to the needs of U.S. allies and partners makes an “accept all” policy more appropriate. Similarly, the necessity to properly program students in a training institution would warrant a prioritization and/or slot system, while security cooperation objectives are adequately served by the current open door policy.<sup>14</sup> Although they seem closely related, the two objectives of military training and building partnerships also create tensions. Focusing on the quality of military training would suggest limiting student load to ensure adequate billeting and base resources. However, if security cooperation is an important goal, then DLIELC should not only continue to accept all students but also have surge capacity to maximize FMS cases in the future. The tension between the academic and security cooperation objectives is also apparent in the teaching staff’s hiring criteria: instructors have an ELT background but no policy/international/intercultural relations background. DLIELC’s policy of maintaining tight control over SET books—instead of disseminating them to partner countries—makes sense from a business point of view, but not if security cooperation is the main focus.

## Case Study Observations: Identity

In the case study analysis, we considered whether other DoD organizations faced similar issues. Overall, we found that organizations closely aligned to DSCA and OSD guidance, that report to DSCA or directly to OSD(P), tend to be more government/policy-oriented than those reporting to one of the Services.

Organizations such as DIILS, DISAM, CCMR, and COE-DMHA are aware of OSD and COCOM Theater Campaign Plan guidance and align their activities with the guidance outlined in those strategic planning documents for the most part. There is a clear and logical rationale for this adherence to policy guidance and priorities. The funding and the ultimate

<sup>12</sup> The RAND-developed cost model for DLIELC, Appendix B, Table B.5, seems to suggest that the figure is reasonable.

<sup>13</sup> DLIELC, “End-of-Course Survey (EOCs) Annual Trend Report, CY 2009,” p. 22.

<sup>14</sup> There are limits to this argument: Opening the door to the extent that the quality of DLIELC’s services to its students deteriorates would likely hamper the security cooperation objective.



long-term viability of these organizations depend on providing courses and consulting projects that are in accordance with policy objectives.

Organizations reporting to a Service, such as IAAFA, DIMO, and Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), are another step removed from national-level policy guidance and therefore see themselves more as military organizations. Policy objectives are there, but they appear to the management of these organizations as somewhat opaque, if not distant.

An interesting case study of another organization that has an English language training mission is the UK Defence School of Languages/English Language Wing (DSL/ELW). DSL/ELW is unquestionably a defense organization under the Ministry of Defence's central funding. It delivers ELT to fee-paying foreign nationals and has no pretensions of being an academic institution. Courses are managed by a dedicated military course officer; a defense civil servant oversees the standard of instruction and also instructs. Equally, the Canadian Forces English/French Language instructional program exists solely to instruct those languages to members of the Canadian Forces; again, it makes no claim to being an academic institution.

What appears to be critical from these case studies is the importance of clarity in mission, which can be found in the form of guidance from DSCA, informed by a careful review of the GEF, as well as clear lines of command and financial control and expectations. It is of concern that DLIELC is not an engrained component of the overall security cooperation community within the Air Force or at the Joint level, although it has a key role to play in security cooperation. Indeed, one could argue that many of DLIELC's challenges are compounded by the fact that it does not firmly belong to this community.<sup>15</sup>

## Recommendations

As we note above, we find that conflicting priorities of DLIELC have led to contradictory views on the institution's identity (what is its primary purpose—is it an academic, military, or government/policy institution?). As a result, DLIELC's institutional priorities appear vague, as is its definition of what constitutes success. This further emphasizes the need expressed in Chapter Two for overarching guidance.

Given this fact, OSD and USAF need to emphasize the government/policy-oriented aspects of DLIELC as an instrument of the security cooperation community. Simply stated, DLIELC, like all security assistance and security cooperation organizations within DoD, is an instrument of U.S. government policy. All management assumptions related to its structure and functions must fully emphasize this principle. Overall, DLIELC is a training organization with some educational functions. Its primary purpose is to build partnerships, and both the educational and military roles of the school need to serve that objective. This is not to say that fulfilling the security cooperation role is all that matters: Obviously, failing to adequately fulfill the training function well would have a dramatically negative impact on U.S. security cooperation objectives. All three roles are important, but security cooperation should take precedence.

Thus, we offer the following six recommendations for DLIELC:

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<sup>15</sup> In Chapter Nine we fully address this issue.



1. Deemphasize the academic character of the organization. This currently distracts from its main mission as a training organization and an instrument for security cooperation.
2. Look beyond ELT credentials in teacher recruitment process. *Experience and skills in cross-cultural communication* and a basic knowledge of security assistance and security cooperation would be highly valuable qualifications for anyone who teaches at DLIELC.
3. For all instructors, expand faculty pre-service training (PST) to provide basic skills and understanding in security cooperation. Providing skills and understanding in key areas related to the core mission is an important step in building both mission valence (attractiveness of the mission) and commitment to the school.<sup>16</sup>
4. Have more military personnel interact with IMSs. Anecdotal evidence from DLIELC sources suggests that IMSs look for interactions with U.S. military personnel.<sup>17</sup> However, this happens rarely, because U.S. military personnel focus on U.S. students. Thus, consideration should be given to orientation tours of nearby DoD facilities and units. “Militarizing” to some extent the environment of IMSs could potentially have a positive effect on students’ motivation, facilitate the transition from DLIELC to FOT, and reduce disciplinary issues.<sup>18</sup>
5. Consider creating an alumni program and modeling this program, perhaps, on the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies or other similar alumni network organizations. Such a program could include hosting meetings in the United States or in partner countries, sending e-newsletters, creating alumni chapters in the respective partner countries, enabling professional and social networking websites to build on and sustain IMS English language skills and shared experiences at DLIELC. Promotions of former DLIELC students could be highlighted, among other important news events. Moreover, it may be possible for DLIELC alumni to receive support from local organizations involved in ELT (e.g., the State Department, embassies).
6. Reemphasize the importance of building relationships with students and consider new initiatives such as developing field trips (to include U.S. military units and facilities) and cultural activities,<sup>19</sup> including the AMIGO program, which needs a thorough assessment.<sup>20</sup> This means increasing DLIELC’s budget accordingly to reflect growing requirements in student load; such readily identifiable and discrete incremental costs could be easily factored into the cost models that are to be introduced into the financial management structures and practices of DLIELC.

<sup>16</sup> See Hal G. Rainey and Paula Steinbauer, “Galloping Elephants: Developing Elements of a Theory of Effective Government Organizations,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1999.

<sup>17</sup> Another way to provide IMSs with a more military environment would involve making IMS life more similar to the U.S. students’ life. IMSs could, for instance, have some PT or other types of drills during their free time. Interactions with DLIELC faculty are an integral part of an IMS experience, which, in turn, impacts the school’s effectiveness in meeting its building partnership objectives.

<sup>18</sup> Currently, disciplinary issues are handled by the sponsoring military department rather than DLIELC. Anecdotal evidence from DLIELC sources suggests that it takes a major offense to get expelled from DLIELC. Breaches of discipline, for the most part, are not sanctioned.

<sup>19</sup> An inexpensive option would be to start a speaker series with guest speakers coming to DLIELC to discuss human rights law, civil/military relations, and, more generally, topics related to American values.

<sup>20</sup> It would be useful to find out, in particular, why this program finds an insufficient number of sponsors, and whether this is related to the requirement for sponsors to provide DLIELC with a quarterly Sponsorship Report, a process that some prospective participants may find too cumbersome.

## Assessment

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As prescribed in AFJI 16-103, DLIELC uses a combination of internal and external assessments to evaluate the DELP. Results of these assessments are provided to a variety of organizations, including HQ AETC, which receives a periodic summary known as the *balanced scorecard*.

This chapter reviews a range of assessments conducted by DLIELC, including strategic assessments and student and instructor evaluations, and then describes the results of our analysis of these assessments. Based on this analysis, we find that *the lack of a formal and functioning assessment/evaluation process inhibits DLIELC from being capable of defining and assessing its own performance*. DLIELC's current processes are not working, whereas other training and educational units in AETC are successful. The chapter concludes with some specific actions for improving the balanced scorecard, as well as six recommendations for enabling DLIELC to establish a robust overall assessment process. These recommendations would be codified in the overarching guidance recommended in Chapter Two.

### Internal Assessments

#### Student Feedback

To identify strengths and weaknesses in ELT, DLIELC conducts an EOC survey two weeks prior to graduation. This survey gives students an opportunity to provide feedback on several areas of ELT, including classroom environment, effectiveness of training, and use of technology. Several related sections address DLIELC operations, tours and the AMIGO program, and DLIELC services and facilities (e.g., the dining hall). The survey contains separate sections and questions for GET, SET, the instructor development branch (IDB), and ECHO Company.

Student comment sheets are available to students to provide positive or negative feedback to DLIELC. Once the comment sheets are completed, students leave them in one of the designated drop boxes. The ability to complete comment sheets at any time allows DLIELC to address student concerns in a timely manner.

#### Instructor Effectiveness

Regular evaluations of instructors by DLIELC management are necessary to ensure the quality of classroom instruction and provide useful feedback to instructors. DLIELC 1025.58 prescribes the guidelines on how instructor evaluations are conducted. Instructors are observed and formally evaluated twice each year on three dimensions: (1) planning and preparation, (2) techniques of instruction, and (3) learning environment. As an administrative tool, the performance evaluation form is adequate. However, the effectiveness of the form for providing

developmental feedback to instructors depends on the quality of comments provided by raters on the form.

### **Field Trips**

DLIELC also evaluates the objectives met when students take field trips. Field trips are offered as part of the field studies program (FSP) to comply with DoD Instruction 5410.17. Previously known as the Informational Program (IP), the FSP (see chapter 11 of the JSAT) is voluntary, but is to be encouraged. The FSP is designed to support four areas of emphasis: (1) internationally recognized human rights as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;<sup>1</sup> (2) the democratic ideals of an elected government and effective civil-military relations that reinforce that elected government; (3) the roles and interrelationships of a culturally, ethnically, economically, and socially diverse population in a democratic society; and (4) the U.S. free enterprise system and its role in a democratic society. To determine compliance with this requirement, DLIELC students complete a form following each field trip indicating if the objectives were met.

### **External Assessments**

The English Language Preparedness Survey, formerly the Direct Mail Questionnaire, is designed to evaluate how well DLIELC course objectives and training serve FOT needs. Specifically, the feedback helps DLIELC determine if DLIELC graduates have the necessary language skills to succeed in FOT. The FOT instructors evaluate students' language skills in several areas—listening, comprehension, speaking, reading, and writing. It should be noted that DLIELC graduates (i.e., students in FOT) no longer complete self-assessments using this survey.

As an additional external assessment, DLIELC requests the CEA, an accrediting body recognized by the U.S. Department of Education, to independently evaluate DLIELC. The CEA accredits English language programs using objective and established standards. These standards provide the foundation for evaluating an English language program on several factors, including its curriculum, faculty, administration, student services, and student achievement. The CEA first accredited DLIELC in 2000. DLIELC was reevaluated in 2005, receiving full accreditation for an additional ten years.

### **Strategic Assessments**

DLIELC periodically provides its reporting chain, the 37th Training Wing, with a balanced scorecard. The scorecard presents additional metrics for evaluating organizational effectiveness. These metrics include DLIELC's international student graduation rate, instructor development production, graduates' satisfaction with training for professional growth, ability to respond to COCOM requests for MTTs, subject matter expert exchanges, LTDs, student-to-instructor ratios, timeliness of hiring, percentage of medical clearances completed, and scheduling effectiveness.

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<sup>1</sup> See United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, 217 A (III).

### Evaluation of Student Success

Graduation requirements are outlined in DLIELC 1025.25, Chapter 1. Specifically, students must be scheduled in the MASL, meet all prerequisites, be in attendance for at least 18 class periods (or 80 percent of available class time), and successfully complete quiz/performance evaluations the last week of training, whereupon they receive a certificate of graduation. Students must also achieve graduation requirements specified for individual MASLs or FOT (e.g., ECL score required by FOT). Students failing to meet any of the requirements for graduation may still be provided with a certificate of attendance or a certificate of training.

Defining student success presents many challenges for DLIELC. A number of factors affecting a student's ability to meet graduation requirements are beyond DLIELC's control. For example, DLIELC does not control the length of time a student is enrolled. Students can be underprogrammed or have training time curtailed by the sponsoring military department. Consequently, students may be making satisfactory progress toward graduation but are not provided with sufficient time to meet the English requirements for FOT. Another concern found in defining success occurs when a student's graduation requirements change during the course of training. This may occur, for example, when a student's FOT changes and the corresponding English requirements are different.

### Improving Assessment Metrics

The most recent balanced scorecard (as of December 31, 2010) indicated a few areas of concern, including satisfaction of instructor development training among graduates,<sup>2</sup> student-to-faculty ratio, hiring timeline for instructors, and completion of student medical clearances. The percentage of DLIELC instructor development graduates who were satisfied with training for professional growth (74 percent) was slightly below the goal of 85 percent. Additional analysis by DLIELC of this issue suggested that the lower score could be partly attributed to a particular course that used a new instructor.

Concerns directly related to the content and breadth of the assessments were also identified. For example, although the assessment of the FSP shows that it is meeting minimum requirements, the assessment is extremely terse and does not provide enough information to determine the quality or quantity of information learned during field trips.

Other assessments, such as the EOC survey, reflect DLIELC's complex identity as an academic, military, and security cooperation institution. Questions in the EOC survey suggest that DLIELC's academic function is the primary focus of this assessment. The BP role (a subset of security cooperation) of the school is somehow reflected in the numerous questions that assess the quality of the support staff and facilities at DLIELC. It is also covered by more-general questions about how pleasant, welcoming, and respectful IMSs find their environment at DLIELC to be. These questions are useful for DLIELC to find out whether any element (be it teaching staff, support staff, infrastructures, programs) is inadequate and needs to be improved. In terms of evaluating the BP impact of DLIELC, however, such questions provide only a short-term perspective. Although they describe how satisfied students are with their time at DLIELC, the question is whether their experiences will durably affect their perception of the United States and lead them, over the course of their career, to promote links (at whatever

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<sup>2</sup> Students attending instructor development are those who will be or are English language instructors in their country.

level that may be) between their country and the United States. BP, like security cooperation, is a complex notion. A previous RAND study noted the following:

Security cooperation programs are designed to promote shared values and threat perceptions, so that others will be more likely to identify security interests in common with those of the United States; shared technology and procedures, so that others will be more able to protect common interests; and the freedom to devote Air Force resources to the highest priority missions. Although it is important for partners to become technically more capable as a result of this cooperation, the U.S. Air Force emphasizes building enduring relationships through shared skills and the trust that emerges from gaining confidence in these shared skills.<sup>3</sup>

This long-term dimension, and how DLIELC specifically contributes to it, is largely overlooked by DLIELC's current assessment tools (for possible BP metrics; see Appendix A). Additional assessment approaches are needed to follow up with students after FOT and upon returning to their homelands.

As a strategic assessment, the balanced scorecard provides useful measures in several relevant areas. However, not all perspectives are clearly represented. As part of a well-designed performance measurement framework, Kaplan and Norton (1996) suggest that organizations should develop performance measures for each of four areas: (1) financial, (2) customer, (3) internal business processes, and (4) learning and growth.<sup>4</sup> DLIELC measures largely emphasize the customer and the internal business process aspects. The focus on these two areas is consistent with the primary mission of DLIELC to train international students in English. The remaining two perspectives, however, are not well represented in DLIELC's balanced scorecard. The learning and growth perspective could be captured in part by continuous improvement recommendations; however, benchmarks for this process were not included as part of the balanced scorecard. The financial perspective was also not represented on the balanced scorecard provided to the 37th Training Wing. Overall, the following factors and related metrics should be included in a revised balanced scorecard methodology:

1. **Financial.** Core dimensions include operational expenses, revenue (e.g., American Language Course), and requirements (e.g., POM).
2. **Internal business processes.** Core dimensions include student management (e.g., programming, discipline), curriculum development, instruction and testing (e.g., test validation), physical infrastructure (e.g., information technology support, classroom quality and availability, housing), mission support (e.g., timeliness of hiring), and resource utilization (e.g., time between qualifying for FOT and attendance at FOT).
3. **Customers.** Core dimensions include partner capacity (e.g., operable systems, student commitment and satisfaction), English proficiency (e.g., ECL scores, confidence in communicating), cultural awareness, and student success (e.g., training readiness for FOT, alumni survey).

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<sup>3</sup> Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kim Cragin, Eric Stephen Gons, Beth Grill, John E. Peters, and Rachel M. Swanger, *International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-790-AF, 2009, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *Translating Strategy into Action: The Balanced Scorecard*, Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.

4. **Learning and growth.** Core dimensions include FOT site feedback, internal feedback from staff and instructors, instructor quality and development (e.g., performance ratings, feedback and development plans), and staff development (e.g., support staff commitment and satisfaction).

A separate concern relates to the FSP. Although the international training summary slides for the balanced scorecard referenced an American culture survey, DLIELC indicated that this particular survey was abandoned many years ago. According to responses from DLIELC, students had a difficult time accurately completing the survey, resulting in poor quality responses. Currently, DLIELC uses students' dichotomous responses on Form 5140.2(D) following a field trip to determine if the selected objective was met. Specifically, students circle one of the listed objectives for the field trip and then indicate if that specific objective was met. Although Form 5140.2(D) is short and simple and meets the requirement of the DoD FSP, the subjective responses provided by students may not accurately reflect students' learning of U.S. culture. This is also true of the two EOC survey questions relating to field trips. Students are asked to evaluate the following statement: "I learned about [h]uman [r]ights and the American [d]emocratic way of life through weekday/weekend field trips." These statements seem too general for students to provide a clear answer: About a fifth of them neither agreed nor disagreed by providing a neutral response. Overall, current assessments and poorly designed surveys do not make it possible to identify how much students have really learned or which events facilitate understanding of U.S. culture.

## Recommendations

DLIELC lacks a fully functioning assessment process. As noted, the lack of a formal and functioning assessment/evaluation process inhibits DLIELC from being capable of defining targets and assessing its own performance. This chapter, in examining both student and instructor evaluations, as well as assessments reporting to other entities, considers three key elements of a comprehensive system of assessments. The existing guidance does not mandate any specific approach to assessment, nor does it hold DLIELC accountable to HQ AETC. Nonetheless, the processes and resources available within its current structures could form the foundation of an effective assessment system if properly leveraged.

The following recommendations for DLIELC aim at addressing this issue and providing DLIELC with a more systematic way to assess its own performance. The first three recommendations relate to student and instructor evaluations:

- Leverage AETC's existing training assessment process, including conformance to training development and evaluation policies, such as those contained in AETC Instruction 36-2201, *Technical and Basic Military Training Evaluation*.
- Explore standard processes for training development and assessment, thereby gaining access to the lessons observed by similar training organizations. Conforming to existing practices will put DLIELC in a position to leverage the experience and resources of the full AETC staff, including the AETC Inspector General.
- Improve assessment of the FSP and coordinate with the Air Force Culture and Language Center to develop measures for assessing knowledge and comprehension of U.S. culture.



The next three recommendations relate to the balanced scorecard:

- Revise the balanced scorecard to fully represent each of the four performance measure perspectives discussed above.
- Reevaluate current metrics to ensure that they are clearly written; relevant; inclusive of academic, military, and BP objectives; and primarily under DLIELC's control.
- Include specific metrics geared toward measuring the long-term BP impact. Assessing long-term BP impact is difficult, but a solution could include the following two steps:
  - Set up a pre- and post-training survey and/or quiz focusing on U.S. culture and values. Much good work done has been done in this field by, for example, the World Values Survey, Pew Trust, the International Institute of Education, and Gallup, all of which should be consulted when designing these surveys. The degree to which students improve in these domains between the beginning and the end of their training could be matched with their country of origin, length of stay at DLIELC, initial ECL score, course attended, and the specific field visits made. Progress could be monitored over the years.
  - Hold focus groups with students, using well-defined focus group protocol, to find out how their knowledge and perceptions of the United States have changed during their time at DLIELC. Over time, insights from these focus groups could also be used to refine EOC and field visit surveys.

## Manpower

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Having adequate manpower and the ability to address variable demand, particularly in a dynamic and difficult-to-predict training environment, is essential. Possessing the relevant mechanisms to quickly and reliably gain access to the right employees is critical to maintaining effective operations, regardless of the situation. In the case of a training organization like DLIELC, where resource demands increase in direct proportion to the student load, manpower becomes one of the most important variables in ensuring that the organization continues to function effectively.

This chapter examines the current hiring process and looks at utilization of instructors, instructor qualifications, the military environment, and meeting short-term demand. Based on our analysis, we find that the *hiring process is unable to respond quickly to short-term and cyclical demand*. The chapter concludes with recommendations for addressing this challenge.

### Current Hiring Process

The process by which DLIELC hires new instructional staff is laboriously long and is a contributing factor to the institution not being able to respond in a timely manner to variations in demand for ELT. Because of the numerous levels of approvals needed for a new hire, recruiting a new instructor reportedly averages over six months.

### Utilization of Instructors

The current teaching faculty of DLIELC consists of 172 faculty instructors. Of these, 59 are not engaged in full-time instruction and are, instead, detailed to curriculum development, MTTs, and other duties. This creates, at times, a shortage of teaching staff. We were unable to ascertain how DLIELC can justify the dedication of such a large number of instructors to curriculum development, especially given that the school is replacing modules on average every three to five years, despite this large investment of resources. Given the highly competitive nature of the foreign language training market, more cost-effective means should be explored by HQ AETC leadership and DLIELC management.<sup>1</sup> In cases where curriculum development can be effectively outsourced (e.g., GET), DLIELC can expand the use of dedicated curricu-

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<sup>1</sup> This should consist of purchasing existing commercial content packages and instructional tools such as software where they meet DLIELC's ELT requirements.



lum developers as a reserve pool of language instructors to be utilized in response to short-term higher demand (although variable demand for ELT could be more efficiently met through contract instructors; see below). Where there are requirements to develop stand-alone specialized curricula, these should be coordinated by the actual experts in that particular technological or training field, with guidance from English language instructors.

## Qualifications of Instructors

DLIELC civil service instructors must meet certain educational requirements to be considered for employment.<sup>2</sup> DLIELC uses a category ratings system, which indicates that the best-qualified instructors have a combination of education in ESL/EFL and professional experience teaching ESL/EFL to adults. While ostensibly a reasonable requirement, we find that the rigid application of these standards might be counterproductive. One of DLIELC's critical tasks is to educate selected students in an English technical vocabulary to prepare them for FOT. Such knowledge is an invaluable tool to enable effective and efficient FOT. However, the school assumes that an academically credentialed instructor of English language who lacks technical background or experience in a specialized field can be as effective in providing instruction in technical language as a retired NCO who does not possess a college degree in ESL/EFL. We suggest that a blended team approach, which combines people with technical backgrounds and individuals with ESL/EFL education, may yield stronger outcomes for both building security cooperation and developing English language skills. While it is difficult for DLIELC to initiate changes in this field absent revisions to DoD and U.S. Office of Personnel Management regulations, other agencies are exploring creative options. For example, the Department of Veteran Affairs is creating a hybrid system using U.S. Code, Title 38.

## Military Environment

We are sensitive to the reality that it is implicit in DLIELC's mission to create relationships with students as a way to introduce them to life in the United States. Moreover, DLIELC has an opportunity to build a relationship between students and the U.S. armed forces. Because DLIELC is a military establishment, one might expect to see a larger presence of U.S. armed forces personnel as instructional staff. Despite the potential benefits, however, the military departments may be reluctant to provide personnel to DLIELC to serve as language instructors.

Two options constitute possible solutions. First, students at DLIELC are financed through security assistance or security cooperation funding; under the provisions of U.S. legislation and the *Security Assistance Management Manual* (DoD, 2003), HQ AETC leadership and DLIELC management should ensure that the military departments are fully reimbursed for the accelerated cost of military personnel assigned to DLIELC. Second, although likely suboptimal, HQ AETC leadership and DLIELC management could explore innovative options (either through the authorities provided in U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 1595, and/or contracting) of hiring retired military personnel, particularly those who possess an intimate knowledge of contemporary technical language. Just as DLIFLC provides its foreign instructors (who do not necessar-

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<sup>2</sup> U.S. Code Title 5 covers Civil Service terms and conditions.

ily hold a teaching degree in their native language)<sup>3</sup> with extensive training prior to taking on a class, DLIELC could develop an annual training program to retrain retired military personnel to become instructors.

## Meeting Short-Term Demand

### Innovative Hiring Practices

HQ AETC leadership and DLIELC management may wish to take advantage of the provisions of Title 10, Section 1595, regarding the Secretary of Defense's authority to hire civilians at DLIELC on a term basis. The language in law covers the ability of the Secretary of Defense to make term appointments at the "English Language Center of the Defense Language Institute."<sup>4</sup>

If such a course of action were followed, DLIEC could make local hiring decisions on an "excepted service" basis, thereby precluding the necessity to develop and adhere to a certification list of candidates, as is the case with standard hiring practices. Although a shift in hiring authority would have to be executed in full accordance with Air Force regulations and AETC's standing operating procedures for the management of civilian employment, other DoD educational institutions (e.g., Air University) have demonstrated that this can be done successfully.

Alternatively, DLIELC could explore the use of consultants and experts, as authorized by Air Force Manual 36-203, *Staffing Civilian Positions*, 2002. Such an approach could provide a ready pool of language professionals "on call" and ready to come to the school's aid when needed. Importantly, the lack of overhead costs and long-term commitment makes this an attractive solution from a financial standpoint. Similarly, DLIELC could also explore the hiring of instructors on a less-than-full-time basis. This type of arrangement could also lead to a low-cost pool of professionals who could augment the full-time faculty simply by increasing their hours when required.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> According to DLIFLC's website, "In addition to the Academic Rank qualifications, applicants must have near native language proficiency in all skills, in addition to strong English skills. Language testing will be required for recommended candidates. A four-year accredited university degree is the minimum requirement. Education related to foreign language education, linguistics or MATFL/TESOL, etc., is *preferred*" [emphasis added].

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 81, Section 1595, "Civilian faculty members at certain Department of Defense schools: employment and compensation."

(a) Authority of Secretary.—The Secretary of Defense may employ as many civilians as professors, instructors, and lecturers at the institutions specified in subsection (c) as the Secretary considers necessary.

(b) Compensation of Faculty Members. — The compensation of persons employed under this section shall be as prescribed by the Secretary.

(c) Covered Institutions.—This section applies with respect to the following institutions of the Department of Defense:

- (1) The National Defense University.
- (2) The Foreign Language Center of the Defense Language Institute.
- (3) The English Language Center of the Defense Language Institute.
- (4) The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.

(d) Application to Faculty Members at NDU.—In the case of the National Defense University, this section applies with respect to persons selected by the Secretary for employment as professors, instructors, and lecturers at the National Defense University after February 27, 1990.

<sup>5</sup> See DoD Directive 1400.25-M, *Civilian Personnel Management*, 2009, Subchapter 340.

Finally, as mentioned in other chapters, military reservists could be a short-term fit that would also provide a military presence and an intimate knowledge of contemporary technical language.

### **Contracting Instruction**

Given the more recent increase in demand for English language training, DLIELC has been able to use an existing General Services Administration contract vehicle to hire contract English language instructors to meet variable demand.<sup>6</sup> However, a dedicated contract vehicle optimally developed to meet DLIELC's unique character and labor requirements would be preferable.

### **Case Study Observations**

The Canadian Forces English/French language instructional program uses government employees as managers for the program but employs contracted instruction to meet its variable demand requirements. Within the security cooperation community, such arrangements are increasingly the norm (CCMR, DLIFLC, PLTCE, and COE-DMHA), because they enable these organizations to meet variable demand in a very cost-efficient and content-effective manner.

### **Recommendations**

As noted above, we found that *DLIELC's current hiring process is inefficient, inherently inflexible, and unable to respond to short-term and cyclical demand.* The following recommendations address these issues by addressing policy alternatives and innovative practices. In terms of policy alternatives:

- Utilize civilian academic hire provisions in U.S. Code, Title 10.
- End the current practice of curriculum development. Explore commercially available, off-the-shelf curriculum/instructional techniques.

In terms of innovative practices:

- Establish an IDIQ contract vehicle to hire ELT instructors, as required. Have specialized military/technical language curriculum requirements executed and further supported by knowledgeable experts in those fields and recover the cost of their labor from the requesting client.
- Emphasize the importance of building partnerships to obtain more military department personnel. Such assignments must be on a full cost-recovery basis with the services. Fur-

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<sup>6</sup> This should be considered a fortuitous short-term solution. DLIELC should have its own IDIQ contract for temporary instructors.

thermore, HQ AETC leadership and DLIELC management should explore hiring or contracting for retired military personnel.

- Use experts and consultants as a ready pool of language professionals who could be brought on to quickly fill gaps because of unforeseen student load fluctuations.



## Organization and Advocacy

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An organizational structure with clear lines of authority ensures that all personnel within the organization have clear expectations of their respective roles. In an effective organization, employees know where to go to get their job done and understand their chain of command. Office directors have a clear sense of purpose and can easily identify the roles of others in the organization and can ensure that the path to the highest levels of the chain of command is clear, widely understood, and accessible.

Strong institutional advocacy ensures that resourcing issues are addressed at the right level and that the institution has a voice and a champion when questions arise. Institutional advocacy is not easy. In the case of an interservice organization like DLIELC, there are many potential masters; unless a single advocate is clearly identified, failures are likely to occur.

Based on our analysis, we find that the organization struggles to meet variable demand. DLIELC officials told us that reporting requirements can be cumbersome and confusing to incoming students. Importantly, the organization has lacked an institutional advocate, resulting in a lack of focused oversight within DoD as it relates to ensuring the effective and efficient execution of ELT.

In this chapter, we detail where these findings come from and provide some recommendations to address them.

### Structure and Advocacy

After careful investigation and review of DLIELC's management structures and linkages to national-level policy, it is clear that the organization has been ill served by the management oversight structure. As result, DLIELC suffers from three major organizational weaknesses:

- isolation from HQ AETC's institutional managerial oversight
- lack of advocacy to support long-term development
- isolation from national-level security cooperation policy.

Recently, HQ Air Force has become actively engaged with greater oversight and a view toward optimizing DLIELC's performance. Obviously, the sui generis nature of the organization has worked against its full integration within the HQ AETC community. We believe, however, that DLIELC would function better if it were more fully integrated into that education and training community and subject to its institutional oversight and performance evaluation methods.

Since DLIELC provides students to the technical training schoolhouses of the Air Force, Army, and Navy, its leadership must be graded on its ability to provide students with sufficient English fluency to do the FOT as scheduled. Failure to provide qualified students on time causes training seats to go empty, resulting in a potential loss of production to FOT providers.<sup>1</sup> While AETC is not measured by the production of foreign students, setting aside FOT seats limits the opportunity to use those same seats for U.S. students. Each service has the same requirement, and 2AF would have the ultimate responsibility for meeting other service requirements. Consequently, this is a strong argument that DLIELC should report to a military department.

As for the lack of advocacy, recent POM deliberations have shown that DLIELC is disconnected from an established structure that can provide advocacy and support. Moreover, ties to a clear management structure are needed to ensure that DLIELC is accountable, through the chain of command, for its security cooperation mission. The absence of a proper requirements identification process highlights one of the consequences of the disconnected management process. Recently, HQ AF/A1DG hired personnel to specifically create and manage a requirements process and to pursue advocacy for DLIELC at the Air Staff level. These are welcome developments and bode well for correcting advocacy concerns in the future.

Of concern to us is that while there is great merit in aligning DLIELC more closely to HQ AETC and AF/A1DG, this by itself will not provide DLIELC a closer relationship to the security cooperation community so as to have improved visibility of impending demand and gain an institutional voice in affecting the inflow (in size and time) of students the better to execute its mission. Currently, DLIELC's EA is the AF/A1DG. One issue with this approach is that AF/A1DG and parallel staffs elsewhere are not established in the security cooperation community, either within the USAF or more broadly, with the COCOMs, Joint Staff, and OSD/Policy. AF/A1DG officials have generally not attended conferences, planning meetings, and workshops focused on security cooperation issues. Such events are a primary venue for organizational advocacy to take place. HQ AF/A1DG has suggested a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the principal interested parties as a means of ensuring the right organizations have a role in managing DLIELC. We believe this approach holds promise, especially since security cooperation considerations are very important when addressing discipline, academic progress, and general student care.

In the case of discipline issues, the foreign culture and sensitivity of bilateral security relationships between the United States and each particular nation requires a well-informed "diplomatic touch" and special care in handling these delicate issues without causing undue embarrassment or harm in foreign relations. Additionally, IMSs need more care than typical U.S. students arriving at a training base. The foreign students are entering a new culture that in many cases is completely different from their home culture. Every student should be greeted at the airport, and preparations should be made to provide for the first few weeks of a student's stay at Lackland AFB.

Overall, we found that of the organizations examined in our case study analysis, those reporting either directly or indirectly to DSCA enjoy a clear advocate in DSCA and generally have a better understanding of variations in demand for professional services because of their integration into the security cooperation community. Indeed, residing in a military depart-

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<sup>1</sup> The same would be true for the other military departments.

ment, but adhering to DSCA/security cooperation guidance is not mutually exclusive, as many BP organizations have proven this to be possible. Moreover, this model is reinforced when we recall that DLIELC is financed on a reimbursable basis, versus being fully funded through the POM process. These organizations also have close financial reporting ties to DSCA and its oversight structure. The fact that these schools have a close connection to policy has led them to develop effective procedures that capture all fixed and variable costs associated with the organization's operation and recover them from the client. Not only would DLIELC benefit from a closer tie to the security cooperation community to help it solve the issue of predicting variable demand, but such a closer relationship with DSCA might well also bring improved cost-recovery practices to DLIELC. AF/A1DG's MOA should address these concerns as well.

Ultimately, there are two conflicting demands—the need to provide IMSs in a timely manner for FOT and the need to effectively care and provide for students to meet security cooperation goals. The lack of adherence to a military department's management rules and regulations furthers neither requirement. While it might work to place DLIELC under AETC/IA (reporting to AETC and a part of the security cooperation community), this solution would produce a headquarters staff organization that would not be optimally set up to oversee an executing organization. From RAND's perspective, keeping DLIELC under AETC and adhering to AETC's training methods and standards while taking security cooperation guidance from DSCA (through an MoA), should provide an acceptable solution to all key stakeholders.

### **Meeting Variable Demand**

DLIELC's demand signals point to a demand function that is anything but predictable over the medium to longer term. To all appearances, DLIELC is organizationally rigid and not sufficiently flexible to meet variable demand signals. The reality of living in a variable-demand environment should be acknowledged. Basic assumptions about the organization's structures and procedures need to be reviewed and readjusted as required to meet this condition. In Chapter Three, we discussed an approach that provides a flexible solution to meeting variable demand, and in Chapter Eight we addressed ways to deal with this through manpower adjustments. It is not clear that a different organizational structure would improve performance, but it is likely that without higher-level involvement, the challenges confronting DLIELC will be difficult to overcome. DLIELC operates freely and with little oversight. Whatever organizational structure emerges, timetables and measures of performance are required to ensure action and compliance.

### **Obtaining Advocacy in the Security Cooperation Community**

As indicated above, organizations reporting either directly or indirectly to DSCA have a clear advocate and generally a better understanding of demand because of their integration into the security cooperation community. Similarly, the UK Defence School of Languages/English Language Wing is established on the clear principle of supporting the Ministry of Defence's policy priorities as cost-efficiently as possible. In the case of the Canadian Force's English/French language training program, the management and "ownership" of the language instruc-



tion content remains under the control of the Canadian Forces; the actual foreign language training is largely executed through contract faculty.

## Recommendations

As noted above, based on our findings, DLIELC struggles to meet variable demand and find the right balance of identities. Until recently, it lacked a strong policy champion. This situation has produced internal organizational pathologies that are impeding DLIELC from reaching its full potential in terms of effective training and on a fully cost-reimbursable basis. HQ AF/A1DG is already taking steps to address these issues, but the following recommendations can help ensure their success.

In terms of purely organizational issues, DLIELC should adopt greater managerial flexibility to meet variable demand through the adoption of new labor delivery options (as discussed in the previous chapter on manpower). In terms of advocacy, the situation is more complex, but, at a minimum, DLIELC should

- ensure that OSD and USAF leadership agree on clarified oversight responsibilities and functions of DLIELC
- ensure that the advocate or champion within DoD is actively involved in the requirements process. AF/A1DG has a plan to do this; from an execution perspective, the plan would be most easily implemented.

Finally, should OSD and USAF leadership agree that DLIELC remain under the management of the USAF, the principles, practices, and norms already established under AETC need to be fully implemented to ensure that DLIELC becomes more responsive and accountable to DoD policies and priorities.

## Summary of Key Findings and Recommendations and Implementation Plan

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### Summary of Key Findings

Based on our analysis, we found eight critical management areas that have problems that need to be resolved. They can be thought of in terms of the elements of effective organizations to which they correspond. From our research and analysis of DLIELC's mission and performance, we determined the following important challenges in these eight areas:

1. **Policy.** DLIELC is governed by a maze of guidance. However, the guidance does not necessarily reflect the reality of the circumstances within which it must operate.
2. **Business Model/Requirements.** DLIELC lacks a robust requirements determination process, and the organization's business model is unable to meet variable demand.
3. **Financial Risk.** Current financial management practices expose ELT clients (defined as DoD, Department of State, and foreign countries) to needless financial risk.
4. **Technology.** DLIELC should introduce new technologies at a quicker rate. The successful use of these technologies could lower fixed and variable costs.
5. **Identity.** DLIELC has conflicting priorities, which have led to contradictory views on the institution's identity (i.e., is it an academic, military, or government/policy institution?).
6. **Assessment.** The lack of a formal and functioning assessment/evaluation process inhibits DLIELC from being able to define and assess its own effectiveness.
7. **Manpower.** The hiring process (lasting six-plus months) is unable to respond quickly to short-term and cyclical demand.
8. **Organization/Advocacy.** Importantly, the organization has had no clear institutional advocate, resulting in a lack of focused oversight within the Department of Defense as it relates to ensuring the effective and efficient execution of ELT.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> During the course of this study, HQ AF/A1DG took on this tasking. The matter is still worth noting until the evidence is gathered regarding the effectiveness of this arrangement.

## Summary of Key Recommendations

To address these eight critical management areas, we identified recommendations for each area, which are captured in Table 10.1. They are discussed in more detail in the rest of the document.

**Table 10.1**  
**Recommendations**

Critical Area	Recommendations
Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fully review all applicable rules and regulations to ensure currency and appropriateness</li> <li>Create two instructions, a governing DoD instruction and a consolidated AF instruction, covering everything needed to grade, audit, govern, cost, and direct the organization</li> <li>Consider leveraging existing AETC processes and procedures where they may create opportunities to fully tap into AETC's resources and expertise</li> <li>Review existing rules and regulations to look for underutilized authorities and provisions that could be exercised to enhance DLIELC's effectiveness</li> </ul>
Business model/ requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Institute a process to enable more accurate depiction of demand using the proposed model</li> <li>Reduce seasonal peaks by delaying certain categories of students</li> <li>Improve utilization of existing instructors by restricting leave during peak season</li> <li>Create "breathing space" within existing supply via possible relocation of U.S. Army students or by the creation of a "finishing class"</li> <li>Increase supply by utilizing proposed supply strategy</li> </ul>
Financial risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Form a task force of senior leadership from the 37th Training Wing, HQ AETC, and DLIELC to implement cost recovery reform</li> <li>Have the task force review proposed costing models to ensure methodological accuracy</li> <li>Once validated, fully cost DLIELC's activities</li> <li>After costing library is developed, review and reissue financial management policies and procedures as they relate to DLIELC</li> </ul>
Technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Explore where there may be cost-effective means to deliver some ELT through distance learning</li> <li>Explore computerized methods, such as OPIC®</li> <li>Consider using a collaborative platform approach to update SET textbooks</li> <li>Provide all students (not just SET students) with laptops</li> <li>Buy additional commercial bandwidth for Internet usage; add costs to fixed cost of operating schoolhouse</li> </ul>
Identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deemphasize the academic character of the organization</li> <li>Look beyond ELT credentials in teacher recruitment process</li> <li>Have more military personnel interact with IMSs</li> <li>Consider creating an alumni program</li> <li>Consider involving IMSs in self-assessment for placement, progression, or curriculum</li> <li>Collaborate with Defense Language Testing Advisory Board to fully review the validity and reliability of the ECL</li> <li>Expand faculty PST to provide basic skills and understanding in security cooperation</li> <li>Reemphasize and develop field trips and cultural activities</li> </ul>

**Table 10.1—Continued**

Critical Area	Recommendations
Assessment	<p>Leverage AETC’s existing training assessment process including conformance to training development and evaluation policies</p> <p>Explore standard processes for training development and assessment, gaining access to lessons from similar training organizations</p> <p>Improve assessment of the FSP and coordinate with the Air Force Culture and Language Center to develop measures for assessing knowledge and comprehension of U.S. culture</p> <p>Reexamine balanced scorecard to fully represent each of the four performance measure perspectives</p> <p>Reevaluate current metrics to ensure they are clearly written; relevant; inclusive of academic, military, and building partnerships (BP) objectives; and primarily under DLIELC’s control</p> <p>Include specific metrics geared toward measuring the long-term BP impact</p>
Manpower	<p>Utilize U.S. Code, Title 10, civilian academic hires provisions</p> <p>End the current practice of curriculum development, which unnecessarily consumes faculty manpower</p> <p>Establish a dedicated contracting vehicle to purchase English language instruction and support</p> <p>Have specialized military/technical language curricula requirements executed by knowledgeable experts in those fields</p> <p>Emphasize the importance of building partnerships by obtaining more military department personnel</p> <p>Use experts and consultants as a ready pool of language professionals who could be brought on to quickly fill gaps because of unforeseen student load fluctuations</p>
Organization/ advocacy	<p>Ensure that OSD and USAF leadership agree on clarified oversight responsibilities and functions for DLIELC</p> <p>Ensure that an advocate or champion in DoD is actively involved in the requirements process</p> <p>Fully implement principles, practices, and norms established by AETC to ensure DLIELC becomes more responsive and accountable to DoD policies and priorities</p>

## Implementation Plan

OSD and AF/A1 asked RAND to help DLIELC in its strategic planning. The RAND team took this to mean assisting OSD, AF/A1, and DLIELC to develop an integrated plan to implement the findings of this report. Given the extensive nature of the findings of this report, as well as the large number of recommendations to address those findings, we outlined how those recommendations can be implemented.

In Appendix C, we include a matrix we developed with a view toward facilitating the implementation of the recommendations. The plan has been organized to represent the key recommendations of the report in 13 outcomes. These outcomes are organized in the same fashion as they appear in the report. These are to be achieved by the various supporting inputs articulated in the report. Each outcome and input also refers to the appropriate implementing agencies (see Appendix C). Also, we distinguish where each outcome and input touch one of the eight management areas of this report.

Finally, each of the 13 outcomes has been assigned a priority or sequencing—immediate (now), mid-term (within two to five years), and long-term. These time dimensions represent both implementation timelines and their importance and the immediacy of each outcome to improving DLIELC’s financial efficiencies and operational effectiveness.

In Table 10.2, we summarize the 13 key outcomes in terms of the management area and priority (which does not exclude execution in tandem or imply sequentiality).

**Table 10.2**  
**Recommendations to Address Problems in the Critical Areas Identified**

	Outcome (Critical Area)	Priority
1.	Clarified mission statement/priorities in conformance with USAF, DSCA, OSD policies and priorities (M/P; O/A)	Immediate
2.	Enhanced policies/procedures, implemented to increase managerial effectiveness (M/P; O/A)	Immediate
3.	Policy to improve prediction of ELT demand (R; I; M)	Immediate
4.	Policy to prioritize student flow by reducing seasonal demand peaks (R)	Mid-term
5.	Policy that expands teaching capacity by existing labor supply and that introduces greater flexibility in managing labor to meet peak demand periods (FM/M)	Mid-term
6.	Policy to manage increase in supply of ELT (R)	Long-term
7.	Policy that overhauls existing management of finance system, practices, and key supporting tools (MP; FM)	Immediate
8.	Policy that establishes that curriculum development will be undertaken only when reimbursable (FM; I; M)	Immediate
9.	Policy that better exploits technology in support of ELT, with clear objective of reducing costs wherever possible (FM; T; M)	Long-term
10.	Policy that clearly establishes that DLIELC is ELT organization and essential BPC instrument (I; O/A)	Long-term
11.	Effective assessment process (A)	Mid-term
12.	Policy to expand DLIELC's labor flexibility (R; FM; I; M)	Long-term
13.	Policy that seeks to improve advocacy for DLIELC by senior sponsors (O/A)	Mid-term

NOTES: M/P = Mission/Policy; R = Requirements; FM = Financial Management; T = Technology; I = Identity; M = Manpower; O/A = Organization and Advocacy. Immediate refers to execution years. Mid-term refers to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Long-term refers to FYDP and beyond.

## Measuring Partnership Building

**Table A.1**  
**Potential Application to DLIELC of Public Diplomacy Assessment Metrics<sup>a</sup>**

BP Objective	Proposed Public Diplomacy Assessment Metrics	Potential Application to DLIELC
Increase understanding of U.S. policy and culture	Monitor “exit survey responses that demonstrate comprehension of U.S. culture following a cultural event” and follow evolution from one FY to the next	Improve surveys administered to students after field trips and aggregate results to observe successes, failures, and trends
	Measure “relative change in Fulbright scholars’ knowledge of the U.S. after Fulbright exchange” by comparing pre- and post-exchange surveys	Create a pre- and post-training survey and/or quiz focusing on U.S. culture and values, and monitor pre- and post-score improvement
	Measure “Overall score of general population focus group respondents concerning the improvement of their understanding of U.S. culture”	Hold focus groups with students (e.g., students who have completed their ELT and are waiting for their FOT to start) to find out how their knowledge and perceptions of the United States has changed
Increase favorable opinion toward the U.S.	Not easily transposable to the DLIELC case	
Increase U.S. influence in the world	Examine “relative change in opinion polls of students who have participated in educational exchanges with the United States which state their level of satisfaction with their experience”	Monitor students’ level of satisfaction over time, as expressed in surveys (DLIELC already collects, aggregates, and analyzes these results)

<sup>a</sup> Kenneth Matwiczak, project director, *Public Diplomacy Model for the Assessment of Performance*, report to the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, September 2010, pp. 82, 87, 96, 117.



## Cost Model

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### Description of Cost Model Tables

Table B.1 includes all direct costs associated with student training. It is a roll-up of calculations from Tables B.3, B.4, B.5, and B.6. Table B.2 adds the costs in Table B.1 to indirect costs from calculations in Table B.7 to compute the total cost of training. The costs represented in these tables are best estimates and are intended to represent a methodology in approaching costs. The costs factors are not validated. We propose the model as a methodology for computing total costs, not as the final answer. The tables list the direct cost items that should be accounted for in the program in four major categories. It remains for the Air Force to validate the costs with official estimates. RAND's intent was to produce a working model, not to give a final number for the cost of producing English language training. Having said that, our estimate of \$54.5 million is considerably higher than the actual POM costs of \$44 million.

**Table B.1**  
**Roll-Up of Direct Student Costs**

Summary of Direct Student Costs	Cost per Student	Yearly Cost (all students)
Phase 1: In-processing (one-time cost/student). See Table B.3	\$16.45	\$52,939
Phase 2: Fixed direct costs (weekly cost/ADSL). See Table B.4	\$789.65	\$48,809,078
Phase 2: Variable direct costs (weekly cost/ADSL). See Table B.5	\$32.53	\$2,010,773
Phase 3 - Out-processing (one-time cost/student). See Table B.6	\$65.80	\$211,743
Total direct costs (all students)		\$51,084,533

NOTE: ADSL = average daily student load.

**Table B.2**  
**Estimate of Direct and Indirect Student Costs**

Estimate of All Costs	Estimate (yearly)
Direct costs. See Table B.1	\$51,084,533
Indirect costs (w/o bldgs.) See Table B.7	\$3,381,375
Total	\$54,465,908



**Table B.3**  
**Phase 1: Direct In-Processing Costs per Student**

Description	Detail	Total: First Week Prior to Class	Divide Total Cost by Entire Population?
<b>In-processing schedule (Thurs. and Fri. before first day of class and finance brief on Mon. at end of first day of class)</b>			
Roll call (Thurs.)	1 GS-07 for 30 min.	\$25.13	YES
Alumni briefing (Thurs.)	1 GS-07 for 15 min.	\$12.56	YES
ID card briefing (Thurs.)	1 E-6 for 15 min.	\$10.82	YES
Roll call—Medical packets and dependent insurance checks (Thurs.)	1 GS-07 for 25 min.	\$10.07	YES
ECL video and tutorial (Thurs.)	1 GS-07 for 30 min.	\$12.08	YES
Testing briefing (Thurs.)	1 GS-11 and 1 GS-05 for 30 min.	\$27.63	YES
Roll call (Fri.)	1 GS-07 for 15 min.	\$6.04	YES
Field Studies Program briefing (Fri.)	2 GS-09s for 1 hr. each	\$59.11	YES
CPM briefing (Fri.)	1 GS-11 for 30 min.	\$17.88	YES
Information technology briefing (Fri.)	1 GS-11 for 20 min.	\$11.92	YES
37 TRW/JA (Fri.)	1 O-3 for 15 min.	\$16.11	YES
Dean of Academics (Fri.)	1 O-5 for 15 min.	\$22.32	YES
Commandant of Troops (Fri.)	1 O-5 for 15 min.	\$22.32	YES
MTM briefing (Fri.)	1 E-5 for 1 hr., 20 min.	\$49.63	YES
Commandant/Deputy Commandant welcome (Fri.)	1 GS-15 for 20 min.	\$23.61	YES
Physical training briefing (Fri.)	1 GS-09 for 10 min.	\$4.93	YES
EM (Fri.)	1 GS-09 for 15 min.	\$7.39	YES
Finance briefing (Mon.)	3 people (E3, E5, GS-09) from 802 finance hold finance brief for 4 hours	\$372.78	YES
<b>Manning for Arrival Activities Students Must Complete</b>			YES
Testing	45 min. in computer lab—Additional GS-11 lab technician present	\$26.82	YES
ID card	GS-05, 8-hr. shift: CAC, fingerprints, PIN	\$156.03	YES
IT/automation	2 GS-09s for 2 hrs. each	\$ 18.21	YES
<b>BOS Costs (Thurs.-Sun. prior to first day of class Monday)</b>			
Meals	\$11/day per student	\$44.00	NO
Lodging	\$39/day per student	\$156.00	NO
Incidentals	\$10.80/day per student	\$43.20	NO
Total manpower-associated costs, all units, per student		\$16.38	
Total manpower-associated costs only, DLIELC only, per student		\$10.27	Subtract from Indirect O/H
Total in-processing cost per student (first four days)		\$16.45	

NOTES: O/H = overhead; ID = identification card; ECL = English comprehension level; CPM = country program manager; MTM = military training manager; EM = emergency management; CAC = common access card; PIN = personal identification number.

**Table B.4**  
**Phase 2: Direct Fixed Costs per Student**

Description	Detail	Total Classroom Costs	Nonclassroom Costs	Divide Total Cost by Entire Population?	Notes
<b>Manpower (salaries)</b>					
Instructors	GS-11s. Based on average daily student load and student:instructor ratio	\$244,573.59		YES	
Training instructors	GS-11s. Uses number of training instructors from earlier input. Training instructors may or may not be directly involved with students depending on what they are learning. 50% of time directly involved with students	\$1,430.25			Estimated 50% of time goes toward nonteaching training
OPI instructors	GS-11s. Uses number of OPI instructors from earlier input. If not conducting OPIs, they are expected to work on updating their OPI materials as well as completing one self-assessment per year		\$4,290.76		Estimated 75% of time goes toward OPI material development
Operations team—manning front desk	3 GS-04s		\$2,129.42	YES	
Crisis team	1 E-4, 1 E-8, 1 O-2, 1 O-4		\$8,715.69	YES	100% of their time goes toward crisis management
Bookshop	1 GS-05 manning shop, 8 hrs./day, 5 days/wk.		\$780.16	YES	
MTMs	Doing accountability/discipline issues; 5 MTMs (E-5) each spending 5 hrs./day		\$4,653.28	YES	Estimate of hrs./day spent doing accountability work
<b>Materials</b>				YES	
Commercial texts GPC and BPA	In CY2011, \$83,171.73 in commercial texts and \$35,000.00 Form 9	\$2,272.53		YES	
Packing supplies and materials	Total purchases on GPC was \$26,870.63	\$516.74		YES	
Writing instruments, labels, paper, etc.	Total cost from May 2010 to April 2011 was \$474,971.76	\$9,134.07		YES	
<b>IT Services</b>				YES	
Internet	Time Warner monthly cost \$11.8K per year		\$226.92	YES	
Server printers	13 server printers at \$3.5K each. Equip. refresh rate is 3 years		\$291.67	YES	
Classroom printers	150 classroom printers at \$300 each. Equip. refresh rate is 3 years		\$288.46	TRUE	

Table B.4—Continued

Description	Detail	Total Classroom Costs	Nonclassroom Costs	Divide Total Cost by Entire Population?	Notes
PC workstations	245 PC workstations at \$880 each. Equip. refresh rate is 3 years		\$1,382.05	YES	
Servers	10 edu. servers at \$3.3K each. Equip. refresh rate is 3 years		\$211.54	YES	
Maintenance	IT maintenance on computers/laptops, \$28K/year and 5% directly supports students		\$26.92	YES	
<b>Base Operations Support Costs (should be standard for all students in all MASLs (courses))</b>					
Food stipend	Student receives \$11 per day stipend for food		\$77.00	NO	
Lodging stipend	Student receives \$39 per day stipend for lodging		\$273.00	NO	
Incidentals stipend	Student receives \$10.80 per day stipend for incidentals		\$75.60	NO	
BOS factor	FY11 BOS factor at \$2,000/student		\$38.46	NO	
Lodging energy costs	104 kw individual daily avg. at \$.045 cents per kw		\$32.76	NO	Not clear if accounted for in BOS factor
Lodging, water, and sewage costs	55 gallons a day at \$.04 per gallon per individual		\$15.40	NO	Not clear if accounted for in BOS factor
Facility energy costs	104 kw individual daily avg. at \$.045 cents per kw		\$32.76	NO	Not clear if accounted for in BOS factor
Facility water/sewage costs	8 gallons a day at \$.04 gallons per individual		\$2.24	NO	Not clear if accounted for in BOS factor
<b>Medical</b>					
Medical visits	1 flight surgeon, 1 nurse, 2 techs each at 8-hr. shifts. \$600k for total package, including contracting fee and med staff. Rough estimates: 3–5 sick visits per day, 2–4 physicals per day, numerable walk-ins. Given that medical staff is widely used by more students than those that require physicals, all medical costs will be spread to each student		\$11,538.46	YES	Assume DLIELC pays medical contract. Not considered a manpower cost to DLIELC
Total manpower-only weekly cost per student (excludes instructor)			\$13.69		Subtract from indirect O/H
Total fixed class and nonclass weekly cost per student		\$216.99	\$572.67		
Total fixed weekly costs per student				\$789.65	

NOTES: From 802nd Mission Support Group: FY96 BOS Factor = \$1,371/student, used 1.159 FY07 inflation factor to obtain FY07 BOS Factor = \$1,589/student. We used Consumer Price Index conversion from 1996 to 2011 to obtain \$2,000/student.

**Table B.5**  
**Phase 3: Direct Variable Costs per Student**

Description	Detail	Total Classroom Costs	Nonclassroom Costs	Remarks	Student Population Involved
<b>Requirements by MASL (course)</b>					
Physical training	3 days/wk., one hour each, 2 GS-4s. 100 attended of 300 IMSs required to attend PT last year so will use 100 out of total yearly population		\$106.47		100
<b>IT</b>					
Laptops	75% of laptops go to student. Roughly 250/yr. laptops purchased at \$1,100 each. 469 laptops in total inventory		\$5,288.46	If 75% of laptops go to students, then 352 students receive a laptop. 352/total population is percentage of students who receive a laptop = 3.4%	352
Software for laptops	\$15,000 additional software for students		\$288.46	If 75% of laptops go to students then 352 students receive a laptop. 352/total population is percentage of students who receive a laptop = 3.4%	352
<b>Testing</b>					
Quizzes	Weekly for GET, biweekly for SET. In computer lab. One GS-11 lab technician. 5 BALIC in 27 wks, 5 SET in 9 wks, 2 ALPS1 in 12 wks, and then weekly GET quizzes. Quiz is 45 min. in length		\$492.04	2010 numbers: 94 BALIC students, 767 SET only students, 1106 GET+SET students, 29 ALPS1 students, 1,014 GET only students	58
TOEFL	Taken twice. DLI pays the testing fee. \$170/test		\$340.00	Cost accounts for 21 students/yr. who take TOEFL	21
<b>Materials</b>					
Texts/CDs for GET/SET	In CY2010, \$636,416.80 in texts and CDs for SET and GET instructors and students. 90% of students/instructors attend/teach GET/SET (other 10% of students/instructors attend/teach IDB)	\$12,238.78		Cost already reflects per GET/SET student per week	2,887
Texts/CDs for IDB	In CY2010 texts issued to IDB by course: BALIC=\$8,6939.21, ALPS=\$3,314.51, AELIC=\$16,048.94, MACS=\$6,643.27, TOEFL=\$1,681.30, MELT=\$,2688.99, MDS=\$1,962.05	\$2,293.81		Cost already reflects per IDB student per week	331

Table B.5—Continued

Description	Detail	Total Classroom Costs	Nonclassroom Costs	Remarks	Student Population Involved
<b>Field Trips and Receptions</b>					
AMIGO Friday Evening Reception	2 GS-7s and 2 GS-9s for 4 hours, Each reception costs \$8,000 in catering. Occurs monthly		\$1,945.32	250 staff and students attending, assume 90% of attendees are students	2,700
Field studies	Contract cost \$700 per bus with guide. 75% contract bus, 25% base bus. Avg. 40 students/bus. 1 GS-9/bus on weekend trip. 1 GS-11/bus weekday class trip. 104 weekend trips/yr. 90% one-bus trips. 104 weekday trips/yr. Already subtracted out Houston weekend trips		\$2,902.79	Weekday trips already factor in normal instructor pay; assuming zero overtime. Overtime hours for GS-09 were normal standard pay rate, not 1.5x for example	9,152
Trips to DC	IDB students only. 1 GS-11 and 1 GS-9. 50 students/trip. 5 trips/yr. \$80,000/trip. Comes out of \$35/student/wk. in tuition		\$7,829.83	Need to factor in TDY cost of GS-11 and GS-09. Otherwise, GS-11 salary already covered since this is a M-F trip. GS-09 salary currently accounted for in computation	250
Overnight Houston trip	2 GS-9s 24 hrs. overtime each. 100 students/trip \$20,000/trip. 12 trips/yr. Included in 104 weekend trips		\$4,942.74	Overtime hours for GS-09s were normal standard pay rate, not 1.5x for example	1,200
Total manpower variable weekly costs attributed to DLIELC			\$6.95	Subtract from indirect O/H	
Total variable weekly costs per ADSL			\$32.53		

NOTES: ADSL = average daily student load, or the average number of students in any given week. If a curriculum development instructor sits in the class while a new curriculum is being tested, that individual's billable time needs to be captured. ECL testing is as follows (assuming during high times): 20 instructors (GS-11) for 45 minutes (weekly basis); 64 instructors (GS-11) for 45 minutes (once a month).

**Table B.6**  
**Phase 4: Direct Out-Processing Costs per Student**

Description	Detail	Weekly Totals	Divide Total Cost by Entire Population?
Meals: Thurs. of graduation week	\$11/day	\$11.00	NO
Lodging: Thurs. of graduation week	\$39/day	\$39.00	NO
Incidentals: Thurs. of graduation week	\$10.80/day	\$10.80	NO
Out-Processing: IT/Automation	2 GS-11s 18 hours each for out-processing of laptops, including re-imaging	\$1,287.23	YES
Administrative processing for graduation	1 GS-7. 11.5 hrs./wk.	\$277.86	YES
Graduation photo	\$4.20 per photo. Costs include everything	\$4.20	NO
Graduation ceremony	Graduation ceremony lasts 1 hr. 2 presenters: GS-12 and O-6 each needing 2 hrs. for prep/delivery. Graduation happens weekly. Additionally 3 E-6s help for 4 hrs./wk., 1 GS-11 for 2 hrs./wk., and 1 E-8 for 2 hrs./wk.	\$992.52	YES
Out-processing briefing	1 GS-07 on Tues. of graduation week for 37.5 min. (the 37.5 is an average length of time; out-brief can take 60 min. in peak period, 30 min. standard)	\$15.10	YES
<b>Total manpower out-processing costs per student, DLIELC-only</b>		<b>\$0.80</b>	<b>Subtract from indirect O/H</b>
<b>Total out-processing (cost per student)</b>		<b>\$65.80</b>	

**Table B.7**  
**Phase 5: Indirect Institutional Overhead Costs**

Overhead Costs	Detail	Costs (yr.)	Manpower Double Count
Curriculum development manpower	10 GS-9s + 3 GS-11s	\$837,814	
Curriculum development, materials/maintenance	Support for 15 computers + 3 copiers + binding machine	\$9,000	
Curriculum development refresh	3 year refresh	\$14,667	
Overhead (front office)	1 Col, 3 Lt Col, 2 Capt, 4 SSgt, 3 GS-05	\$780,059	\$(690,774)
AFSAT portion for ELT setup			
AETC/AI portion for ELT setup			
AETC/A5 portion for POM preparation			
AMIGO program materials			
Administration/operations materials	Automation, paper, ink, etc.	\$220,625	
Food service manpower	Food server costs for AMIGO Inn	\$738,199	
Food service supplies	Breakfast/lunch/dinner costs	\$165,000	
BOS manpower	Building cleaners/managers	\$266,011	
Base operating support materials	Toilet paper, water, cleaning supplies	\$250,000	
Replacement costs	Computers/equipment (3 yr. refresh, 150 (library + staff))	\$100,000	
Bldg. refresh.	25 bldgs., refresh \$500k every 10 years	\$1,250,000	Excluded
Depreciation	Buildings (50 years replace, 25 bldgs., \$5.0 M each)	\$2,500,000	Excluded
<b>Total fixed costs (w/o bldg. costs)</b>		<b>\$3,381,375</b>	
<b>Total fixed costs</b>		<b>\$7,131,375</b>	

NOTES: The manpower double count sums up previous direct costs of overhead personnel from the total cost of the overhead. The remainder of the overhead is indirect. Building costs are estimated but are not a reimbursable item.

## **Integrated Implementation Plan**

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On the following pages, we present the matrix we developed to facilitate the implementation of our recommendations. The plan is organized to represent the key recommendations of the report in 13 outcomes. These outcomes are organized in the same fashion as they appear in the report.



**Table C.1  
Integrated Implementation Plan**

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Outcome #1: Immediate	Clarify mission statement and priorities in conformance with USAF, DSCA, and OSD policy and priorities	X					X							X
Outcome #2: Immediate	Enhance policies and procedures and implement them to increase managerial effectiveness	X					X							X
Input #1	Undertake a full review of all applicable DLIELC policies and regulations to ensure they are current and appropriate	X					X		X					
Input #2	Adopt existing AETC processes and procedures when they create opportunities to use AETC's resources and expertise		X		X	X	X		X					
Input #3	Review existing policies and regulations to find underutilized authorities and provisions that can enhance DLIELC's effectiveness		X		X	X	X		X					
Outcome #3: Immediate	Develop a new policy and implement it to improve prediction of ELT demand using the following new managerial and planning methods	X				X		X			X		X	
Input #1	Recalibrate the wheel		X					X						
Sub-input	Identify factors that affect required training time, such as native literacy rate, student motivation, and other factors identified in empirical literature on learning a second language		X					X						
Input #2	Use regression models developed by RAND to predict student load based on FMS		X					X						

Table C.1—Continued

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Input #3	Use regression models developed by RAND to predict average English language training time for new countries based on world modernity data. Update as required													
Outcome #4: Mid-term	Develop a policy to prioritize student flow by reducing seasonal demand peaks the better to manage better resources and labor scheduling through considering the following options:	X				X		X						
Option #1	Schedule students with no FOT during nonpeak months		X			X		X						
Option #2	Do not schedule students during peak months who will attend a frequently occurring FOT		X			X		X					X	
Option #3	Schedule only MTTs deemed critical to COCOM TSCP priorities during peak months and delay other MTTs to nonpeak months		X			X		X					X	
Option #4	Prioritize students based on their funding source		X			X		X						
Outcome #5: Mid-term	Develop a policy that expands teaching capacity by existing labor supply and introducing greater flexibility in managing labor to meet peak demand periods	X				X			X				X	
Input #1	Increase utilization of existing instructors by restricting leave during peak season		X										X	
Input #2	Explore with U.S. Army the option for ECHO Company to train U.S. students at separate U.S. Army locations to accommodate different needs		X			X		X	X				X	
Input #3	Set up a finishing school for students who are ECL qualified/waiting for SET/FOT (no class size limitation)		X					X					X	

Table C.1—Continued

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Sub-input	Incorporate military jargon, acronyms, pace of speech, accents, etc.		X					X					X	
Outcome #6: Long-term	Develop a policy to manage an increase in the supply of ELT	X			X	X		X						
Input #1	Increase classroom capacity to 200 rooms		X		X	X		X						
Input #2	Increase instructor capacity to 250 instructors		X		X	X		X						
Input #3	Prepare for execution of additional surge options		X					X						
Input #4	IDIQ temporary instructor contractor		X		X	X			X				X	
Input #5	Contracted ELT programs (university or contractors)		X						X				X	
Input #6	Temporary facilities rental and contracted temporary instructors		X		X	X			X				X	
Outcome #7: Immediate	Develop a policy that overhauls the existing <i>management</i> of the finance system, practices, and key supporting tools	X					X		X					
Input #1	Organize a joint task force under Director, DLIELC to implement cost recovery reform		X	X	X				X					
Input #2	Review RAND-developed costing models and validate their accuracy		X		X				X					
Input #3	Review is to be informed by relevant authorities in Title 10, Title 22, and USAF regulations		X		X		X		X					
Input #4	Final validated models need to conform methodologically with HQ AETC's models		X		X				X					

Table C.1—Continued

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Input #5	Develop costing library capturing all costs associated with ELT		X						X					
Input #6	Joint task force to provide decision briefing to HQ AETC, USAF A-1, DSCA, and OSD with proposals to reform the financial management policies and procedures for DLIELC		X		X	X			X					
Outcome #8: Immediate	Develop a policy to establish that curriculum development will be undertaken only when it is reimbursable	X				X			X		X		X	
Input #1	Develop a regulation to capture all costs associated with curriculum development to be invoiced to contracting client		X						X					
Input #2	Initiate an administrative and financial process to procure needed curriculum from commercial sources		X					X	X					
(Implied) input	Develop a policy by which instructors engaged in curriculum development are to be utilized for ELT		X					X					X	
Outcome #9: Long-term	Develop a policy to better exploit technology in support of ELT, with the clear objective to reduce costs wherever possible	X							X	X			X	
Input #1	Review all of RAND's technology enhancement recommendations and develop a phased implementation plan to:		X							X				
Sub-input A	Use technology to replace/reduce time for in-country MTTs		X					X		X			X	

Table C.1—Continued

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Sub-input B	Explore developing a collaborative platform approach to updating SET textbooks		X					X	X	X			X	
Sub-input C	Provide all students with laptops and add cost to course costs		X					X	X	X				
Sub-input D	Purchase sufficient commercially available bandwidth necessary for internet usage; costs to be added to fixed costs of all ELT courses								X	X				
Sub-input E	Explore options to disconnect students from the NIPRNET									X				
Outcome #10: Long-term	Draft a policy that clearly establishes that DLIELC is an English language training organization and an essential instrument of BPC	X			X	X					X			X
Input #1	Develop a policy to state that DLIELC is not an academic organization	X			X	X	X				X			X
Input #2	Develop BPC-relevant criteria for hiring instructors		X					X			X		X	
Input #3	Explore ways and means to effect greater interaction between U.S. military and ELT students		X					X			X		X	
Input #4	Explore ways and means to create an alumni association		X				X		X					
Input #5	Consider involving IMSs in self-assessment for placement, progression, or curriculum		X					X				X		

Table C.1—Continued

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Input #6	Collaborate with the Defense Language Testing Advisory Board to review the validity and reliability of the ECL to ensure that students are accurately programmed, placed into the right course level, and proficient enough to attend FOT		X					X				X		
Input #7	Expand faculty PST to provide basic skills and understanding in security cooperation. Providing skills and understanding in key areas related to the core mission is an important step in building both mission valence (attractiveness of the mission) and commitment to the school		X				X		X		X			
Input #8	Reemphasize and develop field trips and cultural activities							X	X					
Sub-input A	Evaluate effectiveness of AMIGO program						X	X				X		
Sub-input B	Increase funding as determined effective							X	X					
Outcome #11: Mid-term	Develop an effective assessment process	X		X	X	X	X					X		
Input #1	Reexamine balanced scorecard to represent fully each of the four performance measure perspectives		X									X		
Sub-input	Reevaluate current metrics to ensure that they are clearly written; relevant; inclusive of academic, military, and BP objectives; and primarily under DLIELC's control		X					X				X		

Table C.1—Continued

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Input #2	Leverage AETC's existing training assessment process, to include conformance to training development and evaluation policies, such as those contained in AETC Instruction 36-2201, <i>Technical and Basic Military Training Evaluation</i>		X	X	X							X		
Input #3	Explore standard processes for training development and assessment, thereby gaining access to the lessons observed by similar training organizations. Conforming to existing practices will put DLIELC in a position to leverage the experience and resources of the full AETC staff, including the AETC Inspector General		X		X							X		
Input #4	Improve assessment of the FSP and coordinate with AF Culture and Language Center to develop measures for assessing knowledge and comprehension of U.S. culture		X		X	X						X		
Input #5	Include specific metrics geared toward measuring the long-term BP impact. Assessing long-term BP impact is difficult, but first steps could include:		X									X		
Sub-input A	Set up a pre- and post-training survey and/or quiz focusing on U.S. culture and values. The degree to which students improve in these domains between the beginning and the end of their training could be matched with their country of origin, length of stay at DLIELC, initial ECL score, course attended, and the specific field visits made. Progress could be monitored over the years		X					X				X		

Table C.1—Continued

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Sub-input B	Hold focus groups with students to find out how their knowledge and perceptions of the United States have changed during their time at DLIELC. Insights from these focus groups could also be used to refine EOC and field visit surveys		X									X		
Outcome #12: Long-term	Develop a policy to expand DLIELC's labor flexibility	X			X			X	X		X		X	
Input #1	Explore all possible innovative U.S. government hiring practices by initiating a policy and legal review to ascertain if U.S. Code, Title 10, civilian academic hires provision applies to DLIELC; if so, implement its provisions as quickly as possible		X			X		X	X		X		X	
Input #2	Develop a dedicated contracting vehicle to purchase English language instruction and support. HQ AETC leadership and DLIELC management should make a strong case for the unique DLIELC requirement for a robust IDIQ contract vehicle under the Federal Acquisition Regulation to hire ELT instructors and curriculum development for ELT instruction and curriculum development, as required.		X	X	X	X		X	X		X		X	
Input #3	Commission only those experts with specialized military/technical lexica to undertake curricula development on a fully reimbursable basis invoiced to the requesting client		X					X	X	X			X	



Table C.1—Continued

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Input #4	Enhance BPC by exploring ways to obtain more military department personnel as instructors on a cost-recovery basis with the military department. Furthermore, HQ AETC leadership and DLIELC management should explore hiring retired military personnel via new, innovative U.S. government hiring practices, or on contract		X			X							X	
Input #5	Consider the use of experts and consultants as a ready pool of language professionals who could be brought on to quickly fill gaps due to unforeseen student load fluctuations. Moreover, the hiring of part-time instructors could add a credible and quickly accessible “surge” capability without detriment to other, ongoing administrative or courseware development functions		X					X					X	
Outcome #13: Mid-term	Develop a policy that seeks to improve advocacy for DLIELC by senior sponsors	X			X	X	X							X
Input #1	Ensure Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Air Force leadership agree on clarified oversight responsibilities and functions of DLIELC		X		X	X	X							X
Input #2	Should the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Air Force leadership agree that DLIELC should remain under the management of the U.S. Air Force, the principles, practices, and norms already established under AETC need to be fully implemented to ensure that DLIELC becomes more responsive and accountable to Department of Defense policies and priorities		X		X	X	X							X

Table C.1—Continued

Organizational Change	Recommendations	DLI internal policy	DLI internal management	37th TW	HQ AETC	USAF, DSCA, OSD	Mission/policy	Requirements	Financial management and cost recovery	Technology	Identity	Assessment	Manpower	Organization and advocacy
Input #3	Adopt greater managerial flexibility in order to meet variable demand through the adoption of new labor delivery options and a thorough review of current costing methods and implementation models to ensure that all costs associated with English language training are recovered through accurate pricing of training		X		X	X		X	X		X		X	
Input #4	Ensure that HQ AETC engages itself in the responsibility for DLIELC administration and evaluation		X		X		X					X		X



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