


Political Participation and the United States Army Officer Corps

by

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United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY OFFICER CORPS

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Many people believe the Army has always had an ideological firewall between officers' professional behavior and politics. This is not the case. Throughout its history the Army has vacillated between periods of political activity and abstention on the part of its officers. Despite George Washington's example, officers in the first half of the 19th Century openly participated in politics while in uniform. Following the Civil War, the Army underwent a period of reform led by General William T. Sherman, Major General Emory Upton and Secretary of War Elihu Root. During that period any political participation by serving officers became taboo. With the end of World War II and the advent of the All Volunteer Army, the officer corps entered a hybrid period where political activity in uniform was forbidden but participation as a private citizen was allowed and often encouraged. This paper examines the topic of political participation by officers within a historical context, assesses what level of participation is acceptable today and offers recommendations to address current trends.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY OFFICER CORPS

Upon entering the formal Mall Entrance of the Pentagon, one immediately sees the names of the signers of the Declaration of Independence who also served in the Army during the American Revolution. As you move up the formal stair case to the offices of the Army's senior leaders, the preamble of the Constitution, the Army colors, and all of the Army's battle streamers follow the 'soldier-signers' signatures. At the top of the staircase is a copy of the famous painting by John Trumball of George Washington resigning his commission as Commander-in-Chief to Congress on December 23rd, 1783. The choice of decoration for the formal staircase was made by General George Casey, the 36th Army Chief of Staff.¹ He intended to convey two messages to visitors. The first message is that the history and fates of the Army and nation are interwoven. The second message is the fundamental concept of military subservience to civilian authority in the United States.

The second message, subservience of the military, is a fundamental tradition protecting democracy in the United States. History is replete with examples of democracies destroyed by the direct involvement of the military in political matters. As a result, it is a commonly held belief that the American officer corps has always gone out of its way to maintain a politically neutral stance, fulfilling the non-partisan role of the faithful servant to the nation as a whole. History shows this is not the case; the way officers interpret the acceptability of political involvement has changed over the last two centuries. Recent developments in communications technology coupled with changes brought about by the All-Volunteer Army appear to be causing a shift in what is deemed

to be acceptable and necessitates a review of Department of Defense policies regarding political activities by members of the military.

The Early Years of the Republic

Most Americans believe the military has always been a politically neutral body. In reality, it was common for Army officers to actively participate in politics for the first hundred years of the republic. In 1801, the chief clerk of the War Department compiled a list of all 256 officers in the Army, along with their political affiliations, in order to help decide which 86 officers would be released from duty as part of President Jefferson's effort to draw down the force.² Even though Jefferson did not use the list to eliminate political enemies in the Army³, it shows how common political affiliation was at the time and that it was considered to be acceptable despite the youth and vulnerability of the nation.

The Army's development in the early years of the republic was markedly different than what was happening in Europe at the time. While the Napoleonic Wars caused European armies to grow to massive sizes, the United States Army remained small and unprofessional in nature. There was an antipathy toward standing armies in the United States, and they were seen as an existential threat to the security of the state.⁴ By extension, professional military officers did not hold the same position of trust that officers enjoy today.

Although distinguished service during wartime was a political asset in the early 19th Century,⁵ a professional military career was often a hindrance. Because virtually all politicians of the era were landowners, most politicians held militia commissions.⁶ As a result it was common for candidates for office to have served in the Army but professional soldiers could be seen as a threat.

The 1852 presidential election between Franklin Pierce and Winfield Scott serves as a good example of this concept. Both Pierce and Scott served as generals in the Mexican War but only Scott was a career officer. Pierce's military service fit within a larger career that included terms in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. During the election, Scott was "attacked for his military formality; his war record and mercenary motives were contrasted unfavorably with the simple idealism, patriotism and valor of the citizen-soldier Pierce answering the call to duty."⁷

Amazingly by today's standards, Scott remained on active duty during the 1852 campaign and retained command of the Army following his loss.⁸ Rather than causing outrage among professional officers, Scott's candidacy was supported by many officers because his leaving would cause a small ripple effect of promotions in the seniority based system of the day.⁹

The Civil War: The Impact of Rapid Expansion

The army grew exponentially in response to the national emergency and attack on Fort Sumter. As a result, there were not nearly enough professional officers to lead the quickly growing army. Most units were Volunteer Regiments, raised and commanded by local community leaders and wealthy citizens. Like earlier American wars, there were a large number of politicians in uniform and partisan political activity was common.

Lincoln's opponent in the 1864 election was General George McClellan, who resigned his commission in order to run. The campaign was bitter and saw the active participation of general officers against the President.¹⁰ The campaign of a famous general during wartime, supported by general officers who spoke openly against their Commander-in-Chief, clearly violated the supremacy of civilian authority over the

military by today's standards but was not an issue at the time. In fact, the Democratic Party nominated McClellan "in a bid for the soldier vote."¹¹

The Civil War was the first time soldiers were seen as a voting block and both political parties tried to use them to their advantage.¹² The Republican Party, concerned about President Lincoln's re-election, initiated legislation supporting suffrage for soldiers. The 1864 election was the first in American history to see the wide use of absentee ballots.¹³

Governor Morton of Indiana even asked President Lincoln to allow Hoosier units to return home in order to vote.¹⁴ The attempt was not successful, but shows how politicians were willing to use the military as a tool in order to secure an election. Following the war, most of the states repealed the laws allowing absentee voting for soldiers. Some, like Texas, even passed laws barring soldiers from voting.¹⁵

The Post Civil War Professionalism Movement

Following the Civil War there was a movement toward professionalism in the Army led by General William Sherman, Emory Upton and later by Elihu Root. The period was a difficult one for the Army and marked a fork in the road for military professionalism. Like most post-conflict periods in American history, the Army was drawn down to very low levels following the Civil War, and there was even debate about the necessity of having a standing Army at all. Most of the Army was dispersed on occupation duty throughout the South as part of Reconstruction and throughout the West subduing Indian tribes.

In Washington civil-military relations neared an all time low. A constitutional emergency developed between President Johnson and the Senate regarding control of cabinet positions in general and the War Department in particular. President Johnson

suspended Secretary of War Stanton from office and temporarily placed General Grant, who was then the Commanding General of the Army, in the position of acting Secretary of War.¹⁶ After the Senate over-rode President Johnson's action, Secretary Stanton was returned to his position having been suspended for five months.

While the crisis was going on, General Grant detailed both General Sherman and General Phillip Sheridan to the War Office in order to "compile a code of articles of war and army regulations."¹⁷ Occupying the office next to the Secretary of War's, General Sherman became involved in the crisis. Being involved in the messy affair further reinforced General Sherman's contempt for politics and Washington.

With the election of Ulysses Grant as President the following spring, Sherman had an expectation that he, as the Commanding General of the Army, would be part of the Administration's inner circle. After all, Sherman was Grant's principle subordinate during and after the Civil War and the two shared a close personal relationship. What Sherman did not understand was that, once in office, Grant's priorities would change and the inexperienced politician would be overwhelmed by the professional politicians surrounding him.

One in particular, William Belknap, played a significant role in Sherman's political isolation. As Grant's Secretary of War, Belknap worked to undermine Sherman's authority and influence at every turn. It had become customary at the time for the Secretary of War to give military orders directly to the adjutant-general and other department primary staff officers.¹⁸ Belknap took the matter to extremes by seizing control of all fiscal and administrative authorities in the War Department. He personally reserved the authority to appoint sutlers, and to approve officers' leaves, transfers, and

discharges.¹⁹ Despite protesting to President Grant, Sherman was in effect reduced to a figure head.

By 1874 the situation between Sherman and Belknap reached such a low point that Sherman asked for, and was given, permission to move his headquarters to Saint Louis. Sherman's position had been reduced to the point that his entire headquarters consisted of himself and three staff officers. By moving his headquarters to Saint Louis, Sherman ran away from his troubles in Washington, but the move proved fortuitous toward restoring the balance of power within the War Department.

In 1876, Belknap was implicated in a corruption scandal involving the appointment of sutlers, among other things. Shortly after the scandal came to light, President Grant and Belknap's successor, Judge Alphonso Taft, asked Sherman to return to Washington. By being absent from capital, Sherman was one of the few administration officials viewed as being clean of corruption. Grant and Taft's request was a political move to restore the image of the Administration and War Department, but it also resulted in the restoration of several important authorities to the Commanding General's office.²⁰

According to Michael Fellman in his book, *Citizen Sherman*, Sherman's two greatest achievements during his tenure as Commanding General of the Army were "the establishment of the Advanced School for Infantry and Cavalry Officers at Fort Leavenworth in 1881, and his support of reform-minded younger army intellectuals, like Emory Upton."²¹ In a letter to General Philip Sheridan, to whom Sherman gave the task to establish the school, he said, "I don't want to meddle with this new school or to have

it the subject of legislation, because if this is done, like West Point, it will be made political and taken out of our control.”²²

Given Sherman’s involvement in the constitutional crisis during the Johnson Administration and his poor treatment during the Grant Administration, it is easy to understand his hatred for politics and his belief in the need for reform of the officer corps. As a result, Sherman was an enthusiastic patron of reformers like Upton.

Upton was pivotal in the reform movement of the Army and the professionalization of its officer corps. A graduate of the United States Military Academy Class of 1861, Upton became one of the youngest division commanders in the Union Army three years later. Shortly after the war Upton wrote a book, *Infantry Tactics*, that was used at West Point. *Infantry Tactics* advocated changes in the way the Army should be organized, and how it should fight, and established Upton as a leader of professional reform in the Army. As an instructor at the Military Academy, he was also well situated to have an influence on the officer corps.

In 1875 Upton received permission from Secretary of War Belknap, with General Sherman’s active support, to conduct a tour of the world in order to study the organization and practices of other nation’s armies. The intention was for Upton to report on what he saw, “which would allow him to recommend reforms in the American army.”²³ Upton spent most of the next year and a half touring Asia, India and Europe taking notes and reporting back. He was particularly impressed by the German military who had recently won the Franco-Prussian War.

According to Stephen Ambrose in his book *Upton and the Army*, “Upton regarded the Prussian system, with its general staff, mass army, and freedom from

civilian control, an ideal one. For the remainder of his life, Upton was to attempt to get the United States Congress to adopt army reforms based on the Prussian model.”²⁴ In the German Army, Upton saw everything he believed the American Army lacked. The German Army possessed technological advantages over their enemies while the United States Army was still using antiquated trap door rifles and black powder. The Germans were organized in a unified manner while the Americans had a separate field Army and a number of autonomous support departments. The Germans had a formalized and trained reserve system, while the Americans still relied on militia with no training standards and units who answered to their individual governors--each of whom had their own political agendas. The Germans had a general staff that served to coordinate and unify strategy and operations, while the United States Army did not have any organization responsible for coordinating any plans or functions. The Germans had a professional education system at the graduate level to train professional senior officers, while the entire United States Army officer education system consisted of the Military Academy at West Point and several technical schools for the Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery.

In addition to the other benefits mentioned, Upton believed the German General Staff system would shield the Army from unnecessary political intrigue by getting politicians out of the daily planning and running of the force. He also believed the German Kriegsakademie, coupled with the system of rotating officers between the General Staff and line assignments, developed a more professional officer who would rise on his merits, and not on political connections or longevity. The last point was

critical as Upton believed he was held back by the American promotion system that was based almost entirely on seniority and political patronage.

Following his return, Upton wrote and published, *The Armies of Asia and Europe*, at his own personal expense.²⁵ The book was a critical, if not economic, success and was widely read and discussed among the reform movement. In addition to publishing his book, Upton wrote extensively about reform in *The Army and Navy Journal* and encouraged others to write on the subject as well.²⁶

The following year Congressman, later President, James Garfield and Senator Ambrose Burnside led a Joint Congressional Committee to address Army reform. Both General Sherman and Upton testified before the committee and had a significant impact. As a result the committee submitted a bill to reform the Army along the lines recommended by Upton and Sherman. Intense lobbying by staff officers, who had much to lose in a reorganization of the Army, and politicians, who feared losing civilian control over the Army, defeated the bill.²⁷

Upton was only deterred for a short time. While the congressional debate was going on, he began work on a third book, *American Military Policy*.²⁸ Additionally, he continued to write magazine articles calling for the need to reform the Army. While still writing his book, Upton was transferred to California, where he became despondent and committed suicide in 1881.

With Emory Upton's death, the cause of reform went into hibernation. However, he left a generation of officers who studied his books at West Point, thoroughly believed in his theories, and held a deep-seated dislike for the civil-military establishment as it existed. Evidence of his impact could be seen eleven years after his death in the words

of General John Schofield as he delivered a speech to the West Point graduating class of 1892, urging them “to stay abreast of the political questions of the day while wisely abstaining from active participation in party politics.”²⁹

The disaster of the Spanish-American War of 1898 rejuvenated the reform movement. While the United States won the war, it did so at great expense and with much unnecessary suffering by its soldiers. There was no mechanism at the Army headquarters level to coordinate mobilization, planning, and the deployment of the soldiers, or to oversee support to them in the field. The Quartermaster Department was particularly to blame for the Army’s failures.³⁰ As previously stated, all Army Departments reported directly to the Secretary of War. As a result, Secretary of War, Russell Alger was fired.³¹

Alger’s replacement, Elihu Root, was a man with no military experience but who took his responsibility to fix the Army seriously. In order to prepare for his duties Root read technical journals extensively, and spoke with a number of officers at all ranks of the Army. One officer with whom he spoke, Major William Carter, served under Upton in the 1870’s and recommended *The Armies of Asia and Europe*. He also made Root aware of Upton’s unfinished book on American military policy. With the help of Upton’s relatives and friends, Root had *The Military Policy of the United States* published by the government in 1904. Root agreed with almost all of Upton’s ideas for reform and incorporated them into the Army Reorganization Bill which he personally drafted. He ensured the bill gained attention in the press and he personally appeared before the House Committee on Military Affairs to advocate for it. Root later said of Upton’s books

that “they gave me the detail on which I could base recommendations and overcame my ignorance as a civilian.”³²

The Root reforms aimed to improve professionalism across the Army, in addition to creating significant structural changes that still exist today. Among other things, the Root reforms established the Army General Staff, which gave a great deal of authority to the newly created position of Army Chief of Staff, adjusted the promotion system that had been based entirely on seniority and political influence, and established a “general and systematic extension of military education.”³³

Ironically, one of the greatest obstacles to Root’s reforms was the Army’s Commanding General, Nelson Miles. Phillip Jessup described Miles in his book, *Elihu Root*, as the “last of the powerful military politicians.”³⁴ Miles embodied the old system and freely used political means to try to subvert his boss. President Theodore Roosevelt told Root that he was approached by Miles at one point to propose they share a Presidential ticket. Roosevelt also said that President William McKinley told him of a suggestion by Miles for a political ticket where Miles would run for Vice-President under McKinley.³⁵

Officers like Miles were exactly the type the Root reforms targeted. With a few notable exceptions, like General Leonard Wood, the Root reforms fundamentally changed the culture of the officer corps. It created an officer corps that was reflective of General Sherman and Major General Upton’s core belief that officers had no business participating in politics.

The First Half of The 20th Century

The junior officers trained according to the doctrine developed by Upton and Root in the early days of the 20th Century grew into the leaders of the Second World

War. Generals George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, George Patton and Carl Spaatz all refused to vote believing their allegiance to the nation precluded their belonging to a political party. George Patton summed up their thoughts on political involvement saying, “I am in the pay of the United States Government. If I vote against the administration I am voting against my commander-in-chief. If I vote for the administration in office I am being bought.”³⁶

No one exemplifies this generation of officers’ belief system better than George Marshall. It has been said that George Washington exemplified the late 18th Century and that it was fitting he died within weeks of the end of it. He would have quickly found himself out of step with the pace of change the young country soon went through. Like Washington, George Marshall was a man who represented his nation and the time in which he lived.

Marshall enrolled at the Virginia Military Institute and put on a uniform for the first time in 1897, the year before America fought the Spanish-American War; its first major overseas conflict. Graduating in 1901, he was commissioned just as America entered the world stage as a colonial power. In 1907 he graduated first in his class from the school General Sherman founded; the School of Infantry and Cavalry, which later became the General Service and Staff College.³⁷ He played a prominent role in the American Expeditionary Force in World War I and later served as General Pershing’s aide-de-camp, where he learned valuable lessons concerning general officer interaction with political leaders and the allure of political office for military leaders.³⁸

As Pershing’s aide, Marshall prepared his boss for testimony before Congress. After World War I, the nation was struggling with the structure and role of the Army. The

Chief of Staff, General Peyton March, and Pershing were engaged in a battle concerning seniority following the latter's promotion to the rank of General of the Army. March, as Chief of Staff, was the senior general in the Army by position, if not by rank. The two generals fought publicly and Pershing undercut March's position before Congress.³⁹ Witnessing the power struggle and Pershing's testimony gave Marshall a valuable lesson on political practice in Washington. He learned how to skillfully operate in a political world without becoming partisan.

Marshall served for a short period of time in 1927 as an instructor at the Army War College, the institution that Elihu Root created. Following the death of his wife that year, Marshall transferred to Fort Benning to become the Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School. In his role as an instructor and assistant commandant, Marshall had a significant impact on a number of officers who would go on to lead the Army during World War II. Marshall appreciated the advantages of having an apolitical service culture, and helped further that realization in others.

Marshall's role in the expansion of the Army leading up to, and during, World War II required him to function daily in the political realm. In discussing Marshall's preparedness to become the Army Chief of Staff at the outbreak of the war, Forrest Pogue said, "In the duties of a soldier in a democracy, he was better informed than most. By inheritance, by training, and by prolonged work with civilians, he was aware of the strength and weaknesses of democratic government, and he was wholly prepared to fit his role to that system."⁴⁰ Throughout the war he worked hard to maintain a separation between purely political and military realms, to work efficiently in both, and to shield his field commanders as much as possible.

His relationship with President Roosevelt was more formal than most within the administration and matured over the course of the war. Marshall understood the power of Roosevelt's charisma and how the President liked to use it to gain his way. As a result, Marshall never accepted invitations to visit the President at his home in Hyde Park, New York. He was one of the few people Roosevelt did not call by his first name and he scrupulously told the President the truth as he saw it, even if it directly contradicted Roosevelt.⁴¹

The rapid expansion of the army required Marshall to brief Congress on a regular basis. Just as Marshall was determined to fulfill his role as a non-partisan advisor to the President, he was equally committed to an honest dialogue with Congress. This is not to say that Marshall was politically naïve in his interaction with the legislative branch. On the contrary, he was skillful in getting what the Army needed without delving into partisan politics. Over the course of the war, esteem for the Chief of Staff grew within Congress because of his honesty and refusal to take sides in partisan arguments.

Larry Bland summed up Marshall's philosophy in his book, *George C. Marshall, Soldier of Peace*, "The chief of staff was determined to operate as a member of a political-military team and not to adopt the traditional expedient of attempting to bypass the President's organizational and appropriations decision via friends in Congress. It was important for Marshall to demonstrate his nonpartisan role to both the executive and legislative branches."⁴² This was the basis of Marshall's effectiveness in getting the resources needed to fight the war.

Marshall's stature grew to the point that by the 1944 election his name was being offered as a potential successor to Franklin Roosevelt. His name was mentioned as a

potential candidate in the press, and Senator Edwin Johnson of Colorado made a speech on the floor of the Senate calling on the Democratic Party to “draft General Marshall for President.”⁴³ Unlike General Pershing, his boss in 1920, Marshall had no interest in becoming a politician.⁴⁴ “When Senator Johnson later complained that the Chief of Staff had not thanked him for putting his name forward, Marshall answered, “No, Senator, I certainly did not.”⁴⁵

After the war, Marshall became first Secretary of State and later, Secretary of Defense. Although he was a political appointee in both positions, Marshall avoided political affiliation and maintained his great reputation throughout both terms of office. In his book, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington argued that both the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense should be men of experience who are at the end of their political careers so that they will not be swayed by political issues of the day. Their roles are too important to the nation to be influenced by political issues of the day. Huntington noted that the first four Secretaries of Defense all retired from political life upon leaving the office.⁴⁶ Although Marshall had functioned brilliantly in a political world for a decade and a half before finally retiring as Secretary of Defense, he never allowed himself to become ensnared in partisan politics.

Absentee Voting in World War II and Demographic Changes

George Marshall’s tenure as Army Chief of Staff represented the height of the apolitical officer model that started with Sherman’s leadership 75 years previously. The growth of the Army to more than 10 million soldiers in World War II caused demographic shifts in the officer corps that continue to change how soldiers view their role in democratic society.

President Roosevelt worked to improve voting rights for soldiers. Despite the passage of the 1942 Servicemen's Voting Rights Act, there was a national debate starting in 1943 concerning absentee voting in preparation for the upcoming Presidential election. The debate produced an unlikely alliance between the minority Republican Party and Southern Democrats. The Republicans saw the move as a Presidential grab for a large uniformed voting bloc while the Southern Democrats saw it as a direct assault on Jim Crow laws designed to preclude suffrage to black southerners.⁴⁷ In their efforts to weaken the legislation, both the Republicans and Southern Democrats successfully used the issue of states' rights as their main argument.

Just as land ownership and poll taxes under Jim Crow laws were used to keep southern blacks from voting, professional officers also had a hard time fulfilling residency requirements. Most officers did not live in a state long enough to gain voting rights. A good example of the problem is the case of General William Simpson who said, "I could not have voted if I wanted to. As a native of Texas I was prohibited from voting. The Constitution of Texas in my day had a provision stating convicts, imbeciles, and officers could not vote."⁴⁸

The distinction between professional soldiers and draftees also became a major issue during the congressional debate. The argument centered on the extent to which draftees' rights could be curtailed during a time of war. Even proponents of absentee voting rights stated that professional soldiers chose a nomadic life and with it, chose to give up the right to vote. Draftees were Citizen-Soldiers who did not choose military life. The war was thrust upon them and it was not fair that they should be disenfranchised based on their service to the country during a national emergency. The irony that

professional soldiers were being disenfranchised based on national service was lost during the debate and would not come up again until after the war.⁴⁹

The Army did not have an official position on the proposed Greene-Lucas bill and tried to stay away from the debate altogether. When it became law, the Army translated sections precluding political propaganda too literally. In trying to remain apolitical, the Army cancelled subscriptions to major newspapers and magazines and forbid the “Stars and Stripes” and the Armed Forces Radio from covering candidates during the election.⁵⁰ In an effort to protect its reputation as being an apolitical servant of the nation, the army created further obstacles to soldiers being able to make an informed decision. Following the election, both Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General Dwight Eisenhower complained about the burden implementing the voting law placed on the Army.

Despite all of the obstacles in the way, the Armed Forces cast roughly 5.6 percent of the overall vote in the 1944 election.⁵¹ Of the roughly 9 million service members that were of voting age, 4.4 million requested ballots and 2.7 million military ballots were accepted by their state election boards.⁵²

While the Greene-Lucas Law failed to gain universal suffrage for professional soldiers and many draftees who could not meet state level voter registration requirements, obstacles began to erode following the 1944 election. Foremost among the changes was the attitude of the Army itself. While the Army drew down after World War II, Cold War requirements ensured that it remained sufficiently large to make a draft necessary. Rather than returning to a small, somewhat insular institution, the Army better reflected the society from which it came.

The demographics of the officer corps fundamentally changed during the War. The overwhelming number of officers required for a 10 million soldier army precluded the small pre-war officer corps from dominating attitudes about political and social interaction. Service by so many men and, to a lesser extent, women during the War also broadened the world view of the American public. The result of these factors was an increased interest of many junior officers in politics, and the tradition of political neutrality in the officer corps began to fracture. It is telling to note that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush all served in the military during and after World War II. Following the war, veterans also dominated Congress, as well as politics at the state and local levels for a generation.

No evaluation of civil-military relations would be complete if it did not discuss General Eisenhower's decision to run for president in 1952. Eisenhower never voted while in uniform and there was some question to which party he belonged prior to the election; both parties courted him. Given his previous career, one would assume the officer corps would overwhelmingly support Eisenhower. There is little evidence that happened. It is likely that professional disagreements between Eisenhower and the Army served to dampen any partisan political leanings among professional officers. Eisenhower regularly clashed with senior leaders in the Pentagon and he also fought with Congress to cut the military's budget.⁵³ The Army in particular felt slighted by its former Chief of Staff and it is unlikely that having a former soldier in the White House served to change the institution's stance on partisan politics.

Post-Vietnam and the All Volunteer Force

The Vietnam War and the transition to the All Volunteer Force were the most significant events for the Army in the 1960's and 1970's and impacted civil-military

relations. The conduct of the war strained those relations and eroded trust between the uniformed military and political leadership.

The war coincided with a period of social upheaval in the United States and became a controversial issue of the day. By the end of the Vietnam War the American public was angry and they focused their anger on the military. Social polarization, political upheaval, conscription, questions about the integrity of the nation's leaders (to include the Officer Corps), and a perception that the nation lost an unnecessary war undermined support for the military as an institution. Professional soldiers were seen as sub-culture that was distinct and separate from the greater American society.

The move to the all volunteer force in 1973 also had an impact on the demographic and political makeup of the Officer Corps. Since the end of conscription the Army, as a whole, has been less representative of the nation demographically. The Officer Corps has always been a self-selecting body to a large extent. Because there are only a few ways to gain a commission, the Officer Corps has mostly been college educated, with the majority being white and male.⁵⁴ When combined with the active targeting of the military vote by the Republican Party since the Reagan administration,⁵⁵ there has been a perceived move toward a more Republican Officer Corps.⁵⁶ Whether a disproportionate number of officers cite an affiliation with a single party may or may not be important. If the armed forces are presumed to represent a voting bloc and a natural constituency for one party, there is a problem.

Following the 2000 Presidential election, the impression that the military absentee vote would be the deciding factor in Florida is evidence of this presumption. The Republican Party in Florida viewed the military as a favorable voting bloc and

expected an advantage from their votes. On the other hand, the Democratic Party appealed to “invalidate as many absentee military votes as possible.”⁵⁷

Current Trends and their Implications

The first hundred years of the Army’s history through the end of the Civil War was marked by a politically active Officer Corps. The second hundred years through the end of the Vietnam War was marked by a tradition of apolitical professionalism. Today’s Officer Corps appears to be in what could be termed a hybrid period where officers are expected to be politically astute but non-partisan. This requires a careful balance on the part of the individual officer and there are indications that the Officer Corps is having difficulty maintaining it.

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1344.10, *Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces*, is the policy governing political activity by all service members. It is based on two core concepts. First, members “are encouraged to carry out the obligations of citizenship.”⁵⁸ Second, they are to maintain the “traditional concept that members on active duty should not engage in partisan political activity, and that members not on active duty should avoid inferences that their political activities imply or appear to imply official sponsorship, approval, or endorsement” of any political party.⁵⁹ It is important to note that the policy is specific and only applies to service members serving on active duty, and reserve component members called to active duty for more than 270 days. It does not cover retired military officers and reserve component members when they are not in uniform or on active duty less than 270 days.

In 2006 up to 20 retired general officers spoke out against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the conduct of the war in Iraq. The generals wrote opinion articles in major newspapers and magazines, appeared on television and radio, and lectured

around the country. In what was quickly called “The Revolt of the Generals,”⁶⁰ the retirees crossed a cultural line. According to military tradition, officers, both active and retired, are not supposed to publicly question their civilian leaders once a decision has been made. Most of all, they are not supposed to take personal dissatisfaction outside of military circles. The “Revolt of the Generals” drove political debate about the conduct of the war for a number of months and undermined the position of the Secretary of Defense to a point that there was open discussion about whether he would be fired.

There are two conflicting ways to evaluate this example. On one hand, there is the question of the obligation of experts in a democracy to speak out when they see something amiss. Would a retired elevator inspector be expected to keep quiet about what he perceives to be a dangerous elevator simply because he was no longer serving in his official capacity? Is there a higher obligation to be served to the nation when soldiers’ lives are at stake?

On the other hand, open, and high-profile, criticism in the media by recently retired generals erodes the trust necessary for a good working relationship between active duty generals and their civilian leaders. These leaders would not be able to have an open and honest discussion of sensitive issues if they had to worry about disagreements appearing later in the press. This dynamic ultimately damages the civil-military relationship our system is built upon.

Another potential threat to the civil-military relationship is the tendency for retired officers to serve as media analysts and in think tanks. Such officers, normally but not always retired general officers, use their former rank to gain credibility for their opinions. In an age of mass communications where most civilians cannot name one active duty

general officer, but can name several who are retired, the threat posed by retired officer participation is significant because of the potential to misinform the public and erroneously direct public discussion.

This trend first appeared during the short Desert Storm conflict. With the growth of the 24-hour news cycle, most media outlets have a number of retired field and flag grade officers they turn to when the need arises. Most of the outlets use the officer's rank on screen or in print during the interview. While the name line may indicate if the officer is retired, many civilians do not understand the significance of the status and only perceive that a colonel or general is speaking. This gives the impression of current knowledge and that the analyst speaks authoritatively concerning their service's position.

As in the case of retired officers providing "expert" commentary, there are contradictory ways of looking at this issue. First is the fact that the 24-hour news cycle is not going to go away and there is a need for competent analysts to inform the public what is happening. The Army recognizes this and occasionally briefs retired general officers on current operations in order to keep them informed. While the Army is not allowed to direct propaganda at the American public, and the retired officers are left to draw their own conclusions, there is value to having informed analysts who understand military operations speaking with the public.

On the other hand, the use of retired officers as media analysts, authors in the service of 'think tanks', and as political tools erodes public confidence in the neutrality of the military as an institution. Many of the officers present a misleading picture to the public. By using their rank on screen and stating their opinion on a military subject,

many Americans take their words as fact. The longer one is retired the less current their base of knowledge becomes, which increases the potential misunderstanding.

Further, it is a commonly held belief that many major news networks lean in a distinct political direction. FOX News, CNN and MSNBC, for example, are all perceived to have political agendas and would be expected to hire retired analysts that conform to their political point of view. If the public saw the analyst as also being representative of their former branch of service, it would erode the concept of the non-partisan, apolitical military.

Today the military is one of America's most highly respected institutions, with Army Officers being one of the most highly respected professions. According to a recent presentation by Dr. Leonard Wong, from the Strategic Studies Institute at the United States Army War College, the military profession enjoys an 80 percent approval rating among the American public; the highest rating for any institution. At the base of this respect is the image of the soldier as servant of the nation rising above petty partisan squabbles. In his presentation Dr. Wong warned however, that societal confidence in the military could be eroded if it were seen to become involved in partisan politics. "Involvement by the military (to include retirees) will diminish societal regard for the military institution- especially when the political activity is not connected directly to national security interests."⁶¹

At the same time the popular image of politicians has become one of a self-interested professional campaigner who is beholden to fundraising sponsors, and who does not place the interest of the nation above self. While the characterization of the latter is not fair and accurate in most cases, it is very attractive for politicians to gain the

endorsement of the military either in actuality or appearance. This tendency represents what is probably the most damaging issue for the military in the long term.

The trend raises a paradox. Politicians want military endorsement and participation in election campaigns by senior officers in order to gain reflected credibility. Those same military endorsements and participation in election campaigns undermines and erodes the military's credibility in the long run. In 2004 General Wesley Clark spoke on behalf of Al Gore at the Democratic National Convention while General Tommy Franks spoke at the Republican National Convention on behalf of George Bush. In addition to his speech, General Franks, along with a number of other retired general officers, signed an open letter of support for the candidate. At the 2008 Democratic National Convention, 20 retired Generals and Admirals openly endorsed Barak Obama.

The participation of recently retired general officers on the political stage may have long term unintended consequences. Senior officers giving opinions and endorsements to candidates or in support of politically charged causes, provides an example to junior soldiers that it is acceptable for them to do the same and legitimizes partisan politics within the force. That may be exactly what is happening now. At a January 2012 campaign event for Republican Presidential candidate Ron Paul, Corporal Jesse Thorson gave a speech while in uniform. The short speech violated the Hatch Act and could result in the soldier being tried by court martial.

When lines separating officers from politics become blurred, there is potential for direct impact on military operations. A good example is the case of General Douglas MacArthur, who was relieved during the Korean War because of direct insubordination. As early as 1944 letters between MacArthur and Congressman A.L. Miller, of Nebraska,

were published discussing potential presidential aspirations for the general.⁶² In 1948, while still serving in uniform, MacArthur allowed his name to be entered in the Wisconsin Republican Presidential Primary. As the last straw in the series of actions that led to his dismissal, MacArthur sent a letter to the Republican House Minority leader, Joseph Martin, denouncing President Truman's handling of the war. MacArthur's repeated dallying in politics contributed to his relief from command and damaged the professional image of the Officer Corps.

The perception of an officer as a potential political rival could also have operational consequences. In several classes this year at the Army War College the point was made that General David Petraeus may have been nominated to head the Central Intelligence Agency in order to sideline him from a politically prominent position prior to the 2012 election cycle. While there is probably no validity to the assertion, the fact that senior field grade officers seriously discussed politically motivated assignments at the highest levels of the Army is disturbing.

Recommendations

At the heart of the issue is the tradition of political neutrality in the officer corps. DOD Directive (DODD) 1344.10 outlines a number of political activities that service members can, and cannot, do while on active duty and in their non-duty time. It tries to ensure that the Department of Defense does not do anything that can give the impression of partisanship in the electoral process. The directive however, does not include actions by retired service members. The underlying presumption is that once retired, the service member regains their rights to full political participation. As it stands today DODD 1344.10 is not keeping current with respect to the actions of retired general officers and the impression they are giving the American public.

Upon retirement Colonels and General Officers should be precluded from using their rank while participating in electoral campaigns, while serving as media analysts or in the employ of partisan think tanks for a period of time (3 to 5 years). The time would serve as a graduated 'cooling off period' with the expectation that the officer could speak freely once out of the political eye that their active duty status might generate. After the period of time expires, officers on camera should be required to state publicly that their views do not reflect those of the Department of Defense; similar to disclaimers required by current policy for active duty officers. Both requirements would help to delineate the difference between their status as a retired professional military member and their role as a private citizen.

While on face value this is an infringement of their First Amendment rights as citizens, it is not without precedent. Anti-corruption laws and regulations already preclude employment by retired officers in a number of civilian career fields for a period of time after their separation from active duty.

Further, it should be noted that under Title 10 of the United States Code, retired officers do not actually retire but remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.⁶³ While rare, there is legal precedent to bringing retired officers back on active duty. This study does not advocate the use of the threat of punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to stifle dissent, however those who say that retirees have unlimited first amendment rights are not correct.

While the change might not be acceptable to the officers in question, it is legal, feasible and suitable as a compromise protecting both the individual liberties of the individual while maintaining the critical role of the Army as the non-biased servant of the

nation. Should the retirees decide they cannot abide by the rule, they are free to resign their commission, which by association sacrifices their pension and authority to use their rank, and live the rest of their life as a private citizen.

The situation governing the behavior of active duty officers may be the harder of the two to address. DODD 1344.10 already covers overt political participation by officers. As General MacArthur's example shows, even long and otherwise successful careers do not preclude an officer from overstepping the line.

More difficult is the development of direct relationships between officers and politicians when their use places the former in the position to act as an arbiter of policy. In his book, *Obama's Wars*, Bob Woodward discussed the relationship between General Petraeus and Senator Lindsey Graham, of South Carolina, and how the two shared regular phone conversations.⁶⁴ While Woodward did not suggest that General Petraeus undermined the Obama Administration in any way, the reference is a good example of how senior officers and politicians regularly interact informally. These relationships require careful judgment to determine where the boundaries of proper conduct lay. The fact that all services maintain professional staff liaison offices on Capitol Hill shows that the Department of Defense wants officers to have personal relationships with civilian legislators. It only becomes a problem when the officer's personal opinions and agenda conflict with the position of their chain of command.

This subject will require both formalized training at every level from cadet training at the Military Academy and in the Reserve Officer Training Corps and Officer Candidate School programs, to formalized training in branch schools, the War College, and in the Army's General Officer Capstone course.

While serving as the Secretary of Defense, General Marshall ordered General SLA Marshall to write a book about professionalism called “*The Armed Forces Officer*.”⁶⁵ He ordered the book written after he became concerned about the state of professionalism in the Officer Corps of the period. He thought young officers needed to understand the gravity of their role in the military and in our society. Since it was released in the 1950’s several Secretaries of Defense have had it updated and re-released. Despite that fact it is not part of the post commissioning Officer Professional Military Education system. We must reinforce the responsibilities and cultural norms of the Officer Corps at every opportunity if we are to maintain our standing.

Finally, the Officer Corps must police itself. Officers who knowingly step over the line must suffer consequences for their actions. Undermining the trust and confidence of our civilian leaders, and the American people, threatens the very institutions we are sworn to protect. As General Dempsey said in the recently released Profession of Arms White Paper, “Special trust and confidence is placed in military leaders. This trust is based upon the fact that the members of our profession remain apolitical and would never betray the principles and intent of the Constitution, even at the risk of their own lives.”⁶⁶

Endnotes

¹ The staircase design, messaging and project oversight were executed by the United States Army Center of Military History. The author of this study worked at the Center and conducted tours of the formal Army hallway exhibits on occasion. Knowledge of the project and messages primarily comes from regular interaction and discussions with the Director of the United States Army Center of Military History, Mr. Robert Dalessandro.

² Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010), 11.

³ Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010), 11.

⁴ The Americans probably had good reason to fear a standing army during the republic's infancy. It was the Army that Napoleon used in France to dissolve the republican Directory in his coup d'état in 1799. R.F. Delderfield, *Napoleon's Marshalls* (Philadelphia, Chilton Books, 1966), 58-61.

⁵ Six of twelve presidents between 1815 and 1860 served as Army officers. Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010), 11.

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 161.

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 159.

⁸ Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986), 91.

⁹ Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1986), 92.

¹⁰ Carl Sandberg, *Abraham Lincoln: the War Years 1864-1865, Volume 3* (New York, Dell Publishing Company, 1954), 596.

¹¹ Wilfred E. Binkley, *American Political Parties; Their Natural History* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf Publishing, 1974), 270.

¹² Walter Dean Burnham, *Presidential Ballots: 1836-1892* (New York, Arno Press, 1976),

¹³ Charles Bracelen Flood, *1864: Lincoln at the Gates of History* (New York, Simon and Schuster, Incorporated, 2009), 309-310.

¹⁴ When Lincoln refused to order the soldiers home, Morton offered that Indiana would not send any more troops to fight if he lost the election. Lincoln replied, "it is better that we should both be beaten than that the forces in front of the enemy should be weakened and perhaps defeated on account of the absence of these men." Carl Sandberg, *Abraham Lincoln: the War Years 1864-1865, Volume 3* (New York, Dell Publishing Company, 1954), 605.

¹⁵ Christopher DeRosa, *The Battle for Uniform Votes: The Politics of Soldier Voting in the Election of 1944* (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Volume 97, Number 4, 2007), 130.

¹⁶ It would be unthinkable today to have a uniformed service chief fulfill the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, even for a short while. As another option in the emergency, President Johnson wanted to have General Sherman carry out the Secretary of War's responsibilities temporarily and to nominate Ohio Governor Cox, formerly Commander of the XXIII Army Corps under Sherman, to be the next Secretary of War. Sherman wrote a letter to President Johnson asking to be allowed to return to his command in Saint Louis stating, "Washington was for many (to me) good reasons highly objectionable, especially because it is

the political capital of the country, and focus of intrigue, gossip, and slander.” William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman*, 2nd ed. (New York, The Library of America, 1990), 916.

¹⁷ William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman*, 2nd ed. (New York, The Library of America, 1990), 910.

¹⁸ Michael Fellman, *Citizen Sherman* (New York, Random House, 1995), 279.

¹⁹ Michael Fellman, *Citizen Sherman* (New York, Random House, 1995), 279.

²⁰ Michael Fellman, *Citizen Sherman* (New York, Random House, 1995), 287.

²¹ Michael Fellman, *Citizen Sherman* (New York, Random House, 1995), 290.

²² Elvid Hunt and Walter Lorence, *History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1937* (Leavenworth, Leavenworth Historical Society, 1981), 135.

²³ Stephen Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 87.

²⁴ Stephen Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 96.

²⁵ It is worth noting that the Army was not paid at all in 1877. The payment of \$1,000 in order to publish his book was a considerable expense for Upton at the time. Stephen Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 98.

²⁶ Stephen Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 113.

²⁷ It did not help that Sherman went on vacation at a critical time in the debate rather than staying in Washington to fight for the bill. The timing of the 1878 off year elections also played a major role in the bill's defeat. There is an argument to be made that the bill had no chance from the outset. The fact is that there was no threat and therefore no mission for the Army in 1878. Congress could not conceive of participation in a war at that time and the creation of a standing army was more of a threat than an asset.

²⁸ Ironically, Congressman Garfield assisted Upton by reviewing chapters of his book. The champion of an apolitical Officer Corps adroitly used congressional connections himself in order to advance his cause. Stephen Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 118.

²⁹ Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010), 14.

³⁰ The Quartermaster Department sent large quantities of critical supplies to Tampa, Florida by rail only to have them rot at the railhead when it was discovered the port had no way of loading them onto ships. They did not have a means of disembarking horses, so many of the cavalry's horses drown when they were thrown overboard to swim for shore. Failure of quality

control over contractors resulted in the troops only having rancid canned beef to eat. As a result a large amount of soldiers died of food poisoning, typhoid and malaria.

³¹ Stephen Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 155.

³² Phillip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root, 1845-1909* (New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938), 242.

³³ Phillip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root, 1845-1909* (New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938), 243.

³⁴ Phillip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root, 1845-1909* (New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938), 251.

³⁵ Phillip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root, 1845-1909* (New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1938), 245.

³⁶ Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., *19 Stars: a Study in Military Character and Leadership* (Novato, California, Presidio Press, 1971), 321.

³⁷ Elvid Hunt and Walter Lorence, *History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1937* (Leavenworth, Leavenworth Historical Society, 1981), 152.

³⁸ In late 1919 and early 1920, Pershing made a tour of war industries across country. The trip quickly took on the tone of a political campaign and it was clear that Pershing was thinking of a run for the Presidency. Marshall was disappointed with Pershing's political flirtation and did his best to limit access of political parties to the general. Pershing, like most officers of his time, had never voted and took no part in partisan politics even though he was the son-in-law to a Republican Senator. Forrest C Pogue, *George C. Marshall; Education of a General 1880-1939* (New York, Viking Press, 1963), 212.

³⁹ March and Pershing fought over a number of issues. Pershing was convinced that March was trying to replace him as Commander of the American Expeditionary Force before the end of the war, and March was disgruntled that Congress approved Pershing's promotion to General of the Armies while disapproving the same for him. The issue in Congress discussed in this paper concerned March's plan for the post war structure and end strength of the Army. Pershing disagreed with March's desired end strength number and said so in his testimony. Pershing's testimony contributed to the defeat of March's plan. In an interview with Forrest Pogue, General Marshall discussed the feud and his belief that both Pershing and March were to blame for the hostilities. Forrest C Pogue, *George C. Marshall; Education of a General 1880-1939* (New York, Viking Press, 1963)

⁴⁰ Forrest C Pogue, *George C. Marshall; Education of a General 1880-1939* (New York, Viking Press, 1963), 347.

⁴¹ In Pogue's book he quotes a story by Marshall of a conference early in their relationship where Roosevelt dominated the conversation on a subject. Throughout the conference everyone seemed to agree with the President. Finally Roosevelt said, "don't you think so George?" to which Marshall replied, "I'm sorry Mr. President, but I don't agree with that at all."

Marshall went on to say that the meeting quickly broke up, and the other attendees bid him farewell in the belief that his life in Washington was finished. While Roosevelt never called Marshall by his first name again, he did not hold the general's disagreement against him. Marshall believed Roosevelt now understood that he could rely on the general for honesty. Forrest C Pogue, *George C. Marshall; Education of a General 1880-1939* (New York, Viking Press, 1963), 324.

⁴² Larry I. Bland, *George C. Marshall: Soldier of Peace* (Washington, The Smithsonian Institution, 1997), 16.

⁴³ Ed Cray, *General of the Army; George C. Marshall Soldier and Statesman* (New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), 403.

⁴⁴ Forrest C Pogue, *George C. Marshall; Education of a General 1880-1939* (New York, Viking Press, 1963) 211-212

⁴⁵ Ed Cray, *General of the Army; George C. Marshall Soldier and Statesman* (New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), 403.

⁴⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 454.

⁴⁷ Most southern states had poll taxes, property requirements and, in the case of Florida and Texas, only had the names of electors on the ballot (not the names of the candidates themselves). Restrictive laws were not unique to the south. In Connecticut, people registering to vote had to be able to read and memorize five lines from the state constitution. The final bill had a number of amendments designed to water down its impact. For instance, a compromise between the two sides dictated that in order for soldiers to be eligible to use the proposed federal absentee ballot, they had to first show that they applied for a state level absentee ballot but were not able to meet timelines prior to the final vote. In effect, the rule also restricted the amount of time the soldiers would have to vote using a federal form since they would have to wait for results from their local election board. Christopher DeRosa, *The Battle for Uniform Votes: The Politics of Soldier Voting in the Election of 1944* (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Volume 97, Number 4, 2007), 133.

⁴⁸ Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., *19 Stars: a Study in Military Character and Leadership* (Novato, California, Presidio Press, 1971), 322.

⁴⁹ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee on House Administration, House of Representatives, Hearings on Voting in the Armed Forces on H.R.7571 and S. 3061: Bills to Permit and Assist Federal Personnel, Including Members of the Armed Forces, and Their Families, to Exercise Their Voting Franchise, 82nd Congress, 2nd session, June 26 and July 1, 1952, 46.

⁵⁰ Christopher DeRosa, *The Battle for Uniform Votes: The Politics of Soldier Voting in the Election of 1944* (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Volume 97, Number 4, 2007), 144.

⁵¹ Christopher DeRosa, *The Battle for Uniform Votes: The Politics of Soldier Voting in the Election of 1944* (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Volume 97, Number 4, 2007), 145.

⁵² Christopher DeRosa, *The Battle for Uniform Votes: The Politics of Soldier Voting in the Election of 1944* (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Volume 97, Number 4, 2007), 145.

⁵³ Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010), 20.

⁵⁴ The three major commissioning sources for the Army have been through attendance at the United States Military Academy at West Point, through ROTC and, since World War II, through the Officer Candidate School. With the exception of traditionally black colleges, the majority of American students have also been Caucasian. Prior to the 1960's most women in the United States did not attend college. Today that is no longer true, and both women and minorities are growing in both academia and the military. When added to the discussion about commissioning sources, the fact that the military has traditionally been a male dominated institution that restricts what jobs women can fill, it is understandable that women make up less than 25 percent of the entire Army. Because two of the three main commissioning sources draw from American universities and colleges, it is not surprising that the Officer Corps is reflective of the dominating demographic. Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010), 35-38.

⁵⁵ Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010), 22.

⁵⁶ This statement is based on the assertion that the Carter Administration (Democrat) was viewed by the military to be hostile and significantly underfunded the military. The Reagan Administration, on the other hand, spent heavily on defense and gave the military large pay raises. Both of the Bush Administrations were perceived to be friendly to the military while the Clinton Administration (especially in its early days) was considered to be hostile. This argument is described well in the second and third chapters of *Our Army*. Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010), 10-32.

⁵⁷ Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003), 334.

⁵⁸ Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Directive, 1344.10," February 19, 2008, viewed at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf>

⁵⁹ Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Directive, 1344.10," February 19, 2008, viewed at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/134410p.pdf>

⁶⁰ Perry Bacon Jr. "The Revolt of the Generals," *Time Magazine*, 16 April 2006.

⁶¹ Leonard Wong, Steve Gerras and Andrew Hill, briefing slides with scripted commentary prepared for the Army leadership addressing societal confidence, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, August 18, 2011.

⁶² Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Richard H. Rove, *General MacArthur and President Truman; The Struggle for Control of American Policy* (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1992), 232.

⁶³ Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) J. Mackey Ives and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Michael J. Davidson, "Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Retirees Under Articles 2(4) and 2(6): Time to Lighten Up and Tighten Up," *Military Law Review*, no. 175 (March 2003): 2.

⁶⁴ Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2010), 205.

⁶⁵ Department of Defense, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington, National Defense University Press, 2007).

⁶⁶ Martin E. Dempsey, *America's Military- A Profession of Arms White Paper*, (Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 2012).