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**NATO: MAINTAINING RELEVANCE
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

by

Danny Martinez

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Carolyn Halladay

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NATO: MAINTAINING RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Danny Martinez
Captain, United States Marine Corps
B.A., University of Texas, 2002

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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June 2012**

Author: Danny Martinez

Approved by: Donald Abenheim
Thesis Co-Advisor

Carolyn Halladay
Thesis Co-Advisor

Daniel Moran
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This study interprets the political, strategic, and institutional durability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the diplomatic revolutions of the past twenty years. In particular, the study seeks to understand the characteristics of statecraft, policy, strategy, and institutional custom and tradition that have allowed NATO as an organization and as a group of democracies to cope with the changes in the international system and the stresses and strains of domestic politics and burden-sharing in the inner workings of the alliance, its allies and partners. This study traces the process of transformation and evolution that NATO has endured by analyzing its institutional characteristics, the moral imperatives that guide its actions, and the level of involvement its major players contribute through a comparative case study encompassing such modern operations in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF) in the years since end of the 1990s until present.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACT	Allied Command Transformation
EU	European Union
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IPC	Ituri Pacification Commission
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MFP	Multiple Futures Project
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SECGEN	Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

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This project is dedicated to my mother and grandmother. My academic accomplishments are a reflection of their love and discipline.

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I. THE VALUE OF NATO

NATO, over the course of more than six decades, has become a cornerstone of international security for the western democracies as well as the world system of states and stability thanks to its particular embodiment of statecraft, policy, security and strategy. The quest to create an entity that ensures security and stability and promotes democracy and its notion of the free market economy started after the Great War in the early twentieth century. Without the existence of NATO beyond the year 1991, security agreements would have become untenable and unenforceable covenants¹ in the trans-Atlantic community. Ian Q. R. Thomas deems NATO the “defender of peace,”² the security enforcer essential in the volatile realm of international relations.

This study interprets the political, strategic, and institutional durability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the diplomatic revolutions of the past twenty years. In particular, the study seeks to understand the characteristics of statecraft, policy, strategy, and institutional custom and tradition that have allowed NATO as an organization and as a group of democracies to cope with the changes in the international system and the stresses and strains of domestic politics and burden-sharing in the inner workings of the alliance, its allies and partners. This study traces the process of transformation and evolution that NATO has endured by analyzing its institutional characteristics, the moral imperatives that guide its actions, and the level of involvement its major players contribute through a comparative case study encompassing such modern operations as Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF) in the years since end of the 1990s until the present.

¹ Thomas Hobbes, “The State of Nature and the State of War,” in *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York, NY: Pearson Education, 2003), 69.

² Ian R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 174.

A. HISTORICAL ORIGINS

The origins of this process are to be found in the strategic system of the Paris suburban treaties and the League of Nations of the interwar year, a story that is vital for a comprehension of NATO as a force in war and peace. The Covenant of the League provided for collective security, but the victorious allies failed to keep the peace with sound statecraft in the 1920s, in which they placed too great a faith in good will, as well as institutions without teeth. The latter was made worse by the failure of the United States to play its role in the European system in a sound way.

By 1936, France, which had the lonely task of monitoring and remediating any violations of the Versailles Settlement (left in the lurch by the U.S. and the British in the 1920s and then outmaneuvered by the Germans in the 1930s with the link to Poland in 1934), dealt with the most tangible risk in the formerly French-occupied Rhineland and the “dissolved”³ alliance (collapsing into individual, national “isolationism”⁴). Dr. Colin S. Gray, European Director of the National Institute of Public Policy,⁵ summarizes:

None of France’s former great power allies were willing or able to play an active role in supporting the European order which they had helped establish at Versailles. Russia was a pariah state, distrusted and self-absorbed, though willing to collaborate secretly with Weimar Germany on innovative military projects for mutual advantage. The United States had rejected the League of Nations because of the theoretical obligation to take action for collective security which membership entailed... Last, but not least, Britain was more worried about French hegemony in Europe than it was sympathetic to French security anxieties, so it, too, was not available as an ally, even as an unreliable one. That political condition was to endure until early 1939.⁶

³ Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 105. Gray writes, “The Alliance, plus its American co-belligerent, that had won dissolved almost as rapidly as did the armies of its offshore members, Britain and the United States.”

⁴ Ian McAllister Linn, *The Echo of Battle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 117.

⁵ National Institute for Public Policy, “Dr. Colin S. Gray,” 2009, <http://www.nipp.org/Professional/Bio's/grayc.html> (accessed February 23, 2012). NIPP state, “Dr. Gray is a member of the editorial boards Orbis, Comparative Strategy, Journal of Strategic Studies, Strategique, and Naval War College Review. He has served on advisory panels for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (SDI and weapons), the Department of the Army (tactical nuclear weapons), the Department of the Air Force (innovations), and U.S. Space Command (future of space forces).”

⁶ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 108.

The lack of a common security accord, and the recently acquired cultural aversion to war, added pressure to the weakened global-strategic environment, exacerbated by the global economic status of the 1930s.

The economic despair left in the wake of the Great Depression provided Adolf Hitler the opening to harness national suffering and employ it in a highly-politicized manner through the mobilization of Germany's nationalistic fervor. The global political context of the 1930s, influenced by a sentiment of war-aversion and national individualistic policies, produced the strategic opportunity that Nazi Germany required to exercise its militant expansionist policy, in direct violation of the Versailles Settlement. Germany's "revisionist"⁷ government took advantage of and eventually transgressed the unenforceable agreements, leading the global powers into World War II.

Dr. Gray, explains: "Every international order requires, though does not always enjoy, the service of an effective policing agent or guardian."⁸ The interwar structures of interstate relations in and around Europe provided no such guarantor of the democratic order or, as Thomas Hobbes notes in conjunction with justice and the constitution of commonwealth, the maintenance of covenants and agreements enforceable by a civil power.⁹ The embodiment of a civil power that effectively guards the peace lies within the arsenal of values that rests at the core of NATO. The trans-Atlantic alliance's security would no longer be threatened by the lack of a peace enforcement entity. With its creation in 1949, NATO's actions would be characterized with legitimacy through multinational efforts to maintain stability and security, while promoting democracy and peace.

To date, maintaining the vital national interests of its member nations, whether in close geographical proximity or through out-of-area operations, the Alliance's decisions and actions have in a process over the decades enabled consultation and consensus prior to mobilization of statecraft or force. NATO's assets and methods have proven multi-

⁷ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 108.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁹ Hobbes, "The State of Nature and the State of War," in *Conflict After the Cold War*, 69.

functional over the years, employing not only military force, but also culturally adept personnel that provide due attention to politics, economy, and social structures and dynamics. The organization's receptiveness to its members' cultural sensitivities, strategic and political cultures, along with its adaptive features provide it room to grow and evolve to meet its current and future challenges.

B. THE ALLIANCE'S MORAL IMPERATIVE AND RELEVANCE

This historical study brings to light the mechanisms the Alliance has employed to maintain legitimacy and relevance. By reviewing NATO's past challenges, discerning its valuable practices underscoring the moral imperatives with which it acts, the research shows the factors that contribute to its global legitimacy. This study also highlights the organization's attributes and characteristics that feed its vitality in order to add to this subject's academic body of work.

1. Values, Legitimacy and a Higher Moral Ground Based on Western Norms

The moral responsibility to protect NATO's member nations is no longer a matter exclusively or even mostly of infringement of borders during an aggressive military invasion. Threats of uncompromising ideology¹⁰ that spur terrorism and irregular warfare require deterrent strategies from a civil power that resorts to proactive and preventive measures to promote stability and security. These measures require the organization to provide economic, political, or military aid (or a combination) by establishing a presence inside the confines of another sovereign nation-state—while walking the fine line that distinguishes NATO as a force for good versus an imperialistic vehicle for Western ideals.

¹⁰ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 260. Gray writes: “The problem is that those goals happen to be wildly unreasonable in the view of other cultures. It is true to claim that its objectives are so radical as to be non-negotiable, but it is incorrect to argue that it has no real political agenda. Led by the charismatic Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda demands the removal of allegedly apostate Islamic regimes; the restoration of the Caliphate as the source of supreme Islamic authority over the whole of the Dar ul Islam [...] and the elimination of Western non-, even anti-Islamic influence and practices from the Middle East... [T]he movement's ideologically driven agenda is not of a kind that lends itself to a process of give and take. Unlike Irish or Palestinian terrorist organizations, al Qaeda, claiming religions sanction for its absolute demands, cannot be bribed to the conference table and offered some fraction of its demands.”

There exists a series of conditions in which NATO might take action, while the decision to take action must rest on widely acceptable norms and beliefs. The conditions for action are delineated by the Articles of the Washington Treaty;¹¹ however, the widely accepted norms rely on Western ideals and influences promoted by the Alliance. This study shows how the Western ideals promoted by NATO, which clearly states its Western foundations in its charter, have a historical precedent, and moreover, shape each member nation's individual, yet collectively congruent, moral imperative. These examples are explicated through analysis of NATO's championing of a higher moral ground founded on Western ideals, its partnership with the United Nations and their goal to promote and safeguard human rights, and the case study of German, U.S., and French involvement in contemporary conflicts.

2. Expressing Relevance: Utility of NATO and its Policy, Security and Strategy

A comparative assessment that contrasts security and stability situations before and after security operations that presents the social and political effects of NATO forces' presence may prove instrumental to show the organization's effectiveness. The trans-Atlantic requirement for collective defense, and therefore the requirement and utility of NATO, may seem reactionary. Given its creation after World War II, the requirement for a security partnership proved instrumental for the resurgence of economic power and defense in post-war Europe. As this study historically presents, by comparing the effects of the Alliance's intervention, its roles as defender of the peace and promoter of Western ideals will qualify NATO's worth and relevance. In addition, and in order to dispel this seemingly reactionary characteristic, a look into the Alliance's developments will provide proof of the organization's evolving preventive character through social, military, and economic capabilities. By presenting a review of the global community's reliance and benefits derived from NATO as a provider of peace, as a political forum, and as a catalyst for proper function of the United Nations,¹² this study overcomes this issue.

¹¹ Ryan C. Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 153–157.

¹² Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 48. NATO has enforced numerous UN Security Council Resolutions.

C. THE CRISES OF NATO

Various studies have rigorously researched NATO's historical precedents in order to define the Alliance's attributes and characteristics. Analyses of NATO's leadership, organizational structure and integrity, missions, to specifically point out the temporal, if changing role it had throughout history. This research investigates how the Alliance approached, dealt with, and eventually overcame the various political, economic, and even conceptual obstacles. To better serve the reader, this study defines overarching terms, concepts, and proposes a didactic position from which to view NATO's past, present, and future.

NATO, since its creation, has faced challenges that have cast its endurance at the forefront of global-strategic proceedings. This typecasting of challenges as crises, which the organization must overcome in order to survive, take on an adversarial quality which makes each of them a threat to the Alliance's utility, prestige, and even its existence (by some accounts). However, a broader point of view for organizational behavior certainly downplays the significance of NATO's challenges and characterizes these as checkpoints in a steady transformative trajectory. Depending on which school of thought one ascribes to, the friction-laden obstacles the Alliance has faced give it either a revolutionary character, or evolutionary grit. The following review presents a historical crisis analysis by referencing the crises' proponents' characterizations, culminating in my proposed viewpoint using Samuel P. Huntington's variables of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence in an organization's institutionalization.¹³

The crises, which characterized a facet of NATO's lifespan at the time of occurrence, largely depended on the contextual strategic background and the organization's history. A problematic conception, a bureaucratic crisis, breaches of the alliance, and identity crisis at the end of Cold War represent examples of external and internal obstacles that threatened the Alliance's justification of being. After the crisis of creation, NATO faced the challenge of asset management, notwithstanding the political friction that came with the concept of collective defense: a bureaucratic crisis. The initial

¹³ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12.

phase of the nuclear arms race through the 1950s represents the bureaucratic friction, political bargaining, and burden-sharing¹⁴ that characterizes one of NATO's most notable crises. NATO's dilemma of containment and nuclear weapon plan execution primed the stage for the organization's bureaucratic crisis due to asset management and load bearing within collective defense.

In the mid-1950s, the Suez Canal crisis presented NATO with a challenge that degraded the prestige and credibility of the organization: an internal breach of the alliance. Britain and France took bilateral action to secure individualistic national interests in Egypt, degrading the legitimacy and credibility of the Alliance by acting without engaging in proper means of consultation. The subversive nationalistic actions performed by NATO member states, in direct contradiction of the organization's foundational agreements, received self-corrective attention from the North Atlantic Council,¹⁵ and reformulated its mission objectives to enhance and enforce means of consultation, which would become the defining characteristic of NATO. The refinement of objectives marked a coming of age in the organization's existence that prepared the Alliance for one of its most formidable crises: identity crisis at the end of the Cold War. Without its ideological enemy to systematically spread communism, what mission would define the alliance?

Alexandra Gheciu argues that the role of NATO does not confine itself to international security, but rather concerns itself with the promotion of "... liberal democratic norms and participate[s] in the construction of new laws and institutions in ex-Communist states... [in its pursuit of] security and stability in post-Cold War Europe."¹⁶ This assertion by Gheciu implies a different approach to address international

¹⁴ Wallace J. Thies, *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003).

¹⁵ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 56. Thomas explains: "British and French action, undertaken in collusion with Israel, and accompanied by attempts to mislead rather than consult their NATO allies, caused a major temporary breach in the alliance, which soon needed urgently to be repaired... The alliance was quickly patched up at a meeting of the NAC in December 1956, only three weeks after the fighting ended, when useful texts to express the newly restored unity and point the way forward were conveniently found in the Report of the Committee of Three on Nonmilitary Cooperation."

¹⁶ Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the "New Europe": The Politics of International Socialization After the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 4.

security: dissemination of “liberal norms and rules of international behavior, in particular involving peaceful settlement of dispute, multilateralism, and democracy and human rights promotion in the international arena.”¹⁷ Gheciu further explains that NATO focuses on state-craft through the “inside”¹⁸ approach, promoted by international relations theorist Immanuel Kant, in which “the construction and protection of domestic institutions regarded as progressive and peace generating”¹⁹ were harnessed by NATO to promote “Western-defined norms in the area of security.”²⁰

In essence, the Alliance centered on what it stood for (Western ideals of democracy and economy), and evolved out of the constraints of being defined by its opposition. “Formed to defend the peace, NATO as the Cold War ended tried to transform itself into an organization committed to promoting the peace.... [A] dynamic conception:”²¹ NATO enhanced its survival in the geo-political arena, and succeeded its crisis of identity.

Through the organizational perspective of Samuel P. Huntington, I argue that the crises the Alliance has endured have not single-handedly defined the organization. The crises formed an evolutionary track that fomented organizational characteristics that have led to its institutionalization. As the following analysis proves apparent through historical and conceptual examples, NATO’s degree of institutionalization, along with the characteristics that define it as such, allows the organization to transcend periods of economic strife, political discord, and military action and in-action. As a geo-strategic institution, the flexibility promoted by its civilian and military resource structure makes it more than a military alliance. Its role spreading democratic ideals, and creating security out of instability and threats through diplomatic and military means when warranted, increase its relevance and intrinsic value.

¹⁷ Gheciu, *NATO in the “New Europe,”* 11.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

²¹ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 174.

D. ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY

This study comprises a historical review of NATO's six decades of existence, with particular emphasis on post-Cold War operations as well as its adjustment to the cosmos of war and peace since 1989. In addition to the historical recount of NATO's performance, policy-making, and operating procedures, this study reveals the organization's resilience through comparative military strategy, review of ethical standpoints, and an analysis of current NATO policies.

E. STUDY OVERVIEW

This study examines the NATO's adaptive nature, the propagation of Western ideals through a historical review of its operations and its ethical resolve when faced with terrorism and illegitimate governments; and in conclusion, present the transformative edge that will maintain its legitimacy and relevance in the future. The first chapter of research focuses on the historical actions of NATO to adequately categorize political decisions, military action, or diplomatic maneuvers with institutional characteristics from the Huntington model of institutionalization. Following the historical review that compiles the Alliance's institutional characteristics, an analysis of moral imperatives that guides its projection of Western ideals frames the ethical context of contemporary operations. This study engages an in-depth review of ethical and social responsibility of the Alliance when faced with a "fourth generation war,"²² and the steps taken to maintain legitimacy. Lastly, the conclusion highlights the establishment and maintenance of relevance that NATO possesses through a look at modern Alliance policy and future security endeavors. This study addresses the transformation²³ process within NATO and the actions taken by Allied Command Transformation as it looks to confront future challenges.

²² Scott Jasper, "The Capabilities-Based Approach," in *Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security* (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2009), 12. Jasper contends, "Fourth generation warfare uses primarily asymmetric methods to achieve political outcomes..."

²³ Jasper, "The Capabilities-Based Approach," in *Transforming Defense Capabilities*, 3. "Transformation is defined as a continuous process that shapes the nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies, streamlined organizational structures, innovative processes, and adaptive personnel developments that exploit national advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities. By definition, transformation has no end state."

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II. OVERCOMING CRISES

A. TYPOLOGY OF CRISES

NATO's crises have received global notoriety due the magnitude of the organization's effects on the world stage in the past sixty-plus years of war and peace. Since its inception in 1949, NATO has persisted in an evolving global-strategic environment that encompasses ideological, technological, economical, and cultural changes but poorly anticipated by the alliance's many critics over the years that endlessly predict the death of NATO. Friction created by diverging national strategies, un-common goals, and inflexible guidelines presented NATO with obstacles to gain legitimacy and relevance. The crises, in my view, are requirements in the "institutionalization" of the organization imposed by external and internal factors throughout its history. Each individual challenge presented the Alliance with a defining obstacle that highlighted the organization's deficits in policy and practices.

B. A CHALLENGING HISTORY

As an institution of collective defense and then security and peace, NATO's creation represented a continuation of recovery treaties that advocated economic alliance and collective defense in the years after 1945. A failed history of defense agreements and prior world disillusionment of liberal and capitalist ideals represented obstacles for the insecurity and anxiety that Europe encountered in 1945. The League of Nations, a collective security system predecessor, cast by its critics as well as by the record of 1919–1938 as unreliable, impotent, and partial due to its mal-conceived and ill-enforced legislatures and sanctions a decade earlier.²⁴ After World War II, in the midst of reconstructive effort for the global international structure, the establishment of the United

²⁴ Bernard Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 249. Wasserstein writes: "Two precedents had already been set for the failure of collective security under the League. The first was the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 which had earned the invader a rap over the knuckles but little more from the League-appointed Lytton Commission in 1932. The second was the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935... After the invasion, the League gingerly rebuked Italy and eventually imposed limited an ineffective economic sanctions against her... Liberal opinion in Britain condemned the Italians but Mussolini successfully defied his critics and exposed the League as impotent."

Nations in June of 1945 ascertained the requirement for an international forum, despite the demise of the League. The Soviet Union, entrenched in communist ideology, remained concerned with British and American pre-dominance. The British and Americans became wary of Soviet military capabilities and their ability to employ their arsenal in Eastern Europe.

1. The Economic Dimension of Crisis as a Problem of Security

The Great Depression, the worst possible economic state the world envisioned, “illustrated the inefficacy of international economic cooperation,”²⁵ according to Bernard Wasserstein. The economic insecurity and nebulous future Western Europe faced required the aid and guidance of the United States. Wasserstein further explains:

Europe in the late 1945 was a continent crippled, impoverished, and exhausted. All the economies of the belligerents in the final phase of the war had been geared to military production at the expense of civilian consumption. Destruction of infrastructure and wearing-out of machinery had greatly reduced productive capacity... The relative position of Europe in the world economy had shrunk. The United States now produced more than half of the world’s industrial output. Pre-war tariff barriers and wartime blockade had throttled international trade and abolished Europe’s central role in it. As European currencies tottered, the dollar reigned supreme. The United States had assumed Britain’s pre-1914 position as the world’s financial centre. Any revival of the European economies would inevitably depend on infusions of American capital and resumption of trade with the United States.²⁶

According to Ian Thomas, “Early conceptions about providing for the security of Europe rested on the assumptions about the centrality of economic recovery, which would restore confidence and generate prosperity.”²⁷ The United States, as a creditor for the world and managing the world’s reserve currency in the dollar, became the cornerstone of European economies in peril. While British armed forces were overstretched throughout Europe, Palestine, and the Balkans and unable to respond to a

²⁵ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 172.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 420.

²⁷ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 19.

growing communist movement in Greece, the Greek government appealed to the United States in 1947.²⁸ President Truman acquiesced, “promising U.S. economic and military support for ‘free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’ [according to the President’s message to Congress].”²⁹ June 1947 saw Secretary of State George C. Marshall set forth the basic principles for the United State’s involvement in the economic recovery of Europe in a speech at Harvard University:

It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. [The purpose of U.S. policy] should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which these institutions can exist.³⁰

The Marshall Plan effectively implemented in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, disbursing \$13 million³¹ from 1948 to 1952 across Western Europe.³² The first beneficiary of the economic aid and military guidance was Greece, whom by 1949 had “crushed” the Greek Communists’ “Democratic” Army.³³ Thomas writes, “Despite Marshall’s generous offer of U.S. aid and the sweeping commitments implied by President Harry Truman’s plan, the Truman Doctrine, to provide military assistance to Greece, it was widely hoped that the real initiative to revitalize Europe would come from the European’s themselves.”³⁴

Britain and France renewed their collective security through the Treaty of Dunkirk in March 1947, leaning towards France’s fear of German militarism and rearmament. In March 1948, France and Britain, with the leadership of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, joined the Benelux countries in the Treaty of Brussels “aimed

²⁸ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 420.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 10

³¹ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 424.

³² Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 10.

³³ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 424.

³⁴ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 10.

principally at preventing renewed German militarism in Europe, though it looked toward defending against the possibility of aggression from the Soviet Union.”³⁵

2. The Role of the U.S. Senate in Crisis Management

The Vandenberg Resolution insured that a bureaucratic process remained intact in case a response to international aggression upon the signees of the Brussels Treaty. On June 1948, Republican Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg’s resolution maintained two key principles. The first insured that “in any security treaty signed by the United States there would be no automatic commitment to go to war—Congress, in keeping with its constitutionally mandated powers, would reserve the right to declare war[:]” and the second made sure “no unilateral benefits would accrue to the other parties to the treaty; security should flow both ways.”³⁶ George F. Kennan, political adviser, diplomat and director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, argued that the economic forefront of American-European relations should receive the highest priority in order to address vulnerabilities “to totalitarian exploitation of all kinds, fascist and Nazi as well as communist.”³⁷ However, his long telegram addressed Soviet socio-cultural and political intricacies based on communist ideology, and the potential detrimental impact communist doctrine might impose. Kennan summarizes:

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with U.S. there can be no permanent *modus vivendi* that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world’s greatest peoples and resources of world’s richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and

³⁵ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 11.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history.³⁸

Kennan's views, although advocating economic reform to promote stability, did not disregard the requirement for a strong military posture in Europe. According to Thomas, Kennan believed that if "... a valid long-term justification for a formal defense relationship by international agreement, which could promote security in the North Atlantic area, it would have to be based on the assumption that a treaty would help develop defensive power in the area, act as a deterrent, and thus serve the goal of containment."³⁹

C. A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY

In the aftermath of World War II, Western Europe faced the insurmountable obstacle of overcoming the effects of a non-existent economy, a crippled infrastructure, and thus faced a monumental vulnerability to ideological and military invasion. Soviet influence, initiated by the physical enlargement of the USSR after the 1945 Potsdam meeting between diplomats from the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union,⁴⁰ was solidified by the "... presence of the Soviet Army," in eastern Europe.⁴¹ Communism spread throughout eastern European countries and internalized a repressive doctrine through subversive, coercive, and violent means,⁴² representative of the implementation of collectivism in mid-1930s Russia.⁴³

³⁸ George F. Kennan, "George Kennan's Long Telegram," *National Security Archive: Cold War: Documents*, February 22, 1946, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm> (accessed June 5, 2011).

³⁹ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 13.

⁴⁰ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 414.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 428.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 427–434.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 191. Wasserstein explains: "Collectivization was carried out by force, helter-skelter, and at a breakneck speed. By mid-1930 a quarter of all peasant households had been collectivized. The 'great turn' involved savagery and human suffering on an unprecedented scale. Resistance was widespread... Red army units and urban 'collectivization brigades' were mobilized to enforce the policy by exhortation, bullying, or threats... The Communist Party now assumed direct control over most aspects of life in rural areas."

1. The Anti-democratic Reach of Communist Coercion

The Communist parties began to take over Central and Eastern European countries, with direction and support from Moscow. Bulgaria endured a “purge of non-Communists from the army, police, judiciary, schools, civil service, and trade unions,” followed by the unwarranted arrest, trial, and execution of opposition movement party members in 1945.⁴⁴ Hungary’s Prime Minister, Ferenc Nagy, a non-Communist party member, was subject to strong-arm tactics from the national Communist party who kidnapped his son, whose release would be secured through his exile in 1947. Non-communist party members were similarly neutralized, or eliminated.⁴⁵ Communist infiltration and coercion of the Romanian government was subjected to non-Communist party exclusion, falsification of parliamentary election results in 1946, and the forced abdication of the king in 1947.⁴⁶ A one-party state was effected by the Communist movements in Poland and Czechoslovakia by 1948, through repressive tactics of “censorship, and intimidation.”⁴⁷ The Communist movement, centered in Moscow, formed the failed Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947, “designed to coordinate and confirm the Soviet party’s hegemonic control over the international Communist movement.”⁴⁸ Stalin implemented the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), as an alternative to the Marshall Plan, and to “bind his east European clients to him.”⁴⁹

The threat significantly increased on August 29, 1949, in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, with the Soviets’ atomic test, “First Lightning.”⁵⁰ Soviet nuclear success can be attributed to espionage in Britain and the United States; personnel who “acted out

⁴⁴ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 428.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 430.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 431.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 432.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 434.

⁵⁰ PBS, *American Experience: Race for the Superbomb. First Soviet Test*, June 5, 2011, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/peoplevents/pandeAMEX53.html> (accessed June 5, 2011).

of ideological rather than financial motives.”⁵¹ This assertion by Bernard Wasserstein implies that the Western alliance faced not only a formidable, equally-equipped adversary, but the enemy’s ideology in communism characterized through autarchy, centralized power, and, according to Kennan’s telegram, a bi-polar environment without “peaceful coexistence”⁵² with liberal capitalism.

The Soviet expansionist policy shifted shape and form in order to achieve communist ideal proliferation. The Soviet regime would resolutely implement its seat in international forum organizations “where they see opportunity for extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting [the] power of others.”⁵³ Communism remained viable in any non-liberal/non-capitalist state, in which Western influence could be “inhibited, complicated, or weakened.”⁵⁴

On August 14, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty became effective to “safeguard the freedoms and the civilization founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”⁵⁵ Thomas explains:

The early postwar period witnessed the emergence of a consensus in the West about the two central concepts that would guide future discussion about how to secure peace in Europe. The notions of self-help and mutual aid, enshrined in the Marshall Plan and the Vandenberg Resolution, paved the way for U.S. political and military commitment to defend Western Europe. The concepts also helped to establish an obligation on the part of the United States’ European allies to provide, with U.S. economic assistance, for the defense of Western Europe. The gradual coming together and intermingling of strategic, economic, geopolitical, and ideological considerations ultimately prompted policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic to consider the idea of mutual security guarantees. These guarantees took form in the North Atlantic Treaty, which, along with the Marshall Plan, was designed to thwart the Soviets, soften the appeal of communism, and hasten the recovery of Western Europe.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 478.

²⁹ Kennan, "George Kennan's Long Telegram," *National Security Archive*.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 28–29.

⁵⁶ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 14.

The simplification of the Soviet threat⁵⁷ did not translate into the simplification and justification of NATO granted the challenges of policy in collective defense. The refinement of the goals enshrined the *raison d'être* for the alliance and exemplified consensus, each member's bureaucratic means, and, to a certain degree also guaranteed the longevity of the organization by harnessing Western ideals and concepts delineated in its charter. In retrospect, even the conception of North Atlantic Treaty displayed its institutionalization with measures of identity, bureaucratic, political bargaining, and burden-sharing conflict within the procession of its crises in their number.

D. INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Samuel P. Huntington writes, "Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability."⁵⁸ Furthermore, he stipulates four factors define the level of institutionalization for any political system: "adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures."⁵⁹ Through specific analysis of the history of NATO, this study will present cases of the evolving institutionalization through the organization's growth in these four areas, relying specifically on the qualities that each factor represents.

Adaptability represents a function of environmental challenge and age, and can be measured in length of existence, generational age, and functional terms.⁶⁰ Huntington states, "[C]hanges in environment may be produced by the organization itself—for instance, if it successfully completes the task it was originally created to accomplish."⁶¹

⁵⁷ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 19. Thomas writes: "Kennan reports that 'to justify a treaty of alliance as a response to the Soviet threat, it was inexorably necessary to oversimplify and to some extent distort the nature of this threat. To the soviet mind this was a suspicious circumstance.' In immediate practical terms, the simplification of the threat made it easier to sell the treaty to a war-weary public and to skeptical legislatures. More broadly, it helped to resolve—at least in the short term—the complexities and ambiguities of international politics. The early and intense focus on the Soviet threat and the identification of that threat with all forms of communism compelled Western policymakers to approach a wide range of international problems in terms of how those problems fitted within their conceptions of anticommunism and containment."

⁵⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 13–15.

⁶¹ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 13.

This does not necessarily imply that the organization re-invents itself, but rather that it recognizes the changing environment around it, adapts to new challenges, and uses its experience (reacts with its time-proven procedures) to manipulate a stage that presents novel obstacles that require consideration.

Generational age, as a function of chronology, infers the passing of the proverbial torch. Adaptable and reliable procedures guarantee the “peaceful succession ... of [one set] leaders by another.”⁶² Functional adaptability refers to a malleable mission feature of an organization, making more than just “an instrument to achieve certain purposes.”⁶³

Complexity enhances the lifespan of an organization through member empowerment. “Complexity may involve both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits,”⁶⁴ according to Huntington. Diversification in capabilities requires the diversification and increased utility of its individual members and subunits. Therefore, each member increases their vitality through their specific function, highlighting the critical nature of their respective subunit, and thus magnifying the functionality of the entire organization. This feature, according to Huntington, mitigates external threats and makes the organization less vulnerable.⁶⁵

Autonomy refers to “the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior.”⁶⁶ Imperviousness to external and internal influences increases the integrity of the organization and its procedures. Organizations with high levels of autonomy display an impartial demeanor, and depend on the established procedures to achieve their prescribed goals. The author conveys that a political organization “articulates and aggregates the interests of several [...] groups.”⁶⁷

⁶² Ibid., 14.

⁶³ Ibid., 15.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 18.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 20.

⁶⁷ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 20.

Consensus defines another factor of institutionalization: coherence. Samuel Huntington writes:

The more unified and coherent an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is; the greater the disunity, the less it is institutionalized. Some measure of consensus, of course, is a prerequisite for any social group. An effective organization requires, at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries. The consensus must extend to those active in the system. Nonparticipants, or those only sporadically and marginally participant in the system, do not have to share the consensus and usually, in fact, do not share it to the same extent as the participants.⁶⁸

Coherence develops as a mindset that demands loyalty to the organization. Discipline⁶⁹ within the organization's procedural execution and upholding standards through admissions control imbue the members with a sense of unit purpose in the form of coherence.

NATO exemplifies the qualities required for institutionalization through various political and military events throughout its lifespan. The four aforementioned factors were challenged, although not all once, through the beginning of the nuclear arms race, the Suez Canal incident, and the post-Cold War Yugoslavian conflict in Kosovo. Politics, and the incessant international struggle for power, are also present through internal and external channels, which manage to complicate the evolution of NATO through its organizational growth. Personalities rose from their diplomatic seats to influence the political proceedings and sway the strategic outcomes of these three NATO challenges that revealed peculiar crises for the organization.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 22.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 24.

1. Three Historical Crises

a. *NATO's Nuclear Dilemma*

The nuclear arms race involved the technological procurement, testing, and strategic placement of viable nuclear vehicles that sent the Cold War into high gear, and which dangerously intensified the probability of mutual destruction. After the detonation of First Lightning in 1949 by the Soviets in Kazakhstan the Americans upped the ante by detonating its first thermonuclear device in the Bikini Atoll in March 1952.⁷⁰ The Soviets developed their own thermonuclear technology and conducted its own hydrogen bomb detonation in Kazakhstan in August 1953.⁷¹

The United States actively sought the capability to place nuclear deliverables within missile operational reach. Sweden, although neutral throughout the Cold War had secret ties with NATO and boasted the largest air force behind the British Royal Air Force and “effectively provided air defence not only for Sweden but also for Norway and Denmark, both NATO members.”⁷² Sweden secretly agreed to make its national air bases available to NATO in the event of Soviet aggression on the condition to evacuate the Swedish government to Britain.⁷³ Switzerland and Iceland also covertly joined the neutral group who supported NATO military bases circa 1951.⁷⁴ Wallace Thies explains the socio-political statecraft:

In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration was sensitive to the European's fears and tried hard to assuage them. In September 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested to President Eisenhower ‘a spectacular effort to relax world tensions’ based on the creation of a ‘broad zone of limited armament in Europe.’ Without such an effort, Dulles argued, American troops might have to leave, either because the Europeans would regard their bases ‘as lightning rods rather than umbrellas,’ or because the Europeans would reject an increasingly irritating American presence in their midst. In March 1954 Dulles worried that nuclear weapons had ‘tremendous repercussions’ and that a ‘wave of

⁷⁰ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 478.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 478.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 483.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 482.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 479–482.

hysteria' was 'driving our Allies away from us. They think we are getting ready for a war of this kind. We could survive, but some of them would be obliterated in a few minutes. It could lead to a policy of neutrality or appeasement.' Eisenhower too acknowledged that 'our allies are absolutely scared to death that we will use such weapons.' Hence U.S. spokesmen responded to the Europeans' fears by suggesting that the nuclear weapons on which NATO strategy rested could be made smaller, more precise, and more discriminating; alternatively, American officials suggested that NATO strategy would be revised to emphasize targets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, thereby sparing the NATO countries the horror of being a nuclear battlefield.⁷⁵

Wasserstein explains the new stalemate of nuclear international relations: "The Russo-American duopoly of nuclear power inaugurated a bipolar strategic environment in which the pretensions of Britain and France to great-power status were barely possible."⁷⁶ Edgar Furniss Jr. and Dorothy Pickles, two students of French politics, further explain that Europeans felt their control over national existence was exceedingly disappearing with "reliance on the NATO integrated force on American-owned nuclear weapons."⁷⁷ Thies postulates, "During the Cold War, the European allies often resisted U.S. proposals to strengthen NATO's conventional forces because doing so would in their view devalue the U.S. pledge to use nuclear weapons to repel an attack from the east..."⁷⁸ This observation illustrates the common bargaining and burden-shifting concept proposed by multiple authors as internal friction.

The British and the French would continue pursuit of nuclear weapons development, despite continued NATO support.⁷⁹ Britain detonated their first atomic

⁷⁵ Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 253.

⁷⁶ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 485.

⁷⁷ Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 240.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 254.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 243. Thies writes: "The United States sent B-29 aircraft to Great Britain in 1948 and later stationed tactical nuclear weapons on the continent in hope that these steps would reassure the Europeans that the United States was indeed committed to fight at their side from the start in any future war and thus make them more willing to provide most of the ground forces needed for their defense. The presence of American forces, including those that were nuclear-capable, was on the whole welcomed in Western Europe during the alliance's formative years because of the hope that such a presence would obviate the need for large ground forces, which the Europeans viewed as unduly expensive, socially disruptive, and an inadequate barrier to another cycle of occupation and liberation." This exemplifies the bargaining and burden-shirking ideology.

bomb off Western Australia on October 1952, followed by a thermonuclear device in May 1957. The British had garnered American recognition and a continental deterrent in national view.⁸⁰ The successful launch of “Sputnik” in October 1957 exacerbated the nuclear arms race and led to the eventual “deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Britain, Italy, and Turkey.”⁸¹ Wasserstein adds, “In July 1958 Britain and the United States concluded an Atomic Energy Defence Agreement providing for a wide-ranging exchange of nuclear secrets and coordination for nuclear targeting.”⁸²

The NATO objective to contain the Soviet threat and the consensus over doctrinal employment of nuclear weapons provided the stage for one of the most influential Supreme Allied Commanders in the organization’s history. General Lauris Norstad personified the conscientious objector in the nuclear battlefield due to his preferred methodology on the employment of nuclear weapons.⁸³ Jordan condenses the divergent and debated viewpoints between the United State’s new Commander-in-Chief, his administration, and General Norstad, SACEUR and USCINCEUR:

[T]he mutuality of total nuclear destruction that had become the hallmark of the Cold War after Sputnik, the likelihood of nuclear war was the predominant concern of the New Frontier’s civilian planners, as it had been for their Republican predecessors. They were especially concerned about control over the overseas deployment of nuclear-tipped medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which were Norstad’s responsibility under both of his ‘hats’ as SACEUR and as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR). Norstad wanted multilateral NATO control, partly to provide a disincentive to any West German aspirations to ‘go nuclear’. The Kennedy Administration wanted to ‘renationalize’ American control over these weapons.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 484.

⁸¹ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 60–61.

⁸² Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 485.

⁸³ Robert S. Jordan, *Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Allied Commander* (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000), 4. Jordan writes: “Nonetheless, no one can deny that Norstad was at the center of the great and defining episodes of World War II and the Cold War... Nor could there have been more high drama during the Cold War than the doctrinal debates and diplomatic fencing within the U.S. government and NATO over how and whether to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.” This is the representation of a bureaucratic crisis within the inner workings of NATO.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

Under General Norstad's leadership, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred operational control of all IRBMs in all NATO member-states (including those in U.S. soil) to SACEUR in both peace and war.⁸⁵ Robert S. Jordan writes, "In practice, this meant that the weapons under Norstad would contribute directly to the overall deterrent capacity of both NATO and the U.S. (along with the smaller British strategic force)."⁸⁶ Norstad's manipulation of his dual-hat responsibilities and loyalty to NATO and a multilateral nuclear front without unilateral influence shaped the nuclear policy during his tenure as SACEUR.

The initial phase of the nuclear arms race through the 1950s represents the bureaucratic friction, political bargaining, and burden-sharing that characterize some of NATO's most notable crises. However, these characteristics are encapsulated in the developmental growth of NATO as an institution. Representation of coherent values as an anti-Communist entity for nuclear deterrence, display of institutional complexity through subunit establishment with its Science Committee,⁸⁷ and practice of autonomy by synthesizing and executing the aggregate consensus for nuclear weapons proliferation and control contributed to the greater institutionalization of NATO during the 1950s nuclear armament.

b. Breach of Contract

The "temporary breach of the alliance"⁸⁸ that the Suez Canal crisis instigated presented a subversive challenge with internal initiation that delegitimized NATO as a coherent organization. Gamal Abdul Nasser practiced manipulative politics by revealing an arms purchase agreement in September 1955 from Czechoslovakia

⁸⁵ Jordan, *Norstad*, 107.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 61. Thomas contends: "NATO's leaders also called for increased economic and political cooperation... and, in an apparent response to Sputnik, established the NATO Science Committee, which was to be headed by a science adviser who would report to the secretary general. With this move, a new chapter was added to NATO's growing conceptual canon, and henceforth its leaders would claim that NATO performed, among its many other functions, the role of an alliance for science."

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 56.

(under Soviet control) that produced an arms imbalance between Egypt and Israel.⁸⁹ The British troops stationed at the Suez base, in accordance to an amended treaty signed in October 1954, evacuated Egyptian soil, while Nasser hosted Soviet Foreign Minister, Dmitry Shepilov.⁹⁰ The perceived anti-Western pompous defiance prompted the American cancellation of financial aid for the Aswan High Dam construction, which resulted in the temporary nationalization⁹¹ of the Suez Canal by Nasser in late July 1956. Wasserstein writes, “Two thirds of western Europe’s oil supplies passed through the canal and Eden saw the Egyptian action as a threat of economic strangulation.”⁹² What ensued thereafter was covert tripartite planning by British, Israeli, and French forces. On October 29, the Israelis attacked Sinai, while the Anglo-French air force attacked Egypt two days later, in addition to paratroops in Port Said and Port Fuad on November 5, 1956.⁹³

With vigorous opposition⁹⁴ the Americans “demanded unequivocal Anglo-French acceptance of an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops,” which was soon executed by the three occupying forces by 22 December, and was replaced by a United Nations peacekeeping force.⁹⁵ Ryan C. Hendrickson writes, “While the political elite in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States all understood that each state had different reasons and interests for acting in the manner they did, the event demonstrated the true absence of consultation among the allies as well as the NAC’s impotence at the time, especially given that the allies had defined their national interests in such a dramatically different terms.”⁹⁶

⁸⁹ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 469.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 468–469.

⁹¹ Ryan C. Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 19.

⁹² Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 469.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 470.

⁹⁴ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 19.

⁹⁵ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 471.

⁹⁶ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 19.

Thomas proposes that the difference in conception of NATO before and after the Suez Canal crisis was the emphasis on consultation.⁹⁷ According to Hendrickson, Lord Ismay “sensing the growing political divide and the absence of consultation among the alliance’s major players, [he] encouraged discussions in the NAC that highlighted the need for improved means of consultation.”⁹⁸ The report from the “Three Wise Men” highlighted the changing Soviet tactics to “ensnare newly independent countries” with the unchanged expansionist objectives.⁹⁹ The open dialogue to continually reform NATO’s objectives was initiated by Lord Ismay, whose legacy for open communication resounded through the invigoration of “emphasized alliance cohesion” made possible through consultation.¹⁰⁰ Thomas explains:

The decision further to develop the Atlantic Community through increased consultation was motivated in part by the perception that changing soviet tactics required a corresponding change in NATO. Because the interests of NATO’s members were recognized as not being confined to one area, increased consultation also seemed to provide a solution to the problem of coordinating policy outside of area and simultaneously bolstering the cohesion of the Atlantic Community as expressed through NATO. Although there was widespread agreement that increased consultation would be inherently good, there remained no clear definition of what was meant by the development of an Atlantic Community—or in fact what exactly was meant by the concept itself. Nevertheless, the ambiguous concept of an Atlantic Community had broad political appeal and the community’s development was widely regarded as being the precondition to greater allied unity.¹⁰¹

NATO confronted internal dissent, lack of cohesion, and evolving enemy tactics within ten years of its birth. Through its non-intervention, NATO retained autonomy, reformulated its mission objectives to enhance coherence, and adapted to the

⁹⁷ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 58.

⁹⁸ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 19.

⁹⁹ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 57.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 58–59.

changing time's strategic demands in the midst of "rebellion" of some of its most powerful members who decided to "elevate national concerns over common objectives."¹⁰²

c. Post-Cold War Dissent

The deteriorating social and political conditions presented by the former Yugoslavian countries spiraled into war and atrocities,¹⁰³ economic blockades set by the UN Security Council in 1992, and a confirmed massacre of more than 7,000 men.¹⁰⁴ On the heels of Operation Deliberate Force and the subsequent Dayton Peace Accords, the 1999 Kosovo crisis presented NATO with an ongoing problem in former Yugoslavia. Fighting intensified amidst fervent nationalistic views between the Yugoslav army and an extreme group of Kosovar Albanians,¹⁰⁵ despite a United Nations' Security Council Resolution that demanded a cease to violence.¹⁰⁶

NATO, under persistent pressure from the United States and Britain to act, faced the prospect of undermining UN Security Council legitimacy and popular criticism for its inaction in the face of human atrocities.¹⁰⁷ After gaining "sufficient legal basis,"¹⁰⁸ NATO launched Operation Allied Force in March 1999 in order to "'degrade' the Yugoslav army's capacity to assault Albanian civilians in Kosovo."¹⁰⁹ Wasserstein writes, "The NATO offensive eventually succeeded, however, in forcing the Serbs to remove their forces from the province," eventually reaching a cease-fire agreement on 9 June 1999.¹¹⁰

¹⁰² Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 59.

¹⁰³ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 738.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 739.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 741.

¹⁰⁶ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 94.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 93.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 103.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 741–742 .

During the Yugoslavian crisis, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, garnered the respect and trust through “exceptional diplomatic skills.”¹¹¹ During the UN Security Council’s substantial deliberation on the open defiance against Resolution 1199 that lacked sufficient “military-authorization language” conducive to coercive action,¹¹² Javier Solana patiently orchestrated multilateral approval with enough European support¹¹³ and enough legal credibility to execute with political and humanistic legitimacy. Hendricks adds, “In the aftermath of Allied Force, it was widely felt at NATO headquarters that the campaign was a ‘NATO’ operation, and not strictly an ‘American’ mission, a feeling that was partly due to Solana’s ability to listen to and convey all the allies’ concerns.”¹¹⁴

NATO practiced tremendous autonomy, speaking in Huntington’s terms, throughout Operation Allied Force. Bureaucratic consensus and incredible diplomatic capability empowered NATO through the challenge offensive operations with a peacekeeping mission frame. NATO’s evolution from conflict to conflict accelerated its institutionalization and development as an organization.

E. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE

The crisis of institutionalization for NATO could easily be discarded as the organization’s growing pains. However, the inherent dilemmas in the nature of alliances among democracies and the problem of collective defense and security are the sources for the crisis itself for the Atlantic Community. Huntington writes:

In a more complex society, however, community involves the relation of individual men or groups to something apart from themselves. The obligation is some principle, tradition, myth, purpose, or code of behavior that the persons and groups have in common. *Consensus juris* and *utilitatis communio* are two sides of political community. Yet there is also a third side. For attitudes must be reflected in behavior, and community involves

¹¹¹ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 109.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 97.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 102. Hendrickson writes, “Solana’s background as a Socialist foreign minister from Spain and his activism against NATO earlier in his political career may have been useful in building support among some of the European allies who were more hesitant to support use-of-troops options.”

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 98.

not just any ‘coming together’ but rather a regularized, stable, and sustained coming together. The coming together must, in short, be institutionalized. And the creation of political institutions involving and reflecting the moral consensus and mutual interest is, consequently, the third element.¹¹⁵

Thomas contends that the diversity of conceptions reflects the organization’s malleability, and its changing conceptions are characteristics of its “flexibility, expressions of consensus within the alliance, and a key mechanism to alliance unity.”¹¹⁶ NATO’s institutionalization and ability to transcend mission statements and generational axioms ultimately give it relevance and vitality.

¹¹⁵ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 10.

¹¹⁶ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 7.

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III. MAINTAINING THE HIGHER MORAL GROUND

The challenge to maintain relevance and vitality defies not only the Alliance's institutional characteristics, but also its moral consciousness derived from Western ideals. These Western values, "democracy, free speech, human rights, rule of law, etc.,"¹¹⁷ promoted and defended through NATO's operations, stem as much from international demand as from internal requirement. The moral drive and ethical responses to a changing global scene require the Alliance to act in a manner that keeps it relevant and legitimate.

A. MORAL IMPERATIVE FOR THE ALLIANCE

NATO's "institutional inertia"¹¹⁸ did not become ingrained without an organic moral impetus. Through its evolution, the Alliance has held a steadfast adherence to the changing international norms and regulations that have shaped contemporary global relations. Thomas explains that "out of the conviction that the alliance had achieved a great moral victory in the Cold War, [...] it was therefore morally obliged to continue to serve the interests of peace and security."¹¹⁹ The counterintuitive notion of an organization designed for collective defense regarding a moral obligation to defend its members' vital national interests, and use military force as deemed acceptable by the global community, may be dispelled by analyzing NATO's moral imperative.

Immanuel Kant's ethical philosophy of duty provides the framework for analysis that explains the Alliance's motives for action (or inaction). According to Dr. Lawrence Hinman, professor of philosophy, and co-director and co-founder of the Center for Ethics and Technology, Kant's ethics rest on "duty, universalizability, and respect."¹²⁰ Actions for the sake of duty, or in Hinman's interpretation of Kant, "doing something because it

¹¹⁷ Timothy Garton-Ash, *Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2005), 215.

¹¹⁸ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 187.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹²⁰ Lawrence Hinman, *Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory*, 4th ed. (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2008), 167.

is the right thing to do,” represent “moral worth” and are “morally correct if its maxim can be willed as a universal law.”¹²¹ Hinman further explains, “A maxim for Kant is the subjective rule [...] in mind when performing an action.”¹²² Achieving universalizability depends on the condition of “whether people could consistently will that everyone adopt this maxim as a guide in their actions.”¹²³ Hinman proceeds to explain Kant’s “basic moral principle: the categorical imperative.”¹²⁴ This executive concept provides an unconditional command that guides its users’ actions of genuine morality.¹²⁵ Respect entails the treatment “of other people as ends in themselves—that we respect them as autonomous beings capable of reasoning and making choices based on the results of that reasoning.”¹²⁶

Considering the importance that Kant placed on the ethics of duty, viewing NATO’s actions with these concepts in mind may shed light on the organization’s embodiment as a guardian of the peace, and its moral imperative to protect its members and their interests. The Alliance’s continuing efforts to provide security, promote the Western ideals of democracy and the free market, and (as made evident in the last two decades) engagement in human rights advocacy, display an adaptable trend that conforms to the time’s arena of international relations. From its creation in 1949, NATO has applied military force through deterrence, peacekeeping/peacemaking, and nation-building operations while adhering to the contemporary international norms.

NATO exemplifies the duty principle by defending against expansionist governments and ideologies that threaten the security of its member states. On August of 1949, U.S. Senator Vandenberg testified:

My view is that this treaty is the most sensible, powerful, practical, and economic step the United States can now take in the realistic interest of its own security; in the effective discouragement of aggressive conquest

¹²¹ Hinman, *Ethics*, 167.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 173.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 188.

which would touch off world war three; in the stabilization of western Germany; and, as declared by its own preamble, in peacefully safeguarding the freedoms and the civilization founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.¹²⁷

When viewed as a universal decree, rather than a unilateral sentiment, the duty to safeguard against the expansionist governments with non-compromising ideologies (National Socialist Germany during the 1930s and 1940s) and Soviet Communist threat in the latter part of the twentieth century, in order to prevent mass atrocities, NATO's moral imperative regarding duty maintains moral worth and correctness.

The Alliance reflects universalizability in its actions by following the globally accepted norms set forth by post-1945 international law. NATO's adherence to "Just War theory... customary international law... [and] the principles of proportionality and discrimination [,] internationally recognised as moral imperatives for all states [...] enshrined in covenants such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions,"¹²⁸ satisfies the requirements of Kant's moral ethics. The global acceptance of military power restraint, which minimizes human suffering and provides for the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, is representative of the actions of NATO forces in the contemporary conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the ongoing operations in Afghanistan. ISAF's evolving Tactical Directive, from former Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) General McChrystal to current COMISAF General Allen, succinctly and specifically dictates the importance of discrimination for non-combatants and the gravity that the civilian population holds for the success of combat operations, and the required measured means of force that each trooper must exercise in order to meet the condition of proportionality.¹²⁹

NATO displays Kantian respect toward the peoples of sovereign nation-states that provide legitimate governance for their citizens. The Alliance's interventions on behalf of

¹²⁷ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 28–29.

¹²⁸ Ilan Cooper and Eric Patterson, "UN Authority and the Morality of Force," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* (Routledge) 53, no. 6 (Dec 2011): 141–158.

¹²⁹ Allen, John R. *COMISAF's Tactical Directive*. November 20, 2011. Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters—ISAF.

humanitarian assistance and human rights advocacy, like the actions taken in Kosovo and Libya, present a current-day dilemma to maintain morality and legality, yet still illustrate the qualities of Kantian respect. Most recently, NATO deems this function its “responsibility to protect.” Dr. Robert Jackson, professor of international relations at Boston University, explains:

The responsibility to protect doctrine, in order to shield or rescue people from mass atrocity crimes calls for a departure from the basic legal norms of the United Nations pertaining to war, namely an expansion of the right of military intervention and a restriction of the corresponding right of non-intervention. The doctrine proposes a right of war based on political legitimacy rather than international legality.¹³⁰

In order to compromise between the legality and morality, Dr. Helen Stacy, senior fellow at Stanford Law School summarizes, “Military interventions for humanitarian purposes arising from a state’s failure to protect its citizens from murderous unrest have invoked a moral language of international concern about the competence of domestic governments.”¹³¹ Dr. Stacy’s statement raises the point of a state’s ability to maintain a monopoly of violence and its ability to protect its citizens and their rights. Transgressions against human rights, perpetrated by non-state actors (highlighting the state’s inability to protect), or by the governing regime itself, demonstrate the state’s lack of legitimacy and therefore “surrender their legal prerogatives of sovereignty because of their failure towards its own citizens.”¹³² Through Kant’s perspective, respect for the nation-state’s sovereignty remains intact as long as individuals can think and act for themselves, retaining their individual rights and liberties. Infringement upon these rights and liberties represent a violation of Kant’s concept of humanity, and therefore constitute an amoral act. Through this calculus, NATO’s actions in Kosovo and Libya aligned with the moral imperative to protect a vulnerable population.

¹³⁰ Robert Jackson, “War Perils in the Responsibility to Protect,” *Global Responsibility to Protect* 2, no. 3 (2010): 315 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers).

¹³¹ Helen Stacy, “Relational Sovereignty,” *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting*, March 30, 2005: 396.

¹³² Stacy, “Relational Sovereignty,” 398.

The Kantian ethics of duty illustrate the moral imperative for the Alliance, given contemporary context, the perceived threat, and ethical drive behind its actions. However, a criticism of Kant's ethic of duty may arise by extrapolation, postulating that the necessity to protect vulnerable people prevalently exists around the world, for which the Alliance takes no action. Further inquiry may also propose that NATO's operations reflect an imperative that does not set aside "preferences or potential gains to do the right thing."¹³³ How does NATO justify out-of-area actions in some places, but decide to evade its responsibility in others? Kant's description of the moral agent, and its qualitative "composition of reason and will"¹³⁴ answers this moral interrogative.

B. MORAL AND ETHICAL IMPULSE

NATO engages in operations that positively influence the security and stability of its member states. The Alliance's *raison d'être* maintains relevance through its active peacekeeping, security, and government-building operations. Execution of the organization's mission statement depends on funds, materiel, and political will of its member nations, and their commitment to bolster security and their Western ideals. NATO's actions define self-perpetuation versus self-service¹³⁵—despite possible criticisms of expansion, the organization's promotion of democracy spreads by virtue of prospective members' requests, their candidacy, and ultimately, their alignment with standards of economic and political performance for membership.

NATO's Western ideals, which promote legitimate representative governments along with protection of human rights, become its stake. Limited by resource constraints, NATO must reason if capabilities to conduct operations to end human suffering are tenable by the organization, or whether a regional partner with similar capabilities may answer the call. With vested interest in maintaining stability through collective security,

¹³³ Hinman, *Ethics*, 178. Hinman writes: "What Kant saw most powerfully was that morality consists in doing what any rational being would do in the situation. This involves setting aside our own personal preferences and potential gains to do the right thing."

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 171.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 168. Hinman explains: "This is one of Kant's key insights: An act's moral worth depends on the reason for which it is done. It is not enough that an act conforms to duty; it must also be done for the sake of duty. It must be done out of a concern for what is morally right, not out of some self-serving motive."

the organization, as a rational moral agent, must intervene when its duty to protect its members and their interests are threatened by amoral conditions.

1. Deferment of Action: A Shared Morality

Deferment of action occurred for the Alliance in the summer of 2003. Since 1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) had endured internal strife that plagued the countryside with extremely violent results. According to United Nation's Secretary General report on the Organization Mission in the DRC, "more than 3.5 million people are estimated to have died since 1998 as a direct or indirect result of the conflict."¹³⁶ In what was described as a "Central African web of wars,"¹³⁷ the DRC hosted "nine governments, a dozen large guerrilla movements as well as a huge number of smaller armed groups and militias."¹³⁸ The eastern district of Ituri became the most contested area, for its rich natural resources, and the income generated through occupation and exploitation by the Rwandan and Ugandan war efforts.¹³⁹ Intense rivalry and violent conflicts between the Hema and Lendu groups' militias further complicate the chaotic environment.

Ugandan forces retained control after assignment as the role of temporary peacekeeper after lengthy occupation. In September 2002, Uganda agreed to turn over control of the Ituri district to the unstable DRC government by the end of the year. Concurrently, the Kinshasa based government institutes the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC) designed to supervise the Ugandan's peacekeeping role, and the

¹³⁶ Fernanda Faria, "EUISS: Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa - The Role of the European Union," EU Institute for Security Studies, April 2004, [http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/select_category/22/article/crisis-management-in-sub-saharan-africa-the-role-of-the-european-union/?tx_ttnews\[pS\]=1072911600&tx_ttnews\[pL\]=31622399&tx_ttnews\[arc\]=1&cHash=60354bbd76](http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/select_category/22/article/crisis-management-in-sub-saharan-africa-the-role-of-the-european-union/?tx_ttnews[pS]=1072911600&tx_ttnews[pL]=31622399&tx_ttnews[arc]=1&cHash=60354bbd76) (accessed March 17, 2011), 39.

¹³⁷ Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, "Operationa Artemis," *International Peacekeeping* (Routledge) 11, no. 3 (2004): 510.

¹³⁸ Ulriksen et al., "Operationa Artemis," 510.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

eventual transfer of command. Due to bureaucratic complications, the DRC government “was unable to relieve the Ugandan army in Ituri.”¹⁴⁰

In the spring of 2003, the United Nations’ Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) provided security for the Interim Ituri Administration, under guidance from the IPC. In early May 2003, the Ugandan army withdrew from Bunia, Ituri, as coordinated through the Luanda government, after which immediate ethnic strife erupted. Without a peacekeeping force to regulate tribal power imbalance, the Lendu antagonized the Hema through “extreme violence (assassinations, ethnic cleansing, looting.)”¹⁴¹ The population executed a public demonstration against MONUC, who failed to provide security and protection with its 700 Uruguayan troops from the attacking Lendu.

On 10 May, Secretary General Kofi Annan urged the UN member states to direct close attention and petitioned to address the violence taking place in DRC with a militarized force to minimize the hostilities temporarily. On May 12, the Union des Patriotes Congolaise (UPC), a northern Hema militia attacked and seized Bunia, targeting Lendu, and resulting in 430 deaths in two weeks.¹⁴² With the MONUC force under distress, and escalating destabilization, the Secretary General announced on May 13 that France agreed to participate in the intervention in Ituri.¹⁴³

With the United States occupied with conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO involvement in Africa seemed unlikely. For the European Union, this presented an unrivaled opportunity to demonstrate autonomy for a military crisis management operation on foreign soil. The UN Security Council risked losing legitimacy if another situation degraded to the depths of the 1995 Srebrenica genocide during the Bosnian conflict. The UN adopted Resolution 1484 (2003) on May 30, 2003, in which it “determined that the situation in the Ituri region and in Bunia in particular constitutes a threat to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to the peace and

¹⁴⁰ Ulriksen et al., “Operationa Artemis,” 510.

¹⁴¹ Faria, “EUISS: Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 40.

¹⁴² Ulriksen et al., “Operationa Artemis,” 511.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

security in the Great Lakes Region.”¹⁴⁴ In Luxembourg, six days later, the European Union adopts Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP,¹⁴⁵ launching Operation Artemis in order to quell ethnic strife and mass atrocities in the DRC by bolstering security for MONUC.

Operation Artemis marked the first autonomous European Security and Defense Policy military endeavor without the aid of NATO. Despite its non-reliance on the Alliance’s assets or military forces, the moral aim of the operation paralleled NATO’s advocacy for the protection against human rights violations, and the inherent destabilizing quality they bring on the state, as displayed in the UNSCR 1484.¹⁴⁶ The shared moral alignment, the responsibility to protect, displayed by two coherent, collective security instruments reflects that transgressions against the “moral minimum”¹⁴⁷ often requires military interdiction. Lawrence Hinman explains:

Are nations that are not directly attacked ever justified in intervening militarily for humanitarian reasons to prevent the loss of civilian lives? Does this count as “just cause” for entering an armed conflict? The answer that has emerged in the West is an affirmative one: Sometimes third-party military intervention for humanitarian intervention may be justified to save the lives of innocent people. Typically, this is done under the sanction of some multinational organization such as the United

¹⁴⁴ UN Security Council, “UN Security Council: Resolutions 2003,” United Nations, May 30, 2003, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsr_resolutions03.html (accessed February 1, 2011): 2.

¹⁴⁵ Council of the European Union, “EUR-Lex-Official Journal-2003-L 143,” Official Journal of the European Union, June 11, 2003, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:143:SOM:EN:HTML> (accessed February 1, 2011): 1.

¹⁴⁶ UN Security Council, “Resolutions 2003,” 2. UN Security Council writes: “Demands that all parties to the conflict in Ituri and in particular in Bunia cease hostilities immediately and reiterates that international humanitarian law must be respected, and that there will be no impunity for violators;... Strongly condemns the deliberate killing of unarmed MONUC personnel and staff to humanitarian organizations in Ituri and demands that the perpetrators be brought to justice.

¹⁴⁷ Hinman, *Ethics*, 225. Dr. Hinman, in his explanation of the role of rights in morality, contends: “Rights play a crucial role in the moral life, for they define the moral minimum below which we cannot sink in our relations with other people. Basic human rights establish the ‘floor’ for our relations with any other human being whatsoever; they are the minimal requirements for our treatment of any person at all.” He further explains “... that rights provide a constant check against possible abuses of human dignity, against any attempts to treat people with less respect than they deserve as human beings and as members of a particular moral community.”

Nations or NATO, in part to prevent it from degenerating into some kind of nationalistic campaign. Within this context, all the conditions for just war will continue to apply.¹⁴⁸

C. LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE UN'S ROLE IN NATO OPERATIONS

The moral impulse, reliant on Western ideals, remains centrally imposed within NATO's decision-making structure, due to its adherence to the organization's mission statement. As the military embodiment of the West, it too relies on the global community's approval for action, to a reasonable degree. The United Nations, working in concert with NATO, promotes peace and security as stated in their respective charters and mission statements. Stability, as prescribed in Article 55 of the UN Charter, is integral to international economic and social cooperation.

The United Nations, acting as the "a forum committed to maintaining international peace and security,"¹⁴⁹ formally issues decrees through Security Council Resolutions that urge the global community to action in order to reduce human suffering, and to maintain stability and security. By referencing its original charter and by promoting adherence to customary international law (i.e., 1954 Hague, and 1949/1977 Geneva Conventions protocols),¹⁵⁰ the UN has established itself as the critical institution that provides legitimacy through communal consensus to coercive military action. The UN's Security Council Resolutions garner global moral appeal, and adherence to them by their designated multinational forces, or by other third parties (i.e., European Union,

¹⁴⁸ Hinman, *Ethics*, 250.

¹⁴⁹ United Nations, "United Nations at a Glance," May 21, 2012, <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml> (accessed May 21, 2012).

¹⁵⁰ Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, *Documents on the Laws of War*, 3rd Edition (Oxford, NH: Oxford University Press, 2000), 33. Roberts and Guelff explain: "The factors which lead states and armed forces involved in armed conflict or occupations to comply with the law are complex. They include: a need to be viewed as acting in accord with internationally agreed norms, or with ethical beliefs widely held within the state; a hope that complicity the the law will be reciprocated; and also a fear that if the law is violated, there may be economic and military consequences [...]; judicial consequences (trials, whether before national or international tribunals); political consequences (such as loss of allies); administrative and organizational consequences (which may extend to the disbandment of a military unit); and adverse publicity (e.g., press exposure, criticism from non-governmental organizations)."

African Union, NATO, etc.) depicts their legality of action. As a sanctioning body, the UN lends the notion of legitimacy, due to the organization's promotion and adherence to international law.

The bureaucratic process factors time into security operations based on the UN's assessment of the situation, followed by security organization's deliberation, and ultimately the deployment of its military forces. Consultation and consensus (at least by majority) remain staples of conscientious action by multilateral organizations. The EU's intervention in face of deteriorating human rights conditions and an increasingly dangerous security situation for the domestic public and MONUC arrived fifteen days after the UN's security council's resolution.¹⁵¹

The forward planning and enthusiasm to lead by France,¹⁵² as the framework nation of ESDP peace operations, counteracted the time-consuming,¹⁵³ yet vital political process in the sanctioning and parent organizations, giving way to the rapid deployment and execution of the peace-making mission forces. As a temporal contrast, on May 12, 2003, the UPC, a northern Hema militia attacked and seized Bunia, targeting Lendu and resulting in 430 deaths in two weeks. Despite the potentially destructive time lapse, "Operation Artemis proved to be a surgical and timely military intervention with political

¹⁵¹ Ulriksen et al., "Operationa Artemis," 515. The authors write: "After the conclusion of Operation Artemis, Maj. General Jean Pierre Herreweghe in the Council of the EU declared, at a meeting of the New Defence Agenda on 29 September, there the operation demonstrated that the EU had the autonomous capacity to react rapidly (troops were on the ground within seven days of a decision being taken by the PSC), at a distance of 6,500 km. This was, however, partly explained by the fact that the French had begun to plan for the operation even before the Council had initiated the EU planning process in the joint action of 5 June. The operation was also successful in that it had stabilized the security conditions in Bunia without losses."

¹⁵² Ulriksen et al., "Operationa Artemis," 511. With MONUC forces in distress, and escalating destabilization, the Secretary General announced on May 13, 2003, that France had agreed to participate in the intervention in Ituri.

¹⁵³ Faria, "EUISS: Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa," 40. Faria writes: "In the face of such a disastrous humanitarian situation in Ituri and the revival of extreme violence that could seriously threaten the ongoing progress at a national level towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict in DRC, the UN Secretary General appealed to UN members to form a coalition of the willing to end the humanitarian disaster in Ituri..." in addition to MONUC on May 10, 2003.

importance for the EU as the first post-Iraq, multilateral, non-strategic EU intervention,”¹⁵⁴ which remedied a morally reprehensible situation.

1. NATO’s Historical Precedent to Align Morality and Legality: Operation Deliberate Force, 1994

The oppression by military means in the Balkans struck a nerve of the NATO member states. Germany, with its anti-militaristic culture well formed in the decades following World War II and the Cold War, notably presented its aversion to human rights violations by the state and to the prospect of militarized enlargement within the European continent. Following the disintegration of the Yugoslav republics and their international declarations for independence, Serbian nationalist, militarized movements against Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, received United Nation and European Union acclaim on their behalf by Germany.¹⁵⁵

Germany, with the moral imperative to prevent ethnic violence and militarized expansion in Europe, individually absorbed “hundreds of thousands...”¹⁵⁶ Muslim refugees from Bosnia. Germany’s political rhetoric to quell ethnic violence in the early nineties reflected the moral imperative and ethical drive of NATO. The Alliance’s political discourse espoused by Secretary General Manfred Wörner, “who actively encouraged NATO intervention in the Balkans in numerous public appearances,”¹⁵⁷ led to the eventual bombing of Bosnian Serb forces under the auspices of UNSCR 836 of mid-1993 under the subsequent NATO Secretary General Willy Claes’ direction of Operation Deliberate Force.¹⁵⁸ German cultural aversion to militarism, and its requirement for international approval and accord would surface with their apprehensive

¹⁵⁴ Saferworld and International Alert, “International Alert: Publications,” International Alert, February 2004, http://www.international-alert.org/publications/search_results.php?SearchString=Priorities+for+the+Irish+and+Dutch+Presidencies+in+2004 (accessed March 16, 2010): 9–10.

¹⁵⁵ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 736–7. “A 14,000-strong UN force was dispatched to keep the peace and Germany browbeat its EU partners into recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.”

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 738.

¹⁵⁷ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 73.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 78.

position¹⁵⁹ under a similar morally reprehensible situation with an administratively restraining clause during the 1999 Kosovo conflict.

2. A Gap Between Morality and Legality: Operation Allied Force

The NATO intervention in Kosovo during 1999 took form after the Dayton Accords of 1995, written as a peace agreement with diplomatic concessions by Serbs in Bosnia, had aftershock effects in neighboring Kosovo. The military defeat of the Serbs in Bosnia encouraged rebel Kosovar Albanians to “embark on a guerrilla campaign to oust the Serbs in that region.”¹⁶⁰ The political situation in the UN that authorized a Security Council resolution for Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 did not match that of 1998. Hendrickson writes:

Although most states were willing to condemn [President Slobodan] Milosevic’s repressive policies toward the Kosovo Albanians, the United Nations Security Council was divided on whether to authorize military action against Yugoslavia. The Russians and Chinese stood firm in their opposition to the use of force. Both states viewed Yugoslavia’s problems as sovereign in nature, and thus a question best left for the country to resolve internally.¹⁶¹

The Western allies, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, sought approval for reprisals of military enforcement against Serbian atrocities in Kosovo that continued throughout the summer of 1998.¹⁶² Before the UN Security Council in September of that same year, the Western allies secured SCR 1199 which demanded a

¹⁵⁹ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*. 100–1. “In the aftermath of UN Security Council Resolution 1199, with heightened interest from the United States and the United Kingdom in gaining NATO authorization to threaten military action against Milosevic, Solana was still faced with a number of European allies who remained wary over NATO’s legal authority to act without specific UN authorization. Those allies who remained most concerned were Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and, to a lesser extent, France.”

¹⁶⁰ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 741.

¹⁶¹ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 93–4.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 94.

cease to violence, but “no formal approval for military strikes was given.”¹⁶³ In the meantime, Slobodan Milosevic continued to back the Serbian persecution of Kosovar Albanians with “petulant obstinacy.”¹⁶⁴

What began with NATO’s threat of action through shows of force through by aircraft near Serbian borders and diplomatic threats to curb Milosevic’s human-rights transgressions, escalated to the Alliance’s first offensive campaign since its inception. According to Hendrickson, “The political result was that the UN Security Council demonstrated its weak resolve and in effect removed itself from the political debate.”¹⁶⁵ NATO, politically empowered by the United Nations’ lack of legal determination, embodied the “purposes and principles of the United Nations”¹⁶⁶ to create stability and security, and more importantly, to take ethical action from the moral imperative to protect, under sufficient legal basis provided by Serbian noncompliance of UNSCR 1199 with threat of military force. Wasserstein writes, “The declared object was to ‘degrade’ the Yugoslav army’s capacity to assault Albanian civilians in Kosovo... On 9 June 1999 a cease-fire was signed. A [NATO-led] international force, ‘KFOR’, took over as peacekeepers in Kosovo.”¹⁶⁷

Agreement amongst international relations experts exists when condemning NATO’s Operation Allied Force as illegal under international law, due to the lack of specification on the UNSCR. Cooper and Patterson cite Article 2, Section 4 of the UN Charter, in which it notes, “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...”¹⁶⁸ The superficial interpretation of this portion of the UN Charter supports the illegality of March 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo (as presented by Thomas Franck in a

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 741.

¹⁶⁵ Hendrickson, *Diplomacy and War at NATO*, 97.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 101. In addition, Article 52 of the UN Charter states that regional organizations may use force, as long as “their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”

¹⁶⁷ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 741–2.

¹⁶⁸ Cooper and Patterson, “UN Authority and the Morality of Force,” 145.

Foreign Affairs Article in 1999, and Nebojsa Malic on *Global Research* in 2005.)¹⁶⁹
However, Cooper and Patterson conclude:

From a Just War perspective, legitimate political authorities (states) acted on just cause (saving human life in an area where there was know genocide, and generally buttressing regional order) with right intentions (no intent to take over territory or resources). Every attempt was made by NATO leaders to act in a way proportionate to Serb aggression and that would preserve civilian lives (discrimination). Moreover, NATO and its political counterparts (the United States and the European Union) poured billions of dollars into post-conflict Kosovo to secure an enduring peace. In sum, the cause was just (*jus ad bellum*), the war was fought in a morally restrained manner (*jus in bellum*), and the West worked hard to create just and durable peace (*jus post bellum*). Judged from this perspective, the NATO intervention was moral.¹⁷⁰

3. Bridging the Morality and Legality Gap

According to Jackson, proponents of the responsibility to protect doctrine favor political legitimacy over international legality. Assuming international law adapts to current world events in order to enforce morally acceptable norms, then “*ad-hoc*” amendments to the UN Charter based on humanitarian conditions¹⁷¹ represents an adaptive body of legal concepts. Stacy concludes that the Goldstone Commission’s findings on Kosovo requires that the moral imperative to protect must not be overshadowed by a myopic legalistic stance.¹⁷² Stacy states, “[H]uman rights atrocities provided a rationale for *legitimacy* of NATO intervention, if not the *legality*—legitimate because the intervention resolved a humanitarian crisis and had widespread support within the international community and civil society.”¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Cooper and Patterson, “UN Authority and the Morality of Force,” 150.

¹⁷¹ Robert Jackson, “War Perils in the Responsibility to Protect,” *Global Responsibility to Protect* (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 2, no. 3 (2010): 316.

¹⁷² Stacy, “Relational Sovereignty,” 397.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

D. INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE GUARDIAN OF THE PEACE

As a guardian of the peace, NATO compliments the shortfalls of the UN as a political institution capable of waging war. According to James Turner Johnson's fundamental limitation of the UN as an international organization came from defects in its putative claim to authority, when it came to conflict.¹⁷⁴ He argued that a lack of cohesion, sovereignty, and "an effective chain of command for any military force it might place in the midst of an ongoing conflict [would] prevent it from being an effective arm of international statecraft."¹⁷⁵ Ian Thomas however, viewed NATO as a renewing force that would properly allow the UN to function as initially envisioned.¹⁷⁶ An excerpt of Thomas' publication re-imagines NATO's conceptions as: a "foundation of security efforts of the free world," peace promoter for global stability, arms control treaty enforcer, crisis preventer and manager, humanitarian assistance provider, peacekeeper/peacemaker for the UN.¹⁷⁷

As defender of the peace, the Alliance's moral imperative may be interpreted as a global responsibility, however its allegiance is directed to the security of the trans-Atlantic community. This fact does not limit NATO from operations outside its Atlantic reach or specifically on behalf of its member states, as represented by global response to humanitarian action of NATO Response Force's operations during its mission for earthquake relief to Pakistan in October of 2005.¹⁷⁸ With limited resources and concurrent operations, the Alliance also shares the moral responsibility the UN promotes to curtail human suffering with its regional partners (i.e., the European Union, the African Union).

Evidence of the appeal from NATO's promotion of Western values and moral suasion surfaced during the organization's enlargement and the admission of Central and

¹⁷⁴ Cooper and Patterson, "UN Authority and the Morality of Force," 146.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*: 48.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 179–180.

¹⁷⁸ Jasper, "The Capabilities-Based Approach," in *Transforming Defense Capabilities*, 176.

Eastern European countries in the 1990s. Ronald Asmus writes: “Above all, it was about having a security anchor to help consolidate a pro-Western democratic orientation in what historically had been a rough geopolitical neighborhood.”¹⁷⁹ Slovenia, representative of the political acclaim based on Western norms, declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991,¹⁸⁰ received NATO’s political support,¹⁸¹ and joined the Alliance in an eight-year accession process period yielding successful membership in 2002.¹⁸² Wasserstein writes, “By 2005 Slovenia was ranked 26 on the UN Human Development Index, higher than any other ex-Communist state;” in 2011, Slovenia ranks 21 of 187.¹⁸³ As a defender of the peace, NATO delivers stability and peace through continued political and diplomatic support based on congruent moral foundations.

¹⁷⁹ Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002), 12.

¹⁸⁰ Wasserstein, *Barbarism & Civilization*, 734.

¹⁸¹ Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door*, 242. Given a vote of confidence by Italian Prime Minister Prodi arguing, “... Slovenia’s inclusion would [...] provide geographic contiguity and greater cohesion in NATO’s southern flank.”

¹⁸² Slovenia Government PR & Media Office, “Chronology of Slovenian Integration,” 2004, <http://nato.gov.si/eng/slovenia-nato/chronology/> (accessed May 28, 2012).

¹⁸³ United Nations Development Programme, “International Human Development Indicators,” November 2, 2011, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SVN.html> (accessed May 26, 2012).

IV. NATO'S TRANSFORMATION: SECURITY AND RELEVANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's malleable character allows it to meet the requirements posed by modern security challenges that threaten its multinational interests. As the strategic environment develops, the member-nations of the organization continually shape its goals, not only through rhetoric, but through tangible endeavors that overcome political, economic, and adversarial obstacles. As globalization increases, the interconnectedness between NATO members further cements itself under the umbrella of the organization's ideals represented by its fundamental role: "promoting democratic values"¹⁸⁴ and "safeguarding the freedom and security of its member countries by political or military means."¹⁸⁵ Throughout the last six decades, and into the twenty-first century, NATO maintains its relevance through continuous transformation, meeting the security demands of its member-nations as it transcends its moniker of organization, and embodies the characteristics of an institution.

A. CONTEMPORARY INSTITUTIONALIZATION

NATO, through its history and current practices, embodies these qualities and continues to maintain its significance in the geo-strategic environment. In 2009, Allied Command Transformation's Multiple Futures Project argued:

The Alliance must be able to conduct a full range of operations and missions concurrently, ranging from collective defence to demanding stabilisation and reconstruction operations; and from security sector reform to large-scale high-intensity combat operations. Alliance forces must be ready to operate in WMD/E-contaminated environments while

¹⁸⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO: What is NATO?," December 2, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-57E8907C-4C246CA9/natolive/what_is_nato.htm (accessed December 2, 2011).

¹⁸⁵ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO-FAQ," Mar 7, 2012, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-27CD1148-A28EA4C1/natolive/faq.htm#A2> (accessed Mar 7, 2012).

assuring access to and unfettered use of the sea, air, space, and cyberspace global commons. This unfettered access will be pivotal to the success of all Alliance operations.¹⁸⁶

The parallel of Huntington's adaptability concept and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) vision for NATO's required trajectory resounds as loudly as the organization's sexagenarian history.¹⁸⁷ The organization's ability to serve as a facilitator of West Germany's de-occupation by Federal Republic forces,¹⁸⁸ as the "vanguard of the fight against communism,"¹⁸⁹ and security guarantor and United Nations advocate during the Gulf War and Yugoslavian conflict demonstrate its adaptability.¹⁹⁰ NATO flexed to meet the security demands that threatened stability, infringed on human rights and liberties, or challenged rule of law. The alliance met these demands through careful diversification throughout its history to facilitate political dialogue, promote Western ideals, and create mutually beneficial partnerships through its complex structure of offices and directorates that address current and future needs.

The Alliance continually reflects institutional complexity and autonomy, given Huntington's standards. NATO boasts a civilian and military structure that enhances collective security throughout the entire conflict spectrum, with diplomatic resources such as the Public Diplomacy Division and the forward-looking Emerging Security Challenges Division, to the Joint Warfare Centre and NATO Centers of Excellence that train International Security Assistance Force and NATO Response Force members. Regardless of individual member state political inclination or materiel contribution, the collective resources exist to promote codified joint execution procedures that meet, or exceed, the operational environment demands. Despite differences of political opinion, diplomatic consultation and discourse exemplifies the multinational character of NATO, satisfying its institutional requirement of autonomy.

¹⁸⁶ Allied Command Transformation, "Multiple Futures Project: Navigating Toward 2030, Final Report" (April 2009), 9.

¹⁸⁷ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 55. Thomas writes, "NATO was conceived as being a multifaceted organization, capable of solving problems, providing security, and promoting change."

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 187.

The “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” stipulates:

The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.¹⁹¹

Uncompromising standards and accountability for collective benefit distinguish NATO as an organization with a solid defense mindset, which unifies its members under the risk of potentially costly consequences. These standards, as described in Slovenia’s eight-year accession period, represent the coherent quality within the Alliance.

As the analysis proves apparent through historical and conceptual examples, NATO’s degree of institutionalization, along with the characteristics that define it as such, allows the organization to transcend periods of economic strife, political discord, and military action and in-action. As a geo-strategic institution, the flexibility promoted by its civilian and military resource structure make it more than a military alliance: its role spreading democratic ideals, and creating security out of instability and threats through diplomatic, and military means when warranted, increase its relevance and intrinsic value.

B. THREATS TO REGIONAL SECURITY

1. Regional Instability

NATO seeks to maintain regional security and stability, and the protection of its members’ freedoms and interests. In an increasingly globalized world,¹⁹² the instability created by social strife (denial or abuse of human rights) or economic distress produces far-reaching effects that infringe on the “common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law,” that NATO aims to preserve.

¹⁹¹ “Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” *Active Engagement, Modern Defense* (Adopted by the Heads of State and Government, November 20, 2010), 1–9.

¹⁹² Allied Command Transformation, “Multiple Futures Project: Navigating Toward 2030, Final Report” (April 2009), 6.

Scott Jasper, the Chief Operating Officer at the Center for Civil-Military Relations aboard the Naval Post-Graduate School, presents regional instability by characterizing failed or failing states as a source for concern. Jasper explains that “as a result of political disorder, resource corruption, ideologically centered mismanagement, economic collapse and ineffective social infrastructure,”¹⁹³ a failed state produces instability. The author also correlates a weak state’s inability to enforce institutions and laws to the viability of transnational organized crime and violent piracy.¹⁹⁴

Allied Command Transformation deems it necessary to act upon actions undertaken by state, and non-state actors alike, that may de-stabilize regional security, or threaten a NATO member’s interests. The ACT’s Multiple Futures Project (MFP) states, “The Alliance will need to respond to a wide variety of security challenges that are mainly a consequence of destabilisation and the absence of governance.”¹⁹⁵ The MFP adds that the security challenges will stem from “unbridled extremism, uncontrolled and illegal migration, and friction caused by resource scarcity.”¹⁹⁶

NATO’s Heads of State and Government in Lisbon recognize the threat of instability out of NATO’s regional constraints, which may also foster “extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.”¹⁹⁷ The Strategic Concept for Defense and Security goes further and highlights the vulnerability of international trade routes that may threaten the energy security and prosperity of member nations.¹⁹⁸ The economic arena’s vulnerability comes into focus as the implication of organized criminal activity, and its detrimental social, and economic effects surface to create instability. Criminal activity destabilizes not only public safety, but also the legitimacy of the local government (which may fall prey to corruptive

¹⁹³ Scott Jasper, “The Capabilities-Based Approach,” in *Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security* (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2009), 4.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Allied Command Transformation, “Multiple Futures Project,” 6.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ “Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” *Active Engagement, Modern Defense* (Adopted by the Heads of State and Government, November 20, 2010), 1–9.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

practices). Loss of legitimacy may erode credibility in the domestic regime's capability to maintain governance, creating a loss of sovereignty.

Intra-national and international corruption delegitimizes governments, empowers criminal organizations and individuals, and threatens the stability of global order by skewing economic investment into the world market.¹⁹⁹ Economic destabilization in nascent capitalist countries²⁰⁰ with fledgling economies present optimal opportunities for predatory and nefarious activity that can become breeding grounds for corrupt practices; this in turn could result in inordinate wealth misallocation that produces global market discrepancies. Ensuring international trade assets and governments with whom NATO members conduct business maintain comparable economic ethical trade standards, transparency, and focus on transnational crime, remains high on the organization's priorities through bilateral work with the UN.²⁰¹

2. Ideology

The most influential threat, because of its destructive power, lies in the multi-cultural arena. Francis Fukuyama writes, "Nationalism has been a threat to liberalism historically in Germany, and continues to be one in isolated parts of 'post-historical' Europe like Northern Ireland... Certainly a great deal of the world's ethnic and nationalist tension can be explained in terms of peoples who are forced to live in unrepresentative political systems that they have not chosen."²⁰² John J. Mearsheimer writes:

[H]ypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation-states are both inferior and threatening, is perhaps the single greatest domestic threat to peace, although it is still not a leading force in world politics. Hypernationalism arose in the past among European states because most

¹⁹⁹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment" (UNODC, 2010).

²⁰⁰ Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers," *Sage*, September 1993, <http://pas.sagepub.com> (accessed March 26, 2010).

²⁰¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *UNODC Executive Director meets European Union officials and attends NATO briefing on mission to Brussels*, March 2011, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/eds-corner/March2011/unodc-executive-director-meets-european-union-officials-and-attends-nato-briefing-on-mission-to-brussels.html> (accessed March 5, 2012).

²⁰² Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," in *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on the Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York, NY: Pearson Education, 2003), 13.

of them were nation-states—states composed mainly of people from a single ethnic group—that existed in an anarchic world, under constant threat from other states. In such a system, people who love their own nation can easily come to be contemptuous of the nationalities inhabiting opposing states. The problem is worsened when domestic elites demonize a rival nation to drum up support for national-security policy²⁰³

Fervent nationalism, with its highly politicized quality and mass appeal, can misinform, distort, and manipulate ideology to meet its political end through violent means. September 11, 2001, represented the start of another protracted engagement with global repercussions. Osama Bin Laden, a radical Islamic militant,²⁰⁴ claimed responsibility, justifying the actions as a threat to the beliefs of “more than a billion Muslim followers around the world.”²⁰⁵ Although not a conventional threat of nation-state versus nation-state, the antagonistic view that killed over 3,000 innocent civilians materializes from a skewed and manipulated ideology. Harnessing a political agenda through emotionally charged concepts like religion and nationalism promotes the rise of non-state actors and groups that employ irregular warfare tactics to achieve their goals.

3. Irregular Warfare and the Fourth Generation War

Colin S. Gray differentiates between regular and irregular warfare, noting that the former involves warfare between regular armed forces sponsored by the state to meet political objectives; meanwhile, the latter involves the regime’s “coercive armed forces”²⁰⁶ versus “irregular armed forces of non-state political entities.”²⁰⁷ Its “asymmetric”²⁰⁸ quality, given the imbalance of strategic and tactical advantages and

²⁰³ John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” in *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York, NY: Pearson Education, 2003), 21.

²⁰⁴ Paul Gordon Lauren, Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time*, 4th Edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 119.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 120.

²⁰⁶ Robert M. Fishman, “Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy,” *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 429.

²⁰⁷ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 245.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

disadvantages,²⁰⁹ presents the irregular warfare practitioner with the need to resort to guerrilla tactics and terrorism to achieve its strategic goals.

John Shy and Thomas W. Collier categorize irregular warfare as a necessity of revolutionary war. Revolutionary warfare, according to these authors, “refers to the seizure of political power by the use of armed force.”²¹⁰ Irregular warfare, as grouped by Shy and Collier, encompasses the type of combat operations that subcategorizes the means of a revolutionary war as “political mobilization of people, legal political action, strikes, agitation, and terrorism,”²¹¹ (also including guerrilla tactics).

Although scholarly discord amongst the aforementioned authors exists regarding terminology categorization,²¹² the overarching concept of disparity between the regulars and irregulars with respect with capabilities, training, and equipment remains constant. However, these authors conceptually agree on the high degree of political thrust that propels irregular warfare. Gray contends that irregular warfare weighs “the relative political strength of the belligerents,”²¹³ and Shy and Collier rely on the visited definition of revolutionary war and its use of unconventional tactics to achieve a seizure of power.

Carl Schmitt, a legal and political theorist of the early twentieth century, presents the concept of the political in a reductionist approach that ultimately, and definitively distinguishes friend from enemy.²¹⁴ Schmitt further explains that the friend/foe distinction “denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation.”²¹⁵ The psychology of the political, therefore, allows “[e]ach participant [...] a position to judge

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 246.

²¹⁰ John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 817.

²¹¹ Shy and Collier, “Revolutionary War,” 817.

²¹² Ibid., 815–862. By subcategorizing guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and the concept of irregular warfare under the veil of revolutionary war, the authors diverge from the usage Colin S. Gray employs for irregular warfare, and lean more towards political pursuit of power and the eventual displacement of the governing regime through unconventional means.

²¹³ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 247.

²¹⁴ Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 26.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence."²¹⁶ This engenders the viability of violent conflict between the regulars and irregulars through an antagonistic indoctrination promoted by the leaders that set political, strategic, and tactical guidelines.

The antithesis of being, represented by Carl Schmitt's concept of the political, characterizes an irreconcilable difference that, if allowed to exist, detrimentally affects each opposing groups' *raison d'être*. From an ideological standpoint, the political aspect of irregular warfare exemplifies the inability to coexist, exemplified by the Cold War's capitalist and communist players.²¹⁷ Theoretically, this political force supports Samuel P. Huntington's claim of a state's strife that occurs at the "fault lines[,] between civilizations"²¹⁸ that transcend nation-state borders and ideological boundaries. Following Huntington's theory that maintains "nation states as the most powerful actors in world affairs,"²¹⁹ the implication of weaker nations and civilizations rising and creating conflict through fundamental,²²⁰ irreconcilable and non-negotiable differences,²²¹ presents the opportunity for the employment of irregular warfare. With the opposing groups' political strength on the balance, the strategic and tactical problems that arise, and each groups' capability to adjust in an ever-changing environment, decide the victor in this type of warfare.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

²¹⁷ Kennan, "George Kennan's 'Long Telegram,'" *National Security Archive*.

²¹⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 29.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 25.

²²¹ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 260. Gray writes: "The problem is that those goals happen to be wildly unreasonable in the view of other cultures. It is true to claim that its objectives are so radical as to be non-negotiable, but it is incorrect to argue that it has no real political agenda. Led by the charismatic Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda demands the removal of allegedly apostate Islamic regimes; the restoration of the Caliphate as the source of supreme Islamic authority over the whole of the Dar ul Islam [...] and the elimination of Western non-, even anti-Islamic influence and practices from the Middle East... [T]he movement's ideologically driven agenda is not of a kind that lends itself to a process of give and take. Unlike Irish or Palestinian terrorist organizations, al Qaeda, claiming religious sanction for its absolute demands, cannot be bribed to the conference table and offered some fraction of its demands."

According to Jasper, the employment of “asymmetric methods to achieve political outcomes...” gives way to “Fourth generation” warfare.²²² Jasper explains how this latest iteration of warfare²²³ aims to “collapse the enemy from within by destroying public support and political will.”²²⁴ Colin Gray presents his precept that the “strategic currency” in the “true battle space of irregular warfare ... is the will of the civilian population.”²²⁵ Gray further explains that “modern irregular warfare is all about the allegiance, or tolerance, of the civilian population,” in which “the minds of the people are the zone of strategic and political decision.”²²⁶ The allegiance of the populace becomes the critical factor for regular, or irregular, progress, as it holds the power to perpetuate their cause. Jasper and Gray’s agreement on the importance and vitality of populace is recognized by the Bi-Strategic Commands at SACEUR and SACT assessment of Hybrid Threats as “one of the Alliance’s target Centres of Gravity (CoG).”²²⁷ The importance and support of the local populace foments legitimacy, and ultimately denies the enemy its “indistinguishable”²²⁸ characteristic that provides them freedom of movement that makes their guerrilla, or terrorist, tactics so effective.

C. NATO’S RESPONSE TO THE FOURTH GENERATION WAR

The present security situation presents NATO with a threat of collective security and economic interests based on ideology, and the task to defuse another possible catastrophic event. A hybrid threat, as defined by the NATO Bi-Strategic Command comprised of SACEUR, and Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation (SACT), has “the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means

²²² Jasper, “The Capabilities-Based Approach,” 12.

²²³ Ibid. “The first generation of modern warfare encompassed massed manpower and the line and column tactics of the Napoleonic Wars, the second was dominated by massed firepower in the heavy artillery barrages of World War I, and the third was characterized by nonlinear maneuver starting with the German blitzkrieg in World War II.”

²²⁴ Jasper, “The Capabilities-Based Approach,” 12.

²²⁵ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 254.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Bi-SC, “NATO Capstone Concept,” 4.

²²⁸ Bi-SC, “NATO Capstone Concept,” 5.

adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.”²²⁹ An enemy that presents global-strategic security threats to the Alliance characterized by an indistinguishable quality, coercive approach, and aims to delegitimize and destroy political will proves to be a formidable adversary. However, as indiscernible and nebulous as the adversary may be, it provides NATO with a unifying focus that hastens concepts and prototypes, and the dissemination of tactics, techniques, and procedures that minimize the asymmetric gap.

1. Transformative Vision

NATO has proven efficient at re-inventing itself to through rhetoric and conceptualization,²³⁰ according Ian Thomas, to meet the demands of its current environment. Thomas also explains how Under Secretary of State George Ball compared the organization to living organisms “show[ing] a capability of adjustment to change... [NATO] has undergone a profound transformation into a major element in the Atlantic Partnership.”²³¹

Jasper develops this transformation concept, which replaced the term of “revolution in military affairs.”²³² Jasper defines transformation as:

... a continuous process that shapes the nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies, streamlined organizational structures, innovative processes, and adaptive personnel developments that exploit national advantages and protect against asymmetric vulnerabilities. By definition, transformation has no end state.²³³

Defense transformation for NATO means higher diversification in the conflict spectrum, whilst maintaining core competency in regular warfare.

²²⁹ Ibid., 2.

²³⁰ Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 187.

²³¹ Ibid., 70.

²³² Jasper, “The Capabilities-Based Approach,” 3.

²³³ Jasper, “The Capabilities-Based Approach,” 2–3.

With the understanding that the fourth generation warfare environment will likely develop in an urban setting,²³⁴ in which local populace will be the strategic currency,²³⁵ a notable requirement arises. Recognized throughout the majority of the NATO transformation literature, the need to fill a cultural knowledge gap remains evident. The Bi-SC Input to a New NATO Capstone Concept highlights the need to “understand a wide range of ethnic groups and cultures, systems and structures” so as to not alienate local populations.²³⁶ James A. Winnefeld recognizes the value of Purdue University’s Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS) during training, to qualify and quantify the effects of joint operations on local population attitudes.²³⁷ Dr. Thomas G. Mahnken, a scholar in the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, proposes the need for culturally adept military personnel. Mahnken states, “They should have an understanding of foreign culture and language and be able to work closely with allies and friends.”²³⁸

The interoperability and compatibility promoted by joint training and exercises will increase with repetition and experience.²³⁹ The NATO Response Force, which materialized after the NATO Summit in Prague 2002, “served as a symbol of the

²³⁴ Bi-SC, “NATO Capstone Concept,” 4.

²³⁵ Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations*, 254.

²³⁶ Bi-SC, “NATO Capstone Concept,” 4.

²³⁷ James A. Winnefeld, Jr., “Joint Experimentation: Shaping Doctrine and Capabilities,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (National Defense University Press) 1st Quarter, no. 44 (2007) 48. Winnefeld, Jr., provides a review of cultural attributes and the effects of joint action at the tactical and operational level provided by the Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS) (formerly part of the Joint Futures Laboratory, USJFCOM).

²³⁸ Thomas G. Mahnken, “A New Grand Bargain: Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Defense Planning,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 4th Quarter, no. 55 (2009): 13.

²³⁹ Paul Giarra, “The NATO Response Force Initiative,” in *Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009) 174. Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuar L. Koehl explain: “As it gains operational experience, the NRF will identify capability and interoperability shortfalls that in turn will drive new capability and interoperability requirements.”

alliance's deliberate commitment to improve its collective military capabilities, as well as an endorsement of transformation in general."²⁴⁰ Paul Giarra shares a brief description of the NRF:

The NRF is a rapidly deployable multinational unit made up of land, air, maritime and special forces components. Numbering some 24,000 troops when it reaches full operating capability in October 2006, it will be able to start to deploy after five days' notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days or longer if resupplied.²⁴¹

NATO's systematic standby system for NRF responsibility reflects communal burden-sharing, and a transformative trajectory. NATO directives individually prescribe that all technological and training advantages be prioritized for NRF usage and experimentation.²⁴² The NRF, if not eclipsed by the predominance of ISAF Afghanistan, becomes critical in the NATO's transformative mission due to the inherent benefits for concepts, development, and experimentation; not to mention the effects in optimizing joint training doctrine.

D. NATO'S TRANSFORMATION

Cultural differences must not only be recognized, but also taken into consideration as part of this nation's strategic framework. Divergence between our nation's and other non-Western nations' ideology on religion, politics, civil rights and liberties can create obstacles for progress, or undue friction. Special consideration to culture, its degree of importance, and its heavy integration, from the strategic to the tactical level, should be instituted to produce beneficial results and trends that enhance our legitimacy. Cultural grievances triggered by misunderstandings or lack of cultural knowledge may generate fervent nationalism,²⁴³ which may threaten stability and our regional security.

²⁴⁰ Giarra, "The NATO Response Force Initiative," 171.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 172.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 181.

²⁴³ Fukuyama, "The End of History?," in *Conflict After the Cold War*, 13.

Providing collective security within a multinational construct creates political friction due to the communal burden of this monumental task. In economically austere times, NATO's Secretary General Rasmussen's call for a "smart defense" approach may provide the most palatable solution, given the tightening of defense budgets.²⁴⁴ The greater multi-national cooperation, beneficial political resolve, and open dialogue with emerging powers to maintain security and stability resonate from the Secretary General's proposal like the consensus, consultation, and multi-lateral understanding which have kept NATO on line despite internal discord.

Despite challenging threats and an evolving security environment, NATO has managed to administer internal politics, adapt to tangible security threats, and has emerged as more than a military alliance. Historically, NATO's evolution from conflict to conflict accelerated its institutionalization and development as an organization. NATO's ability to transform and shape-shift to counter modern challenges are a testament to its adaptability.

²⁴⁴ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General, "NATO after Lybia," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2011): 1-3.

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V. A FORCE FOR THE FUTURE

Garnering political and legal legitimacy in order to meet the requirements of *ius ad bellum* is as challenging as maintaining the moral superiority during the conduct of war, and furthermore, during the actions post-bellum. The representation of Western ideals, and by default the representation of the trans-Atlantic community through NATO operations, gains a higher degree of difficulty due to the transparency of actions supported by the Alliance through real-time media and non-governmental organization coverage of combat and rebuilding operations.

The humanistic approach to adequately protect civilians, discern combatants from non-combatants, and deftly determine whether to apply military force due to life-saving necessity are the hallmarks of the NATO's Rules of Engagement. The adaptability to the law of armed conflict comes not out of convenience, but through tactical experience and educated recommendations, which reflects the evolving nature of combat. In order to meet the protective requirement of military leaders to defend non-combatants and their troops alike, in combat scenarios of irregular warfare with increasing difficulty where the enemy's center of gravity rests on its ability to seamlessly blend into the civilian population, political leaders and diplomats of the Alliance support and endorse directives which foment the tactical latitude to meet this need. NATO's COMISAF Tactical Directive provide the morally correct guidance that delineates its members' duty and tempers the use the military force against an enemy that subscribes to no sort of moral restraint in the conduct of war. As will be discussed in chapter 4, the challenge of irregular warfare depicts the major ethical factor that distinguishes ISAF troops as morally superior from anti-Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) forces: adherence to internationally accepted means and modes of violence during the conduct of war.

After diminishing the violence and restoring governance, the Alliance faces and demonstrates the responsibility to rebuild. Timothy Garton-Ash lists Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan (to name a few mentioned in this study) as twenty-first century international

occupation “state-building” enterprises.²⁴⁵ The author urges the trans-Atlantic community to maintain resolve, “and not sullenly withdraw, leaving the job half done.”²⁴⁶ Garton-Ash contends, “It is in failed states, such as Afghanistan, that militant extremists and international terrorists find a congenial home.”²⁴⁷

The responsibility to rebuild receives a moral analysis by Alexandra Gheciu and Jennifer Welsh in 2009. The two authors critique the “Kantian-inspired arguments about international democracy promotion”²⁴⁸ and the establishment of an ethical imperative to rebuild states out of a “special responsibility to rebuild after the implementation of force, a duty to project democracy as a cosmopolitan value, a rendering of the duties of statesmanship, and lastly through a desire to restore self-determination.”²⁴⁹ Gheciu and Welsh write:

Following the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the problem of unstable (particularly postconflict) states acquired new urgency, as such states came to be seen as likely hosts for terrorist movements and, as such, the source of a significant unconventional threat to international security. It thereby became especially important for international actors to contribute to postconflict reconstruction in order to minimize the potential breeding grounds for terrorism. In particular, from this perspective international actors engaged in reconstruction need to develop more effective ways to support progressive, peaceful groups in target societies, and to work with the local population to identify and defeat extremist factions.

In addition to critically assessing the political focus of statesmen on reconstruction with self-interest in mind (versus duty) to ensure security, the authors highlight the lack of consideration given to local populations and the possibility that the promotion of democracy may “destroy arrangements that might promote stability, or that might be perceived as legitimate by the local population.”²⁵⁰

²⁴⁵ Garton-Ash, *Free World*, 223.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 224.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 222.

²⁴⁸ Gheciu and Welsh, “The Imperative to Rebuild,” 130.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 123.

²⁵⁰ Gheciu and Welsh, “The Imperative to Rebuild,” 139.

To meet this demand in Afghanistan, ISAF member nations contribute culturally trained forces into military transition teams, composed primarily of Afghan nationals, in order to train, educate, and create a self-sustaining, indigenous security force. Furthermore, the requirement to respect and foment unity within the local population and their social networks receives pedagogic attention at the highest levels of the Alliance's military structure. In concert with UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA), NATO continues to provide security, rebuild national infrastructure, and distributes funds necessary to establish a legitimate regime for GIRoA. Under a legal and legitimate operation with over a decade of combat and reconstruction operations, ISAF collaterally "identifies reconstruction needs, such as rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities, restoring water supplies providing support for other civil-military relations."²⁵¹

NATO's ability to continually adapt to contemporary challenges will allow it to remain at the forefront of the regional security and collective defense arena. By operating with just cause and ethical resolve behind its actions, the Alliance's endeavors will remain morally justifiable. NATO's adaptive nature will enhance its vitality, and its moral imperative will keep NATO relevant by providing the impulse for action to meet its global security demands.

Garnering universal support for security operation from the United Nations has proven difficult due to national individualistic political agendas. However, as a sanctioning body, the UN's shortcomings as the global conduit for international accord and legal consent shift the responsibility for action to regional security actors. NATO's operations must display political legitimacy through sufficient legal basis, so as not to discredit its credibility.

Training for the tactical units and the lowest echelon level civilian counterparts within the Alliance must continually address operational shortcomings, in order to meet the demands of NATO strategy. Clear articulation of the Alliance's mission, its moral

²⁵¹ NATO, "ISAF-Mandate," April 29, 2009, <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/index.html> (accessed May 27, 2012). "ISAF has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Nine UN Security Resolutions—1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776 and 1833—relate to ISAF... The NATO mission itself was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference of December 2001."

imperative and just cause, will empower its troops to ethically carry out their mission. National militaries must ensure proper cultural training for their troops, so that they may contribute to the Alliance's mission effectively on foreign soil.

Imparting cultural knowledge will increase NATO troops' and members' effectiveness by enhancing environmental understanding and awareness, thereby producing troops that may effectively operate within a foreign environment. Navigating through unfamiliar cultural networks and structures and overcoming language barriers have become priorities as our world increasingly hosts fourth generation warfare scenarios. NATO troops must learn to effectively communicate with the civilian population of the conflict host-nation in order to harness their allegiance and political support.

By clearly articulating the organization's political intent and identifying the leadership's desired end-state, the Alliance's operational- and tactical-level members may understand how to creatively employ their available means within the applicable constraints to meet the mission's demands. Understanding the political environment at the lower levels may eventually lead to viewing rules of engagement as empowering legalese that protects non-combatants and troops alike. Training on the laws of war requires an emphasis on moral responsibility to protect human life and should present ROE as the legal representation of guidelines to achieve their political objective.

NATO must continue to abide by the law of war, deliver coercive military force proportionally and with discrimination, and take the proper steps to win the peace after winning the war. Ethical restraint while providing military support and moral accountability during security and state-building operations must remain the hallmarks of action while promoting Western ideals. The Alliance's steadfast determination to promote rule of law, and democratic and free-market economic practices during the state-building operations will prove beneficial to the organization's commitment to stability and security.

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