

Seasons of Change: Lessons From The Arab Spring

**A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT The Arab Spring is an event that has radically shifted the geopolitical landscape in one of the most volatile regions of the world. Many experts and policy makers were caught off guard by the speed and organizational ability that characterized these revolutions. As the dust settles and the United States begins to reassess the new environment, this monograph asserts that certain indicators can assist planners in predicting both the nature of potential revolutions and the likelihood of stability following revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. This study asserts that the civil military relationship in the affected countries is that primary variable. By analyzing economics, political pluralism and the civil-military relationships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, this monograph concludes the constant indicator for less violent revolutions, as well as the attainment of revolutionary goals, was a universally accepted civil-military relationship. This monograph also provides a framework for planners to approach potentially unstable countries, in order to provide better analysis for Geographic Combatant Commanders and civilian policymakers. Finally, this monograph suggests a more nuanced approach be taken in the execution of theater strategy, focusing more on the analysis of civil-military relations, followed by theater engagements that attempt to inculcate these norms.					
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Abstract

Season of Change: Lessons from the Arab Spring, by Major Jason Noble, United States Army, 43 pages.

The Arab Spring is an event that has radically shifted the geopolitical landscape in one of the most volatile regions of the world. Many experts and policy makers were caught off guard by the speed and organizational ability of disparate citizens that orchestrated and executed these revolutions. As the dust settles and the United States begins to reassess the new environment, this monograph asserts that certain indicators can assist planners in predicting both the nature of potential revolutions and the likelihood of stability following revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East.

The purpose of this monograph is to analyze which variables played a significant role in the nature of the Arab Spring revolutions. This study hypothesizes that the civil-military relationship in the affected countries is that primary variable. This monograph uses the case study method by analyzing civil-military relationships, economics, and political pluralism in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. In conclusion, the constant indicator for less violent revolutions, as well as the attainment of revolutionary goals, was a universally accepted civil-military relationship. The findings of this monograph support the hypothesis of the primary impact that the civil-military relationships had in the affected countries. Each of the countries had disparate economic conditions as well as vastly different levels of political pluralism amongst their populations. These findings do not support a uniform grievance of the people, be economic or in the form of civil society enfranchisement and these variables offer little in future analysis of potential problem areas for military planners. However, the data clearly demonstrated that the civil-military relationship amongst the elites, the military, and the population was a reliable indicator as to the nature and violence level that would be characteristic of each revolution.

This monograph also provides a framework for planners to approach potentially unstable countries, in order to provide better analysis for Geographic Combatant Commanders in their execution of theater strategy and theater engagements. As a result, this monograph advocates a more nuanced approach in the execution of theater strategy, with greater focus on the analysis of civil-military relations, followed by theater engagements that attempt to inculcate these norms.

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Introduction

I took both my little kids - seven and five - into my arms and kissed them, and I wanted them to hear - maybe - my last words to them, which is "I'm going out to get you a better tomorrow."¹

Assama Mohammed, NPR

Revolutions have occurred as long as countries have existed. In the twentieth century, a paradigm of "people's war" emerged and this, along with variations, such as focoism, allowed analysts and political leaders to understand the process by which various actors started and carried out revolutions.² While these revolutions differed in their context, all relied on the leadership of a dynamic and charismatic individual. Leaders like Gandhi, Mao, Ho Chi Min, and Castro represent merely a few of the more well-known leaders central to the history of revolutions. However, it appears that ordinary citizens initiated and carried out the recent Arab Spring revolutions without relying on such leadership.³

New-sounding terms and phrases, advanced by highly persuasive people with apparently solid credentials, can usually find an audience ready to listen.⁴ With that said, it is imperative that military leaders and policymakers seize this occasion for a less costly pursuit of American theater strategy in the region. While analysts are still grappling to understand this phenomenon completely, it clearly represents an opportunity. This new wave of revolutions occurring in North Africa and the Middle East provide the United States government a moment to reframe, reevaluate, and update its theater strategies. The U.S. government prefers soft power when

¹ Rob Schmitz, "Egyptian Uprising Celebrates One-Year Anniversary" <http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world> (accessed January 26, 2012).

² Ernesto Che Guevara, *Venceremos!: The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara*, (New York: Macmillan, 1968). Che Guevara put forward the argument that a small group of revolutionaries need not wait for revolutionary conditions to arise, instead Che Guevara argued that a popular uprising, which would then become the focus of attention and in-turn gain support from the oppressed masses, could create revolutionary conditions.

³ Blake Houshnell, "The Revolution Will Be Tweeted," *Foreign Policy* 2, no. 187 (2011): 24.

⁴ Colin Gray, "The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War," *Parameters* 38, no. 4 (2009): 14.

dealing with belligerent or non-cooperative states as indicated in the May 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS). In the strategy the USG pledged to draw on diplomacy, development, and international norms, and institutions to help resolve disagreements, prevent conflict, and maintain peace, mitigating where possible the need for the use of force. This means credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments with custom-made approaches to deterrence as well as other non-lethal methods to influence actor's behaviors.⁵ Theater strategy will enable the national strategy, but the techniques and methods for the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), which develop the theater engagement strategies, will have to account for this new environment.

Methodology

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the civil-military relationships in the countries that were involved in the Arab Spring movement. After examining those relationships this monograph demonstrates that this variable is the best indicator in determining how a revolution will unfold. The monograph also examines the level of violence and the likelihood of revolutionary success by analyzing these relationships. Additionally, this study analyzes two other variables, economics and political pluralism, in an attempt to demonstrate how they contribute to revolutions and propose that they not be used as sole indicators of revolution. Rather, these variables are more important to consider after revolutions to better aid the GCC and USG in their understanding of the new environments.

Many analysts, scholars, and policymakers have attributed the Arab Spring to a groundswell of democratic feelings sweeping the populations in the region. Others have pointed to the high levels of corruption and unemployment in North Africa and the Middle East as the primary reasons for the revolution. While there are many variables that contributed to the revolution, this study will show that economic conditions and political participation were not the

⁵ President Barack Obama, *The National Security Strategy*, ed. The White House (Washington D.C.: GPO, May 2010), 3.

primary factors that caused the revolutions in each country. This analysis examines economics and political participation, and attempts to determine at what point these variables should be the focus for planners when analyzing the stability, or lack thereof in the GCC areas of responsibility.

Economic conditions can be a source of frustration for a population, however in the case of the Arab Spring, the evidence does not support that this frustration resulted in a revolutionary fervor in all of the countries. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the existence of political parties and civil society prior to the revolution were ineffective as agents of change. In fact, revolutionaries often times had widespread, disparate interests, opposed to democratic processes and transparency.

Hypothesis

The most important indicator of the nature of an interstate revolution is the relationship between the military, its citizenry, and the leadership of the country. If the military has more regard for the citizens than for the regime, it will not turn against its citizens and kill them for the regime's survival. Similarly, if the military allows the revolution's leaders and organizers to implement the changes they seek- elections, transparency, and other democratic ideals- the revolution will be successful.⁶ The violence level of a revolution is directly proportional to the conduct of the nation's military. The military holds the monopoly on violence, prior to the inception of an armed insurgency. If the military has a propensity to "sit out" or enforce civil law in a non-lethal fashion, countries undergoing revolution will have a much lower level of violence. Citizen on citizen violence in the Arab Spring has been minimal. The analysis will attempt to show that the relationship the military has with the citizens will be the primary variable influencing the level of violence in countries experiencing revolutions.

⁶ Peter D Fever, *Armed Servants Agency, Oversight, and Civil Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The President and Fellows of Harvard University, 2003), 7.

Moreover, the success, or the attainment of goals by the revolutionaries, correlates directly to the conduct of the military after the downfall of the regime. This monograph will examine the actions of the military elites in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya after the shooting stopped. The post-revolution conduct of the military will determine if the goals of the revolutionaries are realized. For example, if the military enforces only civil laws and focuses on external threats, nascent governments will have a higher level of success and the reestablishment of a functional civil military relationship is likelier to occur.⁷ However, the power vacuum that ensues after a revolution is tempting to military elites. Egypt may demonstrate this propensity for military leaders to hold onto power, thereby extinguishing the very impetus and goals of the revolutionaries.⁸

In summary, this study hypothesizes that less violent and more successful revolutions are characterized by little influence in the beginning from the military, and breathing room in the post-revolutionary period from the armed forces. As such, the civil-military relationships in the GCC's area of responsibility should be the focus for commanders and operational planners in developing and executing theater strategy.

Purpose

By examining civil military relationships, this monograph will first attempt to provide clues to the commander on where to focus partnership efforts before an outbreak of violence in a particular country. Secondly, this monograph can provide the GCC with an accurate analytical tool to determine the nature of a revolution the GCC commander may encounter, thereby empowering him or her to establish an appropriate operational approach. Finally, the study can assist the GCC commander in visualizing the post-revolutionary environment and enabling the

⁷ M.C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 168.

⁸ Alan Carter, "The Nation State and Underdevelopment," *Third World Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (1995): 586-618.

leadership to reframe its theater strategy for future engagements. The research contained within is designed to assist the GCC in adjusting and refining its theater strategy for different countries within its area of responsibility. The analysis offers a more focused and nuanced approach to the GCC's theater strategy development and execution, as well as the ability to incorporate the appropriate variables when recommending USG actions in the region for future conflicts. The GCC has a limited number of personnel to analyze events and indicators in its very large area of responsibility. This monograph will increase the likelihood of success for pre-revolutionary theater shaping strategies and post-revolutionary actions by providing a tool to visualize the nature of internal state conflict in the GCC area of responsibility.

The Variables

Civil-Military Relations

The military elites of the Middle East and North Africa traditionally separate from their societies. Janowitz claims that this tradition of separation leads military elites to live in a bubble, with a lack of sensitivity to the needs of the population.⁹ In an autocratic government, or one without multiple checks and balances, this tradition leads to a myopic focus and mission for the military, as they receive guidance from few, and sometimes only one source. This phenomenon would explain a ruthless intervention by a nation's military for the sake of regime as well as their own survival. Such was the case in Iran in 2009, Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2012. In addressing the problem of developing societal based norms for a nation's military, Huntington posits that the crux of the problem is balancing the threat of external attacks as well as the civil societal forces that attempt to influence military policy. This is the point where the fissure between society and the military begins. Huntington also envisages an increase in this civil societal alienation as a trend, if regimes continue to abandon conscription. He warns that the citizen soldier is the best

⁹ Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 31-34.

remedy for coalescing society and the military.¹⁰ M.C. Desch further develops this thought as he emphasizes the correlation between external threat and good civil military relations vis-à-vis no external threat and bad civil military relations.¹¹ This is especially helpful in understanding the developments of the Arab Spring. Based on this framework, Egypt's military had focused on a possible confrontation with Israel, thereby giving its mission and very existence credibility and acceptance with the Egyptian people.¹²

In North Africa and the Middle East, regimes have typically controlled their countries' military elites by keeping them divided. Typically, the security forces separate into several commands, each reporting to the political leader on their own. As such, the political leader monopolizes contact between the commands, insisting on little to no cross communication between the services. Political leaders typically avoid appointing possible successors, to reinforce fears that foreign aid and political coordination will disappear in their absence.¹³ With no crack in the will and determination of the military, and without intervention from the international community, revolutionary aspirations by the populations are largely unachievable. Revolutionaries could not succeed, no matter how much social media and discontent pervaded the society. The military holds the monopoly on violence. The actions of the military determine the results.

This monograph uses loyalty to the constitution and rule of law, external threat level, and inclusion of the population into the military to determine universally accepted and functional

¹⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State- the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The President and fellows of Harvard College, 1957), 19-20.

¹¹ Desch, 170.

¹² Across all major segments of the Egyptian public, the military receives overwhelmingly positive ratings. Fully 88% of Egyptians say the military is having a good influence on the country, including 53% who believe it is having a very good influence. Views of the military are more positive now than in 2007, when 70% said it was having a positive impact and 30% described the military's influence as very good. (Pew Research Center, *Egyptians Embrace Revolt Leaders*, Washington D.C., April 25, 2011).

¹³ Jack A. Gladstone, "Understanding the Revolutions of 2011," *Foreign Policy* Vol 90 no. 3 (2011): 8-16.

civil-military relations in the countries analyzed. First, military leaders and elites that pledge their loyalty to the country and constitution, not the regime leaders are less likely to combat the population during revolutions. Secondly, the focus of military policy should be on external threats, not internal security. Countries that use their military forces as an internal security mechanism cause fissures in the fraternity of the military toward its population.¹⁴ Finally, countries that have good civil military relations allow a majority of the population to serve, regardless of tribe or religious affiliation, and give a plurality of the population the opportunity to enter the officer corps. Of the three countries analyzed, Tunisia, and to a lesser degree Egypt, will demonstrate the characteristics of good civil-military relations, while Libya will exhibit none of the traits listed above.

Economics

Without question, economic conditions in a region affect all aspects of a population by creating winners and losers. In North Africa and the greater Middle East between 1985-2005, real economic growth was largely stagnant. Many experts in the region attribute the Arab Spring to this economic sickness.¹⁵ The effects of economic stability permeated all aspects of society, including the civil-military relationship. Empirical data strongly supports the notion that economic stability improves and eventually solidifies the civil-military relationship. Diamond and Plattner's research asserts that countries with an economy in which the GDP per person is over \$3000.00 are less likely to experience military influenced revolutions.¹⁶ Moreover, the research concluded that once a nation reaches the \$1000 GDP/person level the likelihood of

¹⁴ Fever, 7.

¹⁵ George Saghir, "The Facts Behind Future Middle East Instability," *The International Economy* (Winter 2011): 63-65.

¹⁶ Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, ed. *Civil Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press and the National Endowment for Democracy, 1996), 9.

military coup is significantly lower.¹⁷ While the focus here is not military coups, it provides insight into the argument. As economic conditions slowly improve in a country, the military elites usually enjoy a disproportionately higher quality of living due to corruption and overall disconnection from society. This “middle class dilemma” also bleeds over to the general population. Davies, in his seminal work in 1962 asserted GDP per person *growth*, with a corresponding increase in societal status, as a primary causal factor for revolutionary tendencies. A population that rose slightly in real income and status, yet viewed an intolerable gap between their goals and the ability to reach them, was far more likely to participate in revolutions.¹⁸ For these reasons the economic explanation alone of revolution in this region is troublesome at best. Countries involved in the Arab Spring did not experience a recent prosperous level of economic growth, halting just out of range of middle class attainment. The protesters were, for the most part, college educated, yet unable to find work requisite to their education levels. This glut of an educated labor pool, or the dilemma of over education, was the result of poor economic planning, because no industry or infrastructure existed to support these graduates. This overall unhappiness, in not only wages, but also unrealized potentials, seems a more plausible explanation of the population’s sentiments.

A common held belief concerning the Arab Spring is that the economic conditions influenced the propensity toward revolution. This study shows economic conditions as an intervening, rather than a direct causal link for the propensity of revolution. Economic disparity has garnered much more attention than it deserves, seen by many as primary causal variable in the Arab Spring. With that said, economic hardship often inspires change. However, history and empirical data presented in this paper will demonstrate that these changes usually come in the

¹⁷ Plattner, 11.

¹⁸ James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27, no. 1 (1962): 6.

formation of worker's unions and increased civil society groups, not in the removal of the sovereign government.

This monograph will define countries as economically viable that have a GDP/person above \$3000.¹⁹ Secondly, the country must have the ability to self-sustain without foreign aid. Finally, economic viability is viewed as unsustainable in a corrupt environment. Therefore, for countries in this study determined to be economically viable must be in the lower one third in corruption according *Transparency International's World Corruption Index*.²⁰

Political participation and Civil Society

Political participation and the increase in civil society in the region have unique effects not seen in other parts of the world. Britton charts the traditional impetus on change and revolutionary propensity in the Western world to "pressure groups" (trade unions, guilds, and societies, for instance).²¹ However, while these groups participated (albeit not as instigators) actively in the Arab Spring, it appears that conservative Islamic groups whom were better organized and had a more established internal structure trumped others' motives and influence. Berman pointedly draws the distinction between western political participation vis-à-vis Islamic civil society by affirming that Islamism's rise has been the result of the declining efficacy and legitimacy of the state.²² Instead of resulting in liberalization for the population, the failure of the state has become a vector for traditional Islamic culture to reemerge, thereby bucking the trend of social liberalization and transparency that took place in Eastern European and Latin American revolutions. Building on the conundrum, Yom points out that considering Islamist civil society as

¹⁹ "Gdp Per Person Employed (Constant 1990 Ppp \$) ", ed. The World Bank (New York: 2012).

²⁰ Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2010" http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed 6 January 2012).

²¹ Crane Britton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1965), 36.

²² Sheri Berman, "Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society," *American Political Science Association* 1, no. 02 (2003): 257-272.

part of civic life presents severe dilemmas for scholars and government analysts, who are doubtful if Islamic groups could support democratic objectives and transparency, the perceived goal of the revolutionaries.²³ The evidence suggests that the existence of civil society and political participation in the region by the likes of the Muslim Brotherhood, represent a possible divergence from democratic objectives, and had little influence on the organization or execution of the protests. However, once the dust settled they seemed eager and able to fill the void.

The analysis demonstrates that the existence of political parties and civil society prior to the revolution resulted in little, and were ineffective as agents of change, often opposed to the democratic process. This monograph will analyze this assertion by documenting political parties prior to and after the revolutions occurred. Civil society activity, similar to economics, has been attributed as the catalyst for the Arab Spring by a number of Western policymakers. However, this monograph will demonstrate that the few existing and organized political parties were largely caught off guard by the protests, much like the rest of the world.

The Geographic Combatant Commands

Each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) develops theater strategy for its area of responsibility. Two GCCs develop theater strategy for North Africa: Central Command (CENTCOM) for Egypt, and Africa Command (AFRICOM) for the remainder of the continent. To be effective, theater strategy and theater security cooperation is derived from, and consistently linked to national and multinational strategic guidance and policy, and formulated to meet the requirements found in each region.²⁴ Theater strategy is the next logical step in the implementation of the NSS as the GCC implements the NSS at the regional level, as well as

²³ Sean L. Yom, "Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 9, no. 4 (2005).

²⁴ Obama, 8.

enhancing military operations by lessening the need for military action, or by better preparing the environment for U.S. military intervention, should it be necessary.²⁵ The GCC implements this theater strategy using operational art, the next logical linkage. Joint Publication (*JP*) 3-0, *Operations*, defines operational art as the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations, and to organize and employ military forces. Should the need arise in the GCC to create a Joint Task Force (JTF), the JTF commander and his or her staff would employ operational art to promote unified action by considering the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities. Furthermore, they would merge operating processes of partners from other government and non-government agencies, while determining objectives, establishing priorities, and assigning tasks to subordinate forces in the GCC's region. This process facilitates the coordination, synchronization, and, where appropriate, integration of military operations with those of non-military partners, in the ultimate pursuit of the National Security Strategy.²⁶

The Arab Spring

Twenty years prior to the Arab Spring Samuel Huntington identified what he termed one of the most important global political developments of the late twentieth century--a third wave of democratization among thirty previously nondemocratic states. There was no Arab state on his list, yet he identified Tunisia as a prime candidate for future democratization owing to its pace of economic growth, an educated middle class, and the concurrent liberalization measures

²⁵ Clarence J. Bouchat, "An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security," *Strategic Studies Institute* (2007): 16-19.

²⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations*, ed. Department of Defense (Washington DC: 2011).

undertaken by the country's new president, Ben Ali.²⁷ In 2011, this wave hit harder than anyone had yet imagined.

The Arab Spring is a process occurring in the Middle East, which will reshape the region and have important repercussions for the United States government. Currently, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have all experienced revolutions, and Syria's fate is being determined. In general, the spread of less corrupt and more democratic governments in the Middle East will be of tremendous benefit to the United States, as historically, democratic governments have been less subject to radicalism and are more moderate, stable, and inclusive.²⁸ However, as the CENTCOM commander's posture statement cautiously warns, "Throughout history, many revolutions start out well, yet end badly."²⁹

Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya have experienced revolutions in which leaders who enjoyed unfettered power for decades have fallen from power in an unexpected and radical fashion. Ben Ali fled the country, Mubarak is on trial in his country, and Colonel Gadhafi paid the ultimate price as he attempted to overstay his citizen's welcome. While it is true that the three countries all experienced revolutions, assisted by social media, the techniques the revolutionaries executed were all quite different. The patterns and demographics of the protests varied substantially. The demonstrations in Tunisia started in the rural areas and descended toward the capital, finding common cause with a once powerful but more recently suppressed labor movement.³⁰ Conversely, in Egypt, cultured and dissimilar young people in the major cities organized and

²⁷ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Okla. and London: Oklahoma University Press, 1991), 29.

²⁸ Sean M. Lyon-Jones and Steven E. Miller Michael E. Brown, ed. *Debating the Democratic Peace*, An International Security Reader (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996), 27-30.

²⁹ On U.S. interests in the region see United States Central Command, "Commander's Posture Statement", Statement of U.S. Marine Corps General James N. Mattis, U.S. Central Command Commander, before the Senate Armed Services Committee," March 1, 2011, available from www.centcom.mil, (accessed 12 February, 2012).

³⁰ L. Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (2011): 13.

carried out the uprising. Finally, in Libya, disparate tribal bands of armed rebels in the eastern provinces inspired the protests, revealing the tribal and regional splits that have characterized the country for all too long.³¹ It was more than a contagion, or a fall of dominoes, that caused these revolutions to thrive in such a short amount of time; the conditions had to be set for *successful* revolution. What are those conditions?

Three Divergent Cases of Revolt

The analysis of the cases begins with a brief overview of the revolutions in each country. Following, will be an examination of the independent variable: civil-military relationships, as well as the intervening variables, economics, political parties, and civil society pre/post-revolution. The case studies will be followed by recommendations for the USG and the GCCs, as well as documenting what the USG is currently planning to execute in the countries. At the conclusion of the case studies, the GCC can use the analysis as a framework to apply to other actors in the region.

Jasmines in the Air

The Tunisian revolution began in December 2010 and in less than thirty days resulted in the ouster of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. The demonstrations, which will be a theme throughout the region, were thought to be the result of unsustainable unemployment, high food prices, and local government corruption. The population also largely felt disenfranchised by the political process. The self-immolation in December 2010 of a fruit seller, angered by corruption and lack of economic opportunity despite his level of education, set off massive demonstrations in Tunisia and a political earthquake in the Middle East and North Africa. After Ali's exit, the interim government was further destabilized in March 2011 by riots. As a result, the government ousted all members from the old regime and imposed an overnight

³¹ Ibid., 14.

curfew. The government gradually implemented reforms, including dissolving the secret police and deposing the president's RCD party. The government had to postpone the first democratic election, originally scheduled for July 2011, until October 2011 due to the post revolution instability. The newly elected member's responsibility is to create a constituent assembly that will write a new constitution and prepare for legislative elections. Nahda, a moderate Islamist party that bases itself on Turkey's ruling party, has a good chance of being the largest single party in the assembly.³²

Ten months later on October 23, 2011, approximately 4.4 million registered voters lined up to select a 217-member constituent assembly. Millions of Tunisians celebrated the second phase of their Jasmine revolution as many across the country waited in line for hours to participate in the country's first free and fair election. Amidst reports of a 70-80 percent voter turnout of young and old, women and men, moderate Islamists and secularists. At the same time, many in the Arab world as well as the West watched what they believed to be the dreams and aspirations of Tunisians coming to fruition.³³

Tunisian Military

In Tunisia, the military has historically played a professional, apolitical role. The military took on a secondary role in domestic and political actions to the much-feared state secret police. Tunisia's military played a less significant role in the country's revolt than the armed forces in the other nations in the Arab Spring. Unlike militaries elsewhere in the Arab world, such as Egypt, the Tunisian army has never experienced combat and does not dominate the domestic economy. Under Ben Ali, it served as a distant second to the country's domestic security services, from which Ben Ali, a former military police officer, hailed. Its refusal to support Ben Ali's regime

³² Ben Smith, "In Brief: Arab Uprisings 2011," *House of Commons Library* SN/IA, no. 6003 (2011): 22.

³³ John L Esposito, "Tunisia after Its First Free Elections," *Washington Post*, October 27, 2011.

contributed to the nature of the country's overall peaceful revolution. Furthermore, the military has not participated meaningfully in managing the transition period and is unlikely to shape the ultimate outcome in any significant way.³⁴ Since January 2011 (post-revolution), and at the direction of the executive branch, the military has taken on increasing responsibility for domestic security and humanitarian crisis response. This meets the criteria of good civil-military relations

The role of the military in pre-revolution Tunisia is different from the other countries examined in this analysis. The Tunisian military is a small-sized, non-politicized force, whose chief of staff, Rachid Ammar, pointedly refused Ben Ali's directive to fire on protestors, instead acting to control police officers, security and intelligence personnel, and associated ruffians. He also turned aside any suggestion that he and his fellow officers, and not civilians, assume control of the country.³⁵ Steven Cook, from the Council of Foreign Relations reiterated the critical role of the Tunisian civil-military relationship, "The role that the military has played in the Tunisian uprising thus far is intriguing, and as Tunisia grapples with phase two of the post-Ben Ali era, what the military does (and doesn't do) will be critical to the country's political trajectory."³⁶ The Tunisian military, by staying on the sidelines expedited the regime's fall. Additionally, MG Hogg, United States Army AFRICOM commander completed a visit to Tunisia in November 2011, and commented that the revolution was successful due to the lack of violent intervention by the Tunisian military against its citizens.³⁷ General Hogg further reiterated the need for professionalism amongst African militaries, especially as it relates to fraternity with the population.

³⁴ Anderson: 3.

³⁵ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Tunisia's Morning After," *Middle East Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (Summer 2011): 11.

³⁶ Steven A. Cook, "The Calculations of Tunisia's Military," *Foreign Policy* 4, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 62-64.

³⁷ Major General Hogg, United States Army, (speech to the School of Advanced Military Studies, 1 DEC 2011 Marshall Auditorium, Ft. Leavenworth, KS)

Tunisian Economy

Tunisia's economy prior to the revolution was solid, and was a top performer in the region demonstrated by Tunisia's real economic growth, which averaged almost 5% over the past decade (2000-2010). The Tunisian economy declined to 4.6% in 2008 and to 3-4% in 2009-10 because of economic contraction and the slowing of import demand in Europe, Tunisia's largest export market. However, development of non-textile manufacturing, a recovery in agricultural production, and strong growth in the services sector somewhat mitigated the economic effect of slowing exports.³⁸ Tunisia, at the time of revolution, like other actors in the region, needed to create sufficient employment opportunities for an already large number of unemployed, as well as the growing population of university graduates, but not at an alarming rate. The *World Bank's Doing Business 2010 Report* listed Tunisia among the ten best-ranked countries in the Arab World due to its significant reforms in the tax and welfare system and in trade across borders.³⁹ Blaming the revolution solely on poor economic conditions is troublesome since the GDP/person is above \$3,000, the nation does not rely on foreign aid, and as noted by the World Bank, Tunisia was one of the top performing economies in the entire region.

Since the revolution, the interim government has been in financial difficulty, particularly because of a slump in tourism. At the end of May, the G8 offered a package of loans to the government to help it get through its difficulties. Some economists say that painful reforms, such as cutting subsidies, will be necessary to increase economic growth. Since January 14, the Obama administration has contributed close to \$40 million in assistance to help Tunisians prepare for elections; develop a pluralistic, competitive political culture; promote transparency and

³⁸ CIA World Factbook, "The World Factbook, Tunisia, Economy," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html>, (accessed December 15, 2011).

³⁹ Daniela Kirkby, "The Tunisian Economy: Current Challenges and Opportunities for Future Growth," *Consultancy Africa Intelligence* 2, no. 67 (2010): 29-31.

accountability; support indigenous transitional justice processes; support youth employment initiatives; and advance private-sector development.⁴⁰

Tunisia has demonstrated in the past that it can sustain itself with nominal foreign aid. Further, it has no imminent external threats that would impede commerce and the rebuilding of what was a vibrant economy. Corruption resulted in the population's discontent with the local and eventually federal government and the new government must address this.

Tunisia's New Political Environment

The number of lawful political parties in Tunisia has grown rapidly since the Tunisian revolution. There are now over 100 legal parties, including several that existed under the former regime. The existence of political parties prior to the revolution (unlike Libya) greatly aided in the rapid transition to democracy. During the Ben Ali era, there were eight legal opposition parties—but only three; the Popular Unity Party (PDP), Democratic Forum for Labor and Freedoms (FDTL), and Tajdid functioned as independent opposition parties. In 1991, the Ben Ali government, deemed the Islamist opposition party Nahda a "terrorist organization" and outlawed it. Nahda operated in exile in London, but quickly reasserted its position as a major political player following the party's legalization by the post-Ben Ali government. In contrast to more established, older parties, which can draw from previous party structures, a majority of the 100-plus parties as of August 2011 are small and inexperienced. It is unlikely that small-unorganized newer parties can fare well in new elections. The GCC must be cautious in its dealings with these new power brokers. Traditionally, Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party understandably dominated the legislature, winning large majorities in elections most believed were rigged. Nevertheless, the RCD, allowed a small number of opposition parties, such as the

⁴⁰ "United States Department of State, Diplomacy in Action," <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/03/187078.htm> (accessed October 21, 2011).

Progressive Democratic Party and Ettakatol to operate. Others, such as the Islamist al-Nahda and the center-left Congress Party for the Republic, operated from abroad because they were banned.⁴¹

Current U.S. Operational Approach in Tunisia

As discussed above, the USG has contributed monies to Tunisia. The focus of U.S. policy in the short term is on the ability of Tunisia to conduct credible and transparent elections. As the reader can distill from the following programs, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of State is the predominant mechanism in the execution of policy.

Beginning in 2012, the Peace Corps will return to Tunisia with volunteer assignments focusing on English language training and youth skills development. These programs aim at preparing Tunisian students and professionals for future employment, build local capacity, and develop citizens at the grassroots level. Secondly, the US nominated Tunisia for the MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) Threshold Program.⁴² This partnership is recognition of Tunisia's commitment and progress toward democracy and economic freedom. MCC eligibility has traditionally been hard to achieve for nations in the region and should prove a valuable incentive to open and transparent democratic processes. Tunisia's inclusion in the MCC program will support the Tunisian governments' work on policy reform that can lead to faster growth and generate employment, by addressing constraints to economic growth, increasing private sector investment, and improving economic governance. Thirdly, Tunisia has declared its desire for private sector-led growth. US loan guarantees, if authorized by Congress, can provide \$30 million to support a significant portion of the current Tunisian budgetary gap, thereby enabling Tunisia to

⁴¹ Sam Bollier, "Who Are Tunisia's Political Parites," *Al-Jazeera* 2011.

⁴² "About the Millineum Challenge Corporation," <http://www.mcc.gov/pages/about> (accessed Februaryn 9, 2012).

borrow from international capital markets and bring down the cost of financing Tunisia's reform agenda. Fourth, pending authorization from Congress, the United States will unveil a Tunisia Enterprise Fund, providing seed money to support private sector growth. At an initial budgetary cost of \$20 million, this fund will leverage other investors and help Tunisians launch the small and medium enterprises that will be the engines of long-term opportunity.⁴³

Additionally, the USG has proposed the following programs for 2012. These trade and investment frameworks, will establish joint U.S.-Tunisia working groups on bilateral trade and investment. Financially most notable, is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC): OPIC has committed \$2 billion to supporting private sector investment in the Middle East and North Africa, including in Tunisia. OPIC is working to invest in small businesses and the franchising of U.S. companies in Tunisia. Additionally, OPIC is providing U.S. companies with incentives to invest in Tunisia's renewable energy sector, notably wind and solar. Moreover, from an informational standpoint, the United States is providing approximately \$43.3 million to support rule of law, strengthen political participatory and inclusive processes, build the capacity of civil society, and promote freedom of expression. Finally, contributing over \$5 million, the Fulbright program in Tunisia deployed English language specialists, established media training for over 50 Tunisian journalists, and established partnerships with a range of Tunisian universities.⁴⁴

The Facebook Revolution

What became known as the "25 January Revolution" in honor of the day it all began was mostly peaceful, yet the response of the authorities was the very opposite.⁴⁵ Similar to Tunisia,

⁴³ Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: President's Framework for Investing in Tunisia," Embassy of the United States, Brussels, Belgium, (accessed October 27, 2011).

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Amnesty International, "Egypt Rises- Killings, Detentions and Torture in the 25 January Revolution," *Amnesty International* (2011).

the uprisings were believed to be fueled by the bleak outlook for the future and rampant poverty, unemployment, and the relentless repression of basic freedoms, the actions in Egypt were inspired by the success of the revolt in Tunisia in ousting a ruler who for decades had also seemed untouchable. What the protestors witnessed in Tunisia was a military that was unwilling to intervene on behalf of the regime. Fortunately, in Egypt, the military eventually sided with the people.

The Egyptian revolution was unique in that it was able to mass millions of Egypt's youth through social media such as Facebook and Twitter. More impressively, women and men of all ages and from all communities sustained the movement despite a media blackout and severe disruptions in communications. The protest however, took a heavy toll according to Ministry of Health and Population sources-at least 840 people were killed and 6,467 others were injured, , while thousands were detained, many of them tortured.⁴⁶

After only 18 days, the revolution resulted in the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) a twenty-member body made up of senior military officers, became responsible for the administration and leadership of Egypt. The SCAF promised elections would be forthcoming in November 2011. Elections for the National Assembly (lower house) and the Shura Council (upper house) may take place simultaneously in three stages, which will extend over a two-month period. Parliamentary elections are a critical step in Egypt's transition, partly because parliament is obligated to appoint a 100-person Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt in Transition," *Congressional Research Service* 7, no. 5700 (2011).

Egyptian Military

Prior to the unrest of 2011, military officers had refrained from playing a direct role in the affairs of the civilian-run government. This fact makes Egypt's military one of the most progressive, in terms of civil- military relationships in the region. Currently, the military has returned to the forefront, as it remains the preeminent institution in society, with its new responsibility to maintain internal security. Defense spending has been increasing steadily in recent years and prior to the revolution it was thought that it would likely increase

The Egyptian military is a highly regarded and respected institution that provides employment and social services for hundreds of thousands of young people in a country with annual double-digit unemployment rates. Military experts have often asserted that Egypt's armed forces are swollen and maintain labor at excessive levels for peacetime (approximately 310,000 conscripts and an additional 375,000 reservists); while others contend, the large size of the military is justified by the services it provides to soldiers and their families.⁴⁸ Some experts estimate that the military trains 12% of young Egyptian males and that defense industries employ over 100,000 people. The military has its own companies that produce consumer products, food cement, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, and manufactured goods. The military also promotes sports organizations. Additionally, the military is a major holder of municipal land. The officer corps also benefit from higher salaries better housing, and high-quality health care, which helped ensure their loyalty to the government.⁴⁹ Some members of the opposition have criticized these special benefits and the military's fiscal autonomy, asserting that there is little civilian control over the military's budget.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: The January 25 Revolution and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy," *Congressional Research Service* 7-5700, no. RL3303 (2011): 12.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

Egyptian Economy

Because of the revolutions, the economic environment has changed drastically in Egypt, as the country is perilously close to a balance-of-payments crisis. The central bank's foreign exchange reserves have almost halved since the revolution and in March 2012 were down to \$22 billion. Unless tourists start flowing into the country again, and exports begin to rise by mid-2012, the country could find itself in the same situation as Greece.⁵¹ Similar to Eurozone cash strapped countries, the government is borrowing heavily from domestic banks, driving the interest rates on Egyptian bonds to around 15%, an unsustainable rate in a country already facing massive unemployment.⁵² If the USG wants Egypt to continue to honor the Camp David Accords, the priority for CENTCOM and the USG will be economics.⁵³

Egypt is the second largest recipient of American foreign aid. U.S. policy makers are now facing the reality of the new future of U.S.-Egypt relations. The new political environment and level of cooperation between the countries based on shared interests and values is likely to influence consideration of future funding and authorization legislation for U.S. aid in the Congress. Since 1979, the United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of \$2 billion in economic and military foreign assistance. In FY2010, the United States provided Egypt with \$1.552 billion in total assistance. Congress appropriated FY2010 aid to Egypt that included \$1.292 billion in economic and military assistance; and \$260 million in FY2010 military

⁵¹ Dalibor Rohac, "The Economic Threat to Egypt's Stability," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 2, 2011.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵³ The Camp David accords are the popular name given to the historic peace accords forged in 1978 between Israel and Egypt at the U.S. presidential retreat at Camp David, Md. The official agreement was signed on Mar. 26, 1979, in Washington, D.C. by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, with U.S. President Jimmy Carter signing as a witness. Under the pact, which was denounced by other Arab states, Israel agreed to return the Sinai to Egypt, a transfer that was completed in 1982. In a joint letter, the two nations also agreed to negotiate Palestinian autonomy measures in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, but virtually no progress was made on this issue until the 1990s.

assistance. The Obama Administration has the opportunity to shape the future relationship with Egypt by providing Egypt aid for FY2011 at FY2010 levels until March 4, 2011, or with the passage of superseding FY2011 appropriations legislation. For FY2011, the Obama Administration is seeking \$1.552 billion in total assistance, the exact same amount as the previous fiscal year. The administration's request includes \$1.3billion in military assistance and \$250 million in economic aid.⁵⁴

The GCC must provide input on the effects that the status quo, in regards to military spending, will have on the population. This mechanism is the best tool the GCC can use to shape the post-revolutionary environment in Egypt due to the exorbitant amount of money given to Egypt as compared to the other countries in the region. Although the population largely supported the army in its ascension as administrator of the country, protests and reports in December 2011 indicate that the military may be unwilling to cede power to civilian authorities.⁵⁵

Egypt's New Political Environment

An estimated two dozen parties have formed since February 11, including the recently recognized Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), also known as the Muslim Brotherhood. The FJP has an Egyptian Copt, Rafiq Habib, as its vice president and plans to contest between 45% and 49% of parliamentary seats. Based on research conducted by the Pew Research Center, only 17% of respondents said they would like to see the Muslim Brotherhood lead the next government. Moreover, the same poll revealed that 50% of respondents also said it was "very important" for religious parties to be part of a future government and 37% have a "very favorable" view of the Muslim Brotherhood. Other notable parties include the Free Egyptians Party (FEP), founded by Egyptian billionaire businessperson and Coptic Christian Naguib Sawiris, and the Al Adl Party

⁵⁴Jeremy M. Sharp, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations* (2011), 19.

⁵⁵ "Egypt Clashes Move into 4th Day, Us Worried," *The Times of India*, December 19, 2011.

(Justice) party founded by supporters of Egyptian activist and former International Atomic Energy Association Chief Mohammad El Baradei. Most analysts anticipate that over the course of the next few months, parties with similar platforms will either merge or form coalitions, particularly secular parties wishing to compensate for their relative anonymity and organizational weakness and counter the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁵⁶ In January 2012 the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party took 47 percent of seats in the lower house of parliament, and the ultraconservative Salafist Nour Party won 25 percent of the elected seats.⁵⁷

Current U.S. Operational Approach in Egypt

Egypt's relationship with the United States, prior to the revolution was very straightforward, as voiced by the US Ambassador to Egypt prior to the revolution, "President Mubarak and military leaders view our military assistance program as the cornerstone of our mil-mil relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMS (foreign military sales) as "untouchable compensation" for making and maintaining peace with Israel. The tangible benefits to our mil-mil relationship are clear: Egypt remains at peace with Israel, and the U.S. military enjoys priority access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace."⁵⁸

The USG will soon have to decide which theater strategic approach to adopt in a post revolution Egypt. Recent research conducted by the Congressional Research Service offers three options for the USG and CENTCOM. The first of three possible methods labeled an active approach, envisages the USG and CENTCOM insisting on a principle-based foreign policy and theater strategy. CENTCOM would publicly advocate for free and transparent elections, as a prerequisite for further military aid. However, directing aid away from mil-mil programs could have

⁵⁶ Sharp, "Egypt in Transition," 26.

⁵⁷ Leila Fadel, "Final Results Confirm Islamists Winners in Egypt's Elections," *Washington Post* January 21, 2012.

⁵⁸ Marian Wang, "F.A.Q. On U.S. Aid to Egypt: Where Does the Money Go—and Who Decides How It's Spent?," *Pro Publica*, January 31 2011.

a harmful effect on bilateral military and security cooperation. The strategic context of the relationship between the USG and Egypt has traditionally been the maintenance of the status quo vis-à-vis Israel, not transparent democratic institutions.⁵⁹

A second route offered to congress is a quiet approach. CENTCOM could act behind closed doors in order to avoid the appearance of external intervention in domestic affairs and avoid alienating U.S. partners in key leadership positions that could eventually rise to power after the elections. Trade and investment would be the focus, opposed to security and military programs. With the contraction of the Egyptian economy, a shift to economic issues may be tempting to the incoming regime, and the domestic audience. This quiet approach does pose the risk of alienating military elites. The SCAF is still in charge, and due to the monopoly on violence they possess, military leaders will continue to wield heavy influence in post-revolution Egypt.⁶⁰

Finally, a multipronged approach posits that U.S. security interests and efforts to promote reform in Egypt are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Supporters of a multipronged approach assert that U.S. assistance can and should support government reform projects, alongside support for independent civic groups.⁶¹ This approach would see CENTOM utilizing the whole of government principles to their fullest. Historically, the Egyptian government was hesitant to allow information transactions (pro democracy, human rights, and gender equality) free access to their society. If the elections in Egypt are deemed credible, the CENTCOM theater strategy can again focus on the maintenance of the status quo with Israel, and less on the promotion of democracy, since a democratic state will apparently have been formed with lower transaction costs from the USG.

⁵⁹ Sharp, "Egypt in Transition," 27.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 28.

⁶¹ Sharp, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, 15.

Libya Falls

Over 40 years ago, Muammar al Qadhafi led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. Opposition groups citing the same principles are now revolting against Qadhafi to end the authoritarian political system he has controlled in Libya for the last four decades. The Libyan government's use of force against civilians and opposition forces seeking Qadhafi's overthrow sparked an international outcry and led the United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 1973, which authorizes "all necessary measures" to protect Libyan civilians.⁶² The United States military participated in Operation Unified Protector, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military operation to enforce the resolution. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and other partner governments also participated. Qadhafi and his supporters described the uprising as a foreign and Islamist conspiracy and attempted to outlast their opponents. Qadhafi remained defiant amid continuing coalition air strikes, and his forces continued to attack opposition-held areas. Opposition figures formed an Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC), which claimed to represent all areas of the country.⁶³

The revolution reached a milestone when on 20 October 2011 members of the TNC killed the Libyan dictator Moammar Gaddafi in a sewage tunnel in his hometown - the final triumph for pro-democracy fighters who had struggled for eight months to take control of the country. Gaddafi's death came on a day of intense military activity in Sirte, the last loyalist holdout in Libya, where his supporters had fended off better-armed revolutionaries for weeks. Before his capture, a U.S. drone and French fighter jets fired on a large, disorganized convoy leaving the city

⁶² United Nations Security Council, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011)," ed. United Nations (New York: 2011).

⁶³ Country Studies Program, "Libya - the Economy," *Country Studies Program* (2011). http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/libya/ECONOMY.html (accessed February 12, 2012).

that he appeared to have been in. It was never determined if the airstrikes hit Gaddafi's vehicles.⁶⁴ Gaddafi met his ultimate fate soon after and was killed in an extrajudicial killing, an ominous sign of future events.

Libyan Military

Strategists and military experts agreed that the Libyan army had no experience in handling revolutions, despite its considerable military arsenal. During the 42 years of Gaddafi's rule, he did not enable the army to be strong enough to turn against him. This was of considerable concern due to the importance of tribalism in politics and the economy in Libya. The fragility of the Libyan army led to its split between a traditional affiliation to tribalism and regionalism, and loyalty for Gaddafi; illustrated by successive announcements and recorded statements of military commands resigning to join the People's Revolution. During his reign, Gaddafi's military policy consisted of establishing a "special forces unit" led by his son Khamis, within the Libyan army to protect himself. The unit was the Russian-trained "Khamis battalion" or "Battalion 32," whose task was to suppress demonstrations and handle coups and military rebellion. This battalion was the only military unit that remained under Gaddafi's control until the final days of the revolution.⁶⁵

However, this unit was responsible for an extraordinary amount of death and destruction. Another theme throughout the Arab Spring is that relatively small units can inflict disproportional destruction due to civilians having nothing more than small arms. This is currently playing out in Syria. Without the intervention of NATO airstrikes, this battalion would have sacked Benghazi and caused the anti-Gadhafi forces to flee or be defeated.

⁶⁴ Mary Beth Sheridan, "Moammar Gaddafi Is Captured, Killed as Last Loyalist Holdout in Libya Falls," *The Washington Post*, October 20, 2011.

⁶⁵ Elycheikh Ahmed Telba, "People's Revolution in Libya: The Army and Scenarios on Gaddafi's Fall" (accessed November 29, 2011). http://zawaya.magharebia.com/en_GB/zawaya/opinion/398.

Libya's military was characteristic of poor civil-military relations, which resulted in the nature of the revolution to be extremely violent. The officer corps was nepotistic and tribally affiliated and loyalty to Gadhafi was enforced ruthlessly. Finally, Libya had no external threats, and its military was utilized as an internal stabilizer within the country.

Libyan Economy

The Libyan economy is different from the economies of its neighbors in North Africa. Whereas Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia all have large populations, considerable agricultural potential, and well-established industrial bases, Libya possesses few of these advantages. It does however, have abundant energy resources - primarily an attractive type of light low-sulfur crude oil as well as moderate levels of natural gas. Given the Libya's small population (3.6 million in 1984) and sizeable petroleum-derived income, the Libyan economy has more in common with lesser oil-exporting Persian Gulf states than with its North African neighbors.⁶⁶

However, economists expect Libya's economy to contract more than 50 percent in 2011 after eight months of fighting that paralyzed its oil industry, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said. The conflict had a severe impact on economic activity heavily dependent on hydrocarbons, which account for more than 70 percent of output and 95 percent of exports, the IMF said in its Regional Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia. International sanctions and consequent denial of access to foreign exchange have limited the ability to finance imports of goods and services, resulting in severe disruptions in the non-hydrocarbon sectors.⁶⁷ Due to the extended fighting that occurred in Libya, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, the economic repercussions will be far more severe. This in turn will most likely have the effect of an anchor on the

⁶⁶ Country Studies Program, 68.

⁶⁷ Vivian Salama, "Libyan Economy to Contract More Than 50% This Year," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, October 26, 2011.

development of new institutions and democratic processes. Significant amounts of foreign aid will be necessary to return the population to a level of normalcy.

Libya's New Political Environment

The National Transitional Council, which fomented the insurgency and formed a provisional government, has recently drawn a road map aimed at the election of an assembly to draft a new constitution within eight months of Libya's declaration as liberated. When Libya's new rulers declared on October 23, 2011 that, with the fall of Sirte and the death of Muammar Gadhafi, they had finally liberated their country, a constitutional clock began. First, within a month, the chair of the current National Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, is to appoint an interim government. Within three months, it is to pass preliminary electoral laws, and within eight months, Libyans are to elect approximately 200 delegates to an assembly charged with drafting a constitution. A referendum should approve the constitution within one year, estimated mid-2013. If the referendum endorses this document, elections for a parliament and later for a president will follow. This could take a few of years.⁶⁸

In contrast to neighboring Tunisia, which already had a constitution worth amending, Libya is starting with no workable document to guide the process, since prior to the revolution discussion of such were illegal. In a speech to announce Libya's liberation, Mr. Abdel Jalil said that Sharia would be the basis for the country's laws. This would ban usury (interest rates on loans), and legalize polygamy. This clearly caused concern among some of Libya's Western backers, and shocked many secular-minded Libyans, who were displeased with Jalil for possibly interfering in the constituent assembly's autonomy prior to the convention convening.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Unknown, "A New Timetable," *The Economist*, October 29, 2011, 34.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

Political parties were banned and nearly non-existent prior to the revolution. Since then however, several political parties have formed after the downfall of the regime. The National Gathering for Freedom, Justice and Development was already one of the best-organized political groups in the country, particularly in Benghazi. The party enjoyed a six-month advantage there, as Benghazi was the first town taken by the rebels. It models itself on the Turkish party (of the same name) although it is actually the Libyan version of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. At the time of writing, recent protests, especially by women have caused support for the Islamist party to deteriorate. Troubling for the U.S. is the presence of Abdel Hakim Belhaj in the party, head of the Tripoli military council and very much a political Islamist, who also fought against NATO in Afghanistan. British forces caught and extradited Belhaj back to Libya, where Qaddafi imprisoned him.⁷⁰

Another well-organized group that looks set to emerge as the principal rival to the Salabi party is the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL). Founded in 1981 by Muhammad Yusuf Al-Magariaf, a onetime Libyan ambassador to India, it was the primary opposition group for years prior to the current revolution, although it operated primarily in exile. "It will be a major force in Libyan politics because of its past stand," said Jalal Abdul-Mutalib, a former Libyan diplomat and dissident during the Gadhafi era. NFSL does not espouse Islamism in its charter and many people in Tripoli view the party as a secular alternative to Salabi.⁷¹

Current U.S. Operational Approach in Libya

Since the end of official hostilities, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is assisting the Libyan people. USAID is attempting to bolster the basic administrative capacities of interim governing authorities and strengthen new media outlets and civil society

⁷⁰ Michael Cousins, "Political Parties Mushroom in Libya," *Arab News*, November 17, 2011.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

organizations. Of the more than \$90 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance provided as of December 2011, USAID has provided almost \$29 million, including approximately \$13.3 million from USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and \$15.6 from USAID's Office of Food for Peace.⁷²

The current situation in Libya is by far the most complex and ambiguous for the USG. With the National Transitional Council, making movements toward a conservative Islamic agenda the USG will most likely have to sit back and wait. The new political factions that are emerging from post-revolutionary Libya should not be invested in too heavily by the USG. The USG, by providing aid, and allowing breathing room for the nascent government to coalesce can demonstrate to the Libyan people it does not intend to influence the new administration that Libya chooses. It is likely, if militias remain at bay, other more progressive groups will organize and challenge the more entrenched Islamic parties that have had years to cultivate in the region.⁷³

Findings

The data has demonstrated that the levels of economic prosperity as well as the levels of corruption in the countries were mixed. Libya's GDP/person in 2011 led the three countries at \$14,000, Tunisia followed at \$9,400, and Egypt had a respectable \$6,200.⁷⁴ Secondly, a common theme that has permeated discussions of the Arab spring is the presence of rampant corruption that exists in the region. However, according to Transparency International, Tunisia ranked lower in corruption than Slovenia, Croatia, and Brazil, some of the world's surging economies, which did not experience revolution.⁷⁵ While corruption was higher in neighboring Libya and Egypt, the

⁷² Michael Chelius, *Transition in Libya* 2012.

⁷³ Berman: 257-278.

⁷⁴ Index Mundi, "Country Comparison-Gdp/Person " <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=67> (accessed January 14, 2012).

⁷⁵ The 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, ed. Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed January 14, 2012).

level is far lower than other African nations. Finally, Egypt received a disproportional amount of foreign aid compared to the other countries listed. This aid, in the form of military sales from the United States however, does not constitute a requirement for the coherent functioning of the Egyptian economy.⁷⁶ Tunisia and Libya, in addition to having a higher GDP per person than Egypt, also have niche industries, especially oil, that offer a higher likelihood of economic independence, or the ability to show real economic growth without foreign aid.

The evidence also demonstrated that political participation and levels of civil society involvement in the countries varied significantly. These variables offer little in illuminating scholars or policymakers about the propensity or evolution (violent or nonviolent) of a revolution. However, the literature and evidence show that the existence of these factions in some of the countries had little to no effect in the inception or execution of the movements. Political party participation and the existence of a civil society vary widely in the three countries with Libya ranking on the lower end (none) and Egypt on the high end. President Mubarak allowed certain political parties and trade union groups to participate in civil society in the final years of his reign. Ben Ali of Tunisia tolerated a small number of parties but outlawed far more than Egypt's Hosni Mubarak. At the end of the scale was Libya's Colonel Gadhafi who outlawed nearly all parties and would not tolerate any trade union participation. The existence of these parties and other social outlets seemed to have very little influence on the propensity for revolution; but were offset by the rapid organizational capabilities of social media.

Wael Ghonim is among a small group of political activists in Egypt whose social-media shrewdness helped spark the massive demonstrations threatening Egypt's ruling regime. "I said one year ago that the internet will change the political scene in Egypt and some friends made fun

⁷⁶ Sharp, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, 22.

of me."⁷⁷ Ghonim was not a member of any established political faction.⁷⁸ In the past, participation and patronage took years to inculcate a following that would then result in the adoption of ideologies and planned actions. It is understandable how scholars and analysts continue to think in the old paradigm. However, due to the proliferation of social media in the countries, participants in the revolution from all lifestyles were present at rallies and protests in numbers not deemed possible in the past. Political parties had little to do with the revolutions.

However, Facebook users and internet techies will not fill the leadership vacuum that follows revolution. The political parties that existed prior to the revolutions will emerge as the power brokers in the *post-revolutionary* environment, due to organization, not ideology.

The civil-military relationships that each country cultivated prior to the revolution was a constant indicator of the actions the armed forces took. This subsequently resulted in a low violence level in Tunisia and Egypt and a near mass atrocity situation in Libya.

The Tunisian Experience

The analysis demonstrates that the Tunisian army displayed more loyalty to the population than to the regime. The Tunisian military profession had largely been forsaken by the regime. Ali preferred to focus on the internal security forces, and the military was not the beneficiary of significant foreign assistance. Secondly, the amount of military aid provided to the Tunisian military by the United States was significantly lower than Egypt's. Finally, the Tunisian officer corps remained extremely professional and had one of the highest ratios of U.S. trained

⁷⁷ Margaret Coker, "Google Executive Emerges as Key Figure in Revolt," *Wall Street Journal*, February 7, 2011.

⁷⁸ In 2010, Wael Ghonim founded a Facebook page titled, "We Are All Khaled Said," supporting Khaled Said, a young Egyptian who was tortured to death by police in Alexandria. Wael Ghonim used this page in moving and integrating the anti-government protests of the 25th of Jan revolution. He first made an announcement on the page on 14 January 2011 asking members if they were going to plan on taking to the streets on 25th of Jan and do what Tunisia did? In less than 2 hours, he published an event entitled: 25 January. This was the first invitation and many others followed. He anonymously collaborated with activists on the ground to announce the locations for the protest ("Google Man Wael Ghonim Emerges as the Face of Egypt Protests," *International Business Times*), Accessed January 23, 2012.

personnel of any Arab army. Its officer trainees, moreover, enjoy very favorable reputations for dedication and competence with American military and civilian personnel who have worked with them.⁷⁹ Tunisia supports the hypothesis completely as the civil-military relationship acting as an indicator of the nature of internal state revolution.

Of the three countries discussed in this analysis, the stakes for the USG were lowest in Tunisia. Tunisia does not possess a military capable of destabilizing the region and there were few if any terrorist elements operating inside the country that were hostile to the United States. Most importantly, Tunisia does not control the Suez Canal. However, the chronological order that the Arab Spring took could not have been better for the leaders at USAFRICOM. Tunisia allowed the leaders to analyze the current approach the GCC was taking and then alter its approach in order to have a more effective response if other actors in the region experienced instability.

USAFRICOM can execute several actions in Tunisia; examples are a moratorium on arms sales, aggressive engagement with political civil society and youth via social media, and the continuation of financial support to newly elected leaders. In addition, the USG can provide support to civil authorities through training and military-to-military engagement if requested. Recognizing that each country in the Arab Spring is unique and there is no one size fits all approach, the best option is minimal intervention. The unique and most significant aspect of the Tunisian revolution was the refusal of the military to crack down on its citizens. This level of professionalism in the armed forces of Tunisia is the primary attribute that USAFRICOM should be attempting to inculcate in other African nations. USAFRICOM must continue the current relationship it has with the Tunisian military elite. Based on the actions of the Tunisian military leadership, the post-revolutionary Tunisian environment should be the most stable of the countries analyzed.

⁷⁹ Robert Springborg & Clement M. Henry, "Army Guys," *The American Interest* 16, no. 2 (May/June 2011): 23-25.

The Egyptian Experience

The Egyptian army, by contrast, remains heavily invested in the regime. Indeed, it is the regime (SCAF). Like Tunisia, Egypt was a police state, but one with a considerably larger role reserved for the military.⁸⁰ The vacuum that follows will be hard for the military to resist. While it is tempting to twist the data to support the hypothesis, this analysis asserts that the nature of the revolution in Egypt was the result of the military betting on a winner as opposed to an ideal civil-military relationship. In the beginning of the revolution the military-which meets all the requirement of the study to support the population and not the regime-attempted to quell the demonstrators. Only after realizing that the scale of the protests would be something it could not control, did it flip its support of the revolution, assisting in the ouster of Mubarak, and taking over the administration of the country.

Currently the best option for the USG and CENTCOM in regards to Egypt is the above-mentioned quiet approach recommended to Congress by the *Congressional Research Service*. Post-revolution Egypt needs breathing space, and they need assurances that the USG stands by them and the security alliances they signed in the past. The priority for CENTCOM must be the stability of Egyptian/Israeli relations. The challenge for CENTCOM is sending this message while appearing to have little to no contact with the candidates and future members of parliament. The recent revelations (December 2011) and indications that the SCAF may not cede power would be glaring proof that the civil military relationship in Egypt is the primary indicator of the post-revolutionary track of this nation. CENTCOM unfortunately, despite all their contacts with military elites, will most likely not be able to convince the SCAF's leadership to abandon its positions for an increased military role. While the USG must focus on Egyptian/Israel relations, the revolution in Egypt could morph into a military junta ruling the country.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 21.

The Libyan Experience

As events in the Arab Spring unfolded, it is clear to see that each of the three revolutions discussed have had vastly different levels of violence. While Tunisia and Egypt's security forces and militaries intervened for a short amount of time, it became clear to the military elites in Egypt that confrontation with the civilian population was a bad choice for the country as well as for their institutions. However, in Libya the lack of initial fracturing in the military forces, especially the Kamis Brigade could have resulted in a mass atrocity for a large number of the population had NATO had not intervened. The relationship that the military had with its government leaders as well as the lack of fraternity it felt to the population was the primary indicator of the level of violence and overall success of the revolution. In the winter of 2012, the situation in Libya was by far the most unstable. As an example of the daily post-revolutionary violence, on January 23, 2012, (nearly three months after the revolution) five people were killed and 20 wounded when clashes broke out between pro- and anti- Gadhafi forces in the Libyan city of Bani Walid, one of the last strongholds loyal to the late leader.

Moving Forward

After the distillation of the data, the GCC has several opportunities to reframe its theater strategy and execution of operational art. First, the GCC can analyze the relationship that the military elites of a nation have with their current regime. GCC can make an educated analysis on the likelihood of the military holding its ground, or crumbling in the face of a revolution. Next, the GCC can adjust its theater engagement strategy by prepositioning itself to be on the "right side" of a revolution by understanding the civil-military relationship. The GCC can predict the level of violence, the potential for US intervention, and the propensity for human rights abuses and mass atrocities by better understanding the civil-military relationship. After that analysis, the GCCs can better inform policy makers, and better prepare for contingency operations in its areas of operation. Finally, by using the criteria established in this monograph, the GCC can better

focus its planners on which operational variables to analyze, such as economics and the existence of political parties.

Military to military contacts and training must focus on the inculcation of universally accepted civil-military relationships that meet the needs of the population and the security interests of the nation. Some basic questions that the GCC should consider, concerning the civil-military relationship when implementing its theater strategy for the area of responsibility are: 1) what serves as the political control mechanism for the countries' security architecture, and is there accountability to elected constituencies; 2) what influence will existing security agreements have over the implementation of force, and have the regional security structures established a record of accomplishment with political oversight by the electorate; 3) where will the funding come from and what strings will be attached?⁸¹ By addressing the following questions the GCC can begin to understand the current civil military relationship that exists in the countries examined and begin to see the tensions that may arise when it attempts to shape the relationships.

A Look to the Past for the Future

Africa is especially difficult to plan for because the countries are so vastly different, resulting in a large variance in the formation of their civil-military relations. These variances can be attributed to the colonizing experience of the nation and the militaries. The colonial legacy of African nations has led some militaries to have a greater propensity to intervene in political affairs, while other militaries are more apt to stay out of political affairs. Still other theorists believe that a third level of civil-military relations exists in which the militaries of some governments will act primarily in their self-interest; such in the case of coups and military

⁸¹ Martin R. Rupiya, "Challenges and the Emerging African Security Architecture," *Institute for Security Studies* 2, no. 47 (2008): 73-81.

juntas.⁸² This can be the starting point when developing and executing the theater strategy.

Planners that are in a time-constrained environment must focus their attention and education on the data that really matters. It is paramount that each country be viewed through its own lens, which poses challenges for an organization responsible for so many disparate nations.

The United States and the Geographic Combatant Command have done an impressive job at handling what few analyst or political scientists saw coming in the Arab Spring. Tunisia has transitioned and Egypt is showing promising signs with little security lapses or provocations toward Israel. Libya required a NATO intervention, and by all accounts, the operation was extremely successful in stopping an imminent human rights catastrophe, however the future of the internal government is murkier. USAFRICOM should be proud of the leadership it provided during the Libyan operation. Yet, much still needs to be accomplished in the region, and getting ahead of the trend is the role of the GCC, and what policymakers expect of these vital commands, which are immersed in the daily operations of these regions. Refocusing on the civil-military relations of the countries in the region, and cultivating a universally accepted civil-military relationship will prevent, and help predict future revolutions. In a world where analysts can be paralyzed by data, the lens must be narrowed.

⁸² A. R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," *Government and Opposition* 6, no. 1 (1971): 5.

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