

ADAPTATIONS TO CURRICULUM AT THE QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL
OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSE DURING WORLD WAR II

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Military History

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ABSTRACT

ADAPTATIONS TO CURRICULUM AT THE QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL
OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSE DURING WORLD WAR II, by Major Bryan J.
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The United States Army faced an officer shortage while mobilizing before World War II. General George C. Marshall, pushed for the creation of Officer Candidate Schools as a method to bridge the officer personnel gap. OCS generated the largest numbers of officers during World War II.

The Quartermaster School faced the same dilemma as all other branch schools. It used a peacetime curriculum when establishing the training program for their officer candidate course. While a good effort, the faculty could not have correctly anticipated the specific training requirements of junior officers in World War II. The performance of junior officers was a point of consistent inquiry at The Quartermaster School and throughout the Army Leadership. They routinely reviewed both the content of their courses but also the efficacy of their product. This inquisitive culture resulted in numerous adaptations to the overall program. The thesis argues that The Quartermaster School actively sought to adjust its curriculum during World War II in response to reports from combat theaters and realized need for change.

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ACRONYMS

AAF	Army Air Forces
AGF	Army Ground Forces
ASF	Army Service Forces
MTCA	Military Training Camps Association
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OTC	Officer Training Camps
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
USMA	United States Military Academy
VOC	Volunteer Officer Candidate
WD	War Department

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Fort Benning OCS became the model or prototype, for all future OCS's, carefully studied and copied by representatives from the other branches . . . I consider the founding of the Fort Benning OCS my greatest contribution to the mobilization effort.

— General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, *A General's Life*

At the outset of World War II, the United States Army faced an officer shortage while mobilizing after President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared a period of national emergency in September 1939. The existing inventory of officers, including the Regular Army, National Guard, and the Officer Reserve Corps, was insufficient to staff the force as well as to guide the army through expansion. The Army did not design its traditional commissioning sources, the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs at colleges throughout the country, for either rapid expansion or acceleration. General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, recognized this and pushed for the creation of Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) as a way to fill the gap. The Officer Candidate Schools generated the largest numbers of officers during World War II.

OCS had a twofold mission, the training of officer candidates and the selection of those students for commissioning. Unlike West Point and ROTC, OCS would have a compressed time to both train candidates as Soldiers and leaders, and accurately assess their suitability as combat leaders. Due to the short duration of training, OCS would teach only the most critical skills. Selection and assessment of candidates therefore, likely had a greater effect on the success in combat than a specific program of instruction in the

schools. Faculty and academic boards at OCS were largely Regular Army Officers and in some cases World War I veterans. While their experience would be invaluable to the initial establishment of the training programs, they may not have correctly anticipated the specific training requirements of junior officers in World War II. The initial courses would ultimately require adjustments based on actual combat experience.

All branch schools faced the same dilemma; The Quartermaster School was no different. Prior to the war, the training regimen for officers at The Quartermaster School was well suited to the peacetime army. It used this curriculum when establishing the training program for The Quartermaster Officer Candidate Course. Notably, the course opened before the nation entered World War II. This study will argue that The Quartermaster School adjusted its curriculum during World War II in response to reports from combat and realized need for change.

Research Methodology

This study addresses several questions. How did the U.S. Army select and train junior officers for in World War II? Did a system exist to provide feedback to branch schools, and in particular to The Quartermaster School, on the effectiveness of their graduates in World War II? Did the curriculum at The Quartermaster School adjust during World War II and how? Did the performance of U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps junior officers and units in World War II identify gaps in the curriculum used to train officer candidates? Is there a link between performance in combat and changes to the Quartermaster Officer Candidate School curriculum?

The first chapter discusses generally the situation faced in the United States in the period leading to mobilization. Chapter 2 will discuss the Army's efforts specific to

officer training and the establishment of Officer Candidate Schools. Chapter 3 will provide a brief history of The Quartermaster School and in particular of officer training there. Chapter 4 will cover the operations of the Quartermaster Officer Candidate School. Chapter 4 will also detail the program of instruction at the Quartermaster Officer Candidate Course and adjustments to that curriculum during the period of 1941 to 1945. Chapter 5 will provide conclusions drawn from the research on the Quartermaster Officer Candidate Course. It will also answer the research questions stated above and provide recommendations for future research and areas of further study.

Strategic Background

Fifty-eight nations fought in World War II. Of these, the United States was arguably the strongest, and it emerged as such by the end. At the onset of the conflict, this was not readily apparent. In 1939, America had a small, volunteer, professional army of less than 190,000 men. These forces were scattered across the nation and included detachments in Hawaii, the Philippines, the Caribbean, and Panama. It had nine infantry divisions in theory, but could only count three as even marginally effective at half strength. The others were at cadre strength only. Two horse-mounted cavalry divisions still existed, one in reality and one that existed only on paper. The Army had but 110 tanks; all were in the 7th Mechanized Brigade and in independent infantry tank battalions, the nation's only armored units. Nearly all Army organizations were undermanned and under equipped.¹

¹Christopher R. Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Washington: Center of Military History), 8.

In reserve, the nation maintained eighteen divisions in the National Guard. Totalling no more than 198,000, the National Guard was in far worse shape than the active force in terms of personnel. Adding to the National Guard's challenges was lack of training and effective leadership. Officers of the National Guard in many cases were political and their appointments often had more to do with loyalty than ability. The regular army did not consider them equals and active duty schools invested little in training reserve personnel.²

Officers of the period were primarily trainers and administrators of units. Non-commissioned officers were competent and professional, but did not carry the same authority or responsibility for individual training as in contemporary times. Senior officers of the Army knew that the nation would need to be prepared for rapid mobilization in case of war. The vast Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, however, offered a cushion of security that soothed less the less anxious. Nevertheless, the War Department developed a mobilization plan for both materiel and personnel to respond to war overseas or at home.³

In 1939, then Brigadier General George C. Marshall considered the United States Army a "third rate power."⁴ This was powerful testimony to the Congress from the Deputy Chief of Staff. If the nation did not yet see war on the horizon, General Marshall

²Hanson W. Baldwin, *The Crucial Years: 1939-1941, The World at War* (New York: Harper and Row), 24-25.

³*Ibid.*, 24-25.

⁴Mark S. Watson, *United States Army in World War II, The War Department, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army), 148.

and the Chief of Staff, General Malin Craig, did. In the spring of that year, General Craig directed the war plans division to begin looking at how to prepare the army should war break out in Europe or Asia. General Marshall would continue the planning when he assumed the office of Chief of Staff after Craig's retirement on 1 July 1939. As indications of war grew more apparent, General Marshall approved a series of actions that the Army would initiate on the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, short of mobilization.⁵

The Army Begins to Grow and Reorganize

The invasion of Poland by Germany on 1 September 1939 set off a chain of events that would lead the United States Army to begin the largest mobilization in its history. President Franklin D. Roosevelt officially declared the United States neutral on 5 September 1939. This proclamation would provide little true defense against aggression and he likely did not believe that the United States could long stay out of the fighting. He therefore declared a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939 and by executive order authorized the Army to grow by 17,000 men.⁶

This increase would only raise the active force to 227,000. Additional increases to the National Guard would see their numbers grow to 280,000. As a measure of how far stretched the Army was during the interwar period, this growth failed to build it up to a size authorized in the 1920 National Defense Act. To accomplish that would require an additional 50,000 regular army and another 200,000 guardsmen. Roosevelt did not think

⁵Watson, 153-155.

⁶Ibid., 156. While the executive order began the expansion, Congress later validated the action by voting for the subsequent finding to support the action.

that the nation would accept anything more than what he initially announced but privately reassured Marshall that more would be forthcoming.⁷

The 17,000-man increase benefited the infantry mainly; however, it would take more than just more infantrymen to forge an effective fighting force. Coupling the personnel expansion with a reorganization of the division structure enabled the Army to expand three half-strength formations to five that could be organized and manned to conduct training. The solution was in geometry: changing the organization of the division from “square” to “triangular.”⁸ A square division had four infantry regiments organized into two brigades and numbered nearly 28,000. This was an appropriate design for the type of linear warfare experience in World War I. The square gave the division a wide front and the ability to send successive waves of men forward in the attack by echeloning the battalions within the regiments and regiments within the division. While the Army had long since abandoned the tactics, the structure remained.⁹

The new triangular division had fewer men but was more flexible. The organization centered its components on units of three. Each of its three regiments had a battalion of artillery in direct support and the division retained its ability to provide general support from one battalion of heavy guns. This structure allowed the division to either mass as one or operate as three separate combined infantry-artillery teams. One other notable distinction of the triangular division was the abandoning of draft animals in

⁷Watson, 157.

⁸Ibid., 158.

⁹Gabel, 10.

favor of new technology. With the new division came the introduction of motorization and mechanization across the force.¹⁰

The organization of the new division also allowed for the formation of units at the corps and theater army level to provide support. New units would form to provide engineering and medical functions. Quartermaster trains would also organize into functional units operating in the Corps and Army rear areas. All these enablers would be required to form the next higher echelons of organization that an expanding Army would need.¹¹

Continued Expansion Planning

Both the U.S. Government and particularly the Army spent 1940 carefully noting world developments. As Nazi advances across Europe pressed forward, the Army headquarters continually reviewed its manning level and began to formulate requests for additional funding. General Marshall feared an initially proposed supplemental increase in active end strength to 255,000 would not be enough. He began to warn Congress and President Roosevelt that much more would be required of materiel and men. On 17 May 1940, he testified to the Senate Appropriations committee that the regular Army should expand up to 400,000 in order to avoid mobilizing the National Guard. Congress responded by authorizing the Army to grow to its 1920 authorized strength of 280,000. In

¹⁰Gabel, 11.

¹¹Watson, 159.

less than one month, Marshall had secured the immediate support of Congress along with indications that it would support his further requests as the situation demanded.¹²

Marshall wasted no time in directing the War Department staff to begin planning for ever larger numbers in the coming years. He anticipated that the Army would grow to 500,000 by 1 July 1941 and then at an exponential rate to two million by July 1942. Eventually the staff at the War Department began looking to four million as the planning horizon. However, closing the distance between planning the size of an Army and actually getting men in uniform was a tremendous undertaking. Industry could not support the materiel requirements for a 4,000,000 man Army in such a short period and therefore Marshall directed that planning priority be continued at the two million target.¹³

The authorizations from Congress for additional men came with an increase in funding for the military. Marshall felt that the best way to prepare for an expanded force was to modernize the current army. This would necessarily begin with munitions and armament procurement. Finally, the Army had the funding it had lacked for the previous twenty years, and Marshall's intention was to provide the men coming in with the best equipment possible.¹⁴

Filling the Ranks: A Peacetime Draft

But where would the additional men come from? Two options were clear, a draft or a volunteer effort by civilian leaders to recruit citizens to service. The former would be

¹²Watson, 164-168.

¹³Ibid., 169-177.

¹⁴Gabel, 12.

expedient. It would take only 45 days to muster 750,000 new recruits. Envisioning the sheer numbers, Marshall asked the Quartermaster General if the Army had enough tents to accommodate so large a force. No garrison facilities within the service existed that could billet those numbers.¹⁵

The latter would be an end run around the Congress, as it would not require additional legislative authority. While Congress had generally been supportive of the Army to this point, its focus had been on equipping and manning a peacetime Army. A peacetime draft brought with it political consequences. Roosevelt understood that and did not push for action from Capitol Hill. The Army leadership also appeared hesitant to push the Congress for anything else given their recent success in appropriations.¹⁶

There was another reason why the Army was not receptive to the draft at first and that was training. With the previously authorized increases in manpower, it was having a difficult time training the new forces. The anemic size of the prewar Army was causing growing pains. As new soldiers entered the force, the Army needed ever-increasing numbers of officers to train them. The new units forming in the field also needed additional officers.

Three sources of officers were immediately available: the Regular Army, the National Guard and recent graduates of the Reserve Officer Training Corps. The regulars soon spread across the force in an attempt to push as much experience out as possible. The National Guard was full of raw recruits itself and lagged far behind the regular Army in training. The third group of officers, recent graduates of the Reserve Officer Training

¹⁵Watson, 184-185.

¹⁶Ibid., 184-185.

Corps, numbered about 100,000. They were available and relatively well trained but lacked field time and practical experience.¹⁷

Another source of officers was the Officer Reserve Corps. These men were commissioned officers, ranging in service from World War I veterans to ROTC graduates of the interwar period. Members of the Officer Reserve Corps were not on active duty but remained subject to mobilization. The Army mobilization plans relied heavily on this pool of officers.

As Germany swept into France and began attacking Britain from the air, Congress swept aside Marshall's concern. On 20 June 1940, it began debate on a peacetime conscription act. Passage grew likely throughout the summer and Marshall saw all too clearly that the immediate influx of draftees would swamp the ability of the current nine divisions to accept them. He then advocated the mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve. The Protective Mobilization Plan for the Army called for their activation and he would need their organizations to begin accepting draftees.¹⁸

Role of the Military Training Camps Association

The Selective Service Act passed easily that September and required all males between the ages of 21 and 35 to register for one year of service beginning on 16 October. The Army may not have pushed for a draft but a group loosely affiliated with

¹⁷Watson, 185-186.

¹⁸Gabel, 12-13.

them, did. The Military Training Camps Association was a large supporter of the conscription act and rallied much of the support in Congress behind its passage.¹⁹

The Military Training Camps Association organized in 1915 from graduates of the Plattsburg Movement. The movement took its name from Plattsburg Barracks in upstate New York. There in 1915, several businessmen, in response to the sinking of the *Lusitania*, organized a military camp for older gentlemen to receive training in preparation for war. The camp received all its funding entirely through private donations. General Leonard Wood, then Chief of Staff of the Army, agreed to provide officers and equipment to run the camp. Over 3,000 men participated that summer.²⁰

The MTCA organized a similar camp in 1916 and planned another for 1917. It firmly believed that military training of civilians was an important part of national defense. When war with Germany came in World War I, the MTCA urged that its 1917 summer camp transform into an officer training camp, capable of commissioning officers into the Army. The War Department General Staff offered no other acceptable alternative. After initial hesitations, the Secretary of War agreed. He authorized three rounds of three-month camps at 16 locations around the country, each with a capacity of 2,500 men.²¹

The camps opened as Officer Training Schools. The candidates accepted into these camps were former officers and officers holding reserve commissions in the

¹⁹Milton M. McPherson, *The ninety Day Wonders: OCS and the Modern American Army* (Fort Benning: United States Army Officer Candidate School Association), 59.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 27-28.

²¹*Ibid.*, 30-31.

Organized Reserve Corps. Current students enrolled in the Reserve Officer Training Corps program also attended. No candidates came from the enlisted ranks.²²

Morale Problems of a Drafted Army

The mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve in August 1940 did not immediately bring all units into active duty. Their mobilization staggered over the next several months with the latest units called to active duty in late spring of 1941. The Army's experience with mobilizing the National Guard and Reserve forced it to slow the rate of inductions through selective service as well. As the year progressed, the War Department began to see that when the National Guard and Reserve divisions activated for one year only de-mobilized, the Regular Army structure would again be inadequate for the number of new soldiers arriving from basic training. This led Marshall to push for an extended mobilization beyond the initial one year authorized.²³

Marshall wanted a decision on the future of the National Guard by 1 June but the debate in Congress was fierce. The decision to extend the Guard and Reserve did not come until August 1941. This period showed a marked decline in morale and discipline within those units. Marshall noted the deficiencies in a personal letters to division commanders and appealed directly to the commanding generals of the Corps and Armies to ensure that they were aware of their responsibility in maintaining troop morale.

Morale, engendered by the thoughtful consideration for the officers and enlisted men by their commanders will produce a cheerful and understanding subordination of the individual to the good of the team. This is the essence of the

²²McPherson, 32.

²³Watson, 214-218.

American standard of discipline, and it is a primary responsibility of leaders to develop and maintain such a standard.²⁴

At the same time, the Army received a new civilian head. President Roosevelt appointed Harry Stimson as Secretary of War. Stimson was no stranger to the politics of Washington. He served as Secretary of State during the Hoover Administration from 1929 to 1933. This would also be Stimson's second term as Secretary of War. He previously served as Secretary of War under President William Howard Taft from 1911-1913.²⁵

Stimson in turn appointed Robert Patterson as Assistant Secretary. Patterson was a Plattsburg man and well known to the MTCA. His experience as a graduate of the Officer Training School Camp in 1917 certainly biased his judgment on how to provide officers for the expanding army. The MTCA argued that the response should be the same as in World War I. Stimson seemed to become fixated on their proposal.²⁶

The officers of the War Department Staff opposed any such plan as presented by the MTCA. The realities of the time were different from 1917. In 1917, there was not a large standing pool of reserve officers as there was in 1940. The men trained at the OTS camps were largely well off and the sons of political elites. Marshall saw any attempt to institute a similar effort as counter to his efforts to raise morale within a drafted Army. He insisted that any camps for officers draw on existing drafted personnel. Patterson

²⁴Watson, 232.

²⁵The New York Times Learning Network, "Henry L. Stimson Dies at 83 In His Home on Long Island," *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0921.html> (accessed 4 April 2012).

²⁶McPherson, 61-62.

warned that the “best minds” would be lost to the Army if potential officers were to first be subject to the draft. The issue quickly came to a head. Marshall threatened to resign if the Secretary of War followed through on any proposal organized along the lines of the Plattsburg Movement. Faced with the loss of Marshall, Stimson backed down.²⁷

This was not an incident of two strong willed men feeling the other out. They knew each other from World War I. Marshall lectured at the General Staff School at Langres, France where Stimson studied as a Lieutenant Colonel. They rode horses while there and messed together. Stimson later picked Marshall to serve as his aide while Governor General of the Philippine Islands in 1927, a position that Marshall declined out of fear of missing an opportunity to command. Stimson bore him no ill will for his decision. Marshall would later recall his threatened resignation as “reprehensible” and not in the best character of any government official. The incident did not sour their relationship. After the war each often credited the other for the success of the Army in World War II.²⁸

Schools for Enlisted Officer Candidates

Marshall long suspected that the pool of reserve officers would be inadequate to support the mobilization effort. He knew from his inspections that the National Guard and Reserve Officers ordered to active duty were not the highly trained group of individuals that the War Department plans assumed. Early in the mobilization planning

²⁷McPherson, 62-63.

²⁸George Franke, “Henry Stimson and George Marshall: An Enduring Friendship,” The Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/Henry_Stimson_and_George_Marshall.pdf (accessed 4 April 2012).

effort, he directed the staff to look at the requirement to establish special schools for the selection and training of enlisted men as officers. He believed that the wide net cast by the draft would yield enough suitable candidates for training. He also knew that giving draftees the ability to rise from the enlisted ranks to become officers would be a necessary step to improve the moral of a force drafted into service in peacetime.²⁹

While Marshal was certain of the plan, the War Department Staff was not. He pushed the plan forward over the objections of the G-1, G-3 and the branch chiefs. All felt that the Officer Reserve Corps was adequate to meet the needs of the Army. The War Department G-1 also argued in vain that any increase in size to the officer ranks would only lead to a painful downsizing later.³⁰

Marshall overrode his own staff and pushed for the schools. By March 1941, a pilot Officer Candidate School was open at Fort Benning, Georgia. The candidates were graduates of Ivy League Schools, both volunteers and draftees. In execution, the class resembled more closely the make-up of the Plattsburg movement than the ideals of Marshall. MG Courtney Hodges was not receptive to Marshall's ideas. In the mind of Omar Bradley, he was stalling on the effort. Hodges had only barely resourced the school and cautioned Bradley against any thought of expansion.³¹

Without the officers commissioned through OCS, the Army would not have been able to produce enough trained soldiers to mobilize for the war. By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States Military Academy at West Point had

²⁹Omar N. Bradley, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Shuster), 96.

³⁰Watson, 271.

³¹Bradley, 96.

already enrolled its wartime graduating classes (the classes of 1942-1945). Reserve Officer Training Corps programs could likewise not meet the demand due to the length of their programs and the initial deferment for compulsory military service of college students. The Army was also unwilling to commit to an expansion of the existing programs due to the requisite increase in instructor requirements. Thus, only OCS could provide the sheer number of officers required.

CHAPTER 2

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOLS FOR THE ARMY

The outstanding generalization of this experience, in my view, is that we did not have in fact the great mass of trained officers that were carried on the books... We have verified the inevitable- that inadequately trained officers cannot train troops effectively.

— Lt. General Lesley J. McNair, Speech to the
Command and General Staff School, 1942

The Infantry Officer Candidate School

While the decision to implement a system of Officer Candidate Schools across the Army was not wholly without precedent, the size and scope of the system that emerged certainly was. Marshall's plan for a school to select current enlisted men and train them to be officers differed from the experience in World War I where most candidates at the Officer Training Schools were from the upper crust of society and often well connected. While many within the War Department fought against his plan both actively and passively, Marshall pushed on.

Marshall felt that the draft would bring into the service many men who could provide leadership as junior commissioned officers. Commissioning men from the ranks would also provide a boost to morale, especially as he looked to the fall of 1941. He anticipated that there would be an extension to the draft as well as the current service obligations to those already inducted. Despite the analysis of his staff, Marshall thought the greatest shortage of officers would occur in the infantry. Therefore, he directed the establishment of an OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia, home of the Infantry School.³²

³²Bradley, 96.

In the last weeks of 1940, the commandant of the Infantry School, Major General Courtney Hodges, established an officer training school based on plans dating back to 1938. These plans assumed a well-trained candidate pool that did not require basic military instruction. Shortly thereafter, Marshall named him Chief of Infantry and he moved to Washington D.C. For Hodges' replacement, Marshall reached out to a former subordinate, Lieutenant Colonel Omar N. Bradley.³³

Bradley had served under Marshall while a major as an instructor at the Infantry School. Assigned to Fort Benning in 1927 after the death of his wife, Marshall served as assistant commandant and headed the academic department as a Lieutenant Colonel. By the time Bradley arrived in 1929, Marshall had re-worked the curriculum and method of instruction at the school. He insisted that all instruction focus on the practical application of the subject. He preferred that classes present the core, relevant information and not endless additional information. Bradley made a great impression on Marshall and after a year as an instructor was elevated to head the tactics section, making him one of four principal advisors to Marshall. The other section chiefs were all Lieutenant Colonels, like Marshall, and included Joseph Stillwell.³⁴

Bradley was promoted to Brigadier General and reported to Benning in March 1941. His assignment as Commandant of the Infantry School following Hodges may have more to it than sheer coincidence. Bradley found the pilot OCS established by Hodges lacking in its effort and discordant with the spirit of Marshall's idea. The men attending it would be very well suited to a Plattsburg Movement Camp. They were graduates of Ivy

³³McPherson, 66.

³⁴Bradley, 64-65.

League schools or well-off sons who had enlisted in the Army. He described the school as poorly organized and instructed. Hodges had not been a staunch supporter of Marshall's plan and the lack of effort here showed.³⁵

Bradley shared Marshall's view that an Officer Candidate School in some form would be critical to mobilization. After studying the problem, he quickly discerned how to expand the program to nearly twenty-five times its current capacity. He advocated an assembly line technique. It would allow him to infuse more candidates into the school rapidly without a large increase in the required number of qualified instructors. He took the plan to Washington on 6 March 1941. Nineteen days later, Hodges, now the Chief of Infantry, with concurrence of the Secretary of War, instructed Bradley to establish a permanent Officer Candidate School within the Infantry school.³⁶

The swift approval indicated above belies the political realities of the operation. While Bradley initially briefed Hodges and the War Department G1, both remained solidly against the idea and rebuffed him. Bradley describes an underlying prejudice against the "ninety-day wonders," as the graduates were already known, with the War Department headquarters. Only by going directly to Marshall did Bradley win approval for his plan. Marshall was fully supportive and gave him the go ahead. He took great risk by going over the heads of more senior officers but certainly could see that there was a reason why Marshall sent him to Benning.³⁷

³⁵Bradley, 96.

³⁶McPherson, 66-67.

³⁷Bradley, 97.

Bradley's plan called heavily on his West Point experience. Candidates would organize as a rifle company for administration. Leadership positions within the platoons would rotate among the students and allow for evaluation of leadership potential. A commissioned officer served as the tactical officer for the platoon and primary evaluator. The course would share instructors with the Infantry Basic Officers Course at Ft. Benning. Candidates would have mandatory study periods in the evening, would follow a merit system and be subject to a rigid honor code. While not exactly original, it was a proven system for evaluating future officers.³⁸

Thus was born the system that produced more officers for the United States Army in World War II than any other source. Marshall developed a concept, fought against competing ideas held firmly by his superiors and throughout the War Department staff to gain support and won. In execution, he would have to push even further to make his idea a reality. Only by placing Bradley in command was he able to see the realization of his plan.

Officer Candidate Schools Ordered For Other Branches

On 26 April 1941, the Adjutant General's Office announced establishment of Officer Candidate Schools for nine additional branches. Armor, Field Artillery, Cavalry, Coast Artillery, Signal Corps, Engineers, Medical, Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps along with Infantry would all have OCS classes begin the week of 1 July 1941. The total enrollment for these first classes was to be 2,300. The Adjutant General's message

³⁸McPherson, 70.

announcing these additional courses also detailed criteria for those selected to attend.

Unit commanders across the Army selected the initial candidates.³⁹

On 30 August 1941, a subsequent message from the War Department continued the OCS courses at the various schools. The courses would run “until further notice” and the capacity expanded slightly. Additionally, a school for Finance officers was established. The message did not announce specific quotas for the Corps Areas and Departments, but commanders were encouraged not to wait for the quota assignments to begin sending qualified candidates.⁴⁰

From this beginning, Officer Candidate Schools steadily increased in size and graduation rates. The Army needed an ever-increasing numbers of officers to command new units and train new enlisted men as its ranks swelled. By 1943, Officer Candidate Schools would eventually commission over 300,000 officers. This was by far the greatest source of officers commissioned in World War II.⁴¹

Entry to the war brought a rapid expansion and increased speed to mobilization. As 1942 dawned, the Army faced an officer shortage that quickly became the greatest training priority. In order to keep pace with the expanding troop levels, school quotas

³⁹War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office Memorandum, “Officer Candidate Schools,” 26 April 1941, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁰War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office Memorandum, “Officer Candidate Schools,” 30 August 1941, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴¹Robert R. Palmer and William Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Personnel* (Washington: Historical Division, United States Army, 1948), 95.

expanded exponentially. In March 1942, the War Department ordered expansion to all schools (see table 1).

Table 1. Initial 1942 OCS expansion in relative terms

Program	Increase in Capacity
Ordnance	20 times
Engineering	16 times
Field Artillery	12 times
Quartermaster	12 times
Infantry	11 times
Armor	8 times
Coast Artillery	8 times
Finance	5 times
Chemical Warfare Service	5 times
Cavalry	4 times
Medical Administration	4 times

Source: Data adapted from Milton M. McPherson, *The Ninety-day Wonders* (Ft. Benning: United States Army Candidate School Alumni Association, 1998), 114.

The critical shortage of officers would highlight a flaw with the design of the Officer Candidate Schools. Commanders that selected the candidates to attend controlled the entry to the program. Facing pressures both to maintain their unit strengths, and also to send quality candidates to attend OCS, commanders often followed the letter, but not the spirit of the regulations. The War Department further complicated matters by failing to define sufficiently who should attend OCS. Commanders, therefore, did not always send their best and not all men that would have been good candidates for OCS received the opportunity to attend.

Expansion of OCS Overseas

As early as March 1941 the Army began to look at expanding Officer Candidate School beyond the traditional branch schools. Simply moving candidates from overseas duty to schools would remain a challenge throughout the war. On 12 June 1942, the Secretary of War approved suspending return of any officer candidate applicants from Alaska due to the threat of sea travel and overall tactical situation.⁴² A message from Algiers in November of 1943 details the continued difficulty such a prospect faced as the war progressed overseas.

Policy of this theater is that no enlisted personnel will be returned to the US or UK for training as aviation cadets or officer candidates. Not feasible at this time to establish schools here . . . Signed Eisenhower. However liberal policy for direct appointment is announced and in operation. Request applications from individuals submitted prior to departure from US be not transmitted to this theater with the customary directive that they will be returned to US for the purpose. Numerous such directives have been received and result in considerable disappointment to the individual.⁴³

However, talented men with potential for services as officers existed throughout the Army. Commanders overseas recognized this and sought to establish schools within their theaters. Marshall agreed and on 14 March 1942 directed a survey to establish the feasibility of establishing OCS courses in Hawaii and the United Kingdom. He further

⁴²The Adjutant General's Office, "Officer Candidate Schools (Alaskan Defense Command)" 12 June 1942, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴³Algiers to War Department Teletype Message, 19 June 1943, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

saw that the pool of officers generated by such schools would be a convenient source from which to draw on for emergency requirements.⁴⁴

The commanding general of U.S. Forces in New Caledonia (later known as Fiji) also requested to open a school on 17 March 1942. The War Department concurred and on 9 April directed establishment of an OCS program there. It further directed that the school be a branch immaterial one and limited to 400 candidates, with an expected production of 360 officers.⁴⁵

The course opened in August 1942 staffed by officers from units local to Fiji. Candidates came from across the South Pacific Theater. The curriculum followed the Benning model and specifically the Infantry branch subjects. Special topics for candidates entering the Field Artillery branch were interspersed as additional training. It was a well-planned and resourced course and proved to be a model for how to establish an OCS course overseas.⁴⁶

The course in the United Kingdom also took off that summer. On 27 July 1942, the War Department radioed the headquarters there and asked for an update on the school, the estimated capacity and how it would be conducted. In addition, the message asked if the school could be expanded to accommodate 5,000 candidates and if so by

⁴⁴War Department G-1 Memorandum for The Chief of Staff, "Officer Candidate Schools," 14 March 1942, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁵War Department Memorandum for Classified Message Center, "Officer Candidate School," 9 April 1942, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁶HQ United States Army Forces in Fiji Memorandum, "Officer Candidate School," 10 July 1942, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

when. Like the OCS in Fiji, the United Kingdom school was to be the central school for officer candidates in Europe to attend.⁴⁷

In order to assist the theater commanders establish schools that adhered to standards of courses in the continental United States, the commandant of the Infantry School produced a training bulletin on establishment and conduct of officer candidate schools. This document was a complete guide on how to run an OCS program and detailed the Fort Benning method. The War Department distributed it to the commanders of Army Forces in New Caledonia (Fiji), Hawaii, China, the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Australia, India and the United Kingdom along with commanders of the Eastern, Western, Central and Southern Defense Commands.⁴⁸

Units Assigned Quotas for Officer Candidates

Schools submitted their training capacity to the War Department. The War Department would either concur with the capacity submitted by the school or increase the number based on projected needs. The requirements were then apportioned and distributed as quotas to the Commanding Generals of the Corps areas and Department by individual OCS programs. The initial quotas assigned are shown in table 2. Quotas for the Armored Force School at Ft. Knox were separately issued.

⁴⁷War Department Memorandum for The Classified Message Center, "Officer Candidate School in the United Kingdom," 27 July 1942, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁴⁸War Department Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, "Training Bulletin on Establishment and Conduct of Officer Candidate School," 11 September 1942, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Table 2. Initial OCS Quota Breakdown by Corps Areas and Department

	IN	IN	IN	FA	FA	CA	CAV	EN	SIG	OD	QM	MA	Total
	7/5/1941	8/9/1941	9/13/1941	7/8/1941	8/19/1941	7/5/1941	7/1/1941	7/7/1941	7/1/1941	7/8/1941	7/7/1941	7/1/1941	
1st Corps Area	3	2	2	3	3	25	1	1	5	1	6	5	57
2nd Corps Area	18	18	18	7	7	20	2	6	101	4	12	7	220
3rd Corps Area	3	3	2	2	3	19	5	11	14	6	11	10	89
4th Corps Area	64	64	65	48	48	21	10	29	89	8	34	24	504
5th Corps Area	8	8	8	4	5	0	20	3	12	3	7	5	83
6th Corps Area	6	7	7	2	2	5	5	1	24	2	7	3	71
7th Corps Area	17	17	17	7	7	0	15	4	14	1	11	7	117
8th Corps Area	26	26	25	27	27	26	37	12	50	3	18	17	294
9th Corps Area	21	21	21	15	15	25	4	11	85	5	23	14	260
Alaska	2	2	2	1	6	3	0	2	6	1	1	1	21
Puerto Rico	6	6	7	2	1	7	0	2	10	1	2	1	45
Hawaii	11	11	11	5	5	18	0	3	32	2	6	3	107
Panama Canal	8	8	7	2	2	26	1	4	28	2	6	2	96
Phillipeans	1	1	2	0	0	5	0	1	5	1	1	1	18
Total Quota	194	194	194	125	125	200	100	90	475	40	145	100	1982
Seats Avail.	200	200	200	125	125	200	100	100	500	50	150	100	2050

Source: War Department, The Adjutant Generals Office Memorandum, "Officer Candidate Schools," 26 April 1941. RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

As Army units expanded, the number of inductees to fill them could not match the demands. Filling quotas for OCS with well-qualified candidates was challenging as well. Unit commanders who previously supported filling their quotas quickly saw talented men leave their units. While discrete criteria for age and length of service existed, less concrete desirable qualities left room for interpretation. The draftee population of the Army was not a truly representative cross-section of America. Recruiting policies of the Navy and Marine Corps siphoned off large numbers of talented men. Further complicating efforts was established policy that allowed any inductee to apply as an air cadet in the Army Air Forces. Service in the ground force, especially in combat arms, was generally not desirable.⁴⁹

⁴⁹Palmer and Keast, 104-107.

Selection of Candidates

The greatest challenge to Officer Candidate Schools regardless of branch was the availability of qualified candidates. Candidates were warrant officers or enlisted men. They had to be from the arm or service for the school they would attend. Candidates initially had to have at least six months of service. Later, the War Department reduced this requirement to four months. Replacement Training Center commanders argued that they could not nominate well-qualified candidates to OCS because of the six-month minimum service requirement. RTC commanders often could not judge the quality of the men under their command because they were initial entry men and undergoing basic training.⁵⁰

Applicants had to be between 21 and 28 years of age. A score of 110 on the Army General Classification test was the minimum acceptable. They had to be citizens of the United States and free from permanent physical defects. Any request for a waiver to apply to an OCS outside of their arm or service had to be justified by extensive schooling or experience.⁵¹

The most difficult criteria to measure, however, remained the one stressed most in each communication announcing successive courses. Beginning with the first announcement of army wide OCS classes, communications on selecting enlisted men and warrant officers to attend OCS regularly stressed leadership ability as the single most important criteria.

⁵⁰Palmer and Keast, 95.

⁵¹HQ, Army Ground Forces Memorandum, "Pertinent Data Extracted From Section I, War Department Circular #245, 26 November 1941, For Information All Concerned," RG 337, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

The basic and predominant consideration governing selections to officers candidate schools will be the outstanding qualities of leadership as demonstrated by actual service in the army.⁵²

Any educational qualifications were to be a secondary consideration when determining if a man was fit to lead troops in combat. Corps area commanders, who were ultimately to decide the fitness of a candidate to receive a commission, exercised wide discretion. The War Department authorized those commanders to test candidates in any way they deemed necessary to assure the adequacy of the applicant for commissioned service.

Oddly, a definition for “leadership ability” was not presented. The War Department saw fit to quantify minimum qualifications for length of service and intelligence testing. It also produced exacting standards for medical fitness and educational background. But for that quality which the program viewed as most crucial, there was no language to describe the exact qualities which defined leadership ability. While commanders used the wide latitude granted them in selecting candidates, this lack of precision would present difficulties as the program continued.

Good leaders and those with inherent leadership traits can rapidly be identified with little aid. Past this initial selection however, commanders faced the difficult task of assessing whether a potential candidate met an unspecified standard. OCS schools across the Army faced a similar challenge when selecting from the candidates that made it to the schools—whom to commission.

Most units charged with filling quotas ran a board at the Division or equivalent level for candidates recommended by their chains of command. Passing this board was

⁵²War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office Memorandum, “Officer Candidate Schools,” 26 April 1941, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

not a guarantee of success at OCS. A 14 May 1942 memorandum to the presidents of the 28th Infantry Division's officer candidate school selection boards is telling in how frequently the system failed to select quality candidates while being accountable for the quantity of candidates levied on them.

During the past two weeks twelve candidates from the various Officer Candidate Schools have been returned to this Division as non-graduates, and it is noted that the principal cause for their being returned is "lack of leadership". . . . It is the Commanding General's desire therefore that the Division Examining Board be especially watchful that it does not approve any applicant who clearly lacks the qualities of leadership required of an officer.⁵³

Initial Shortage of Officers

Early 1942 was a time of crisis for the United States Army. Entrance to the war, while planned for since the late 1930s, highlighted unpreparedness in many areas. The schools could not produce the number of officers needed and selecting candidates who could achieve all standards and graduate became a problem. In some cases, simply finding enough men was a task some commanders could not easily achieve. The experience of the Army Ground Forces is illustrative of the Army's challenges.

Army Ground Forces controlled the Anti-Aircraft, Armored, Cavalry, Coast Artillery, Field Artillery, Infantry and Tank Destroyer schools. Under initial OCS guidelines, officer candidates would be selected from enlisted men within each branch. By early 1942, it was clear to the Army Ground Forces Headquarters that this would not fill the quotas required. Despite great pressure on commanders to fill their quotas, many seats remained unfilled. A new way forward was required.⁵⁴

⁵³HQ, 28th Infantry Division Memorandum, "Officer Candidates-Leadership," 14 May 1942, RG 337, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁵⁴Palmer and Keast, 104-107.

In March 1942, the Army adopted the Volunteer Officer Candidate plan. These men were exempted from the draft due to dependency (e.g. men with families). They could instead volunteer for training as officers and would attend basic training and then OCS. If the volunteer was not selected for OCS after basic training, or once accepted to OCS if he was not selected for a commission, he was returned home with no further military obligation. By December, 38,134 VOC were in the army. The program slowed significantly in 1943 and eventually ceased operation once dependency no longer offered deferment from induction. The VOC program was crucial to meeting the need for officer candidates, without lowering standards for selection.⁵⁵

While the VOC plan helped close the gap between supply and demand, other deviations from Army policy occurred. When establishing the OCS program, the War Department detailed procedures under which the Adjutant General's office would reassign candidates from overseas areas accepted into OCS programs but not selected for commissioning while all other men returned to their units.⁵⁶ Releasing those men not suitable for combat leadership made sense, but there were nearly 59,000 administrative positions across the Army that also required officers. While not necessarily fit to be combat leaders, scores of men returned to their units after washing out OCS when they clearly had some potential in order to be selected for the school. Therefore, in June 1942 the War Department amended the missions of the OCS programs "to produce good

⁵⁵Ibid., 108.

⁵⁶The Adjutant General's Office Memorandum, "Officer Candidate Schools," 26 November 1941, RG 337, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

administrators from those who lack combat leadership qualities.”⁵⁷ The dual system of commissions and complicated assignment policies for those commissioned as administrators made the program unpopular in the field. Once the officer shortage passed by February 1943 the standards for commission returned to their original specifications.

This was not the only instance of quality issues regarding OCS. As the talent within the pool of possible candidates dwindled, graduation rates declined. The average graduation rate for AGF OCS programs was 86.1 in January 1942. That number fell to 75.6 by December. Marshall grew alarmed at the situation and sent the commanding general of the Replacement and School Command, Major General Harold Bull, to investigate. Bull reported a problem with the quality of candidates, and surmised the emphasis on filling quotas as the root cause.⁵⁸

The various schools made individual efforts to correct the problems. Many established preparatory schools, particularly to aid students from other branches. Others attempted to re-cycle failing candidates in hopes that repeating the course would result in success. The Army Inspector General determined by the end of 1942 that the quality of OCS graduates has sunk so low that immediate change to the programs was necessary. AGF strongly opposed this suggestion and insisted the fault lay not with the schools but with the units who held back quality candidate and the general lack of aptitude within AGF.⁵⁹

⁵⁷Palmer and Keast, 109.

⁵⁸Ibid., 110.

⁵⁹Palmer and Keast, 110.

Rapid Expansion leads to Surplus

The shortage problems of 1942 turned into a surplus problem in 1943. By December 1942, the War Department had already begun pulling back on production quotas for schools. Remarkable as the expansion of the OCS programs was, it was now producing too many officers for Army requirements. Changes to Army expansion plans also further reduced the need for new officers. The War Department therefore directed a curtailment to OCS enrollment and “that graduation requirements be made more exacting.”⁶⁰

Cuts to OCS programs initially reached 50 percent. The AGF strongly protested the cuts. Initial plans called for a 25 percent overage of officers in troop units to account for casualties. The shortage of officers in 1942 prevented achieving this goal. An over strength of officers would also allow for their return to advanced courses in large numbers for additional training. Nevertheless, in March 1943 the War Department cut quotas for all AGF schools except the Anti-Aircraft school. The reduction in OCS quotas for all AGF branches continued until late 1944. Only the Infantry and Field Artillery schools would maintain an OCS program continuously throughout the war.⁶¹

This was not an end to officer candidate training however. The outbreak of the war suspended the normal ROTC summer camps. Beginning in 1943 ROTC cadets instead reported to their OCS for training in the branch associated with their particular ROTC programs. These cadets completed the OCS curriculum and on graduation,

⁶⁰HQ, Army Ground Forces Memorandum, “Quarterly Capacities-Officer Candidate Schools,” 1 February 1943. RG 337, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁶¹Palmer and Keast, 112-113.

commissioned into the Army. VOC candidates also attended OCS until the program ceased in late 1943.⁶²

A Return to Quality

The lack of quality candidates sent to OCS also affected the quality of graduates. Mixed reports speak to the quality of Army junior officers in 1942 and 1943. MG Bull reported to Marshall on 1 October 1943 that

In my contacts with Division, Corps and Army Commanders I have urged criticism of our product and have been much annoyed because all have contributed the valueless remark, "They are fine- just send us more of them." I have officers at each maneuver visiting with division, regimental, and battalion commanders sounding them out on our young officer product with the same result.⁶³

Alternatively, the struggles of the Army in North Africa appeared to fall squarely on the lack of leadership in junior leaders. Enclosed in an AGF defense of its courses are extracts of operational reports that show senior leaders were singularly unimpressed with the state of leadership in the Army's field units:

Major General J. P. Lucas- North Africa Theater:

The bottleneck in Africa, as it is in the United States, is the training of junior officers. They are, in many cases, not leading their men well, which is evidenced by the comparatively large proportion of casualties among field officers who have to supply the impetus to their juniors to move forward. There have been many indications of lack of discipline. In one case, the Colonel of an

⁶²Palmer and Keast, 116-117.

⁶³Major General H.R. Bull to General George C. Marshall, 1 October 1943, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

infantry regiment led his men forward after the junior officers had completely failed to move them which indicated that all they needed was a leader.⁶⁴

AGFs strange decision to include this and similar observations was to illustrate that junior officer education should be a continuum that included OCS instruction, and experience in units, followed by an advanced course.

A benefit to the surplus of officers was the ability to begin separating those unfit for service. Under the shortage of 1942, few commanders separated officers for underperforming. Severe shortages across the force called for the retention of every able bodied officer, including those commissioned through OCS who were not of the quality desired. As the shortage abated and the surpluses began to accumulate, the War Department revised its regulations on “reclassification”, the term for elimination from the service of unfit officers.⁶⁵

On 14 July, Marshall sent a radiogram to commanders down to the division level:

The officer problem demands closer attention. Out of 500,000 officers only four were eliminated from the Army for inefficiency during the month of May. . . . It is inconceivable that of 500,000 only four should fail to come up to the required standards of leadership. . . . Commanders of every echelon will be judged by their discernment and moral courage in the elimination of the unfit.⁶⁶

The Adjutant General also stressed more stringent screening criteria for candidates at OCS under the reduced quotas. In 1943, the number of applicants for OCS

⁶⁴HQ, Army Ground Forces, “Study on Extending Courses at Officer Candidate Schools From Four to Six Months,” RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁶⁵Palmer and Keast, 124.

⁶⁶Ibid., 125.

began to far outpace the available seats. Quality finally began to rise above quantity. To assist with selection a better definition of leadership ability emerged.

No officer will recommend or accept any applicant who does not possess the qualities of leadership desired in an officer. Fundamentally these qualities consist of an adequate education, either formal or gained through experience, which assures quick, sound, logical decision, and personality and character embodying such traits as devotion to duty, unquestioned honesty, and moral and intellectual, as well as physical, courage.⁶⁷

Army Service Forces Calls for Expanded Curriculum

As the Army embraced a renewed emphasis on quality over quantity, the Army Service Forces made an interesting proposal. OCS programs operated under the guidance and direction of their branch chiefs with input from their higher headquarters for type of branches—AGF for all combat branches, Army Air Forces for the Air Corps and ASF for all Service of Supply branches. In May 1943, ASF proposed, in congruence with the Inspector General's report on quality issues of OCS graduates that all OCS courses expand to 17 weeks in length.⁶⁸

AGF opposed this and most other suggestions to change its courses. However, it did invite a critical look into the curriculum of all schools. AGF required each school to prepare programs of instruction should the War Department direct a 17 week course length. The process highlighted great variances between school curriculums. After

⁶⁷War Department, Memorandum No W625-7-43, "Acceptance and Selection of Applicants For Officer Candidate Schools," 1 September 1943, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁶⁸Palmer and Keast, 358.

reviewing all school submissions, AGF directed common periods of training across all branch schools, most of which ASF schools adopted by as well.⁶⁹

The War Department did direct an expansion to 17 weeks effective 1 July 1943. At a conference on 30 June 1943, War Department G1 representatives, with support from the ASF, suggested that OCS expand from four to six months. This would slow down production of OCS graduates and allow for more training of junior officers. ASF also wanted to see a portion of that six-month period conducted at a common school for officers of all arms and services. Both the AAF and AGF strongly disagreed with the recommendation.⁷⁰

AGF argued that expanding the courses to six months would not aid the overpopulation problem; it would only delay its onset. In addition, the primary education for young officers in leadership and command occurred through service with troops and not in schools. It was in this area that the majority of complaints about graduates centered. In the view of AGF, the schools were adequately preparing officers technically. Only service on the line would produce better combat leaders. The Army should reclassify unfit officers and if local commanders at the Division or Corps level were empowered to separate them, it would have an immediate positive impact.⁷¹

There was no immediate decision; however, the issue resurfaced in September. AGF again voiced its opposition to an increase in course length and at this point

⁶⁹Palmer and Keast, 358-359.

⁷⁰HQ, Army Ground Forces Memo Slip, "Conference at War Department Concerning Extension to OCS Course to 6 Months," RG 337, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁷¹Ibid.

Lieutenant General McNair became more personally involved in communicating his opposition to the War Department. Mobilization, in terms of officers, was complete. Further OCS courses would be maintained in order to insure a steady pipeline of replacements, however the 30,000 excess officers in the ground forces alone was thought to be more than adequate to meet any emergency need. Furthermore, the preponderance of candidates in 1944 and beyond would be ROTC men. That pool of candidates had historically performed very well in OCS and as graduates. In his opinion, the better effort would be to focus on improving the quality of officers already in service rather than revising the procurement system.⁷²

Marshall Retains Personal Interest in OCS

In all this, Marshall certainly maintained a personal involvement. Nearly all communications regarding either Officer Candidate Schools operations, or planned adjustments, bear his hand-written initials. His personal correspondence with commanding generals and regular dispatching of personnel to investigate items of interest speak to his continued influence over the program. No detail, however small, was beyond his interest.

On 28 July 1943, Marshall sent a memorandum to McNair expressing his concern on an aspect of candidate life that he felt affected their performance. In his opinion the meals served at lunchtime were too “heavy” and affecting the alertness of trainees during afternoon instruction. He suggested serving a lighter meal at lunch in order that

⁷²Palmer, 360-362; War Department, Memorandum for The Chief of Staff, “Officer Candidate Schools,” 30 December 1943, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

candidates are more attentive in class. It is interesting that this communication was specific to officer candidate schools only. Just two days later, the AGF chief of staff responded to Marshall. After numerous phone calls between schools and rapid studies of menu items and schedules, he assured Marshall that schedules had been adjusted and where possible either lighter meals served or an afternoon of vigorous activity planned.⁷³

Conclusion

The strategic environment in which OCS operated was one of constant assessment and adaptation during World War II. The Army established the OCS program to meet the need of producing officers for service in combat in requisite numbers. As conditions and requirements changed, leaders throughout the Army initiated change at the local and strategic level.

The performance of junior officers, especially the graduates of OCS, was a point of consistent inquiry. Leaders at the War Department, Army Ground Forces Headquarters and Army Service Forces Headquarters, routinely reviewed both the content of their courses but also the efficacy of their product. This inquisitive culture resulted in numerous adaptations to the overall program. OCS courses across the Army demonstrated both initiative in design and initiative in adaptation.

⁷³HQ, AGF Memorandum for The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, "Meals at Officer Candidate Schools," 30 June 1943, RG 165, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

CHAPTER 3

THE QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL

The challenge faced by the Quartermasters during the period of national emergency was no greater than the other branches but the immediate impact of having less than the required number of officers became an emergency in itself. As the nation readied for war, mobilization efforts fell on the Quartermaster Corps. The sinews of war are an apt description for logistics and in particular for combat supplies. During World War II, the Quartermaster Corps provided the great majority of these critical resources. In addition to its traditional missions it also provided for all functions of transportation, to include maintenance of vehicles. At the onset of the conflict, the suppliers would be responsible for setting into motion the great mobilization of the United States Army.⁷⁴

Prior to World War I, assignment as a Quartermaster was a staff assignment, filled from the rolls of the unit's officers. As the Army grew in response to World War I, the first Quartermaster units organized and assembled. Lacking officers with the requisite technical knowledge, the Army looked to private industry for specialists. These specialists would collectively provide the knowledge on how to meet the changing dynamics of an Army in the infancy of motorization and mechanization, and one with extensive requirements for services unique to the Quartermaster Corps: bathing and

⁷⁴Erna Risch and Chester L. Kieffer, *The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply and Services, Volume II*. United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army), 176.

laundry, graves registration and supply. Civilians began training specifically as Quartermasters and commissioning as specialists into the new branch.⁷⁵

Little in the interwar period would prepare the Quartermaster Corps for the challenges to come. While officers commissioned as Quartermasters existed in the Army, their numbers were far too few to meet the demands. The Quartermaster Officer Corps numbered under 700 officers in 1939. This small core of professional officers were dispersed at the various posts and installations of the Army. Few field quartermaster units yet existed although the scope of functions assigned to the Quartermaster Corps had already begun to expand drastically with the period of national emergency. Along with traditional Quartermaster functions of supply, clothing and subsistence, the corps' roles now included motor transportation, along with the associated maintenance and repair of vehicles as well as route planning.⁷⁶

While the Quartermaster Corps would receive additional officers from transfers from the other branches of service, graduates of the United States Military Academy and through the recall of retired officers none of these sources would be able to produce the voluminous number of professional officers required by the expansion. The Officer Reserve Corps, the pool of officers who were graduates of peacetime military programs such as the Civilian Military Training Camps, held reserve commissions and were subject to recall. Their numbers would fill only a quarter of the ultimate requirements. Once this initial pool of officers entered into service however, the Quartermaster Corps, like other branches of the Army, had to turn to qualified enlisted men. Therefore, the majority of

⁷⁵Risch and Kieffer, 175.

⁷⁶Ibid., 176.

officers commissioned after 1939 came from the civilian world with little or no military training. Of the roughly 30,000 officers commissioned into the Quartermaster Corps during World War II, over 23,000 were graduates of the Officer Candidate School (see table 3).⁷⁷

Table 3. Source of Commission for Quartermaster Officers 1942-1945

Source	Total	1942	1943	1944	1945
Total	29,577	14,787	9,899	3,172	1,719
Officers' Reserve Corps	2,901	2,071	521	302	7
National Guard	18	15	2	0	1
Officer Candidate School	23,145	10,482	9,023	2,767	873
Enlisted Men (Direct Commissions)	1,398	427	143	45	783
Aviation Cadets	185	95	32	16	42
Civilian Life and others	1,921	1,696	173	41	11

Source: Erma Risch and Chester L. Kieffer, *U.S. Army in World War II: The Technical Services-The Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History-Department of the Army, 1955), 177.

Interwar Period Mobilization Plans

During the interwar period, the Quartermaster Corps attempted to use its experience in World War I to predict future requirements for mobilization. To support a

⁷⁷Risch and Kieffer, 176.

full mobilization of the Regular Army, National Guard and Organized Reserve required an estimated Quartermaster strength of nearly 400,000 men, including almost 17,000 officers (see table 4). These numbers would not be available in sufficient quantity to support initial mobilization plans and no training establishment yet existed to produce Quartermaster officers in such quantities. In 1922, the Quartermaster School established Winter Plattsburg Camps. The intent for these camps was, as in the years before World War I, to educate businessmen for military preparedness. These winter camps differed in that they focused specifically on the organization and operations of Quartermaster functions in wartime.⁷⁸

Table 4. 1925 Quartermaster Mobilization Requirements

	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted
Combat Zone	7,209	114	248,172
Communications Zone	1,283	—	53,668
Zone of the Interior	8,204	1	64,885
Foreign Garrisons	232	7	6,842
Totals	16,928	122	373,567

Source: Quartermaster Corps Bulletin No. 1, *The Quartermaster Winter Plattsburg Guide* (Washington: The Quartermaster General, 1925), 40.

⁷⁸Quartermaster Corps Bulletin No. 1, *The Quartermaster Winter Plattsburg Guide* (Washington: The Quartermaster General, 1925), 31-41.

The Office of the Quartermaster General laid out guidance for mobilization in February of 1939 that directed the Quartermaster School in Philadelphia to begin planning for wartime. Initial plans for mobilization called for the recall to active duty of Quartermaster officers in the Officers Reserve Corps and officers in the National Guard divisions. These officers would need refresher training prior to assuming duties either within the States or overseas. Beginning 15 days after declaration of mobilization day (M-Day) the QM school would begin three iterations of 30-day officer refresher classes for recalled officers. Initially with a class size of 275, the classes would grow to 500 within 100 days. Two officer candidate classes of 500 men each would follow this, the first class 60 days in length and the second as a 90-day course. The guidance also specified that augmentation to the school would be from “specially qualified” Reserve officers or retired Regular Army officers.⁷⁹

Four months later the Commandant of the Quartermaster School, Colonel Francis H. Pope, replied that insufficient space was available at the Quartermaster Depot in Philadelphia to conduct training for 500 officer candidates, nor could the Depot provide adequate feeding and lodging. The location of the Quartermaster School in Philadelphia would prove inadequate for any large-scale mobilization efforts. This would force students to live in the city and arrangements for their transportation to and from classes laid on by the school. Pope recommended moving the entirety of the OCS mission to

⁷⁹Office of the Quartermaster General to Commandant, The Quartermaster School, “Mobilization Plan of the Quartermaster School,” 16 February 1939, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. The school would offer refresher classes in both Supply and Administration and Construction and Utility specialties. The numbers noted here are aggregate for the periods. The plan allocated the majority of seats to Supply and Administration specialists.

nearby Fort Dix, New Jersey where elements of Quartermaster Officer training already conducted field exercises.⁸⁰

Pope was an 1897 graduate of the United States Military Academy. Like most Quartermaster officers of the time, he had transferred into that branch after initial service in another arm. Originally commissioned into the Cavalry he rose to the rank of Captain and transferred to the Quartermaster branch in 1912. Promoted to Brigadier General by 1931 he had reverted to Colonel by the time he assumed command of the Quartermaster School in 1933. Pope held this assignment until 1940 and was the longest tenured of any Quartermaster School Commandant. Throughout his assignment, few changes occurred to either officer or enlisted training programs.⁸¹

The Quartermaster Corps in the interwar period exhibited a bi-polar identity. The separate training courses for Regular Army Officers and National Guard Officers varied greatly in terms of depth and materiel. Two general categories of officers existed—those who would serve with field units and others who would be true specialists at the depots. *The Quartermaster Review* in its inaugural issue described officer training opportunities in the Corps:

Excellent educational opportunities now exist for officers of the Quartermaster Corps and for those who accept detail in the Corps. Generally speaking, the present trend is to divide Quartermaster officers into two broad classifications, those who wish to qualify for duty as Quartermasters with military forces in the field, and those who contemplate specializing in the techniques of supply, construction and procurement. Both classes of officers may expect to attend The

⁸⁰The Quartermaster School to the Quartermaster General, “Officer Candidate Course,” 28 June 1939, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁸¹E. Ramsay Richardson, *History of the Quartermaster Corps* (Washington: Military Training and Historical Section, Office of the Quartermaster General), 18.

Quartermaster School at Philadelphia where the problems of the Corps both general and technical are presented to the students.⁸²

At nine months in length, the Regular Army Officers course was too long and would not produce enough officers to meet the coming needs of mobilization. The 1939 Course curriculum consisted of 1,097 hours of instruction including lectures, conferences, practical exercises, demonstrations and problems. While the course covered such wide topics as business administration and public speaking, it focused most of the training time to combat operations and mobilization planning. While conferences were the primary instructional means, students would demonstrate competence through practical exercises and final problems in conjunction with field exercises.⁸³

Pope felt that The Quartermaster School was not maximizing its ability to produce trained Quartermasters. He recommended in his 1939-1940 annual report that the Regular Army Officers course be halved and the annual number of graduates doubled to 100. However, he made no specific recommended changes to the curriculum. While this would seem little assistance in hindsight, the leadership of the School clearly saw the coming demands that faced its small cadre of logisticians when mobilization began. However, these recommendations never came to fruition under Pope. He ended his service as Commandant on the last day of May 1940.⁸⁴

⁸²*The Quartermaster Review*, January-February 1937, quoted in E. Ramsay Richardson, *History of the Quartermaster Corps* (Washington: Military Training and Historical Section, Office of the Quartermaster General), 19.

⁸³Commandant of the Quartermaster School to the Quartermaster General, "Detailed Programs of Instruction 1939-1940," 18 July 1939, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

⁸⁴Richardson, 22.

For the shorter ten-week National Guard and Reserve Officers Course, the school recommended cutting blocks on mobilization and methods of instruction. The Secretary of War took note of this reduction and through a series of correspondence with the School Command and the Quartermaster General expressed his concerns over eliminating topics that, in his view, were critical to a future mobilization. Since the National Guards men would likely be the first called into active duty, they should be fully prepared and trained on what would be expected of them in mobilization and given ample instruction on how to train the Army of draftees that would follow them into service.⁸⁵

Initial Mobilization and Establishment of Officer Training Courses

As the war in Europe escalated, the War Department began issuing orders that would bring the Army to an increased state of readiness. The Adjutant General directed the Quartermaster General in June 1940 to institute courses within two weeks for the training of new officers, training for officers recalled to active duty, and specialist courses for key personnel assigned to new units. The Quartermaster School Commandant established two courses, one each for Officers and Enlisted, neither to exceed three months. The Officers' Course (Special) was designed to cover the multiple facets of the Quartermaster Corps in a very general way. Graduates of the course would not be specialists in any specific function. The short course notably excluded weapons or other

⁸⁵Commandant of the Quartermaster School to the Quartermaster General, "Detailed Programs of Instruction 1939-1940," 18 July 1939, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

military training. While some exercises offered practical application, the majority of training was classroom work.⁸⁶

The school evaluated graduates of these courses, particularly the later ones, for specific duty as instructors. The Staff of The Quartermaster School numbered eighteen officers and three non-commissioned officers in the spring of 1940. By the fall, that number had grown to 32 by including members of the selected Reserve. In October 1940, Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Whittaker, the acting and soon to be Commandant, began to see the coming flood of new trainees on the horizon as the first men registered for the draft. For the next nine months, he continually pressed the Quartermaster General to assign additional instructors to the school for the coming officer classes and, in accordance with mobilization plans, for officer candidate classes along with classes for Reserve Officer Training Corps graduates. He instructed his staff to carefully observe the ongoing Officers classes in the spring and summer of 1941 in order to identify students showing particular aptitude for assignment as instructors.⁸⁷

On 7 July 1941, the first Quartermaster Officer Candidate Class opened at the Schuylkill Arsenal, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania with 149 candidates. To accommodate this and the simultaneous start of a 300-seat Reserve Officer Training Corps class, the school graduated early all other classes or suspended their start. As Pope had warned in 1939, the Arsenal could not support the influx of so many trainees and even with preparation was not ready for the sheer number. The school annexed a Pennsylvania

⁸⁶Richardson, 22-23.

⁸⁷Ibid., 24-25.

National Guard Armory for use since it could not find adequate facilities within Philadelphia.⁸⁸

The school anticipated and identified the Officer Candidate Course as a mobilization requirement but The Quartermaster General did not direct its implementation until 26 April 1941. The course was limited in scope to those topics readily available and for which instructors existed. A comparison between the ten-week National Guard and Reserve Officers class of 1939 and the curriculum for the first OCS class shows remarkable similarities and common subjects. Given the lack of instructors to facilitate this new course, it is understandable that the faculty would use existing curriculum where appropriate. The candidates conducted neither field nor military basic training, but this first class contained veteran soldiers with at least 6 months of service. The students did visit a supply depot as part of their technical training.⁸⁹

The course called for three hours of calisthenics and four hours of military drill and inspections each week in addition to the academic schedule. The faculty kept close watch of their charges and constantly evaluated the candidates for their potential as officers. From the very beginning, the faculty kept detailed statistics on the class and used these as indicators of likely success. Some of these areas included: source of service (e.g. Regular Army, National Guard, etc.), age, marital status and education level.⁹⁰

⁸⁸Richardson, 25.

⁸⁹Ibid., 28. See Appendix C for a detailed comparison of topics covered in Quartermaster officer courses between 1939 and OCS class No. 1.

⁹⁰Ibid.

The first Quartermaster Officer Candidate Course graduated from Philadelphia, on 27 September 27 1941 at the Schuylkill Arsenal. Colonel Whittaker introduced the guest speaker, Brigadier General Henry Munnikhysen. Munnikhysen extolled the young officers to see this not as an end but a beginning to their development (see figure 1).

In the line of the Army the greatest stress is laid on the quality of “leadership.” In the context of the Quartermaster Corps you will also be required to exercise that ability, both directly and indirectly. If you have this quality, or develop it, and it can be developed, you will be successful officers. In the Quartermaster Corps, however this ability is more often known as administrative ability. It is the same personal quality, however, which the “line” knows as leadership... The future will depend entirely on your own efforts, study and self-discipline. Remember, this is not the end for you, but merely the beginning. You have merely arrived at the starting point for the big race after having qualified in the preliminaries.⁹¹



Figure 1. First Quartermaster OCS Graduates

Source: Robert E. Deepe, “Procurement of Officers in the Quartermaster Corps Under the Officer Candidate System,” *The Quartermaster Review* 21, no. 3 (November-December 1941): 39.

⁹¹Robert E. Deepe, “Procurement of Officers in the Quartermaster Corps Under the Officer-Candidate System,” *The Quartermaster Review* 21, no. 3 (November-December 1941): 39-40, 98-99.

Officer Candidate School at Fort Lee, Virginia

The Quartermaster School relocated to Camp Lee, Virginia in September of 1941. Plans called for the first Officer Candidate Class to be held at Camp Lee; however, facilities for both The Quartermaster School and the Quartermaster Replacement Center there could not be completed in time. The initial designs called for facilities to support over 750 officers and enlisted from across The Quartermaster School, including 300 officer candidates.⁹²

Camp Lee provided all the additional space that Philadelphia could not. Road and rail service to neighboring Petersburg and nearby Richmond ensured easy transportation to and from the installation. The James and Appomattox Rivers joined at their confluence just ten miles away off the city of Hopewell. From there the waterways flowed to the port cities of the Chesapeake Bay and beyond that to the Atlantic Ocean. Nearby training areas included the A.P Hill Military Reservation, Swift Creek National Park and former Civilian Conservation Corps Camps near Blackstone and in neighboring Chesterfield County.⁹³

The move took a month and by the end of it nearly 463 tons of equipment moved south. Camp Lee had been one of the largest cantonment areas of World War I and had a rich history. The Quartermaster School established on 507 acres of land acquired from the Department of the Interior that previously were part of the Petersburg National

⁹²Risch and Kieffer, 258.

⁹³Ibid.

Military Park. Construction of the Schools facilities and the rest of the Camp continued over several phases until August of 1942.⁹⁴

The Quartermaster School, like the Corps, would see explosive growth. During the war, the size of the faculty would grow from 20 to peak strength of almost 1,900 commissioned and warrant officers and enlisted personnel. Initially organized along battalion lines, the school would eventually form training regiments in February 1942. Students and instructors alike were combined into these organizations at first. However, by late 1942 a change to the organization of the Quartermaster School pooled all academic instructors into an Academic Training Division that served all courses. The goal was to create a greater specialization for technical quartermaster training. Company officers in the regiments remained the primary instructors for all military subjects and as the leadership evaluators for officer candidates specifically.⁹⁵

The commandant both commanded the Quartermaster School and served concurrently as the Commanding General, Quartermaster Replacement Training Center, Camp Lee, Virginia. Under the commandant was an executive officer, responsible for camp administration, an assistant commandant in charge of training and for a time, a Commanding Officer of Troops who oversaw military matters within the four training regiments. Each regiment consisted of battalions and companies. The cadre officers commanded the units but the students would often fill internal leadership positions within the companies.⁹⁶ The Quartermaster School was under the command of the

⁹⁴Richardson, 30.

⁹⁵Risch and Kieffer, 258.

⁹⁶Ibid., 258-259.

Quartermaster General, located in Washington, D.C. Like the other Service of Supply branches, the Quartermaster reported to the Headquarters, Army Service Forces, the logistical counterpart to Army Ground Forces.

Besides additional space, new topics of instruction would also be required. Quartermaster officers in World War I operated well behind friendly lines. There they established warehouses, depots and bakeries much as they would in peacetime. The interwar mechanization of the Army and anticipated speed of operations would require a new kind of leader—one who could serve as both an expert in his trade and battlefield commander. He would have to be as skilled in the employment of weapons within his unit as a rifle platoon leader in the infantry while retaining the technical knowledge required of special staff officers.⁹⁷

Training Beyond Camp Lee

Camp Lee simply could not meet the expanding need for new officers. As new classes reported, the pace of construction at Camp Lee could not keep up. OCS class 4 reported with 717 candidates. Due to the lack of barracks, many of the men bivouacked in tents. Class 5 was expected to bring another 1,200 men with it. Colonel Whittaker requested that the Quartermaster General transfer a portion of future OCS quotas to an alternate training site until Camp Lee could better accommodate the numbers.⁹⁸

The Quartermaster School therefore established a satellite location for the Officer Candidate Courses at, Fort Francis E. Warren in Cheyenne, Wyoming in March 1942.

⁹⁷Risch and Kieffer, 175.

⁹⁸Richardson, 56.

Fort Warren was already a Quartermaster Training Center and contained an Officer Replacement Pool. The Officer Replacement Pool conducted basic military training for civilians directly commissioned as officers for the technical skills or professions. After thirty days of training, they shipped out to Quartermaster units.⁹⁹

The curriculum at Fort Warren mirrored that of the main school at Camp Lee with few exceptions. One such change was that candidates at Fort Warren completed a 30-mile road march to Pole Mountain as part of their field exercises.¹⁰⁰ The office of the Quartermaster General conducted inspections on this facility and reported compliance with the set curriculum for the Officer Candidate Course.¹⁰¹ Fort Warren ultimately graduated five classes of Officer Candidates over the course of 11 months. Nearly 3,800 officers commissioned into the Quartermaster Corps from the Fort Warren courses out of 6,000 candidates. At the conclusion of the fifth class, all OCS consolidated at Camp Lee.¹⁰²

Conduct of OCS at Camp Lee

Wartime requirements of quantity and speed drastically altered the amount and depth of basic level of instruction provided to officer candidates. By April 1942, the curriculum was 12 weeks in length and consisted of 224 hours of classroom instruction. It

⁹⁹Gerald M. Adams, *Fort Francis E. Warren and the Quartermaster Corps in World War II, 1940 to 1946* (Fort Collins: Citizen Printing, Inc.), 22-23.

¹⁰⁰Adams, 22-23.

¹⁰¹Office of the Quartermaster General to the Commandant, The Quartermaster School, "Progress Report," 14 November 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹⁰²Adams, 33.

also included 30 ¼ hours per week of military instruction in such topics as care of equipment, camp administration and calisthenics.¹⁰³ The final week culminated with field exercises.¹⁰⁴ This last week was an increase from previous classes' three-day field training, conducted at A. P. Hill Military Reservation. Candidates trained on motor transport operations and establishment of campsites. Planning and reconnoitering bivouac sites and concealing them from air attack while establishing security against mechanized attack was the specific focus.¹⁰⁵

While the individual topics of instruction certainly had an immediate goal of educating the students, they also served another role. The performance of the candidates' daily execution of tasks would provide an opportunity to assess their leadership abilities as they fulfilled the roles of company leadership.

To further the training of officer candidates the maximum use will be made of CANDIDATE OFFICERS [original emphasis]. All personnel, commissioned, candidate, enlisted and civilian are reminded that the purpose of candidate training is (1) to determine which officer candidates are mentally, physically, and morally fitted for the leadership and ability required of commissioned officers of the Army of the United States during the present WAR, to recommend the relief of those candidates, if any, who are deemed unsuitable

¹⁰³The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, VA "Training Directive No. 8" 29 April 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. The course split class time between academic/technical subjects and military instruction. The numbers of hours aggregated here are from the detailed schedule approved by the School Commandant.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, VA, "Training Directive No 4," 30 March 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. It is important to note that OCS conducted at Camp Lee began in October 1941. With this establishment, many early adjustments to the curriculum may be attributed to learning what training areas were available and how to best employ them. The three-day exercise noted here amounted to only two days training. The third day consisted of a critique of the training and clearing the training area followed by movement back to Camp Lee.

for such commissions and, (3) to give those candidates who demonstrate their fitness to be commissioned all possible assistance in their effort to earn a commission, to train them technically for this responsibility; worthy of the respect and confidence of the soldiers they are to command.¹⁰⁶

Student officers directed the movement of all candidates to and from appointed places. They supervised policing of camp facilities and all student details. Positions ranged from battalion commander to platoon leader and all non-commissioned ranks found within a company. Candidate platoon leaders were accountable for attendance in classroom instruction and group study periods.¹⁰⁷

In order that these candidates be recognized as acting leaders, they were authorized special accoutrements to their uniforms. These accoutrements were not standard Army insignia of rank and not worn outside of Camp Lee. Battalion commanders wore three inverted chevrons on their collar, company commanders two and platoon leaders one. Candidate non-commissioned officers wore rank insignia appropriate to their positions pinned to felt above their breast pockets. Finally, successful completion of an officer leadership position was noted by a “service ribbon”-like device worn adjacent to the candidate’s nameplate.¹⁰⁸

Graduation ceremonies for the officer candidates were simple but well planned affairs (see figure 1). All candidates in school attended the ceremony and observed the proceedings. Typical of these is the graduation ceremony for class No. 4 on May 19, 1942. Colonel Whittaker, the commandant of the Quartermaster School, hosted the

¹⁰⁶The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, VA, “Training Directive No. 7,” 28 April 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

ceremony. After administering the oath of office, the Quartermaster General addressed the assembled formation. The newly commissioned officers then moved forward to receive their commissions from the four student company commanders. After a benediction, the commander of troops for the ceremony dismissed the students, who moved on to their next training event while the staff and faculty attended lunch at the officer's mess of one of the training regiments.¹⁰⁹




Figure 2. Graduation of OCS class at Camp Lee, 1945

Source: The Quartermaster Technical Training Service, *Quartermaster Training Service Journal* 7, no. 21 (25 May 1945): 21.

¹⁰⁹The Quartermaster School Camp Lee, VA, "Special Information Bulletin," 19 May 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

CHAPTER 4

ADJUSTMENTS TO QUARTERMASTER OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSE CURRICULUM

The Quartermaster School continuously sought to ensure that the curriculum of the Officer Candidate course met the needs of graduates and commanders in all theaters of operations during World War II. Did the product of the Camp Lee training base meet the needs of the consumer, namely the United States Army? The answer to the question would either validate the training program or serve as an indicator of needed change. Evidence suggests that both formal and informal feedback systems existed for the Quartermaster School. Questionnaires, official correspondence, personal letters, and individual feedback from recent graduates all made great impact on not just which subjects were taught at Camp Lee, but how they were taught.

The official history of Quartermaster officer training states, “The need for radical change in the officer training program became apparent late in 1942 and early in 1943.”¹¹⁰ The Quartermaster School desperately sought answers on how their graduates performed in operations overseas and Operation Torch was the first great opportunity to test their product. Two themes emerged in reports from North Africa. First, the general lack of leadership ability among Quartermaster officers.¹¹¹ Simply training as supply technicians would not be enough. Junior officers of the Quartermaster Corps would have to be fighting men.

¹¹⁰Risch and Kieffer, 251.

¹¹¹McPherson, 119.

Second, enemy targeting of combat forces' supply lines had shown them incredibly vulnerable to air and armored attacks.¹¹² Although the initial feedback on supply line vulnerability came from reports on the British Eighth Army, US forces were not any better prepared for the threat. It is arguable that the two issues are linked.

The initial programs of instruction for the Quartermaster Officer Candidate Courses provided tremendous levels of detail in technical training. Even those items categorized as tactical instruction focused primarily on the technical delivery of quartermaster functions in a field environment. The understanding of tactics as employed against an enemy force was not covered in these subjects. By focusing primarily on the technical aspects of service in Quartermaster units, officers would not have a basis of knowledge on how to defend their units against attack from the air. A detailed analysis of the curriculum shows that there was virtually no allotment of time to instruction on either air defense or defense against armored forces other than general considerations on bivouac site locations.¹¹³

Colonel Fellers Report on British Army in Africa

In the fall of 1942, Colonel Bonner Fellers, former military attaché to Egypt visited Camp Lee to observe training and offer his observations on desert warfare. He reported his comments and recommendations to Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, the commanding general of Army Service Forces. Somerville forwarded these observations on to his staff and to the Quartermaster General on 1 October 1942. Fellers

¹¹²Risch and Kieffer, 251.

¹¹³The Quartermaster School, "Training Directive No. 4," 30 March 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

stated during his visit to Camp Lee “last week” that he observed both anti-aircraft and anti-tank gunnery as part of the courses.¹¹⁴ This would indicate that as early as September of 1942, the Quartermaster School had already begun modifying its programs of instruction.

The subject of anti-tank gunnery was one of much discussion during this time. Senior Quartermaster officers across the Army training establishment discussed the impact of Fellers’ observations. On 7 November 1942, Colonel John Thompson, the Quartermaster for Headquarters, Armored Force at Fort Knox, wrote to his friend Colonel George Horkan, assistant commandant of the Quartermaster School, about this very subject. While noting that the Quartermaster School faced challenges in establishing a range he urged Horkan to include at the very least, “nomenclature, functioning, dismantling and field repairs” in the course until a range became available. He communicated, “all dope from combat areas clearly indicates the absolute necessity of well-organized self-supporting defense of all trains and supply installations.” As an attachment to the letter, Thompson attached an extract of Fellers report.¹¹⁵

The extract of Fellers’ report entitled “Supply Trains must provide their own Protection” comes from his observations of a US maneuver exercise and his experience as an observer of the British Eighth Army in North Africa. He is very direct in his recommendations.

¹¹⁴Headquarters, Services of Supply, “Memorandum for General Huebner from General Somervell,” 1 October 1941, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration.

¹¹⁵Headquarters, Armored Force, Office of the Quartermaster Fort Knox, KY, “Letter from COL John McD. Thompson to COL George A., Horken,” 7 November 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

In November 1941, Rommel overran the entire rear area of the Eighth Army, wrought havoc among the supply elements; the Eighth Army barely escaped defeat. In May 1942, General Meservey, when captured by the German 90 Light Division, noted every truck he saw towed an anti-tank gun. Supply trains are of the most remunerative targets which the enemy air and armored forces seek. They must provide their own protection or they will never have it. Each supply truck should have a 50 caliber machine gun and should tow an anti-tank gun. Truck personnel should be trained to man these weapons. Light tanks and self-propelled Bofors should be organically a part of the Service of Supply so that a dozen self-propelled Bofors and at least six light tanks could be assigned to each supply train mission. My impression at the maneuver was that supply trains were unprotected and that no one is held responsible for their protection.¹¹⁶

While materiel solutions would solve part of this dilemma, the last line in his report while damning, does not hold much credence. Available evidence does not support an assumption that rear area security was the sole responsibility of Quartermaster personnel on a level that Fellers comments suggest. FM 10-5 limited the scope of the Quartermaster regiment's concern to the division's supply stocks.

The protection of the quartermaster train is a responsibility of the regimental commander. The regiment itself is equipped with rifles and automatic rifles and, if the situation warrants, the regimental commander should supplement these with a request for additional protection. The best protection of the motor trucks is their speed. Additional protection can be furnished by concealment and dispersion and the establishment of road blocks.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶Headquarters, Armored Force, Office of the Quartermaster Fort Knox, KY, "Letter from COL John McD. Thompson to COL George A., Horken," 7 November 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. Bofors here refers to the 40mm automatic Bofors cannon, an anti-aircraft weapon found in Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery units and mounted on Naval vessels for air defense. COL Fellers does not specify whether these capabilities should be provided to the Service of Supply units as a materiel solution or if supply trains should be augmented with units capable of employing such weapons. It is a large assumption that providing light tanks alone to Quartermaster units would provide adequate defense against an attacking armored force. Armor units are organized, trained and equipped to fight as cohesive units in battle. Simply outfitting the Division trains with tanks (as COL Fellers report would indicate) may not have been his intent.

¹¹⁷War Department, FM 10-5 Quartermaster Field Manual, *Quartermaster Operations* (Washington: War Department 1941), 113.

In looking back to how the corps mobilized for the emergency, the Quartermaster experience in World War I showed that threats to the rear areas were limited and therefore not a primary training concern. It is unclear why Feller's directed his critique of this problem toward the Quartermaster Corps. What is clear, however, is that The Quartermaster School responded by altering the content of its Officer Candidate Course.

The timing of this report was apropos as Operation Torch and America's foray into combat in North Africa was underway. At the same time, it was inopportune, because it was obvious that no current graduate of OCS would be able to apply these lessons or benefit from changes. Enemy action alone was not the only hindrance to Allied efforts in Africa. General George Patton landed in Morocco on Sunday, 8 November 1942. By the next morning, only one percent of his 15,000 tons of supplies were ashore to support his forces, even though over 40 percent of his personnel were ashore. Improper storage, lack of load planning and a clear lack of anyone present to take charge hampered operations.¹¹⁸ Patton himself went down to the beaches in order to try to get things moving but to no avail. There he found "the beach was a mess and the officers were doing nothing. . . . As a whole the men were poor, the officers worse. No Drive. It is very sad."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn* (New York: Henry Holt and Company), 138-139

¹¹⁹Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers 1940-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), 108.

Increases to Weapons Training in Response to Fellers' Report

If Feller noted during his visit in September that candidates were training with 37mm anti-tank guns or anti-aircraft weapons then it was not documented in the curriculum. Authorized 600 candidates, Class 15 of Quartermaster Officer Candidate School began 16 November 1942. The class lasted just over twelve weeks and totaled 753 hours of instruction. The program of instruction for classes 15 or 16 (which would start on 30 November) does not list either event. Both classes did include a three-hour lesson on aircraft identification and a four-hour “machine gun-automatic rifle demonstration” though.¹²⁰

While the course now included an extensive increase in weapons training from just six months earlier, the written record of evidence does not support Fellers' observations that fall. It remains possible that Fellers saw a pilot class during his visit—that is, a class that was not formally documented in the program of instruction. Prior to fully introducing classes, faculty piloted these lessons to refine techniques and standards as well as to educate the instructors. More likely, he witnessed training during that visit that had simply been inserted into the program as a response to the ongoing discussions generated by his earlier report prior to its documentation.

Beginning with classes 17 and 18 however, formal changes to weapons training began to occur in the programs of instructions for Quartermaster Officer Candidates. The course reduced slightly from 744 to 722 hours within the same twelve-week period as

¹²⁰The Quartermaster School Camp Lee, VA, “Officer Candidate Courses conducted at The Quartermaster School: Class No. 15, Authorized quota 600, 16 November 1942 to 12 February 1943, Class No. 16, Authorized quota, 600, 30 November 1942 to 26 February 1943. Programs of Instructions,” RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

earlier classes. The changes removed instruction on grenades and the machine gun demonstration. Time for drill and ceremony at the battalion level reduced from five to one hour only. Time on the M1903 Springfield rifle was cut more than half to only fourteen hours from thirty. These hours were replaced with twelve hours of instruction on and firing of the .30 caliber machine gun and six hours with the .50 caliber. Officer candidates now spent five hours with the M1911 pistol, three hours on the M1 Garand and six hours on the M1 carbine. Inspections and forced marches gave way to instruction on rocket launchers (see figure 2) and the 37mm anti-tank gun.¹²¹

¹²¹The Quartermaster School Camp Lee, VA, "Officer Candidate Courses conducted at The Quartermaster School: Class No. 17 Authorized Quota 600, 21 December 1942 to 19 March 1943, Class No. 18, Authorized quota 600, 4 January 1943 to 2 April 1943 Program of Instruction," RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. For a more detailed break out of changes to the specific curriculum, see Appendix A.



Figure 3. Officer Candidate firing a bazooka as part of OCS

Source: The Quartermaster Technical Training Service, *Quartermaster Training Service Journal* 7, No. 21 (25 May 1945): 20. Note: Officer Candidate fires bazooka as part of weapons training course, which includes instruction in the '03 rifle, carbine, .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, sub-machine guns and rifle grenades. They will also go over the infiltration course, if they've never had it before, and during three weeks spent in the field, will use their knowledge of weapons in setting up defense plans for their QM installations and bivouac areas and camouflage them.

Changes to the general basic and military training were not the only ones made to the course. New technical and tactical topics included packaging and loading supplies, aircraft loading and unloading, and loading and bracing rail cars. Jungle trails, hasty mine fields, tank ambushes, and blackout driving now joined familiar subjects as field bakery,

mobile laundry and map reading. The weeklong field exercise now had night objectives added and more emphasis on field orders.¹²²

Table 5. Comparison of Weapons and Combat Skills Training in Officer Candidate Classes Nos. 15/16 and 17/18

Subject	Classes 15 & 16	Classes 17 & 18
Bayonet	12	0
Carbine	2	6
Grenades	4	0
Gas Mask	0	2
Machine Gun-Automatic Rifle Demonstration	4	0
Machine Gun- Cal. 30 Browning Automatic	0	12
Machine Gun- Cal .50 Browning Automatic	0	6
Rifle Exercise (Range)	11	12
Rifle - M1903	30	16
Rifle M1	2	3
Rocket Launcher	0	1
Unarmed Defense	6	10
Bomb Reconnaissance	0	2
Hasty Mine Field- Tank Ambush	0	4
Jungle Trail	0	2
Weapons- Demonstration	0	8

Source: Officer Candidate Courses conducted at The Quartermaster School: Class No. 15, Class No. 16, Class No. 17, and Class No. 18 Programs of Instruction.

¹²²The Quartermaster School Camp Lee, VA, "Officer Candidate Courses conducted at The Quartermaster School: Class No. 17 Authorized Quota 600, 21 December 1942 to 19 March 1943; Class No. 18, Authorized quota 600, 4 January 1943 to 2 April 1943 Program of Instruction," RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Horkan's Impact on the Course

The impact of Brigadier General George Horkan on the Quartermaster Officer Candidate Course cannot be overstated. Horkan rose through the hierarchy of The Quartermaster School. Prior to assuming command as Commandant, he served as Executive Officer, and then Assistant Commandant. In these positions, he was a key individual within the command group at Camp Lee. While serving on the staff at The Quartermaster School, Horkan regularly recommend changes to not just the officer courses, but all courses under the jurisdiction of The Quartermaster School. Thompson's letter to Horkan on anti-tank training is indicative of the communication he maintained with senior officers of the Quartermaster Corps throughout the Army.¹²³

After classes 4 and 5 graduated, Horkan sent questionnaires to all graduates in order to gain their first hand observations on how well the course prepared them for their duties. He was particularly interested in whether or not the course was adequate given their experiences. Horkan wanted the course to be of practical value to men serving in combat. Feedback, especially from officers overseas, led him to push for more field and military training in the curriculum.¹²⁴

By the time he ascended to the post of commandant, his changes to the course took the form of a three-week long field training exercise. The exercises made full use of the training areas around Camp Lee and immersed the candidates in field conditions. Previously identified training areas at Swift Creek Park became bivouac sites along with

¹²³Headquarters, Armored Force, Office of the Quartermaster Fort Knox, KY, "Letter from COL John McD. Thompson to COL George A., Horken," November 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹²⁴Richardson, 59.

newly acquired land at Lake Jordan. The A.P. Hill Military Reservation ultimately became the host for all these events but not until class 34.¹²⁵



Figure 4. Quartermaster OCS students conducting field training at A.P. Hill

Source: The Quartermaster Technical Training Service, *Quartermaster Training Service Journal* 7, no. 21 (25 May 1945): 16. Note. Simulated Strafing attack sends candidates scurrying for cover as gunners man truck-mounted machine guns. OCS men study motor operations, night operations, vehicle loading and march discipline.

¹²⁵Richardson, 59-61.

In addition to field time and exercises, training aids continued to improve. In April 1944, the school installed an M9 anti-aircraft machine-gun trainer at the practice range in the school area (see figure 5.) Powered by an air compressor, this device enabled students to fire small plastic pellets at scale model planes that moved across a screen to simulate engagements. It produced vibration and sound effects replicating the noise of machine gun firing and battle effects.¹²⁶ Because Quartermaster trucks mounted the .50 caliber machine guns primarily for anti-aircraft fire, this piece of training equipment became a valuable addition to the existing training aids used at The Quartermaster School.¹²⁷




Figure 5. M9 Anti-Aircraft Machine-Gun Trainer

Source: War Department, “Anti-Aircraft Artillery Field Manual, FM 4-155” (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 23.

¹²⁶War Department, “Anti-Aircraft Artillery Field Manual, FM 4-155” (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 22-23.

¹²⁷The Office of The Quartermaster General, “The Quartermaster School Officer Candidate School, The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee Virginia History: Supplementary Report 1 January 1945-30 June 1945,” 7. Quartermaster School Archives, Fort Lee, VA.

Leadership Concerns Addressed

By April of 1943, newly commissioned graduates of the Quartermaster Officer Candidate Courses would be much better prepared for the challenges of warfare in World War II. However, as Patton had observed in the North Africa landings, initial performance was lacking. It would certainly take time for those initial impressions to change. In early 1943 even General Eisenhower commented to the Commandant of the Quartermaster School, "I know you are turning out good materiel at Camp Lee, and if you will forgive me, I will mention one thing that cannot be over emphasized—discipline. Drill it into them day and night and make sure that they carry it with them when they leave. I am rabid on the subject and cannot stress it too forcibly."¹²⁸ Notably, no graduate of the improved curriculum would have reached the European Theater yet but certainly, a veiled criticism such as this from the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Europe left a stinging mark on the staff and faculty at Camp Lee.

Class 30 was the first class that lasted 17 weeks and this gave the school an additional four weeks of training time. Horkan, by now commandant of The Quartermaster School, applied most of this additional time to more field and military training.¹²⁹ Interestingly, leadership also made its way into the curriculum as a separate

¹²⁸Headquarters, The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, VA, "Daily Circular No. 91, 17 April 1943," RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹²⁹Richardson, 59.

point of instruction for classes 30 and beyond.¹³⁰ It is difficult to discern what impact this lesson had on graduates as it was only one hour in length in the program of instruction.

Arguably, the inclusion of leadership as a separate entry on the program of instruction shows the commitment of the school leadership to document what was certainly an ongoing component of the course. All instruction in the course focused on future leaders. The lack of any hours devoted to leadership prior to class number 30 does not justify a conclusion that no leadership training occurred during those earlier courses. A better conclusion is that a discussion on how to document the inclusion of leadership training in a course specifically designed to produce leaders resulted in the documentation in the program of instruction for classes 30 and beyond a class on leadership.

Informally, the leadership ability of graduates continued to be of concern to senior members of the Quartermaster Corps late into the war. Correspondence between these officers and the commandant on the subject of leadership continued. The commandant often shared excerpts of these letters with the staff and faculty of The Quartermaster School through memoranda or by posting them in the Camp Daily Circular. Horkan's successor

¹³⁰The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, VA, "Officer Candidate Class No. 30 Index," Quartermaster School Archives, Fort Lee, VA. The document lists "Leadership" under Military Training with a corresponding entry of "16" for hours. The last entry on the page 2 depicts (4) hours without a corresponding subject. Richardson erroneously repeats the previous subject line of "Problems-Military" in his reproduction of the curriculum. See Richardson, 195. A close examination of the original document along with comparisons to previous course curriculum suggest that a typing error occurred at the entry for "Small Arms Ammunition" incorrectly repeating the previous entry of 24 hours for a course that in the previous class totaled 1 hour. By comparing similar subjects each successive entry is out of alignment. A further examination shows that this typing error misalignment causes a similar undue shift in hours from previous courses in 10 entries. Finally, the total hours for that portion of the course are 306 while 330 hours of entries are depicted above it.

as commandant, Colonel L.R. Wolfe, shared two particularly enthusiastic passages of correspondence with his officers on 2 June 1944, entreating his cadre to think on the students with care as they weighed the selection, training and final determination of officer candidates. The first came from the European Theater:

You can quote me to the Staff and Faculty on the following: I realize now that too many people were graduated there who will never be officers. I have a few who I intend to reclassify for lack of leadership, lack of personality, and utter failure to inspire their men. This was a serious mistake, and I know you will correct it there. The time had come when friendship must cease in the selection of leaders of men.[original emphasis]

Another former faculty member sent the following from Italy:

One thing that I noticed with many of our unit commanders is that they are not well versed in leadership; they are not well versed in command, and they lack initiative. Too many are prone to accept a “laisses faire” attitude. Greater stress should be laid upon the development on initiative and leadership.¹³¹

Visits to and From the Quartermaster School

Early changes to Quartermaster instructional materiel came from impressions from Allied operations and from limited experience gained in maneuvers or other training exercises. Observations from Fellers and other sources clearly were held in high regard by the Quartermaster Corps and would lead to a further investment on observers in overseas combat theaters and as witnesses to training. Camp Lee regularly hosted visits by officers returning from overseas assignments. Two months after Fellers’ visit to the Quartermaster School, the Commandant again asked for a visit by the recently returned

¹³¹Headquarters The Quartermaster School, “Memorandum To All Officers of the Staff & Faculty, The Quartermaster School,” 2 June 1944, Quartermaster School Archives, Fort Lee, VA.

military attaché to Sweden.¹³² On 26 February 1943, Colonel A.T. McCone of the General Staff Corps visited with the staff and faculty of the Quartermaster School. Colonel McCone served as a military observer for the entire West Africa region since November of 1941. The School hosted a three-hour session for him that was announced across the camp.¹³³

The Office of the Quartermaster General sent many officers to field installations to observe Quartermaster activities throughout the war. Many times, their reports served as the basis for training directives and circular letters issued to the school.¹³⁴ The Quartermaster School also detailed instructors to attend specific maneuvers and exercises. These instructors returned to the school with their observations and insights on how units conducted operations in the field and how well graduates performed.¹³⁵ In both cases, announcements of these visits and a sharing of the reports filed on return were widely broadcast and shared.

¹³²BG H. L. Whitaker, letter to The Quartermaster General, "Conference between Lt. Col. Hugh B. Waddell, GSC Military Attache, Stockholm Sweden and members of the Staff and Faculty, The Quartermaster School," 16 November 1942, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹³³Headquarters, The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, VA, "Daily Circular No. 47, 25 February 1943," RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹³⁴1LT Joseph C. Smith, Jr. to COL George A. Horkan, Executive Officer, QM School, "Memorandum Subject: Overseas Observers," Undated, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹³⁵Headquarters, The QM School, Camp Lee, VA, "Daily Circular No. 307, 28 December 1943," RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

Experience of Assigned Personnel Used to Inform Staff and Faculty

As new personnel arrived at Camp Lee, either for assignment as instructors or simply transitioning through the Quartermaster replacement pool, the school noted their experience and made them available for consultations on an informal basis. Their presence at Camp Lee was announced through daily circulars posted on unit bulletin boards from post down to the company level. While awaiting orders or class starts they were often detailed to work throughout the various Quartermaster School departments. The 27 July 1943 daily circular advertised, "Capt. Orville H. Brack is presently assigned to QMRP and on duty with Technical Training Service Department. He has recently returned from overseas duty and is available as a consultant."¹³⁶ In a slightly more formal way, senior officers would address specific classes on their observations.¹³⁷ The frequency of these events increased as the war continued. The school took great advantage of these personnel and ensured that they received the appropriate audiences to share their experience.

The faculty at the Quartermaster School remained continually engaged in ongoing professional education. At the same time that the curriculum for Officer Candidate Courses began to increase the amount of weapons training, the faculty began to educate themselves as well. Special classes for the instructors, outside of their normal training

¹³⁶Headquarters, The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, VA, "Daily Circular 177, 27 July 1943," RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹³⁷Headquarters, The QM School, Camp Lee, VA, "Daily Circular No. 61, 13 March 1944," RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. Lt. Col. Perry addressed the officers of Headquarters and Headquarters Company in the School theater on 13 March 1944 about his experiences in the Middle East.

hours, were scheduled and Regimental Commanders held responsible for the proficiency of their subordinate officers. Company officers of the officer candidate battalions were required to know weapons nomenclature, assembly and disassembly, care and cleaning, mechanical functions, corrective measures for immediate action and effective methods of employment for all small arms included in the officer candidate course instruction.¹³⁸

Continuous Improvement

Regular reviews of tactical material and other instructional methods were addressed at weekly meetings of the School Department. These meetings assessed the current curriculum as well as reports from overseas theaters. It may also be deduced that the experiences of instructors and other cadre while overseas also added to these discussions along with formal correspondence and dispatches from forward commands. The information discussed and internal debates that followed at these informal meetings would certainly color the perceptions of those in attendance. Furthermore, they may well be credited to later changes in curriculum without discrete cause and effect relationships.¹³⁹

This spirit of innovation continued throughout the school's existence. In a 1945 historical report, the school details its adaptations to curriculum made since the first of

¹³⁸Headquarters, The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, VA, Office of The Commanding Officer of Troops, 15 November 1942, "Training Memorandum No. 4 Subject: Weapons Training," RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

¹³⁹Headquarters, The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee, VA, "Daily Circular No. 148, 22 June 1944," RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. The School Department from 1942 until 1945 was the administrative division of all instructors at the Quartermaster School for all academic subjects.

that year. The Pacific area became the focus of map exercises, field operations, and logistical planning. Instructors used maps of previous operations to illustrate classroom lessons and analyze actions taken. A continual analysis of the program of instruction occurred throughout its use. By 1945 virtually all staff level training had been eliminated in favor of items that supported the duties of junior officers in the field.¹⁴⁰

The faculty also experimented with new learning techniques. These included the use of skits, motion picture films, viewgraphs with accompanying phonographic recordings, special demonstrations, and new training aids. Panels of experts presented information on topics such as supply management and operations in the field. Leadership seminars became the culminating event for each class. Senior officers would spend two days with the class before graduation focusing their discussions on how to succeed as junior officers.¹⁴¹

Throughout the war, the staff and faculty kept current with the rapid developments of the war and changing situations concerning quartermaster operations by the constant study of classified reports received from overseas observers sent to various theaters by the Quartermaster General. As officers processed through the Quartermaster School replacement pool, the staff conducted daily interviews with them. Instructors from

¹⁴⁰The Office of The Quartermaster General, "The Quartermaster School Officer Candidate School, The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee Virginia History: Supplementary Report 1 January 1945-30 June 1945," Quartermaster School Archives, Fort Lee, VA.

¹⁴¹Ibid.

various departments interviewed individuals multiple times in an attempt to capture the most information during their temporary assignment.¹⁴²

Analysis of Evidence

Both the formal and informal feedback channels did affect curriculum at Camp Lee. Clearly, the reports of military attaches and combat observers made direct and in some cases dramatic impacts to the training regimen of the school. What impact the more informal conferences and consultations with recently returned officers had on classroom instruction is more difficult to discern in terms of discrete documentation. However, while not explicitly documented in the programs of instructions, the experiences of these officers most certainly were incorporated into vignettes and situational exercises during field training if not specifically as individual items in the curriculum.

While the Quartermaster School undertook the mission of creating an Officer Candidate School and hastily prepared a curriculum, it did not leave them untouched in the face of unrealized expectations. Instead, it responded throughout the course of World War II to the changing dynamics of modern warfare. The faculty did the best they could to design a course that would produce the type of officer needed to supply the nation's Army and lead the men that would provide the lifeblood of war. Throughout its wartime existence, the Quartermaster Officer Candidate School received multiple variations of guidance and in some cases unrelenting directives from their higher headquarters. In each

¹⁴²Ibid.

case, the faculty adjusted where necessary to ensure that their graduates were capable of performing in the field.¹⁴³

¹⁴³The Office of The Quartermaster General, "The Quartermaster School Officer Candidate School, The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee Virginia History: Supplementary Report 1 January 1945-30 June 1945," Quartermaster School Archives, Fort Lee, VA.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The Quartermaster School adjusted its curriculum during World War II in response to both reports from overseas theater and self-recognized need for adaptation. It continually followed a system of self-examination and critical reflection on not only the subjects taught but the method of instruction used as well. This process of adaptation and improvement was led by men that knew they could create a better product through their instruction.

This desire to seek better methods and better output occurred within a larger Army construct that also continually sought to ensure that the Army commissioned the best-trained men to serve as leaders in combat. Leadership is the ultimate combat multiplier. Whether an officer served as an infantryman in the island hopping campaigns of the South Pacific or as the commander of a graves registration company on the bluff overlooking the carnage of Omaha Beach in Normandy, the challenge was similar. Materiel and soldiers will only achieve what leaders set out to accomplish. Given that, the men engaged in producing those leaders saw their efforts to train these leaders as a true contribution to the war and victory. While not lauded in the same manner as battlefield heroics, their passion and commitment to this cause is therefore worthy of recognition and accolade.

Recommendations

This study examined topics that deserve further inquiry. The education of officer candidates during World War II was an evolving process. A study of how each branch approached the challenge of educating the officers of their field would be a complete telling of the story. As the Logistics branch debates whether or not to become a commissioning branch, a study of the two other branches within the current Logistics Corps (Ordnance and Transportation) would complete the historiography for that discussion.

A study of the continued divide between technical and tactical education for officers is worthy of additional discussion. Within the logistics community there is often a debate on how much is too much for technical training. Should officers be generalists, capable of managing the multifaceted nuances of integrating multifunctional logistics? Or is a better approach to have officers specialized within a particular field of logistics and strive to become subject matter experts within that realm?

This study shows that this argument has roots at least as far back as World War II. The Quartermaster OCS developed officers prepared to serve across the spectrum of Quartermaster functions. Later schooling and assignment experience developed technical expertise within those functions. While initial OCS classes received a depth of instruction on specific Quartermaster functions, these points became less weighty as the course changed. Throughout the conflict, the OCS curriculum was continually adjusted. Often this was in response to field reports, at times it was deduced by leadership at Camp Lee. The goals of these adjustments were always the same—produce the best-trained officer possible.

The personal involvement of George C. Marshall in the development and employment of officers in the United States Army deserves additional detailed examination. The files at the National Archives in College Park Maryland, are a treasure trove of information on this subject. The multitude of records on officer management from the Office of the Chief of Staff bear witness to Marshall's personal involvement in the selection of officers for command and promotion to the senior ranks of the Army.

Specific to the Quartermaster Corps, the involvement and influence of George Horkan in the training of the Quartermaster Corps during World War II deserves additional investigation. The evidence found for this study illustrates his influence but there is a lack of documentation on the totality of his impact.

Further researchers of this topic should consult four primary sources. Records Group 92 at the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland is the primary location for most primary source material on The Quartermaster School during World War II. The Quartermaster School Archives at Fort Lee, Virginia also retains many primary source materials that are not include in the National Archives stacks. E. Ramsay Richardson's manuscript *History of The Quartermaster School* is an excellent history of operations at The Quartermaster School at Camp Lee. The *U.S. Army In World War II* series of books produced by the Center for Military History known unofficially as "The Army Green Books" is well researched and complements any research on primary sources. In many cases, the "Green Books" effectively fill gaps found between primary sources.

Thus the OCS program of World War II, and in specific the Quartermaster OCS, can still provide insights of significance today. As the United States Army begins to look

forward to a time without large major combat operations, the need for a rapidly expandable training establishment will wane. Likewise, the lessons gained from our involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan, while fresh now, will soon be set aside as the Army begins preparations for the next perceived threat. This is natural, and should not receive an entirely negative response.

Operational environments continually change and evolve. The Army must be mindful that lessons learned are not lessons that immediately apply to all future environments. The OCS program in 1945 looked similar to the one established in 1941 but the content had been largely adapted. The initial curriculum established for the Quartermaster OCS represented the “best guess” of what officers would need to know to be successful. The active desire of the staff and faculty at Camp Lee to seek out the requirements of commanders in the field, their adaptability to incorporate new topics and their unwillingness to rest on the status quo are exemplars to any involved in officer education today.

APPENDIX A

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION COMPARISON-

CLASSES 15/16, 17/18, 29 AND 30

Subject	Classes 15 & 16	Classes 17 & 18	Class 29	Class 30
General (Orientation, Disciplinary and Basic Training)/ Later Military Training				
Academic Orientation	2	0	0	0
Aid to Dependents	2	0	0	0
Articles of War	2	0	0	0
Bayonet	12	0	0	0
Calisthenics/Physical Training (include marches, Personal Combat Obstacle Course and Boxing)	34	37	96	74
Obstacle Course	10	10	0	0
Unarmed Defense	6	10	0	0
Camp Sanitation	3	0	0	0
Carbine, Cal. .30 M1	2	6	6	6
Care of Equipment	2	2	2	2
Care and Cleaning, Small Arms	—	—	1	1
Classification of Candidates	—	3	3	0
Company Orientation	2	2	2	2
Display of Equipment		4	4	4
First Aid in the Field	10	12	0	0
Formal Inspection	24	24	22	27
Grenades	4	0	0	0
Gas Mask		2	2	4
Gun- 37 mm Anti-Tank		4	6	6
Infantry Pack and Equipment	5	2	2	4
Interior Guard, Security in Bivouac	6	4	4	4
Leadership	—	—	—	1
Machine Gun-Automatic Rifle Demonstration	4	0	0	0
Machine Gun- Cal. 30 Browning Automatic	—	12	8	8
Machine Gun- Cal .50 Browning Automatic	—	6	8	8
Military Courtesies, Discipline, etc.	4	0	4	4
Military Drill Consisting of:	—	—	—	28
Squad	5	5	5	—

Platoon	5	5	5	—
Company	3	3	3	—
Battalion	3	1	1	—
School of the Soldier, w/o Arms	4	4	4	—
School of the Soldier, w/ Arms	5	4	4	—
Extended Order Drill (Night Exercise)	0	0	0	8
Military Sanitation and First Aid	3	0	12	13
Morale Development	1	0	0	0
Parades and Reviews	12	10	10	10
Physical Inspection	—	2	2	2
Pistol- U.S. M1911	0	5	0	0
Problems-Military	—		4	4
Thompson Submachine Gun	—	6	6	6
Small Arms Ammunition	—	—	1	1
Protection Against Carelessness	2	0	0	0
Protection of Military Information	2	0	0	0
Rifle Exercise (Range)	11	12	32	32
Rifle - M1903	30	16	18	16
Rifle M1	2	3	0	0
Rocket Launcher	0	1	0	0
Security & Protective Measures- Individual	4	5	12	24
Shelter/Field Tent Pitching	4	5	4	5
Wear of the Uniform (Uniform Regulations)	1	1	1	2
Preparation of Camp Sites	—	—	—	4
Military Training Films	—	—	—	8
Training Marches	37	30	0	0
Medical Form	—	2	0	0
Time- Company/Regimental Cmdrs.	—	20	9	13
Clearing Equipment	—	4	4	0
Graduation	—	4	4	0
Total General	268	288	304	306
Technical Training				
Academic Orientation	—	2	2	2
Aid to Dependents	—	2	2	2
Army Orientation	—	—	12	11
Army-Special Service Division	—	—	1	1
Board Procedures	4	4	3	2
Bomb Reconnaissance	—	2	0	0
Classification Procedures & A.P.S.	8	8	8	8
Commercial Transportation	6	5	5	11

Company Administration	30	30	27	40
Defense Against Chemical Warfare	11	8	11	0
Fiscal, Procurement, Agent Officer	8	8	8	12
Foreign Maps	5	0	0	0
Graves Registration	2	2	0	2
Identification of Aircraft	—	3	1	0
Methods of Instruction & Training Management	15	15	15	19
Military Courtesy	—	4	0	0
Military Law	11	11	11	13
Organization of Q.M.C.	1	1	0	0
Organization of the Army	—	—	5	4
Packaging and Loading of Supplies	6	4	4	4
Protection Against Enemy Action	—	—	—	24
Protection Against Carelessness	—	2	2	0
Protection of Military Information	—	2	2	2
Salvage	10	10	9	10
Subsistence and Mess Management	17	16	17	18
Supply; Depot, Post , Unit (and Air Force-class 30)	29	29	29	36
Total Technical	163	168	—	—
Tactical Training				
Aerial Protection and Camouflage	3	0	0	0
Demonstration Battalion Tactical Training Exercises	—	—	—	44
Field Operations Consisting of:	117	74	73	91
Organization	12	12	—	—
Motor Transport & Supply	26	26	—	—
Field Orders and Administration	24	24	—	—
Air Transportation	10	10	—	—
Special Warfare	12	2	—	—
Field Exercises in connection with Motor Transport	33	0	—	—
Foreign Maps	—	5	0	0
Map Reading	19	19	24	30
Identification of Aircraft	3	0	0	0
Prismatic Compass- Field Exercises	8	8	0	0
Use of The Compass in the Field	—	—	4	0
Night Compass Exercise	—	—	2	0
Sketching- Field Exercise	16	8	4	0
Chemical Warfare Demonstration	—	4	4	0
Night Direction Finding	—	2	2	0

Driver Training (Night)	—	2	2	0
Traffic Control & Main Supply Road	—	2	2	0
Hasty Mine Field- Tank Ambush	—	4	4	0
Jungle Trail	—	2	2	0
Tactical Problem (Motor March)	—	14	14	0
Railhead & Truckhead	—	4	4	0
Gasoline & Oil Supply	—	2	2	0
Weapons- Demonstration	—	8		0
Mobile Laundry	—	8	4	0
Blackout Driving	—	2	2	0
Clothing and Equipage	—	—	4	0
Convoy Operations- Vehicle Concealment	—	4	4	0
Cross Country Driving	—	2		0
Examination	—	—	4	0
Field Bakery	—	8	4	0
1st and 2nd Echelons (Maintenance)	—	4	4	0
Sterilization and Bath	—	8	4	0
Carloading and Bracing	—	2	2	0
Cargo Plane Loading	—	2	2	0
Motor, Park, Supply & Dispatch	—	2		0
Mobile Refrigeration and Model Motor Park	—	—	2	0
Kitchen Car	—	—	1	0
Warehouse Operations	—	—	4	0
Total Tactical	192	194		
Total Technical and Tactical (29 &30)			277	457
Miscellaneous				
Individual Study Hours	110	72	80	—
Sex Hygiene and Venereal Diseases	—	—	1	—
QM Board	—	—	1	—
Medical Form	—	—	2	—
Processing, deprocessing and graduation	20	—	—	—
Total Miscellaneous	130	72	87	5
Grand Total	753	722	748	768

Source: Officer Candidate Courses conducted at the Quartermaster School Programs of Instruction for Class No 15 and No. 16 and Class No 17 and No 18, RG 92, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD; The Quartermaster School Officer Candidate Class No. 29 Index and Officer Candidate Class No. 30 Index. Quartermaster School Archives, Fort Lee, VA

APPENDIX B

CLASS DATA FOR OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSES CONDUCTED AT CAMP LEE, VIRGINIA

Class No.	Start Date	Graduation Date	Class Length	Enrolled	Graduated	Graduation Rate
1	7-Jul-41	27-Sep-41	11 weeks, 5 days	151	135	89.4%
2	22-Oct-41	17-Jan-42	12 weeks, 3 days	153	146	95.4%
3	26-Jan-42	25-Apr-42	12 weeks, 5 days	497	483	97.2%
4	23-Feb-42	23-May-42	12 weeks, 5 days	717	703	98.0%
5	6-Apr-42	3-Jul-42	12 weeks, 4 days	473	459	97.0%
6	4-May-42	1-Aug-42	12 weeks, 5 days	1,207	1,175	97.3%
7	1-Jun-42	13-Aug-42	10 weeks, 4 days	1,235	1,220	98.8%
8	6-Jul-42	25-Sep-42	11 weeks, 4 days	1,257	1,236	98.3%
9	20-Jul-42	16-Oct-42	12 weeks, 4 days	1,241	1,199	96.6%
10	17-Aug-42	13-Nov-42	12 weeks, 4 days	1,333	1,228	92.1%
11	14-Sep-42	11-Dec-42	12 weeks, 4 days	1,267	1,114	87.9%
12	5-Oct-42	23-Dec-43	11 weeks, 2 days	1,314	1,130	86.0%
13	19-Oct-42	15-Jan-43	12 weeks, 4 days	684	511	74.7%
14	2-Nov-42	29-Jan-43	12 weeks, 4 days	716	591	82.5%
15	16-Nov-42	12-Feb-43	12 weeks, 4 days	702	589	83.9%
16	30-Nov-42	26-Feb-43	12 weeks, 4 days	708	588	83.1%
17	31-Dec-42	19-Mar-43	11 weeks, 1 days	709	603	85.0%
18	3-Jan-43	2-Apr-43	12 weeks, 5 days	725	609	84.0%
19	18-Jan-43	16-Apr-43	12 weeks, 4 days	689	594	86.2%
20	1-Feb-43	30-Apr-43	12 weeks, 4 days	682	557	81.7%
21	15-Feb-43	14-May-43	12 weeks, 4 days	789	650	82.4%
22	1-Mar-43	28-May-43	12 weeks, 4 days	870	684	78.6%
23	22-Mar-43	18-Jun-43	12 weeks, 4 days	984	781	79.4%
24	5-Apr-43	2-Jul-43	12 weeks, 4 days	718	519	72.3%
25	19-Apr-43	16-Jul-43	12 weeks, 4 days	763	565	74.0%
26	3-May-43	30-Jul-43	12 weeks, 4 days	706	607	86.0%
27	17-May-43	13-Aug-43	12 weeks, 4 days	622	494	79.4%
28	31-May-43	27-Aug-43	12 weeks, 4 days	323	262	81.1%
29	21-Jun-43	17-Sep-43	12 weeks, 4 days	375	318	84.8%
30	5-Jul-43	5-Nov-43	17 weeks, 4 days	308	254	82.5%
31	19-Jul-43	19-Nov-43	17 weeks, 4 days	320	290	90.6%
32	16-Aug-43	17-Dec-43	17 weeks, 4 days	304	254	83.6%

33	13-Dec-43	8-Apr-44	16 weeks, 5 days	103	69	67.0%
34	10-Jan-44	5-May-44	16 weeks, 4 days	82	70	85.4%
35	21-Feb-44	16-Jun-44	16 weeks, 4 days	337	257	76.3%
36	6-Mar-44	30-Jun-44	16 weeks, 4 days	352	238	67.6%
37	20-Mar-44	14-Jul-44	16 weeks, 4 days	368	255	69.3%
38	3-Apr-44	28-Jul-44	16 weeks, 4 days	373	256	68.6%
39	17-Apr-44	11-Aug-44	16 weeks, 4 days	362	232	64.1%
40	1-May-44	25-Aug-44	16 weeks, 4 days	261	212	81.2%
41	19-Jun-44	13-Oct-44	16 weeks, 4 days	316	213	67.4%
42	3-Jul-44	27-Oct-44	16 weeks, 4 days	362	251	69.3%
43	17-Jul-44	10-Nov-44	16 weeks, 4 days	381	250	65.6%
44	31-Jul-44	24-Nov-44	16 weeks, 4 days	384	246	64.1%
45	12-Aug-44	8-Dec-44	16 weeks, 6 days	347	220	63.4%
46	26-Aug-44	22-Dec-44	16 weeks, 6 days	398	222	55.8%
47	14-Oct-44	9-Feb-45	16 weeks, 6 days	331	211	63.7%
48	4-Nov-44	2-Mar-45	16 weeks, 6 days	284	164	57.7%
49	20-Jan-45	18-May-45	16 weeks, 6 days	201	130	64.7%
50	17-Feb-45	15-Jun-45	16 weeks, 6 days	111	60	54.1%
51	27-Mar-45	20-Jul-45	16 weeks, 3 days	100	66	66.0%
52	28-Apr-45	24-Aug-45	16 weeks, 6 days	120	86	71.7%
53	19-May-45	14-Sep-45	16 weeks, 6 days	127		
54	16-Jun-45	12-Oct-45	16 weeks, 6 days	94		
55	23-Jul-45	16-Nov-45	16 weeks, 4 days	140		
56	27-Aug-45	21-Dec-45	16 weeks, 4 days	138		

Source: Data adapted from E. Ramsay Richardson, History of the Quartermaster School, (Washington: Office of The Quartermaster General), 179-180; The Office of The Quartermaster General, “The Quartermaster School Officer Candidate School, The Quartermaster School, Camp Lee Virginia History: Supplementary Report, 1 January 1945-30 June 1945,” Quartermaster School Archives, Fort Lee, VA.

APPENDIX C

QUARTERMASTER OFFICER COURSE COMPARISONS

1939 REGULAR COURSE THROUGH OCS CLASS NO. 1

Regular Officers Course 1939	National Guard and Reserve Officers Class 15 JAN 40	Officers Class Special #1 1 JUL 40-21 FEB 42	ROTC Class	OCS Class 1
Fiscal (6 hours)	Quartermaster Corps Administration	Field Operations	Administration of Civilian Personnel (12 hours)	Civilian Personnel (12 hours)
General Principles, History, Organization and Administration, QMC (12 hours)	Government Contracts	Training Management	Fiscal Accounting (16 hours)	Defense Against Chemical Weapons (10 hours)
Salvage, Laundry, Cemetery & Field Printing (4 hours)	Mobilization Planning	Company Administration	Utilities (15 hours)	Fiscal Accounting (13 hours)
Civilian Personnel (8 hours)	Mass Procurement of Supplies	Civilian Personnel	Procurement (28 hours)	Map and Aerial Photograph Reading (12 hours)
Business Administration (79 hours)	Training Management	Military Law	Salvage (9 hours)	Methods of Instruction (5 hours)
Business Economics (21 hours)	Map Reading	Fiscal	Transportation, Commercial (9 hours)	Military Discipline, Courtesies, and Customs of the Service (3 hours)
Business Law (33 hours)	Military Organization	Procurement	Storage and Issue (26 hours)	Military Law (10 hours)
Combat Orders (21 hours)	Combat Orders	Transportation, Commercial	Property Accounting (27 hours)	Military Sanitation and First Air (3 hours)
Government Contracts (25 hours)	Tactics and Technique, QMC Combat	Storage and Issue	Military Courtesy and Discipline (3 hours)	Military Subjects (94 hours)

Mass Procurement of Supplies (36 hours)	Defense against Chemical Warfare	Subsistence	Military Law (10 hours)	Organization and Administration of the QMC (12 hours)
Methods of Training (6 hours)	Military Law- The Law Against Military Offenses	Salvage	Tactics and Techniques, QMC (58 hours)	Personnel and Correspondence (29 hours)
Military Jurisdiction (1 hour)	Interior Guard Duty	Property accounting	Motor Transportation (15 hours)	Procurement (24 hours)
Military Organization (14 hours)	Military Sanitation and First Aid	Organization and Administration, QMC	Organization and Administration QMC (12 hours)	Property Accounting (26 hours)
Miscellaneous (73 hours)	Care and Operation of Motor Vehicles	Methods of Instruction	Personnel and Correspondence (12 hours)	Salvage (9 hours)
Mobilization Planning (54 hours)	Military Law- Court Martial	Military Subjects	Subsistence (31 hours)	Subsistence and Mess Management (29 hours)
Physical Exercise (120 hours)	Echelons of Maintenance- Motor Transport Battalion		Military Hygiene (3 hours)	Storage and Issue (6 hours)
Procurement (38 hours)	Conduct of Elementary Training		Military Drill and Calisthenics (54 hours)	Tactics and Technique, QMC Combat (41 hours)
Property Accounting (23 ours)	Commercial Law-Contracts		Training Management (6 hours)	Training Management (6 hours)
Storage and Issue (42 hours)	Signal Communications		Methods of Instruction (5 hours)	Transportation , Commercial (18 hours)
Subsistence (84 hours)	Marches and Shelters		Director	Transportation , Motor (14 hours)
Tactics and Technique, QMC Combat (205 hours)	Commercial Law-Property and Maintenance		Total- 384 hours	Utilities (13 hours)
Terrain Exercises (48 hours)	Advanced Map and Aerial			Total- 407 hours

	Photography Reading			
Topography (31 hours)	Large Motor Transport Operations			
Transportation, Motor (25 hours)				
Transportation, Rail (14 hours)				
Transportation, Water (3 hours)				
Utilities (71 hours)				
Total- 1097 hours				

Source: Data adapted from E. Ramsay Richardson, *History of the Quartermaster School* (Washington: Office of The Quartermaster General), 179-180.

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