


Sweden-A Global Military Player?

by

Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Giner
Swedish Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A

Approved for Public Release
Distribution is Unlimited

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT:

The author is not an employee of the United States government.
This document, therefore, may be protected by copyright law.

This manuscript is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 21-03-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Paper		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Sweden-A Global Military Player?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC Michael H. Giner, Swedish IF				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Colonel Alan L. Orr II USMC Department of Military Planning, Strategy and Operations (DMP SO)				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Only a work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright. The author is not an employee of the United States Government. Consequently, this document may be protected by copyright.					
14. ABSTRACT The post Cold War strategic landscape has allowed Sweden to openly declare its aspirations to be a strong regional military power and an active member of the European Union with strong support of the European Union's military capability development. In support of Sweden's national security policy, the Swedish Armed Forces have begun a transformation into a professional expeditionary force with increased usability, interoperability, sustainability, and ability to conduct international operations. This paper evaluates Sweden's ability to assume Framework Nation responsibility for a European Union Battlegroup in support of the European Union's foreign policy and Sweden's national security strategy. The paper initially analyzes the national security implications of Sweden's European Union membership and Swedish motives for participation in global operations. This is followed by an analysis of the Swedish Armed Forces' capability to provide high readiness force packages for global operations. Finally the political support, and to some extent also public support, for Sweden's provision and deployment of high readiness force packages are examined.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS ESDP, CSDP, Transformation, EU Battlegroup, Nordic.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			UNLIMITED	46	

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SWEDEN-A GLOBAL MILITARY PLAYER?

by

Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Giner
Swedish Army

Colonel Alan L. Orr II
Project Adviser

Only a work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright. The author is not an employee of the United States Government. Consequently, this document may be protected by copyright.

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Giner
TITLE: Sweden-A Global Military Player?
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 21 March 2012 WORD COUNT: 8,444 PAGES: 46
KEY TERMS: ESDP, CSDP, Transformation, EU Battlegroup, Nordic.
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The post Cold War strategic landscape has allowed Sweden to openly declare its aspirations to be a strong regional military power and an active member of the European Union with strong support of the European Union's military capability development. In support of Sweden's national security policy, the Swedish Armed Forces have begun a transformation into a professional expeditionary force with increased usability, interoperability, sustainability, and ability to conduct international operations.

This paper evaluates Sweden's ability to assume Framework Nation responsibility for a European Union Battlegroup in support of the European Union's foreign policy and Sweden's national security strategy. The paper initially analyzes the national security implications of Sweden's European Union membership and Swedish motives for participation in global operations. This is followed by an analysis of the Swedish Armed Forces' capability to provide high readiness force packages for global operations. Finally the political support, and to some extent also public support, for Sweden's provision and deployment of high readiness force packages are examined.

SWEDEN-A GLOBAL MILITARY PLAYER?

The Swedish Armed Forces must be deployable [...] and contribute to a greater extent than hitherto to Sweden's security and stability in the world.

— Swedish Government (2009) ¹

Sweden, one of the oldest nation-states in Europe, takes a proactive role in the efforts to strengthen the European Union's capacity for military crisis management. One tangible example of this effort is, according to the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt, the commitment to lead the Nordic Battlegroup.² In January 2011, Sweden had a European Union Battlegroup (BG) ready to deploy within ten days of a European Union Council decision to start implementing its mission. This was the second time that Sweden, as Framework Nation, commanded what in Europe is known as a Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) on a six-month standby period for global operations. The Swedish Government indicated a willingness to assume Framework Nation responsibility in 2014 as well. Had that intent been implemented, Sweden would have institutionalized a responsibility for European Union global rapid deployment on a 3-year cycle.

Current Swedish policy emphasizes Swedish support to the European Union's ability to contribute to crisis management operations. Furthermore, as a member of the European Union (EU), Sweden has endorsed the principles of the European Union's foreign policy.

This paper evaluates Sweden's ability to assume Framework Nation responsibility for a European Battlegroup in support of the European Union's foreign policy and Sweden's national security strategy. The paper initially analyzes the national security implications of the European Union membership and Swedish motives for

participation in global operations. Thereafter follows an analysis of the Swedish Armed Forces' capability to provide high readiness force packages for global operations. Finally, the political support, and to some extent also public support, for Sweden's provision and deployment of high readiness force packages are examined.

An important driver for Swedish national security is its geostrategic position because geography presents opportunities for politicians and policymakers. The degree of exploitation of these opportunities depends on the national strategy. The geographical opportunities and the use of these can be seen in terms of power. Colin S. Gray states that, "[P]ower is local."³ Sweden's geographical expanse has varied over the centuries. During the medieval era, Swedish territory only covered what is today the central and southern part of Sweden. In the 1600s Sweden was, after Russia, Europe's second largest nation. Although situated in the northern part of Europe, Sweden has always maintained some form of relationship with Continental Europe. However, in 1630, when King Gustaf Adolphus decided to involve Sweden in the Thirty Years War to defend Protestantism against the Counter-Reformation, a more active era began during which Sweden's influence was extended well beyond its borders. This 200-year long era brought about direct Swedish involvement in European politics, and participation in many wars. The era ended in 1809 with the divide of Sweden into two parts and the loss of a third of its territory to Russia, the part that is today Finland. After this loss of territory, the union with Norway was established by the Treaty of Kiel, through the Swedish Campaign against Norway, and the alliance of Denmark and Norway, that supported France in the Napoleonic Wars. The Swedish-Norwegian union lasted until 1905. What then followed can be considered a partial Swedish withdrawal from

continental European high politics. This withdrawal lasted until Sweden became a member of the European Union in 1995.⁴

Rather than being an active player on the European stage during the Cold War, Sweden became a firm supporter of the United Nations (UN). Sweden has been a UN member since 1946, with a well-established record of support to peace support operations (PSOs). Since 1956, Sweden has deployed more than 100,000 soldiers to more than 120 PSOs in 60 different countries. The Swedish commitment to PSOs remains high and the current Swedish policy objective is to, over time, have 1,700 soldiers deployed in international operations. That number is foreseen to increase to 2,000 troops by the year 2014. Current capability enables Sweden to have certified and NATO interoperable troops deployed in four different international operations, not including units on European Union readiness. At least one of these operations can be a reinforced battalion sized, or equivalent, operation.⁵

In the fall of 2011, Swedish forces were engaged in three NATO-led operations: Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) in Libya, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The Swedish contribution to OUP was eight fighters and one C-130 air-to-air refueling tanker. The Swedish ISAF contribution remains Sweden's largest and most important international military commitment, where Sweden leads the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-Sharif.⁶ In 2011, the Swedish contribution to ISAF was in the range of 500 to 600 military personnel including reinforcement with two Swedish MEDEVAC helicopters. A possible future European Union Battlegroup contribution can be seen in light of the envisaged cutback of ISAF beginning in 2012. On 14 December 2011, the Parliament

decided to start the reduction in early 2012 to a level of 200 personnel by 2014.⁷

However, the most ambitious contribution to international operations since the current defense reform started might be the Swedish contribution to the European Union Naval Force's (EUNAVFOR's) counter piracy Operation ATALANTA off the coast of Somalia. In addition to contributing sea-going units, Sweden assumed responsibility for the leadership of ATALANTA's Force Headquarters from mid-April to mid-August 2010.⁸

The current Swedish national security policy, largely based on the multi-partisan Defense Commission's report *Defense in Use* submitted in June 2008, states that Sweden, through cooperation with others, can deal with threats and challenges before they reach Sweden's territory.⁹ Swedish national security is, according to current policy, strengthened through confidence building measures, joint crisis management operations and active, credible contributions to Nordic, European and global security. As the Atlantic Forum notes in its report *Nordic-Baltic Security in the 21st Century: The Regional Agenda and the Global Role*: "[T]he Nordic countries have real military capabilities. Sweden's Air Force, Finland's artillery, Norway's navy and Denmark's expeditionary capabilities are among the best in Europe. Combined, the four continental Nordic countries would be one of Europe's military heavyweights," thus emphasizing the benefits of Nordic defense cooperation.¹⁰

The Nordic defense cooperation was formalized in 2009 when the cooperation on various levels was brought into a single structure. The Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFECO) includes all Nordic countries aiming at: "[C]ooperation across the entire range of defense structures in order to achieve better cost-effectiveness and quality, and thereby creating enhanced operational capability."¹¹

European Union Membership and its implications for Sweden's National Security

The political debate over Swedish European Union membership started shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 when the Government declared that Sweden would apply for membership in October 1990. During the Cold War, European Union membership was seen as incompatible with the traditional Swedish nonalignment aimed at neutrality in the event of war. Sweden submitted an application for European Union membership in July 1991, and negotiations for accession started in February 1993. After only one year of negotiations, the Council agreed to accept Sweden as a member in March 1994, and an agreement between Sweden and the European Union was signed in June 1994. In addition, Sweden joined the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework in 1994. The following year Sweden, together with Finland and Austria joined the European Union. All three nations being non-NATO members resulted in the European Union, with these three new members and Ireland, having four non-NATO members as members of the Union at that time.¹²

European Union membership has tremendous impact on Swedish national security and policy formulation. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, stated in his *Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs*, 16 February 2011 that: "Sweden must be at the heart of European cooperation. European foreign policy is our foreign policy. At a time when other Member States are facing major problems at home, our country has the strength to take on further responsibility to advance European positions."¹³ The Swedish Minister of Defense, Sten Tolgfors, reiterated this narrative in an Op-Ed contribution in January 2012 where he described most European nations as free riders and not contributing to European defense, whereas Sweden, Poland, Estonia and Norway were the only European

nations increasing or keeping their defense spending at current levels. He also mentioned OUP in Libya as an example of an operation, on the borders of the European Union, where only five European NATO nations, and Sweden, made substantial contributions. According to Tolgfors, OUP proved that, although Sweden is not a NATO member but a partner nation, Swedish forces are more capable and interoperable than many NATO members'. He further argued that the U.S. considers Sweden, Australia and New Zealand as net contributors to common security through the participation in operations and the commitment to defense reforms.¹⁴ Carl Bildt declared in February 2012 that: "Sweden's security is built in solidarity with others. Threats to peace and security are deterred collectively and in cooperation with other countries and organizations. Membership of the European Union means that Sweden is part of a political alliance and takes its share of responsibility, in the spirit of solidarity, for Europe's security."¹⁵

Under the current European Union Treaty (the 2009 *Lisbon Treaty*), European Union Member States are expected to assume mutual responsibility for Europe's security by enhancing the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).¹⁶ The European Union should be able to execute: "[J]oint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories."¹⁷

The Swedish Parliament ratified the *Treaty of Lisbon* on 20 November 2008, including Article 42.7 on mutual defense of the *Treaty on European Union*, and the solidarity clause (Article 222) in the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union*. Article 42.7, also known as the “mutual defense clause” deals with cooperation in the event of armed aggression. Article 42.7 states that: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States.”¹⁸ The solidarity clause states that: “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States.”¹⁹ As a member of the European Union, Sweden also endorses the principles of the European Union’s foreign policy. This policy is in turn based on the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) that not only articulates the global role that the European Union seeks to play, but also postulates an ambition for Member States to share the responsibility for global security.²⁰

Article 42.7 and Article 222, together with Sweden’s national solidarity declaration from 2009, are fundamental for Swedish national security policy in a Europe characterized by mutual dependence. Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region can serve as an example of its application. According to this policy document, the national security policy position is based on “security in cooperation.” Hence, security policies of the

Nordic countries and the European Union Member States will strongly influence Sweden's national security policy. The Arctic strategy states: "The recently adopted Nordic Declaration of Solidarity, reinforcing and enhancing the solidarity declaration adopted in 2009, has led to Sweden's security policy becoming even more closely interwoven with the political priorities of the other Nordic countries. Sweden's unilateral declaration of solidarity and a stronger Nordic declaration of solidarity may hence involve new areas of responsibility and higher expectations for action as far as Sweden is concerned."²¹ In addition to the Swedish declaration of solidarity, the Finnish Parliament passed a bill with a similar objective in 2009. Furthermore, a common Nordic Declaration of Solidarity was presented at the Nordic Foreign Ministers' meeting in 2011.²² Foreign Minister Carl Bildt reiterated the Swedish commitment in February 2011 stating: "Membership of the European Union means that Sweden is part of a political alliance and takes its share of responsibility, in the spirit of solidarity, for Europe's security. Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We expect these countries to act in the same way if Sweden is similarly affected."²³ For Sweden and Finland, the mutually declared military assistance is important since neither of the two nations is a member of NATO and thus not covered by NATO's Article 5 of the *Washington Treaty*. On the other hand, the NATO members Norway and Denmark are, and are thus included by the Swedish defense guarantee.²⁴ It should, however, be noted that Denmark, although a European Union member, does not participate in the European Union's military cooperation.²⁵

A 2011 report from the European Parliament exemplifies how Sweden's aspiration within European defense cooperation is regarded from a European

perspective. The report, *The Impact of the financial crisis on European Defense*, categorizes the Member States into three categories according to their attitude to European Union defense cooperation: Activists, Undecided, and Specialists. Sweden together with France, Germany, Poland and the Netherlands were labeled as actively looking for cooperation options or leading efforts within the Activist group.²⁶ The report also recognizes the Swedish-German “Ghent Initiative” which aims at intensifying military cooperation in Europe. The goal of the Ghent Initiative is to: “[P]reserve and enhance national operational capabilities – with improved effect, sustainability, interoperability and cost efficiency as a result. It could even make possible a broadening of military capabilities.”²⁷

As shown above, the strategic environment has significantly changed from a Swedish perspective. Not only is the Cold War era over during which Sweden’s official policy was based on nonalignment aimed at neutrality in the event of war. More importantly, Sweden joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, became a member of the European Union in 1995, and has since 2009 been committed to the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity. Under the *Lisbon Treaty*, the European Union is from a Swedish perspective a political alliance wherein Member States take responsibility for themselves, and provide aid and assistance to each other. For Sweden, it is important to demonstrate that Sweden is a committed partner and a member taking responsibility not only for the development of capabilities, but also through participation in operations. While these commitments enhance Sweden’s own national security, they also increase Swedish influence on European foreign policy formulation and execution.

European Union Battlegroups

Rapid Response was identified as an important aspect of the European Union's military capability at the 1999 Helsinki European Council. The so-called *Helsinki Headline Goal 2003* subsequently assigned to Member States the objective of being able to provide rapid response elements available and deployable at very high levels of readiness, i.e., to be deployed within ten days.²⁸ The European Union Battlegroup is a specific form of Rapid Response Element that only represents one possible European Union-led military response to an emerging situation. It has a separate procedure and mechanism, compared to other units declared available. Full operational capability to deploy two European Union Battlegroups was achieved on 1 January 2007. Battlegroup offers are made at a Battlegroup Coordination Conference that is organized twice a year.²⁹

According to the *European Union Battle Group Concept*, a Battlegroup is considered to be the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, and coherent force package capable of autonomous rapid response operations, either for stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of a larger operation. A Battlegroup is based on a battalion sized combined arms force that is reinforced with Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) assets. A Battlegroup can either be formed by a Framework Nation that has volunteered to take the lead, and the Council has agreed, or by a multinational coalition of Member States. In addition, a Battlegroup should, through the contributing Member States, be associated with a Force Headquarters ((F)HQ) and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as logistics and strategic lift, and other air and naval enablers. The Battlegroup should be able to start executing its mission no later than ten days after a Council Decision to launch an

operation. The Battlegroup needs to be sustainable until the mission is terminated or until it is relieved by other forces. Thus, planning should be based on the assumption that the Battlegroup is sustainable for 30 days of initial operations, and if re-supplied, up to 120 days.³⁰

The training and preparation needed to meet the defined and agreed requirements, including HQs and enablers, are a Member State's responsibility. Furthermore, certification is required to guarantee that the defined standards are met. For Swedish units, and units under Swedish command, it is essential that the qualitative requirements are met, due to the fact that Sweden and some other Member States introduced the qualitative aspect in the capability development process, and also the requirement for Member States to certify their contributions. Sweden used the NATO force evaluation tools as laid out in the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) Evaluation and Feedback (E & F) Programme [sic.] to ensure that all requirements were met for NBG 08 and NBG 11. The use of this well-established program has been successful. It has not only increased the level of interoperability, but also allowed full transparency.³¹

The European Union Battlegroups are not only central for the capability development for the individual Member States' and their transformation efforts, they are also important at the European level. The European Union Battlegroups are considered to be the best developed mechanisms for regular and intense military pooling and sharing at the European Union level. This assessment was determined by the European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, that is responsible for organizing the work of the Parliament's committees and interparliamentary delegations

in the field of external policies.³² This 2011 European Parliament report also notes the Battlegroups' value as test beds for new military solutions within the commonly agreed political framework.³³

Swedish Defense Reformation and Rationale for Participation in Global Operations

The Armed Forces are undergoing an extremely radical transition from defense against invasion to an operational defense force. This places particular demands on governance. [...] The Commission's opinion is that it is possible to formulate monitorable [sic.] demands on operative capability (defense effect).³⁴

In the 2008 Defense Bill, the Swedish Government stated that: "[It is] the Government's ambition to substantially increase the effect of and ability to participate in Peace Support Operations. This is not least reflected by the NBG 08 commitment."³⁵

The first steps toward the transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces started as early as 1999. Until 2004, a Network Based Defense was discussed and evaluated.³⁶

However, in 2004 the Swedish Parliament decided to thoroughly transform the Swedish Armed Forces in order to align them with the post Cold War security environment. After all, the threat from the Soviet Union was gone and Sweden had been a member of the European Union since 1995.³⁷

The 2004 decision to transform the Armed Forces eventually led to the replacement of conscription, a system in place since 1901, with an all volunteer force comprised of standing units, as well as units manned by voluntary reservists.³⁸ The political objective from 2007 clearly expressed that: "The Armed Forces' flexibility and functionality must increase. Swedish units and capabilities need to be more available and flexible in terms of operations, tasks and coalition partners regardless of whether it is in Sweden, in Europe or globally."³⁹

The system of conscription was formally abolished in May 2010. However, the law on conscription is retained for use in case of a national emergency.⁴⁰ The previous system with a dual force structure was replaced with a structure with one single set of forces, able to execute both national and international tasks. Within this new structure there are both standing units, and units with part-time contracts. Most of the Air and Naval Forces are, or will be, standing units with very high readiness, while the majority of the Army units will be part-time, although there are or will be standing Army units as well. The Army will be organized into two brigades based on battalion sized Battlegroups. The political goal is for the Armed Forces to deliver operational effect "here and now", and thus provide return on investment. This means that all units will be fully trained and equipped in accordance with their respective state of readiness level.⁴¹

From a Swedish perspective, the European Union has developed into an important global actor, both politically and economically. It has gained increased strength in the fields of security and defense. For Sweden, the European Union is the most important platform within the international arena. Thus it is important for Sweden to play an active role in the development of the European Union's military capability. Sweden's commitment and ability to participate in European Union-led operations is demonstrated by the fact that Sweden has participated in all European Union operations, both civilian and military.⁴² The implications of European Union membership for the Armed Forces were identified early, including a requirement to maintain, and further develop the capability to provide rapidly deployable forces for combat and peace support operations. In the Swedish Armed Forces Annual Report in 2004, the Supreme Commander identified that European Union membership would most likely lead to

politically binding commitments with consequences for the Armed Forces, therefore membership was an important driver for Defense Planning.⁴³ The report also noted that European Union membership, in conjunction with the European Union's enlargement, was the single most important event in the framing of Sweden's strategic environment.⁴⁴

From the Swedish Armed Forces' perspective the role of being a military capability gap filler has been an important driver. The aim, from this perspective, is to provide highly trained and interoperable units within capabilities where there is a common shortfall.⁴⁵ The consequence of this approach is that Swedish units are in demand, and furthermore that where and when they are deployed, they play an important role in the accomplishment of the mission.

In the Defense Reform Bill presented by the Government to Parliament in March 2009, the Government gave its views on world affairs, and on Swedish security and defense policy. In June 2009, the Parliament passed the bill with the largest opposition party (the Social Democrats) supporting the chapter on security policy, hence all major parties in Parliament support it. According to this new policy, the security environment and the threats Sweden face are much more multifaceted than during the Cold War. A broad spectrum of threats must be countered by policies and by armed forces with greater flexibility than the old anti-invasion defense had. While a direct armed attack on Sweden seems unlikely for the foreseeable future, Sweden cannot rule out crises or events involving the use of military force in and around the Nordic region. Unlike the Cold War posture, current policy states that national security now is built together with other nations, thus adding a regional perspective.⁴⁶ Furthermore, there is broad consensus in the Parliament that Sweden must be prepared to act when a crisis occurs

outside of Swedish territory, or if an attack occurs on another European Union member or a Nordic state, even if that attack is not directly aimed at Sweden.⁴⁷

The Nordic Battlegroup, with contributions from Sweden, Norway, Finland, Ireland and Estonia, plays an important role in the intensified defense cooperation with the Nordic countries. It should be noted that three of the troop contributing nations are non-NATO members, i.e., Sweden, Finland and the non-Nordic nation Ireland. Although non-Nordic, the NATO nation Estonia has strong ties with the Nordic nations and was also a part of the Swedish empire from 1561 to 1721. The inclusion of the non-European Union nation Norway is one indicator of the increased defense cooperation between Sweden and Norway. Swedish participation and framework nation responsibility have accelerated transformation of Swedish Armed Forces, which the Government acknowledged early on in the process: "The effort emanating from the NBG, in preparation for the standby period between 1 January and 30 June 2008, has served as a strong force in the transformation from a defense against invasion, towards a deployed expeditionary force."⁴⁸

According to the Government, the Swedish participation in international operations augments the Armed Forces' ability to operate both nationally and internationally. This can also be seen in light of a shrinking force structure which impacts training opportunities and capability development. The ability to fight is of utmost importance, and this ability is maintained and developed through participation in national and international operations and training. Apart from augmenting the ability to fight, the Framework Nation responsibility also accelerates capability development where it plays an important role in the transformation towards an adaptation to future

requirements, including command and control capability and enablers such as logistic support.⁴⁹

Participation in rapid deployment operations, and operations on the higher end of the conflict scale, are also important to the Swedish defense industry. The value of Swedish arms sales was 13.7 billion SKR (approximately 2 billion USD) in 2010.⁵⁰ It is a national security interest to participate in international operations and through these to promote technical interoperability for Sweden.⁵¹ Prior to the announcement of Swedish fighters participating in the NATO operation OUP in Libya, *Bloomberg Businessweek* commented on the fighter jet market saying: “Eurofighter competes with jets including Dassault Aviation SA’s Rafale, also patrolling over Libya after flying missions in Afghanistan since 2002, and the yet-to-be-battle-tested Saab AB Gripen. That jet is made in Sweden, where the Government said yesterday it might join the conflict.”⁵² The paper also quoted Francis Tusa, London-based editor of the *Defense Analysis* newsletter stating: “It never hurts to have the ‘as used in combat’ stamp. It can only do you good.”⁵³ However, the Swedish Air Force has participated in several international exercises in recent years, the most important being the U.S. led Red Flag exercises, in which it has participated in since 2006.⁵⁴ In these exercises, the Gripen system has shown its capability as multi-role fighter, with full capability to operate in the three roles: air-to-air, air-to-ground and reconnaissance.⁵⁵ Until the involvement in OUP, the system lacked the sought after “used in combat stamp”. Participation in OUP with roughly 2,000 flight hours, 650 combat missions and more than 150,000 reconnaissance pictures taken was successful, according to a press release issued by the manufacturer SAAB, on 26 October 2011.⁵⁶ One month after the completion of OUP, the Swiss Government

announced that Switzerland will procure 22 Gripen fighters in an estimated € 2.5 billion deal.⁵⁷

There is clear political will to transform the Swedish Armed Forces in order to achieve increased flexibility and functionality and to have a single set of forces available “here and now” for both international and national operations. The justification for active Swedish participation in international operations range from promotion of arms sales, to the achievement of the objective to play an important and active role in the development of the European Union’s military capability. However, the importance of participation in international operations for the augmentation of the Armed Forces’ ability to fight should not be underestimated since it is through these operations that the ability is sustained. Early on in the transformation process, the Supreme Commander’s perception was that the European Union membership would be a driver for the transformation of the forces, and in the framing of Sweden’s strategic environment. In this context, the Nordic Battlegroup plays an important role in intensifying Nordic defense cooperation, and as a strong force in the transformation process itself.

The Swedish Armed Forces’ Capability to Provide High Readiness Force Packages

The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.⁵⁸

The ongoing transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces, with emphasis on rapid deployment and development capabilities seeks, to deliver the politically decided effects the new defense policy requires. Standing up NBG 08, which was the main effort for the Armed Forces in FY07, has not only accelerated the transformation, but also

served as the engine in the transformation process itself. The overall result was a highly trained, rapidly deployable unit with modern equipment and considerable firepower for global operations.⁵⁹ Several significant shortfalls were identified within the Swedish defense capabilities, and included: inter-theater lift support, intra-theater lift support, expeditionary land systems, command and control systems, interoperable enablers, the sustainment of the forces, and a certification process that supported the transformation process and enhanced NATO interoperability.

Strategic lift was an area given special attention early on in the transformation process. Strategic lift was already a prioritized capability prior to NBG 08, where it was identified as a critical area for improvement. The Government stated in the 2008 Defense Bill that: "Sweden today lacks national strategic airlift capability. The development of the European Union's Rapid Response Capability emphasizes the requirement for assured access to Strategic Lift."⁶⁰ Strategic lift is considered to be a critical capability shortfall for most European nations. European Union Heads of State, at an informal meeting in 2005, identified it as a key capability gap.⁶¹ Nevertheless, since Sweden had taken on the Battlegroup Framework Nation responsibility, it was a Swedish interest and responsibility to obtain assured access to strategic lift assets.⁶² Sweden hence started negotiations for participation in the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initiative to acquire, manage, support and operate three Boeing C-17 Globemaster III strategic transport aircraft.⁶³ The decision to participate for a 30-year period, and with assured access to 550 flight hours per year, was taken by the Parliament in May 2008.⁶⁴ It is interesting to note that Sweden (after the U.S.) is the second largest stakeholder in SAC.⁶⁵ However, the first C-17 was not operational until

July 2009. Therefore, and to further develop the strategic airlift capability, Sweden joined the multinational Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) consortium, which charters six Antonov An-124-100 transport aircraft, in March 2006.⁶⁶ Consequently, Sweden had already assured strategic airlift capability for NBG 08. In addition, Sweden participates in and contributes with staff to the NATO Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) that coordinates strategic military transport by air, sea or on land.⁶⁷

It is not only in the area of strategic mobility that Sweden has made advances. To increase the capability to tactically deploy and support forces, Sweden has also invested in new helicopter systems. This is an area where European nations currently have insufficient assets in order to ensure intra-theater lift.⁶⁸ The Swedish helicopter fleet is currently being replaced and ten Super Pumas (AS 332) entered service in 1995. In addition, there were 20 Augusta A109 Light Utility Helicopters procured through 2006, and 15 UH-60 Black Hawks have been acquired and will enter service in 2013, followed by 18 medium sized NH-90 helicopters in 2018.⁶⁹ It is noteworthy that the UH-60s would have been available for the proposed NBG 14 contribution.

The ongoing transformation has also affected the force structure itself. The land forces, Active and Reserve, have been reorganized into two Brigade Combat Teams with a total of eight modular capabilities-based maneuver battalions, plus CS and CSS battalions. In addition, the Army National Guard (ARNG) is reorganized and modernized into 40 ARNG battalions. Recent and planned acquisitions for the Army seek to improve the land force's ability to rapidly deploy globally. This includes 200 C-130 transportable Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs) of the BAE Systems RG32M, which is a 4x4 Light Armored Vehicle with a crew of five to seven, and a basic combat weight of about 7,300

kilos. In its Swedish configuration, they are mine hardened patrol vehicles (MHPV).⁷⁰ They will be fitted with the W&E Platt protected weapons stations and thus receive increased protection from STANAG 4569 Level I to Level III, and allow the vehicle to be fitted with a variety of weapon systems.⁷¹ An older version of the RG32 is already in use, and was used by NBG 08 and 11 for units requiring a light and thus rapidly deployable vehicle. Sweden additionally ordered 113 new C-130 transportable armored 8-wheeled vehicles, also designated as Armored Modular Vehicles (AMW), from Patria, with an option to procure an additional 113 vehicles. The Patria is a modern armored eight-wheeled vehicle with a high standard of protection, mobility, and accessibility. Sweden already has more than 150 older version Patrias, the 6-wheeled Patria XA180 and XA203, in various variants in operational use.⁷² Delivery of the new Patria was initially planned for 2012, but due to legal disputes regarding the procurement process, the delivery has been delayed to 2014.

As for the naval forces, they have not been as thoroughly transformed as the land forces. However, the Swedish Navy has successfully participated in recent blue water operations in the Mediterranean and in the Horn of Africa, thus confirming the ability to participate in international blue water operations. Future procurement will support the Navy's international role, although national defense, i.e. homeland defense will remain the priority for the Navy.⁷³ The Marine battalion will be reorganized and in addition to its capability for littoral amphibious operations, it will be reinforced with armored vehicles for land operations, enabling it to conduct maneuver battalion type operations on land.⁷⁴

Like the land forces, the Swedish Air Force is increasing its ability to participate in international operations. The Air Force's four divisions of Saab JAS39C/D Gripen fighters are being successively equipped with a stand-alone MIDS Link 16 tactical data link, also known as TADIL-J in the U.S., to allow participation in coalition operations. However, the JAS39 system is anticipated to retain its Swedish national data link as the primary communications system for national defense operations. The Link 16 implementation was driven by the NBG 08 Framework Nation responsibility through a CHOD decision in 2004.⁷⁵ The Swedish Air Force is furthermore enhancing the system's long-range standoff capability.⁷⁶ As previously mentioned, the Swedish Air Force participated in OUP. In terms of rapid response, it is interesting to note that the first fighter landed in Sicily within 23 hours of the political decision to deploy.⁷⁷

Swedish forces made available for international operation are certified. As mentioned earlier, all Swedish European Battlegroup contributions are certified through NATO's OCC program.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Sweden uses NATO's OCC Evaluation & Feedback Programme [sic.] for all international standby forces. The program not only facilitates the certification itself and allows for transparency, it also enhances the level of interoperability with NATO.⁷⁹ In this regard, the NBG Framework Nation responsibility accelerated the implementation of NATO procedures for certifying standby units, as well as other combat units.⁸⁰

Regarding the Swedish European Union Battlegroup contributions, Sweden officially reported to the European Union Military Committee on 8 December 2010 that NBG 11 had met all requirements and that the unit would enter its standby phase without any limitations, ready to assume all tasks according to the Battle Group

Concept.⁸¹ NBG 08 also met its operational requirements, although budget constraints for FY07 impacted the training and standing up of the unit. However, these minor limitations were mitigated during the standby phase and did not impact the unit's ability from an operational standpoint.⁸²

The Swedish Armed Forces' capability to provide high readiness force packages has been increased through the procurement of systems that are well suited for global expeditionary warfare. Not only do the systems have a high level of protection and firepower, they are in many cases also air transportable. The enabling forces' ability to support and contribute to coalition operations has also been enhanced. Furthermore, the force structure has been modified to better support the new requirements and a certification process has been implemented that ensures that all requirements, including NATO interoperability, are met.

Political Support for the Provision and Deployment of High Readiness Force Packages

Sweden has since 2006, and therefore during the period of contributing European Union Battlegroups, been governed by a coalition of center-right parties led by the Swedish Moderate Party. Between 1994 and 2006, the Social Democratic Party was the ruling party. However, the Green Party and the Left Party, representing about 15 percent of the members of Parliament, have questioned the Swedish contribution. More importantly, the Social Democratic Party, the largest opposition party, opposed the Swedish Framework Nation responsibility for 2011. If the center-right coalition had lost its majority in the parliamentary elections in September 2010, then the Swedish European Battlegroup Framework Nation responsibility beginning 1 January 2011 would have lacked majority political support.⁸³

Part of some of the political parties' opposition to European Battlegroup participation stems from the non-usage of the force. During the Swedish European Union Presidency⁸⁴ in 2009, the usability of the European Union Battlegroups was a prioritized policy issue by the Government. The Swedish Presidency therefore organized different workshops in order to facilitate a political discussion on a more flexible view on their use.⁸⁵ The intent was further developed in the Work-program for the Swedish Presidency of the European Union:

Development of the EU's crisis management capability is an important part of the objective of strengthening the EU as a global actor. The aim is to improve the EU's capacity to take action in crisis situations and thereby contribute more effectively to international peace and security. The Presidency will work to strengthen the usability of the EU's civilian and military crisis management capabilities, for continued capability development and for more effective coordination between EU crisis management instruments.⁸⁶

A Presidency-led workshop on 24 July 2009 concluded that the use of the Battlegroups was: "[N]either only a question of availability, nor only a matter of political will."⁸⁷ However, and more importantly, it was noted that the fundamental issue is to have Battlegroups that are deployable and sustainable. The importance of the Battlegroups as a tool for transformation was also emphasized.⁸⁸

The Battlegroups were also discussed at the informal meeting of European Union Defense Ministers hosted by the Swedish Presidency. Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, noted that Member States devote a great deal of effort to provide Battlegroups and that Europe must make full use of their potential. At the same time, he firmly expressed that: "Any Battlegroup deployment must meet the operational needs of the moment."⁸⁹

The Swedish Framework Nation responsibility for 2014 eventually became officially questioned, and the Social Democratic Party and the Green Party declared in the Parliament during December 2011 that such a responsibility was not foreseen before 2015. The decision to not declare Swedish willingness to assume a Framework Nation responsibility prior to 2015 was also supported by the Parliament's multi-partisan Committee on Defense.⁹⁰ The Swedish Parliament later followed the Committee on Defense's proposal and decided on 15 December 2011 that Sweden would not assume a European Union Battlegroup Framework Responsibility prior to 2015.⁹¹ The Parliament furthermore directed the Government to initiate a review of the European Union's Battlegroups.⁹²

The basis of the Green Party's opposition to a Battlegroup Framework Nation responsibility does not stem from opposition to Swedish forces being deployed in general, but rather that, according to them, forces are being put on high readiness although a European Union Battlegroup deployment is unlikely. However, the Green Party does not oppose a more limited contribution in 2014. Moreover, the Green Party supports the goal to have 2,000 troops deployed and even proposed an increase. The Social Democratic Party supports the current level of deployed troops, although they favor increased involvement in UN operations. The Left Party is in total opposition to further Swedish Battlegroup participation due to costs and an anticipated lack of a UN mandate for European Union Battlegroup operations.⁹³

However, the current Government firmly supports Sweden's contribution to the European Union's military capability, including assuming responsibility for Battlegroups. Carl Bildt, Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed this position in his *Statement of*

Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs in February 2012

stating: “Sweden continues its commitment within the European Union’s battlegroups. We are working for these battlegroups to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations when necessary, including in the event of major disasters. The European Union’s ability to assist with crisis management, state-building and humanitarian support in vulnerable countries contributes to a strong and unified Europe. Sweden takes its responsibility for an active European role in such operations.”⁹⁴

Sweden’s active support of the European Union’s military capability development should also be seen in light of the country’s domestic NATO debate. The Green Party and the Left Party not only officially oppose Swedish application for NATO membership, along with the Social Democratic Party, they also firmly oppose Swedish participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF). Interestingly, the Social Democratic Party recognizes NATO as a vital actor for European security and international crisis management, and supports Swedish participation in UN mandated NATO operations.⁹⁵

Questioning of the European Union Battlegroup commitment has not only been voiced by the Parliament, but also by the Swedish National Audit Office (NAO).⁹⁶ The NAO’s report on NBG 08 criticized the way the Swedish contribution increased in order to meet the requirement. From the initial level of 1,100 soldiers, Sweden subsequently placed 2,350 soldiers on high readiness. Furthermore, the operational requirements were agreed to only one year before the training started. That, in turn, led to incomplete tasks issued to units and delays in the allocation of mission essential equipment. This would not have been an issue if the task had been given to an existing unit, but the Swedish contribution was task-organized for the mission, which in turn made

coordination a challenge. Cost control and the relationship between costs and tasks added to the confusion, according to NAO. Nevertheless, as the NAO concludes, from the beginning of its 6-month standby phase the NBG 08 was certified, equipped and organized without any reservations, other than tactical AIRMEDEVAC.⁹⁷ NAO also audited the NBG 11 contribution, and a report is expected to be delivered in May 2012.⁹⁸

Public Support for International Operations

*Transatlantic Trends*⁹⁹ notes in their survey *Transatlantic Trends 2011* that compared to Americans and other Europeans, Swedes are the most likely to approve of their Government's handling of foreign policy issues, with 74% of respondents showing approval. Furthermore, Swedes were more supportive of maintaining troops in Afghanistan compared to other Europeans. They are also more willing to promote democracy even if it would lead to periods of instability, with an 83% support rating. In this survey, Swedes were also the most supportive of military intervention in Libya with 69% supporting, compared to a 59% support in the U.S. and a 53% support in the U.K. It should also be noted that Swedes, according to this survey, are evenly split on the importance of close cooperation with NATO.¹⁰⁰ This is of importance for Swedish national strategy formulation.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) conducts a bi-annual survey on matters related to national security and defense. According to their survey, 56% of the Swedish population is in support of international peace enforcement operations, even if these would result in the loss of life to Swedish troops. The majority, 53%, was of the opinion that European Union membership positively contributed to Swedish national security, and a majority of 59% supports the Swedish contribution to the European

Union's military rapid response capacity. However, not as many, 49%, are in support of Sweden assuming a Framework Nation responsibility although the majority, 65%, is in support of Sweden being a leading player in the European defense industry. It should be noted that 73% responded that the European Union contributes to the security in the Nordic-Baltic region, whereas 58% are of the opinion that NATO contributes.¹⁰¹

According to the preliminary results from the 2011 survey, only 28% of the population is in support of a Swedish NATO membership.¹⁰²

Although the current Swedish Government firmly supports an active Swedish role in the European Union's military capability development, including Sweden assuming European Union Battlegroup Framework Nation responsibility, it was not possible to obtain majority political support for NBG 14. The non-usage of the European Union's Battlegroups clearly contributed to this. However, it should be noted that Swedes, unlike many other Europeans, are willing to deploy forces and prepared to risk the loss of troops, for the achievement of political goals. This may be related to the relatively high approval ratings of the Government's handling of foreign policy issues.

Conclusion

Since Sweden's entry into the European Union in 1995, Sweden has made a doctrinal change from the Cold War national security policy of "Non-alignment in peace, aiming for neutrality in case of war", to become an active member of the European Union's defense structure. European Union membership has immense implications for Swedish national security and its formulation. This is manifested through official documents and statements, as well as through actions. The post Cold War strategic landscape has also allowed Sweden to openly declare its aspirations as a strong

regional military power, and thus officially declare that an attack on its Nordic neighbours will be considered as an attack on Sweden.

The European Union membership means that Sweden is a member of a political union where the members have agreed to take their share of responsibility in order to achieve common goals and interests. For Sweden, it is clear that European Union membership has reinforced the mutual dependence which in turn calls for Member States to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity in the event of crisis. Sweden also formalized the responsibility to provide military assistance to other Nordic countries through a Declaration of Solidarity.

The rationale for Sweden's participation in global operations stems from the notion that threats and challenges should be met before they reach Swedish territory, and in cooperation with other nations. Swedish national security is furthermore strengthened through confidence building measures and participation in international operations with significant and credible contributions. Sweden's active role is justified by the fact that Sweden is one of Europe's wealthier nations and therefore has the ability to assume greater responsibility. However, active participation is also justified by a need to augment the Armed Forces' ability to fight, and in support of capability development. In addition, Sweden is a major arms producer and the use of Swedish products in real operations showcases the equipment and promotes arms sales.

In the last decade, the Swedish Armed Forces have undergone a transformation into a professional expeditionary force that matches Sweden's national security policy aspirations. The Swedish Armed Forces' transformation has not only led to the abolishment of the conscript system and a thorough reorganization, it has also led to

procurement of equipment suitable for global rapid deployment operations, thus enhancing force deployability. Furthermore, Sweden has invested in the build-up of assured access to strategic lift which is a recognized capability gap among European nations. The transformed force has increased usability, interoperability, sustainability, and ability to conduct international operations.

As one of the European Union's 27 members, Sweden has twice assumed Framework Nation responsibility for a European Union Battlegroup. Doing so six months out of 36 confirms Sweden's role as a leading contributor to the European Union's rapid response capabilities. This creates stature for Sweden, and a high level of insight into, as well as influence on, the European Union's military capability development. Through providing NATO-certified combat units for global rapid deployment, Sweden demonstrates its capability and commitment to support the European Union's foreign policy and the development of the Union's military capability. Enablers such as strategic lift, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft support the Swedish contributions. Certification and NATO interoperability are guaranteed through the use of NATO's force evaluation tools, which also ensure transparency.

The NBG Framework Nation responsibility should not only be seen as an indicator of Sweden's strong support of European foreign and defense policy, but also in light of Sweden's regional ambitions and efforts to intensify cooperation with the Nordic countries. Partnering with neighboring nations has strengthened the ability to promote national and common regional interests, and enhanced efficiency and teamwork between defense authorities in the Nordic and Baltic region. The Nordic defense cooperation and the declarations of mutual support in the event of an attack are clear

indications of its application. The NBG buildup, training and standby period has undoubtedly facilitated the creation of formal and informal networks between individuals, units and nations which in turn not only foster a common defense identity, but also promote national security objectives. It is likely that Nordic and Baltic cooperation also promotes sales of Swedish defense materiel and know-how through the use of Swedish equipment by Swedish units, and to some extent by other participating nations.

The Battlegroup undertaking has undoubtedly served as an engine for the Swedish Armed Forces' transformation process. Furthermore, through actions and official statements, Sweden has shown that the Battlegroups are considered as unique and effective instruments for rapid reaction operations. However, no European Union Battle Group has been deployed to date. The issue of non-usage was one of the military-related areas addressed by Sweden during the Swedish Presidency of the European Union in 2009. The non-usage was also an essential motive for the Swedish decision to step down from a Framework Nation responsibility in 2014. Nonetheless, the Swedish air component assigned as an enabler to the NBG 11 was deployed to NATO's operation in Libya.

Sweden's high level of ambition within the realm of European Union military cooperation can also be seen in light of domestic opposition to NATO membership. A Swedish NATO membership currently lacks public and political support. At the same time, Sweden is a force contributor to NATO operations with public national support.

For participation in international operations, two things are required: available forces with the right capabilities required, and the national political will to participate. Deployed Swedish forces have that support, and the Swedish population is willing to

accept even higher levels of risk than other Europeans are. But despite the current center-right coalition Government firmly promoting Sweden assuming an active role in European security and defense, the political support for Sweden assuming Framework Nation responsibility for a European Union Battlegroup in 2014 proved to be insufficient.

Endnotes

¹ Swedish Government, "A functional defense, English summary of the Bill 2008/09:140," Stockholm, March 19, 2009, <http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/13/77/05/1705333d.pdf> (accessed November 6, 2011). The full quote reads, "The Government's defense policy orientation [...] is aimed at enhancing Sweden's defense capability by increasing the usability and accessibility of the country's armed forces. The Swedish Armed Forces must be deployable here and now and contribute to a greater extent than hitherto to Sweden's security and stability in the world. Enhanced operational accessibility and flexibility will enable the armed forces to respond to crises and conflicts more rapidly and effectively, even where these arise at short notice."

² Carl Bildt, "Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, Wednesday, 16 February 2011," Stockholm, February 16, 2011, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/16/11/48/dc78c337.pdf> (accessed November 6, 2011).

³ Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, eds., *Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), 2.

⁴ Lee Miles, ed., *Sweden and the European Union* (Padstow, Cornwall: TJ International, 2000), xii.

⁵ Sten Tolgfors, Swedish Minister of Defense, "International solidarity from Hammarskjöld to Libya, presented to the United Nations Association (UNA) of Sweden," n.p., September 16, 2011, <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9497/a/175367> (accessed January 5, 2012); Swedish Ministry of Defense, "PFF:s planerings och översynsprocess – utvärdering 2011 – översättning av sammanfattning och slutsatser," [Memorandum, NATO's evaluation of Sweden 2011 within the NATO Planning and Review Process]. Stockholm, July 25, 2011, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/17/28/80/3f0e05c6.pdf> (accessed November 5, 2011).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Swedish Parliament, "Riksdagsskrivelse 2011/12:81," [Parliament Decision 2011/12:81]. Stockholm, December 14, 2011, http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Kammaren/Riksdagsskrivelser/Riksdagsskrivelse_GZ0K81/ (accessed January 16, 2012).

⁸ Swedish Parliament Press Release, "Swedish naval force to participate in and lead counter-piracy operation off the Somali coast," Stockholm, February 18, 2010,

http://www.riksdagen.se/templates/R_PageExtended_21246.aspx (accessed January 16, 2012).

⁹ Swedish Defense Commission, "Försvar i användning Ds 2008:48," [Defense Commission's Report Defense in Use, Ds 2008:48]. Stockholm, June 13, 2008, <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/10715/a/107264> (accessed November 6, 2011). The Swedish Parliament's Committee on Defense (Defense Commission) prepares matters concerning military defense, civil defense, measures to reduce vulnerability in society, nuclear safety and radiation protection and the Coast Guard insofar as these matters do not fall to any other committee to prepare. The Committee on Defense prepares appropriations falling within expenditure area 6 - Defense and contingency measures, <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Utskott-EU-namnd/Forsvarsutskottet/Beslut-i-korthet/> (accessed February 28, 2012).

¹⁰ Frances G Burwell, et. al., *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2006), 3, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=16218> (accessed October 6, 2011).

¹¹ NORDEFECO Home Page, "NORDEFECO CHOD Guidance," <http://www.nordefco.org/sfiles/45/1/file/chod-guidance.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2011).

¹² Swedish Government Home Page, "Sveriges väg till EU-medlemskap," [Sweden's path towards a European Union membership]. <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2477> (accessed November 24, 2011). A national referendum on the European Union membership, with an 83% turnout, was held in November 1994. 52.3% voted in favor, 46.8% voted against and 0.9% registered blank votes. NATO currently has 28 member countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. The current 27 European Union member states are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. The current non-NATO, European Union members are: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden.

¹³ Carl Bildt, "Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, 2011."

¹⁴ Sten Tolgfors, "Europa måste bidra mer militärt," [Europe must contribute more militarily]. *Svenska Dagbladet Online*, January 15, 2012, http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/europa-maste-bidra-mer-militart_6770613.svd (accessed January 16, 2012).

¹⁵ Carl Bildt, "Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, Wednesday, 15 February 2012," Stockholm, February 15, 2012, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/18/62/82/05a7646d.pdf> (accessed February 17, 2012).

¹⁶ European Union, "Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Lisbon Treaty Article 21, 24 and 42," Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 53, March 30, 2010, <http://eur->

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL:EN:PDF (accessed October 10, 2011).

¹⁷ Ibid., Lisbon Treaty Article 43; For background see, Gerrard Quille, European Union Parliament background paper, “Common Security and Defense Policy,” Brussels, May n.d., 2011, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en//FTU_6.1.3.pdf (accessed October 10, 2011).

¹⁸ Ibid., Lisbon Treaty Article 42 and Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union Article 222.

¹⁹ Ibid., Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union Article 222.

²⁰ European Union, “A secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy,” Brussels, December 12, 2003, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (accessed November 6, 2011). According to the current level of ambition from 2008, the European Union should be able to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days for a major operation. Furthermore the European Union should have the ability to simultaneously conduct two major stabilization and reconstruction operations involving up to 10,000 troops plus a civilian contingent for at least two years; two rapid-response operations using European Union Battlegroups; an evacuation operation lasting up to 10 days; a civil–military humanitarian assistance operation and around one dozen civilian missions, including one major operation involving up to 3,000 personnel that could last several years. In addition the European Union should be capable of conducting a maritime or air surveillance/ interdiction operation. Council of the European Union, “Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities,” Brussels, December 11, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf (accessed November 6, 2011).

²¹ Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” Stockholm n.d., 2011, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/17/92/18/b52d6892.pdf> (accessed December 10, 2011).

²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Finland Home Page, “The Nordic declaration on Solidarity,” April 5, 2011, <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=217312> (accessed November 6, 2011).

²³ Carl Bildt, “Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, 2011.”

²⁴ For background on Nordic collaboration, see Carl Bildt, “Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, Wednesday, 15 February 2012,” ; Sten Tolgfors, “Speech by the Minister for Defense at Almedalen on the Baltic Sea Co-operation,” Visby, July 03, 2009. <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/12091/a/129883> (accessed February 17, 2012).

²⁵ For background see, Danish Ministry of Defense Home Page, “EU - The Danish Defence Opt-Out,” <http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/TheDanishDefenceOpt-Out.aspx> (accessed February 19, 2012); European Union, “Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Protocol (No 22) on the position of Denmark.”

²⁶ European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, "The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defense," Brussels, April n.d., 2011, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201106/20110623ATT22406/20110623ATT22406EN.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2011).

²⁷ German and Swedish Ministries of Defense, "Food for Thought: Pooling and sharing, German-Swedish initiative, European Imperative Intensifying Military Cooperation in Europe 'Ghent Initiative'," Berlin and Stockholm, November n.d., 2010, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511deseinitiativ/sede260511deseinitiativ_en.pdf (accessed November 15, 2011).

²⁸ European Union, "Factsheet EU Battlegroups," Brussels, February n.d., 2005, 1, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Battlegroups.pdf> (accessed November 6, 2011).

²⁹ European Union External Action, "Common Security and Defense Policy: Development of European Military Capabilities, Military Capabilities/8," Brussels, January n.d., 2011, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1222506/110106%20updated%20factsheet%20capacities%20militaires%20-%20version%208_en.pdf (accessed November 10, 2011).

³⁰ Council of the European Union, "EU Battlegroup Concept (partial declassification) 13618/06 EXT1, COSDP 775," Brussels, April 27, 2007, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st13/st13618-ex01.en06.pdf> (accessed November 6, 2011). See also, European Union, "European Union Headline Goal 2010, approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004, endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004," Brussels, June 18, 2004, <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf> (accessed December 11, 2011).

³¹ Swedish Ministry of Defense, "PFF:s planerings och översynsprocess – utvärdering 2011 – översättning av sammanfattning och slutsatser."

³² European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, "The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defense," 60.

³³ Ibid, 14.

³⁴ Swedish Government, The 2005 Commission on Managing and Financing the Defense, "Betänkande av Försvarsstyrningsutredningen, SOU 2005:92," [Memorandum SOU 2005:92]. Stockholm, November n.d., 2005, <http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/05/20/44/a80a7543.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2011).

³⁵ Swedish Government, "Förslag till statsbudget för 2008: Försvar samt beredskap mot sårbarhet, Prop 2007/08:1 Utgiftsområde 6," [Government's Defense Budget Bill FY08]. Stockholm, September 20, 2007, 15, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/08/81/69/e3abb9db.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2011).

³⁶ Swedish Government, "Förslag till statsbudget för 2003: Försvar samt beredskap mot sårbarhet, Prop 2002/03:1 Utgiftsområde 6," [Government's Defense Budget Bill FY03].

Stockholm, October 3, 2002, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c4/30/79/eba7e70c.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2011).

³⁷ Swedish Government, "Regeringens proposition (2004/05:5) Vårt framtida försvar– försvarspolitisk inriktning 2005–2007," [Government's Proposal for Defense 2005-2007]. Stockholm, September n.d., 2004, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/03/04/63/5968d238.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2011).

³⁸ Swedish Government, "Regeringens proposition (2004/05:5) Vårt framtida försvar– försvarspolitisk inriktning 2005–2007,"; Swedish Parliament, "Riksdagens beslut, Betänkande 2004/05:FÖU5 Sveriges försvarspolitik 2005-2007," [Parliament's Decision based on Government's proposal for Defense 2005-2007]. Stockholm, December 16, 2004, <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utskottens-dokument/Betankanden/Arenden/200405/FOU5/> (accessed October 10, 2011).

³⁹ Swedish Government, "Förslag till statsbudget för 2008: Försvar samt beredskap mot sårbarhet, Prop 2007/08:1 Utgiftsområde 6," 19.

⁴⁰ Swedish Government, "Regeringens proposition 2009/10:160, Modern personalförsörjning för ett användbart försvar vissa frågor om Försvarsmaktens personal," [The Government's Proposal, Modern resourcing of a Defense in use]. Stockholm, March 18, 2010, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/14/24/75/98a49e22.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2011); Swedish Parliament, "Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:121 § 11," [Protocol from Swedish Parliament, 2009/10:121 § 11]. Stockholm, May 19, 2010, http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Kammaren/Protokoll/Riksdagens-protokoll-2009101_GX09121/ (accessed November 20, 2011).

⁴¹ Swedish Defense Commission, "Försvarsutskottets betänkande (2008/09:FöU10) Försvarets inriktning," [Defense Commission's Report 2008/09:FöU10]. Debated in Parliament, Stockholm, June 12, 2009, agreed June 16, 2009, http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utskottens-dokument/Betankanden/Forsvarets-inriktning_GW01F%C3%B6U10/ (accessed October 10, 2011); Decision see, <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utskottens-dokument/Betankanden/Arenden/200809/FöU10/> (accessed October 10, 2011); Swedish Government, "Regeringens proposition 2008/09:140, Ett användbart försvar," [The Government's Proposal, Defense in use]. Stockholm, March 19, 2009, <http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/12/29/57/853ca644.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2011).

⁴² Swedish Presidency of the European Union, "Important defense policy issues during the Presidency," Stockholm, July n.d., 2009, <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2011/a/130195> (accessed October 5, 2011).

⁴³ Swedish Armed Forces, "Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2004," [Swedish Armed Forces' Annual Report 2004]. Stockholm, February 18, 2005, 6, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/Årsredovisningar/Årsredovisning%202004/ar04.pdf> (accessed December 5, 2011).

⁴⁴ Ibid., 9.

⁴⁵ Swedish Armed Forces, "Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2007," [Swedish Armed Forces' Annual Report 2007]. Stockholm, February 22, 2008, 25, 50,

<http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/Årsredovisningar/Årsredovisning%202007/ÅR%2007%20huvuddokument.pdf> (accessed February 27, 2012); Swedish Armed Forces, "Rapport från perspektivstudien hösten 2007 – Ett hållbart försvar för framtida säkerhet," [Swedish Armed Forces' Long Term Vision Report 2007]. Stockholm, December 20, 2007, 15-16, 18-19, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/Perspektivplan/Slutrapport%20perspektivstudie%202007.pdf> (accessed October 20, 2011).

⁴⁶ Swedish Government, "Regeringens proposition 2008/09:140, Ett användbart försvar."

⁴⁷ "Sweden will not remain passive if a disaster or attack were to befall another EU Member State or Nordic country. We expect these countries to act in a similar fashion should Sweden be under threat." Ibid., 9.

⁴⁸ Swedish Government, "Förslag till statsbudget för 2008: Försvar samt beredskap mot sårbarhet, Prop 2007/08:1 Utgiftsområde 6," 33.

⁴⁹ Swedish Government, "Förslag till statsbudget för 2008: Försvar samt beredskap mot sårbarhet, Prop 2007/08:1 Utgiftsområde 6," 19 -22. The NBG commitment also ensures access to training facilities and participation in training activities globally within areas not otherwise easily accessible, such as jungle training, which is crucial for Sweden's ability to participate in global operations. Furthermore it provides opportunities to maintain and develop the ability to command and control operations at brigade level and higher. The inclusion of a Swedish FHQ facilitates Swedish participation in relevant working groups in the European Union and NATO, thus giving Sweden assured access to Command and Control (C2) structures and procedures. In addition, it provides access to multinational exercises on that level, and augments the ability to meet new operational capability requirements where army combat units will mainly be used in mission specific, predefined battalion combat groups.

⁵⁰ Fredrik Reinfeldt, Swedish Prime Minister, "Regeringens skrivelse 2010/11:114, Strategisk exportkontroll 2010 - krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden," [Swedish Government's Report to the Parliament on Defense Sales 2010]. Stockholm, March 11, 2011, 6, <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/16/42/79/908a9426.pdf> (accessed November 25, 2011).

⁵¹ Ibid., 9.

⁵² Howard Mustoe and Andrea Rothman, "Libya Conflict May Spur Sales of Battle-Proven Eurofighter," *Bloomberg Businessweek Online*, March 24, 2011, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-03-24/libya-conflict-may-spur-sales-of-battle-proven-eurofighter.html> (accessed November 25, 2011).

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Joris Janssen Lok, "Swedish Gripens Deploy To Red Flag Without Recce Pod, Link 16," *Aviation Week Online*, July 3, 2008, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/GRIPE_N07038.xml (accessed November 25, 2011). Gripen is in operational service within the Swedish, Czech Republic, Hungarian, South African and Royal Thai Air Forces. There have been or are currently on-going sales negotiations with Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark,

Finland, India and Norway. In addition, the Gripen is used by the UK Empire Test Pilots' School (ETPS) - Britain's flight test training school, which is operated by QinetiQ in partnership with the UK MOD. For further background on Gripen users, see SAAB, "Gripen, The Face of Success," http://www.saabgroup.com/Global/Documents%20and%20Images/Air/Gripen/Gripen%20product%20sheet/The_Face_of_Success.pdf (accessed November 26, 2011).

⁵⁵ Editor, "Gripen in NATO-Led UN Mission," *DefenceTalk Online*, April 7, 2011, <http://www.defencetalk.com/gripen-in-nato-led-un-libya-mission-33311/> (accessed November 25, 2011).

⁵⁶ SAAB, Gripen News, "Mission Completed," Linköping, October 26, 2011, <http://www.saabgroup.com/en/Air/Gripen-Fighter-System/Gripen-News/> (accessed November 24, 2011).

⁵⁷ France 24, "Switzerland picks Gripen over Rafale, Eurofighter," *France24 Online*, November 30, 2011, <http://www.france24.com/en/20111130-switzerland-picks-gripen-jets-over-rafale-eurofighter> (accessed December 10, 2011).

⁵⁸ Official Journal of the European Union, Volume 53, "Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Lisbon Treaty Article 42."

⁵⁹ Swedish Armed Forces, "Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2007," 23.

⁶⁰ Swedish Government, "Förslag till statsbudget för 2008: Försvar samt beredskap mot sårbarhet, Prop 2007/08:1 Utgiftsområde 6," 50.

⁶¹ European Union External Action, "Common Security and Defense Policy: Development of European Military Capabilities, Military Capabilities/8."

⁶² In addition, the capability is required for national needs, due to force reductions in combination with a large geographical area to defend, which in turn call for a high degree of operational mobility.

⁶³ *NATO Home Page*, "Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), A key capability for the Alliance," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50105.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed December 15, 2011).

⁶⁴ Swedish Parliament, "Riksdagens protokoll 2007/08:112 § 9," [Protocol from Swedish Parliament, 2007/08:112 § 9]. Stockholm, May 15, 2008, <http://www.riksdagen.se/webbnav/index.aspx?nid=101&bet=2007/08:112> (accessed November 20, 2011).

⁶⁵ Marcus Weisgerber, "Team Airlift," *Air Force Magazine Online*, June 2009, <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2009/June%202009/0609airlift.pdf> (accessed February 25, 2012).

⁶⁶ *NATO Home Page*, “Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS),” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50106.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed December 4, 2011).

⁶⁷ *Movement Coordination Centre Europe Home Page*, <https://www.mcce-mil.com/> (accessed December 3, 2011).

⁶⁸ Henri Bentegeat, Chairman of the European Military Committee, “The steps needed to move ESDP from theory to facts,” Brussels, April n.d., 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/0804_Europe%27s_World.pdf (accessed October 11, 2011).

⁶⁹ Swedish Ministry of Defense, “PFF:s planerings och översynsprocess – utvärdering 2011 – översättning av sammanfattning och slutsatser.” The Swedish Super Pumas have different configurations ranging from transport to MEDEVAC.

⁷⁰ *BAE Home Page*, http://www.baesystems.com/ProductsServices/I_and_a_Is_rg32m.html. (accessed February 15, 2012); *Army-Technology.com Home Page*, <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/rg-32m/> (accessed February 15, 2012).

⁷¹ *UPI.com Home Page*, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/09/07/Sweden-orders-Australian-weapons-stations/UPI-46051315402103/ (accessed February 15, 2012).

⁷² Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV), “Press Release, New armored wheeled vehicles for Swedish military,” Stockholm, August 13, 2010, <http://www.fmv.se/WmTemplates/page.aspx?id=5238> (accessed November 20, 2011); *Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) Home Page*, “Armored Wheeled Vehicle 360,” <http://fmv.se/en/Projects/Armoured-Wheeled-Vehicle-360/> (accessed February 10, 2012).

⁷³ For examples on the Navy’s transformation, see *Swedish Defense Materiel Administration (FMV) Home Page*, “Visby-class corvette, is a stealth ship with versatility,” <http://fmv.se/en/Projects/Visby-class-corvette/> (accessed March 10, 2012); *Kockums Home Page*, “The Gotland Class Submarine,” <http://www.kockums.se/en/products-services/submarines/gotland-class/> (accessed March 10, 2012).

⁷⁴ Eleanor Keymer, “Country Briefing Sweden: Moving on, moving out,” *Jane’s Defense Weekly*, Volume:48, Issue:44, October 26, 2011, 26-27.

⁷⁵ Swedish Ministry of Defense, “PFF:s planerings och översynsprocess – utvärdering 2011 – översättning av sammanfattning och slutsatser.”; Flight International, “Sweden goes for partial Link 16 fit,” *Flight International Online*, October 2005, <http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/sweden-goes-for-partial-link-16-fit-202193/> (accessed November 5, 2011). The Gripen C/D fleet is the NATO-compatible version of Gripen. In comparison to the A/B versions, with 54 A’s and 12 B’s in service in the Swedish Air Force (SWE-AF), it has extended capabilities in terms of armament, electronics, etc, but also air-to-air refueling capability. The C version is the international version with 56 fighters in Service in the SWE-AF, and the D version is the two-seated version of the C (international configuration) with 12 fighters in service in the SWE-AF.

⁷⁶ *Airforce-technology.com Home Page*, “Gripen, Sweden,” *Airforce-technology.com* <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/gripen/> (accessed December 10, 2011); *Swedish Armed Forces Home Page*, “Stridsflygplan Jas 39 C/D,” [JAS 39 C/D Fighter]. <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Materiel-och-teknik/Flyg/Stridsflygplan-JAS-39-C/> (accessed December 10, 2011).

⁷⁷ *Swedish Armed Forces Home Page*, “Kön klar!,” [Ready to go]. <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Forband-och-formagor/Nordic-Battlegroup/Nyheter/Kon-klar-OBS-Ej-klar/> (accessed December 10, 2011).

⁷⁸ For background on evaluation and certification, see Erik Lundberg, “Evaluation and Certification of the Nordic Battlegroup,” Swedish Defense Research Agency, Stockholm, Base Data Report FOI-R- -1909- - SE, January 2006, 16-22, <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir1909.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2011).

⁷⁹ Peter Nordlund et.al., “Att styra försvaret - balanserade styrkort och förbandsvärdering” [Balanced scorecards and an integrated cost and effect evaluation of military units]. Swedish Defense Research Agency, Stockholm, Base Data Report FOI-R--2452—SE February 2008, 44-47, <http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2452.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2011).

⁸⁰ Swedish Armed Forces, “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2007,” 4.

⁸¹ Swedish Armed Forces, “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2010,” [Swedish Armed Forces’ Annual Report 2010]. Stockholm, February 18, 2011, 31, <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/upload/dokumentfiler/Årsredovisningar/Årsredovisning%202007/ÅR%2007%20huvuddokument.pdf> (accessed February 27, 2012).

⁸² Swedish Armed Forces, “Försvarsmaktens Årsredovisning 2007,” 23-24.

⁸³ Sten Tolgfors, “Juholt äventyrar fredsinsatser,” [Juholt jeopardizes Peace Support Operations], *Svenska Dagbladet Online*, May 11, 2011, http://www.svd.se/opinion/brannpunkt/juholt-aventyrar-fredsinsatser_6154839.svd (accessed October 5, 2011). Also available at, *Swedish Government Home Page*, <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9496/a/168187>.

⁸⁴ The European Union has a system of rotating Presidencies of the Council of the European Union. The Presidency that presides over the Council for six months plays a vital part in the organization of the work of the European Union, especially as the driving force in the legislative and political decision-making process. It is also the Presidency’s responsibility to organize and chair all meetings and work out compromises.

⁸⁵ Swedish Presidency of the European Union, “Important defense policy issues during the Presidency.”; Swedish Presidency of the European Union, “EU Common Foreign and Security Policy during the Swedish Presidency, Priorities and Results 1 July–31 December 2009,” Stockholm, December n.d., 2009, 20. http://www.se2009.eu/polopoly_fs/1.28726!menu/standard/file/ofw%20eng%20white.pdf (accessed October 5, 2011).

⁸⁶ The Swedish Presidency of the European Union, “Work programme for the Swedish Presidency of the EU, 1 July – 31 December 2009,” Stockholm, June 23, 2009, 18,

http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/documents/en/090623_SE%20Pres%20Prog.pdf (accessed 5 October 2011).

⁸⁷ The Swedish Presidency of the European Union, *Presidency Report- Seminar on the use of EU Battlegroups*, (Stockholm: Ministry of Defense, July 31, 2009).

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Council of the European Union, "Edited summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the informal meeting of EU Defense Minister, Goteborg, Sweden, 28 and 29 September 2009, (S219/09)," Brussels, September 29, 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/110389.pdf (accessed January 29, 2012); For further details on the results from the Defense Ministers' meeting, see Council of the European Union, EU Political and Security Committee, "Increasing the Flexibility and Usability of the EU Battlegroups 15336/09)," Brussels, November 4, 2009, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st15/st15336.en09.pdf> (accessed October 5, 2011); Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions on military capabilities, 2974th External Relations Council meeting," Brussels, November 17, 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Military_capabilities_EN.pdf (accessed October 5, 2011).

⁹⁰ Swedish Defense Commission, "Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2011/12:FöU1 Utgiftsområde 6 Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap – budgetåret 2012," [Defense Commission's Report on Defense expenditures FY12]. Stockholm, December 7, 2011, http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utskottens-dokument/Betankanden/Utgiftsomrade-6-Forsvar-och-sa_GZ01FöU1/ (accessed January 28, 2012). Sten Tolgfors, the Swedish Minister of Defense, declared on 1 December 2011 that a separate agreement had been made between the Government, the Social Democratic Party, and the Green Party regarding Sweden's European Union Battlegroup participation in 2014. Sten Tolgfors, "Bred uppgörelse om NBG," [Broad agreement on NBG]. Sten Tolgfors' Blog, December 1, 2011, <http://tolgfors.wordpress.com/2011/12/01/bred-uppgorelse-om-nbg/> (accessed December 3, 2011).

⁹¹ There are currently eight parties represented in the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) with 349 seats. The distribution of seats by party is: the Moderate Party 107 (Moderaterna, M), the Christian Democrats 19 (Kristdemokraterna, KD), the Liberal Party 24 (Folkpartiet Liberalerna, FP), the Center Party 22 (Centerpartiet, C), the Green Party 25 (Miljöpartiet de Gröna, MP), the Social Democratic Party 112 (Socialdemokraterna, S), the Sweden Democrats 20 (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) and the Left Party 19 (Vänsterpartiet, V). The Parliament is divided into two distinct blocks with the Government consisting of M, KD, FP, and C and the Opposition consisting of S, V and MP. The two blocks do not formally cooperate with the far-right wing Sweden Democrats who oppose Swedish involvement in the European Union's military cooperation.

⁹² Swedish Defense Commission, "Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2011/12:FöU1 Utgiftsområde 6 Försvar och samhällets krisberedskap – budgetåret 2012." The Defense Commission will forward a report on possible Swedish European Union Framework Nation responsibility in 2015 to the Parliament in June 2012. For details see <http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utskottens-dokument/Betankanden/Arenden/201112/FöU8/> (accessed March 9, 2012).

⁹³ Swedish Parliament, "Riksdagens protokoll 2011/12:49 Torsdagen den 15 december, § 10," [Parliament's debate on defense expenditures 2012]. Stockholm, December 15, 2011, http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Kammaren/Protokoll/Riksdagens-protokoll-2011124_GZ0949/ (accessed January 28, 2012).

⁹⁴ Carl Bildt, "Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, Wednesday, 15 February 2012."

⁹⁵ Swedish Parliament, "Riksdagens protokoll 2011/12:49 Torsdagen den 15 december, § 10."

⁹⁶ NAO is part of the central control function of the Parliament and is the only body that can audit the entire state finances. Its role is to ensure that the Parliament receives an independent and coordinated audit.

⁹⁷ Swedish National Audit Office, "Den nordiska stridsgruppen 2008 – en del av EU:s snabbinsatsförmåga (RiR 2010:20)," [Nordic Battlegroup 2008]. Stockholm, October 10, 2010, <http://www.riksrevisionen.se/sv/rapporter/Rapporter/EFF/2010/Den-nordiska-stridsgruppen-2008--en-del-av-EUs-snabbinsatsformaga-/> (accessed November 5, 2011).

⁹⁸ *Swedish National Audit Office Home Page*, "Den andra nordiska stridsgruppen NBG11," [The second Nordic Battlegroup NBG11]. <http://www.riksrevisionen.se/GRANSKNINGAR/Pagaende-granskningar/Pagaende-granskningar/Inledd-granskning-Den-nordiska-stridsgruppen--NBG11/> (accessed November 5, 2011).

⁹⁹ The 2011 survey is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, with additional support from Fundação Luso-Americana, Fundación BBVA, the Communitas Foundation, and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁰⁰ Zsolt Nyiri and Ben Veater-Fuchs, *Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2011* (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2011), http://www.gmfus.org/publications/TT/TT2011_final_web.pdf (accessed October 31, 2011).

¹⁰¹ Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, "Statistik och analys, Opinioner 2009, Om allmänhetens syn på samhällsskydd, beredskap, säkerhetspolitik och försvar," [2009 Survey]. Stockholm, December n.d., 2009, <https://www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/25042.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2011).

¹⁰² Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, "Delredovisning - Opinioner 2011," [2011 Survey, preliminary results part 2]. Stockholm, January 15, 2012, https://www.msb.se/Upload/Kunskapsbank/Statistik_larande/Delredovisning_Opinioner2011.pdf (accessed January 24, 2012).

