


One Among Many: Building Partner Capacity in a Multinational Command

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**ONE AMONG MANY: BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY IN A MULTINATIONAL
COMMAND**

by

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Besides the cardinal mission of fighting and winning the Nation's wars, the United States Army has a salient tradition of training and advising foreign militaries. The new Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes the enduring nature of the mission to build partner capacity. Although it does not envision large-scale, prolonged stability operations in the near term, the guidance cautions against the total divestment of mission capabilities and emphasizes the retention of lessons learned over the past decade. The establishment of NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan provides a unique case study for understanding the challenges found in training indigenous security personnel, operating within a multinational training command, and creating and training an entire armed force from the squad to the ministerial level.

ONE AMONG MANY: BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY IN A MULTINATIONAL COMMAND

Besides the cardinal mission of fighting and winning the Nation's wars, the United States Army has a salient tradition of training and advising foreign militaries to provide security for their countries.¹ The relative frequency of these missions is evident when one considers that General Raymond T. Odierno's service from cadet to Chief of Staff of the United States Army has been historically framed by Army participation in two major training and advisory missions to build large scale partner capacity. Preceding the deployment of combat troops to Da Nang by a full decade, the United States' training mission in Vietnam began in 1955 when the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina assumed responsibility for the development and training of the newly autonomous South Vietnamese Army.² That the Army finds itself involved a generation later in another major operation advising and training the Afghan National Security Force illustrates the recurring nature of these types of missions and emphasizes the need to understand the challenges involved in their execution. When viewed in this historical context – that these missions occur as a sort of 'generational spike' in Army missions – it is not inconceivable to envision a future scenario in which Soldiers are again called upon to conduct a large scale foreign military training mission. Moreover, given the extensive U.S. experience in coalition warfare and its current austere economic situation, future execution of such an extensive training mission may be as part of a multinational, rather than unilateral, command. The recent U.S. experience in building the partner capacity of the Afghanistan National Security Force as part of a multinational training command offers a distinct view of the magnitude as well as

challenges of such a mission. This paper will examine a particular aspect of building partner capacity – the ‘security force assistance’ necessary to create and train an entire armed force from the level of squad to ministry. It will briefly highlight the training mission in Vietnam for historical context, describe how this type of security force assistance mission fits within the contemporary strategic defense guidance, and examine the current multinational training operation in Afghanistan for a better understanding of the operational environment related to these types of missions. Rather than presenting a checklist of lessons learned, it will identify particular challenges related to the host nation and multinational training command to inform those tasked with future efforts of this magnitude. While multicultural themes and multinational operations are the focus of this paper, its primary audience is members of the U.S. Army.

A brief overview of the United States’ training mission in the Republic of Vietnam illustrates the magnitude of the endeavor to constitute and develop an entire foreign military while facing an armed enemy. Given the Cold War demands for resources on the Korean peninsula and European plain, the size and scope of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina and the subsequent Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) highlight the extensive commitment of the United States to this 18-year training effort. Far from a handful of personnel advising tactical units in the fielded force, U.S. personnel were “successively assigned to central agencies and staffs (Defense Ministry, [Joint General Staff], corps, and service branch commands), as well as local agencies and units (military schools, training centers, divisions, and military regions)” to impact all elements of the entire South Vietnamese armed forces.³

In the early days of the assistance mission, the South Vietnamese faced numerous training and organizational challenges. These included a shortage of officers with higher command and staff experience, a deficit in branch qualified officers and noncommissioned officers, a lack of training doctrine, and a scarcity of instructors and actual training facilities.⁴ Enduring problems with logistics and maintenance manifested themselves as “overcrowded depots, confused inventories, bottlenecks in local transportation, bureaucratic confusion at the local field supply points, long delays in procuring certain hard-to-manufacture munitions” and a lack of preventative maintenance and absence of spare parts.⁵

U.S. military assistance was aimed at addressing these challenges. Efforts in the logistics fields focused on improving supply inventories and distribution.⁶ Responsible for the U.S. supply and support advisory mission in 1967, United States Army, Vietnam filled critical Vietnamese equipment shortages, assisted with ammunition supply, and supported operations with major materiel handling equipment. However, issues were not just encountered with systems and processes. One of the challenges rooted in the host nation was the “tendency for senior Vietnamese commanders, especially corps commanders, to hoard resources, misuse them, or divert them to their favorite units.”⁷

With the help of its advisors, the Vietnamese National Armed Forces significantly expanded its training efforts from just one recruit training center and ten service schools in 1955 to 33 training centers and 25 service schools in 1970.⁸ By this time, MACV had also equipped the majority of the nine infantry divisions, the marine and airborne divisions, and two separate regiments with the “new weapons and equipment specified in the improvement and modernization programs.”⁹ The efforts of both the training and

assistance command and those advisors who “served from the palace level to the [South Vietnamese Army] battalion and the district/subdistrict level in the field”¹⁰ provide a historical example of a large scale military endeavor to build another nation’s entire military from its very roots. In the contemporary security environment, this mission falls within the classification of building partner capacity.

Building Partner Capacity

Released on January 5, 2012, the new Defense Strategic Guidance has fully established building partner capacity as an important element of the current and future U.S. military strategy. Grounded in a strategy to transition from the current conflicts to pending challenges while stewarding limited capital during a time of constrained resources, the strategic guidance describes the conditions, dangers, and opportunities of the worldwide security situation, outlines ten paramount missions for the U.S. Armed Forces, and details eight principles to steer force and enterprise development. Two of the ten missions address security assistance and building partner capacity. “Provide a Stabilizing Presence” includes activities to help “build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence.” Acknowledging a limitation on resources, the guidance for this mission directs that a “reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity.” The associated mission of “Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations” emphasizes “non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations.”¹¹ These military-to-military partnerships could

include elements of security force assistance, which falls within the doctrinal sphere of stability operations, and includes the organizing, training, equipping, and advising of host-nation security forces.¹² Although the guidance for this mission states that “U.S. forces will be . . . ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible,” it specifies that “forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations” and challenges the military to “retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.” In the steering principles that follow the ten mission sets, the strategic guidance recognizes the difficulty of predicting with absolute certitude the changing nature of the strategic environment, cautions against “wholesale divestment of the capability to conduct any mission,” and stipulates the maintenance of a “broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of [these ten] missions.”¹³ While the U.S. military may no longer be structured to conduct extensive stability operations, the warning to not completely lose mission capabilities and to retain that which has been learned during the past decade serves as an imperative to study the challenges involved in a major training and advisory mission.

This new strategic guidance was presaged nearly two years ago when then Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates issued a clarion call on “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance” in *Foreign Affairs*. Framing partner capacity building measures in a historical context, Gates detailed how the U.S. military has assisted its partners since the days of Lend Lease and the Second World

War. Military assistance was then used to support the U.S. Cold War strategy of helping partners resist aggression and has evolved to the contemporary efforts to build security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. While recognizing that “the United States is unlikely to repeat a mission on the scale of those in Afghanistan or Iraq anytime soon,” Gates emphasized that the “effectiveness and credibility of the United States will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of its local partners.” He directed that “this strategic reality demands that the U.S. government get better at what is called “building partner capacity.”¹⁴ In addressing the wide range of such an effort, Gates applauded the progress made in the past decade to resource the advisory missions of the Iraqi and Afghan fielded force, but also admonished that “there has not been enough attention paid to building the institutional capacity (such as defense ministries) or the human capital (including leadership skills and attitudes) needed to sustain security over the long term.”¹⁵ By dissecting capacity building into these categories of fielded force and institution, Gates illustrated the scope and scale of such an endeavor.

Defining the Mission

Lieutenant General (Retired) James M. Dubik, former Commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, has greatly added to the body of knowledge on the challenges associated with partner capacity building. Commenting on Gates’ article, he divided this mission set into three distinct categories:

First, building the capacity of current allies and partners with already mature military forces . . . [which requires] routine single service and joint exercise and experimental programs, structures, and agreements to improve force interoperability, leader-exchange programs, and discussions about ways to blend investments and operational capabilities among the alliance or partner nations’ militaries . . . Second, fixing the tactical shortcomings of indigenous military forces . . . [which] are the result of institutional deficiencies: a poor training system; an inadequate

leader selection and development system; a poor command structure; often weak acquisition, maintenance, supply and logistics systems; and poor personnel policies that result in a corrupt promotion system and insufficient pay and allowances . . . Third, creating both military forces and security institutions from whole cloth . . . [which] requires a broad enterprise approach that builds security forces simultaneously with creating security ministry proficiency.¹⁶

These three categories represent the wide spectrum of potential requirements needed to assist our various partners of today as well as those of the future. Addressing the force structure required to accomplish these missions, Dubik stated that:

. . . all categories of partner capacity-building missions rely upon single-service or joint general-purpose forces. Special operations forces have a role to play in each of the three categories, and under certain limited conditions they may be able to execute the second category by themselves. They are insufficient, however, to conduct the kind of exercise program called for in the first category, to execute all of the institutional and supporting system improvements associated with the second category, or to manage the vast enterprise necessary for the third category.¹⁷

The role of conventional forces, which Dubik titled general-purpose forces, in building partner capacity is doctrinally substantiated in the Army's counterinsurgency manual, which notes:

. . . the mission of developing [Host Nation] security forces goes beyond a task assigned to a few specialists. The scope and scale of training programs today and in the scale of programs likely to be required in the future have grown. While [Foreign Internal Defense] has been traditionally the primary responsibility of the special operations forces (SOF), training foreign forces is now a core competency of regular and reserve units of all Services.¹⁸

Emphasizing the role of the entire Army in the security force assistance mission, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey, when he was the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, wrote that "It is clear that we are stronger when we act with partners in today's operating

environment. Therefore, security force assistance is no longer an “additional duty.” It is now a core competency of our Army.”¹⁹

Dubik illustrated that the sheer magnitude of training an entire foreign military is much more than simply teaching small units of infantry to shoot, move, and communicate:

Not only does this . . . require the creation of a training infrastructure – training facilities of many types, barracks, and associated headquarters and processes to manage training – to generate security forces, but it also requires putting in place the institutional capacity to recruit, train, acquire, develop, sustain, fund and manage all facets of a nation’s security forces in order to replenish and continually improve those forces.²⁰

The security force assistance mission of creating and training an entire armed force, consisting of multiple services and branches from the squad to the ministerial level - while the host nation is often engaged in combat operations - requires an understanding of the demands involved with executing such a task. The recent multinational training mission in Afghanistan provides a current study from which to understand some of the particular challenges found in this type of mission.

Afghanistan

Following the successful combat operations to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States and its partners focused on the manner and method of establishing and supporting critical Afghan Interim Governmental structures. In September, 2003, the Afghan Interim Government and the United States, which was designated the “lead nation” to develop the Afghan National Army, decided that all elements of the Afghan Ministry of Defense would be built as new entities.²¹ For the next six years, a series of U.S. military organizations and commands developed the growing Afghan National Army. In 2009, the United States Combined Security Transition

Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was combined with the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) and Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV was “dual hatted” as the commander of both commands. The establishment of, and United States participation in, the NTM-A multinational training command provides a unique study for future U.S. involvement in multinational training commands and identifies particular challenges and unique aspects of this multinational environment.

Established by NATO in November 2009, NTM-A merged personnel from current bilateral efforts, to include CSTC-A, into a unified multinational training command under a three-star commander to continue training the Afghan National Army and Air Force and “expand the coalition role in training the Afghan National Police [and] conduct senior-level mentoring to the Afghan National Army.” Over the next year, the command organization developed as three deputy commanders were resourced to lead the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan Air Force (AAF), and Afghan National Police (ANP) and three deputy commanders for International Security Cooperation, Programs, and Regional Support were resourced to support these training functions.²² NTM-A collectively defined the ANA, AAF, and ANP as the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). In addition to training critical combat skills, the command also focused on the crucial missing capabilities of how to “staff, support, and administrate.”²³ As of summer 2011, NTM-A and its Afghan counterparts were training Afghan soldiers, airmen, and police at 70 training sites in 21 provinces throughout the country and more than 500 military, law enforcement, and civil service advisors were assisting and advising in the nation’s security ministries.²⁴

The challenges faced by NTM-A while training the ANSF provide valuable information for future multinational training endeavors and may be broken down into two main categories – those related to the host nation personnel to be trained and those related to the multinational training command itself.

Host Nation Challenges

Officers and noncommissioned officers of the United States Army understand how to train American Soldiers due in no small part to an inherent shared culture and background. However, challenges such as corruption, lack of mechanical aptitude, and illiteracy that are found in other countries may confront these same officers and noncommissioned officers and must be understood and addressed so that they do not endanger the training mission.

The overall absence of corruption in the U.S. military may make it difficult for the advisory personnel to summarily recognize its detrimental effects on the security forces of the host nation and the population they are meant to serve. In their study on Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, authors Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker point out that “corruption is not unique to Afghanistan; large-scale corruption also exists in many other underdeveloped countries, as well as some developed countries in which Western concepts of leadership do not prevail.”²⁵ Although common, this blight contains the potential for ruinous results. Defense analyst David Isby wrote that although a certain degree of corruption has always existed in Afghanistan, “the recent rise in corruption challenges the very legitimacy of Afghan governmental institutions, threatening the country’s future. It has undercut the ability of Afghans and foreign supporters alike to create effective Afghan political and societal institutions.”²⁶

Corruption related to the security forces may be categorized as internal and external. Internal corruption victimizes personnel serving within the security forces and would include Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker's example of "the theft of soldiers' pay and their food rations by self-serving leaders."²⁷ External corruption victimizes the population and would include illegal vehicle checkpoints and the demand for bribes.

NTM-A recognized that "pervasive corruption in Afghanistan undermines the nation's stability and the effectiveness of the ANSF" and focused its efforts to combat corruption on "preventative actions and behavior modification." One of the actions to prevent internal corruption was the implementation of electronic funds transfers of salaries to ensure financial transparency and accountability and prevent the skimming of subordinates' pay. NTM-A also "supported [International Security Assistance Force] guidance on counterinsurgency contracting practices and biometric efforts."²⁸ Enforced supply accountability not only ensures the availability of needed personnel and equipment, but also reinforces an ethos of stewardship. During the latter portion of 2011, the ANSF conducted 100 percent inventories of both personnel and such critical items as weapons, vehicles, and night-vision devices and created national-level property books to better account for and manage equipment.²⁹ While there is no short-term solution for endemic corruption, a combination of leader development and training are required to purge this negative characteristic from the security force and must be addressed early in the mission, since, as Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker note, "cultures change more slowly than the duration of most interventions."³⁰ By establishing the multiple layers of training institutions found in basic training, noncommissioned officer courses, a national military academy, and command and staff courses, the training and

advisory command can “simultaneously affect multiple generations of Afghans across the force – from cadet to colonel and recruit to sergeant major.”³¹

America’s relationship with the automobile since its advent potentially distorts the advisor’s fundamental understanding of the indigenous recruit’s abilities. Those in the U.S. military generally take for granted that all adults know how to operate motor vehicles and that many understand the role of preventative maintenance in sustaining vehicles and equipment. Additionally, the number of mechanical devices found in the average American home may cause an advisor to quickly forget that this degree of mechanization is hardly mirrored in other parts of the world. NTM-A encountered this lack of mechanization among the ANSF recruits selected to serve as vehicle operators. An advisor for the ANA 205th Corps noted that prior to an NTM-A led up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle training course, none of the Afghan trainees had received “any type of formal driver education” and “many [had] never driven before at all.”³² Driver training does more than merely reduce the amount of equipment loss – it is a force protection measure as well, due to the number of non-battle injuries and fatalities suffered by the host nation security force when there are an insufficient number of trained drivers.³³ In order to improve drivers’ skills and emphasize safe vehicle operating procedures, NTM-A increased the duration of driver’s training from one to five weeks.³⁴ This level of mechanization is just one example of critical demographic factors that must be considered when training indigenous forces.

Literacy may be the most important social statistic for a training and advisory command to understand the basic skill levels of the population from which the security forces will be recruited. Like corruption, it is not a singular issue found in only a small

number of countries – according to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 776 million people, or one out of every five adults, in the world are illiterate.³⁵ Further, the vast majority of these illiterate individuals live in one of 35 countries that have a “literacy rate of less than 50 percent or a population of more than 10 million people who cannot read nor write.”³⁶ These staggering statistics have an immediate impact on a training command working with a host nation security force in one of these countries. A soldier who cannot read, write, or recognize numbers is not able to pass map grid coordinates for medical evacuation or reinforcement operations, request resupply of specific items, read a vehicle operator’s manual, or even count his paycheck to ensure that it has not been ‘skimmed.’ A policeman who is illiterate cannot write down a license plate number, take a report, or recognize his own weapon serial number.³⁷

To address the 14 percent literacy rate among the basic Afghan recruits entering the ANSF, in March 2010, NTM-A implemented a focused literacy program and initiated mandatory literacy training for all soldiers and police in basic training. It hired Afghan Ministry of Education-certified instructors to implement this training, and eventually expanded literacy training to include those already serving in the operational forces.³⁸ Literacy training is such a fundamental building block for a trained security force that Lieutenant General Caldwell labeled it the “essential enabler.”³⁹

The connection between the societal challenges found in a host nation and the ability to train its security force must be recognized and understood. Corruption strikes at the very center of unity of command and purpose within the security force and reduces the confidence that the general population must have in its security force.

Levels of mechanization are directly linked to the sophistication of the weaponry and vehicles with which the foreign security force may be equipped. Literacy not only improves the human capital of the security force, but also provides a means with which to reduce corruption and widen the aptitude for mechanization.

Training Command Challenges

The constraints encountered in working in a multinational environment are widely acknowledged. Sovereign agendas and national caveats concerning the employment of troops are a very real cost for working within a coalition. Yet these troop contributing nations bring an unparalleled legitimacy and credibility to the overall political objectives of the mission. Now consisting of 37 troop contributing nations, or almost one-fifth of the world's countries, NTM-A represents a consensus-based authority that brings particular validity to the ANSF training mission.⁴⁰ These troop contributing nations also bring a capability to the mission to assist in training the indigenous forces with non-standard equipment. Although NTM-A is training the ANSF on predominantly NATO standard small arms, some of the former Warsaw Pact members of NATO and other non-NATO training partner nations are particularly suited for training the ANSF on such non-NATO standard weapons and systems as the D-30 howitzer, SPG-9 recoilless rifle, and Mi-24 attack helicopter. These multinational training partners also assist in overcoming such training challenges as the training of the police element of the security force.

Identifying all of the security requirements for the host nation is a critical aspect of determining the composition of the security forces. While the military members of the training command logically understand the militarized entities of the foreign security forces that they are training, this understanding does not always translate to the host

nation police forces that play such a critical role in providing security for the populace and supporting the 'clear, hold, and build' phases of the counterinsurgency.

Complicating this even more is the fact that there is rarely just a singular police force to be trained. The ANP consists of four main entities: the Afghan Uniformed Police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, the Afghan Border Police, and the Afghan Anti-Crime Police. Major General Walter M. Golden, Jr., NTM-A Deputy Commander for Police, described these entities as:

- The Afghan Uniformed Police are the regular police that patrol villages, provinces and roads. The AUP is in all 34 provinces and has 90,500 members.
- The Afghan National Civil Order Police is a national level response force, used for counterinsurgency and civil order. ANCOP has 11,700 members.
- The 20,000 member-strong Afghan Border Police provide border security with posts and customs operations around the nation.
- The Afghan Anti-Crime Police investigate crimes and functions as police intelligence. The AACP has over 3,400 members.⁴¹

In their study *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan*, Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Olikier note that “. . . other U.S. government agencies have not been able to provide police training on a large scale in active conflict zones. This task has often fallen to the U.S. military by default; absent substantial changes in the capacities of other U.S. agencies, it will almost certainly fall to the Army in the future.”⁴²

The challenge of training such police forces is compounded by the lack of a standardized U.S. national police that could be called upon to assist in this mission. Participating in a multinational command has directly addressed this need, as numerous troop contributing nations have contributed the professional police needed to train the Afghans on both traditional rule of law functions as well as the paramilitary skills that are

necessary for a police force operating in a counterinsurgency environment. Italian Carabinieri, French Gendarmerie, Romanian Jendarma, and Spanish Guardia Civil, to name but a few, provide a police, not military, based focus to the training for those who will be responsible for the day-to-day security and protection of the population.⁴³

The instruction of Afghan police also provides an excellent example of how a multinational command may need to engage external actors outside the command and direct control of the training mission to maximize capabilities and results. For six years, the police training environment was one in which:

multiple bilateral police training initiatives created a lack of unity of effort in the police training function. German, US State Department, US Department of Defense, European Union (EU) and other contributing nations conducted various forms of police training. The result lacked a coherent strategy, unity of effort and defined leadership. Each nation brought their own funding, national standards and techniques, and national caveats resulting in a confusing array of training initiatives for the Afghan National Police.⁴⁴

In 2009, the NTM-A and European Union Police – Afghanistan (EUPOL) relationship could easily have resulted in competition over a finite group of professional police trainers and resources. Lieutenant General Caldwell, Commander NTM-A, led a year of heavy engagement and coordination to ensure that these entities complimented, instead of contradicted, each other. EUPOL and the independent German Police Project Team (GPPT) representatives were invited to fully participate in meetings that the Commander, NTM-A, or his Deputy Commanding General for Police, held to coordinate and resource police training efforts. The EUPOL and GPPT representatives were treated as partners, and not subordinates, in this work, which highlighted that each of these entities brought a significant aspect to the training effort. Although the EUPOL manpower contribution was relatively small in comparison to that of NTM-A, the entire

contingent was made up of professional policemen, whose experience would be critical as the Afghan police shifted from a counter insurgency-based policing effort that was heavy on paramilitary and survival skills to that of a more traditional policing model of community-based policing. EUPOL assumed responsibility for building the Afghan Police Staff College and manning it with trainers. From competition to collaboration, this participation resulted in the signing and implementation in the spring of 2011 of the first-ever, country-wide Memorandum of Instruction on Police Training by the Afghan Ministry of Interior, NTM-A, EUPOL, and the GPPT.⁴⁵

The development of the police force is just one aspect of training and advising a national security force. As Dubik noted in his article, building a national security force from the “whole cloth” is a massive endeavor that must include all facets of recruiting, to include manning and resourcing the recruiters, building the induction centers, and establishing and developing the recruiting command. All aspects of training, to include training and resourcing the drill instructors, fabricating the individual and collective training centers, and creating the training and doctrine command, must occur. Paramount in this process is the thought given to the force structure to be built and trained and the identification of the capabilities that will be needed by that force. That the ANA was “originally built as an infantry-centric force”⁴⁶ helps to explain why it has been largely unable to conduct independent operations. The training capabilities to develop critical enabling and support functions needed for independent combat operations, like military intelligence, engineer and route clearance, signal, and military police, have only been built in the past two years. The essential support and special branches – logistics, human resources, finance, legal, and medical – that are critical for

creating a self-sustaining force are also now being developed. The medical field is an excellent example of the nature and requirement of these support and special branches. For a national military, especially one at war, to be self-sufficient requires more than the training of combat medics. Host nation medical and nursing staff, hospital administrators, and laboratory technicians are all required to man regional and national military hospitals and facilities.

It is crucial to train not only the individual and collective police and soldiers, but the personnel of the security ministries as well, for “it does no good to train, equip and professionalize capable police and fighting formations if the ability to manage the growth, training, and sustainment and employment of these forces is lacking.”⁴⁷ NTM-A senior advisors advise their Afghan counterparts on the ministerial and higher staff functions, assess the Afghans’ ability to become self-sufficient, and establish Ministerial Development Plans, which focus NTM-A support to the ministries and are driven by these four key questions:

- Are the fundamental functions to be performed clearly defined – and are they at an appropriate level of complexity?
- Is the ministry manned, trained, and equipped to perform the functions?
- How well can the Afghans perform the functions?
- Is the performance of these functions sustainable?⁴⁸

To overcome the particular challenge of an all-military force advising senior host nation civil authorities in the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, NTM-A/CSTC-A initiated a program of Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA). U.S. Department of Defense civil servants serve as senior advisors in the security ministries to capitalize on their “unique insight and expertise for running a large military

organization” and bring a depth of knowledge to the ministries.⁴⁹ The importance of these senior advisors cannot be understated – while the indigenous soldiers and police learn their trade at the training and fielding centers, it is the ability of the officers and civilians of the General Staff and security ministries to employ some form of the programming, budgeting, and planning process that will enable this leadership to grow, manage, and sustain the security forces.

By the very essence of the mission, a training and advisory command is provisional in nature and will change shape and organization over time to provide the needed support to the maturing host nation security forces. As temporary training sites move to permanent training centers and training institutions evolve, the training command’s focus, functions, and priorities will also shift. This is best evidenced by the role of the NTM-A in the train-the-trainer process. NTM-A trainers were first utilized to train the large number of Afghan recruits needed to man the expanding security force. As the ANSF began to grow, NTM-A shifted a portion of its trainers to begin training Afghans to serve as the primary recruit trainers. In the past year, 453 ANP instructors and 1,396 ANA instructors were trained and certified to lead police and army training. Afghan instructors training Afghan recruits is a key element of the “effort to create a self-generating and self-sustaining system that can be maintained by the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defense.”⁵⁰ Since fewer NTM-A trainers were needed to conduct recruit training, NTM-A was able to again shift trainers to instruct Afghan leaders on how to manage, resource, and sustain the training infrastructure located at the various training centers and institutions.

Understanding the challenges that a training command will encounter – that the command will change structure and focus over time, that developing senior level institutions is critical to establishing an enduring force, that building an entire national security force is a vast requirement requiring significant resources, to include time, and that the military training mission will include non-traditional aspects such as training police – is just as critical as recognizing the inherent challenges that levels of corruption, mechanization, and literacy present in the host nation. Cultures and international partners will differ in future missions, but those responsible must have a framework with which to consider the indigenous forces to be trained and the training command to be organized. If the U.S. Army again receives the mission to train a foreign military, it must begin with an appreciation of these challenges.

Conclusion

The Army's current security force assistance training and doctrine represent a significant commitment to the partner capacity building mission. In the past decade, the Army has gained considerable experience from working with host nation forces and has written this experience into its doctrine. Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, was published on May 1, 2009 to address "common characteristics and considerations for conducting security force assistance and [clarify] what units and individual advisors must understand to work "by, with, and through" their counterparts."⁵¹ Furthermore, the Army collaborated with the Marine, Naval, and Air Force organizations responsible for development and doctrine to jointly publish FM 3-07.10, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces* on September 10, 2009.⁵² However, current security force assistance advisory doctrine and training does

not yet extend to the institutional, or ministerial, level called for by Secretary Gates. FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, is focused mainly on the brigade-level advisory efforts and FM 3-07.10, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces*, is focused primarily on the battalion-level advisory mission. While both publications provide information for all levels of advisory positions, there is a noticeable absence of doctrine to specifically cover national-level institutions such as security ministries, general staffs, national military academies, or recruiting or logistics commands. Just as it is critical to excel in the tactical advising mission to ensure dominance on the battlefield, it is crucial to enable such key functions as planning, programming, and budgeting in the sections and directorates of the general staff and the offices and departments of the security ministries in order to develop an enduring and sustainable security force.

With the mission to “train Advisor Skills, Combat Skills, and Security Force Assistance skills to provide Army and Joint Force Commanders with trained personnel and units to build security capacity in designated countries,” the 162d Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk represents the Army’s significant commitment of resources to maintain and build competence in support of the partner capacity building mission. This purpose-built unit currently trains Security Force Advisory Teams to include joint sourced teams and Security Force Assistance Brigades in combat, tactical, force protection, foreign cultural, counterinsurgency, communication, and advisory skills in preparation for advising their ANA and ANP partner units.⁵³ However, there is currently no training methodology or purpose-driven preparation for those military officers identified to serve as senior advisors in the Afghan security ministries, General Staff, and other institutional level

organizations. Instead, these individuals are processed through the seven-day theater-mandated training at the CONUS Replacement Center along with other individual deployment augmentees destined for duty in Afghanistan.⁵⁴

The new Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizes the enduring nature of this mission to build partner capacity and makes it clear that “large-scale, prolonged stability operations” are not envisioned for the near term. However, the ‘generational spike’ frequency of such a training mission may occur sooner, rather than later, in the spectrum of time, emerging in some unforeseen trouble spot. The recent suggestions of military training assistance for a post-Gaddafi Libya only serve to highlight the speed with which such a mission could appear.⁵⁵ The manner in which these mission requirements develop will only increase in the future – just as ‘today’s backwater may become tomorrow’s flashpoint’ in the operational sense, today’s flashpoint may very well become tomorrow’s training and advisory requirement.

In the 1980’s, the Army’s Center of Military History chronicled the advisory efforts in Vietnam as part of its larger, multi-volume series *The U.S. Army in Vietnam*.⁵⁶ Although particularly informative about the establishment and operations of the large-scale training and advisory command, this history only tells what happened and does not contain the analysis, guidance, and application that a doctrinal imperative would provide to an organization tasked with executing such a mission. The Army would be well served to document the challenges associated with the large-scale training of foreign security forces, as well as those associated with working with international partners in a multinational training command, and codify them in doctrine before the current resident knowledge of institutional training and advising is lost.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Army, "Mission," 2012, <http://www.army.mil/info/organization> (accessed January 5, 2012). The Army's mission is to "fight and win our Nation's wars by providing prompt, sustained land dominance across the full range of military operations and spectrum of conflict in support of combatant commanders."

² Ronald H. Spector, *United States Army in Vietnam; Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1983), 239.

³ In the early 1950s, the Americans were involved in the training of Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. Not long after the din of gunfire had died down at Dien Bien Phu, the Americans took a leading role in the mission to train the nascent South Vietnamese Army. On February 12, 1955, Lieutenant General John O'Daniel "assumed responsibility for the organization and training of the South Vietnamese Army." Spector, *United States Army in Vietnam*, 177 and 239.

⁴ Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, "The RVNAF," in *The Vietnam War; An Assessment By South Vietnam's Generals*, ed. Lewis Sorley (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2010), 5 and 40.

⁵ Jeffrey J. Clarke, *United States Army in Vietnam; Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988), 165.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 164-165.

⁷ General Bruce Palmer, Jr., *The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1985), 72.

⁸ Khuyen, "The RVNAF," 44.

⁹ Clarke, *United States Army in Vietnam*, 379.

¹⁰ Palmer, *The 25-Year War*, 158.

¹¹ U. S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2012), 5-6, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed January 5, 2012).

¹² U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 6, 2008), 6-14.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership*, 6.

¹⁴ Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010): 2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁶ Lieutenant General (Retired) James M. Dubik, "A Closer Look at the 'Build Partner Capacity' Mission," *Army* 62, no. 1 (January 2012): 14-15.

¹⁷ Ibid., 15-16. In his *Foreign Affairs* article, Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates wrote, "Within the military, advising and mentoring indigenous security forces is moving from the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key mission for the armed forces as a whole." Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," 3.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 15, 2006), 6-3. The various staff functions needed for training foreign security forces demonstrate the requirement for Soldiers from multiple branches throughout the Army for large-scale training missions: financial manager; staff judge advocate; construction engineer; political-military advisors; public affairs; force protection and focused intelligence staff; materiel management; health affairs; security assistance; and civilian law enforcement. Ibid., 6-5.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Security Force Assistance*, Field Manual 3-07.1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, May 1, 2009), Foreword.

²⁰ Dubik, "A Closer Look at the 'Build Partner Capacity' Mission," 15.

²¹ Obaid Younossi, et al., *The Long March; Building an Afghan National Army* (Arlington: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009), 13. The authors write that "By April 2002, the "lead nation" strategy had emerged, which distributed responsibilities among five nations: Germany would be responsible for developing the ANP; Italy would lead judicial reform; Japan would coordinate disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of warlords and militias; Great Britain would assume accountability for counternarcotics efforts; and the United States would build the ANA." For further information and assessment on the lead nations' efforts, see Deborah Hanagan, *The Changing Face of Afghanistan, 2001-08* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2011).

²² NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, *Year In Review; November 2009 to November 2010* (Kabul: NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, 2010), 24, 25, and 29 and NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, *Anniversary Ceremony; Nov. 2009 – Nov. 2010* (Kabul: NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, 2010).

²³ Colonel Brock Millman, "ANA Leadership Development," *Enduring Ledger* 4, no. 4 (September – October 2010): 10.

²⁴ Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV and Colonel Keith A. Detwiler, "Return on Investment," *Armed Forces Journal* 149, no. 1 (July/August 2011): 18.

²⁵ Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan; Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts* (Arlington, VA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2011), 109.

²⁶ David Isby, *Afghanistan; Graveyard of Empires – A New History of the Borderland* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2010), 200.

²⁷ Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan*, 109.

²⁸ NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, *Year In Review*, 22-23.

²⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development,” October 2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_10/20111006_111006-backgrounder_ANSF_en.pdf (accessed March 10, 2012).

³⁰ Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan*, 109.

³¹ Caldwell and Detwiler, “Return on Investment,” 19.

³² Master Sergeant Paul Hughes, “Up-armored Humvee training improves ANA driving safety,” NTM-A Public Affairs, October 13, 2011, <http://ntm-a.com/wordpress2/archives/7327> (accessed March 10, 2012). This course is part of the standardized training conducted at the Regional Military Training Centers. Hughes notes that “approximately 50 students graduate from each of the courses which are offered about once every 10 weeks.”

³³ U.S. Army Specialist Patrick Morgan of the 104th Transportation Company developed a train-the-trainer vehicle operation program of instruction, noting that “The 9th Kandak Commandos were having a lot of driving fatalities due to poor training.” Technical Sergeant Samara Scott, “Afghan Army commandos graduate first master drivers course,” NTM-A Public Affairs, May 27, 2011, <http://ntm-a.com/wordpress2/archives/4475> (accessed March 10, 2012).

³⁴ NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, *Year In Review*, 12.

³⁵ United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, “United Nations Literacy Decade (2003 - 2012),” 2011, <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/education-building-blocks/literacy/un-literacy-decade/> (accessed March 10, 2012).

³⁶ United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, “Literacy Initiative for Empowerment (LIFE),” 2011, <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/education-building-blocks/literacy/un-literacy-decade/literacy-initiative-life/> (accessed March 10, 2012). UNESCO defines literacy as “The ability to read and write with understanding a simple statement related to one’s daily life. It involves a continuum of reading and writing skills, and often includes also basic arithmetic skills (numeracy).” United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, “UNESCO Institute for Statistics Glossary,” 2006, <http://glossary.uis.unesco.org/glossary/en/home> (accessed March 11, 2012).

³⁷ Examples used during NTM-A briefings. Information is personal knowledge based on the author’s previous assignment at Headquarters, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan from 2010-2011.

³⁸ Office of the Deputy to the Commanding General, *Literacy Education; Empowering a Professional Force* (Kabul: NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, 2011), 3, 5, 11, 12, and 15. This white paper notes that “for the purposes of training the ANSF, NTM-A/CSTC-A defines functional literacy based on the equivalency of a US 1st through 3d grade education level.”

³⁹ William B. Caldwell, IV. and Derek S. Reveron, “Beyond the Tenth Year in Afghanistan: Security Force Assistance and International Security,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, September 2011, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201109.caldwell_reveron.afghanistan.html (accessed September 12, 2011).

⁴⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Robert Williams, U.S. Army, Director, International Security Cooperation, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, e-mail message to author, February 11, 2012. LTC Williams confirmed that there are 37 troop contributing nations in NTM-A/CSTC-A. Also, United Nations, “United Nations at a Glance,” <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml> (accessed October 17, 2011). The United Nations counts 193 member states.

⁴¹ Major General Walter M. Golden, Jr., “Policing the Training: Engaging the Afghan National Police Training Organization,” *Shohna ba Shohna; Shoulder to Shoulder* 1, no. 5 (September 2011): 4. Two additional entities are emerging as security entities: the Afghan Public Protection Force, which secures critical facilities and development projects, and the Afghan Local Police, which is a temporary community-based security force.

⁴² Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker, *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan*, xx and 115. The authors note that the “U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) hired DynCorp International to assist with police training in 2003. In May 2005, the United States established CSTC-A to oversee ANA development, and it soon took control of ANP development as well.” *Ibid.*, xvi.

⁴³ Information is personal knowledge based on the author’s previous assignment at Headquarters, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan from 2010-2011.

⁴⁴ Office of the Deputy to the Commanding General, *EUPOL; Partnering for Civil Police* (Kabul: NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, 2011), 5.

⁴⁵ Information is personal knowledge based on the author’s previous assignment at Headquarters, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan from 2010-2011.

⁴⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).”

⁴⁷ Caldwell and Detwiler, “Return on Investment,” 18.

⁴⁸ NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, *Year In Review*, 20-21.

⁴⁹ Caldwell and Detwiler, “Return on Investment,” 18. Also, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, *Year In Review*, 22.

⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).”

⁵¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Security Force Assistance*, Foreword.

⁵² FM 3-07.10 is categorized as MCRP 3-33.8A in the Marine Corps, NTPP 3-07.5 in the Navy, and AFTTP 3-2.76 in the Air Force.

⁵³ 162nd Infantry Brigade, *Command Brief*, briefing slides, Fort Polk, LA, February 8, 2012 and MAJ John A. Redford, Brigade Operations Officer, 162d Infantry Brigade, Fort Polk, LA, telephone interview by author, February 9, 2012.

⁵⁴ Information is personal knowledge based on the author's previous assignments at Colonels Management Office from 2008-2010 and Headquarters, NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan / Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan from 2010-2011.

⁵⁵ Agence France-Presse, "If Asked, NATO Could Provide Training For Libya: US," November 7, 2011, <http://214.14.134.30/ebird2/ebfiles/e20111108853060.html> (accessed November 9, 2011). U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, is quoted as saying, "NATO is prepared, if requested by the new Libyan authorities, to consider ways in which it could help the Libyan authorities, particularly in the area of defense and security reform." Also, Josh Rogin, "Feltman: U.S. could play role in military training in Libya," September 14, 2011, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/14/feltman_us_could_play_role_in_military_training_in_libya?hidecomments=yes (accessed November 1, 2011).

⁵⁶ The two volumes titled *Advice and Support* are arguably the preeminent sources of information on the advisory effort in Vietnam. See Ronald H. Spector, *United States Army in Vietnam; Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941-1960* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1983) and Jeffrey J. Clarke, *United States Army in Vietnam; Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988).

