


Strategy Research Project International Fellow

Assessment of Ukrainian National Defense Policy

by

Colonel Yuriy Tsurko
The Armed Forces of Ukraine



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 19-03-2011		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Assessment of Ukrainian National Defense Policy				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) COL Yuriy Tsurko				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Dr. Stephen Blank Strategic Studies Institute				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This strategy research paper (SRP) examines the current Ukrainian defense policy in light of latest changes in domestic and foreign policy made by newly-elected President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich in the period of 2010-2011. A short historical review provides background to understand the conditions and ways of forming contemporary Ukrainian defense policy from the time of gaining the independence in 1991. The system of national documents is shown to be a legal basis for defense policy formulation and implementation. While conducting analysis of current Ukrainian defense policy, the paper assesses the effectiveness of its implementation, advantages, shortfalls, and potential risks are considered and assessed. The SRP also provides and evaluates the alternatives of Ukrainian defense policy implementation in the future, and contains suggestions for Ukrainian government about possible missions, actions, and recourses allocation regarding the armed forces development, defense industry reformation, and international military cooperation.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Ukraine, Defense Policy, Assessment, Reforms, Development, Effectiveness					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 30	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY

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Colonel Yuriy Tsurko
The Armed Forces of Ukraine

Dr. Stephen Blank
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Yuriy Tsurko
TITLE: Assessment of Ukrainian National Defense Policy
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 09 March 2012 **WORD COUNT:** 5772 **PAGES:** 30
KEY TERMS: Ukraine, Reforms, Development, Effectiveness
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

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ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY

It is impossible to read Ukrainian history without sedative.

— Volodymyr Vynnychenko,
Ukrainian Writer, Playwright, Artist,
Revolutionist, Politician and Statesman.

Background of Ukrainian Defense Policy

Contemporary Ukrainian Defense policy originates from July 16, 1990, when the Parliament of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic approved the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine. This event became a major cause of disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Declaration determined Ukraine's rights to secure and defend the national state, to provide the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and to have national armed forces, among many other issues. The use of the Armed Forces beyond Ukrainian territory was prohibited without the agreement of the Parliament. Also, the intentions of "... becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear free principles: to accept, to produce and to purchase no nuclear weapons"¹ was proclaimed. In the area of international relations, Ukraine was proclaimed as being a subject of international law and an equal participant of the international society that has the rights to provide national interests, support international peace and security strengthening, and participate in European processes and organizations. Ukraine recognized the priority of universal human values and norms of international law.

After the "August Putsch" in Moscow on August 19, 1991, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Act of declaration of independence of Ukraine that determined

its separation from the USSR, which was confirmed by results of the national referendum on December 1, 1991.²

The Act and Declaration became the basis for creation of the new Constitution, a set of new laws, the main principles for the state's positioning in international agreements, and treaties with other states. Two main principles of Ukrainian defense policy – the neutral and non-nuclear status that Ukraine proclaimed to achieve in the future – made the process of gaining independence considerably easier at that time. Some political experts expressed an opinion that only these commitments made possible the rapid international recognition of Ukrainian independence. But, after two years of independence, Ukrainian politicians implied that Ukraine's neutrality could limit the capability to protect its national interests. That is why the statement about the necessity for revision of Ukrainian neutrality (defined as "non-bloc status") was included in the principles of national security established by Ukrainian Parliament Resolution "On the main directions of the foreign policy of Ukraine" on July 2, 1993:

After disappearance of the confrontation in Europe, the problem of creating a pan-European security structure, based on existing international institutions as the OSCE, NACC, NATO, WEU, becomes the first-priority. The full membership of Ukraine in this structure will create the required external guarantees for [Ukrainian] national security. Because of dramatic changes that occurred after the disintegration of the USSR, which determined the contemporary geopolitical position of Ukraine, the declared [by Ukraine] ... intent to become in the future a neutral and non-bloc state has to be adapted to new conditions and cannot be considered as an obstacle to its [Ukrainian] full participation in a pan-European security structure.³

Other principles for providing national security at that time included: a defensive military doctrine, international military cooperation, prevention of WMD proliferation, support for UN humanitarian and peacekeeping activities, prohibition of Ukrainian

Armed Forces being used for domestic law-enforcement, and the prevention of foreign forces basing on Ukrainian territory.⁴

Following this, Ukraine gradually increased cooperation with international organizations – UN, OSCE, NATO; and used its formally existing intent of neutrality for protection against being deeply involved with Russia in post-Soviet reunification. On February 8, 1994, Ukraine became the first ex-Soviet republic to join the NATO program “Partnership for Peace”. On July 9, 1997, Ukraine signed the Madrid Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine. Later, two multinational units were formed: in 2000 – the Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion UKRPOLBAT with the mission of participation in multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; and in 2002 – the international Ukrainian-Romanian-Slovakian-Hungarian engineer battalion “Tisa”, as a rapid reaction force with the mission of natural disaster relief in the Carpathian region. These events ended the first phase of Ukrainian defense policy development namely – creating the foundation for it.

The second phase of the development of Ukrainian defense policy was characterized by the creation of the clear political course of joining NATO, active participation in UN/NATO-led peacekeeping activity on one hand and diminution of relations with Russia on the other. In 2002, the president of Ukraine declared joining NATO a necessity. This decision was included in the new Military Doctrine-2003 and Law “On the fundamentals of national security of Ukraine”:

... Providing the full-scale participation of Ukraine in the pan-European and regional collective security systems, [Ukrainian] membership in the EU and NATO, while maintaining good relations and strategic partnership with Russia, other countries of the CIS and other countries in the world.⁵

In the second half of 2003, Ukrainian-Russian relations were very seriously impacted by the incident around the Island of Tuzla in the Kerch Strait. The background of the situation relates to the issue of border delimitation in the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait. After the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Island of Tuzla, as a part of the Crimean Peninsula, came under Ukraine's sovereignty. This allowed Ukraine to possess the main fairway from the Black Sea to the Azov Sea (Figure 1). Russia had to pay the taxes for ships crossing through Ukrainian territorial waters, but could not dig another canal without damaging areas of fish spawning in shallow waters around the Russian Taman Peninsula.




Figure 1. The Kerch Strait and Island Tuzla.

On 29 September 2003, the authority of the Krasnodar Region of the Russian Federation started unauthorized dam construction to join this island with the Taman Peninsula, and declared the formal aim of preventing the Taman's shore-line from erosion caused by sea flows. But, in reality, the main reason was to suppress Ukraine

politically and to gain advantage in the sea-border dispute. By the time the increased water's flows in the Kerch Strait would erode that small island (length – 6.5 km, width – 500 m), it would allow Russia to claim the rights for changing the sea borders and use the fairway freely. After fruitless negotiations, Ukraine deployed the armed Border Guard's unit on the island. On 23 October, the dam construction was stopped 102 meters before the Ukrainian sea border (Figure 2). In December, after the meeting of Ukrainian and Russian presidents, the agreement on cooperation on exploitation of the Azov Sea and the Kerch Strait was signed, but the situation concerning delimitation of the sea borders in those areas is still unresolved.



Figure 2. The dam constructed in the Kerch Strait.

This “Tuzla event” and changes in Ukrainian leadership after the presidential elections in 2004 accelerated Ukraine’s course toward NATO. That year was the most successful in Ukrainian military activity abroad. More than 3,000 soldiers were involved in operations in Kosovo, Lebanon, Iraq, Sierra-Leone and many UN missions around the world. But the permanent internal political crisis caused by an uncompromising fight for power did not allow for accomplishment of the strategic aim of accession to NATO. Other circumstances that influenced the NATO-joining process and made it impossible later were: the social, economical and political division of the Ukrainian people; unbalanced Ukrainian economics, and Ukraine’s strong dependence on oil, natural gas, other raw materials and goods provided by Russia; weakness of Ukrainian leadership; aggressive Russian foreign policy that used economics as a weapon; the world financial crisis in 2008-2009; and lack of attention and real support from NATO, EU and the U.S. The end of the second phase and the beginning of the third, contemporary one, determined the presidential elections of 2010 and was followed by significant changes in Ukrainian defense policy.

Current Ukrainian Defense Policy

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in his pre-election program “Ukraine for People” proclaimed Ukraine’s non-bloc status as a main objective of his future foreign policy. Having gained power, Yanukovich very quickly achieved a fully loyal majority in the Parliament, which allowed him easily to make changes in Ukrainian foreign policy. The first and completely unexpected event for Ukrainian society was the signing of the Kharkov agreement on April 21, 2010 with Russia, which prolonged the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s basing in Sevastopol up to 2042 in exchange for a discount of the natural gas price (in accordance with previous Ukrainian-Russian agreements the term for this

Fleet's basing supposed to end in 2017). Later, on July 1 that year, the Law "On the essentials of domestic and foreign policy" was approved, which established Ukraine's non-bloc status⁶. Also, this Law made changes in the Law "On the fundamentals of the national security of Ukraine". So, the integration into the Euro-Atlantic security space was deleted from the list of national interest priorities, and the strategic objective of NATO membership was excluded from the main directions of the state's national security policy implementation. In addition, the task of adjusting all related laws and agencies' regulations within three months was assigned to the Government.⁷

Some experts made the assumption that the main reason for this Law's approval was just the desire to introduce the new "non-bloc" status of Ukraine:

By and large, adoption of the new wording of the Law ... looks like a kind of "political revenge" of the new authorities, which presents Ukraine to the world community as an unpredictable state whose foreign policy course depends on the home policy situation.⁸

Thus, at the end of 2011 the Ukrainian defense policy came to be regulated by many documents, as it is shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3. System of documents that formulate the defense policy of Ukraine

These numerous laws, as well as subordinate decrees, regulations and directives often are contrary to one another. For example, the decrees of the President of Ukraine “On the military doctrine of Ukraine” and “On the national security strategy of Ukraine”, as subordinate to the laws, still contain statements about future NATO membership and some anachronisms inherited from the Soviet past, such as the concept of “military organization of Ukraine”. So, the Law “On the fundamentals of national security of Ukraine” defines the “military organization” as:

...set of bodies of the state authorities and military formations created in accordance with the laws of Ukraine; and whose activity is under democratic civil control and directed toward protection the national interests of Ukraine from external and internal threats.⁹

But, in reality, only the Armed Forces and Internal Troops (Ukrainian Gendarmerie) are the subjects of this; the rest of structures involved in the defense sphere position themselves as non-militarized and do not apply this concept in corresponding laws. These discrepancies, along with many others, were examined while the Strategic Defense Review was conducted in 2009. But, up to present time, no final results of that process were presented to the Ukrainian and international society, and no following strategic-level document was published. This two-year ambiguity has seriously impacted the activity of governmental agencies and officials that operate in the defense sphere. Thus, the previous State’s Program of Armed Forces development 2006-2011 was recognized as obsolete before 2009 because of permanent underfunding of its activities and failures of leadership during the program implementation. The annual budgeting for the last three years has been executed on the out-of-plan basis. Also, the force-employment planning has suffered from unreliable data about the forces’ capabilities.

Therefore, in order to analyze the nature of modern Ukrainian defense policy, it is necessary to consider and compare basic laws (Figure 3), select from them some rational statements and organize everything into an easily understandable structure. As an analysis methodology this paper uses the approach that was developed in the U.S. Army War College – the Strategy Formulation Model.

Thus, the objectives of the legal Ukrainian defense policy might be taken from the Law of Ukraine “On the fundamentals of national security of Ukraine” and described as follow:

To guarantee the constitutional human and citizen rights and freedoms;

To protect the state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the state’s borders, and to prevent interference into Ukrainian domestic affairs;

To provide for the integration of Ukraine into European political, economical and legal space;

To develop equal, mutually beneficial relations with other states in the world, following Ukraine’s interests.¹⁰

Ukrainian laws do not clearly describe the ways and means of policy and do not contain the definitions of these categories at all. So, the Law “On the fundamentals of national security of Ukraine” contains so-called “main directions of state’s national security policy”, which are divided into several “spheres”: international, state security, military and borders security, domestic affairs, economical, scientific-technological, social and humanitarian, and informational.¹¹ Another Law “On the essentials of domestic and foreign policy” contains so-called “essentials” of policy divided into several “spheres”.¹²

Thus, having interpreted the content of Laws, mentioned above, the ways of defense policy might be defined as follows:

Compliance with the non-nuclear and non-bloc status of Ukraine;

Participate, under the auspices of the UN, OSCE, other international organizations, in international security and peacekeeping activities: fight against international organized crime and terrorism; resist the proliferation of WMD and means of its delivering; assist international peace and security; prevent and eliminate conflicts, first of all, in regions that border Ukraine;

Integrate into European and regional collective security systems, develop constructive partnership with NATO and other political-military alliances; maintain strategic partnership with Russia, the USA, and good relations with other countries in the world; promote international military cooperation;

Reform the Armed Forces: improve its organizational, functional structures and its command and control system; provide the finances and recourses as required; make a gradual transition toward fully voluntary forces; modernize and develop the defense industry; modernize and acquire the newest weapons and equipment; utilize obsolete arms; provide social protection for military personnel and their families.

Concerning the means of defense policy, the Constitution of Ukraine states that "... protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and provision of its economic and informational security are the most important functions of the state, and the matter of all Ukrainian people."¹³ The Law "On Defense of Ukraine", following the Constitution's statement, broadens the definition of defense of the country:

The defense of Ukraine is the system of political, economical, social, military, scientific-technical, informational, legal, organizational and other

state's actions regarding the preparations for armed protection and defending the state in case of armed aggression or armed conflict.¹⁴

This law defines the credentials, functions and responsibilities for legislative and executive branches of the Government, ministries and agencies, military forces, local authorities, enterprises and organizations of any form of ownership, and citizens of Ukraine in the defense sphere. Other respective laws (Figure 3) that establish responsibilities for structures mentioned above, contain specific and mutually agreed defense missions and tasks. Thus, formal demands for jointness and cooperation, while providing security and defense, have been established by Ukrainian Law.

An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Current Defense Policy Implementation

As of today defense policy has not fully achieved its objectives. This is reflected in discrepancies between the given declarations and the real results of policy implementation. So, nongovernmental organization like Human Amnesty, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) regularly have noticed that the compliance with constitutional, human and citizen's rights and freedoms in Ukraine has decreased for the last two years:

Ukraine further moved to authoritarian rule with allegations of a number of politically motivated persecutions. ... human rights defenders faced threats and assaults from both State and non-State actors. ... Defenders documenting cases of corruption were also targeted in ... Ukraine.¹⁵

The results of researches made by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Right Union showed that the Armed Forces Regulations declared the military personnel rights to be fragmentary; and the fundamental constitutional principles such as rights equality, respect to human dignity, and others were very often neglected¹⁶.

Considering the effectiveness of providing the protection of the state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of the state's borders and preventing the

interference into Ukrainian domestic affairs, it is possible to notice that Armed Forces and other related organizations of Ukraine do not have the capabilities to accomplish their missions, first of all, because of the absence of clear doctrines and concepts in the aforementioned laws.

The second significant cause is the unwillingness of the Ukrainian Parliament and Government to put defense issues into the list of priorities: a) the regional situation around Ukraine is quite stable and safe (thanks to NATO's being on the border); and b) the Ukrainian Constitution strictly prohibits the involvement of the Armed Forces in the internal political struggle for power:

The Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations cannot be used ... for limitation of the rights and freedoms of citizens or to overthrow the constitutional order, remove the authorities or impede their activity.¹⁷

The third cause is pervasive corruption that significantly impacts the capabilities of Ukraine to protect its national interest. This corruption destroys everything that does not match the private interests of Ukrainian political and financial-economical elites. These elites consider the state, and Armed Forces as a part of it, like an enterprise that should bring some profit; national interests are always behind the private benefits (e.g. the Kharkov "Black Sea Fleet – gas price" agreement in 2010); and the state's budget serves as legal source for personal or corporational enrichment (for example, purchasing supplies at inflated prices or lobbying for weapon and equipment acquisitions, as is regularly discussed in Ukrainian media¹⁸).

As the result of this, the annual military budget during the period of 2009-2011 did not exceed 1% of Ukrainian GDP, and 85-90% of its expenses were spent for personnel salary and utilities.¹⁹ The total deficit of the State's Program of Armed Forces development 2006-2011 financing at the end of 2010 was around 25%, which allowed

Ukraine to accomplish only 39% of total number of Program's activities. The levels of operability for the most high-technological weapons at the end of 2010 are: for combat aircraft – 24%, for helicopters – 36%, for combat ships and support vessels – 7%. Significant problems also exist in areas of personnel recruiting, military housing, force training and others.²⁰

Another weak position of Ukraine– is its almost full dependence upon Russia for weapons and equipment. Elements of former Soviet defense industry that Ukraine got after Soviet Union disintegration, despite their relatively high technological level, cannot produce the full range of weapons required for the Armed Forces (they can only produce around 10%). Ukraine never had a clear military-technical policy that would be adequate to its national interests, but did not implicitly promote Russian ones. Ukrainian defense industry relies heavily on spare parts and raw materials imported mostly from Russia; and almost all samples of military goods are produced for other countries, again mostly for Russia. But Russia, using Ukrainian capabilities, does not invest in their modernization, and builds simultaneously similar facilities and develops new technology for reducing its dependence on Ukraine.²¹

The active participation of Ukraine in security and peacekeeping activities has been the country's main contribution to international peace and stability for a long period of time. Ukraine has had a positive experience of cooperation with NATO in such activities as the Planning and Review Process (PARP), Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC), 15th rotation of NATO Response Forces (NRF) and all NATO-lead missions (Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Mediterranean Sea). But, because of financial limitations and low readiness of equipment and weapons, Ukraine does not have the

capabilities to participate in a very important EU-led anti-piracy operation ATALANTA and provide protection for Ukrainian sailors, who are one of the most numerous among ship's crews in the world (third position by number of officers and fifth – by total number).

Despite formally established demands for close cooperation in defense and security spheres between governmental institutions, in real life the Ukrainian post-Soviet state design is extremely divided. For example, the Constitutional article mentioned above defines the single organization, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is responsible for defense of the country and protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability.²² Legally anchored separate status of governmental structures, even in the case of severe crisis, does not permit to reassign the organizations and structures from one agency to another. This is especially harmful at operational and tactical levels, where coordination and cooperation while executing common tasks could happen only through higher commanding levels. The situation worsens by diminishing the role of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDCU), which became a “substitute’s bench” or “place of exile” for politicians and top-level officials, removed from power. By the way, Raisa Bogatyriova, who has been occupying the post of Secretary of the NSDCU for four years, is not an expert in national security area, but has a long medical background. Her assignment for this position at the end of December 2007, was politically motivated and used by President of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, for the weakening of the influence of Prime-Minister Yulia Tymoshenko during the domestic political struggles for power. The new President of Ukraine, Victor Yanukovich, conducts his own policy very secretly, and does not use the legal NSDCU

mechanism of collective decision making, trying to avoid open public discussions (so, the recent session of the NSDCU was on January 20, 2012, and the previous one – almost nine months ago, on April 8, 2011).²³

Also, after presidential election in 2010 tremendous changes happened in the foreign policy processes of Ukraine. The magazine “The national security and defense” issued by Ukrainian think-tank non-governmental organization The Razumkov Centre in March 2011 contains an interesting analysis of the first-year activity results of new Ukrainian authority. The Ukrainian parliament actually was separated from foreign policy development. The center of policy formation and execution removed to the Presidential Administration, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was actually transformed into an additional structure subordinated to the presidential Protocol Service structure. Foreign policy is still implemented in ways hidden from society, and lacks a clear, effective and focused strategy. It also depends on the opportunistic interests of political elites. Experts also mention that, factually, there is no civil control over the actions of the Governmental institutions and no effective dialog between the state’s authorities, societies and experts; and short-term and tactical achievements prevail the long-term objectives. It is also noticed that the majority of experts in defense and security area express the opinion that Ukraine does not have reliable guarantees for its independence and sovereignty. The self-proclaimed “non-bloc status” does not provide the comprehensive security for Ukraine without the strong and real commitments from EU, USA, Russia and NATO, and gaining those guarantees seem unrealistic in current situation.²⁴

The next, widely advertised objective of the national defense policy, Ukraine's integration into European political, economical and legal space, has come under threat now. Regardless of the solution almost all bureaucratic issues, the final signing of the agreement on EU association was postponed for an indefinite term because of explicit and strong evidence that Ukraine's state authority retreats from the rule of law, freedom of speech and assembly, free media activity and other principles of democracy. European parliamentarians mentioned that an especially brutal case was using selective justice for prosecution of the opposition. That is why Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich's official visit to Brussels planned on October 20, 2011, was cancelled. Later, on October 27, 2011, the European Parliament issued a Resolution on the current situation in Ukraine that contains hard demands related to democracy restoration and sets them as a required condition for Ukrainian-EU association signing on December 19, 2011.

There was no surprise that Ukrainian top-level officials ignored all those demands of the Resolution. Despite frequent visits of many European leaders and their numerous attempts of persuading the Ukrainian President to fulfill recommended actions, he played his own game. Understanding the importance of Ukraine for both the EU and Russia, Yanukovich wanted to maneuver between these two centers of influence, not joining any of them, and trying to gain maximum concessions simultaneously: from the EU – softening the demands for association signing; and from Russia – discounts in natural gas prices and favorable conditions for economical cooperation and trade. But he lost. Russia, having not involved Ukraine into its integrating project – the Custom Union, started gradual pressure on Ukraine by blocking

the negotiations regarding natural gas price and threatening by economical sanctions in the future. Keeping a permanent eye upon the situation's development, and seeing that when the summit's time had come, nothing was done by Kiev, the EU refused to initial and sign the agreement on association.

The fourth objective of national defense policy, to develop equal, mutually beneficial relations with other states in the world, following Ukraine's interests, also has not been achieved, again, because of the vagueness of real Ukrainian interests and their dependence on personal short-term objectives of financial-industrial groups of oligarchs. Also, Ukraine, in contrast to neutral European countries, is not bordered by friendly and economically and politically equal states. Ukraine's neighborhood is more challenging: the unrecognized Transnistrian Republic with frozen ethno-political disputes; Belarus with a dictator's regime; unstable Caucasian region with many of frozen conflicts; Turkey with its own domestic politico-religious problems; and Russia, the strategic and our biggest trade partner, but also the only state that created almost all the crises and challenged Ukraine's security.

Thus, the conditions of uncertainty in Ukraine's defense and security areas were left to grow and grew worse. The adaptation of the "non-bloc status" and failures to implement the majority of declared defense policies have left Ukraine in a "grey zone" between two global centers of influence, the EU and Russia, and "... without the ability for self-defense and without reliable international commitments regarding the protection of Ukraine's independence and sovereignty".²⁵ Also, this major change in Ukrainian foreign policy creates the image of Ukraine as an unpredictable state, depending on the domestic preferences of the political elite.

The dominant tendency to look towards Russia has unbalanced Ukraine's foreign policy. Experts noticed that partnership with Russia transformed into an exchange of the national interests of Ukraine for Russia's temporary economic concessions. At the same time, the level of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO and USA has not grown significantly:

The dialog with EU is complicated by internal political processes in Ukraine. Namely the country's domestic situation has become the problematic factor in relationships with the U.S. There is a noticeable decrease in the U.S. interests in Ukraine – because of changes of its geopolitical priorities and displacement of geostrategic interests from Europe to other world's regions.²⁶

If Ukraine continues to follow the existing course of policy and stays under strong Russian pressure, Ukraine will fall more and more under the influence of Russia, and could lose its sovereignty completely.

Suggestions for Defense Policy Development

Based on analysis of the current situation, Ukraine has three main approaches for developing its policy course in the future: first, to continue the existing course of "non-bloc" policy; second, to return back to EU and NATO integration; and third, to change priorities in favor of Russia.

The last approach leads directly toward Ukraine's subordination to Russia, is completely inappropriate, and should be avoided by all costs.

The second approach is the most desirable, but it could be realized only by creation of favorable conditions, first of all – by the change of political power in the state and change the mind of Ukrainian people. The nearest term of possible political changes is the second half of 2012, when parliamentary elections will take place. The next term of doing so is the beginning of 2015, when the presidential elections will occur. But, in case of a worsening of the political, social and economical situation in

Ukraine that would lead to massive uprising against the existing authority such changes could happen earlier. The public polls at the end of 2011 showed the stable tendency of the people's declining trust in all branches of the legal Government and ruling Party of Regions. The Razumkov Centre released the data that confirms the rapid decline of the Government's popularity to a level of 4-7% and, at the same time, the rise of the protesting mood of Ukrainians, 52% of whom expressed the desire to act this way for protection of their own rights and freedoms.²⁷ Regarding the people's change of mind toward joining NATO and the EU, this issue requires a well-conceived informational campaign and a long time for implementation.

Undoubtedly, the first, "non-bloc" approach, remains the one in power for the conceivable future and, in the case of the pessimistic scenario of long-term political changes, – for several years. That is why the main efforts in defense policy development and implementation must reassure the international community by demonstrating the reliability and predictability of Ukraine, and should be focused on:

Compliance the non-nuclear status and a strong non-proliferation role;

Membership in international institutions and integration into European collective security systems;

Active participation in international security and peacekeeping activities.

The first way seems to be not very difficult to execute. Ukraine has well-developed legislation in this area and does not show any desires to process nuclear capabilities. By supporting international initiatives directed at preventing the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and technology for its delivery, Ukraine could play a significant role and increase its influence in foreign policy. Being among the world

leaders in nuclear and ballistic missile technology development, Ukraine can provide numerous experts and some facilities for participation in preventive operations and execution of different control measures. Having good capabilities in the area of protection from nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) threats (Army's multifunctional NBC protection and engineer units) and experience of their using (Chernobyl nuclear plant in 1986, humanitarian mission in Kuwait in 2003), Ukraine can become a significant contributor of such forces. The necessity of increasing protection against consequences of man-made disasters was exemplified by the 2011 nuclear catastrophe in Japan. Moreover, based on the results of the Strategic Defense Review in Ukraine during 2009-2010, these disaster crisis scenarios received the first-grade priority and recommendations for enhancing the Ukrainian Armed Forces' NBC and engineer capabilities.

Ukraine is a member of many international organizations, which act to provide peace and security – UN, OSCE, BLACKSEAFOR, GUAM. Having obtained positive and stable results from this participation, Ukraine should not stop or slow down cooperation with other countries and their armed forces. Also, Ukraine, having a lack of financing for its defense needs, should take advantage and enjoy all benefits from international aid proposed at bi-lateral (U.S., U.K., Germany, Canada and others) and multi-lateral (NATO, EU) levels. Annual National Programs of cooperation with NATO, PFP, PARP, OCC and other programs, exercises and activities will remain important tools of developing the capabilities of the defense of Ukraine.

Ukraine has to increase its participation in peacekeeping and security provision activities, which should become the main mission of the Armed Forces in the short and

middle term perspective. Religious and ethnic extremism, international terrorism, sea piracy, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking of weapon, narcotics, human beings, and illegal migration exposes significant threats to stability and security of any country in the world. This was confirmed by the results of Strategic Defense Review in 2009-2010, having defined as first priority for crisis scenarios, related to providing security for Ukrainian citizens abroad and participation in multinational operations. Ukraine, based on its achievements in the past, can contribute unique capabilities, such as strategic airlifting, helicopters, engineers, mechanized units, and training facilities. Active peacekeeping also will support the reformation of Ukrainian Armed Forces by establishing clear objectives and high standards for personnel and units' interoperability requirements and characteristics of weapons and systems.

Maritime forces should be created, that could execute durable anti-piracy deep-sea and shore operations.

Ukraine should develop capabilities for employing abroad up to three battalion-level task forces, which would be able to accomplish the full range of peacekeeping and stability operations anywhere in the world.

The Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine, with unified center of command and control at the state-level for enhancing the effectiveness of employment the Armed Forces and other governmental agencies should be created, as an integrated system.²⁸

Considering the unbalanced character of the existing military budget and the low level of financing for defense needs in the future²⁹, the Ukrainian Government should revise the principles of the Armed Forces' organization. The calculations made while conducting the Strategic Defense Review in 2009-2010, showed that the number of

active servicemen must be reduced by factor of two as a minimum, and the main source of Armed Forces manning should become a Reserve. By reducing spending for personnel salary, the Ministry of Defense will be able to relocate funds for personnel social support and housing, forces training providing, and new weapon and equipment acquisition.

Significant attention should be paid to reorganization of Ukrainian defense industry. Reforms must be aimed at releasing it from being the only provider of individual components and assemblies for the Russian military-industrial complex, and become a creator of the abilities for production, as Ukraine's own forces, in cooperation with other countries, high-technology weapons and equipment, which constitute the foundation of modern armed forces: C4 and ISR systems (first of all, based on space platforms), all types of high-precision guided munitions, combat and cargo aircrafts, ships, and submarines.

Conclusion

Despite its long history, Ukraine is a very young state. Being divided for many centuries and having different values, Ukrainians have not formed a strong and joint nation. This process just started 20 years ago, but the influence of the turbulent past is still strong. During the Soviet period, Ukraine, as a federal republic, did not form its own foreign and defense policy – this function belonged to the central power in Moscow. Many current Ukrainian leaders have Communist background (unfortunately, lustration has not been done) and did not know any other state-building practices that were different from the Soviet model. That is why they usually try to use the Russian Federation experience or blindly copy some Western patterns, but do not develop unique Ukrainian ones.

Nevertheless, despite many problems, I consider our limited results as having built the potential for a good way ahead. The necessity of significant improvements in Ukrainian Defense policy is clearly understood in Ukrainian society; but the impossibility of doing this quickly and with a short-term perspective is also well known. Every big change takes a long time. The next good opportunity to make some important changes will appear in 2014-2015, when the next Strategic Defense Review will be held; and I hope to participate in it and contribute, as much as I can, to deal with both old problems we have not solved and new challenges.

Endnotes

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⁹ “*On the fundamentals of national security of Ukraine*”, article 1, paragraph 5.

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¹¹ *ibid*, article 8.

¹² “*On the essentials of domestic and foreign policy*”, articles 3-11.

¹³ The Constitution of Ukraine, article 17, paragraph 1, <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=254%EA%2F96-%E2%F0&p=1322509073211007>.

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¹⁷ The Constitution of Ukraine, article 17, paragraph 4.

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