


Strategy Research Project International Fellow

Why has Peace not been Achieved in Colombia?

by

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Colombian Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2012

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

WHY HAS PEACE NOT BEEN ACHIEVED IN COLOMBIA?

by

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ABSTRACT

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Colombia has not been at peace during the last century. It has been fighting against different forms of violence, including communism, insurgency movements, drug trafficking, self-defense groups, criminal bands and others. During the last decade, there have been many changes in the security environment of the country; however, despite significant efforts by the Government and Armed Forces, Colombia has not achieved the desired peace. This project will examine some of the factors behind why it is difficult to achieve this goal of peace for Colombia, as well as offer solutions for obtaining the desired endstate in the future.

WHY HAS PEACE NOT BEEN ACHIEVED IN COLOMBIA?

Colombia faces a critical juncture in its recent history. One road leads to civil war, chaos and economic collapse. The other leads to peace, reforms, and economic progress.¹

Colombia is a country with 1,138,910 square kilometers of territory and a population of around 45 million,² one of the largest countries in South America. It has the privilege of possessing coasts in two oceans and a wealth of natural resources, including a large number of minerals such as coal, copper, gold, iron, nickel and silver, energy resources such as oil and natural gas, and plenty of water resources.

Since its independence from Spain in 1819, Colombia has known very few periods of peace. Its history is closely linked to periods of almost constant violence that even threatened to turn the country into a failed state. This threat has come from leftist guerrillas, right-wing armed groups, and drug cartels, among others. Paradoxically, despite its history of violence, Colombia is one of the most solid and stable democracies in the region. In the last decade, the country has experienced positive changes especially in its economic and security indicators, which were interpreted at the time by General Padilla Deleon, Joint Military Forces Commander, as “the beginning of the end of the end” of such widespread violence. However, despite recent achievements, the much-desired peace remains elusive for Colombians.

There are many reasons why Colombia has not achieved peace. This paper analyzes some of the causes that have made it difficult for Colombia to be able to achieve the political goal of peace. Some of them are related to the history of the country, some of them have a social, political, and cultural content, and others result from the role played by military forces in sustaining democracy.

Historical Setting: Peace has been the Exception not the Rule

As suggested by Constanza Ardila in her book *The Heart of the War in Colombia*, periods of comprehensive peace have been the exception rather than the rule in Colombia during the entire 20th Century.³ Therefore, in order to gain a better comprehension of the current situation in Colombia, it is important to have some historical background of the country which, in one way or another, has influenced the fact that the achievement of peace in Colombia still is not a reality.

Between 1819 and 1824, after an arduous military campaign led by the Venezuelan General Simon Bolivar, Colombia achieved its independence from Spain. As Geoff Simmons suggests in his book *Colombia: A Brutal History*, "Bolivar and his revolutionary allies had secured the independence of much of South America from the Spanish monarchy, but the years of turmoil, civil war and foreign intervention were set to continue."⁴ After independence the "Great Colombia" (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama) was born. It was formed by the Departments of Venezuela, Cundinamarca, and Quito, and its capital was Bogotá. General Simon Bolivar was appointed as President of the Republic and Colombian General Francisco de Paula Santander as Vice President, and from that moment the difficulties of the nascent republic began. The main reason for these difficulties was the different strategic vision that each of them had for the country. While Bolivar had a centralist vision and believed in union among the departments, Santander had a federalist vision for the country. Years later, in 1827 during the Ocaña's Convention, the differences between Bolivar and Santander worsened to the point where Bolivar assumed dictatorial powers to preserve the unity of the Great Colombia, leaving the Federalists out of the government, including Santander.

After that, Bolivar was no longer seen as "the liberator" of five nations in Colombia, but as "a dictator." Three years later Bolivar died due to illness and Santander was appointed as President of the Republic. The country adopted a new constitution and began to make some reforms. Among those reforms, the one that had the biggest political impact was the reduction of the Catholic Church's influence in education, a role that it had played since the era of colonization. This reform led to the birth of the two traditional parties in Colombia: the Federalists were identified as "Liberals," and their opponents, the Centralists, the Catholic Church, and the laity, began to identify themselves as "Conservatives."⁵ The differences between those political parties have been one of the causes that generate the diverse manifestations of violence in the country.

Since then, Liberals and Conservatives have fought for political dominance in Colombia and in turn excluded any other political group that attempted to participate. The differences between Liberals and Conservatives continued throughout the nineteenth century and produced a series of armed conflicts, to finally reach what is known as "The Thousand Days' War," which was fought between 1899 and 1902 and left 100,000 dead.⁶ At the same time, other factors such as the independence of Panama and a deep economic crisis fueled the mood of confrontation which generated multiple internal revolts between Liberals and Conservatives, who accused each other to be the causes of the crisis.

Subsequently, on April 9, 1948, an event occurred that would forever mark the history of the country. That day the presidential candidate for the Liberal Party, Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, who had the best chance to win the election, was assassinated in

Bogotá. Gaitán had led a grassroots social movement, which supported a series of reforms by democratic means and rejected the revolutionary path. All the tensions between the two traditional parties exploded with the assassination of Gaitán, and led Colombia to live a most brutal of their experiences in what is known as the period of “La Violencia” (1947-1958). The discrepancies between the two parties led to an armed confrontation, especially in rural areas, where violent clashes caused the loss of at least 200,000 lives between the followers of both parties.⁷ This experience has been one of the most influential factors in the history of Colombia because it generated a culture of violence as a way to solve differences. The impact of what happened during those years still is felt today within Colombian society. As Professor Santiago Villaveces Izquierdo wrote, "Political violence has been a problem along the foundation of the history of Colombia, which became visible and decentered endemic in modernity in Colombia with the arrival of the era known as La violence."⁸ This period was an extremely complex phenomenon characterized by both partisan political rivalry and sheer rural banditry.⁹

During the 1960's, some of those armed groups that fought in support of the Liberal Party during the era of “La Violencia” became illegal armed groups of leftist origin. Using guerrilla tactics, especially in rural areas with little infrastructure and minor governmental attention, they attacked civilians, military and police forces and the economic infrastructure. Violent acts such as murders, extortions, kidnappings, and assaults on police stations and military barracks started to become the daily events in the country. It was at this time, that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was formed. A movement of Maoist origin that based its fight in protracted

people's war, the FARC became one of the major obstacles to achieving peace in Colombia.

In the 1970's, another phenomenon began that has caused huge damage to the country: drug trafficking. Initially, drug trafficking predominantly focused on the marijuana trade, but later shifted to coca cultivation, the production and marketing of cocaine and, more recently, of heroin. Due to the enormous revenues obtained from drug trafficking, some drug lords organized their own armed cartels that permeated the society with corruption and fear. Colombia relapsed into a new period of violence from a different origin which was the production and control of drug trafficking routes. Still even today drug trafficking remains one of the biggest causes of violence in the country.

A third phenomenon emerged in response to the state's inability to cope with the actions and abuses of guerrilla groups, especially the FARC, who were occupying and controlling much of the country. Farmers and land holders formed self-defense organizations, which eventually were transformed into armed organizations, in order to safeguard their interests in different regions because governmental forces could not protect them. What started as small self-defense movements in different parts of the country became more widespread, and were later grouped into a military organization with well-defined structures and leadership: The United Peasants Self Defense Group (AUC). By this time, the FARC had already become the biggest drug cartel in the world and had control of much of the coca crops in the country, as well as the production in rudimentary laboratories and the marketing of cocaine to the outside world. This factor gave them immense economic power so that the only way to confront them, as shown by the AUC, was going into the drug business to equal their economic resources in

similar magnitude and logistics. From the beginning of the new millennium, the country lived in a critical situation caused by the violence of guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug cartels. Colombia was on its way to becoming a failed state.

In 2002, with the election of President Alvaro Uribe, the situation began to change in the country. The Democratic Security Policy promulgated during Alvaro Uribe's presidential campaign began to bear fruit and the security condition improved significantly. During this period some actions were essential for the country's recovery, such as various military successes against leftist guerrillas and their leaders, the demobilization of most of the paramilitary groups, and an improvement in the economy. In addition, it was necessary to pass a constitutional amendment for the re-election of President Uribe to give him more time to finish this task of achieving peace. During his next term, security indicators remained positive and important domestic and foreign investor confidence increased. Everything that was happening in the country for the first time in decades gave Colombians hope that peace could be achieved.

Assuming that peace would soon be a fact, "the beginning of the end of end" was promulgated by some government and military officers. The academia began arguing about post-conflict scenarios and the new role of the military forces. Some adjustments in defense budgets for the new era of peace were discussed. A new approach of the U.S. aid through Plan Colombia to make assistance more social than military and other topics were broadly discussed based on the assumption that peace would be possible.

However, Colombia is still far away from peace. According to the latest report from the *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development Organization*, Colombia is ranked 5th among the countries with the highest violent deaths.¹⁰ New

criminal gang organizations arose as a result of the demobilization of paramilitary groups in the quest to control illicit crops and drug trafficking routes. FARC, despite having lost the support from the civilian population and over 50 percent of its members during the last decade, is still committing terrorist acts in some parts of the country. Kidnapping and extortion are increasing. This is where the question arises: why has Colombia not yet achieved peace?

Social Content: A Class Struggle

The differences between social classes were extremely defined from the very beginning of Spanish colonization.¹¹ There was a very clear distinction between pure Spanish born in the old continent, Spanish-descendants born in the “new land”, and finally those who had no relation with Spain, such as the mulattos, mestizos (white-indigenous mix), zambos (black-indigenous mix), indigenous and black African slaves, who were at the bottom of the social scale.¹² This inequality was the main cause for Colombians to take up arms and fight for independence. Although in a different way, Colombia still has a stratified social classification today.

As explained before, the political differences in Colombia were the common denominator among its citizens and one of the ways to solve those differences was through violence. These political differences began to increase in the twentieth century when social differences were added. “Violence has been an important and often decisive social process in the structuring of Colombian society at various junctures in the nation’s history.”¹³ For example, in the rural sector the differences were between the few owners of large extensions of land (landowners) who needed a work force and the vast majority of the existing poor rural population at that time. On the other hand, in urban areas a labor force was required that did not exist to face the socio-economic

changes that lay ahead because of industrialization. This situation brought a new problem, which was an internal migration of rural population to cities in search of better opportunities, leading to the creation of new social classes who settled in the areas surrounding the cities. According to Safford and Palacios, in 1938 only 29 percent of Colombia's population lived in cities, and at the end of 20th century it increased up to 70 percent.¹⁴ These new social distinctions generated new conflicts, where there was just no difference from the political point of view nor from the social.

Later on, the rise of drug trafficking in the 1980s created a variety of problems in Colombia. The appearance of new millionaires led to a drug culture that threatened the traditional social structure that had been in existence for centuries and penetrated all sectors of Colombian society.¹⁵ Given the huge amounts of money available to drug lords, they obtained a significant power in many aspects of Colombian life, not only in the social, but also in the economic and the political spheres.

Catholic Church: Conservative and Traditionalist?

Roman Catholicism is the religion of the vast majority of Colombian people. From the conquest times the military missions were accompanied by Catholic priests. During colonization the biggest goal of the church was the evangelization with the purpose to convert the indigenous to Catholicism. Later on, the Spanish rulers gave to the church the very important role of developing education in the new territories, as well as creating and sustaining hospitals and asylums. Since those times the "marriage" of the Catholic Church and State became very solid and the influence of the church over the government issues has been very strong. Thus, "The church as an institution was authoritarian and paternalistic and had traditionally been associated with elite structures in the society."¹⁶

During the period of Independence, the clergy was divided between supporters of the King and those who favored independence. The senior clergy preferred to support the former government, while the parish priests and many of the religious supported independence. Therefore the role played by the church during the Independence was decisive as it contributed to the mobilization and recruitment of the populace, thanks to its important influence on the people.

Throughout the 20th century the influence of the Catholic Church continued to grow, to the point of almost controlling education in Colombia. But its influence was not only in education and social welfare, but also began to permeate the union organizations.¹⁷ The social reforms implemented by the Colombian government in the 60's, led to a fragmentation within the church and even some priests began their own struggle against the government. The best known case is that of the priest Camilo Torres, who joined the National Liberation Army and was killed in 1966. This fact became a symbol for Latin American leftists who sought social change in their countries. As was Camilo Torres, several priests are today aligned with the left thinking and also are well known for having relationships with the FARC. Normally they are used as spokespersons for the liberation of hostages or to send some messages to public opinion or the government.

The changes for the Catholic Church began in Colombia with the Concordat in 1973. It redefined the relationship between the Colombian Government and the Vatican. Under this agreement, the clause of the 1886 Constitution regarding the establishment of the Catholic Church as the official religion was changed to the Roman Catholicism as the religion of the great majority of Colombians.¹⁸ In the same way, some changes

about the Catholic marriage, the evangelization in indigenous territories and its role in the education system were redefined.

The biggest defeat for the Catholic Church occurred in 1991. Before that, Catholicism was recognized in the Constitution of 1886 as the official religion of the country. But in 1991, with the new Constitution, the Catholic Church lost its role as cohesive and cultural element of Colombian society thanks to the recognition of freedom of worship, the freedom of religious education and the suspension of civil effects of Catholic marriage by divorce. As a consequence, a significant erosion of the church's political influence in the society and government occurred.

In short, the Catholic Church traditionally has been a key player in the political and educational system in Colombia. In the InVamer Gallup survey of May 2011,¹⁹ the Catholic Church ranks fourth in terms of favorability among Colombian institutions, losing its traditional second rank. However, despite its loss of influence and power the church is still a key actor to play in the effort to achieve peace in Colombia.

Political Framework: The Pendulum Effect

When talking about political development in Colombia in reference to the violence and the conflict, it is clear that the state lacks a long-term strategy. Historically, the country has handled the problem of violence in a cycle that resembles a "pendulum." Some administrations have adopted strategies of strong opposition to violent groups (guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug traffickers, and criminal gangs) using military power. Then a change in administration suddenly leads to other strategies who use an overly naive diplomacy. This inconsistency in the national strategy against violence is one of the causes of this long term problem, when implementation of short-term goals has occurred without any strategic vision.

The analysis below describes the strategy involved by the administrations in power during the periods of increased turbulence in the country regarding the handling of public order and violence.

Take the assassination of Gaitan in 1948 as the starting point. This, for many thinkers, marks the beginning of the period of "La Violencia." In that year the President was the Conservative Mariano Ospina Perez, who expelled from his government all the governors of liberal affiliation, ordered the army to close Congress by force, and increased rural police repression against the Liberals and other belligerent people. His administration is remembered as repressive and militaristic.

Later, in 1950, the Conservative Laureano Gómez, who won the elections without any opposition by the Liberal Party, was elected President of the Republic. During his administration the chaos in the country was accentuated. Death squads, peasant self-defense movements supported by the Communist Party, military forces and police were immersed in a wave of mutual extermination. Approximately one million peasants were displaced from their land by threats from either side.²⁰ President Gomez opted to reduce civil liberties in response to this escalation of violence, and used the police and military forces as law enforcement to carry out his orders. This decision further polarized the nation and increased violence. Due to illness, President Gomez had to withdraw temporarily from office and when he tried to return, he found that a coalition of moderate Conservatives and Liberals had installed a "military arbitration" as the only possible solution to widespread violence that the country suffered.

The new administration, headed by General Rojas Pinilla, had the political objective of ending the wave of violence that was sweeping the country. He offered

amnesty and government assistance to those who lay down their arms. At the same time, he carried out further reforms for social and economic development. Among his most important achievements were creating the Social Security Institute and giving farmers access to the credit system. He started to build an economic infrastructure that internally connected the country with roads and railways. Another of his initiatives to avoid violence was to take away the right to vote of the rural police in elections because its members were seen as politically affiliated. Also he transferred the police to the Ministry of Defense to serve as an institution of national character. His success in the management of public order decreased political violence, and led to his reelection. This situation bothered the traditional parties who thought that their access to power was threatened. Because of that, the same political parties that put General Pinilla in office agreed to depose him and forced him to relinquish power. A new agreement to exercise power was born under the National Front. Within this coalition, the main leaders of the traditional parties agreed to lead the country, alternating the presidency every four years up to 1974 when the country supposedly would reach peace.

In this way the Liberal Alberto Lleras was elected the first President of the National Front in 1958. His administration was limited to mending fences between the two traditional parties, and although some measures were announced to reduce rural violence and banditry, they were never put into practice. At the end of his term the country still suffered from the phenomenon of political violence and seemed to be without a hope of improving the situation. In accordance with the National Front's agreement, the next term would be led by the Conservative party, and Guillermo Leon Valencia was elected for the period, 1962 to 1966. Although his primary aim was

to pacify the country, using a balance between military and diplomatic power, his administration did not produce positive results in the management of public order. He ordered the army to fight guerrillas, attacking them in what they called "independent republics" which were nothing more than sanctuaries for members of these organizations from which they planned and launched all of their misdeeds. At the same time, he implemented, with some success, military-civic campaigns to counterbalance the military actions. At the end of his term, due to public unrest, caused especially by a student sector protesting the country's economic plight, he declared a "state of siege." During that period the largest guerrilla groups in the country were born: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) of communist origin and the National Liberation Army (ELN), formed by students inspired by the Cuban revolution.

In 1966 the Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo came to power and reversed his predecessor's policies, including the lifting of the state of siege. His weak administration in the management of violence led to the creation of new guerrilla groups such as People's Liberation Army (EPL), inspired by the Chinese revolution as the armed wing of the Communist Party of Colombia Marxist-Leninist. The situation of violence continued in the country and the state had to impose states of emergency to handle this special situation. For the next elections, challenging the National Front and the two traditional parties, the deposed General Rojas Pinilla presented his presidential candidacy. This election was conducted in an atmosphere of extreme violence, and in a certain way General Pinilla was seeking to end the power that had always been held by the two traditional parties. The election of Conservative Misael Pastrana led to general discontent, generating the birth of a new guerrilla group, Movement 19 de Abril (M-19)

in remembrance of the date on which the National Alliance for Progress (ANAPO) led by General Rojas Pinilla lost the election. It is important to highlight that the emergence of the main guerrilla groups that still exist today in Colombia, such as the FARC and ELN, and others that subsequently laid down their weapons, such as the EPL, Quintin Lame, and M19, occurred during the time of the National Front, when power was held by the two traditional parties.²¹

Upon completion of the 12 year agreement to govern the country through the National Front, the Liberal Alfonso López Michelsen, son of former President Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, was elected (1974-1978). His government faced a national strike of major proportions led by trade union organizations and movements, and several workers and students who participated in the protests were killed or injured. These events are remembered for the killing of 14 people during the riots and the assassination of former government minister Rafael Pardo Buelvas by a Workers Self Defense Command, which demonstrated the degree of social polarization that was dividing the country.²² As during “La Violencia,” again the military forces were used in a repressive way in the management of public order against the population.

The period 1978-1982 was led by Liberal Julio Cesar Turbay, who, as a result of the deterioration of public order, adopted a vigorous strategy against armed groups through the implementation of the Security Statute. The purpose of this statute was to keep order throughout the country and restore it where it had been disturbed. Among the measures taken in this statute was the strengthening of existing criminal law with increased penalties and the prosecution of the rebels by the military criminal justice system.

In 1982, the strategy against violent armed groups changed radically again with the rise to power of Conservative Belisario Betancourt. "During his four year term, Betancourt's highest domestic priority was to pacify Colombia's four main guerrilla groups. His approach to dealing with the escalating political violence differed profoundly from that pursued by his hard-line predecessor."²³ He started peace dialogues with those organizations, signing a truce with the FARC, the EPL and the M-19, which included a ceasefire by the military forces. As a result of these discussions, the Patriotic Union was born as the political arm of FARC. Perhaps the most remembered event of Betancourt's government, which left an indelible mark on the recent history of Colombia, was the attack on the Palace of Justice by the M-19 guerrilla group supported by the drug cartels. This attack had the alleged intention of forcing the President of the Republic to face a public trial for breaking the ceasefire with that group, but it really was intended to pressure the national government not to sign the agreement on the extradition of drug traffickers to the United States. The President, as Supreme Chief of the military forces, ordered the recovery of the Palace, which, in a bloody operation, led to the burning of the Palace of Justice by the terrorists. As a result of this attack on the democracy of Colombia, 55 people were killed, including some judges. Even today, there is much controversy over some alleged missing during the operation and this action has been taken as symbol of human rights abuses and overwhelming use of force by the state.

Between 1986 and 1990, the Presidency of the Republic went back to the Liberals with Virgilio Barco, who continued on the path of dialogue with the guerrillas, achieving the demobilization of the M-19 and the declaration of paramilitary groups as

illegal. However, those groups already had grown in numbers, organization, and illicit activities, so no results were achieved after his presidency.

The economist Cesar Gaviria Trujillo from the Liberal Party became President in 1990. These elections were marked by violence widely promoted by the drug cartels and three candidates for the Presidency were killed. Two of them were from the left wing and the other one from the Liberal Party, Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento, who had the greatest chance of being elected. Galan was eventually replaced by Gaviria as the Liberal Party candidate. His administration continued on the path of dialogue, achieving the demobilization of the EPL and other less influential groups. But while he was talking about peace with them, he continued the frontal war against FARC, attacking their main sanctuary, "Casa Verde." The government suffered its worst outbreak of narco-terrorism by drug cartels and the growth of paramilitary self-defense groups as a way to counter the advance of the guerrillas, who had already obtained financial support from drug trafficking. As a result, the numbers of murders and victims of armed conflict increased in comparison with previous years. In 1994, the power remained in the hands of the Liberals with Ernesto Samper. His policy was to combat the systemic drug trafficking, from the destruction of illicit crops and processing labs for cocaine, the seizure of chemical, air and maritime interdiction, money laundering, the forfeiture of the property acquired with drug money and the total dismantling of the Cali Cartel. Ironically, his presidential campaign was accused of receiving money from that cartel.

Again, a total change in policy against generators of violence in the country was presented with the election of the son of former President Misael Pastrana Borrero, the Conservative Andres Pastrana, in 1998. By the time of his election, the violence in the

country was untenable because of the war between guerrillas and paramilitaries for the control of the cocaine market. He chose to start peace talks with the main source of violence in Colombia, the FARC. These dialogues were initiated without a ceasefire pact by the insurgent group and with a demilitarization zone of 25,000 square kilometers without any government presence, which was taken and controlled by FARC to train its new members, to increase coca crops, and to plan terrorist attacks, among other activities. The desire to achieve peace at any cost led the country to the brink of collapse. Paradoxically, the administration also achieved the signing of the U.S. assistance pact for combating drug trafficking through Plan Colombia.

Again there was a complete turnaround between 2002 and 2010, during the administration of Alvaro Uribe Velez. Colombia reached an astonishing breakthrough with regard to the restoration of security and recovery of governance by the state, as suggested by Spencer in his study *Colombia Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010*. He suggested that it was a process of transformation through which the government and citizens regained control of a state overwhelmed by violence.²⁴ According to the author, five factors converged in a kind of synergy to achieve this recovery. The first was the leadership and strategic vision of President Uribe, which complemented the commitment of his administration and military leaders to achieve the ends of his Democratic Security Policy. The second was a political consensus between the government and the people who gave popular support for the implementation of the Democratic Security Policy. The third factor concerns the institutional strengthening achieved through reforms in the military forces and police as well as increasing their capacity. The fourth factor was the assistance of the United

States in technical skills, technology and equipment provided to the military forces. Finally, the enemy's inability to adapt to the rapid and effective implementation of the Democratic Security Policy by the government meant that it did not understand the changes in the environment, which prevented proper or delayed reaction.²⁵

Politically, the Colombian State has not had a coherent and long term vision for the management of violence in the country. The political objective of achieving peace has been handled in accordance with the character of every president. In the same way, the strategy against the violent groups and the issue of peace has been totally erratic. This situation has impacted Colombia terribly, because every four years the policy has changed.

Cultural Context: A Culture of Violence

The use of violence as a way of resolving disputes has a long history in Colombia. Lewis in *When the Cultures Collide* wrote that Colombia has experienced more than ten civil wars. These domestic conflicts have had a very strong impact on the way of thinking and behavior of Colombians.²⁶ The country has a legacy of violence that is historically complex and multifaceted. And as Richard Lewis says: "Colombians are not by nature aggressive people, but so many internal confrontations have made them rather defensive and more intolerant."²⁷ According to the study "Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011" issued by the Geneva Declaration Armed Violence and Development Organization, Colombia is the fifth most violent country in the world.²⁸ But this violence not only has to do specifically with those derived from the various conflicts experienced by the country, as we have seen, but also manifests itself in other ways. Apart from the violence generated by collective organizations from the left or right, there is also individual violence, which has been increasing lately. This makes it very difficult

to differentiate between criminal violence motivated by money and political violence motivated by social and ideological differences.

The multiple episodes of violence, coupled with the limited periods of uneasy peace, have led Colombia to an almost permanent state of conflict. This is tied to other conditions such as: minimal state presence in some remote areas, the criminalization of some forms of protest, the high levels of corruption, impunity, and social acceptance of violence as a form of conflict resolution. These conditions have led Colombians to maintain a culture of violence and what is worst of all, to live with it. It could be argued that Colombians are not used to living in a different environment than this violent one, and somehow see peace as something unattainable. Conflict is socially accepted, and the real goal is not to achieve peace as a way of life (because it is unreachable), but simply to reduce violence.

Economic Framework: A Paradox of Underdevelopment and Prosperity

On this basis, Colombia is the exception to the rule and would have already achieved peace, if it depended on positive economic indicators. “Lethal violence is strongly associated with negative development outcomes in various ways and is accompanied by low levels of overall achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.”²⁹

Since the beginning of “La Violencia,” Colombia, with the exception of Brazil, was the only Latin-American country whose GDP from 1960 to 1995 grew faster than the world at large, although it was relatively modest in comparison with those of Asia in the same period.³⁰ Colombia had a break in the economy at the end of the 90’s. However, during the last decade Colombia has demonstrated strong macroeconomic performance despite the global economic crisis. Some of the most important statistics of different

resources are as follows. According to the Country Watch Database, Colombia over recent years has had a very strong GDP growth averaging 6.7 percent annually from 2005 to 2007, with a small reduction in 2008 of 2.4 percent. It recovered again in 2010 to an estimated 4.7 percent.³¹ Similarly, inflation has fallen from 9.3 percent in 2003 to 4.8 in 2010. According to the World Bank, Colombia's GDP has grown from U.S. \$34.894 billion in 1985 to U.S. \$234.045 billion in 2009.³² According to the International Monetary Fund international reserves have grown by about US \$4.5 million between 2008 and 2010.³³ Europe World Plus' statistics suggests that Colombia has increased its GDP per capita of US \$1,361.3 in 1985 to US \$ 5,125.9 in 2009, becoming the fourth largest economy in Latin America.³⁴ But despite the positive statistics above, the level of income inequality is one of the highest in countries with similar economies and still 45 percent of the population is below the poverty line, which is a limitation in the economy.

After analyzing the top ten most violent countries in the world ³⁵ (El Salvador, Iraq, Jamaica, Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Lesotho), six of them are on the list of the fifty countries of the world with population below the poverty line. Economically, with the exception of Venezuela and South Africa, the other countries have negative economic indicators. This suggests that there is a connection between poverty, economic indicators and violence. However, it also draws attention to how other countries in the region, including Ecuador and Bolivia, with similar or worse economic situations than Colombia, do not go through “a not peace situation” as the country has lived in the past fifty years. However Levitt and Rubio, in *Understanding Crime in Colombia and What can be done about it*, suggest that despite the enormous attention to poverty and income inequality given as explanations for

Colombia's crime problem, they find little empirical evidence that Colombians have a particular propensity toward violence that is greater than other countries' residents.³⁶

The positive macroeconomic indicators do not mean that the general population or the lower classes receive all the benefits of this situation. Still there are people without a job, basic services, health and food to sustain them and their family and this is when the problem is not economic but social.

In addition, the real economic problem for the country is the negative effect of insecurity and conflict on GDP. The World Development Country Brief (2007) estimated that if Colombia had achieved peace 20 years ago, the income of an average Colombian today would be 50 percent higher and 2.5 million children would be living above the poverty line today.³⁷ There would be more available resources to invest in the social problems, instead of spending in defense and security, as well as rebuilding the infrastructure destroyed by terrorist actions.

Military Forces and Society: A Different Relationship

The role that the military has historically played and plays even today is another reason why Colombia has not achieved peace. "Although the Colombian Armed Forces' obedience to civilian rule is rare for contemporary Latin America, such a relationship is not irregular from the perspective of Colombia's own history."³⁸ As suggested by Mark Ruhl in his study of the armed forces and society in Colombia, the government's control over the military has been the norm since the early years of independence.³⁹

Unlike the Spanish army, which consisted of aristocrats, the liberation army of Bolivar was made up of ordinary people without titles or scrolls. After achieving independence from Spain, the size of the army was reduced. By 1853, the Colombian army was poorly armed and equipped and served minor missions different than their

natural role of defending the nation, such as guarding prisons, delivering mail and taking care of lepers in asylums. The status of the army had reached a critical point because of the lack of resources given by Congress. Under these conditions, the army had very low prestige as an institution and the incorporation of soldiers and officers became critical, to the point of recruiting the homeless, which was a common practice in the Spanish army.⁴⁰ Under these circumstances obviously the army did not participate in any major activity for the country's political development during this important period of the beginning of the Republic as an institution.

For this reason, in 1854 the army commander, General José María Melo, led a coup d'état which kept him in power for a few months. Despite having the support of the workers, the aristocracy of the traditional parties joined to form its own army, defeated Melo's army, and drove him out of power. As a result, there was a complete demilitarization of Colombian society,⁴¹ reducing the army's budget to the minimum, leaving a force of 400 men with police functions and implementing a system of sanctions and rewards in the hands of Congress. This resulted in the military being subordinated and controlled by the civil establishment. In this way one could say that Colombia began its political life without the army.⁴²

The army did not play a greater role in the numerous armed conflicts that occurred during the remainder of the nineteenth century, including the Thousand Days' War (1899-1902), because of its small size. But it is precisely because of this bloody war that a truce was signed between the political parties. To ensure this, President Rafael Reyes started to create a professional military institution. Thus, a Chilean commission trained in Germany came to the country to assist in this process of

professionalization with the creation of the Military Cadet's Academy in 1907. In this way the army began to change its image and even some children of the aristocracy started to join the institution.

By that time the country was experiencing a period of relative calm interrupted only by the riots of workers in the United Fruit Company in 1928, where the "new army," in the process of professionalization, was sent by the national government to control the rioting peasants. As a result some workers were injured and others were killed. After that, in 1932 Colombia began a war with Peru, in which it was shown that Colombia did not have military forces ready to carry out the kind of missions needed to defend the national sovereignty. However, after overcoming many difficulties, including lack of required training and appropriate weapons, the army was able to achieve victory over the neighboring country. This indicated to the political class the real role of the military. As a result of this war, increases in the numbers of military forces from 5,000 to 14,000 men, in the budget and in the performance of some professional programs were possible.

After the progress made in the relationship between the military forces and society after the war with Peru, the national government, headed by the Liberal Alfonso Lopez, initiated a total turn in the role played by military forces during his administration. The new "social mission" of the army would be colonization. This "colonizer army," as he called it in his inaugural speech, had the admirable mission of extending the Colombian territory within its own boundaries.⁴³ The reality was that Lopez saw the army as a Conservative army, which was a threat to the development of his liberal social reforms and therefore should be somehow neutralized. A good way was to send it to

these remote areas to "colonize." This new mission, coupled with the interference of civilians in purely military affairs, an official purge of Conservatism begun by the government, the creation of a police force as a counterweight to the army, and the prohibition of political affiliation of the military created an environment of institutional opposition and indignity among its members. Again the military institution was undermined by the government in power, without any reaction from the military.

In contrast, a period of relief in military relations with the national government was seen during the next presidential term, but unfortunately for the military institution President Lopez was reelected and the tensions came back. This time, an unsuccessful coup d'état against him was led by an army colonel. It failed for two reasons: the first was the lack of cohesion among the officer corps, who despite being mistreated by the President, had not been consulted or considered in making decisions about their mission and performance. They were not strong enough to prevail against this humiliating situation. The second, and more important factor, was the traditional meaning of "obedience" of military to civilian authorities who were popularly elected.

Again the Conservative Party came back to power in 1946 with Mariano Ospina Pérez. The public order situation became chaotic as a result of rural violence between Conservatives and Liberals. As a solution, the government appointed military mayors in the areas most affected by the conflict. According to McAlister, a total of 202 municipalities were run by military mayors, bringing some relief from the violence and therefore gratitude to the institution.⁴⁴ However, because the army became immersed in the bipartisan conflict, the people began to see it as the armed wing of a Conservative government chasing Liberals. During this time "Bogotazo," as is known the event of

Gaitan's assassination and subsequent riots in Bogota, occurred and the military again supported the presidency in this crisis. By presidential order the army assisted him in closing the Congress, which was controlled by Liberals, and this act reaffirmed the perception of the population about the affiliation of the army with the Conservative party. As mentioned earlier, it was in this environment that the era of Violence in Colombia began.

Then the Conservative president Laureano Gómez, seeing the spread of violence in rural areas, decided to increase the military budget to confront the liberal guerrillas. The conflict between the two traditional parties turned into civil war, with military forces playing a totally repressive role in favor of the Conservative government. The neutrality of the armed forces was at stake, and that's when the military leadership realized the reputation that Conservatism was giving to the institution. In turn, the political elite saw the military as the only solution to the situation of violence in the country. Then the military government of General Rojas Pinilla came to power, which gave a social orientation to the administration based on the Peronist model. Many reforms were made to improve the living conditions of the lower classes through a National Secretariat for Social Assistance. Rojas knew that it was a unique opportunity to position the military forces at the national level and change their status and image in the society. To achieve this he required a budget increase, which was widely criticized by political parties. His administration still is remembered by the working class as one of the most beneficial in recent years. But unfortunately, the military was not prepared for such challenges at the strategic level, nor to provide an alternative to rule the country in times of crisis because of the historical role given to the armed forces by the

government. The lack of experience in the country's strategic affairs and the lack of identity as an important and powerful institution to assist the growth of the nation soon had their consequences. The economy deteriorated; violence increased and in the same way the support of the population was reduced. Without big changes in the situation of violence a new chapter in the role of military forces in the country ended, with the military in the highest position of President of the Republic.

From then until today, no matter which political party has ruled the country, the role of the military forces and police has been primarily keeping the public order. As a consequence, they have performed different tasks such as controlling prisons, civil defense, preventing the smuggling of drugs, coffee, and emeralds, and managing public protests and customs. As noted by Rebecca Bill Chavez in her article *Integrating Human Rights and Public Security*, the incapability of law enforcement to deal with the unusual crises has led to the deployment of troops to the streets.⁴⁵ This situation has resulted in a mixture of the roles that military forces and police play, which illustrates that today the country has a "policing military force" and a "militarized police." Both share roles in the fight against drugs, kidnapping and in the security of economic infrastructure facilities, energy, and roads, among others.

In short, the different roles given to the military forces historically by the different administrations, the omission of its opinions and marginalization in making strategic decisions in the country, its neutral political affiliation, and its repressive role have led to a poor relationship between the military and society, which has reduced its credibility and respect as an important institution that can help to achieve peace in Colombia.

Conclusions

It is a general assumption in Colombia that defeating the FARC or reaching a peace agreement with that organization would be enough to achieve peace, but it is not that simple. As an example, following the death of FARC's leader Alfonso Cano in a November 4, 2011 military operation, hopes grew again in the country about the arrival of peace. There are many other factors that make the achievement of peace in Colombia difficult; some of them are cultural, social, and economic and they are not easy to solve.

Colombia has a long tradition of political violence. Breaking this tendency is not an easy task. For example, in the last elections for governors and mayors on October 28, 2011, voters in 23 municipalities disagreed with the outcome of the election and proceeded to burn the city hall facilities. The violent exercise of politics tends to reproduce or generate resentment which in turn justifies further violence in an infinite chain. At the same time, violence creates a perverse incentive in society that recognizes violence as a path. Rebuilding is never easy. Social inertia is almost unstoppable; it requires leadership, will and agreements.⁴⁶

There are close links between armed violence, insecurity, and development. The link between high levels of armed violence and the fragility of the institutional capacity to contain or reduce it is well recognized; therefore the interdependence between insecurity and underdevelopment is established.⁴⁷ This becomes a vicious circle in which violence is a key constraint to development because it affects economic growth and productivity, and this development is not achieved because of the violence. Unemployment, insecurity, inequality, impunity, and corruption, among others, are components of a complicated web. Violence is a key limitation for development because

it affects economic growth and productivity, and therefore the ability to decrease the levels of poverty, inequality and exclusion experienced by the majority of the population.⁴⁸ Although the macroeconomic indicators are positive for the country, the impact of this improvement does not have an impact on the majority of the population. While there are still high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality, these will continue to fuel corruption and financing of illegal activities that degenerate into violence.

In contrast to many countries in Latin America, where the military forces have played a significant role in nation-building, in Colombia this was not the case.⁴⁹ The military's contribution to achieving peace in the country has not been well understood because of the roles played by history. Its party affiliation in its beginnings and subsequent unconditional support for the system run by the traditional political class did not help to build a good relationship between military and society. In the same way, the endless task of handling the public order has led to the militarization of social conflicts in the country and to the deterioration of the image and perception that civil society has of the institution, to the point of perceiving it as an obstacle to peace, rather than a solution. Generally speaking, the conception that civil society in general have had about Colombia's military power is as a repressive force and a resource of power to handle public order.

Recommendations

Based on the history, culture, economy and the roles played by civil society, Catholic Church, and the military, the following recommendations are provided:

1. For the government:

a. As suggested by Holmes, Gutierrez and Curtain, a continuous commitment and a harmonized strategy are necessary to effectively calm decades-long conflict in Colombia.⁵⁰ A top priority in that strategy, which is an essential condition for peace in Colombia, is the formulation of a clear National Security and Defense Policy. This policy must articulate an innovative form of relationship between the military and society to build a new type of civil-military relations to facilitate the search for peace.

b. In the same way, the government should initiate a reevaluation of the roles played by the military and police forces in that National Security and Defense Policy to adjust those roles in accordance with their constitutional mission. The general thinking that the state's enemy is internal and not external has led the military forces to take on tasks which are not in accordance with the constitutional mission. Furthermore, some of those missions are not under a legal framework, bringing as a consequence that military personnel have been involved in justice problems discrediting the institution.

c. The State must start to take into account the military forces in the design of the defense and security policy. Military experience and knowledge is an important contribution to build such strategies that could carry out national interests. It is important to put aside the fear of some political sectors that the military has any lust for power, which is shown not to be the case throughout history, even in the most difficult situations for the country.

d. The education system is an important and unique way to start to change the legacy of violence lived by generations in the population. An important effort

in solving conflicts must be focused in the education system of the country. From elementary schools to masters' and doctorate programs, Colombia must develop a coordinated program where the people are taught about different solutions to solve problems different from violence.

e. The state must achieve a policy where the less favored population feels the real impact of the good economic momentum of the country. Education, basic services, and jobs must reach this vast population to enable them to choose different options rather than the illicit activities in the guerrillas or drug cartels, which in turn generate more violence in a vicious circle. "Improvements in the development of social services and poverty reduction programs are still lacking because of an inefficient use of limited resources."⁵¹

f. As part of the economic reforms, the government must tackle a better distribution of the wealth. As a consequence of the economic boom of Colombia in recent years, this is an important factor that would help to approach the social inequality in Colombia, and therefore a facilitator to achieve peace. A rapprochement of wealth and income distribution between the higher classes and the poorest would be a stability factor that somehow would avoid a lot of violence which is derived from class struggle.

g. Taking advantage of the historic Catholic tradition in the country and its high level of credibility as an institution among Colombians, one should not rule out a leading role by the church for peace. The combination of good relations with the state as well as its foundations in the Christian faith can be a good combination of neutrality at the time of bringing parties to possible peace talks.

h. Some examples of conflicts solved by negotiation must be studied to take from them the lessons learned. To mention a few, the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland, where those negotiations were fundamental. As noted by Marcela Lopez Levy “Peace will come when organized civilians, that is, civil society, is strong enough to be taken into account by those who are armed. We must insist on solutions to the violence which are inclusive of the majority of Colombians and negotiated by society.”⁵²

2. For the military forces:

a. The greatest strength of the Colombian military is its tradition of obedience to civil authority. Despite the difficulties experienced by the country through its history, military forces have remained loyal to their oath to serve their country. This is definitely the way for democracy to take its course and the military should not think for a moment about the possibility of taking control of government. This must remain the fundamental premise of the institution and should remain reinforced from the early years of military career of each of its members.

b. Today’s situation in the fight against the major armed threats to the state (FARC, ELN) is in a good momentum. It is an opportunity for the military to seek appropriate spaces to begin to play different roles from that of managing public order. Successful operations in support of the civilian population, humanitarian assistance in natural disasters, and evacuation of noncombatants, would begin to gradually change the perception of the military forces by some sectors of the population, especially in rural areas where they have been most affected by violence. One of those opportunities is in nation building, as for example the

construction of roads and bridges by military engineers, or with the support of military aviation connecting vast and distant productive areas with major industrialized centers. The biggest challenge here is to change the repressive perception of the military that the population has as a consequence of the history of internal conflicts.

c. For this reason, the military forces should develop programs for its members at all levels, from the soldiers to the strategic leadership, to focus more deeply in the process of education and training in the study of the social sciences. This will give them a broader view in important fields such as economics, anthropology, sociology, criminology, education, and political science, offering a solid foundation for a better understanding of human behavior and thus accepting the challenge of building a nation.

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