

A Monograph
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Abstract

MONOGRAPH by MAJOR Gregory W. McLean U.S. Army, 37 pages.

What can we learn from past leaders that is important enough to be included in the new Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22? Leadership principles the Army has used to date are inadequate. This monograph reviews some of the most revered generals in military history, to study their leadership principles and determine the commonality among them.

The Army is in a state of transition after 10 years of war, and history has shown leadership lessons can be lost during a transition period to a more garrison Army. The purpose of this monograph is to reflect on leadership lessons and use criteria based upon some of the great generals from military history. The Army has the chance, like General George C. Marshall did during the interwar period between 1919-1941, by creating a new leadership manual that can save lives and create leadership principles for the Army to strive for. These changes to the new ADP can help leaders face the unknown by giving them a road map to handle issues based on principles which are proven from past revered leaders. Today's leaders have the same responsibility as General Marshall to revise the new leadership doctrine in preparation for the next war using the examples which have been proven from its past.

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Introduction

Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designed can replace it.

General Omar Bradley.¹

What can we learn from past leaders that is important enough to be included in the new Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22? Leadership principles the Army has used to date are inadequate. Leadership principles are essential for the success of the United States Army in every action it undertakes. This monograph reviews some of the most revered generals in military history, to study their leadership principles and determine the commonality among them. General George C. Marshall's insight that man is the fundamental instrument in war should be examined to determine if it is still relevant today. Leadership principles are essential to leading soldiers in the United States Army, which is why choosing the correct material to fill ADP 6-22 is so important.

The Army is in a state of transition after 10 years of war, and history has shown leadership lessons can be lost during a transition period to a more garrison Army. The purpose of this monograph is to reflect on leadership lessons and use criteria based upon some of the great generals from military history. These generals decorate the United States currency; have cities, towns, states, schools, and monuments named after them. History has demonstrated common traits of perseverance, discipline, understanding your men, calmness under pressure, being an example, and concise orders among these famous generals. These traits are common among all

¹ II John T. Nelson, *General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army 1939-41*, ed. Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 1.

great generals since the conception of the United States Military.

General George C. Marshall's leadership principles contained in Field Service Manual (FSR) 100-5 from 1939 are a good model for the new ADP. The changes, which occurred during the interwar period between 1919-1941, can be a valuable insight to what future challenges the Army faces. The operational environment of 2012 is challenging, but the principles of General Marshall still apply, and should be the bedrock for the new ADP FM 6-22.

Soldiers deserve good leaders. The Army has great examples to use from leaders who had well-defined leadership principles. Leaders who are equipped with these leadership principles will serve soldiers as better leaders. Leaders when training for combat, and deployed to combat, do not have time to read leadership principles which are over-explained in length. Non-commissioned officers and officers revert to using simplicity during combat and maxims based on General Marshall's principles are easy to understand and proven useful.

The Army's senior leaders understanding how leaders where in search of doctrine which was shorter and easier to reference, introduced a new concept for doctrine in 2009 called "Doctrine 2015" at the Doctrine Re-engineering Conference in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A significant finding by the Mission Command Center of excellence was that U.S. Army Field Manuals (FM) were too long and too hard to understand.²

Another major finding was for Army doctrine to get back to the basics of providing material focused on preparation for success in combat. In response, the U.S. Army developed Doctrine 2015 to introduce five hierarchical classes of publications. First is the Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs) to help define the fundamentals of a subject in a concise ten pages. The ADPs focus on overarching lessons from the recent decade of war. The Army will also use the

² Brigadier General Charles A. Flynn and Brigadier General Wayne W. Grigsby, "The Mission Command Center of Excellence: Driving Institutional Adaptability," *Army* 62, no. 2 (2012).

ADPs to direct the actions of the Army towards capturing the lessons learned for integration into doctrine and all aspects of capability development.³ This will help capture lessons learned and prepare the Army to prepare for the next conflict.

These revisions will remove over 590 pages from FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*. Since the new leadership ADP will be no more than 10 pages in length, it should be based on principles using the best examples of leadership. This monograph will highlight the lessons that have been tested and proven in and out of combat since the beginning of the United States Army.

Marshall's interest was the creation of long-term changes within the Army, so he developed a new way to look at leadership principles in 1939.⁴ He gave leaders a sense of what was important by explaining his thoughts and ideas using maxims. He adopted Elihu Root's and the German Army's concept of leadership that revolved around the human dimension as part of the larger operating force.⁵ This helped Marshall achieve his desired end-state of quality leadership in combat by condensing leadership lessons learned from World War I into a three-page chapter. He believed he had to shape the values of the Army first, get rid of some of the old ways of thinking, modify others, and eventually introduce new ideas to the force. He realized a leader must be the ultimate example for his organization with values that should be long standing and binding. General Marshall understood from his experiences in WWI and the Philippines, that a revised leadership doctrine was needed for a future war. Chapter 3 from FM 100-5 1939 and 1941 was the result. Today's leaders have the same responsibility after serving the last 10 years in combat, to revise the new leadership doctrine in preparation from the next war but use the

³ Ibid.

⁴ Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General* (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1963), 254.

⁵ Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army doctrine : from the American Revolution to the War on Terror*, Modern war studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 145.

examples which have been proven from its past.

Literature Review

Academics and management consultants have studied leadership theories and philosophies for years. Their studies have shown many different opinions on what management styles or philosophy are the best. Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus argue management means to bring about, to accomplish, to have charge of, responsibility for, or to conduct something.⁶ Leading is influencing, guiding in direction, course, action, and opinion. Bennis/Nanus argue the distinction is crucial and clear, that managers are efficient and leaders are effective.⁷ Management typically consists of a set of contractual exchanges, “you do this job for that reward,” or agreements or contracts.⁸ The Army leadership model differs from these business management and leadership theories. Bennis/Nanus would answer the question of what should go into the new ADP 6-22 with theories of influencing, guiding, and caring about opinions from others. Leadership for the Army should not be described in the ADP using theories and complex ideas about guiding others. This monograph will prove how past generals have used discipline, knowledge of their men, perseverance, and concise orders to lead men with success.

Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus also have found leaders spend a good deal of time with their employees, clients, other leaders, and consultants before developing a vision for their organization.⁹ They study the history of their organization to determine the reasons for past successes and failures; they study the present to determine current strengths, weaknesses, and

⁶ Warren G. Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders : strategies for taking charge*, 2nd ed. (New York: HarperBusiness, 1997).

⁷ *Management skills : a Jossey-Bass reader*, 1st ed., Jossey-Bass business & management series (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2005), 6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁹ Warren G. Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders : strategies for taking charge*.

resources; and they look to the future to identify possible long-term changes.¹⁰ Nanus also noted leaders then interpret this information and construct a realistic vision that fits the norms of the group and inspires followers to put forth more effort. This is an example of the style Marshall used during the interwar period to prepare the Army for the upcoming conflicts. Extraordinary leaders at every level communicate compelling visions.¹¹ This is exactly what General Marshall set out to do with FM 100-5 1939 chapter 3 and should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

Tom Peters tells us good managers are doers and his big five management areas address the following, what the business world of chaos are, create total customer responsiveness, pursue fast paced innovations, achieve flexibility by empowering people, learn to love change, and build systems for a world turned upside down.¹² His formula will help managers succeed with proactive performance in a chaotic world. The Army does not promote the use of the term management as defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary - the act or art of managing: the conducting or supervising of something (as a business). The Army does promote the use of leadership as defined in Merriam – Webster - a person who directs a military force or unit or a person who has commanding authority or influence. Management theories as discussed by Peters would confuse military leaders discussing terms of customer innovations and building systems. This is not material which should be included inside the new ADP 6-22.

Douglas McGregor taught management as “Theory X” and “Theory Y” models. Theory X is an authoritarian management style; McGregor explains the average person dislikes work and

¹⁰ Michael Z. Hackman and Craig E. Johnson, *Leadership : a communication perspective*, 4th ed. (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2004), 100.

¹¹ Flynn and Grigsby, "The Mission Command Center of Excellence: Driving Institutional Adaptability."

¹² Thomas J. Peters, *Thriving on chaos : handbook for a management revolution*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1987).

will avoid it he/she can.¹³ Therefore, most people must be forced with the threat of punishment to work. McGregor continues by noting, the average person prefers to be directed and tries to avoid responsibility, most are also relatively unambitious, and needs security above all else. Theory Y is a participative management style, were McGregor believes work is as natural as playing.¹⁴ Employees will apply self-control and self-direction in the pursuit of organizational objectives, without external control or the threat of punishment. Everyone is committed to objectives, and they accept and often seek responsibility. In industry, the intellectual potential of the average person is only partly utilized. Using human behavior research, he noted the way an organization runs depends on the beliefs of its managers.¹⁵ This is another example of how management theory does not apply to leadership in combat. It focuses on making money not surviving and winning campaigns. McGregor focuses on punishment to make men work. Discipline is necessary in leadership, however McGregor's style of leadership has not been practiced by America's most revered generals, and should not be included in the new ADP 6-22.

The U.S. Army learns in three ways: through experiences during combat; in training which replicates the challenge of war; and through doctrine backed by study. In the past, the Army has made the mistake of not writing down its experiences as they apply to leadership principles. As the Army transitions to peace time operations, the opportunity arises for the force to utilize the three ways it learns from the last 10 years of war, to find and articulate these leadership insights. Erwin Rommel once said, "...the British write some of the best doctrine in the world; it is fortunate their officers do not read it."¹⁶ The U.S. Army's transition to an ADP

¹³ Douglas McGregor and Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, *The human side of enterprise*, Annotated ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Force Development and Training for Army Doctrine Publications, *Army Doctrine Primer*,

style of manual should help avoid this type of criticism.

Doctrine is a set of beliefs or principles. It provides the force with a common basis for understanding, and the necessary fundamentals to succeed in combat. General J.F.C. Fuller once wrote, “the central idea of an army is known as its doctrine, which to be sound must be based upon principles of war, and which to be effective must be elastic enough to admit mutation in accordance with change in circumstance. In its ultimate relationship to human understanding this central idea or doctrine is nothing else than common sense – that is, action adapted to circumstance.”¹⁷ The Army doctrine affects how the army fights, how it is structured, and how the army prepares for the next conflict.¹⁸

John T. Nelsen II, in his work, concluded the challenges during an interwar period are monumental. General George Marshall agreed with his assessment.¹⁹ Today leaders, including General Martin Dempsey, former Army Chief and Staff and current Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs, understand that changes in the Army doctrine and leader development are necessary “...we must be able to learn and change faster than our future adversaries.”²⁰ General Dempsey promised in 2011 to emphasize leader development and to make it job number one.²¹ Doctrine is a key component to helping the Army learn from its experiences so leadership lessons are not lost. Doctrine helped to codify best practice based on enduring principles, examples from history and validated lessons from experience and operations.

(London: British Ministry of Defence 2011), i.

¹⁷ J. F. C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1926).

¹⁸ Flynn and Grigsby, "The Mission Command Center of Excellence: Driving Institutional Adaptability."

¹⁹ John T. Nelson, *General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army 1939-41*.

²⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Army Leader Development Strategy*, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2009), 1.

²¹ General Martin E. Dempsey, "Leader Development," *Army Magazine*, February 2011.

Professor Richard Holmes from the British Command and Staff College described doctrine as “an approved set of principles and methods, intended to provide large military organizations with a common outlook and a uniform basis for action.”²² The purpose of doctrine is to provide the Army with a framework for constructing combat to achieve a given purpose. Doctrine guides action by providing context for actions taken.

ADP or the former use of Field Manuals help the Army put doctrine in defined categories to help soldiers find pertinent information with clarity and speed. With the ongoing effort to limit the number of FM’s, there needs to be not only a clear definition of what an FM is, but also an explanation of what it is not. The U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has proposed the following definition: A Field Manual is a Department of the Army (DA) publication that contains doctrine principles, with supporting common tactics, techniques, and procedures that apply across the force and describes how the Army and its organizations operate while conducting operations and training for those operations.²³ With these definitions of doctrine, field manuals, and the understanding of the criteria laid out earlier. Then surveying some of the most revered generals in American military history should help give input to what should be included inside the new ADP for leadership.

This monograph uses a series of historical surveys to analyze the U.S Army’s evolution of leadership principles. This paper will also highlight these leadership styles and the maxims used by selected leaders. This monograph will also dissect FM 100-5 from 1939 and 1941 to learn how George Marshall explained leadership in preparation for WWII. This will be followed by recommendations for organizing a re-writing of FM 6-22 in ADP.

²² *Army Doctrine Primer*.

²³ Rich Burks and Ken Loudner, "How-To in Army Doctrine," *Army Space Journal* Fall Edition(2009).

Army Leadership Lessons

War must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have men of character activated by principles of honor.

George Washington Commander, Continental Army (1775-81), and President of the United States (1789-97)

General George Washington was an iconic example of enduring leadership qualities. Washington's strongest trait was his perseverance, or what is often referred to as grit.²⁴ From the founding of the Army, leaders learned quickly that subordinates were looking for well defined and easily understood principles – especially during combat.²⁵ General Washington taught his officers to be strict in their discipline and required nothing unreasonable of his officers and men, but punctual compliance to mission requirements.²⁶ Washington taught his officers to reward according to their merits, without partiality or prejudice, and punish with stern discipline. Washington understood discipline would be the backbone of his outnumbered and inexperienced Army. He realized his leadership principle if taught could produce an army able to win independence. Washington also believed if his leadership principles were taught correctly and given with clear and concise order's, it would bring success to his Army.²⁷

Washington suffered some devastating losses, but he endured. He approached a nearly impossible task to organize, train, equip, and lead what was at the time a militia-based force of about 16,000 men, against the greatest colonial power in the world, the British Army/Navy.

²⁴ Gerald M. Carbone, *Washington :Lessons in Leadership*, 1st ed., The Great Generals Series (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 188.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 189.

²⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Ernest L. Webb, "Properly Led, I Will Follow Anywhere," *Military Review* LX, no. 80 (1980).

²⁷ Lin Yihan, "George Washington - Leadership Case Study," Leadership with You, <http://www.leadership-with-you.com/index.html>.

Washington's troops in 1775 were inexperienced, underequipped, poorly trained, and faced a superior foe in nearly every respect. He took the Army during its greatest transition from citizen soldiers to professionals over the course of six years of continuous combat. Washington provided key traits for combat leadership with his determination, pursuit of excellence, reward by merit, discipline, and open communications with others.²⁸

General Washington's leadership traits demonstrate the criteria of principles of perseverance to overcome any obstacle and constantly pursue excellence while maintaining discipline in the harshest conditions is the example of leadership principles which should be included in ADP 6-22.

Rogers' Rangers -- commanded by Major Robert Rogers (1731-1795) -- was an Independent Company of Rangers formed from hunters and trappers experienced in fighting Indians in the woods of New Hampshire and Vermont. The term "Ranger" derives from a handful of mounted men paid to "range" between the forts marking the edge of settlement.²⁹ The unit trained using his unique maxims to conduct scouting and raiding missions. Major Rogers formed nine companies of rangers and "for their benefit and instruction reduced them into the following rules, or plans of discipline."³⁰

Rogers Standing Orders were 28 rules which Major Roberts deem to be the most important to have his Rangers succeed. For example, one of Rogers Standing Orders was "tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don't

²⁸ Carbone, *Washington :Lessons in Leadership*: viii.

²⁹ John R. Cuneo, *Robert Rogers of the rangers* (New York,: Oxford University Press, 1959), 41.

³⁰ Bruce Catton et al., *Grant, Lee, Lincoln and the Radicals* (USA: Northwestern University Press, 1964).

never lie to a Ranger or officer.”³¹ Roger’s maxim represented easily understandable concepts that easily translate for contemporary use.

Today’s 75th Rangers Regiment of the U.S. Army claim descent from this famous Rogers special operations unit. The current maxims used by the U.S. Army Rangers bear some resemblance to Rogers real Ranging Rules, but the Standing orders are a modern day creation which are still useful to see how maxims when used can make leadership principles useful.

STANDING ORDERS, ROGERS' RANGERS³²

MAJOR ROBERT ROGERS, 1759

- *Don't forget nothing.*
- *Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minute's warning.*
- *When you're on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first.*
- *Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don't never lie to a Ranger or officer.*
- *Don't never take a chance you don't have to.*
- *When we're on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can't go through two men.*
- *If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so it's hard to track us.*
- *When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us.*
- *When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.*
- *If we take prisoners, we keep 'em separate till we have had time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between 'em.*
- *Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed.*
- *No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a scout 20 yards ahead, 20 yards on each flank, and 20 yards in the rear so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out.*
- *Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force.*
- *Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries.*

³¹ Ranger Training Brigade, *Ranger Handbook SH 21-76 United States Army*, (Fort Benning, GA: United States Army Infantry School, 2011).

³² Major Robert Rogers, *Journal of Major Robert Rogers*, March of America Facsimile Series, Number 44 (Ann Arbor, MI: Univeristy Microfilms, Inc., 1765).

- *Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and Indians attack.*
- *Don't cross a river by a regular ford.*
- *If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your own tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.*
- *Don't stand up when the enemy's coming against you. Kneel down, lie down, hide behind a tree.*
- *Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch, then let him have it and jump out and finish him up with your hatchet.*

The 28 Rules above were the standing orders (field manual) of operation of his unit. Not all of Rogers Rules apply to leadership, but it was an example of how leaders in combat simplify their philosophy by using maxims. Major Rogers also taught his rangers values, for example ... “as leaders need to shepherd, and protect our families as the family leader and in terms of how we, as Christians, are called to a higher standard.”³³ This illustrates how he wanted his rangers to put their unit before themselves and hold themselves accountable for their actions just as God would. Roger’s rules as they apply to leadership helped him emplace discipline, honesty, initiative, focus on mission. These leadership principles from Major Roberts include discipline and how to give concise orders and should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

General Robert E. Lee, one of the most revered generals in the history of the United States, did not have a checklist, but he did teach maxims which he used to teach his subordinates. Lee had seven basic and universal rules³⁴

1. *Never underestimate your adversary*
2. *Try to know what your adversary is going to do before he knows what you are to do.*
3. *The offensive calls for surprise by inferior forces and for superior concentration at the critical point by equal forces.*

³³ Ranger Training Brigade, *Ranger Handbook*, (Fort Benning, GA: United States Army Infantry School, 2011).

³⁴ Douglas Southall Freeman and Stuart W. Smith, *Douglas Southall Freeman on leadership* (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1990).

4. *Every movement must be measured in terms of an early start, accurate staff work, the endurance of the troops, and the marching capacity of their leaders.*
5. *The commander must have a good eye for ground.*
6. *Always interpret strategy in terms of available position and line of march.*
7. *Know your subordinates.*

By being able to apply these rules, it allowed General Lee to never lose his cool.³⁵

Douglas Southall Freeman, one of Lee's biographers, stated Lee never asked his men to "needlessly sacrifice"³⁶ he always put them to the test, but it was never for "butchery or carelessness of his resources and men."³⁷ Douglas continued noting, Lee also applied these rules to understand his subordinates, this may sound simple, but he always knew how to handle each of his lieutenants. General Lee was fair, encouraged initiative and gave full credit to those who succeeded.³⁸

Douglas Southall Freeman believed General Lee ability to keep morale in his army was an important principle when it came to General Lee's leadership. He was able to "establish, reestablish, and maintain morale several times during the Civil War."³⁹ Lee was able to keep morale high because he followed his universal rules of leadership that were useful in combat. Lee demonstrated discipline, an understanding of his men and a concise way to present his principles and should be included in the new leadership doctrine.

General John J. Pershing always told everyone, "I was not born a leader; I was born a

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., 173.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

farmer in Missouri.”⁴⁰ General Pershing said you needed to have character and understanding to be a good leader. He tried to learn from every experience and then turned that knowledge into a good purpose. Professor of History Frank E. Vandiver wrote that Pershing understood people as the essence of leadership and the essence of understanding was education.⁴¹ General Pershing often said, “a leader had to have self-discipline and self-development, and if anyone can do combat leadership it will be the greatest leadership challenge any leader will face. There are the hazards of death, coupled with poor working conditions, and it may be the only leader activity where both followers and leaders would rather be somewhere else.”⁴²

In combat, a leader makes decisions based on unreliable information. If this is the case, the manual for leadership must be able to be easily understood. General Pershing rose to the level of General of the Armies because he had the capacity to learn from experiences and to practice what he learned,⁴³ this helped transform the U.S. Army doctrine for future generations. General Pershing helped mold the future leaders of World War II and shape the Army for the 20th Century.⁴⁴ Pershing’s lessons of self-discipline and development are characteristics which should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

General Douglas MacArthur’s principles of leadership are another example of how a leader can briefly explain what is expected from his subordinates to be successful.⁴⁵ General MacArthur’s principles were written during peacetime operations, but the Army still has to

⁴⁰ Professor of History Frank E. Vandiver, Rice University, *John J. Pershing and the Anatomy of Leadership*, ed. Department of the Air Force, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History Number Five (Colorado Springs: United States Air Force Academy, 1963).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Frank Everson Vandiver, *Black Jack : the life and times of John J. Pershing*, 1st ed., 2 vols. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977).

⁴³ Frank E. Vandiver, *John J. Pershing and the Anatomy of Leadership*.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ H Paul Jeffers and Alan Axelrod, *Marshall* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

function while not conducting combat operations and his principles focused on garrison activities are useful as well. His principles are a concise way for leaders to understand what should be expected from them.

- *Do I heckle my subordinates or strengthen and encourage them?*
- *Do I use moral courage in getting rid of subordinates who have proven themselves beyond doubt to be unfit?*
- *Have I done all in my power by encouragement, incentive, and spur to salvage the weak and erring?*
- *Do I know by NAME and CHARACTER a maximum number of subordinates for whom I am responsible? Do I know them intimately?*
- *Am I thoroughly familiar with the technique, necessities, objectives, and administration of my job?*
- *Do I lose my temper at individuals?*
- *Do I act in such a way as to make my subordinates WANT to follow me?*
- *Do I delegate tasks that should be mine?*
- *Do I arrogate everything to myself and delegate nothing?*
- *Do I develop my subordinates by placing on each one as much responsibility as he can stand?*
- *Am I interested in the personal welfare of each of my subordinates, as if he were a member of my family?*
- *Have I the calmness of voice and manner to inspire confidence, or am I inclined to irascibility and excitability?*
- *Am I a constant example to my subordinates in character, dress, deportment, and courtesy?*
- *Am I inclined to be nice to my superiors and mean to my subordinates?*
- *Is my door open to my subordinates?*
- *Do I think more of POSITION than JOB?*
- *Do I correct a subordinate in the presence of others?*

These questions/principles are uncomplicated – which is what makes them timeless and so much more useful than hundreds of pages of over-explained values. General MacArthur said “in the end, through the long ages of our quest for light, it will be found that truth is still mightier than the sword. For out of the welter of human carnage and human weal the indestructible thing that will always live is a sound idea.”⁴⁶ General MacArthur also believed, “It is easy, of course, to overemphasize the influence of machinery in war. It is man that makes war, not machines, and

⁴⁶ Les Brownlee and Peter J. Schoomaker, "Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capability," *Parameters* Summer 2004(2004).

the human element must always remain the dominant one. Weapons are nothing but tools and each has its distinctive limitations as well as its particular capabilities. Effective results can be obtained only when an army is skillfully organized and trained so as to supplement inherent weaknesses in one type of weapon by peculiar powers in others.”⁴⁷ General MacArthur focused his principles on the human dimension, and understanding your subordinates is one of the most important qualities a leader can have. He also understood leaders must be calm during times of duress, a constant example, and encouraging which are qualities which should be included in ADP 6-22.

From a peacetime philosophy and mindset back to combat focus, General George S. Patton was a hardened commander who knew what it took to survive and achieve victory in combat with effective leadership principles comprised of discipline, presence, and perseverance.⁴⁸ General Patton in a letter to his son at West Point described leadership “...as the one thing that wins battles. I have it – but I’ll be damned if I can define it. Probably it consists in knowing what you want to do and then doing it and getting mad if anyone steps in the way. Self-confidence and leadership are brothers.”⁴⁹ He won respect from his men by winning battles and this bonded him with his soldiers. Here is an example of “Patton’s Fighting Principles” taken from his letter of instruction issued to his Army before D-Day, on 6 March 1944.⁵⁰

- *Everyone was to “lead a person”*
- *A commander who failed to reach his objectives and who was not dead or severely wounded has not done his full duty*
- *Visit the front daily – to observe, not to meddle*
- *Praise is more valuable than blame*

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Owen Connelly, *On war and leadership : the words of combat commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 112.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 130.

⁵⁰ M2 Communications, "Leadership Now," M2 Communications, www.leadershipnow.com.

- *Your primary mission as a leader is to see with your own eyes and be seen by your troops while engaged in personal reconnaissance*
- *Persons who did not rest will not last*
- *Plans had to be simple and flexible*
- *Information is like eggs: the fresher the better*
- *Orders are to be short to tell what to do not how*
- *Tell the troops what they are going to do and what they have done*
- *Visit the wounded personally and frequently. Award decorations promptly*
- *If you do not enforce and maintain discipline, you are a potential murderer*
- *Men in condition do not tire*
- *Courage, don't make counsel of your fears*

General Patton summed it up suitably; every subordinate understood what a leader must do to be successful in his army – follow his leadership tenets. This information was presented in a memorandum format and distributed to all commands in combat. It was concise and easily understood by every soldier in his formation. Patton based this guidance off his study of war through history, which also made his leadership principles tested in combat. His focus of achieving the mission at all costs (perseverance), discipline, simple and flexible orders that left room for initiative are principles that should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

General George C. Marshall became the Chief of Staff of the Army in July 1939 at a time of great uncertainty throughout the world. Conflict seemed inevitable as Europe stood on the verge of war and Japan seemed bent on establishing hegemony in the Pacific. Marshall brought to his new job a sense of urgency and vision, which grew out of his experiences in World War I. He was shocked by America's unpreparedness for the war. A full year was required after Congress declared war before a trained army could be deployed to Europe. Because of the lack of quality peacetime training, casualties were needlessly excessive. Marshall determined to never allow America to be placed in this "ghastly situation" of an "almost criminal lack of proper preparation."⁵¹

⁵¹ Larry I. Bland, Sharon R. Ritenour, and Jr. Clarence Wunderlin, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol 2: We Cannot Delay: July 1, 1939 - December 7, 1941* (Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins

In September 1939, General George C. Marshall approved the Field Service Manual FM 100-5 Operations. This was the first time a single source was the principle war-fighting manual. This manual was heavily influenced by Clausewitz, but also based on the application of techniques of modern warfare since World War I.⁵² The bold changes in the FSR increased emphasis on the sociological and psychological considerations in war.⁵³ This is when General Marshall realized how important leadership on the battlefield was for his inexperienced Army in preparation for the upcoming war. He needed to show how Army leadership functioned with the ideas of duty, honor, and country.⁵⁴ General Marshall directed all field commanders for their comments on the new manual by 1 January 1941. With the war machine working overtime in Europe at this point, he realized this manual had to be easy to understand for all levels of leadership and was the first to take into account how leaders could articulate war and leadership with the theoretical elements of operational design for war. Chapter 3 emphasized how leadership should be applied in combat or virtually every aspect of warfare. This manual was highly intellectual but contained the collective experience and wisdom of the Army and its leaders from World War 1.⁵⁵

Marshall decided the Army needed a drastic change in doctrine. The importance of focusing doctrine on combined arms and combat in doctrine helped focus leadership principles for the first time.⁵⁶ “Scattered throughout history, we can see the wreckage of armies that learned

University Press, 1986).

⁵² Jörg Muth, *Command culture : officer education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the consequences for World War II*, 1st ed. (Denton, Tex.: University of North Texas Press, 2011).

⁵³ Kretchik, *U.S. Army doctrine : from the American Revolution to the War on Terror*: 144.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Department of the Army Headquarters, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations*, (Washington D.C. : Government Printing Office, 2001), 10-1 to 10-14.

⁵⁶ Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-65, "Leadership Statements and Quotes," ed.

nothing from their experiences or learned badly, or learned too late.”⁵⁷ FM 100-5 linked the accomplishment of the mission to the forces in the field.⁵⁸ During the interwar years, General Marshall attempted to digest the lessons of the conflicts from the past and issue them inside of FM 100-5. Marshall understood the problem of increasing the size of the active duty force and how that complicated teaching new recruits how to lead in harsh and uncertain conditions in combat.⁵⁹

“Army officers are intelligent. Give them the bare tree, let them supply the leaves.”⁶⁰ Leadership, written by General Marshall in 1939 in FM 100-5, Chapter 3, was that bare tree. Marshall uses maxims to guide his reader through what he expects from his officers and soldiers. Chapter 3 specifies what General Marshall expects from his Army as they prepare for combat in WW II, and lead men in combat. General Marshall’s easy to understand definitions and maxims help any individual comprehend his ideas, but he never tried to overstate or explain any principle or expectation. Marshall understood in combat, leaders need a tool (doctrine), which is easy and quick to digest and understand. General Marshall specified his model to assist leaders with the lessons he learned from history, his mentors, and during World War I.

General Marshall believed values and professionalism went hand in hand. Leaders had to be good stewards of American values and professionals on and off the battlefield. He instituted these values inside of Field Manual 101-5, published in 1939 and 1941. These manuals took a new step forward and helped for the first time influence officer and soldiers how to lead men in

Headquarters Department of the Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1985).

⁵⁷ Roger J. Spiller, "In the Shadow of the Dragon: Doctrine and the U.S. Army after Vietnam," *RUSI Journal*, no. December (1997): 42.

⁵⁸ Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, *The challenge of change : military institutions and new realities, 1918-1941*, Studies in war, society, and the military (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2000), 181.

⁵⁹ Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Field Service Regulations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), 21.

⁶⁰ 600-65, "Leadership Statements and Quotes," 11.

combat. Chapter three became the example for all soldiers to strive for in training and combat in preparations for combat, and by doing so, General Marshall saved lives.

General George Marshall, after WW I, noted that American success came from the courage of the individual leader and soldier and not by the "soundness" of centralized leadership doctrine.⁶¹ The relatively short duration of the U.S. Army's involvement in World War I prevented the development of leadership experiences similar to the Civil War.

General Marshall attempted to correct the mistakes of WW I, of not having the Army ready for combat, by installing initiative and leadership concepts into the Army's doctrine. This effort is illustrated in the 1939 and 1941, FM 100-5 which incorporated the ideas from the 1936 German manual the *Truppenfuhrung* "Command of Troops" from the German Army in 1936.⁶² Here is a passage from the *Truppenfuhrung*: The advance of technology notwithstanding, the role of the individual remains decisive. His significance has been further enhanced by the dispersion characteristic of modern warfare. The emptiness of the battlefield demands independently thinking and acting fighters who exploit each situation in a considered, determined, and bold way. They must be thoroughly conscious of the fact that only results matter.⁶³

This is from FM 100 – 5 1941 Chapter 3 written by General Marshall. "In spite of the advances in technology, the worth of the individual man is still decisive. Every individual must be trained to exploit a situation with energy and boldness and must be imbued with the idea that success will depend upon his initiative and action...a willingness to accept responsibility is the foremost trait of leadership. Every individual from the highest commander to the lowest private

⁶¹ Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General*: 250.

⁶² Martin Van Creveld, *Fighting power : German and US Army performance, 1939-1945*, Contributions in military history, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 28.

⁶³ Ibid.

must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure, than an error in judgment in the action taken.”⁶⁴

Martin van Creveld demonstrated entire sentences were clearly lifted straight from the German regulations but the overall effect is subtly different and, indeed, indicative of a dissimilar conception of the nature of war.⁶⁵ General Marshall’s concept was different in that he focused on teamwork and unit cohesion by tying it all back into leadership.⁶⁶ His focus on the individual changed the leadership position of the Army. He believed success in combat required quality leadership.⁶⁷

Marshall felt an urgent need to improve the Army’s readiness to fight a modern war. His problem included antiquated weapons, materiel, and doctrine from the last war.⁶⁸ Marshall’s plan to prepare the Army was to capture what had been accomplished in the past and create an environment focused on one thing – war. Marshall told his new officers reporting to the War department as early as the summer of 1939 they should consider their jobs “as war assignments” and “approach their problems as if they were at war.”⁶⁹ This meant all reports, doctrine, and studies should be concise, frank, and straightforward, just as in combat.⁷⁰ Marshall was also concerned with inefficiency within the Army during this period. He wanted his officers and

⁶⁴ Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Field Service Regulations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1941), 100.

⁶⁵ Van Creveld, *Fighting power : German and US Army performance, 1939-1945*: 32-33.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁶⁷ Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General*: 254.

⁶⁸ John T. Nelson, *General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army 1939-41*: 1.

⁶⁹ George C. Marshall, Forrest C. Pogue, and Larry I. Bland, *George C. Marshall : interviews and reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, Rev. ed. (Lexington, Va.: G.C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991), 310-11.

⁷⁰ John T. Nelson, *General George C. Marshall: Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army 1939-41*: 56.

leaders to react rapidly and thoroughly in combat.⁷¹

Chapter 3 begins with General Marshall's focus on the human dimension of leadership "leadership is based on the knowledge of men"⁷² Marshall explains with simplicity, what any leader should focus on to lead men in combat, but also with a deeper meaning of how the Army should command and lead. Understanding soldiers does not mean leaders require medical or psychiatric degrees. It means men are the most powerful weapons the Army has to accomplish the mission. Marshall continues by saying, "man is the fundamental instrument in war; other instruments may change but he remains relatively constant."⁷³ Marshall understands from his experiences in World War I, without understanding the human dimension of his men, their culture, and how they react to certain circumstances you cannot be a successful leader in combat.

He continues with the theme of understanding by using another maxim "to gain confidence, the leader must find the way to the hearts of his men. This he will do by acquiring an understanding of their thoughts and feelings, and by showing a constant concern for their comfort and welfare."⁷⁴ Again, he focuses on men and how to deeply understand your most valuable weapon is to gain intimate knowledge of them. By doing this, the leader will better comprehend how to use each soldier to the best of his ability when under the harshest conditions in combat. This is very similar to General MacArthur's "Do you know the Names and Characters of all your subordinates?" This is applied in more of a setting for combat instead of a peacetime approach.

Line number 103 from FM 100-5 1941 is another example of how such a few thoughts can have such a great influence on the Army. "Troops are strongly influenced by the example and conduct of their leaders. A leader must have superior knowledge, will power, self-confidence,

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² *Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Field Service Regulations*, 97.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ *Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Field Service Regulations*, 104.

initiative, and disregard of self. Any show of fear or unwillingness to share danger is fatal to leadership. On the other hand, a bold and determined leader will carry his troops with him no matter how difficult the enterprise. Mutual confidence between the leader and his men is the surest basis of discipline in an emergency.”⁷⁵ Marshall is informing his army they must have a thorough knowledge of history and tactics, strong will, able to take the initiative, and put their soldiers first. Marshall is implying to properly use your best weapon you must understand every aspect of it. Leaders need to be learning at all times to improve themselves and their organization at any level.

Marshall then explains by getting to know your soldiers, it allows leaders to see their point of view. It also allows them to teach in their intent and purpose, which allows them to transmit instructions to all levels below. Marshall’s approach is not new – it is fundamental leadership. These foundational concepts are the bedrock of leadership and reflect Washington, Lee, and Patton and the German manual *Truppenfuhrung*.⁷⁶ General Patton believed the elusive secret to leadership and military success is the soul, genius, and personality.⁷⁷ This is very similar to General Lee’s last rule “know your subordinates,” which is why these maxims are time tested and proven in combat.

Marshall continues in paragraph 104 in the 1941 version of FM 100-5 chapter 3, “it is essential that he (leader) know from personal contact the mental, moral, and physical state of his troops, the conditions with which they are confronted, their accomplishments, their desires, and their needs.”⁷⁸ Desires are an interesting term for Marshall to use for leaders in combat, Merriam-

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Van Creveld, *Fighting power : German and US Army performance, 1939-1945*.

⁷⁷ General George S. Patton Jr., "Success in War," *Military Essays and Articles by George S. Patton, Jr. General, U.S. Army 02605, 1885-1945* 1931, 335.

⁷⁸ *Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Field Service Regulations*, 104.

Webster defines desires as “to long or hope for.” Once again, he emphasizes the importance of understanding your best weapon, in an easy, clarified manner for the Army. This can also be taken from General Patton’s memo to his army “visit the front daily...tell them what they are doing and what they have done”⁷⁹ said in a different way, but both are easy to understand what is important in combat.

FM 100-5 1941 continues to use Marshall’s lessons learned from combat experiences and history in the form of maxims. “Leading troops in combat, regardless of the echelon of command, calls for cool and thoughtful leaders with a strong feeling of the great responsibility imposed upon them. They must be resolute and self-reliant in their decisions, energetic and insistent in execution, and unperturbed by the fluctuations of combat.”⁸⁰

General Marshall understood initiative was important in combat, as leaders of today have witnessed during ten years of constant combat. Marshall believed every organization should maintain high standards of military conduct and performance of duty without destroying the initiative of the individual. “A leader must have superior knowledge, will power, self-confidence, initiative, and disregard of self.”⁸¹ This again can be taken from examples from General Washington – “discipline is the backbone of the Army”⁸² – General Lee – “Try to know what your adversary is going to do before he knows what you are to do.”⁸³

Marshall’s language may be outdated, but his meaning remains relevant. When leading large organizations leaders affect so many with their decisions and influence. FM 100-5 in three pages prepared leaders to train and fight in the largest army ever assembled during World War II.

⁷⁹ General George S. Patton Jr., "Success in War."

⁸⁰ *Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Field Service Regulations*, 102.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 103.

⁸² Carbone, *Washington :Lessons in Leadership*: 188.

⁸³ Freeman and Smith, *Douglas Southall Freeman on leadership*: 164.

General Marshall's ability to be brief, yet highly intellectual in his thoughts makes his manual useful for combat. He used his experiences in World War I to help mold what was needed in battle for World War II. He understood exactly how to influence his leaders and inculcated it through doctrine so that any leader had access for use in combat. Although technology has changed in 70 years the most important weapon in combat has not. Developing leaders who can perform in combat under the worst conditions should be the goal for any leader. It has been proven over time, maxims based on sound and proven leadership principles are easy to understand and useful in combat. General Marshall's leadership principles in Chapter 3 of FM 100-5 incorporate discipline, perseverance, knowledge of men, and how to use simple and concise orders and should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

General Bruce C. Clarke, former commander of U.S. Army Europe from 1958-1960 also had combat experience in World War II and Korea, also believed the ultimate weapon of any war of the future is the ground combat soldier, whom he regarded as "the only weapon in our arsenal who knows no limit or offers no bounds."⁸⁴ General Clarke was renowned for his teaching of combat leadership; General Eisenhower said, "The Army has had two great trainers – Von Steuban and Bruce Clarke."⁸⁵ He produced many maxims, which carried on the traditions of Marshall, for example: What Soldiers expect from their Leaders:

- Honest, just, and fair treatment
- Consideration due them as mature, professional soldiers
- Personal interest take in them as individuals
- Loyalty
- Shielding from harassment from "higher up
- The best in leadership
- That their needs be anticipated and provided for
- All the comforts and privileges practicable

⁸⁴ General Bruce C. Clarke, "General Bruce C. Clarke: A Study in Leadership and Training," ed. Missouri U.S. Army Training Center Engineer and Fort Leonard Wood (MO,1980), ii.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 26.

- To be kept oriented and told the ‘reason why’
- A well-thought-out program of training, work and recreation
- Clear-cut and positive decisions and orders which are not constantly changing
- Demands on them commensurate with their capabilities – not too small, not too great
- That their good work be recognized, and publicized when appropriate

This is very similar to General Marshall’s FM 100-5 Chapter 3 in 1941, General Clarke took one step further and reduced it to bullet comments with some maxims mixed in. This product is still universal, to the point, clear and easily understood.

General Clarke’s subordinates in 1963 put together a pamphlet, which compiled all of his thoughts, philosophies, and stories of leadership and command. Clarke believed the combat commander (leader) should remember battle is fought for “real money and for keeps”⁸⁶ Clarke stated the leader must master his techniques, expand his knowledge, exhibit a fine example of stamina and courage and always set the proper example.⁸⁷ Clarke’s style of presenting information is again similar to FM 100-5 1941 because Clarke emphasized the human element of leadership as the most important element. These traits of leadership of understanding your men and using concise orders should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore, a veteran of the Korean War who commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry in Vietnam, the “Garry Owen,” George Armstrong Custer’s regiment. In 1965, his unit was the first to fight North Vietnamese regulars in the bloody battle in the Ia Drang Valley, has four principles of conduct in battle for leaders:⁸⁸

1. “Three strikes and you’re NOT out!” A leader can either inspire confidence in his unit – or contaminate the environment and his unit with his attitude and actions.
 - Must be visible on the battlefield

⁸⁶ General Bruce C. Clarke, "Guidelines for the Commander," ed. U.S. Army (U.S. Army, 1963), 9.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Connelly, *On war and leadership : the words of combat commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf*: 214.

- Exhibit determination
 - Will to Win
 - Remain calm and cool
 - Show no fear
 - Ignore the noise of war (Dust, smoke, explosions, screams and yell of the wounded and dead. That is all normal)
 - Never give a hint of uncertainty
2. “There is always one more thing you can do to influence any situation in your favor and after that, one more thing – and after that, one more – etc. etc.”
- What are you doing that you should be doing?
3. “When there is nothing wrong – there’s nothing wrong except – THERE’S NOTHING WRONG! That is exactly when a leader must be most alert.
4. “Trust your instincts.”
- They are products of your education, training, reading, personality and experience
 - When seconds count instincts come into play, act fast impart confidence and don’t second guess

General Moore’s leadership tenets of discipline, understanding of his men are clear, concise, and remaining calm under pressure should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army from 1979–1983, led a charge for “a back to basics charge” to leadership in 1980.⁸⁹ He stated leadership is a process, which can be intuitive because soldiers and officers have to be framed and molded in character.⁹⁰ He believed leadership meant the Army had to focus on the essentials and cornerstones of the principles established and proven. Combat brings harsh conditions and risk to resources, without a true understanding of the core leadership elements that are simply defined, could cause the Army to go down a path of destruction.⁹¹ Meyer wrote about how General Bradley defined applying leadership for combat “just as the diamond requires three properties for its formation— carbon, heat, and pressure—successful leaders require the interaction of three properties—character, knowledge, and application. Like carbon to the diamond, character is the basic quality of the

⁸⁹ General U.S. Army Edward C. Meyer, "Leadership: A Return to Basics," *Military Review* LX, no. July NO. 7 (1980).

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

leader . . . But as carbon alone does not create a diamond, neither can character alone create a leader. The diamond needs heat. Man needs knowledge, study and preparation . . . The third property, pressure—acting in conjunction with carbon and heat—forms the diamond. Similarly, one’s character attended by knowledge, blooms through application to produce a leader.⁹²

The Army has to reevaluate its application of leadership principles in doctrine for easier use in combat.⁹³ General Meyers noted, “. . .the Army needed to have a renaissance in the art and practice of leadership because the country could not suffer through the same agonies a future mobilization which time permitted us to correct in the ramp up for WWII.”⁹⁴ World War II highlighted many problems with leadership in the ramp up for combat “lack of basic leadership in many units, and some inept command leadership by officers in high rank”⁹⁵ put a spotlight on the Army in 1940. Meyer was trying to avoid having the same leadership issues General Marshall was dealing with in 1939.

He also believed the lack of leadership was a serious concern, and could be solved easily by drawing on several contemporary leadership theories and principles from the leaders of the past, which have been proven in combat.⁹⁶ General Meyers said, “Honesty, loyalty, courage, self-confidence, humility, and self-sacrifice are characters engrained in our consciousness.”⁹⁷ These principles General Meyer were searching for are the same leaders have proven in the past and should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

⁹² General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, "Leadership," *Parameters* Winter(1972): 7; Edward C. Meyer, "Leadership: A Return to Basics."

⁹³ General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, "Leadership: A Return to Basics."

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁹⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Marvin A. Kreidberg and First Lieutenant Merton G Henry, "Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945," ed. Department of the Army (Washington D.C.1956), 606.

⁹⁶ Edward C. Meyer, "Leadership: A Return to Basics," 7.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

In 1981 the Marine Corps published a pamphlet titled *Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders*, it was originally published during World War II and distributed Corps-wide as an official training guide by Lieutenant General A. A. Vandegrift, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. The Director of the U.S. Marine Corp in 1981, D. M Twomey, noted this “contained in pure form the formula for positive combat leadership. The essence of its fundamentals applies both on and off the field of battle to all leaders, regardless of rank, specialty, or duty assignment. I commend these truths to your careful study. Failure to follow them can cost your professional credibility in peacetime and, in war, the lives of those dependent upon your leadership.”⁹⁸ These principles of leadership were formulated from experience in the Solomon Islands Area and were prepared to help the rest of the Corps understand what leadership in combat consisted of. The Marines had 41 principles, focused on es spirit de corps, discipline, loyalty, temperament, clear orders, and training.⁹⁹ These principles meet the criteria of having discipline, clear and concise orders, and perseverance and therefore should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, former commander of Third United States Army, noted in 1980 the leadership philosophy the Army produced did not change much over the last 40 years.¹⁰⁰ General Ulmer conducted a leadership survey for the Army in 2004. The study isolated behaviors, derived from the Army leadership doctrine, and tried to synthesize them for the Army.¹⁰¹ General Ulmer and his team concluded twelve behaviors validated by officers returning from combat theater and selected those twelve behaviors as the most important factors for leader

⁹⁸ Commandant LtGen A. A. Vandegrift, U.S. Marine Corps, "Battle Doctrine for Front Line Leaders," ed. United States Marine Corps (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Development and Education Center, 1981).

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Major General Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "Notes on Leadership for the 80s," *Military Review* LX, no. July, NO 7 (1980): 10.

¹⁰¹ Frank E. Vandiver, *John J. Pershing and the Anatomy of Leadership*; *ibid.*

success in combat.¹⁰² These leadership traits were referred to as the “BIG 12” and they were sent to the Army Chief of Staff to help define the differences between a “good” and a “bad” leader.

“BIG 12”

- Keeps cool under pressure
- Clearly explains missions, standards, and priorities
- Sees the big picture; provides context and perspective
- Can make tough, sound decisions on time
- Adapts quickly to new situations and requirements
- Sets high standards without a “zero defects” mentality
- Can handle “bad news.”
- Coaches and gives useful feedback to subordinates
- Sets a high ethical tone; demands honest reporting
- Knows how to delegate and not “micromanage”
- Builds and supports teamwork within staff and among units
- Is positive, encouraging, and realistically optimistic

These are the traits leaders look were looking when leading men and women in combat, not a long drawn out vignette or definition, which takes two to three pages to define.¹⁰³ Leaders need resources they can draw upon quickly to refresh and use on a moment’s notice. “The last few decades have taken leadership instruction and clouded it in academic obscurity-theories, grids, continuums and even touchy-feely exploration. Ask a young officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) what leadership means and you get an abstract, impersonal response. The Army has lost sight of what leadership in the Army is all about. It is time we got back to basics.”¹⁰⁴ General Ulmer’s concepts and the “Big 12” again highlight tenets and qualities of leadership of calmness, clear and concise orders, perseverance, and being an example which should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

General Schoomaker, former Army Chief of Staff and the honorable R.L. Brownlee,

¹⁰² Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, "Leader Behavior: How to Identify Good Leaders," *Armor* 2006.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

former Secretary of the Army, gave strategic guidance on developing a campaign guide for Army leaders in 2005. They stated the Army must adapt and try to eliminate irrelevant policies, processes, and doctrines during this transition from war.¹⁰⁵ The U.S. Army must continue to produce combat ready leaders prepared to lead men at a moment's notice, and give them a document which can be used easily in combat.¹⁰⁶ Doctrine must support a strategy to operate in a dynamic environment, and it must adaptive to work in today's battlefields. "Our enemies – regular and irregular – will be well armed, well trained, well equipped, and often ideologically inspired. We must overmatch their training and the development of our leaders. They will be patient, and they will adapt.¹⁰⁷ Speed and adapting in combat is what gives the Army its competitive edge on the enemy. "We must learn faster, understand better, and adapt more rapidly."¹⁰⁸ Understanding the Army must be able to adapt more quickly than its adversaries. It must also learn easily on the move, which were the same ideas, and values General Marshall used in 1939 in FM 100-5, Chapter 3. The new ADP 6-22 will establish the Army's leadership doctrine and the fundamentals, which all leaders should accomplish for their mission and their soldiers.

Dr. Francis J. Harvey former Secretary of the Army said leaders in this century need to be pent-athletes, multi-skilled leaders who can thrive in uncertain and complex operating environments... innovative and adaptive leaders who are expert in the art and science of the profession of arms. The Army needs leaders who are decisive, innovative, adaptive, culturally

¹⁰⁵ Commander General Frederick M. Franks, Training and Doctrine Command, "CGSC Student Briefing," (Fort Leavenworth: CGSC, 1994).

¹⁰⁶ Peter J. Schoomaker and R.L. Brownlee, "Our Army at War - Relevant and Ready... Today and Tomorrow. A game Plan for Advancing Army Objectives in FY05 and Beyond," *Thinking Strategically*, 28 October 2004.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ *Army Leader Development Strategy*, 5.

astute, effective communicators and dedicated to life-long learning.¹⁰⁹ The secretary used adaptive twice in his remarks and it's used several more times throughout FM 6-22. Merriam-Webster dictionary defines "adapt" as "to make fit (as for a specific new use or situation), often by modification. Leaders must be able to embrace change created by the environment they are operating in.

After 10 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is once again going through another transition and leaders are already speaking up to ensure the Army captures the lessons learned. In early 2012, General Raymond T. Odeirno, former Commander of 4th Infantry Division, Commander of all forces in Iraq, and the current Chief of Staff of the Army, introduced his intent and vision for the Army. He referred to it as his *Marching Orders*; General Odeirno defined his intent, priorities, principles, and his leader expectations.¹¹⁰ He was able to develop in eight bullets exactly what a leader must do to fulfill his vision for the Army. The leader expectations are:

- Have a vision and lead change
- Be your formation's moral and ethical compass
- Learn, think, and adapt
- Balance risk and opportunity to retain the initiative
- Build agile, effective, high performing teams
- Empower subordinates and underwrite risk
- Develop bold, adaptive, and broadened leaders
- Communicate – up, down, and laterally; tell the whole story

In eight short and concise bullets, the Chief of Staff of the Army was able to illustrate exactly what he expected for his leaders. This is a great example of how soldiers and leaders expect from a leadership manual to prepare them for combat and all of General Odeirno leader

¹⁰⁹ Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 6-22 Army Leadership*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 2-4, Figure 2-2.

¹¹⁰ Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odeirno, "Marching Orders, 38th Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, America's Force of Decisive Action ", ed. United States Army (Washington D.C.: United States Army, 2012).

expectations are very similar to the leaders of the past that have been proven and should be included in the new ADP 6-22.

Conclusion

“You give a good leader very little and he will succeed; you give mediocrity a great deal and they will fail. This is illustrated everywhere...It depends on leadership.”¹¹¹
General George C. Marshall

The new ADP 6-22 should include the lessons of leadership principles from the leaders throughout the history of the Army that are proven in history from the great leaders. General George Marshall designed the template in 1939 in FM 100-5, chapter 3, and can be repeated with the new ADP 6-22. The ability to use maxims, which have been proven effective over time, is how the new ADP should be formed.

General John J. Pershing believed leadership as an art, which is why so many senior Army leaders recognize leadership as difficult to teach and understand. Teaching virtues and values is a hard concept to grasp for soldiers. The Army’s advantage is the number of great examples worth examining from the past. The Army needs to examine past success of leaders with an in-depth microscope so it can understand how these great men have affected the path of the Army. With the use of past leader’s principles to lay the ground work in an easy to understand format which then can easily be used to teach leadership. This would ensure future generations of leaders are not searching for answers, which have already been studied, tested, and confirm in the harshest conditions during combat.¹¹²

Today the Army has the ability to teach future leaders the key elements of leadership that

¹¹¹ U.S. Army Major Bohdan Prehar, "Teaching Leadership in the 1980s: "Back to Basics", "*Military Review* LX, no. 80 (1980).

¹¹² *Field Manual (FM) 6-22 Army Leadership*, 7-1.

are easily defined. From the experiences learned from leaders since its inception. General John M. Schofield figured this out in the late 1800s, so why is the Army's doctrine today still long and confusing for combat? There are no tricks or gimmicks, and in the watchwords of General Schofield, "...the Army should avoid losing its perspective of what is important to leaders. In reflecting for a moment on reasons why most people chose the Army as a profession, most of them realize leading people has much to do with their decision. It was leading which influenced us. Some of the most satisfying moments came as mentors help develop subordinates. It is especially important, as leaders progress through the second half of their career, to continue developing those who will follow us."¹¹³ If we can follow General Schofield's advice we can capture the last 10 years of lessons learned in combat combined with the great leaders from America's past and have a leadership manual which can prepare future leaders based on the principles which have been proven.

General C. B. Gates, like Marshall, a veteran of the fighting during the First World War and recipient of both The Navy Cross and two awards of the Army Distinguished Service Cross, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, believed that "leadership is intangible, hard to measure and difficult to describe. Its qualities would seem to stem from many factors. But certainly they must include a measure of inherent ability to control and direct, self-confidence based on expert knowledge, initiative, loyalty, pride, and a sense of responsibility. ...They are not easily taught or easily learned. But leaders can be made and are made."¹¹⁴ This is an example of the leadership theories, which will be discussed since they apply to combat and how doctrine if done correctly can help prepare leaders for combat.

¹¹³ The Center fo Consciousness Research and Transformation, "Leadership and the Military: George C. Patton," <http://thec crt.com/>.

¹¹⁴ S. L. A. Marshall and United States. Dept. of Defense., *The officer as a leader*, 1st ed. (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1966), 236.

The Army develops doctrine manuals so any soldier from general to private can pick it up and understand exactly the lesson or information in the manual. The Army has to take its own advice in this situation and adapt its leadership manual for the organization and situations it leaders must excel in combat. If leaders are going to be adaptive and have the ability to train others, they must understand the fundamentals of the doctrine of leadership and be able to refer to it quickly without painfully reading hundreds of pages. An adaptable leader has the ability to recognize any changes in his environment, identify the new situation and trigger the changes necessary to exploit success. The United States Army is paid to win land wars, with capable and competent leaders. The new ADP has to use the leadership principles which have been proven from the revered leaders from the past.

General Robert W. Cone, Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, informed the Army at a Combined Arms Symposium that the Army is “approaching a strategic transition ... we have to lay the groundwork for this future force –the Army of 2020.”¹¹⁵ He also noted, the Army should remember it has not always transitioned successfully after wars in the past.¹¹⁶ Cone acknowledges that doctrine will be the driving change to training and maintaining the lessons from combat to continue to build for the future from the past.¹¹⁷ The Army has to find the right balance of focusing on the current fights as we learn and implement the lessons of the 10 years of war... to help the Army through the next transition.¹¹⁸

In the Army, leaders help their followers reach difficult goals and complete arduous tasks. People in such an environment cannot be managed as defined in business theories; they

¹¹⁵ General Robert W. Cone, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Laying the Groundwork for the Army of 2020," *Association of the United States Army*, no. No. 11-2 (2011).

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

must be led in combat in order to survive. Under terrible conditions, successful combat leaders build and lead amazing organizations, which get things done to achieve the mission. Such a doctrine is more playbook than textbook, and like any playbook, it is merely a gateway to decision, not a roadmap.¹¹⁹ Leadership can be taught and emulated from the success of mentors and leaders from different eras. The Army has the best pool of resources to choose from using maxims and time tested leadership principles which are proven and easily applied in future conflicts.

In 2009, the Army introduced a new way to look at doctrine with the “Doctrine 2015” concept. Since the Army has agreed to design Field Manuals with an emphasis on usefulness and the context of the narrative over length, they have the same opportunity General George Marshall had in 1939 to impose the proper structure of leadership for the next generation of soldiers. The Army must not focus only on the last ten years; it has hundreds of examples where outstanding leadership excelled in combat. This initiative is long overdue and needed, but leadership has to be focused like General Marshall example in 1939. All ADPs can be no more than 10 pages, which is perfect for any leader who is preparing or conducting combat operations. There have been several updates in leadership doctrine since 1941, none as efficient or as proven for combat leadership as General Marshall’s example in 1939 and 1941.

In 1899, the Secretary of the Army Elihu Root stated, “The machine (Army) today is defective; it needs improvement; it ought to be improved.”¹²⁰ Although today’s Army is not defective, leaders in 1939-41 had much more operational experience with combat and specifically with leadership in combat, much like today’s leaders. Their ideas were helpful for the leaders

¹¹⁹ Connelly, *On war and leadership : the words of combat commanders from Frederick the Great to Norman Schwarzkopf*: 127-28.

¹²⁰ Kretchik, *U.S. Army doctrine : from the American Revolution to the War on Terror*: 151.

who prepared and fought in Europe to defeat the Nazi Regime. The Army has come to the crossroads yet again; leaders have operational experience, which cannot be lost to future warriors. One of the major lessons from the interwar period leaders do not have time to sift through a manual hundreds of pages long. The doctrine initiative has taken the first steps but using maxims and analogies from past leaders, which has been proven in combat to capture the lessons of the past, so the future leaders can take the baton and carry it to the finish line. Soldiers deserve a manual which is designed with the theoretical elements of operational design for war, and which is highly intellectual but contained the collective experience and wisdom of the Army from the past and the last 10 years of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Chief of Staff of the Army just released a document “Decisive Action” and he defined his leadership principles in an easily defined and holistic form.

George C. Marshall was determined to set right the wrongs he had experienced when a woefully unprofessional army and officer corps went to World War I, which caused an unparalleled number of American casualties in only nineteen months of war. In his view and it can be stated now he made a historically correct assessment, the inadequacy of many American officers came from their advanced ages, inflexibility of mind, and lack of modern and practical training.¹²¹ The Army cannot make the same mistakes of the past. Non-commissioned officers and officers revert to maxims based on General Marshall’s principles, because they are easy to understand and useful in combat. Doctrine is the driver of change for the Army, which will allow these new/old leadership concepts and principles to structure of the force for future combat operations.

The Doctrine 2015 initiative presented the perfect time to design a new leadership manual that encompasses the examples of revered leaders and the enduring lessons of leadership.

¹²¹ Ibid., 109.

These lessons should include values of honesty and loyalty, which were proven by General Lee and General Pershing. The new ADP should include a focus on the human dimension – understanding your men are the most important weapon system in the United States Army, like the *Tupperfuhring* and Marshall's FM 100-5, and General Bruce Clarke's philosophies. General Patton's orders of being an example displaying calmness, mimic those from Lieutenant General Hal Moore. These are the concepts of leadership the Army must replicate, there is no need to be original, and the ideas from the past are proven and are still relevant. The Army has the chance, like Marshall did in 1939 to be the shining example for all to live by and by create a new leadership manual that can save lives and create leadership principles for the Army to strive for. Leaders deserve a new leadership publication that can prepare future leaders for the next conflict that is based on principles, which are time tested and proven.

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