


Strategy Research Project

Army National Guard: Regionally Aligned Brigade Force of First Choice

by

Lieutenant Colonel Edward S. Smith
United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 16-03-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Army National Guard: Regionally Aligned Brigade Force of First Choice				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Edward S. Smith				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Dr. John A. Bonin Department of Academic Affairs				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution: A					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This paper provides analysis and recommendations for inclusion and implementation of Army National Guard BCT's in support of the Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) Concept. In addition to accruing operational capabilities to react to global contingencies, the Army's 2011 Posture Statement also anticipates Contingency Expeditionary Forces use in several capacities to include Regionally Aligned Brigades, responsive to Combatant Commanders for Theater Security Cooperation. Anticipating a reduction in force structure to the Active Component as missions in Iraq and Afghanistan culminate, consideration of National Guard forces for Global Force Management selection in the execution of Security Force Assistance (SFA) is essential to accomplishing the Army's objectives. Use of National Guard forces in the RAB concept provides the most efficient and effective means for maintaining an operational reserve. The challenge for the National Guard is how to operationalize the RAB concept. The Army must be able to program select National Guard units within the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model in order to train, man, and equip those forces for possible contingency missions as RABs in support of CCDR SFA plans.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Theater Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			UNLIMITED	28	

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: REGIONALLY ALIGNED BRIGADE FORCE OF FIRST CHOICE

by

Lieutenant Colonel Edward S. Smith
United States Army

Dr. John A. Bonin
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Edward S. Smith

TITLE: Army National Guard: Regionally Aligned Brigade Force of First Choice

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 16 March 2012 **WORD COUNT:** 5,594 **PAGES:** 28

KEY TERMS: Theater Security Cooperation, Security Force Assistance

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper provides analysis and recommendations for inclusion and implementation of Army National Guard BCT's in support of the Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) Concept. In addition to accruing operational capabilities to react to global contingencies, the Army's 2011 Posture Statement also anticipates Contingency Expeditionary Forces use in several capacities to include Regionally Aligned Brigades, responsive to Combatant Commanders for Theater Security Cooperation. Anticipating a reduction in force structure to the Active Component as missions in Iraq and Afghanistan culminate, consideration of National Guard forces for Global Force Management selection in the execution of Security Force Assistance (SFA) is essential to accomplishing the Army's objectives. Use of National Guard forces in the RAB concept provides the most efficient and effective means for maintaining an operational reserve. The challenge for the National Guard is how to operationalize the RAB concept. The Army must be able to program select National Guard units within the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model in order to train, man, and equip those forces for possible contingency missions as RABs in support of CCDR SFA plans.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD: REGIONALLY ALIGNED BRIGADE FORCE OF FIRST CHOICE

We cannot surge trust, and we do not want to try to build relationships and seek capabilities after a crisis has started.

—Admiral James G. Stavridis¹

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) “brings fresh focus to the importance of preventing and deterring conflict by working with and through allies and partners,” stresses Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.² The executive summary of the 2010 QDR expands on “prevent and deter” as it describes the importance of building security capacity of partner states. The QDR emphasizes strengthening and institutionalizing general-purpose force (GPF) capabilities for Security Force Assistance (SFA) in support of building partner capacity to prevent and deter conflict.

With the United States’ forces exit from Iraq in December 2011, withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan by 2014, and Department of Defense (DOD) budget cuts of \$487 billion over the next 10 years, the military’s strategic role is likely to experience a dramatic shift from prevailing in today’s wars to preventing and deterring conflict. This shift will place a greater emphasis on SFA missions in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders’ (GCCs) Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs). In response to the challenge of greater emphasis on SFA missions, the Army developed the Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) concept in 2011. The purpose of this paper is to outline the benefits of integrating the Army National Guard (ARNG) within the RAB concept, and propose ways and means for the inclusion of the ARNG in the implementation of the RAB concept.

This paper defines Security Cooperation and Security Force Assistance, and describes how the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept supports those objectives. The paper also demonstrates the shift from “prevail” to “prevent-and-deter” within the DOD as evidenced by our National Security Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and the commentary of leaders within the DOD. The paper will further describe how the National Guard can operationalize the RAB concept and why the National Guard should provide forces to the Army in the execution of the RAB concept.

Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations. Department of Defense Directive 5132.03 prescribes policy on security cooperation and Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States* defines security cooperation as:

DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments...that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a region.³

Combatant commanders develop security cooperation strategies to link engagement activities with national strategic objectives. Bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity are examples of security cooperation activities.

The 2010 QDR suggests the most dynamic security cooperation activity in the coming years will be security force assistance (SFA) missions: “hands-on” efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories.⁴ SFA is DOD’s contribution to a unified action

effort to support and augment the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions to facilitate the achievement of specific objectives shared by the U.S. Government (USG). The US military engages in activities to enhance the capabilities and capacities of a partner nation (or regional security organization) by providing training, equipment, advice, and assistance to those FSF organized in national ministry of defense (or equivalent regional military or paramilitary forces).⁵

The Army addresses security cooperation and security force assistance in three of its most recent publications: The Army Capstone Concept, The Army Operating Concept, and Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1 *Security Force Assistance*. The FM describes the framework of SFA utilizing the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as the implementing force. The FM describes SFA as the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. SFA improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security organization's security forces.⁶ Several Army publications published between 2009 and 2011 describe how the force will conduct security cooperation and security force assistance.

The United States Army Operation Concept 2016-2028 describes the concept of regionally aligned forces operating under the control of the Army Service Component Command in support of the GCC's security cooperation plans.

The Army provides combatant commands with regionally aligned and specially trained forces with competence in the languages, cultures, history, governments, security forces, and threats in areas where conflict is likely. These forces support combatant command security cooperation plans by developing sustained relationships with partner nation governments and their security forces. Regionally aligned forces participate routinely in multinational exercises and security force

assistance missions to reassure allies and friends while deterring adversaries.⁷

Building on the Army Operating Concept and the manual for Security Force Assistance, the Army's 2011 Posture Statement also anticipates BCTs available to combatant commanders for security cooperation engagements, exercises and other regional requirements as well as fulfilling requirements for a Global Response Force and the CBRNE Consequence.⁸ From these strategic publications, the Army developed the concept of the Regionally Aligned Brigade in 2011.

Further developing the regionally aligned forces concept, FORSCOM and the Army G-3/5/7 codified the term Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) in 2011 and provided the following definition:

A RAB is a tailored Army General Purpose Force usually organized as a modular brigade, sourced by the ARFORGEN process to meet a Combatant Commander's Global Force Management validated requirements for Security Cooperation Activities or Security Force Assistance. A Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) capable of full spectrum operations, the RAB is globally available to meet emergent requirements in the Available Pool as part of the mission force.⁹

The concept of the RAB is to apportion forces to the Combatant Commanders through GFM and in the case of the Army, the ARFORGEN process in order to meet the CCDR's TCP goals and objectives.

Language in the United States' most recent strategic documents gives credence to the shift from "prevail" to "prevent-and-deter" and the implementation of the RAB concept to achieve our future objectives. In the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), President Obama defined engagement as the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders. The President further posited that successful engagement depends on the Nation's ability to integrate the elements of our national

power. President Obama defined the military's role in engagement as follows: "Our Military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments."¹⁰

In the 2011 National Military Strategy, Admiral Mullen stressed the importance of regionally aligned forces in the conduct of security cooperation. "Strengthening international and regional security requires that our forces be globally-available, yet regionally-focused."¹¹ The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review further prioritized the DOD's efforts.

As U.S. forces draw down in Iraq and make progress toward building stability in Afghanistan, more capacity will be available for training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces in other parts of the globe.¹² In the future, as our forces transition into a period of less intensive sustained operations, the Department's force planning assumes an ability to undertake a broader and deeper range of prevent-and-deter missions, acting wherever possible as part of a whole-of-government approach and in concert with allies and partners.¹³

Department of Defense leaders recommend the Army focus on engagement and security cooperation in building partner capacity and deterring potential adversaries as part of the "prevent and deter" transition.

"As part of the joint force, the Army might provide more regionally aligned headquarters in support of combatant commanders," wrote GEN Robert W. Cone, "with habitual relationships with identified foreign governmental and military partners."¹⁴

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta offered, "Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities."¹⁵ Secretary Panetta further directed the military to "conduct a sustainable pace of presence

operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises.”¹⁶

The development of the RAB concept in the midst of an expected reduction in force, and towards the Joint Force of 2020 that stresses capability over capacity is essential. There are several arguments that support including the National Guard in the RAB concept: DOD guidance on operationalizing the reserve force, the ability to reduce the OPTEMPO of the Active Component, and the relative value (cost) of reserve component.

The Reserve Component as an Operational Force

Two assumptions made in the Army Operating Concept (AOC) 2016-2028 are particularly relevant to the National Guard when considering implementation of the RAB concept and support DOD’s directive to manage the reserve component as an operational force. First, the Army will continue to employ the Army National Guard and Army Reserve on a routine basis as part of its operational forces. Second, the Army will continue to use a force management model that relies on unit replacement and cyclical readiness to govern the training, deployment, and reset of its operational forces.¹⁷ The AOC reinforces the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) established in October 2008.

DoDD 1200.17 established the Reserve Component as an operational force. This directive established DOD policy requiring the RC to provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Under this policy, Service Secretaries are responsible for ensuring RC forces meet operational readiness requirements as identified by the President and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, Service Secretaries must ensure the RC units

participate across the full spectrum of missions while maintaining unit integrity.¹⁸ In congressional testimony, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stressed the value of the Reserve component, “They’ve gotten battle experience. They’re better; they’re more capable. I don’t want to lose that.”¹⁹

The most important aspect of operationalizing the National Guard is the continued inclusion in the ARFORGEN process for possible Deployment Expeditionary Force (DEF) and Contingency Expeditionary Force (CEF) missions. The ARFORGEN process requires units to achieve aim points in training, equipping, and manning readiness. Exclusion from the ARFORGEN process will result in a failure to prioritize resources over time and synchronize unit manning, equipping, and training for National Guard units. Additionally, National Guard BCTs excluded from ARFORGEN force pools will lack mobilizations, training, and deployments essential to maintaining competency across the range of military operations.

National Guard BCTs not apportioned and allocated through ARFORGEN, may result in the National Guard’s development of niche missions in order to remain relevant. Development of additional missions and exercises outside of Combatant Commanders’ security cooperation plans has potential to complicate the synchronization of efforts as evidenced by the challenges of the State Partnership Program (SPP).

The SPP is one of the National Guard’s great successes. While the SPP demonstrates an overall effective use of the National Guard in support of Building Partner Capacity, the program has flaws regarding integration and synchronization with the priorities of the GCC and the U.S. Ambassador. The difficulty in synchronization is

largely due to lack of dedicated statutory authority as well as myriad funding mechanisms. Multiple Title 10, Title 32, and National Defense Authorization Act authorities support SPP activities while funding flows from Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts to SPP through approximately nine programs and activities.²⁰

National Guard units sourced as RABs through GFM and ARFORGEN ensures the synchronization of unit efforts with the priorities of the GCCs and U.S. Ambassadors while providing clearly defined statutory authorities and funding mechanisms. Finally, including the National Guard in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model as Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEFs) to support RAB missions ensures the Service Secretaries achieve the objectives set forth in DoDD 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force*.

In addition to ensuring National Guard BCTs remain part of the ARFORGEN process, several policies and statutes require amendment for the National Guard to remain an operational force. The policies that require action include Access to the National Guard; Training, Transient, Holding, and School (TTHS); Medical/Dental Readiness; and Full Time Manning. Finally, review of the 1980's Total Force principles provides lessons for consideration as the Army implements policies towards an operational reserve component.

The approval of the NDAA 2012 was critical to ensuring the management of the ARNG as part of the operational force and solved one of the greatest problems facing implementation of the ARNG in the RAB concept ...assured access. Section 516 of the 2012 NDAA modified section 12304 of Title 10 U.S. Code. The modification to section 12304 allows Service Secretaries to order members of the Reserve Component to

active duty other than during times of war or national emergency for a period of not more than 365 days. The law requires Service Secretaries to include manpower and associated costs identified in defense budget materials, as well as a description of the mission, and states not more than 60,000 members may be on active duty under this authority at any one time.²¹ Approval of the 2012 NDAA allows the Army to program select National Guard units within the ARFORGEN model in order to man, train, and equip those forces for possible contingency missions as RABs or enablers to RABs in support of the CCDRs SFA plans. However, simply gaining access to the National Guard does not solve the problem of readiness. The Army and the ARNG must address several readiness policies to ensure the National Guard provides trained and ready forces.

Between September 11, 2001 and the end of 2003, over 319,000 citizen soldiers, 27% of the Reserve Components, performed active duty. During that time, the National Guard transferred 74,000 individuals to fill the ranks of deploying units. Additionally, the Army transferred 35,000 pieces of equipment from non-deploying units to forces deployed to Iraq, leaving non-deployed units lacking more than one-third of their critical equipment.²² These figures demonstrate the need to implement policies that enable the National Guard to mobilize units without significant cross leveling of equipment and personnel. Additionally, the Army must ensure funding for reserve component BCTs participating in the RAB concept is adequate to meet readiness aim points within the ARFORGEN process. Access alone does not ensure readiness of the reserve component as part of the Total Force. One revision of policy required to assist the

reserve component with achieving the status of an operational force is the Training, Transient, Holding and School (TTHS) Policy.

The ARNG's TTHS account is not large enough (~2.5% of end strength) to allow National Guard units to segregate non-deployable soldiers from deployable units.²³ As a result, the National Guard assigns Soldiers awaiting basic training and advanced individual training to deployable units. This creates an inherent requirement to conduct time constrained cross leveling of deployable Soldiers into mobilizing formations. Additionally, this requires National Guard units to schedule Reset activities during Train/Ready years in order to account for late additions to manning rosters and insure all individuals meet mobilization standards and ARFORGEN aim points. Another policy that merits revision is the Medical and Dental Readiness Management Policies and Programs.

One of the greatest challenges to the Reserve Components' ability to establish itself as an operational force is medical and dental readiness. Currently, RC members incur a cost to receive health insurance. Service members pay a monthly fee of \$54.35 for their own insurance and \$192.89 for a family plan.²⁴ In contrast, active duty service members and their families pay no enrollment fees and no out-of-pocket costs for any care received from the Primary Care Manager or with a referral. Authorizing full TRICARE benefits to members of RC units in receipt of an alert order (typically 12 months prior to mobilization) would vastly improve RC medical and dental readiness and greatly assist in operationalizing the reserve component.

The last critical policy requiring revision is the manpower authorization of the ARNG's full-time manning levels established in 1999 and revalidated in 2005. Currently

the Army funds RC units at 74% of validated requirements and units do not achieve 100% of full-time manning authorizations until they are in receipt of an alert for mobilization order.²⁵ The Army must implement regular studies regarding the full-time manning requirements of the RC and authorize funding at 100% if it truly desires the capabilities of an operational force within the reserve component.

A final caution in operationalizing the National Guard comes from lessons observed from the Total Force Concept of the 1980s. In the 1980's, the DOD established three principles for improving the readiness of the Reserve Component. While the policies of the 1980s were well intentioned, there are several lessons that today's force should avoid when operationalizing the modern Reserve Component.

The first principle known as "Mirror Imaging" called for maintaining similar force structure in the Active force and the National Guard. The premise was that the Guard would be equal and relevant if it had similar force structure. The problem with Mirror Imaging was the lack of resources and training time provided for the National Guard to maintain readiness of personnel, equipment, and training.

The second principle, known as "First to Fight Funding" ensured units likely to see combat first were fully armed, trained, and manned. Those forces not designated as "First to Fight" resided primarily in the reserve component and received minimal funding. The third principle referred to as "Cascading Modernization" saw Reserve Component forces inherit Active Component equipment replaced by modernized, next generation stocks. This process resulted in reserve forces receiving older equipment that lacked interoperability, required higher maintenance costs, and caused reduced operational readiness rates.²⁶ Analysis from the Comprehensive Review of the Reserve

Component suggests a solution to avoiding the mistakes of implementation of the Total Force policies of the 1980s.

The Review recommends the Global Force Management Board should synchronize the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) with Service programmatic planning, and provide an annual update to the Secretary of Defense describing the Reserve Component sourcing identified in the GFMAP to facilitate budgeting for the planned use of the Reserve Component.²⁷ These measures along with changes to TTHS, medical/dental readiness, and full-time manning policies will assist the Army in managing the ARNG as an operational force.

Why use the National Guard

Addressing present policy shortfalls and ensuring the Army manages National Guard BCTs through the ARFORGEN process outlines steps the Active Component must take in order to manage the National Guard as an operational force. However, these actions do not explain why the Army should consider National Guard BCTs for RAB employment. Two reasons paramount to the use of National Guard BCTs as RABs in support of GCC requirements are reduced cost to the Army and reduced OPTEMPO for Active Component BCTs. Finally, National Guard BCTs present several inherent capabilities that make them the force of first choice for Theater Security Cooperation.

Reduced OPTEMPO

The Army will identify up to six Regionally Aligned Brigades annually in support of GCC's Theater Security Cooperation plans.²⁸ Additional global requirements managed through an annual rotation include two Global Response Forces (one airborne, one heavy), and one heavy BCT in Kuwait.

The Army will return to the Global Response Force (GRF) concept as the focus shifts from “prevail” to “prevent-and-deter” missions. This concept designates one airborne and one heavy BCT capable of a global response in the event of unforeseen crisis requiring major combat operations. The Army will exclude all airborne BCT’s not assigned to a combatant command from RAB requirements in order to meet the requirements of the Airborne GRF. The airborne BCT’s in USAREUR and USARPAC will not be available for RAB requirements, as CCDRs will retain those assigned forces for missions in addition to RAB requirements. Department of Defense officials said they are planning to reduce the number of active component BCTs from 45 to possibly as low as 32 and the Army’s Chief of Staff, General Raymond Odierno said the Army would cut eight brigades in the next few years.²⁹ In a briefing from the Pentagon on 26 January 2012, Secretary of Defense William Panetta announced the reduction of the Army by 80,000 over the next five years in an effort to meet defense budget cuts of \$487 billion over the next 10 years.³⁰

In total, the Army will support 10 requirements annually; six RABs, one Heavy BCT in Kuwait, one BCT in Korea, one Heavy BCT for GRF, and one Airborne BCT for GRF. The Army will provide rotational units to nine of the requirements annually. A single forward stationed BCT will support the Korea requirement. Utilizing the ARFORGEN model with a 1:3 dwell to deployment ratio and 9 months BoG, each requires four active component BCTs. Nine requirements supported by four BCTs calls for 36 BCTs, four more than available after budget cuts and proposed force restructuring. According to the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component (CRFRRRC), a combination of two AC BCTs and three NG BCTs

can support one requirement annually over a six-year period. Additionally, the CRFRRC demonstrated eight RC BCTs could support one requirement annually over six years.³¹

If the Army supports four of the six GCCs with a mix of AC/RC, CENTCOM with a pure AC solution and NORTHCOM with a pure NG solution, the AC requirement reduces to 25 BCTs as compared to 36 BCTs in a pure AC solution. In this example, the National Guard provides 20 BCTs to support the Army's requirements. This solution provides an OPTEMPO cure for active component BCTs and creates flexibility for the DOD in the event of crises action planning. Without assistance from National Guard BCTs, 100% of the active component's BCTs will deploy in four years time. Including National Guard BCTs in support of the same requirements requires only 78% of the active component BCTs over a six-year period. Additionally, the cost of a pure active component solution is significantly greater than a mixed active component/reserve component solution.

Cost

With approximately \$487 billion in defense budget cuts over the next ten years, cost savings across the Army is imperative. Use of National Guard BCTs to conduct RAB missions in lieu of AC units provides a substantial cost savings. Several studies outline the relative value of utilizing the National Guard to conduct operational missions such as the RAB.

In 2010, the ARNG and USAR accounted for 51% of the Army's military end strength and 16% of the base budget. The ARNG provided support to sixty-one named Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) exercises in FY 2010 with approximately 21,750 Soldiers.³² The ARNG sources seventy-nine (79%) of Army exercises in support of Combatant Commander's TCP requirements.³³ These figures demonstrate

the National Guards ability to support GCC's TCP requirements and the cost savings associated with implementation of National Guard RABs.

Utilizing the Contingency Operations Support Tool (COST) to determine comparable costs, the 2011 CRFRRRC developed notional base costs for Active Component BCTs of \$100 and \$278 for dwell and deployment years respectively. Utilizing the COST, a Reserve Component BCT's base cost is \$33 during dwell, and \$50 in the final Train/Ready year due to an additional 21 days required for pre-mobilization training. According to the Comprehensive Review, the nominal cost of a reserve component BCT deployed for 9 months is \$246.³⁴

The goal of the Secretary of Defense is to mobilize the reserve component for 12 months; 9 months deployed, and the remaining 3 months used for pre-deployment training and post-deployment activities. Utilizing the normalized cost values, the CRFRRRC developed several rotational costing models: AC pure, AC/RC mix, and RC pure. Each model differed in the number of AC or RC units used and the number of months deployed for AC and RC units. For the reserve component, each model assumed a one-year mobilization regardless of the length of the deployment. The most cost efficient model used two AC BCTs and three RC BCTs (2-3 AC/RC) with BoG time of 12-months and 9-months respectively. This model also exceeded the steady-state ARFORGEN goal of 1:3 and 1:5 mob/deployment to dwell ratio for the AC and RC respectively. The 2-3 AC/RC mixed model averaged a 1:2.5 deployment to dwell ratio for the active component and a 1:4.5 mobilization to dwell ratio for the reserve component. The nominal cost of this model was \$3150, a 9.2 percent decrease from the AC pure model, which posted a nominal cost of \$3468. In comparison, a RC pure model

required eight BCTs and achieved a nominal cost of \$3406. However, both AC and RC pure models adhered to 1:3 and 1:5 mob/deployment to dwell ratio.

Considering requirements for BCT's in Kuwait, Korea, GRF heavy, GRF airborne, and six GCC's the most effective and nearly the most cost efficient method feasible is to support Kuwait, GRF heavy, and GRF airborne with AC pure ARFORGEN models, each requiring four AC BCTs to support annual requirements. The active component should source CENTCOM with a pure AC BCT ARFORGEN model. Forces apportioned to NORTHCOM would generate from an ARFORGEN model of eight NG BCTs. The remaining GCCs should receive forces through 2-3 AC/RC mixed models. Total AC BCTs utilized to meet the requirements is 24 plus one for Korea. This calculus accounts for 78% of the Army's 32 BCTs. The National Guard provides 20 of 28 available BCT according to this recommendation or 71% of available BCTs.

Additional requirements such as the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the National Guard's ten Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) require consideration for sourcing. Either the airborne or the heavy GRF can double as the NRF. The 10 HRFs, each one aligned with a FEMA region and responsible to the Department of Homeland Security, are DOD sponsored and National Guard sourced units. Each HRF consists of approximately 500-700 Soldiers with significant Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High explosive (CBRNE) capability as well as substantial command, control, and security capability. HRFs will complement already existing forces of DODs CBRNE consequence management enterprise. Based on the recommendation above, the National Guard provides 20 of its 28 BCTs for apportionment through ARFORGEN in support of GCC requirements. The remaining eight National Guard BCTs as well as

the sixteen National Guard Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (MEBs) and other forces not tasked provide solutions for the National Guard's ten HRF requirements. The subject of sourcing the HRF is too broad to provide thorough analysis in this report. However, the National Guard should consider changes to force structure in order to form permanent HRF units and protect BCTs for use in support of GCC requirements.

Force of First Choice

As recommended in the Comprehensive Review of the Reserve Component, the RC can provide a stable, ready-trained capability for meeting CCDR needs and Service requirements. Where the Reserve Component has an enduring relationship with a supported command, as is the case with the National Guard's SPP, the Global Force Management process should consider those units for missions in support of security cooperation and BPC activities first.³⁵ The National Guard currently has State Partnerships with 63 partner nations and a collective security agreement with 7 island nations in the Eastern Caribbean.³⁶ While these relationships are bilateral, the use of National Guard BCTs for TCP operations within the CCDR's AOR builds upon pre-existing relationships and takes advantage of cultural and language skills already developed through the SPP.

The National Guard's dual status as either a federal or a state asset provides a unique capability of forces that have experience across the full spectrum of operations, ranging from stability and civil support to offensive and defensive missions. Additionally, the National Guard's Soldiers often possess unique skills outside of their Military Occupation Skill (MOS). Many guardsmen hold civilian occupations as police officers, emergency medical technicians, and educators. These civilian acquired skills add to the National Guards' capability when dealing with Foreign Military Forces. These skills are

often in high demand among foreign militaries, which frequently play a major role in their nation's disaster response plans, border security, civil disorder, and counterdrug operations.³⁷

Predictability of use is critical to the National Guard BCTs efficiency and effectiveness. Programming National Guard BCTs to support three of the six annual RAB mission requirements provides focus for training and readiness. Time is the National Guard's greatest constraint. Providing predictability in apportionment and allocation of National Guard forces in support of GCC TCP plans allows the National Guard to maximize their training time and limits post-mobilization training requirements. This ensures the National Guard can provide at least nine months BoG in support of the combatant commander.

Implementation

There are several recommendations that would facilitate implementation of National Guard BCTs in the RAB concept. First, the National Guard must adjust annual Unit Training Assemblies (UTAs) required for units managed through the ARFORGEN process. Secondly, the National Guard should regionalize support of GCC's in accordance with the State Partnership Program.

National Guard Soldiers must participate in 48 UTAs per year (24 days) in a paid Inactive Duty Training (IDT) status and 15 days of annual training for 39 statutory days.³⁸ Increasing annual training days from 15 to 21 in the two years prior to the available year permits National Guard units to achieve train and equip readiness aim points as prescribed in the steady-state ARFORGEN model. Additional days added in the form of UTAs places undue stress on the traditional guardsman, as they usually fall on the first or last work day of the week requiring the guardsman to miss time with

his/her civilian employer. Annual Training days are predictable and allow the employer more lead-time and flexibility to backfill his absent employee.

When considering allocation of NG BCTs in support of RAB missions, the GFMAT and sourcing processes should consider SPP relationships already established between the supported GCC and the supporting BCT. National Guard units such as the 404th MEB, Missouri National Guard, and the 35th Engineer Brigade, Illinois National Guard already established relationships with AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM respectively. In 2011, the 404th MEB supported USARAF with 1,246 man-days in support of security cooperation efforts. The 35th provided medical support to Haiti, military police exchange with El Salvador and participated in the Joint Exercise Beyond Horizons. The 35th's support totaled 1,762 man-days.

Through the SPP, the National Guard aligns BCTs and MEBs with each GCC. Two BCT's and one MEB support SPP activities in CENTCOM. Fifteen BCTs and three MEBs support SPP activities in EUCOM while three BCTs and four MEBs support the SPP in AFRICOM. In PACOM, the National Guard aligns three BCTs for SPP within the AOR. Five BCTs and eight MEBs support SOUTHCOM through established SPP relationships. The Rhode Island National Guard collaborates with the Bahamas in NORTHCOM and provides a Military Police Brigade for partnership activities.

The Army and the National Guard should realign the SPP to mirror DODs strategic focus. When possible, the Army should maintain relationships established between State Guard units and partner nations. However, during times of significant shifts in U.S. interests, the National Guard may need to consider reorganization of its SPP design to support security cooperation. States with multiple BCTs or at least one

BCT and one MEB such as Texas, California, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Georgia may support more than one State Partnership. Based on the earlier recommendation to support AFRICOM, PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and EUCOM with a 2-3 AC/RC ARFORGEN model and NORTHCOM with a pure national guard ARFORGEN model, priority for support to State Partnership Programs should favor those GCCs.

With the end of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the announced departure from Afghanistan by 2014 the United States Military is undergoing a significant shift in policy and strategy. Under the shadow of significant budget cuts over the next 10 years, a leaner more adaptable force is required to meet the strategic objectives. Ideally, security cooperation activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive U.S. military intervention. Establishing, maintaining, and enhancing security cooperation among our alliances and partners is important to strengthen the global security framework of the United States and its partners.

Finally, a mix of Active Component and National Guard BCTs in accomplishing the RAB mission is critical. Although analysis in the Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component demonstrates the requirement for eight NG BCTs to cover the same deployment period as four AC BCTs, there is still a cost saving when compared to a pure Active Component solution.³⁹

Because regionally aligned forces maintain the general set of skills necessary for cultural understanding in their training, they are more capable of applying those skills in a variety of cultural settings. Thus, regionally aligned Army forces provide joint commanders the ability to comprehend more quickly and accurately, act more appropriately and effectively, and achieve the desired outcomes in any cultural

context.⁴⁰ When rebalancing the force to meet future national security challenges, the Reserve Component should be a “force of first choice” for those tasks for which they are particularly well suited, owing to their overall cost effectiveness and the skill sets that they can provide. Missions that follow a predictable operational schedule fall clearly into this category.⁴¹

National Guard BCTs provide CCDR’s forces that are accessible, cost effective, and multifaceted in scope of mission. The success of the SPP and informal support relationships such as the 35th Engineer Brigade, Missouri Army National Guard and SOUTHCOM demonstrates the National Guard’s ability to provide world-class support to combatant commanders across a wide range of activities. Implementing National Guard BCT’s as part of the Regionally Aligned Brigade concept supports strategic guidance for managing the reserve component as an operational force, reduces active component BCTs OPTEMPO, reduces costs, and provides the GCCs with a highly capable force in support of Theater Security Cooperation.

Endnotes

¹ Admiral James D. Stavridis, “Strengthening the Bridge: Building Partnership Capacity,” *Military Review* 90, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2010): 5.

² Robert M. Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), i.

³ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2, 2007), 42.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 26.

⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), V-15

⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, *Security Force Assistance*, Field Manual No. 3-07.1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 2009), 1-1.

⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, August 19, 2010), 25.

⁸ John M. McHugh and George W. Casey, Jr., *2011 Army Posture Statement*, Posture Statement presented to the 112th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2011), 11.

⁹ Andrew Dennis, "Regionally Aligned Brigade (RAB) Operational Planning Team (OPT) 24-25 AUG 11," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Bragg, NC, U.S. Army Forces Command August 23, 2011. 17.

¹⁰ Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 11.

¹¹ Mike G. Mullen, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership*, (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 8, 2011), 10.

¹² U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 28.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 44

¹⁴ Robert W. Cone, "Shaping the Army of 2020," *ARMY*, October 2011, 76.

¹⁵ Leon E. Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012), 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5

¹⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army Operating Concept*, 11.

¹⁸ Robert M. Gates, Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force: Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 29, 2008), 5.

¹⁹ Karen Parrish, "Secretary, Chairman Offer Glimpse into Budget Strategy," *American Forces Press Service*, October 13, 2011

²⁰ Lawrence Kapp and Nina M. Serafina, *The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 15, 2011), 11.

²¹ National Guard Bureau Office of Legislative Liaison, *FY 12 National Defense Authorization Act: Analysis of H.R. 1540, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012* (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, December 15, 2011) 1.

²² James J. Carafano, "The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future," *Heritage Lectures*, No. 869 (December 6, 2004) 10.

²³ Reserve Officers Association, "Resourcing the Army Reserve as an Operational Force," January 26, 2010, http://www.roa.org/site/DocServer/White_Paper_Draft_3_Feb2010.pdf (accessed January 11, 2012) 3.

²⁴ *TRICARE Homepage*, <http://www.tricare.mil/mybenefit/home/overview/LearnAboutPlansAndCosts/TRICAREReserveSelect> (accessed January 11, 2012).

²⁵ ROA, *Resourcing the Army Reserve as an Operational Force*, 4.

²⁶ Carafano, *The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine*, 9.

²⁷ Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component: Volume I Executive Summary and Main Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 5, 2011), 6.

²⁸ Raymond T. Odierno, *Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) Execute Order (EXORD) Regionally Aligned Brigades (RAB)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 2011), 10.

²⁹ Lolita C. Baldor, "Army Chief Sees Greater Role for Guard and Reserves," January 27, 2012, <http://hamptonroads.com/2012/01/army-chief-sees-greater-role-guard-and-reserves> (accessed February 6, 2012).

³⁰ Tom Vanden Brook, "Defense Secretary Leon Panetta defends a leaner military," *USA TODAY*, January 26, 2012 <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-01-26/panetta-military-defense-cuts/52805056/1> (accessed February 4, 2012).

³¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component*, 49.

³² Army National Guard, *Preventing Future Conflict: The Army National Guard and Security Cooperation: A Comprehensive Review of the Army National Guard's Support to Security Cooperative Initiatives Past, Present, and Future* (Arlington, VA: The Army National Guard Directorate, October 6, 2011), 5.

³³ Army National Guard, *White Paper: The Army National Guard and Security Cooperation: Coordinating Draft (version10)* (Arlington, VA: The Army National Guard Directorate, June 3, 2011). 2.

³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component*. 46.

³⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component*, 89.

³⁶ Kapp and Serafino, *The National Guard State Partnership Program*, 1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 7

³⁸ National Guard Bureau, *Army National Guard Training*, National Guard Regulation 350-1 (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, August 4, 2009) 15.

³⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component*, 48.

⁴⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *The United States Army Operating Concept, 2016-2028*, 25.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 26.