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**PAKISTAN'S FIRST MILITARY COUP:
WHY DID THE FIRST PAKISTANI COUP OCCUR AND
WHY DOES IT MATTER?**

by

Naghman Chaudhry

March 2012

Thesis Co-Advisors:

Anshu Chatterjee
Feroz H. Khan

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MATTER?**

Naghman Chaudhry
Captain, Pakistan Navy
M.B.A., Preston University Islamabad, Pakistan, 2004-5

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Author: Naghman Chaudhry

Approved by: Anshu Chatterjee
Thesis Co-Advisor

Feroz H. Khan, Brigadier (Ret) Pakistan Army
Thesis Co-Advisor

Daniel Moran
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

The first military coup of Pakistan in 1958 set up a pattern that continues to show itself four decades later and dominate the government either directly or indirectly. The first military coup of Pakistan also created an institutional path for the subsequent three military coups. The first military coup was due to various factors, not just one that civil military theorists neglect to explain. The British recruitment policy during the pre-partition period had as large a role in creating the setting for the coup as did unequal distribution of resources and geographical location. Pakistani military at the time of partition was professional while the other institutions were weak, which challenges the notion that professional military do not cause coups. The Pakistani military also gained prominence because of the all-around external and internal threats. The powerful military and bureaucratic alliance further delayed the enactment of a constitution and changed seven prime ministers within first eleven years of independence by further discrediting the politicians before the people. All these events provided occasion, opportunity and disposition to the Pakistan army to affect the first coup by General Ayub Khan in 1958. The thesis also evaluates the effects of the first military coup on the present civil-military relations in Pakistan.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The first military coup of 1958, led by General Ayub Khan, has set up a pattern in Pakistan where today, most of the policy matters, such as the foreign or domestic are crafted with the tacit approval of the Pakistani military. The Pakistani military continues to dominate the government either directly at the center or indirectly in charge of several institutions. This core imbalance in civil-military affairs is primarily due to what Pakistan inherited at the time of the independence of Pakistan.

A. BACKGROUND

Muslims were traditional warriors who conquered the subcontinent in the late fourteenth century by defeating Hindu Emperors or Rajas who ruled the Indian Subcontinent for almost eight hundred years.¹ The population of the subcontinent, at that time, was primarily Hindu and Buddhist.² Due to the prolonged rule of Muslims in India, the Muslims were able to convert some segments of the population to Islam. They mostly settled in the provinces of East Bengal, Punjab, Frontier Baluchistan and Sind, the areas that are now Pakistan. By the 16th century, the Mughals dominated the reins of power in the Indian subcontinent. However, they did not try to force their religion (Islam) on the Hindus, the majority population.

1. British Period

The British entered the sub-continent in 18th century as traders. By 1858, they overthrew the Muslim empire in order to protect their interests and ruled India until 1947.³ The British took over the government of India, which changed the status of Muslims from rulers to subjugate.⁴ On the other hand, for Hindus it meant adapting from

¹ Chuadhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Lahore Research Society of Pakistan (Lahore Pakistan Punjab University, 2003) 2–3.

² Stephen Philip Cohen, introduction to *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 10.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah India-Partition Independence* (New Delhi: Rupa.Co, 2009), 25, 26.

one invader to another. The British employed the tactic of divide and rule to disintegrate the Hindu-Muslim coexistence for administrative convenience.⁵ Dividing tactics prolonged the role of the British as mediators, which further aggravated cleavages between the two communities.⁶ The first victim of the British Raj was the Persian language, which was replaced by English as the official language. Hindus were quick to adapt to the new system of governance; they acquired education-related opportunities in the government, learned the English language and dominated the higher jobs in the administration.⁷ The Muslims, however, abhorred the West and the English language, which resulted in their economic and material isolation. The Mullahs (Muslim clergy) further enhanced the isolationist Muslim psyche by issuing decrees forbidding learning the English language.⁸ The British also maneuvered to confine their privileges to Hindus to isolate and discriminate Muslims from mainstream prosperity.⁹ Muslims felt alienated and were discriminated against because of their changed status, identity, and relegation to the minority population. Muslims were convinced that their future role in a united democratic India would be one of subservience to the Hindus after the departure of the British, and the Hindus, with a ratio of one to three, would continue to dominate in the electoral constituencies.¹⁰

B. POLITICAL INHERITANCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN BEFORE INDEPENDENCE

A country may have different sets of ethnic minorities, groups of people who may have different ideas, beliefs and caste systems; however, strong political leadership that has deep roots among the people can only fill this gap and keep a nation united. India and Pakistan came into being as a result of a political movement under the leadership of Mohan Das Gandhi, Pundit Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who were instrumental in

⁵ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005), 4.

⁶ Singh, *Jinnah India*, 27.

⁷ Ali, *The Emergence Pakistan*, 6, 7.

⁸ Abbas, *Pakistan into Extremism*, 5.

⁹ Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah To Zia* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1979), 4.

¹⁰ Ali, *Emergence of Pakistan*, 11.

the mobilization of the people on the platforms of Congress (majority Hindu representative party) and Muslim League (Muslim representative party). They also played a central role in the independence of India and Pakistan.

Right from the onset, there was no comparison between the two political parties. Congress had cemented its foundations deeply among the populace due to its longer existence and organizational breadth. The Congress Party (INC) was formed in 1885 after a long demand by its leaders.¹¹ After 1920, especially, Gandhi brought forth many reforms on the basis of a joint consensus in the party and encouraged representation of the people from all walks of life. Rizvi argues that the struggle for independence enabled Congress members to evolve patterns to resolve internal conflicts and aggregate diverse interests. These measures not only empowered the leaders, but also managed to win the confidence of the people. Nehru nurtured democratic institutions, within the party as well at the national level.¹² As a result, Congress won the 1937 elections, the first that granted full suffrage, forming governments in eight out of eleven provinces. During these elections, a large number of Muslims also voted for Congress. Thus, the Congress Party managed to develop a nationwide political base among the people of the Indian subcontinent well before independence. Congress' astute leadership even managed to cultivate some Muslim leaders, such as Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad and Zakir Hussain, who voted against the partition of India.¹³

Whereas the Muslim League miserably failed to emerge in the 1937 elections as either a true representative of Muslims or a national party, it later successfully orchestrated the nationalist movement of Pakistan. The Muslim League was formed by Muslims from an elite class in 1906 with a view to protect the interests of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent. The Muslim League, however, kept struggling to become a truly Muslim representative party until 1939–40, due to widespread divisions within the

¹¹Encyclopedia Britannica, Indian-"National-Congress," <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/285841/Indian-National-CongressRizvi> (accessed December 2, 2012).

¹² Yogendra K. Malik, *Government and Politics of South India* (New York: West View Press, Sixth Edition, 2008), 35.

¹³ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 26.

Muslims. Even the great leader of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, remained an active member of the Congress. Jinnah and Congress leaders were in a joint “quit India movement” against the British. At this stage, Jinnah was also known as the ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity. He later joined the Muslim League, in 1935, when he realized that after the departure of British, the Muslims would be marginalized and relegated to a minority, not only in the country but within the party. Gandhi had formed a unity party that included some of the Hindu Nationalists. Thus, he became a staunch supporter of the two-nation theory, which meant that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations and both had separate identities and traditions. From 1929 onward, Congress and the Muslims remained under the same unification umbrella to eject the British from India.

The Muslim league also lacked any internal cohesion or collective leadership and its credibility was often challenged by other Muslim parties. It was only after the 1937 elections that the Muslim League emerged as a strong Muslim unification party, once Muhammad Ali Jinnah managed to convince the Muslims of India that their survival rested only in a separate state for Muslims. He also managed to attract the most prominent Muslim leaders under one Muslim League umbrella. However, this unification of the Muslim leaders actually took place too late, just two to three years before the creation of Pakistan, in 1944–1947.¹⁴ Thus, the Muslim League had very limited experience as a grassroots party. The center of gravity of the Muslim League remained Jinnah, as his charismatic personality overshadowed the rest of the Muslim Leaguers.

Cohen argues that although leaders like Jinnah mobilized the Muslims toward one cause, “these leaders, were half converted preachers of democracy, though well-educated and half westernized elite of Indian subcontinent. These leaders had no practical experience of running democratic systems.”¹⁵ What these modern leaders did not understand was that modernization also involves change in behavioral attitudes. Democratization also requires institutionalization of the complete system, including

¹⁴ Hassan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (Lahore: Pakistan. Sang-e-Meel publications, 2000), 61.

¹⁵ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 29–30.

social values, political parties and rules of law. The point to bring home, here, is that unity among Muslim political leaders was lacking even before the partition of the subcontinent also.

One important variable in the military intervention of Pakistan, but not in India, was the issue of governance and leadership prior to the independence of both countries. Therefore, there was no backup available in case of the demise of Jinnah. Later, circumstances proved this problem to be real, as after the death of Jinnah, the Muslim League failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a national party. Rizvi argues that the “Muslim league failed to form the diverse political culture and identities of Pakistani citizens into one united platform after the demise of Jinnah.”¹⁶

C. THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN AT INDEPENDENCE

After independence, Jinnah centralized the powers by becoming the governor general and president of the constituent assembly of Pakistan. Instead of empowering the constituent assembly and parliament, however, he centralized all authority, in the governor’s office, laying down the wrong foundation for a democratic Pakistan.¹⁷ Jinnah and his party’s (Muslim League) main objective was the creation of Pakistan and the leadership totally focused on this aspect; nobody thought about the political and economic next. Still, when scholars debate the reasons for the existence of Pakistan, some argue that the objective of Pakistan was to create an Islamic state, whereas others argue that Jinnah’s vision was to create a modern progressive Pakistan where the masses would have equal rights.

India and Pakistan became independent on 14–15 August 1947, respectively, when the British withdrew from the Indian subcontinent. Rizvi argues that the effect of circumstances leading to independence carry deep impacts on the outlook of new nations and ensuing events.¹⁸ Pakistan was no exception to this experience. It underwent the

¹⁶ Hassan-Askari Rizvi, introduction to *Military State and Society in Pakistan* (New York: Macmillan Press, 2000), 4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 4–5.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, *Military and Politics*, 51.

traumatized experience of starting from an insurmountable load of problems. The departing British gave only eleven days (to a joint committee of Indians and Pakistanis) to divide the resources between the two countries, which they had taken almost a hundred years to build.¹⁹ That is why scholars often describe Pakistan as “a nation that was born in a hurry.”²⁰ Rizvi points out that pre-independence distrust between the Indian and Pakistani political leadership, by the time both countries achieved independence, had already turned to hostility. Pakistan received its first setback just one year after independence when its great founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, died in 1948, which not only delayed the formation of a constitution but also left the country in political chaos.²¹ After the death of Jinnah, the Muslim League lost momentum and direction. Jinnah was a leader who acted as a nucleus and had brought the party together despite a wide range of differences among the party leaders. His demise, therefore, further widened the gap between politicians. This factor added further miseries to the bitter reality,

Pakistan was also handicapped after independence, as the politicians and most of the senior Muslim League leaders holding ministerial positions in the cabinet had no roots among the majority of people, as they were migrants from the Muslim minority provinces of Northern India.²² The absence of political roots was a large obstacle for migrated politicians. Rizvi argues that “distrust continued to taint their interaction in the post-independence period.”²³ These events further weakened the political structure of Pakistan. Shuja Nawaz explains that compared to India, Pakistan clearly suffered from competent and a capable leadership during this period. The vacuum left by the weak political leadership was soon filled by the army, which was the only institution that was intact, cohesive and powerful.

¹⁹ Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 25.

²⁰ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 3.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 100.

²² *Ibid.*, 100–101.

²³ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 5.

1. Economic Inheritance

Another major setback for Pakistan at the time of independence was unfairness in the transfer of resources by India, in collusion with the British. It included the unjust demarcation of geographical boundaries, including Kashmir. These problems were further compounded due to a mass influx of refugees, who later formed 10 percent of the population of the resource-starved new state of Pakistan. The seeds of hatred were thus sown between the two countries, which later fought three wars that resulted in the ascendancy of the Pakistani army as a political institution. Under the British, the major defense and industrial infrastructure was based in what became India. It included all the major financial institutions, state banks, steel mills and seven ordnance factories.²⁴ These factors made India not only financially better, but also in a stronger bargaining position with Pakistan. Jalal argues, “One determined to deny the resources and the other eager to receive.”²⁵ During the process of resources distribution, the role of the departing British had been relegated to the level of arbitrator only and thus, they had no say over the distribution of resources. The distribution of resources was left to the mercy of powerful Indian leaders. Cohen argues that India not only betrayed Pakistan as far as allocation of resources was concerned, but also forged a bond with the British to manipulate international boundaries, and connived with some of the rulers of the Muslim majority princely state, who as per the partition plan, were supposed to annex with Pakistan, including Jammu and Kashmir.²⁶

Pakistan was given only one-third of its financial share by India. By insistence, Pakistan was given 200 million rupees to start afresh.²⁷ Thus, Pakistan started with meager resources and no industrial setup compared to India. During the process of resource distribution, the 1948 War of Kashmir also broke out. This event led India to deny further resources to its new enemy, Pakistan.

²⁴ Ibid., *The Military and Politics*, 43.

²⁵ Jalal, *Martial Rule*, 33.

²⁶ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 47.

²⁷ Jalal, *Martial Rule*, 34.

Uncertainty about the creation of Pakistan and its start, with negligible resources, led Indian and British leaders to believe that the new state would not survive long.²⁸ These speculations led to the transfer of an enormous amount of money from Pakistan to India. Jalal says that 3,000 million rupees (alone) were transferred from Pakistani Punjab to India, by the migrants.²⁹

2. Lack of Trained Bureaucrats

Soon after independence, Pakistan was trapped in insurmountable problems as it had neither resources nor trained bureaucracy. It had to start everything from scratch.³⁰ Jalal argues that one of the mammoth tasks for Pakistan was to establish a capital at “Karachi,” which included the shifting of manpower and records from Delhi. She points out that, to start with, Pakistan had only 157 civil servants; Cohen states that Pakistan had only 80 civil servants, whereas India had more than 1,400 trained civil servants at the time of partition.³¹ This was because before the independence of both countries, the literacy rate amongst Hindus was very high compared to Muslims due to Hindu participation in the English schools early on. The percentage of Hindu bureaucrats in the Indian Civil Service was 82 percent, whereas, Muslims were only 5 percent, because of their poor literacy level.³² Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard Goetze, Jr., while citing Max Weber, argue that the:

Decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its technical superiority over other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations (such as army) exactly, as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production.

Thus, the scarcity of civil bureaucrats was an important factor that led to the start of weak democratic control over the military.

²⁸ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 43, and Jalal, *Martial Rule*, 26.

²⁹ Jalal, *Martial Rule*, 36; Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 41.

³⁰ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 59.

³¹ Jalal, *Martial Rule*, 31.

³² Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 41.

3. Lack of Central Infrastructure

Another major difference between India and Pakistan was India's already established central infrastructure at the "capital," New Delhi, which it inherited from the British prior to partition. For this reason, India did not face any administrative problems as all the official records and necessary infrastructure, including the state bank, major financial institutions, and all industries, continued to work as usual after the transition of power from Britain to India.

4. Refugees' Problems

From its birth, Pakistan was deluged in immense socio-political problems, augmented by a poor infrastructure and its economy in shambles, which created an anarchy-like situation.³³ Approximately one hundred thousand refugees were killed or massacred on the way to Pakistan.³⁴ The number of refugees who needed to be housed and given food was approximately one million, and these later formed 10 percent of the population of Pakistan.

The Pakistani army, which was ill equipped, with a total strength of one hundred and forty thousand officers and men, and had other challenges also, which will be discussed in Chapter II, was over-stretched to safely escort these refugees from India.³⁵

5. Ethnicity Problems and the Separation of Two Wings

Pakistan also faced challenges of administration of its two wings, East (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan, which were separated by 1,500 miles of India (approximately).³⁶ East Pakistan was also the least developed province due to British extortion of its rich resources over the centuries, and because the region is prone to floods and monsoons rains. Therefore, the population of East Pakistan was the poorest in the

³³ Ibid., 256, 261, 262.

³⁴ *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Partition of India," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India (accessed December 12, 2012).

³⁵ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 52.

³⁶ Ibid., 59.

whole of India. Moreover, the population of both East and the West Pakistan had different ethnic backgrounds. Rizvi argues that these problems were further compounded due to geographical differences between the East and West, with hostile India in between.³⁷ It was, therefore, difficult for the religion, which formed the basis for the creation of Pakistan, to hold the two wings of Pakistan together, especially for a newly emerging, resource-starved state like Pakistan.³⁸ The civilian leadership had neither the resources nor the capability to administer the two wings. Thus, its dependence on the army to run the administration increased in the early years.

Jinnah made his first fatal mistake after the creation of Pakistan, when he designated Urdu (the West Pakistani dialect) as the national language, much to the chagrin of the majority Bengalis. The Eastern politicians soon started accusing the people of the West of depriving them of all the resources. This issue sowed the first seed of hatred between the people and the political leadership of the two wings, which continued to grow with time, and later culminated in the creation of Bangladesh.

6. The Pakistani Army and Defense Resources

It is important to understand the British control of Indian armed forces prior to partition because it shows why the Punjabis have more association with the Pakistani army. Rizvi argues that the British had kept the army troops at the ratio of 56 percent from Punjab, which later formed Pakistan, because (1) the British minimized recruitment from the Hindu majority areas because they stopped trusting them after they instigated a civil disobedience/quit India movement against British (1905–1911).³⁹ (2) These regions (Punjab and Frontier) had a favorable disposition toward the army; therefore, the British relied more on the Muslims for recruitment.⁴⁰ (3) The people of Punjab were not only obedient, but also better warriors. (4) The British earned good will among the majority of Punjabi soldiers (martial races), who after returning home from leave or war or on

³⁷ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 52–54.

³⁸ Jalal, *Martial Rule*, 25.

³⁹ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 50.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 46–48.

retirement, spoke generally very highly of the British Raj. They thereby generated good will toward the British among the people of Punjab and Frontier. The British, through the military, also penetrated the local civil society, while interacting with the elite and upper strata. (5) The British also, handsomely compensated soldiers in the form of generous cash rewards and agricultural land. This step further created military as well British good will among the locals (an area that later formed part of Pakistan). The people of Punjab, therefore, preferred joining the army and considered it a prestigious and honorable profession. Recruitment from the Hindu majority regions was comparatively small; therefore, the people of India could not develop the same kind of affiliation or bonds with the Indian military, later on compared to the Pakistani military.⁴¹

Cohen points out also that at the time of independence, the Pakistani army was dominated by Punjabis and Pathans, and that the representation of Punjabis in the British army, before the partition was more than 54 percent (the majority of the area later formed part of Pakistan), whereas in India, the army ratio represented the national population.⁴² In Pakistan, even up to the present time, 70 percent of the cadre of the officers' corps and soldiers are recruited from the province of Punjab and, the remainder from the Frontier province, purely on a volunteer basis.

At the time of the independence of Pakistan, the distribution of armed forces and shares was to be done based on a ratio of 66:34 (for India and Pakistan, respectively).⁴³ However, both armies developed serious differences over the distribution of military assets after partition. In principle, it was agreed that Pakistan would receive its one-third of the share; however, India refused to release the share due Pakistan.⁴⁴ In this share distribution, India had the clear advantage as most of the defense stores were located in India. In the meantime, the Kashmir War broke out and India became even more stringent in the division of stores. The three key command workshops were left in India. Out of forty-six training establishments, only seven existed in Pakistan. Three out of

⁴¹ Jalal, *Martial Rule*, 42–45.

⁴² Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 44.

⁴³ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 54.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, *The Military and Politics*, 54–55.

seventeen ordnance factories were located in Pakistan. Pakistan's request to dismantle the proportionate machinery was also rejected by India. Rizvi states that much-needed items like military ammunition, tanks and other munitions were also denied by India.⁴⁵ Rizvi explains that "the military always occupies distinctive position when new nations emerge."⁴⁶ The army leadership was more organized, while civilian institutions were very fragile. The Pakistani military leadership soon started looking towards developed world to seek training.⁴⁷ Due to unfriendly neighbors and emerging war rhetoric with India on the Kashmir issue, the civilian leadership also felt the need to procure new equipment and modernize its military as per Western training standards.

7. Internal Challenges

Unlike India, the newborn state of Pakistan faced secessionist movements in two out of a total of four provinces, immediately after the partition, as the two provinces showed a reluctance to cede into Pakistan.⁴⁸ They were fearful of the majority Punjabi dominance. The ruler of Kalat, in Baluchistan, also declared its independence and its accession to Oman, which resulted in an outbreak of insurgency in Baluchistan. Rizvi argues that "Afghanistan also began to manifest interest in the future of the Pathans living on the east of the Durand Line when it became clear that the British were leaving India."⁴⁹ Instances of raid on some parts of Frontier province by some of the tribal, on the behest of Afghanistan also came to light. The weak civilian government had no option but to request the army leadership to suppress the insurgency.⁵⁰

8. External Challenges

This paper will later argue that one of the root causes of the ascendancy of the Pakistani army lay in an existential threat to Pakistan from India. Rizvi argues that for

⁴⁵ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 54–56.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, *State and Society in Pakistan*, 76.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, *The Military and Politics*, 54.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 54–56.

Indian leaders, the creation of Pakistan was a shock for the secular identity of India. The seeds of friction and hatred further grew because of the dispute with Kashmir as well as India's military action in Junagadh (a state ruled by a Muslim ruler with a majority of Hindus), and annexation of Hyderabad by the Indian army in 1948.⁵¹ These manifestations of practical actions were further validated by the statements of Hindu leaders who openly talked of the reunification of the subcontinent, such as in the Hindu Mahasabha election statements of 1951.⁵² Sardar Patel, in a speech in 1950, mentioned "A time might come when India and Pakistan would realize their mistake of partition and both the countries would be again be reunited."⁵³ These suspicions were further confirmed by the Indian occupation of Goa, which generated warning signals for Pakistan. Fear of the external threat by India thus became one of the main policy instruments of Pakistani foreign policy. Similarly, Afghanistan did not recognize the existence of Pakistan. Therefore, the Afghan government, realizing the fact that Pakistan was a resource-starved, newly emerged state, instigated an insurgency in the Frontier Province, with the help of some locals. Thus, a constant campaign was launched by Afghanistan to annex Frontier Province within its borders. Rizvi argues that Afghanistan had the backing of both India and the Soviet Union.⁵⁴

D. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

What were the political and social conditions that led to Pakistan's first military coup in 1958? Understanding this is important because Pakistan remains one of the few countries in the world where the military consistently intervenes in "times of crisis." While there are several explanations offered by various scholars, they tend to be unipolar, not recognizing the dual complexity of the social and political settings, which led to political struggle among the elite and the presence of a professional military that was seeking to assert its authority in the new nation. The research here will identify the

⁵¹ Ibid., 52–53.

⁵² Ibid., 52.

⁵³ Embassy of Pakistan, India's War Propaganda against Pakistan. White Paper Published by Government of Pakistan, 1956, 2

⁵⁴ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 55–56.

reasons behind the first coup in Pakistan, which laid a path for the military to become one of the governing bodies. In addition, it will explain the impact the first coup had on civil-military relations by influencing the political and economic institutions and providing the groundwork for further coups. I will explain the setting that led to the first coup, which cannot be limited just to the idea of weak politicians leading to “rescue” by the military or the idea that the military sought out power and saw an opportunity in a new nation-state. While these ideas are all relevant, they do not sufficiently explain what led to the first coup in 1958.

Pakistani history, since independence from the British in 1947, includes four successful military coups leading to the formation of a military-dominated state. The civilian regimes between the coups also experienced military interference, which is often under-researched by scholars studying Pakistan. These actions generate questions as to why Pakistan has witnessed frequent military interference since its inception. Generally, as democracy spreads across the world, why does military interference remain a cyclical issue in Pakistan? I contend that the first military coup in Pakistan by Ayub Khan, created an institutional path for the three subsequent military coups. It brought the military into the civilian power structure, which was designed to be a democratic system. It also shaped the nature of civil military relations in the country, which then shaped the future activities of the civilian leadership as well as embedded the military in the local politics. Why did this occur? The answer lies in understanding the setting, which was going through a consolidation phase. Who were the primary actors and what led to the end of democracy in Pakistan in 1958? Currently, the military leaders continue to play the role of kingmakers even when they are not in power. Exploring the causes of the first military intervention will, therefore, help identify the weaknesses in civilian regimes as well the power structure of the military, which have resulted in the military’s domination over political affairs in Pakistan.

E. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This thesis will show the causes behind the first military intervention and its impact upon the pattern of civilian-military relations in Pakistan during the first two decades. I will examine the setting in 1947 through 1958 when the coup occurred. I will also examine General Ayub Khan's regime as it consolidated its power, which then shaped the political institutions for decades to come.

F. IMPORTANCE

The first military intervention lays the path for subsequent military interventions. Therefore, understanding the first coup is not only important for Pakistan, but also for the international community, which views Pakistan as an unstable political system where the powerful army could step in at any time. The study gains further significance because there is an assumption that military coups in Pakistan gave rise to instability in the region and, due to raw sentiments regarding this concern in Pakistan, no one has so far attempted to study this topic. Especially avoided are considerations that during a civilian regime, the military continues to play a dominant role behind the scenes. Is this because the military as an institution is very strong in Pakistan? The following questions illustrate the study's significant contribution to analysis of not only Pakistan, but also other countries where militaries play a powerful political role.

- (i) What was the political structure of the country before and during the military intervention and did it contribute to the intervention?
- (ii) What were the roles of external players in shaping the environment in favor of the first military intervention?
- (iii) To what extent did the first military coup shape the environment for subsequent military interventions in Pakistan?
- (iv) What was the level of friction between the civil government and military when the first military intervention was carried out?
- (v) How has the first military coup affected civil-military relations in Pakistan?

G. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

Scholars studying Pakistan are divided over the causal variables for the country's coups. Many blame the military for preventing consolidation.⁵⁵ Others blame the civilian government for being corrupt and autocratic, leading to an intervention by the military.⁵⁶ However, this thesis will show that a combination of factors resulted in the first military intervention in Pakistan. The first coup was a result of the combination of the failure of political leadership to establish grass-roots level support among the people, failure of political bargaining among them, which then presented opportunities for the military seeking a new role in the new country. In addition, the Pakistani military, under the British, had roots among the people, especially among the Punjabis, that allowed it to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the political haggling that lasted over a decade. The second to fourth coups were due to a combination of various factors, which included the failings of the civilian leadership and the maneuverings of the army in order to maintain its newly gained political position. However, the first coup created a space for the military to stay in the civilian political realm as a power group and that aspect cannot be under-estimated, especially by the U.S., which often pressures the Pakistani military to step out of domestic politics. Also, one cannot underestimate the role played by the U.S. in "allowing" the military to intervene in 1958. The military, under Ayub Khan, became deeply embedded in the country's economic and power structures.

H. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to establish a solid methodological framework to answer the research questions, a review of the various theories that explain military coups is required. Several scholars point to various reasons that could lead to military interventions and the consequences of such interventions on civil military relations. An exploration into this literature helps to determine the causes of *coup d'états* in the world from a historical perspective. I find that although there is vast literature on military interventions, it is

⁵⁵ Ayesha Siddiqi, *Military-INC, Inside Pakistan's Military Economy, Milbus: A Theoretical Concept* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 33.

⁵⁶ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 100.

incomplete in explaining the Pakistani case. The conditions in Pakistan illustrate no single variable in effecting military interventions. Therefore, an understanding of various factors and variables will help determine the cause of the first military intervention. These factors include professionalism, vested and corporate interests, military syndicalism, friction between the institutions, weak civilian institutional control, politicization, and disposition of the military to intervene. External influences, such as the acquisition of weapons, superior military training, and interests of the super powers also played a contributory role. These contributory factors are divided by categories in the following section.

1. Military Professionalism

Samuel Huntington discusses military professionalism in *The Soldier and the State* and the sources of praetorianism in *Political Order in Changing Societies*.⁵⁷ He identifies relevant causes, such as lack of professionalism and non-autonomous military and personal interests.⁵⁸ He argues that with a rise in military professionalism, the chances of military intervention decreases and gives rise to an expert, socially responsible and professional officer who possesses corporate loyalty and responsibility as do doctors and engineers in society.⁵⁹ These qualities, in turn, make him loyal to the state, which prevent him from instigating coups.⁶⁰ Huntington's argument centers on making the military sterile and neutral by making it professional.⁶¹ Janowitz also argues that the professional, civilianized, and modern military does not influence coups.⁶²

⁵⁷ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies: Praetorianism and Political Decay* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968) 193.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*; *The Soldier and the State, The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations* (Cambridge: Massachusetts University Press, 1957), 4–6.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 8–11.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁶² Narcis Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 55.

My thesis challenges Huntington's and Janowitz's arguments.⁶³ I contend that being a centralized and hierarchical organization, the military stands loyal to military leadership, rather than a civil government. This is what happened in Pakistan in 1958, when the military followed the orders of the army leadership, by overthrowing the elected president.⁶⁴ Hasan Askari Rizvi states that the armed forces of both Pakistan and India, after their independence, inherited many professional characteristics of the British armed forces when General Ayub Khan took command of the Pakistani army in January 1951.⁶⁵ However, these two militaries followed different paths: the Indian military remained subservient to democratic civilian control, while the Pakistani military carried out repeated interventions. However, professionalism has remained an aspect of the military in both cases.

In contrast to Huntington's theory, Finer argues that it is a professional military with its own politically distinct identity that leads to a coup. He states that a professional military is more prone to coups because the military draws a distinction between the nation and the government and begins to invent its own notions of national interest. He cites General MacArthur who stated that "I find in existence a new and a dangerous concept that members of our armed forces are laying allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily hold the authority of the executive branch of the government rather than the country and its constitution."⁶⁶ In other words, a professional military may have a political identity. In the Pakistani case, this is apparent as the military was trained as a professional organization under the British and remains that way.

⁶³ Morris Janowitz, *Civil Military Relations: Regional Perspectives, Civil Supremacy over Military* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981).

⁶⁴ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horse Back: The Role of Military in Politics: The Political Strengths of the Military* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 24.

⁶⁵ Hassan Askari Rizvi, Civil Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan, *Journal for International Institute for Strategic Studies* (Feb 1998).

⁶⁶ Finer, *Horse Back*, 26.

2. Military Syndicalism

Military syndicalism occurs when the military believes that the civilian government is too incompetent to govern and the military itself is the sole deciding factor about what is good or bad for a country. General Gursel's coup of 1960 in Turkey is a case in point.⁶⁷ The above-explained group of coup planners was also infused with a sense of syndicalism. Being in the battlefield, they had a strong belief that they knew more than the incompetent civilians.⁶⁸ This played a role in rallying the military against the civilian leadership.

Military syndicalism also flows from professionalism. Scholars claim that in such cases of intervention, the military feels that only the military is competent to judge what is good or bad for the armed forces and the country because they are the true professionals. This factor may put the military on a collision course with the government.⁶⁹ Military intervention may also occur when the professional and autonomous military fails to aid the government, for instance, as a coercive force to suppress the opposition.⁷⁰ Finer points out that "the very nature of professionalism on which Huntington sets such store and which he regards as *politically sterile*, often thrusts the army into a collision with civilian authorities."⁷¹ Thus, the above factors leading to coups illustrate that professionalism is not a sufficient condition, by itself, but other factors also play a role.

Stephen Cohen, who has done extensive work in Pakistan and has interviewed some of the senior Pakistani military officers, presents some causes of military interventions, illustrating the complex issues in Pakistan. He argues, "First is the

⁶⁷ Ibid., 27.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 47.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 27

⁷⁰ Ibid., 26–28.

⁷¹ Ibid., 26–28.

professional competence compared with the incompetent and corrupt political leadership.”⁷² He also quotes one of the senior Pakistani officers on military intervention:

We intervene because the politicians and civilian bureaucrats are corrupt and inefficient. We are incorrupt and selected on the basis of merit and the best of us reach higher ranks, whereas the civilians need no formal education to attain higher bureaucratic appointments and their selection is based on political reasons, rather than merit.⁷³

This is what Finer has termed as the sense of Syndicalism or the quality of judgment, which firms up the belief in the military, that it is more loyal and patriotic to the state than the government. I contend that one of the reasons for the first coup was the failure of the political leadership to govern and to provide grass roots level support to the people. A growing divide amongst the politicians resulted in seven prime ministers and eight assemblies in the eleven-year history of Pakistan.⁷⁴ In addition, the military, which was a professional organization, grew to believe that it was the only professional organization in the country.

3. Patriotism

Cohen’s research shows that Pakistani army officers also claim power because “they consider themselves more patriotic to the nation than the civilians.”⁷⁵ The conspiracies of two coups during the first eleven years show that the officers who planned the coups were all professional and patriotic officers who had fought in the Kashmir War and liberated 40 percent of Kashmir from the more powerful India.⁷⁶ These officers planned a coup because of the government’s cease-fire decision during the

⁷² Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 126.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁷⁴ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 80.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 126–128.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, *The Military and Politics*, 78–79.

Kashmir War of 1948. The sense of patriotism made them believe that the civilian government was inefficient and weak and not patriotic enough to take Kashmir from India.

4. Class and Corporate Interests

Finer also points to the importance of social class in the military. He argues that the “military supports the civilian power when it is drawn from the same social class and overthrows it when it is drawn from different social class.”⁷⁷ He also argues that corporate interests are a strong cohesive force that binds the military together. The interests become corporate when the military shares common values.⁷⁸ The military leadership also ensures that the military become members of the same corporate culture. For example, the Pakistani military benefits from various welfare schemes. This welfare includes free housing, land, and membership in exclusive clubs. Access to these benefits and facilities is denied non-military members. The Pakistani elite also ensure that military members come from the same social class by changing their economic conditions.

Moskowitz links military corporateness to two sets of forms, substantive and associate. Substantive interests are direct and they include autonomy and institutional cohesion. Associate interests are indirect and they indicate the military’s desire to achieve a certain level of control over land and captured territory. The desire by the Pakistani military to retain control over the captured territory of India is a case in point.⁷⁹ This shows that the military intervenes when its corporate interests are threatened.

5. Disposition, Mood and Opportunity to Intervene

Finer argues that disposition comprises the mood and the motive. “It is the self-awareness that permits the army to conceive that it has the unique duty to watch over the

⁷⁷ Finer, *Horse Back*, 3 and 40.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 3–5.

⁷⁹ Joseph Moskowitz, “Involvement in Politics, a Content Analysis of Civilian and Military Journals in Pakistan, France and –Israel” (PhD diss, New York University, 1983), 13–15.

national interest.”⁸⁰ It makes the military feel that it is aware of its special and separate identity, distinguishing it from civilians, with a sense of overwhelming power.⁸¹ It happens when the military assumes that it is the sole power holder in a country. Mood and motive incite the military to intervene when the military leadership has some grievances against the government on political issues.⁸² General Ayub’s mood to intervene in 1958 can be gauged from Wint’s 1958 report on Ayub’s coup. Wint says:

The Pakistan army had gained prestige and the people despised politicians. The army was conspicuously efficient and incorrupt. Thus, an imbalance developed between the respected army and the corrupt and inefficient politicians. The army might have moved earlier to intervene; however, the military desisted from intervening because its commanders had inherited the traditions from British that it should stay aloof from politics.⁸³

Wint writes that, finally, the East Bengal parliament impelled General Ayub to act. He concludes, “None of the politicians which the army despised dared to protest. They simply withdrew.”⁸⁴ Some of the people of Pakistan also supported what he terms the “revolution of 1958 in Pakistan.”⁸⁵

6. Politicization

Politicization of the military is considered a process that is the opposite of military professionalism.⁸⁶ Kotera Bhimaya argues that public policies include public politics, individuals and pressure groups. He maintains that the military may participate in one group without taking part in others. The second effect of politicization is military participation in policy formulation and decision-making processes, directly or

⁸⁰ Finer, *Horse Back*, 71.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 60–63.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 61.

⁸³ Guy Wint, *The 1958 Revolution in Pakistan*, *St Anthony's Papers*, Number 8, 1960, p. 76–77 and *Ibid.*, 82.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 82–83.

⁸⁶ Kotera M. Bhimaya, *Civil Military Relations, Comparative Study*, RAND Graduate School, March 1997.

indirectly.⁸⁷ Moskowitz argues that the politicization may be of two types, overt and induced. Overt politicization occurs once the army gets directly involved in the decision-making processes, whereas induced politicization arises as a result of civil-military relations in a country.⁸⁸ I contend that the Pakistani army was politicized soon after the creation of Pakistan because of a weak civilian government and divided politicians. The army leadership was given frequent opportunities by certain members of the political leadership to involve themselves in public affairs, which opened the doors to political power for the military elite.

7. Lack of Institutionalism and Economic Causes

Professor Robert Looney and Shahid Javed Burki also throw some light on military interventions. They argue that democracy failed in Pakistan because politicians were not able to design a set of institutions that could prevail over the interests of the narrow elite. From 1947 to 1958, democracy failed because of conflict between the two social groups, which sought to dominate the political stage. The first group had worked hard to create Pakistan. Most of the people who belonged to it, lived outside the boundaries of the new country; once this group migrated to Pakistan, they began to compete with the indigenous economic and social elite for a place on the political stage. Most of the indigenous had opposed the idea of the new country. The conflict between these two groups delayed the process of giving the country a durable and permanent framework, to the point that the economy came to a near collapse and provided the military the opportunity and a reason to intervene.⁸⁹

8. External Influence

Scholars of military interventions are divided over the role of external players or the international environment in shaping the local environment. Huntington, in *Political*

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Moskowitz, *Content Analysis of Civilian and Military Journals*, 13–15.

⁸⁹ Robert Looney, *Failed Economic Take offs and Terrorism in Pakistan and Budgetary Consequences of Defense Expenditures in Pakistan*, 2004, and Shahid Kardar, *Democracy and Development*, July 3, 2001. Available at [www. Dawn.com](http://www.Dawn.com), Pakistan (accessed October 3, 2011).

Order in Changing Societies argues that “no convincing evidence exists of a correlation between American military aid and military involvement in politics.”⁹⁰ In contrast, scholars from developing countries see a strong relationship between external influences, such as military aid, which may have an effect on military intervention. Rizvi, Shuja Nawaz, and Ayesha Jalal argue that the quest for modern technology brought the military leadership closer to the West.⁹¹ Ayesha Jalal says that the “U.S. role in Pakistan directly encouraged the military leaders to dominate their control over the civilians.”⁹² Shuja Nawaz stated that the U.S.-Pakistani friendship, after independence, was “more of civil to military rather than military to military.”⁹³ Jalal argues that understanding why the military came to power requires careful scrutiny of different ways, which are the interplay of the regional, domestic, and international factors. Both arguments hold merit when it comes to understanding what happened during the first coup.

9. Military as Savior of the State and Connectivity between the People

Rizvi provides an argument that shows the connectivity between the state and the military in the colonial phase is also an important cause. Rizvi argues that Ayub Khan was a British-trained officer who had inherited the same power structure, influence, and training of the British armed forces when he took over command of the Pakistani army in January 1951.⁹⁴ He also says that being from the majority province of Punjab-Hazara, Ayub Khan represented the majority Punjabis. Thus, people had developed affection for him, while they viewed civilians, who came from other regions of India, as inefficient.⁹⁵ Ayesha Siddiqa argues that the military, in people’s perspective, was considered a guarantor of the state’s survival because it was rooted in the region.⁹⁶ People were

⁹⁰ Huntington, *Political Order*, 193.

⁹¹ Jalal, 6; Shuja, *Crossed Swords*; Venkataramani, M.S, *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947–1958* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers 1982), 284.

⁹² Jalal, 6.

⁹³ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 98–101.

⁹⁴ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 36, 40

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁹⁶ Siddiqa, *The Military*, 43.

convinced that Pakistan's troubled relations with India and territorial disputes with Afghanistan would only be resolved through the army, which many felt was embedded in the region, unlike the political leadership that came from central India as Muhajirs (refugees). Hussain Haqqani argues that the Pakistani military deliberately weakened the political structure of the country in order to consolidate its political power.⁹⁷

10. Rise of Friction

Alfred Stepan argues that the military intervenes when friction between civilians and the military reaches a certain level.⁹⁸ He logically relates the civil-military relations in some countries of South America to the friction between the military and the democratic government in Pakistan?⁹⁹ Jordan Thomas also used this model to determine the level of civil-military friction in Turkey.¹⁰⁰ He says that military coups occur when the level of friction between the two institutions crosses acceptable limits. In Pakistan, the first signs of civil-military friction appear when General Ayub Khan was promoted to Army Chief, after superseding his two seniors. However, due to the hierarchical nature of the army, the resentments soon died down.

Obtaining and analyzing data from the selected four military coups and drawing conclusions will require an understanding of variable values, the causes of friction between civil-military relations, and their effects. Stepan is famous for explaining how a democratic regime, in which the military was highly politicized, could change into a democracy capable of civilian control of the military. He measured civil-military relations in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Spain as a function of the relative power and friction between military and elected governments.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 97, 265.

⁹⁸ Alfred C. Stepan, *The Military in Newly Democratic Regimes; the Dimension of Military Contestations-Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and Southern Cone.*; and Jordan K Thomas, *European Union's Impact on Turkey's Pattern Civil-Military Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 68–76.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 76.

¹⁰⁰ Jordan K Thomas, "European Union's Impact on Turkey's Pattern Civil-Military Relations" (M.S. thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, June 2005).

¹⁰¹ Serra, *The Military Transition*, 52.

I adapt the same model by defining four extreme edges of civil-military friction and military political power with the help of the following figure. The lower left corner of the figure depicts the ideal model of democratic civilian control where both friction and military power are low. Civilian control implies complete subservience of the military to elected officials. In this corner of the graph, it can be seen that civilians have more control over the military with regard to political issues and issues related to control over the defense budget. The United States and United Kingdom are cases in point where civilians exclusively control the defense budget, yet no signs of rifts are seen.

However, if the military attains more power compared to civilian institutions, as was the case in Pakistan, the military gains more prerogatives giving rise to civil-military tensions (see Figure 1)” In the first decade, civil-military friction rose in two forms. First, it was not clear how the new civilian leadership was going to handle the military, so different in India, where the Congress Party moved decisively to claim its position over the military by negotiating an institutional agreement; in Pakistan the power vacuum left a lot to power-grabbing among the politicians and some members of the military. Second, democratic elections would have replaced West Pakistani leadership with East Pakistani leadership, which was not reflected in the Punjabi majority military. This also made the military very insecure with West Pakistan politicians. This was reflected in the struggle that took place between Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as well as Mujib-ur-Rehman.




Figure 1. Stepan’s Model: Weak Political and Civilian Institutions.¹⁰³

Thomas Bruneau and Richard Goetze discuss how civilians can exert internal and external control over the military through institutional control such as spending. This includes the MOD as well an effective and efficient bureaucracy and legislators.¹⁰⁴ The military budget was subsequently increased during the first decade of Pakistan’s independence, due to an existential threat from India. With the army chief as defense minister, there were no checks and balances on the military’s spending. Rizvi argues that later on, the weak political government, in order to appease the army, kept its budget at an average of 60 percent of total expenditures until the occurrence of the coup.¹⁰⁵ Shuja Nawaz argues that the army’s influence increased because of shortages of trained civil servants and delays in framing the constitution. He points out that “Pakistan’s history is a conflict between an underdeveloped political system and the powerful army that grew in

¹⁰² Stepan, *The Military in Newly Democratic Regimes*, 68–76.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas Bruneau and Others, *Who Guards the Guardians and How, Democratic Civil-Military Relations, Ministry of Defense and Democratic Control* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 72.

¹⁰⁵ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 57.

political strength and numbers.”¹⁰⁶ The history of Pakistan and the circumstances that shaped its political structure and the emergence of its military will be argued in Chapter I, as well the evolution of civil military-relations at the time of Pakistan’s independence.

11. Crises of Leadership and Governance

Shuja Nawaz argues that Pakistan faced serious leadership crises immediately after the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and, due to the absence of any other acceptable leadership, has been facing leadership and governing crises ever since.¹⁰⁷

In contrast, in *The State of Martial Rule*, Ayesha Jalal rejects the idea that the weakness of the political system was the main variable explaining the first military intervention in Pakistan. She argues that in the quest for survival, the Pakistani military rose to a position of dominance. She attributes military intervention to a nexus between the top military and civil bureaucracies of Pakistan, which deliberately dismantled and derailed the political process. She also points toward the influences of London and Washington as contributory factors to military interventions in Pakistan.¹⁰⁸

I see a combination of factors that explains Pakistan’s history of military coups. First, the strongest factor was the powerful, professional, and opportunist military leadership, which found the occasion, disposition, and opportunity that was presented by a weak and disconnected political leadership. In addition, being a new state, there was fear for survival, which led the patriotic military to support military intervention. I will show that weak political institutions contributed to the professional military’s sense of connectivity to the new state, which was forming under a new regime after 1947.

Without doubt, the first coup had an effect on how the civil government worked with the military. The thirty-two years of military rule in the country are testimony to this. After the death of General Zia ul Haq in 1988, there was a common perception that the military would not take over again. However, the 1999 coup, by General Musharraf,

¹⁰⁶ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, XVII.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 527–528.

¹⁰⁸ Jalal, 3–5.

showed that the army is still a powerful political force. The prior coups were pro-active, while the coup of 1999, by General Musharraf, was reactive.¹⁰⁹ Although the reasons were different, the heightened tensions in civil-military relations, which have their roots in the 1958 coup, continue to contribute to the coups.

Currently, the tilt of civil-military relations in Pakistan is in favor of the army. It continues to remain at the helm of affairs as an arbitrator, while earlier it played the role of a ruler. Recent policy statements, which should come from civilian elected rulers, continue to be transmitted from army headquarters.¹¹⁰ The political leadership and the people still view the army as a kingmaker in the country. I will show the role the Pakistani army continues to play in the present democratic setup in my conclusion.

I. METHODOLOGY

A process-tracing method will be used to establish the dependent and independent variables determining the causes of coups and military interventions. It will also help identify the causes of rising military power vis-à-vis weak political institutions. The corporate interests of the military and its mood regarding intervention will also be analyzed through the process-tracing method. Military interventions and levels of friction have been identified as independent variables. Stepan's model helps establish the causes of friction in civilian-military relations. I will rely on three sources of information: newspapers, archives, and research and academic books and journals. Electronic and Internet sources will also be used to access relevant data.

J. THESIS OVERVIEW

I divide my arguments into four chapters. Chapter II covers the cause and the setting for the first military coup. Chapter III covers military rule (1958–1969) and civil-military relations during that period. It also discusses the economic conditions of the

¹⁰⁹ S. Iftikhar Murshed, "The Military Coups," *The News Pakistan*, March 7, 2011, www.thenews.com.pk (accessed September 1, 2011).

¹¹⁰ Iftikhar A. Khan, "Kayani to Stay on as CoAS till 2013," *The Dawn*, July 23, 2010 (accessed October 13, 2011).

country during the period of General Ayub Khan. Chapter IV is the conclusion and a description of the impact of the first coup on future civil-military relations in Pakistan.

II. UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST MILITARY COUP

A successful coup is considered to set the pattern for civil-military relations in a country. In Pakistan, the first successful coup occurred in 1958. This chapter provides the background and the causes of the first military coup in Pakistan, which was led by General Ayub Khan. The first coup changed the role of the military in the country and had a deep impact on subsequent civil-military relations in the sub-continent. What led to the coup and its specific consequences are the focus of this chapter.

A. INTRODUCTION

Militaries often play various roles in state formation and war making, from implementing state leaders' policies to intervening in politics—either by accepting being used in political disagreements, refusing to comply with the political elites' demands, or via coups. Charles Tilly illustrates that the politicization of the military is not a new phenomenon and dates back to 1400 BC when the Roman and Greek empires used militaries extensively to expand their dynasties and against internal opponents.¹¹¹

At the beginning of the 20th century (1917–1955), there were 28 new states formed in the world and, out of these, 13 states suffered coups.¹¹² Between 1950 and 2011, there were approximately 190 coup attempts in different parts of the world, including Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Uganda, Chile, Spain, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Argentina, Brazil, Algeria and Congo. In 2011, the last attempted coup took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo against Joseph Kabilla.¹¹³

The 20th century has seen three waves of democracy. These waves came during 1828–1926, 1943–1962 and the 1970s to the 1980s, each followed by reversals in the

¹¹¹ Charles Tilly, *How War Made States and Vice Versa, Coercion Capital and European States*, 83–85.

¹¹² Finer, *Horseback*, 3.

¹¹³ BBC News, April 1, 2010 /hr/1 Africa, The World Coup d' etats, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/> and Wikipedia, November 4, 2011, http://Wikipedia.org/wiki/org/list_of_coups (accessed on November 11, 2011).

form of military coups or the ascendancy of the authoritarian regimes.¹¹⁴ I contend that democratic transitions or reversals leading to coups result from a variety of reasons: Different political culture, legitimacy problems, lack of institutional consolidation or civil-military tensions.

Pakistan is one of the countries that have seen four successful military interventions, in 1958, 1969, 1977, and 1999. However, it is very important to understand Pakistan's first coup because it set the pattern for subsequent military coups in Pakistan and changed the trajectory of civil-military relations in the country. The Pakistani military clearly lies at the center of the country's politics and economy, and we need to understand the initial conditions that led to its entrance in politics. In order to understand the first coup, it is also important to understand how the British maintained civil-military relations in the sub-continent, as some of the influencing factors date back to Britain's recruitment policy in the subcontinent, before independence.

B. BRITISH RECRUITMENT POLICY BEFORE THE INDEPENDENCE OF PAKISTAN

From 1858–1947, the British ran two parallel administrations in India. The commander-in-chief (CNC) of the military and the civilian viceroy were separate in the execution of their duties. Both were directly controlled by London. After the viceroy, the CNC was the second most powerful authority in India and number two in protocol. At the operational level, the military and civilian authorities were equal. After 1833, the British placed another senior military advisor/budget officer directly under the civilian viceroy in order to assert control over the military budget (see Figure 2).¹¹⁵ All requests for funds of military aid and requirements were processed through him.¹¹⁶ Bruneau argues that civilian control can only be effective if the institutional set-up works effectively and the military budget is monitored in an efficient way.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Huntington, *The Third Wave, Democratization in the late Twentieth Century* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 34–38.

¹¹⁵ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 26–28.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, *State and Society*, 41.

¹¹⁷ Bruneau, *Who Guards the Guardians*, 72.




Figure 2. British Civil-Military Set-Up of Administration before Independence¹¹⁸

The British maintained effective civilian control over the military through their recruitment policy. The British army was kept professional and away from the influence of local politicians because the majority of army troops represented the locals. The British also devised a policy of recruiting more troops from the Muslim minority provinces rather than Hindu majority provinces.¹¹⁹ Recruiting troops from minority areas had four advantages. First, the British did not trust a majority of the Hindus after the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and quit-India movement against the British (1905–1911).¹²⁰ After the mutiny, most of the Indian regiments were re-organized into battalions with a mixture of soldiers of diverse cultures. Second, the Punjab and Frontier regions had favorable dispositions toward the army; therefore, the British relied more on these minority areas for recruitment.¹²¹ In addition, the people from those areas did not participate in the mutiny. Third, these people were not only loyal but also better warriors: the British

¹¹⁸ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 26–28.

¹¹⁹ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 44.

¹²⁰ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 50.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, *State and Society*, 38, 46, and *The Military and Politics*, 46–48.

earned good will among the majority Punjabi soldiers who, after returning home from leave, war or retirement, generally spoke very highly of the British Raj.¹²²

The recruitment policy adopted by the British had long-term effects on both India and Pakistan after their independence. A strong bond between the Punjabi people and the Pakistani military was created. People held them in great esteem, while the Indian army, with a mix of people from various regions, could not develop a strong civil-military bond.¹²³

C. FACTORS THAT SHAPED THE ASCENDENCY OF THE PAKISTANI ARMY

At the time of independence, Pakistan, along with India, inherited British institutions. However, because of the way the British Empire was set up, the Pakistani state inherited a weak bureaucracy and economy, but an intact military. It was not only professional, but maintained a centralized command, modern values and British traditions. The army leadership was organized, while civilian institutions were very fragile, and this imbalance significantly contributed to shaping the state formation process in Pakistan. Rizvi, in *The Military State and Society*, argues that the military stands out as a distinctive institution, in newly emerging states, as being highly disciplined and more oriented toward modern technologies, and that it has overwhelming control over the instrument of violence.¹²⁴ The bureaucracy reflects some of these characteristics, but the military takes the lead as it is in possession of guns, esprit de corps, intercommunication skills and hierarchical values. The political and civilian institutions hardly reflect these values.¹²⁵ Yet, as mentioned in Chapter I, the logistical foundations of the Pakistani army were very weak. Shuja Nawaz notes that “Pakistan army began life with a weak logistical infrastructure and a dependence on the Indian good will to transfer assets to Pakistan.”¹²⁶

¹²² Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 33.

¹²³ Jalal, 42–45.

¹²⁴ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 20.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 20–21.

¹²⁶ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 31.

1. Mission of the Pakistan Army

The Pakistani defense council first sat in September 1947 to define the mission of the Pakistani Military: to support the civil government and police in maintaining law and order and to prevent any tribal incursions. Its external role was to prevent aggression from minor powers and to defend against the major powers.¹²⁷ It shared 3,250 and 1,320 border miles with hostile India and Afghanistan, respectively.¹²⁸ The 450-mile Kashmir border had already been declared a war zone by Pakistan. Bruneau argues that in order to exert effective civilian control, its mission had to be properly defined.¹²⁹ I contend that, in the case of Pakistan, its mission was beyond the capabilities of the Pakistani army as it faced multiple challenges soon after partition, which included several problems: 1) escorting millions of refugees, 2) highly volatile internal and external challenges that included an existential threat from India, and 3) Duran Line disputes with Afghanistan. The suspicions of the Pakistani leadership soon became reality when India occupied the Muslim princely states of Junagadh and Hyderabad; then occupied Goa just a few years after independence.¹³⁰ Then, the Kashmir War of 1948 broke out and emerged as a permanent bone of contention between the two countries. As discussed in Chapter I, Pakistan was also facing external threats from Afghanistan. The internal security situation was also far from satisfactory, as mentioned in Chapter I.¹³¹ All of these factors transformed Pakistan into a state, facing existential threat from its neighbors. The Pakistani leadership, therefore, soon started looking to the United States for military training and aid.¹³²

Under these conditions, the foremost requirement of the leadership of Pakistan was to build a formidable defense and a powerful military. The first speech of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan highlighted the importance of a strong army. Liaquat Ali Khan

¹²⁷ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 66–68.

¹²⁸ Ibid., *The Military and Politics*, 42–45.

¹²⁹ Bruneau, *Who Guards the Guardians*, 33.

¹³⁰ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 48, 54–57.

¹³¹ Ibid., 42–45.

¹³² Ibid., 40–43.

said, “The defense of the state is our foremost consideration, it dominates all other governmental activities.”¹³³ These sentiments were widely shared by the migrated refugees from India who settled in major cities afterward, and became a strong political voice. Others who supported the strong army were Kashmiris and religious groups.¹³⁴ Thus, during the first eleven years of its independence, and until the first coup, Pakistan spent an average of 60.69 percent of its national budget on its defense (Table 1).¹³⁵

Table 1. Defense Expenditure 1947–1958 until Occurrence of the First Coup
(In Million Rupees)

Year	Defense Expenditure	Total Expenditure Met from Revenue	Defense expenditure as percentage of Total expenditure
1947-1948	153.8	236.0	65.16
1948-1950	550 (approx.)	750 (approx.)	72.06
1950-1952	700	1350	61.00
1952-1954	700	1400	56.00
1955-1956	917	1433	64.02
1956-57	800.9	1330	60.18
1957-58	854	1521	56.13

Source: Pakistan’s Defense Policy, Pakistan’s Horizon Vol, 36, No 1 (First Quarter 1983), 32–56 and Rizvi, *Military, State And Society In Pakistan*, 63.

In addition, the U.S. military also continued to provide military aid to Pakistan during this period. The extra burden of defense came at the cost of more economic deterioration, joblessness, and law-and-order problems for the newly born state of Pakistan, which further alienated the people from the politicians. It is worth pointing out that none of the above mentioned defense expenditures were spent on modernization of the defense industry or the research and development activities. The lack of defense

¹³³ Ibid., 62.

¹³⁴ Ibid., *State and Society*, 76.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 62.

industries made Pakistan more dependent on the West. In contrast, India focused on self-indigenization and remained inward looking during this period.¹³⁶

Due to the weak political structure of the country, defense and security policies were left to the bureaucrats and the top military leadership. After the formulation of the policy, both the military and civil bureaucrats had complete autonomy over the decision-making process. Similarly, no checks and balances or measures to implement an oversight mechanism of the defense budget were adopted.¹³⁷

Although the Pakistani army leadership was professional, it did not have any experience with reorganizing its army from scratch. It was, therefore, decided by Jinnah that the British CNC would command and train the Pakistani army leadership and reorganize its army for the first four years.¹³⁸ Administratively, the Pakistani army was under the command of the governor general of Pakistan, but operationally, it was under the British supreme commander and the viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten.¹³⁹ The British commanders responsible for the defense of Pakistan were highly professional, but they had no nationalistic feelings to defend Pakistan.¹⁴⁰ As a result, when the Kashmir war of 1948 broke out, the British CNC refused to send troops to Kashmir when ordered by the governor, Jinnah.¹⁴¹

I contend that this was the first incident where the army chief was reluctant to follow the orders of a democratic civilian leader. During this period, General Ayub Khan, who later became the first Pakistani CNC, was the major general and watched all these events closely.¹⁴²

By the time Ayub took over command of the Pakistani army in October 1951, it had already established itself as the most powerful, central and hierarchical institution,

¹³⁶ Ibid., 61.

¹³⁷ Ibid., *State and Society*, 77.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 54–57.

¹³⁹ Jalal, 42–45.

¹⁴⁰ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 60.

¹⁴¹ Siddiqa, *The Military*, 33.

¹⁴² Ibid., 35.

compared to other institutions. Rizvi argues that, at the time of independence, the institutional balance had already been created between the British trained Pakistan army and the other weak institutions.¹⁴³ Ayub Khan had also inherited the same traditions and a “superior mindset from the British.” Rizvi and Finer argue, “The military always occupies a distinctive position when new nations emerge.”¹⁴⁴ Lack of political and institutional control in Pakistan, and dependency on the Pakistani army by the political leadership, soon became factors that led to Pakistani military officers, along with some civilians, being apprehended while conspiring to plan a coup just a few years after independence.

2. Nationalism and Existential Threats

Soon after the partition, existential threats to the country, such as in the Kashmir War of 1948, the Baluchistan Insurgency, and skirmishes with Afghanistan, brought the people and army to one platform. Finer argues that, in some instances, nationalism drives the army to intervene. For this reason, just four years after the inception of Pakistan, two attempts to cause military interventions were foiled.¹⁴⁵ The first attempt was staged by General Akbar Khan, which became known as the “Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case” (1951). In this coup plot, some of the activists in civil society also played a part, such as the poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz, who was an owner of the newspaper, *The Pakistan Times*.¹⁴⁶ The second conspiracy to stage a coup, by some of the middle ranking officers, was also foiled in 1953. General Akbar, the then divisional commander during the Kashmir War, was instrumental in the planning of a coup. These officers were convinced that civilian leadership was incompetent and not capable of retaking Kashmir. They considered them more as patriots and viewed the government as incompetent. The important thing was that military intelligence unearthed the coup. The officers were court-martialed accordingly, and sentenced.¹⁴⁷ Rizvi argues that, until this time, the civilians had control

¹⁴³ Ibid., *Military and Politics*, 20–21.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., *State and Society*, 40.

¹⁴⁵ Finer, *Horse Back*, 27, 31 and 45.

¹⁴⁶ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 79.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

exercised control over the Pakistan military, and the military leadership, until this time, was loyal to the civilian leadership.¹⁴⁸

This aspect also highlights the fact that, until 1951, the top army leadership maintained a professional posture and was not interested in attempting a coup. Some scholars attribute it to the fact that army was not involved in initial coup plots because it still adhered to British professional traditions. While some argue that the army leadership thoroughly wanted to discredit the politicians before taking over, I argue that although the coup planning was unsuccessful, it did have some effect and influenced the thinking of the military leadership.

In addition, the Pakistani army was also facing serious external threats from Afghanistan. Soon after the independence of Pakistan, Afghanistan raised the issue of annexing the NWFP province in Afghanistan, followed by a raid on Pakistan in September 1950.¹⁴⁹ Finer and Siddiq explain that a country that has a history of wars and perceives an existential threat becomes dependent on its army and considers it a savior of the state.¹⁵⁰

D. POLITICAL TENSIONS IN THE CIVILIAN SECTOR

After the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistani politicians found it extremely difficult to establish links with the people and Pakistan clearly suffered from an incompetent and incapable leadership. In the absence of a constitution, and with a lack of unity among politicians, democracy could not really flourish in Pakistan. The political leaders of Pakistan not only failed to create institutions, but they also failed to fulfill the basic economic needs of the people. Ayesha argues that the political process went off the rails well before the first military coup in 1958, when Liaquat Ali Khan failed to frame the first constitution of Pakistan, until his death four years after the independence of Pakistan.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 79–81.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 54.

¹⁵⁰ Finer, *Horse Back*, 31, 45.

¹⁵¹ Jalal, 140.

The economic conditions of the country were deteriorating along with the political institutions of the country. By late 1951, the national economy had slipped into very bad shape. The value of exports fell by 20 percent and the prices of imports escalated to around 40 percent.¹⁵² Foreign exchange reserves had dropped to an all-time low. Trade policies were framed to benefit a few industrialists while not caring about the masses. The steps taken by the politicians continued to foster the distrust of the people due to the poor economic situation, joblessness and poverty.

1. The Rise of Religious Forces

Other factors included the rise of regional and parochial forces, political corruption and the open defiance of the norms of the parliamentary system.¹⁵³ Internal division among the Muslim League further fragmented the political leaders as they kept switching their allegiances to promote their own self-interests. This vacuum was readily filled in by religious parties that succeeded in acting as major pressure groups, despite a poor track record in electoral representation.

In order to assert control over democratic institutions, weak politicians forged alliances with religious forces to justify an extremely centralized system of governance, in which the economic, political and cultural rights of various ethnic identities in Pakistan were denied.¹⁵⁴ This policy was to resonate for decades as Pakistan struggled to keep itself afloat. Issues of political authority, culture, language and economic justice gained eminence in the post-partition era.

Religious parties further weakened the already fragile political infrastructure by arousing the sentiments of the people to the detriment of the minorities. Finally, politicians succumbed to pressure for the first time in the history of Pakistan. The word “ideology” was introduced, in 1953, during Punjab disturbances against a religious minority, the Ahmadis.¹⁵⁵ In this context, a resolution was passed stating that the

¹⁵² Ibid., 141.

¹⁵³ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 57.

¹⁵⁴ Jalal, 143.

¹⁵⁵ Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah To Zia* (Lahore Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 1979), 25.

ideology of Pakistan would be based on Islam, and no one challenged it.¹⁵⁶ The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-e-Azam), never used the phrase “Ideology of Pakistan.” The “Two-nation Theory,” for him, was a means to bargain for maximum autonomy and the preservation of the social, economic and political rights of the Muslim community. Political leadership was thus forced to bank on the slogan of Islam for the unity of the politicians. This entailed a total deviation from the vision of Jinnah and the first step toward radicalizing or undermining the very cause and essence of establishing a democratic state. Several steps that initiated extremist trends were taken to appease religious scholars and Ulemas who had decided to play a decisive role in molding the newly founded state as a theocracy. Interestingly, these very Ulemas were opposed to the creation of Pakistan on the principle that Islam needed no territorial recognition. Most of them were against partition and criticized Muhammad Ali Jinnah on his efforts for Pakistan as being un-Islamic.¹⁵⁷ They were also highly critical of Jinnah and the entire Muslim League leadership as being Westernized and un-Islamic.¹⁵⁸ However, once Pakistan became a reality, they took it upon themselves to take charge of the situation and purge the country.¹⁵⁹ Interestingly, the religious parties were also divided as to who was to lead and who was to follow, as the leaders belonged to different sects. The three religious leaders and groups like Allama Mushriki, Maudidi and Majlis-i-Ahrar (religious group) had totally opposite views and divided opinions about the following of Islamic principles.¹⁶⁰

A religious leader, Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi, believed that the creation of Pakistan had produced an opportunity for the resurgence of Islam. He tried to form a nexus of religion-minded people who were ardent followers of Islam, to seize power using all available means for expanding the influence of Islam.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 26.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 51.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 37–38

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 53.

¹⁶⁰ Jalal, 143.

¹⁶¹ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Military and Mosque* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brookings Press, 2005), 21–22.

Finally, the internal division among politicians and religious leaders compelled them to look to the army to resolve their differences. Ayesha Siddiqa argues that this vacuum and intrusion is responsible for the present morass, fragmentation of leadership, and the ascendancy of the army, which took the reins of power into their own hands.¹⁶²

2. Ethnic Discrimination

Most of the ruling elite and feudal lords belonged to West Pakistan. This included the religious leaders as well. They not only deprived the minorities of their rights, but also declared the followers of the Ahmedi sect to be un-Islamic. In parallel, a Cinderella treatment was meted out to the majority Bengali population. Major resources, aid and donations were being diverted to the development of West Pakistan. The quota in civil bureaucracy and the military was only marginal. Rizvi argues that, until 1967, the majority Bengalis represented only 7 percent of the strength of the army.¹⁶³ These events began to antagonize the feelings of the Bengalis. Jalal argues that the ruling elite of West Pakistan missed the pulse of the Bengalis by an arm's length by not making Bengali one of the national languages. Instead, the Urdu language was declared the only official language of Pakistan.¹⁶⁴ This step sowed another seed of hatred in the Bengali population. The army was used to stamp out the police strike in Bengal; the policemen were only agitating against delays in receipt of pay. Disproportionate use of force by politicians in Bengal also angered local Bengalis. An imminent Indian threat was projected, however only 2 percent of the army was employed on the borders for the defense of East Pakistan.¹⁶⁵ A slogan made famous by the politicians and the military elite was used during this period: "The defense of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan."¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Ayesha Siddiqa, "Enticing the People," *The Dawn Pakistan*, August 22, 2008, www.thedawn.com.pk/august2008 (accessed December 2, 2011).

¹⁶³ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 152.

¹⁶⁴ Jalal, 85 and Rizvi, *State and Society*, 115.

¹⁶⁵ Jalal, 85 and Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 150–153.

¹⁶⁶ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 155.

The final collapse of the political government began with the emergence of a political crisis in East Pakistan in March 1958, when the then chief minister failed to get a budget passed and this ended in a tussle between him and the then governor, Fazl ul Haq. It resulted in the removal of the two chief ministers and a governor.¹⁶⁷ The president had to impose presidential rule in East Pakistan, which lasted for two months before the first military intervention of October 1958.

E. POLITICAL BUREAUCRATIC TENSIONS

With independence, Pakistan inherited a few highly skilled bureaucrats. They were British trained, experienced, seasoned and efficient. At the time of British, bureaucratic recruitment was throughout India and was competitive, based purely on merit: those selected were the best brains of their times. Due to the deterioration of the political institutions, these bureaucrats became the sole drivers of the country's policies and occupied the most important positions in Pakistan's bureaucracy. Shuja argues that a trio comprised of civilian bureaucrat Iskandar Mirza, the (secretary of defense) and Ghulam Muhammad, (the secretary of finance) and the then army chief, General Ayub Khan, dominated the state institutions with the help of the Judiciary.¹⁶⁸ The two bureaucrats were the most senior officers in the Indian civil service at the time of independence. Both were given the opportunity, to dominate civilian institutions due to weak political leadership and their internal differences.

Immediately after the death of Quaid-e-Azam, Khawaja Nazimudin, a prominent politician from Bengal, who took over as the governor general, was made prime minister after the death of Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951.¹⁶⁹ Ghulam Muhammad, from the position of the secretary of finance became the Governor General. In parallel, both bureaucrats manipulated the promotion of one of their friends, General

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., *State and Society*, 74–76.

¹⁶⁸ Shuja Nawaz and Nadia Ghani, *Field Marshal Ayub Khan: A Selection of Talk and Interviews* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) and Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 139.

¹⁶⁹ Jalal, 137.

Ayub Khan as the commander in chief of the army, by superseding his three seniors.¹⁷⁰
The troika started playing musical chairs with the weak politicians.

It is worth pointing out that, in the absence of a constitution during that period, the governor general was more powerful than the prime minister as he could dissolve the cabinet as well as sack the prime minister himself.¹⁷¹

Justice (retired) Sharif Hussain, who is a prominent author of various law journals in Pakistan argues:

Pakistan might have been a different country today, if some events, which changed the course of its history, were averted. Almost all these events are attributable to the conduct and performance of the civil and military bureaucracy, the politicians, the landed aristocracy and the superior judiciary.¹⁷²

In the absence of a weak political infrastructure, most of the bureaucrats transgressed their authority and connived with every ruler. Some of them were Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Muhammad Ali Bogra and Iskander Mirza, who directly ruled the country as head of government and the state.

The second Prime Minister after Liaquat Ali Khan, Khawaja Nazim was a very sincere politician; however, the bureaucracy did not like his way of governance and the fact that he represented Bengalis. Therefore, Ghulam Muhammad dismissed him on April 17, 1953.¹⁷³ Against his dismissal orders, the then speaker of the national assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin, filed a petition in the Sind High Court. The British justice, A.R Cornelius, decided that the governor general exceeded his constitutional limits and suspended his dismissal orders.¹⁷⁴ The government appealed to the Supreme Court. Justice Muhammad Munir, who was the Chief Justice of Pakistan, suspended the orders of the Sind High Court and upheld the orders of the governor general, by evoking

¹⁷⁰ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 33.

¹⁷¹ Jalal, 62.

¹⁷² Justice (Retd) Sharif Hussain Bukhari, "*Judgments- Changing the Course of History*," www.qlc.edu.pk/publications (accessed November 15, 2011).

¹⁷³ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 66.

¹⁷⁴ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 126.

a doctrine called the “*Law of necessity*.”¹⁷⁵ This law, passed by the Supreme Court had three effects: (1) Both the military and the bureaucracy became the unchallenged king-makers of the country, and further cornered the politicians. This decision became a handy tool for subsequent military interventions as well. (3) The bureaucracy and the army leadership could rely on the judiciary to further their illegitimate role in the country.

During this period, the speaker of the national assembly was murdered. This led the Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad, to dissolve the national assembly on October 25, 1954 and assemble a new cabinet with Muhammad Ali Bogra, (another bureaucrat) as the Prime Minister. Rizvi argues that “had Ghulam Muhammad not enjoyed the support of the army, he could not have dismissed the first constituent assembly.”¹⁷⁶ Immediately after dissolution of the assembly, the army chief, Ayub Khan, was formally inducted into the new cabinet as a defense minister, in addition to being army chief.¹⁷⁷ I contend that Ayub’s elevation was a reward for backing up the bureaucrat turned governor general.

The dissolution of the assembly further marginalized the politicians and strengthened the bureaucratic-military nexus. The civil bureaucrats, with the backing of army, kept changing prime ministers and further discredited the politicians before the public.¹⁷⁸

In another significant development, Iskandar Mirza turned into a key player in the power game and became the fourth governor general of Pakistan on August 18, 1955 when Ghulam Muhammad went on sick leave.¹⁷⁹ To ensure his confirmation as governor general, he dismissed his contender, Muhammad Ali Bogra, and replaced him with Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, another bureaucrat, as the fourth prime minister.¹⁸⁰

During this period, the government came under severe pressure by the majority Bengali population to reframe the constitution. Eventually, the constitution was

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 77.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., *State and Society*, 80.

¹⁷⁸ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 130.

¹⁷⁹ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 66–67.

¹⁸⁰ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 128.

formalized, under pressure from religious parties as well, on 23 March 1956. It declared Pakistan to be an Islamic state with a parliamentary form of the government. Under this new constitution, Iskandar Mirza took over as the first president, while Chaudhry Muhammad Ali continued as the prime minister.

Mirza, instead of acting as a constitutional president, tried to serve as a bureaucrat. This led to differences with the then prime minister, Muhammad Ali, which resulted in the sacking of Muhammad Ali, who was replaced by a Bengali politician, Mr. Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy on September 12, 1956. Mr. Suharwardy was a leading lawyer and a veteran politician. He also tried to be independent in pursuit of his foreign policy goals. This again led to the eruption of serious differences between him and the president.¹⁸¹ He was made to resign from parliament, without seeking a vote of confidence, on October 10, 1957. After him, Chundrigarh took over as the sixth prime minister. However, he resigned after just two months.

Lastly, a powerful feudal lord and well-known politician from Punjab, Feroz Khan Noon, took over as the seventh prime minister. He dedicated himself to conducting successful general elections in 1959. The atmosphere became political and there was a good likelihood that the Muslim League, under the leadership of Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, was gaining popularity in Pakistan. The brewing of a political climate in the country panicked the powerful bureaucracy-military nexus. In the prevailing circumstances, Ayub Khan and Iskandar Mirza pressured Noon to postpone the elections.¹⁸² The Prime Minister refused to do so. Meanwhile, he formed his own Republican party by mustering some of the deserters of the Muslim League. Iskandar Mirza also sent a secret telegram to the United States, while stating that “the politicians, who may come to power after elections were socialists who may endanger the democratic process and bring in communism.”

Shuja argues that with a tacit green light from the United States and army leadership he dissolved the assemblies and imposed martial law making General Ayub

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 130–131.

¹⁸² Ibid., 152–153.

the chief martial law administrator on October 7, 1958.¹⁸³ By then, the country had already reached the brink of its political crisis. The ushering in of martial law also closed the doors of rule for the civil bureaucracy permanently. Thus, the first eleven-year period in the history of Pakistan was dominated by the civil bureaucracy. After just nineteen days of martial law, Ayub Khan overthrew Iskanadar Mirza on October 27, 1958 and sent him into exile in England. During the first eleven years of independence, seven prime ministers and eight cabinets had been changed.

F. POLITICAL MILITARY TENSIONS

Another factor that contributed to the politicization of the army and improved its confidence was when the government asked it to run the internal administration of the country, immediately after independence. The weak civilian institutions were unable to control the internal and external threats to the country as it lacked basic resources, a work force and an industrial set-up. An internal crisis arose when the Khan of Kalat from Baluchistan refused to join Pakistan. The army was subsequently sent to quell the rebellion. Serra argues that, in order to demonstrate effective civilian control, the army had to be kept away from the civilian sectors of administration.¹⁸⁴ The civilians did otherwise in Pakistan. In 1948, anti-police riots in Bangladesh, in 1951 (Balouch Insurgency) and 1953 (anti Ahmedi Riots), the army was extensively used to suppress riots. Martial law was imposed in major cities of Punjab. Successful army actions on the internal front had two effects: (1) improvement of the army's confidence that it could handle civil affairs better than the civilians; (2) it started viewing civilian leadership as incompetent and unable to run its affairs.¹⁸⁵ The army was involved, by order of the politicians, to assist civilians, also. The army remained widely involved in resolving the socio-economic problems of the people as well. It undertook massive relief operations in cyclone-affected areas while providing food and shelter. Army engineers restored means of transport, including repairs to bridges, railway and telephone networks. In 1951, 1952

¹⁸³ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 151.

¹⁸⁴ Serra, *The Military Transition*, 73.

¹⁸⁵ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 81.

and 1954, the army remained involved in an anti-locust drive, which saved standing crops, and conducted anti-salinity and water logging operations successfully in Sindh.¹⁸⁶ I contend that these factors were sufficient for the people to consider army leadership as their role model, compared to the weak politicians. Shuja argues that Ayub Khan, after seeing political decay, started thinking about creating an office of supreme commander of the armed forces, with himself as a supreme commander and *ex-officio* member of a cabinet with a view to stop the interference of politicians in the internal affairs of the country.¹⁸⁷ Shuja, while quoting an Ayub memoir, points out that Ghulam Muhammad, who was the prime minister in 1953, offered Ayub Khan the opportunity to take over the country, but Ayub declined.¹⁸⁸

I contend that Ayub did not take over at this stage because he was still maintaining the professional values of the British. However, some argue that the army did not take over in 1953 because the army leadership wanted to see a complete collapse of the political infrastructure and wanted to discredit the politicians before publicly taking over.

The influence of military leadership in the affairs of state further increased during the period of President Mirza because of his personal friendship with General Ayub. Also, Mirza's previous military background, as well his close ties as secretary of defense with the military, played a part.¹⁸⁹

As evidence, when the military was employed in an anti-smuggling drive in East Pakistan, some of the politicians, who were backing the smugglers, tried to exert influence over army leadership through the prime minister to curtail the anti-smuggling operations. The army chief, in turn, told the president to stop the prime minister from interfering in the army's operations. Subsequently, the president ordered Prime Minister Noon, not to interfere in the army's anti-smuggling drive.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., *The Military and Politics*, 78.

¹⁸⁷ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 89.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 89.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 78–79.

The above evidence suggests that by the mid-fifties (three years before the first coup), the army had been heavily politicized and the army chief had become a key player in the decision-making processes of the country, not only in defense, but in foreign affairs also, as the bureaucrats-turned-politicians were no match for the powerful military. In 1956, the tenure of the army chief, General Ayub, was extended to another term of five years.¹⁹¹ By this time, Mirza had realized his mistake of concentrating a disproportionate amount of power to Ayub, but Shuja argues that by then, it was too late for the president to remove Ayub.

During this period, the mistrust between Ayub and the president had also grown, as Ayub started bypassing the president in all dealings with the Americans.¹⁹² Shuja argues that while quoting U.S. consular, General Frisk, that by March 1957, some of the army generals had openly started saying that “they would not employ such low characters as politicians even as clerks.”¹⁹³ Finer called this a sense of syndicalism and a national interest, when the military begins to draw their own notions and judgment as to what is right or wrong for a nation. They also consider themselves as guardian of the state.¹⁹⁴

G. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE AND MILITARY AID

I contend that one of the factors that influenced the army to intervene was its interaction with developed countries. Soon after the partition, the military leadership started looking toward developed military powers to seek training to thwart external threats.¹⁹⁵ Due to unfriendly neighbors and emerging war rhetoric with India on the Kashmir issue, the civilian leadership also felt the need to procure new equipment and modernize its military as per Western training standards. Finer and Rizvi argue that “the military has learned to use modern skills on par with modern armies.”¹⁹⁶ Soon Ayub

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 100.

¹⁹² Ibid., 150.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Finer, *Horse Back*, 26.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 40–43.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., *The Military and Politics*, 42–45 and Finer, *Horse Back*, 7.

Khan established contacts with the United States while bypassing the weak civilian leadership.¹⁹⁷ I contend that, in a fragmented and backward society like Pakistan, the army leadership established itself as a role model and maintained a distinct identity. Rizvi, in *The Military State and Society* argues, “an institutional imbalance was created between the Pakistan army and other institutions because of continued interaction of the Pakistani army with the West.”¹⁹⁸ Rizvi also points out that:

The interaction of the Pakistani military with the West channeled ideas and doctrines from abroad which had implications for domestic and social-political and security affairs. These social changes enabled Ayub Khan to evaluate the Pakistani society in terms of backwardness.¹⁹⁹

Siddiqa argues that “the tacit support from the West ultimately translated into institutional imbalance and the rise of the political strength of the military. This aspect also bolstered the image of the military and the society and civilian institutions.”²⁰⁰ I argue that the Indian army officers did not form any treaty and peace accords with the West. They remained part of the same culture and society, thus a vacuum did not develop between Indian society and the army. SEATO and CENTO membership also gave immense exposure to Pakistani army officers. This fact has been acknowledged by Pakistani as well as Indian scholars.²⁰¹ I have deduced that if there is much of an intellectual vacuum between the civil and military leadership, it unbalances the equilibrium and provides an opportunity for the military to intervene. During this period, the decay and fragmentation of political institutions could be seen, which was in sharp contrast to the emerging modern military leadership that had further honed its skills by interacting with modern countries and technological advancements.²⁰²

One of the factors that improved the confidence of military leadership to incite a coup was the favorable attitude of United States towards military leadership. During the

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 41.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., *State and Society*, 20 and 79.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Siddiqa, *Military*, 67.

²⁰¹ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 139, and Jalal, 33.

²⁰² Rizvi, *State and Society*, 79.

period of the cold war, the United States was desperately looking for staunch allies in South Asia in the neighborhood of the Soviet Union and China in order to counter communism and socialism. The United States' inclination toward Pakistan was based on four main points: Pakistan's proximity to the Soviet Union, which could offer the United States opportunities to watch Soviet moves; the country's proximity to the Persian Gulf (which could enable Pakistan to defend vital sea transportation routes for oil to the U.S.); the ideological closeness of Pakistan to countries of the Middle East and the comradeship of Pakistan with China, which could help the United States befriend China.²⁰³ America's leadership was also eying the deteriorating political situation in Pakistan. It saw its best alternative in Ayub Khan, as he was pro-West, modern and a charismatic leader. During that period, Pakistan-U.S. relations could be seen more in terms of inter-military relations than in terms of civilian-civilian relations. Shuja argues that "the U.S. noted that the army was the only institution free from rivalries and was identified as most suitable to serve U.S. interests."²⁰⁴

H. THE ARMY'S PRESTIGE

The Pakistani military was not only professional; it was also hierarchical and maintained a distinct identity by remaining away from society. Finer argues that the army takes a distinct shape because of its unique culture, corporate identity and cohesiveness. While comparatively staying away from public, their public image remained high.²⁰⁵ Successful results obtained by the Pakistani army in the 1948 Kashmir War further broadened the image of the army before the public. Rizvi explains that Ayub Khan's thinking started to change in 1954 when the former Prime Minister (Ghulam Muhammad) offered him, the job of taking over the administration of the country.²⁰⁶

²⁰³ Doctor Qaisar Rashid, *The Moment of Truth*, 65.
News,<http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=47858&Cat=9&dt=5/19/2011> (accessed October 19, 2011).

²⁰⁴ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 149.

²⁰⁵ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 21.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, *State and Society*, 71.

The decay in political leadership and civilian Institutions led Ayub to believe that it was in the nation's best interest that he should save the country from corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. Finer has deliberated on this problem of national interest in depth and he argues that this belief stems from a unique mission in a society and awareness of its self-sacrificial values. The military in Pakistan also considers itself a servant of the state and not of the politicians. Finer argues that this was the driving force of the coups in many countries. I contend that Ayub Khan also began to think himself as the servant of the state and not the politicians, which later inclined him to affecting the military coup.²⁰⁷

I. FINAL COLLAPSE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The final collapse of the political government began with the emergence of the political crisis in East Pakistan, in March 1958, when the chief minister failed to get a budget passed, and this ended in a tussle between him and the governor, Fazlul Haq. This resulted in the removal of the two chief ministers and a governor by the president.²⁰⁸ The president had to impose presidential rule in East Pakistan, which lasted two months. Meanwhile, in West Pakistan, President, Iskandar Mirza, also imposed martial law as the political situation was out of control. This was the last nail in Mirza's coffin. Rizvi explains that, by 1958, the corruption, black marketing, the shortage of food and joblessness forced the people out of their homes.²⁰⁹ The government treasury was empty and foreign exchange reserves had shrunk to 240 million rupees.²¹⁰ There was widespread industrial unrest and labor unions struck. The impotent leadership failed to deliver and people started looking to the army as their saviors. Ayaz Gul argues that "the

²⁰⁷ Finer, *Horse Back*, 29–31.

²⁰⁸ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 83.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 83.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 84.

general perception among the people on the coup was that only the army could bring back prosperity and peace.”²¹¹ Whereas Rizvi argues, “there was a feeling of relief among the general public.”²¹²

Ayub Khan was also heard to say, on many occasions, that the political leadership was inept and unable to run the affairs of the country.²¹³ This is what has been termed by Finer when the military assumes itself as guardian of the state.²¹⁴ There are two instances before the actual military intervention where Ayub was getting poised to overthrow the government. He toured both East and West Pakistan extensively in 1957 and gave the people first-hand information and apprised the political leaders about the deteriorating political situation.²¹⁵ He was quoted as saying that “if people want me then I will not shirk my duty.”²¹⁶

J. OCCASION, DISPOSITION, MOOD, AND OPPORTUNITY

Finer explains that that the military intervenes when it has mood, opportunity and disposition.²¹⁷ This is what finally happened in Pakistan as the political parties provided the Pakistani military the opportunity, occasion and disposition to intervene. Ayub Khan was also inspired by the geo-political changes going on around the world as mentioned earlier. Rizvi and Finer argue that various instances of coup around the world also influenced the military leadership (coup in Egypt 1952, Iraq and Burma 1958).²¹⁸ The political deadlock, weak economy, support of the people and judiciary provided the

²¹¹ Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Coup React” *Date Line, Voice of America*, [www.fas.org/news/Pakistan/1/999/indexayubkhane notes.com](http://www.fas.org/news/Pakistan/1/999/indexayubkhane%20notes.com) (accessed December 3, 2012).

²¹² Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 88.

²¹³ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 149.

²¹⁴ Finer, *Horse Back*, 47.

²¹⁵ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 85–86.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 83.

²¹⁷ Finer, *Horse Back*, 60–63 and 71.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 3–4 and Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 85.

military the occasion, opportunity and disposition to intervene. The imposition of martial law was the last nail in the coffin of the then president by again inviting the army to take over control of the country.

Bruneau and Scott Tollesfson argue that tension may arise when the military is compelled to rescue society from corrupt politicians.²¹⁹ Later, General Ayub sentenced more than 200 civil bureaucrats for corruption charges after initiating the military coup. The military took over from the president, without any violence or bloodshed. The Supreme Court legitimized the military coup while declaring that military coups are a natural phenomenon and a routine matter in different parts of the world, while citing examples of all around coups.

My general findings of the first coup, as also shown in Figure 3, are:

- Weak political institutions and corrupt politicians who had no grass-root level support.
- Lack of institutional control and delay in formation of constitution.
- Powerful and professional army, brimming with the sense of nationalism, corporate interests.
- Involvement in internal security and administrative duties that could otherwise have been resolved politically.
- Internal and external threats and the clean and incorrupt army that emerged as a savior of the state.
- The Punjabi army had roots amongst the people.
- External influence and modern education created a divide between the less educated society and the modern army.
- Effect of influence on all-around coups in the world.
- Development of Bureaucracy-military nexus.
- Finally, occasion, opportunity, disposition and mood.

²¹⁹ Bruneau and Scott Tollesfson, *Who Guards the Guardians*, 25.




Figure 3. Causes of The First Coup in Pakistan

K. CONCLUSION

This chapter examines the various reasons for the cause of the first military coup in Pakistan. In order to understand the reasons for the first coup, this chapter looked at the emergence of the civil military relations in the Indo-Pak sub-continent at the time of the British. The British had devised an effective civilian control over the military because: (1) Military authorities were dependent on the civilian viceroy for its budget requirement, (2) The army was kept professional by insulating it from the influence of the local politicians, (3) Recruiting more troops more from minority areas, like Punjab, as they were better warriors, and (4) The British devised policies where it generated a good will among the locals (recruitment areas) by offering more perks and privileges to

soldiers. This resulted in the creation of a strong military bond between the people of Punjab and the army. Most of the recruitment areas later formed part of Pakistan in 1947.

I contend that after partition, the Pakistan military was already professional and had inherited British traditions and professionalism. On the other hand, the political leadership who had advocated for the cause of Pakistan had no roots among the people. Pakistan's problems were compounded when its leadership died soon after partition, thus leaving a vacuum in the country. In the absence of a constitution, democracy could not really flourish as post-independence Pakistan had only one political party, i.e., the Muslim League. This created a vacuum readily filled by religious parties that succeeded in acting as a major pressure group, despite a poor track record in electoral representation. These events further collapsed the political institutions.

Issues of political authority, culture, language and economic justice gained eminence in the post-partition era. A decay in political institutions led to the rise of a strong bureaucracy and the army nexus, which further damaged the political institutions. The bureaucrats replaced seven prime ministers and eight constitutions, which further discredited the politicians before the public. These events further damaged the civilian institutions, while the Pakistan army continued to rise in power and authority, because Pakistan was mired in internal and external problems after partition. It faced existential threats from both India and Afghanistan, and internally, its two provinces were facing insurgency. Pakistan, in a quest for survival, military aid and training formed alliances with the United States. The regular interaction of a weak army with a modern Western state made its leadership a modern thinker, while the society remained backward and illiterate. In India, the army mirrored society.

I contend that the first coup in Pakistan was caused by weak political institutions and divided politicians who had no grass roots level support. A lack of institutional control and a delay in the formation of a constitution, plus a powerful and professional army brimming with a sense of nationalism, also contributed to the coup. Other factors include: syndicalism, patriotism and corporate interest, internal security and administrative duties that could otherwise have been resolved politically, and internal and external threats along with a clean and non-corrupt army that presented itself as a savior

of the state. External influences and modern education caused a division between the less educated society and the modern army. Also, occasion, opportunity, disposition, and a rise in civil-military friction affected the first coup.

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III. MILITARY RULE (1958–1969) AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The authoritarian regime of Ayub Khan's from 1958–1969 led to further weakening of the democratic institutions, laying the groundwork for the second military coup Ayub's policies. During this period, the country also saw rapid economic growth, which ultimately brought income inequalities due to lack of effective redistributive policies that gave rise to regional and intraregional disparities. These disparities led to the emergence of anti-military socioeconomic forces, which were exploited by political forces, due to a lack of representative institutional building. Specifically, this chapter explains Ayub's treatment of the Bengalis, opposition parties and civilians that led to civilian strife. Finally, this chapter explains Ayub's downfall because of his authoritarian policies and non-adoption of a representative political culture.

In expounding upon the history of Ayub's regime and policies and then eventually his downfall, I illustrate here that various factors play a role in regime formation and regime downfall.

Ayub restored the confidence of the people by immediately addressing the root causes of economic mismanagement and corrupt practices by civil bureaucrats. He managed to bring corruption under control by adopting good administrative techniques. Isharat argues that the strength of Ayub's success can mostly be attributed to good administrative techniques, adoption of the right strategies and consistent formulation of economic policies.²²⁰ These steps also brought the prices of basic commodities under control. General Ayub successfully brought the sagging economy of Pakistan out of crisis. However, his economic policies generally favored the urban population and focused on benefitting the upper middle class and a private sector in the West, while creating regional and intra-regional economic disparities within Pakistan. The biggest impact was felt by the Bengalis and the non-Punjabi rural class.

²²⁰ Ishrat Husain, "Economic Policies under Shoaib," www.iba.edu.pk/economic_policies_under_shoaibJuly1999, (accessed January 10, 2012).

A. TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES

The ultimate beneficiaries of Ayub's industrial policies were targeted people from the private sector and the urban and industrial classes, whereas low-level industrial workers were further deprived and saw their salaries lowered. Ayub introduced revolutionary measures in the industrial sector, which included policies like trade liberalization and import and export incentives while taking maximum advantage of foreign aid. During Ayub's period, Pakistan became one of the fastest growing nations in Asia, with growth at 7 percent. Pakistan's industry grew by 72 percent, compared with 55 percent as the average industrial growth rate of Asian countries.²²¹ His period, prior to the 1965 War, saw a 17 percent rise in the manufacturing sector.²²² However, the wages of industrial workers dropped 12 percent between 1954 and 1967.²²³

During this growth period, the state diverted income from agriculture resources to the industrial sector, which created rapid growth in the urban sector. This would have been an effective policy if the benefits had been distributed in rural areas as well as across the country; however, that was not implemented. Earnings from jute, especially from East Pakistan were also spent on the industrialization of the urban West, which later became a symbol of regional exploitation.²²⁴ At the same time migration into the urban sector limited because of the geographical differences. Before the period of Ayub Khan, the difference in per capita income between East and West Pakistan was 30 percent. However, at the end of Ayub's era (1969), the difference had grown to 61 percent.²²⁵ The rapid industrial growth during Ayub's period gave rise to two factors: regionalism and class inequalities.²²⁶ Ian Talbot argues that between 1961 and 1967, only 22 percent of the loans taken from the Pakistan Investment and Industrial Corporation were diverted to

²²¹ Omar Noman, *A Political and Economic History Since Independence, Military Rule and Civil War*: London and New York, Kegan Paul International Press, Revised Edition, 1992.41,37.

²²² *Ibid.*, 37.

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 40.

East Pakistan, while the rest were spent in West Pakistan.²²⁷ Ayub's policies brought not only inter-wing economic disparities but intra-provincial trade policies in line with Western countries that facilitated rapid industrialization of the country. Large-scale manufacturing grew at the faster pace of approximately 23.6 percent per annum in between 1949 and 1954, and continued to maintain an impressive growth rate during the first half of 1960. The annual growth rate during this period was as follows: wing disparities, as well as a major chunk of development, were utilized in urban Punjab.²²⁸

However, during Ayub's regime, Pakistan adopted trade policies in line with the policies of the Western countries that facilitated the rapid industrialization of the country. Large-scale manufacturing grew at faster pace of 23.6 percent per annum in between 1949–1954, and continued to maintain impressive growth rate during first half of 1960 also. The annual growth rate during the period, as shown in Table 2, was as follows:

Table 2. Annual Growth Rates of Various Sectors of Economy
(Percent per Annum)

Year	Agriculture	Manufacturing- Large and Small	Services	Banking	Public Admin	GDP
1958–59	4.0	5.6 and 2.3	4.0	12.9	9.8	5.5
1959–60	0.3	2.7 and 2.3	3.8	22.1	-2.7	0.9
1960–61	-0.2	20.3 and 2.9	4.7	10	1.3	4.9
1961–62	6.2	19.9 and 2.9	4.0	8.5	3.9	6.0
1962–63	5.2	15.7 and 2.9	4.2	11.5	2.8	7.2
1963–64	2.5	15.5 and 2.9	4.0	8.9	9.7	6.5
1964–65	5.2	13.0 and 2.9	7.0	37.9	17.8	9.4
1958–1964	3.0	13.3 and 2.7	4.1	12.3	4.1	5.2

Source: Wiggins and the Government of Pakistan Economic Survey, 1984–85²²⁹

²²⁷ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan a Modern History, Solon among the Subalterns, Economic Development*. London and India: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers Revised Edition 2009, 170.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Wriggins, 183.

Ayub's industrial policy was based upon trade liberalization, which included import and export bonus schemes. He further liberalized trade by extending the benefits of the Open General License (OGL) scheme, which encouraged the participation of new traders. Import duty on heavy industrial machinery was kept minimal. Ayub also placed a number of items on the free import list, which continued to encourage investors. However, foreign investment in the industrial sector remained minimal.

Omar argues that the liberalization of the economy under Ayub Khan was "not a neo-classical paradise that it appeared to be."²³⁰ The industrial program was, instead, a product of profit incentives created by government distortions as a response to price signals originating in market transactions. The protection of local industries from foreign competition led to the protectionism of local industries as well, luring the private class into industrial investment. However, the lack of checks and balances on implementation partly resulted in the addition of inefficient industrial units, which were primarily kept operational for want of subsidies. Omar, while citing Soligo and Stern, argues that out of forty-four industries, the values of twenty-three of the industrial units was negative and the value of input was more than the output of these units.²³¹ The dollar was artificially kept high, which encouraged imports while discouraging exports. This policy put undue strains on export-oriented agricultural commodities, which affected the rural and manufacturing classes.

Osama and Akbar Zaidi, while quoting studies of the Asian Development Bank, argue that the liberal import policy could not have taken place without the inflow of aid during the period.²³² Foreign aid from the 1950s to first half of 1960 increased from 2.65 percent to 7 percent of the GNP.²³³ Gustav Papanek, in *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* argues that foreign aid significantly contributed to strengthening the economy of Pakistan during Ayub's period. Inflation was kept in

²³⁰ Omar Noman, *A Political and Economic History*, 38.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 39.

²³² Athar Osama, *Facts and Fictions of Ayub's Economic Miracle*, August 20, 2007, <http://www.understandingpakistan.com/index.php/fact-and-fiction-of-ayub-economic-miracle-athar-osama/> accessed (January 23, 2012).

²³³ *Ibid.*

complete check (around 3 percent during the 1960s).²³⁴ Pakistan reached a budget surplus for the first time in its history during Ayub's era. Overall, the GNP and per capita incomes hovered between 6.7 percent and 3.8 percent, respectively.²³⁵ These measures gave rise to a new class of small industrialists who hailed from the middle-urban class and failed to create investment opportunities for people from urban and Tehsil (small cities) areas. The twenty-two families who benefitted immensely from the industrial revolution emerged as the richest families in Pakistan.²³⁶ They owned 66 percent of the industries, 97 percent of insurance and 80 percent of the banks.²³⁷ The direct beneficiaries of his policies were a few elite and people from the urban middle class, such as military officers and bureaucrats who were given lucrative appointments in the public and private sectors as a result of the economic boom. Ayub's son was one of the indirect beneficiaries of the industrial revolution. He benefitted because his industrialist father-in-law was given extra concessions, which resulted in the growth of his industrial empire.

On the other hand, Ayub's regime neglected the welfare of the common man as developmental projects were engineered only to benefit a special class. Little attention was paid to the provisioning of social services, including the education sector. The population growth rose from 2.3 percent to 2.8 percent during his period, and this led to a further decline of living standards, in general. He further imposed a ban on the trade unions and, as mentioned earlier, the wages of the industrial workers went down 12 percent under Ayub's government. His policy makers were under the impression that lowering wages and imposing a ban on trade unions would facilitate an economic take-off. However, what they neglected to do was control prices for wage workers, who saw a reduction in income. Since Ayub's economic developments were mainly focused in urban areas, some of the population of rural areas shifted to urban areas in quest of better

²³⁴ Syed Asad Hussain, *Pakistan's Economy Under Different Shadows, Politics and Policy*, November 8–14, 1999, <http://www.pakisatneconomist.com/issuew/1999/issue44/etc3.htm>, (accessed December 13, 2011).

²³⁵ Athar Osama, *Facts and Fictions of Ayub's Economic Miracle*.

²³⁶ Gustav Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives*, 1967.

²³⁷ Omar Noman, *A Political and Economic History*, 41.

fortunes. These changes began to directly affect the common person.²³⁸ The rapid urbanization, with no planning on government's part, led to cost increases in the housing sectors, again affecting low-wage workers and further deterioration in basic health care facilities.²³⁹

Ayub's unequal economic policies thus created a large vacuum between the rich and the poor, which gave rise to socio-economic tensions in the country. Over time, these economic frustrations increased among the working class and later played a contributory role towards the fall of Ayub's regime, manifesting as street protests and leading to the second military intervention.²⁴⁰

B. THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR

Ayub Khan was highly inspired by the European industrial revolution. For this reason, his policy makers channeled the agriculture resources of West and East Pakistan towards the industrial sector. His overall policies resulted in luring rural farmers to invest their export-oriented agricultural savings to the industrial sector. However, only 15 to 37 percent bore fruitful results, while 65 to 85 percent of the agriculture investments went to waste due to higher consumption in the rich urban class.²⁴¹ His widely trumpeted land reforms act also proved to be only cosmetic in nature because efforts at land reforms were not only half-hearted, but also lacked implementation, partly due to the influence of the land elite over the civil bureaucracy.²⁴² Overall, Ayub's agriculture reforms could not improve the living conditions of the rural population. Thus, the socio-economic divide continued to grow among the masses despite the fact that Ayub brought revolutionary changes in the agriculture sector.

When Ayub took over, the agriculture sector was the biggest sufferer. The rate of growth in this sector, until 1958, was a meager 1.43 percent per annum, even falling

²³⁸ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan a Modern History*, 170.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ishrat Hussain,

²⁴¹ Omar Noman, *A Political and Economic History*, 18.

²⁴² Ibid.

behind the population growth, which was 2.4 percent.²⁴³ Ayub Khan recognized the importance of the agriculture sector as more than 80 percent of the Pakistani population was associated with agriculture and lived in rural areas. Modern irrigation techniques were used and as well as the term “*Green Revolution*.” During the first stage, dams were built and the flow of water to all non-irrigable areas was channelized. Consolidation of holdings and stern measures against hoarding were combined with rural credit and work programs.²⁴⁴ In the second stage, modern fertilizers and tube wells were provided at subsidized rates to farmers. His policies in the agriculture sector led to a 3.7 percent increase in its growth in the late 50s. Later, in the 60s, agricultural growth rose to 6.3 percent per annum.²⁴⁵ Wheat production saw a rise of 91 percent; rice and sugar output increased by 147 percent. He made effective use of aid from the United States. U.S. food supplies were provided to meet shortages, under U.S. public law PL 480. The United States aid also helped keep commodity prices down.²⁴⁶ A landmark pact on water management, known as the *Indus Water Treaty*, was formalized with India. On the whole, Pakistan displayed very impressive economic progress during a period when other countries, like Korea and Taiwan, were struggling to catch up. Wriggins argues that Pakistan made excellent use of the World Bank and other donors’ consortiums. These steps built up donors’ confidence to further the loan by increasing its GNP.²⁴⁷

Under the land reforms act, Ayub’s government distributed 2.5 million acres of land to landless farmers by usurping landlords with large holdings.²⁴⁸ In 1959, the land reforms ceiling had been fixed to 500 acres irrigated and 1,000 acres of un-irrigated land.²⁴⁹ The ceiling was, however, fixed in terms of individual instead of family holdings. Omar argues that barely 35 percent of the surrendered land came into use, while the rest

²⁴³ Athar Osama, *Facts and Fictions of Ayub’s Economic Miracle*.

²⁴⁴ *Pakistan, The Ayub Khan, Pakistan Index*, Era, Mongabay.com, data of 1994. http://www.mongabay.com/history/pakistan/pakistan-the_ayub_khan_era.html, (accessed December 7, 2011).

²⁴⁵ Omar Noman, *A Political and Economic History*, 141, 183.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

²⁴⁷ Wriggins, 183.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ Omar Noman, *A Political and Economic History*, 41–42.

of it remained uncultivable.²⁵⁰ Overall, the Punjabi rural feudal and elite were not affected by land-reform policies as they were given due compensation for uncultivable land. Ayub's administrative machinery, therefore, failed to implement land reforms act. I contend that Ayub's land reforms act was not successful due to failing in implementation part.

Heavy investment and the construction of dams, roads and new cities also created a big job market for the labor force and transportation industry. Ayub Khan's economic policies significantly changed the political climate of the country. Morale and the opinion of the performance of civil servants improved significantly with the improvement of the country's economy. Overall, retired bureaucrats and military officers were the main beneficiaries, while ignoring the low income group employees' class.²⁵¹ As a result, one of the instrumental roles of Ayub's downfall was played out by the street power of the masses, which was mainly comprised of the low-income class and industrial workers.²⁵²

In economic and political terms, the 1965 War proved disastrous for Pakistan's economy and the image of Ayub Khan. The war had two effects: it not only stopped U.S. aid to Pakistan, but foreign investments were reduced by 25 percent.²⁵³ Shuja argues that Pakistan spent 7.6 billion rupees (U.S. 1.6 billion) of its military's takeover on defense alone.²⁵⁴ The lack of democratic institutions and a power base in the hands of one authoritarian ruler led Ayub into making the wrong policy decision regarding going to war when the country was struggling economically.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 41.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Ishrat Hussain.

²⁵³ Omar Noman, *A Political and Economic History*, 256.

²⁵⁴ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 236.

C. THE DOWNFALL OF THE REGIME

Interestingly, some scholars attribute Ayub's downfall to the country's economic boom. His economic policies mostly resulted in the unequal distribution of wealth between certain privileged classes and the common person. With the growth of the economy, a vacuum of income between the inter-regional, inter-personal, rich and poor classes grew. A gap between the majority people of East Pakistan and West Pakistan was clearly visible. Most of the development related to work and donor funding were utilized in the West.²⁵⁵

Omar argues that the lack of concern over distributional issues proved to be "Achilles heels for the Ayub's regime."²⁵⁶ The revolt against Ayub Khan was brought about because of conflict between the regional disparities and the class inequalities. Wriggins, in "*The Rulers Imperatives*," argues that economic development in Pakistan gave rise to socio-economic forces that disturbed the equilibrium in society and gave rise to political, social and economic tensions in the country. There were no institutions in the country to balance out these socio-economic and political forces because of the lack of institutions.²⁵⁷ Bhutto further fueled the sentiments of these deprived people and successfully transformed these groups into a political force by encouraging the people into the streets, which virtually crippled the state's machinery due to the numerous strikes and protests. Most of these violent protestors were students, industrial workers, clerks and lawyers. In March 1969, a workers' strike totally crippled the industrialist capital, Karachi, which had 40 percent of the industries of Pakistan.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ Shahid Javed Burki, Ayub's Fall, *A Socio-Economic Explanation*, *Asian Survey*, Vol, 12, No 3, March 1972.

²⁵⁶ Omar Noman, *A Political and Economic History*, 40.

²⁵⁷ W. Howard Wriggins, *The Rulers Imperative: Strategies for Asia and Africa*, (New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1969), 182-186.

²⁵⁸ Omar Noman, *A Political and Economic History*, 43.

The opposition parties, which were kept away from the democratic process, joined the street protests later.²⁵⁹ I argue that the lack of democratic consolidation, dysfunctional civil institutions and the concentration of power within Ayub Khan as well as the rise of socio-economic tensions led to the emergence of the socio-economic forces, which became one of the reasons for his downfall.

D. AYUB KHAN AND ETHNIC MINORITIES

When Ayub came to power, there were two political parties in East Pakistan, the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik (peasants and workers).²⁶⁰ However, like the politicians of West Pakistan, the politicians of East Pakistan were divided and engaged in bitter political bickering and squabbling to the extent that the speaker of the provincial assembly was killed and the deputy speaker was seriously injured. Therefore, the people of East Pakistan initially welcomed Ayub, thinking that army leadership was incorruptible, upright and would perform better than corrupt politicians and change the fortune of the Bengalis.²⁶¹

Nonetheless, Ayub was a disappointment to the Bengalis. His constitutional changes in 1962 deprived the Bengalis from participating in decision making on both political and socio-economic matters. Choudhury argues that under Ayub's policies, "the Bengalis could only react but could not act."²⁶²

Further, his economic policies widened the gulf between East and West Pakistan as all development was directed toward West Pakistan, ignoring East Pakistan. The major utilization of foreign aid and developmental infrastructure, including the building of a new capital and industrialization were directed towards benefitting the people of West Pakistan. Shuja argues that 75 percent of the aid and resources were spent in West Pakistan during this period.

²⁵⁹ Shahid Javed Burki, *Fall of Ayub*, 211.

²⁶⁰ Golam W. Choudhury, *Pakistan 1: Transition from Civilian to military Rule, Military intervention in Pakistan*, Scorpion Printing Press Ltd., Victoria House England, 1988, 28.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶² *Ibid.*, 29.

Ayub continued to spend more resources in West Pakistan, while marginalizing the Bengalis, which fuelled the sentiments of the Bengalis. After the 1965 War, East Pakistan suffered heavily, in economic terms, as the annual growth rate in East Pakistan declined to 4 percent, whereas the growth rate in the West remained around 6.4 percent until 1968.²⁶³ Wriggins argues that “Bengali civil servants, whose representation was already marginal in the civil services, felt they were getting short shrift in a service where they were poorly represented at higher levels.”²⁶⁴ Ian Talbot argues that the Bengali majority population had been marginalized since independence over language and other issues. However, the policies of Ayub Khan further fuelled the Bengalis sentiments as the bureaucratic military felt threatened by political participation and the decentralization of power, which might have closed the chapters for any future political role by the West Pakistani elite and the Punjabi-dominated military.²⁶⁵ This further exacerbated the differences between the economies of the two wings of Pakistan. The per capita income and the ratio of the strength of the military between East and West were, subsequently, 36.4 percent and 45.6 percent and 149 (Bengalis) to 894 (West Pakistanis), respectively.²⁶⁶

Cohen argues that the representation of Bengalis in East Pakistan had been lower since the British period as the Bengalis were not inclined toward joining the army. Also, they were marginalized after the mutiny since the mutiny was launched by the Bengal-based army. Therefore, the representation of Bengalis in the military remained low under the British period. He also argues that the British did not develop any infrastructure in Bengal because of its geographic location, which was more inhospitable, and was unproductive for investors due to the high density of severe cyclonic conditions and its

²⁶³ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 256.

²⁶⁴ Wriggins, *The Rulers Imperative*, 184.

²⁶⁵ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan a Modern History, Yahya's Inheritance from Ayub*, 188.

²⁶⁶ Shuja, 256–257.

excessive poverty level.²⁶⁷ Cohen argues that some of the concerns regarding the diversion of all developmental and East Pakistan resources toward West Pakistan were therefore, slightly exaggerated.

During the seventeen days of the 1965 War, East Pakistan was left to defend itself in economic as well defense matters. The West Pakistani regime only provided one infantry division and some skeleton units of air force and navy to defend the large territory of East Pakistan.²⁶⁸ For this reason, West Pakistanis firmly believed that the “defense of East lay in West.” I contend that it was a wrong myth based upon an unrealistic hypothesis. The undefended East Pakistan, during the War of 1965, also strengthened the Bengali belief that West Pakistan did not care about their defense. Talbot argues that the 1965 War proved a turning point toward changing the anti-West Pakistan sentiments of Bengalis as it underscored the geographic isolation and vulnerability of the eastern wing.²⁶⁹

Further, some undesired results of the 1965 War also destroyed the myth that the powerful Punjabi martial West Pakistan army could defeat India easily.²⁷⁰ I contend that the 1965 War results also emboldened the Bengalis to step up their demands for more autonomy and more power. In 1968, the seeds of friction and hatred grew further between the East and West Pakistanis when a leader of the Awami National Party, Shiekh Mujib, was implicated and put behind bars in the famous “*Agartala Conspiracy Case*.” A few authors, like Qutbudin Aziz, point fingers at India, which has never accepted the creation of Pakistan, as instrumental in hatching an Agartala conspiracy with the help of Shiekh Mujib and some Bengali military officers, with a view to liberate East Pakistan.²⁷¹

²⁶⁷ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 54.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 189.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ Talbot, 186; Qutbudin Aziz, *Blood and Tears* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974), 34.

E. AYUB AND THE CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP

This part explains that one of the contributory causes of the fall of Ayub's regime was the lack of institutional building, an intolerant attitude toward political opponents and lack of political culture. Ayub's fall occurred for three reasons: 1) lack of adoption of political culture as he failed to consolidate the democratic institutions, 2) unexpected results from the 1965 War and the signing of the Tashkent cease-fire agreement with India, 3) the unequal distribution of income that gave rise to class differences in the country and was successfully exploited by the politicians who were marginalized by Ayub during the eleven years of his authoritarian rule.

Ayub, who was an authoritarian ruler, suppressed the opposition by making wide use of state machinery and intelligence agencies. Immediately after taking over, he targeted civil bureaucrats and punished them for corruption, malpractices and inefficiency. In order to bring democratic reforms under pressure from the U.S. government, Ayub Khan introduced a concept of electoral participation, known as the Basic Democracies System (BD), which was a multi-layered political process in which the chosen representatives were elected at a grass roots level.²⁷² The BD system, despite its weaknesses, had one major advantage. It became instrumental in creating a political culture in Pakistan that eventually caused the resignation of Ayub due to a mass mobilization of the people.

The BD system also resulted in communication between local government and central government while bypassing the provincial political system. Each tier was given certain responsibilities that varied from local administration, agriculture and addressing the problems of the local community.²⁷³ It mobilized public opinion, generated a political will and encouraged the people's participation. The BD system also brought Ayub closer to the people. Many social scientists, like Wriggins, have praised the BD system adopted by Ayub Khan.²⁷⁴ However, BD members remained dependent on

²⁷² Qurratulain Akhtar, *Ayub Era at a Glance*, September 2, 2006, www.qurratulain.wordpress.com/2006/09/2/ayubs-era-at-glance/ (accessed December 12, 2011).

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Wriggins, *The Rulers Imperative* and *Shuja Crossed Swords*, 186.

bureaucrats for their funds and for the resolution of their internal disputes. The bureaucrats were firmly controlled by the central government; thus, in turn; the BD members remained loyal and subservient to Ayub. These BD members remained a political instrument to further Ayub's policies and cast votes in favor of Ayub Khan during the 1966 elections, thereby defeating Fatima Jinnah. The media remained under the strict control of the government. A leading newspaper, *The Pakistan Times*, was banned and later nationalized by the government. Thus, Ayub Khan exercised tight control over the people through a centralized administrative infrastructure.

Ayub was an authoritarian leader who did not allow the nurturing of political institutions. He came down hard on politicians by introducing a "Public Representative Office Disqualification Act (*PRODA*)," which rendered them unable to hold public office for fifteen years, if found guilty.²⁷⁵ Another ordinance, the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO), authorized special tribunals to try former politicians for "misconduct," an infraction not clearly defined. The prosecution of politicians could be avoided if the accused did not contest elections or be part of an electoral body for a period of seven years. About 7,000 individuals were tried, including prominent politicians, like Suhrawardy and later Shiekh Mujib, in conspiracy cases.²⁷⁶ The courts were banned from hearing any case against martial law orders. Several appeals against the imposition of martial law were dismissed by the Supreme Court.²⁷⁷ The much trumpeted, so-called political stability was more personalized than institutionalized.²⁷⁸

The joint opposition was divided and continued to serve its own self-interests. Fatima Jinnah, the sister of Jinnah, was made a unanimous candidate for joint opposition, but was no match for the powerful Ayub, who had firm control over the state resources. He carried out massive rigging in the 1966 elections, utilizing all the state machinery,

²⁷⁵ *Pakistan, The Ayub Khan, Pakistan Index*, Era, mongabay.com, data of 1994. http://www.mongabay.com/history/pakistan/pakistan-the_ayub_khan_era.html, (accessed December 7, 2011).

²⁷⁶ *Constitutional Development*, page 67, Chapter 2, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/44457184/Constitutional-Development> (accessed December 19, 2011).

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 161.

including the intelligence agencies, at district levels, and the BD members helped him. These events led Ayub to win the 1966 elections with a large margin. Ayub also adopted a divide and rule policy among the politicians. During this period, Fatima Jinnah, Bhutto and Shiekh Mujib emerged as three political leaders from the West and East Pakistan.

Notwithstanding the above, Rizvi argues that the graph of Ayub's popularity started falling immediately after the 1965 War as he failed to rise up to the expectations of the people, unable to win the 1965 War, liberate Kashmir from India and then, finally, by signing the Tashkent agreement, having failed to improve the socio-economic conditions of the common man. Just forty-eight hours after the signing of the Tashkent agreement, the enraged students and elements from Islamic parties filled the streets, including politicians like Maulana Maudadi, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Bhutto. Politicians tried to give the impression that Ayub Khan had sold Kashmir to India by signing a cease-fire agreement.²⁷⁹ Shuja Nawaz argues, regarding the culmination of the climax of the 1965 War, "What was being portrayed as a magnificent victory over India by Ayub Khan's propaganda machine produced only disillusionment and catalyzed his eventual fall from grace."²⁸⁰

Bhutto was an astute politician, who was the foreign minister until 1966, and noticed the changes in the wind when Ayub's popularity was falling. He resigned from Ayub's cabinet because of the sagging popularity of Ayub and formed his own party as The Pakistan People's Party.²⁸¹ Bhutto portrayed himself a hero in the eyes of the people as he apparently resigned from Ayub's cabinet because Ayub compromised on Kashmir's cause. Mujib also managed to mobilize public opinion of the East Pakistanis against the West Pakistani marginalization of the Bengalis.

By the end of 1968, Bhutto managed to successfully exploit the rising socio-economic forces and by mobilizing public opinion with a strong critique of Ayub.²⁸²

²⁷⁹ Talbot, *Pakistan a Modern History*, 178.

²⁸⁰ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 214.

²⁸¹ *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zulfiqar_Ali_Bhutto#Political_career (accessed December 12, 2011).

²⁸² Rizvi, *The Military and Politics*, 167.

Combined opposition also joined Bhutto and the street protests, along with the people, to overthrow Ayub. The situation eventually grew out of control and the country came to a virtual halt due to almost daily strikes. In January 1968, Ayub was reported to have had a heart attack from the ongoing strikes and the unproductive results of the 1965 war. By early 1969, Yahya started taking note of the deteriorating law and order situation and feared that the armed forces, under the name of Ayub Khan's army, were being discredited in the eyes of the people.²⁸³ He was also under pressure from political parties to impose martial law. Under these conditions, the politicians started switching their center of support toward army leadership rather than strengthening democratic control. Under the prevailing conditions, Ayub Khan had no option but to resign. However, instead of holding elections or handing over his powers to the speaker of assembly, he transferred his powers to his most trusted general, Yahya Khan. Yahya Khan took over from Ayub Khan in March 1969 and imposed martial law.

F. CONCLUSION

When Ayub took over the country, its overall political and economic conditions were in a poor state. The country's treasury was virtually empty. Ayub, using his administrative acumen, brought about a revolution in the economic policies of the country, which made Pakistan one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. Pakistan saw the unprecedented growth rate of 7 percent with an industrial growth of 76 percent, which was better than any other Asian country's growth rate (of 55 percent) during that period. Similarly, he improved growth in the agriculture sector and introduced the modern concept of a green revolution by making use of modern technologies and building dams. Agricultural growth was raised from 1.3 percent in 1958 to 6.3 percent by the mid-1960s. However, the high growth and industrialized rate relied on extracting resources from the rural areas of East Bengal and low wage workers in the West, leading to disparities in the country, which were not corrected as the country grew.

Ayub's land reforms act was only partially successful as it lacked implementation. The large landowners, from whom the land was generally taken, remained unaffected

²⁸³ Ibid., 242.

because only 35 percent of the surrendered land was cultivable. Moreover, the landlords who surrendered the land were adequately compensated. The results of agricultural reforms could not improve the financial miseries of the farmers and people living in the rural areas.

In addition to economic disparities, the 1965 War proved disastrous for Pakistan's economy and to the image of Ayub Khan. The war had two effects; it not only stopped U.S. aid to Pakistan, but foreign investments were reduced by 25 percent. He failed to provide basic facilities like health care and education to the common man. Instead, the cost of manufacturing goods and commodity prices increased due to rapid urbanization and the excessive importation of machinery, while exports remained slow. Workers' wages decreased by 12 percent. The population growth remained unchecked, which brought further difficulties for the poor. The main beneficiaries of Ayub's policies were twenty-two families, which included his close associates. These families were virtually controlling the major businesses of the country. I contend that the rapid growth of industrialization was due to the inflow of aid, profit incentives and high protectionism to local industry. Of these industries, 35 percent were inefficient and a burden on the government.

Despite having enabled a massive economic improvement in the country, Ayub's policies resulted in class and regional disparities as the major beneficiaries of his policies were the targeted industrialists and the urban population of the middle class. These beneficiaries included retired army officers and bureaucrats, while depriving the people from rural areas and small Tehsils (small cities), including East Pakistan. Instead of undertaking developments in all parts of Pakistan, Ayub mostly channeled development in West Pakistan. The export-oriented income from the agriculture sector of East Pakistan was spent on industrialization in West Pakistan that further sowed the seeds of resentment in the majority Bengali population, which alienated them further. The post 1965 War period saw a major decline in the economy of the country and proved disastrous for Ayub's regime. The United States stopped the flow of aid as well military supplies to Pakistan. Ayub's economic policies gave rise to socio-economic forces that caused mass political and socio-economic tensions in the country. Industrial workers,

lower middle-class clerks, student unions and lawyers all played instrumental parts in the movement against Ayub. These socio-economic forces were successfully exploited by politicians like Bhutto, which was one of the reasons for Ayub's downfall.

Ayub's regime was a disappointment for the majority Bengalis as they initially viewed him as incorruptible and clean compared to politicians. Once Ayub came to power, there were two major political parties in East Pakistan, the Awami League and Krishak Sramik (peasants and Workers). In 1962, his political system deprived the Bengalis from participating in the decision making in both political and socio-economic matters at the national level. Under his policies, the Bengalis could not act, but only react, leading to an increasing number of protests. The worst occurred when he failed to appreciate the growing divide between East and West Pakistanis. He continued to extend a Cinderella treatment to the East Pakistanis and did nothing to alleviate the sufferings of the majority Bengalis, who started to view West Pakistanis as usurpers. Further, his economic policies brought a wider gulf between both East and West Pakistan as all development was directed toward West Pakistan, while ignoring East Pakistan. He continued to spend more resources in West Pakistan and marginalize the Bengalis, and this fuelled the sentiments of the Bengalis. After the 1965 War, Ayub's policies further cut economic development in Pakistan. Thus, the annual growth rate in East Pakistan declined even more after the 1965 War. Further, the lack of any defense of East Pakistan during the 1965 War, less representation of Bengalis in political activities, and discrimination in the jobs provision quota in the federal government further charged their nationalistic feelings against Pakistan. This exacerbated the differences between the economies of the two wings of Pakistan. I contend that some of the concerns raised by the Bengalis, such as unequal development and a smaller quota in the military, can be attributed to its geographical location to and historical reasons that date back to the British recruitment policy. Similarly, the British disregarded Bengal, with regard to undertaking development because of its geographic location.

Ayub Khan was an authoritarian ruler. Therefore, he did not let democratic institutions nurture. Instead, he devised policies where most of the powers were centered on him. Ayub suppressed the opposition by making wider use of the state machinery and

intelligence agencies. Ayub introduced a concept of electoral participation, known as the Basic Democracies System (BD). The BD system became instrumental in creating a political culture in Pakistan. The BD system also brought Ayub closer to the people due to direct access of local representatives to the central government by bypassing the provinces. These BD members remained a political instrument to further Ayub's policies and help Ayub Khan in consolidating his hold on power. The media also remained under the strict control of the government. Ayub continued to suppress any opposition and critique of his policies, including the politicians from East Pakistan. Ayub introduced draconian laws with a view to coerce the politicians, such as the "Public Representative Office Disqualification Act (PRODA)" and the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) under which politicians could be tried by the government. About 7,000 politicians were tried under these acts. The courts were barred from hearing any case against martial law orders. Ayub's policies kept the opposition divided, which allowed him to continue for eleven years as president. He carried out massive rigging in the 1966 elections, while utilizing state machinery. During this period, Fatima Jinnah, Bhutto and Mujib emerged as three political leaders from West and East Pakistan. By the end of 1968, Bhutto managed to successfully exploit the rising socioeconomic forces and mobilized public opinion in the form of street protests. The situation eventually grew out of control once Ayub imprisoned the opposition leaders. The country's economy came to a virtual halt due to almost daily strikes. By early 1969, Yahya Khan, who was the army chief, started taking note of the growing law and order situation in the country, as the army's prestige was being damaged under the name of Ayub Khan. Yahya Khan took over from Ayub in a peaceful coup in March 1969 and imposed martial law.

The fall of Ayub Khan can be attributed to a lack of political culture and institutional building, his discriminatory policies toward Bangladeshis, the unexpected results from the 1965 War and the signing of the Tashkent cease-fire agreement. Ayub's downfall also occurred due to the unequal distribution of income that gave rise to regional and class differences in a country that was successfully exploited by the politicians. These inequalities and treatment with the minorities by the military regime of Ayub again led to the cause of the second military takeover. I contend that the first coup

in Pakistan continued to weaken the democratic institutions while further politicizing the army. These events later resulted into affecting the further two coups and ensured the army's role in future politics in Pakistan.

IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE FIRST COUP ON THE PRESENT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN AND THE CONCLUSION

This chapter is a brief explanation of civil-military relations in Pakistan developed in the post-independence period. The analysis is divided into three periods; the first period is under the administration of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971–1977). This part shows that despite bringing the military under democratic civilian control, Bhutto failed to consolidate the civilian institutions, which led to his downfall. The second part analyzes the post-Zia period of civil-military relations. It shows that General Zia's (1988–1999), policies, while transferring powers to the civilians, ensured and secured the army's future role in the country's politics. The third part explains present and future civil-military relations in Pakistan. It shows that the military will continue to act as a political institution in the future politics of Pakistan because of the lack of a democratic consolidation process and the all-around security threats to the country.

A. THE BACKGROUND OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN

The first military coup, led by Ayub Khan, set up a pattern where foreign or domestic policy of Pakistan is crafted with the consent of the military. This core imbalance in civil-military affairs is primarily due to what Pakistan inherited during partition. The country inherited the powerful and hierarchical Pakistani army, and at the same time, weak civilian institutions. The internal and external threats to Pakistan, such as those it inherited at the time of partition, have persisted. I contend that the continuation of these threats, external and internal, created and continue to create a major imbalance in civil-military relations in Pakistan. Cohen argues:

The civil-military relations in Pakistan are central to and inseparable from central-province relations, ethno-regional conflict, internal political stability, Islamists influence in the polity, the prospects of warfare with India, nuclear security, and region and global terrorism.²⁸⁴

²⁸⁴ Stephen P. Cohen and others, *The Future of Pakistan, Security, Soldier and the State* (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2011), 200.

I agree with some of Cohen's arguments, such as the security issues, issues with India and Afghanistan, and nuclear proliferation, which are central to civil-military relations. These factors explain that all-around security threats and nuclear issues are central to civil-military relations in Pakistan as the Pakistani military views itself the guardian of its national interests, while viewing civilian governments as incompetent and disloyal to the country. The Pakistani military also protects its image and its corporate interests and would never want the state to meddle in its internal professional workings. Huntington emphasizes the point that, in order to exert democratic control over the military, the military has to be kept professional and autonomous.²⁸⁵ The rest of the issues that Cohen has raised, such as central-province relations, ethno-regional conflict, internal, Islamic influence in the polity are over-exaggerated and have nothing to do with the military.

I contend that even today, fifty years after the first military coup (1958), Pakistan still faces the threat of another military coup.²⁸⁶ Although the civilian elected government has been in office since 2008 in Pakistan, the state continues to be dominated by the military.²⁸⁷ The recent statement by Prime Minister Gilani on December 23, 2011, shows strong criticism of the continued interference in the internal affairs by the Pakistani army leadership.²⁸⁸ The recent issue of the "memo-gate scandal" (which implicates the president of Pakistan for hatching a conspiracy against the army), has allowed the military to present itself as a better institution over the civilian government.²⁸⁹ This shows that democratic control over the armed forces continues to remain weak in Pakistan.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁵ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 83.

²⁸⁶ Declan Walsh and Salman Masood, "In Pakistan, Talks Aim to Ease Split." *The New York Times*, January 14, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/world/asia/pakistan-army-and-civilian-leaders-meet-amid-bitter-split.html?> (accessed January 23, 2012).

²⁸⁷ Declan Walsh and Salman Masood, "In Pakistan, Talks Aim to Ease Split."

²⁸⁸ Dawn official Correspondent, "Move Afoot to Bring Down Govt: Gilani," *The Dawn News*, December 23, 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/23/no-institution-has-right-to-create-a-state-within-state-pm.html> (accessed January 20, 2012).

²⁸⁹ Official Correspondent, *The Economic Times*, January 11, 2012, www.economic-times.com.indiatimes.com (accessed February 12, 2012).

²⁹⁰ Declan Walsh, "Pakistani Court Widens Role," *The New York Times*, January 22, 2012 (accessed January 21, 2012).

I argue that the numerous reasons that led to the first coup in the Pakistan continue to be present today. The issues that can be handled by politicians are still decided by the military, which makes the military believe that it is the savior of the state, and what Finer has termed “nationalism and syndicalism.”²⁹¹

The general cycle of military coups also shows that the Pakistani army mostly came to power with the assistance of extra-regional powers, civilian institutions (judiciary), and opposition personalities, which are always ready to provide widespread legitimacy to military regimes.²⁹² For instance, Ayub Khan’s, Zia ul Haq and Musharraf’s coups were backed by the United States and duly legitimized by the judiciary. The opposition parties also played significant parts in collaborating with the military regimes of the past, which resulted in the coups.

There have been missed opportunities to stop the cycle, but the civilian regime, due to their weakness and the Cold War, were not able to take advantage of those moments. I contend that the only time the civilians in Pakistan could have achieved control over the military was during the period of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971–1977) and partially during the time of Nawaz Sharif from 1997–1999. However, during both periods, Bhutto’s and Sharif’s, the military ultimately affected the coups because of the lack of institutional control, and due to the authoritarian policies of the civilian rulers caused by their weakness, as well as the lack of U.S. support for the civilian regimes, which has reduced support during the civilian periods due to its own interests.

B. BHUTTO’S ERA AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was in an ideal position to offset the effects of the first military coup and had laid a firm foundation for future civil-military relations in Pakistan. Bhutto made textbook-style changes to assert civilian control over the military as argued by Serra and Bruneau in “*The Military Transition*” and “*Who Guards the Guardians.*” The army’s mission was, for the first time, properly defined and curtailed.²⁹³ MoD was

²⁹¹ Finer, *Horse Back*, 4 and 34.

²⁹² Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan*, 91.

²⁹³ Bruneau, *Who Guards the Guardians*, 103.

staffed with career bureaucrats who had knowledge about the military's workings. The designation "Commander in Chief" was changed to the respective services' Chief of Staff, The Joint Staff headquarters (JSHQ) was created and brought under control of the MoD. All budget allocation/requirements were routed through Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) to have further rationalization of the budget. The tenure of the army chief was reduced from five years to three. For the first time, the role of the military was defined in the 1973 constitution of Pakistan, under article 245; the act of high treason was incorporated into the constitution.²⁹⁴ A higher defense organization was created with effective control of the civil bureaucracy. The defense committee of the cabinet was formed and the constitution was re-framed, which ensured a confined role for the military.

This section discusses the heightened civil-military tensions due to the creation of a parallel security force to dilute the powers of the army and repeated sackings of the military chiefs, which led to one of the causes of the third military coup.

Bhutto's government created a civilian Federal Security Force (FSF) to strengthen the internal security of the country so that the military could remain externally focused and to dilute the powers of the military. However, the FSF was used to suppressing Bhutto's political opponents and further coercing the military generals.²⁹⁵ Bhutto sacked the then army chief, General Gul Hasan, and air chief, Air Marshal Rahim Khan. Two years later, another air chief, Zafar Chaudhry was also sacked. These military chiefs were removed because of their refusal to make the army and air force available during a police strike.²⁹⁶ Later, all these factors began to escalate civil-military tensions.²⁹⁷ Soon after, due to the ineptitude and failure of a civilian democratically elected government, as well as complicit political actors in the opposition, the military found its way back by affecting the third military coup, in 1977.

²⁹⁴ Shuja, *Crossed Swords, Challenging Army*, 338.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 212.

²⁹⁷ Serra, *The Military Transition*, 41, 60, 70, 75.

Bhutto was a feudal lord, despite having worn the hat of a democratic ruler; his policies were hardly different than the policies of military dictators. Bhutto failed to build up civilian democratic institutions. He had politicized the judiciary and preferred resolving political disputes with force. He silenced the media, opposition and civil society, while continuing to humiliate the army leadership. He carried out massive human rights violations in Baluchistan. He repeated the mistake of his predecessors by involving the army in martial law and suppressing Baluchistan insurgency, which were actually political issues. Bhutto rigged the 1977 elections by making extensive use of the state machinery, which led to a mass mobilization campaign, led by a joint opposition alliance, known as the Pakistan National Alliance, with a common agenda to overthrow Bhutto's regime. The mass mobilization campaign became uncontrollable and led to the imposition of martial law in some of the major cities of Punjab.

Some army officers who were supposed to be enforcing the martial law refused to obey Bhutto's orders and suppress the people's demonstration. Thus, the situation went further out of Bhutto's control. Finer argues that the military may intervene once it refuses to side with the government to curb violence.²⁹⁸

These events provided space, opportunity and occasion to the then army chief, General Zia, to overthrow the government.²⁹⁹ On July 5, 1977, the army overthrew Bhutto and took over the government by imposing martial law for the third time.

I contend that the deadlock between the opposition and the ruling party provided space to the army, while the judiciary legitimized the coup, as per the practice in vogue. The frequent involvement of the army in martial law, as explained in Chapter I, emboldened the army's confidence that it could handle civil affairs better than the politicians. The coup was also legitimized and welcomed by the United States in the form of providing billions of dollars of military aid to the dictator who was ready to fight the Soviet Union in a proxy war.

²⁹⁸ Finer, *Horse Back*, 132–134.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 153.

I contend that sacking the military generals and curtailing the powers of the military is not sufficient for assertion of civilian control over the military. It can only be achieved by initiating the process of institutionalization of the democratic institutions, political culture, rule of law and accountability at all levels. Bhutto failed to institutionalize civilian control and lost the ideal opportunity for bringing the military under democratic control.

C. THE POST-ZIA ERA AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Eleven years of Zia's authoritarian rule thus further institutionalized the army's role in the country's politics. Rizvi argues that the emergence of post-coup d'etat civilian regimes in Pakistan have been no different than other military states that have experienced prolonged military rule.³⁰⁰ Pakistan is, therefore, one of the countries where the military, while transferring powers to civilians, also ensured and secured its future role in the power politics of the country. The Pakistan military also shaped itself into an autonomous and a political actor with all the capabilities for pulling the strings of power-politics from the sidelines, while transferring power to the civilians.³⁰¹

The Pakistani army played an instrumental role in the collapse of the Soviet Union and remained hand-in-glove with the U.S. government. During the period from 1979 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, the army was involved in key foreign policy matters and key strategic decision-making issues. As mentioned in Chapter II, the intellectual gap between the modern Pakistani army and the civil society had already opened, once the army joined the Western block. These events further widened the intellectual gap and the institutional superiority between the army and the other civilian institutions of Pakistan.

Post-Zia civilian regimes thus inherited a weak democratic structure and soon saw a power tussle between the four powerful institutions, the president, the army chief, the

³⁰⁰ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 189.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

prime minister and the judiciary. The power struggle between these institutions continued until the fourth coup by General Musharraf, in 1999.³⁰²

General Zia left a powerful presidential system in the country, while Pakistan's was based on the British parliamentary system. One of the causes of the power tussle between the president and the prime minister was because of the incorporation of article 58 in the constitution by General Zia, which gave unbridled power to the president over the prime minister. During this period, the army emerged as kingmaker and referee between Presidents Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari and Prime Minister Sharif. This period also saw emergence of the president-army nexus, as both (the army leadership and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan) were the legacies of General Zia. This nexus further dented civil-military relations and weakened the democratic institutions.

The only political party on the scene was Pakistan's People's Party (PPP). The PPP was disliked by the military regime because of the fear of a backlash and the atrocities committed by army regimes against the PPP politicians. Benazir was also considered a security risk by the military because of a fear of rolling back Pakistan's nuclear program by Benazir, under the influence of the West.

The Army leadership thus handpicked an elite industrialist from Punjab, Nawaz Sharif, who was prepared as a leader of Islami Jamohri Itihad (IJI), to counterbalance the political power of the PPP in the forthcoming 1988 elections.³⁰³ General Aslam Beg, the then Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), admitted in 1995 that the Army did not trust the PPP.³⁰⁴ Nawaz Sharif, with the full financial support of the army and the president contested the elections of 1988. I contend that the Pakistan military wanted to protect its corporate interests and autonomous status by keeping Benazir Bhutto from coming to power.

Elections were held and the PPP won with a narrow margin (38.5 percent of the seats), while the IJI, led by Nawaz Sharif, gained 30 percent of the votes, thus emerging

³⁰² Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 411.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, 412.

³⁰⁴ Rizvi, "Military President Nexus" *The Daily Nation*, May 9, 1995, www.thenation.com.pk.may.95 (accessed February 2, 2012).

as the second-largest party in the election and the government in Punjab the largest province.³⁰⁵ The military-president, (Ishaq Khan) nexus managed to limit the scale of the expected PPP national election victory in 1988, using the ISI as a tool to influence the political process by promoting the creation of the IJI.

Pakistan, during the post-Zia period had become what Samuel Huntington describes as a “praetorian society,”³⁰⁶ where the regime is dominated by the military, or a coalition of military and bureaucracy, as a consequence of the inability of weak civilian institutions to assert control over the armed forces.

As a result, when Benazir came to power as prime minister, she found herself trapped in a difficult situation because: (1) Benazir could not get the political parties together to neutralize the growing power of the army. The opposition parties preferred to look toward army leadership to eliminate other opponents from the political scene. (2) The organized military leadership was better placed to exert its influence over the prime minister. (3) General Zia’s constitutional engineering (article 58) had given insurmountable powers to the president who had no direct role in the parliamentary form of government. Thus, Benazir and the other prime ministers, in the following years, remained under pressure and influence of the military and could not exert effective civilian control over the affairs of the state. The power politics between the institutions continued with no one ready to show any flexibility.³⁰⁷ This resulted in the dismissal of four governments (Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, two governments each).³⁰⁸

During the elections of 1990, the military played a key role in rigging the elections and distributed enormous funds, with the support of Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the then Army Chief General Aslam Baig to PPP political opponents.³⁰⁹ These political parties were the IJI, Jamat-e-Islami and some other political parties. The period from 1988 to 1997 saw a power struggle between the president and the prime ministers, while

³⁰⁵ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 415.

³⁰⁶ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 3, 83–85.

³⁰⁷ Shuja, *Crossed Swords*, 415.

³⁰⁸ Passed by the U.S. Congress in 1985, it empowered the President to certify that Pakistan had no nuclear weapons to qualify for U.S. aid.

³⁰⁹ Rizvi, *State and Society*, 193.

the last tenure of Nawaz Sharif from 1997 to 1999 saw a power tussle between the judiciary, the army chief and the prime minister.

Nawaz Sharif came to power, as a result of 1997 elections by winning 2/3rd majority seats. This time, Sharif was in position to bring constitutional changes and weed out draconian presidential powers to dissolve assemblies. Most of the authors and social scientists in Pakistan and around the world were of the view that the period of coups in Pakistan was over. Nawaz Sharif did away with the presidential powers under 58.2 (b). He also clipped the powers of national assembly members to cross the floor (changing loyalties). However, Sharif also emerged as an authoritarian ruler, being a legacy of the military regime. Sharif wanted to concentrate all powers within him. He also tried to coerce the judiciary. During the period from 1997–1999, the army remained subservient to civilian authorities until Sharif started jeopardizing the corporate interests of the army and other civilian institutions like the judiciary. Nawaz Sharif removed the then army chief General Jehangir Karamat over a petty issue.³¹⁰ Then, due to Sharif's policies, the naval chief resigned. Sharif was also accused of coercing the media men. Then the friction between Sharif and the army chief rose to unbearable limits on a number of issues, such as the Kargil War, promotions/appointments of officers and Sharif even sacked General Musharraf once. These factors resulted in a coup d' etat by Musharraf and his loyal generals in October 1999. The fourth coup was a reactionary coup and was caused by the heightening of civil military tensions to an unbearable level.

The civil-military friction heightened because:³¹¹ 1) The prime minister had earlier removed two service chiefs over a petty issue. Few army generals believed that the prime minister had damaged the prestige of the army by prematurely removing the former chiefs. 2) A difference of opinion with the then army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, over the appointment of the generals and the Kargil War. 3) The removal of General Musharraf (in a humiliating way) while Musharraf was in an airplane on his way back from an official trip to Sri Lanka. 4) Sharif made another mistake by selecting Musharraf's successor from among the engineering corps, against the traditions of the

³¹⁰ Shuja, *Crossed Swords, Systematic Failures: The Wars Within*, 499.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 515–518.

army. In the Pakistan army, the chiefs have traditionally been from the fighting arms. The Pakistan army is very hierarchical and proud of maintaining its values and corporate interests. 5) Sharif's third mistake was to supersede (in the absence of Musharraf) two fighting arms generals, who were in key positions in the army. These generals were instrumental in staging the fourth coup. Musharraf's coup was validated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Irshad A Khan.³¹² Also, the opposition political parties, and the people, in general, welcomed Musharraf's coup.

The fourth coup, in Figure 4, shows that the Pakistani army maintains a centralized, hierarchical, and cohesive structure that remains insulated from outside interferences. The generals, in the absence of the army chief, were loyal to the army over the civilian government.³¹³ The army also protected its values, traditions and corporate interests by not allowing the prime minister to promote a non-fighting arms officer (an engineering corps officer). The analysis also shows that civil-military relations before the fourth coup were at their lowest ebb.

³¹² Farrukh Saleem, "Coup d' etat," *The News*, January 1, 2012, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todaysprint> accessed (January 12, 2012).

³¹³ Finer, *Horse Back*, 54.




Figure 4. The Fourth Military Coup

I contend that the three earlier coups were proactive, while the fourth coup was purely a reactionary coup. Analysis of the post-Zia, Pakistan army shows that the army still maintained a bounce-back capacity, in the form of the coup d' etat if its corporate interests were threatened.³¹⁴

In between the third and fourth coups (1989–1999), the military was afforded many opportunities by the divided and corrupt politicians. However, the military did not intervene. It preferred to exert its influence once its interests were jeopardized. After the deaths of General Zia and Bhutto there was a political vacuum in the country. Then, throughout the period between 1990 and 1999, there was a repeated power struggle between the three power brokers of the country; the army, the president and the prime minister; the judiciary has only recently emerged as a political actor in Pakistan.

³¹⁴ Hassan Askari Rizvi, "Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Pakistan," *Journal of the International Institute for Strategic Affairs*, 1998 (February 1998).

The fourth coup changed the political wrangling, which largely revolved around the relationship between the PPP and the PML (N) and the military leadership. The army had developed close relations with the PML (N) since the Zia period and, conversely, had an antagonistic association with the PPP after Bhutto's execution. Now it appears that the army is likely to distance itself from the PML (N) and may no longer tango with the party that was used as a counter-weight to the PPP in the post-Zia period.

President Musharraf remained President/Chief Executive of the country from 1999–2008. Musharraf remained a darling of the United States and was wholeheartedly supported by the United States, until he started displaying a lukewarm attitude toward the United States regarding undertaking military action in FATA areas. Cohen argues that, like his military predecessors, Musharraf was a failure, as ten years rule of Musharraf failed to bring Pakistan's economy back on track. Musharraf lacked strategic vision and did not set any priorities, while targeting one issue after another.

During Musharraf's period, civil-military relations were further affected when he replaced civil bureaucrats with military officers in some of the important civil sectors.

I contend that military officers lack strategic vision as they are not trained to perform tasks pertinent to the civil sector. However, Musharraf was determined that if he banked on the military, he would be successful in changing the fate of the country.³¹⁵ Cohen argues, and I quote: "Musharraf rejected my suggestion during our meeting, by removing the corrupt politicians and bringing the new generation of competent

³¹⁵ Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan*, 3.

politicians.”³¹⁶ Musharraf became unpopular when he signed a controversial deal with the Pakistan people’s party under the NRO, while utilizing his presidential powers to condone all outstanding corruption cases in the courts against the politicians. Musharraf had to resign due to the sacking of the chief justice of Pakistan. Musharraf, again, heavily staffed civil bureaucratic appointments with military officers. The ministry of defense was staffed with retired army officers, with the exception of one civilian bureaucrat. Some of Musharraf’s close associates were employed at very lucrative appointments in the civil sector. Musharraf’s decline started and his policies failed due to the following: 1) fiscal and administrative devolution to districts, which further weakened the power of the provincial governments.³¹⁷ 2) Musharraf gave freedom to the media with the opening of approximately 80 independent TV channels. The independent and free media gave rise to the mobilization of political culture and the activation of a vibrant and a free civil society as a watch dog, which became very critical of Musharraf’s policies.³¹⁸ 3) Musharraf’s last nail in the coffin was the sacking of the chief justice of Pakistan. The sacking was widely reported by the media and resulted in a mass mobilization of lawyers and civil rights activists, which led to Musharraf’s resignation. The opposition ruling party and judiciary united with the free society to resist future military interventions.³¹⁹

D. ANALYSIS OF THE POST MUSHARRAF PERIOD AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

The post-Musharraf period has seen not only numerous civil-military crises but a judiciary-civil crisis and the crisis between the political leaders, as well. The post-Musharraf army leadership of General Kayani, who took office in 2007, remained, initially, subservient to civilian authorities and the military extended full cooperation in order to establish a writ of the government over the state institutions.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid., 5.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

In fact, it was the army leadership that prevented the political crisis once the ruling PPP refused to reinstate the sacked chief justice of Pakistan, resulting in the worst form of political stalemate. This was a golden opportunity for the army chief to take over because the politicians were divided and the judicial crises were going on. General Kayani successfully intervened in March 2009 in order to defuse a stand-off between the political leaders. He brokered a deal between the president and Nawaz Sharif to reinstate Chief Justice (CJ) Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry and thus avoided a major political turmoil.³²⁰ In addition, Kayani voluntarily recalled all the military officers from civilian departments, which were deputed into civil departments.

It is meaningful to analyze the statement given by the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General Kayani at the first Corps Commanders' Conference (CCC) following the general elections of February 28, 2008, since it reflects the line of conduct to follow in his relationship with the newly elected civilian authorities. One hundred seven CCC members outlined the framework of civil-military relations after the end of a decade-long period of military rule.³²¹ A framework was centered on the following key elements:

- (i). The army fully stands behind the democratic process and is committed to play its constitutional role in support of the elected government.
- (ii). The Army will stay out of the political process and will not be dragged into unnecessary controversy.
- (iii) The COAS shows optimism about a harmonized relationship between the various pillars of the state as provided in the constitution, in order to maximize the smooth working of the civilian government.
- (iv) Schism at any level, given the current circumstances, would not be in the larger interest of the Nation.

Despite the fact that the army leadership was very forthcoming in extending its cooperation to the military, I contend that the civilian regimes that had been succeeding military rule in Pakistan faced a serious identity crisis as they have to strike the proper

³²⁰ Zahid and Jeremy, *The Times Online*, 14 March 2009. www.thetimesonline (accessed January 1, 2012).

³²¹ Official Correspondent, "Corps Commanders Conference," *The News*, March 6, 2008, The ISPR, Press Release 30/2008, Rawalpindi, (accessed January 23, 2012).

balance between asserting their autonomy without alienating the military. I argue that for the transiting democracies, the military's support, or neutrality is crucial for the government's survival. In that regard, the heated or muffled exchanges between civil and military leadership in the past two years confirm that analysis.

Talat Masood, a defense analyst of Pakistan, points out that "Kayani has been very supportive of the democratic process and has clearly distanced himself from politics, but there is a need for reforms to institutionalize the process that is so far, entirely depending on one man, General Kayani."³²² General Kayani has also set up the first precedent by regularly coming to the parliament sessions and, when summoned, to answer defense-related questions. The control of MoD over the military has been partially increased. All budget proposals have been routing through the MoD and ministry of finance after thorough deliberation and rationalization; however, the army still maintains its say because the secretaries of defense in the MoD have always been appointed with the recommendations of the Army Chiefs.

Notwithstanding the above, the army has also shown its strength where army's corporate interests have been jeopardized, such as: 1). The Corps Commanders in the 122nd conference, held in 2010, publicly expressed serious concerns regarding clauses impacting national security included in the so-called Kerry-Lugar bill.³²³ The forum announced it had issued a warning to the government, against signing the U.S. bill. 2). On July 27, 2008, Pakistan's cabinet division issued a formal notification placing the ISI under the minister of the interior in an attempt to break the link with the army, thus prompting strong opposition by both the army and then President Musharraf. Within hours, before leaving for an official visit to Washington, PM Gilani had to reverse the order, arguing misinterpretation. Likewise, Gilani's second attempt to deal with the secret service was no more successful when, three days after the Mumbai attack, Gilani considered sending the DG ISI to Delhi, a move that the defense analyst, Shereen Mazari,

³²² Talat Masood, "Bridging the Civil Military Divide," *The News Pakistan*, 7 September 2009, (accessed January 12, 2012).

³²³ ISPR, Press Release 396/2009, Rawalpindi – October, 2009.

describes as a bizarre behavior of the leadership.³²⁴ 3) The three-year extension given to the army chief and the one year to the DG ISI shows that the army still maintains influence over the civilian government. 4). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has quite often been a visitor of army headquarters in the past. This shows the political strength of the army. 5). The policy statements that should be coming from the foreign office or the prime minister continue to emanate from army headquarters. 6). The army holds a monopoly on the three army forces with regard to the appointments of senior officers. The president of the NDU has always been from the army. Most of the chairman joint chiefs have been from the army. The director general of the ISI and the Strategic Plans Division (Nuclear Command Authority) has always been from the army. In the lucrative UN peacekeeping missions, army headquarters has a complete monopoly, while the navy and air force have no representation. All secretaries of defense have been from the army. The coast guard, which is primarily the role of the navy, is headed by the army's top brass.

I contend that in order to maintain effective civilian control the above mentioned appointments should be evenly distributed to generate service rivalry, with the exception of the secretary of defense who should be a career bureaucrat to maintain effective civilian control over the military.

Of late, certain policy decisions taken by the government, have led to an increase in civil-military tension in Pakistan, such as the famous issue of the memo scandal. The issue of memo-scandal was aimed to implicate the president of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari and Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistan's former ambassador to the United States. They were accused of conspiring against the Pakistan army.³²⁵ The tension rose further between the executive and the army when the Army and the ISI chiefs gave affidavits in court that "who is behind the memo issue," must be investigated, thus openly challenging the civilians.

³²⁴ Shireen Mazari, "The Prime Minister's Confusion," *The News International*, 20, January 2010 (accessed January 23, 2012).

³²⁵ Fareed Zakaria, "Pakistan's Besieged Government," January 11, 2012, *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/opinion/Pakistan> (accessed January 15, 2012).

The prime minister of Pakistan, in a recent statement, has accused the army of violating its constitutional limits. I quote: “We will not allow the rise of the states within the state, while being strongly critical of Pakistan army.”³²⁶ In return, the army was equally critical of the remarks uttered by the prime minister. The army spokesman stated that, “the army leadership did not act unconstitutionally, while mentioning that the remarks uttered by the prime minister may have very dangerous consequences.”³²⁷ The Inter-Services Public Relations department has recently rebuffed and been critical of statements given by the prime minister against the army in the public media.³²⁸

I contend that the prime minister and the president, who are already facing corruption charges in the court, could not afford another memo issue scandal. Both the president and the prime minister tried their best to politicize the army by forcing it to withdraw its support from the memo issue; however, the army chief has refused to act in what he terms a violation of the constitution. In retaliation, the prime minister sacked the secretary of defense on January 11, 2012. He was a retired general and was placed as secretary of defense on the recommendations of the army chief.³²⁹

Tanvir Ahmed Khan (the ex-foreign secretary), in a recent editorial in the “*The News Pakistan*,” mentions that the current civil-military tension in Pakistan emerged when the armed forces are not particularly assertive and have, in fact expressed a willingness to extend support to the new political system.³³⁰ He also mentions that “the inherent sense of insecurity in the new leadership led to poorly conceived initiatives to curb the armed forces.”³³¹

³²⁶ Cyril Almedia, “For Whom the Bell Tolls,” *The Dawn*, December 23, 2011, (accessed January 1, 2012).

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Official Correspondent, “Pakistan’s Army Warns of Grievous Consequences Over Prime Minister Gilani Comments” *The Economic Times*, January 11, 2012, www.economic-times.com.indiatimes.com (accessed February 12, 2012).

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Tanvir Ahmed Khan, “Civil-Military Tensions,” *The Daily News Pakistan*, January 18, 2012, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/todaysprint>. (accessed January 28, 2012)

³³¹ Ibid.

E. FUTURE CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN

This section argues that in Pakistan there is less of a chance of future coups due to changing internal and external political environments in the country. However, due to weak civilian institutions and external threats to the country, the military will continue to act as a powerful power broker in the country.

During the cold war, military regimes were often tolerated by both sides as long as they represented a close ally in the overall game but, in today's globalized world, where the economy is high on the agenda, democracy is widely considered the most suitable type of regime to ensure desired development, even if the notion of democracy itself is subject to different interpretations. Since Pakistan opted again for a civilian elected government in February 2008, Myanmar is the last country where the military is still in power. In the emerging political scenario, the military may maintain a position of equidistance from both major political parties the PML (N) and the PPP in the country. To that extent, GHQ would no longer have any favorite side between these two major parties. Perhaps a level playing field for the all the political parties could emerge till such a as time the army decides to back one particular party against another.

With regard to the future of the civil military relations in Pakistan, Cohen argues, "Pakistan is unlikely to extricate itself from its *path dependent patterns*" (history of the military coups) of tolerating a gross imbalance of power between the military and the civilians."³³² Cohen points out that the imbalance continues to be maintained since the partition of Pakistan. This factor has been adequately covered in Chapter II. Cohen also asserts, "In Pakistan the military continues to defy the civilian democratic control and where military intervention is plausible, if not widely considered legitimate, mechanism of the regime change."³³³ Cohen has also brought out that the civil society in Pakistan is weak and because of that, the military gains prominence.³³⁴ I challenge Cohen's

³³² Cohen, *The Future*, 199.

³³³ *Ibid.*, 200.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

assertion and argue that the previous military regimes have been thrown away by the power of the people and the civil society. Thus, I do not agree with Cohen.

I contend that unless the military is kept autonomous, and its corporate interests are not threatened, the military will stay sterile and continue to cooperate with the civilians. However, because of the weak civilian institutions and the divisions among the politicians, the military will remain a powerful broker in the country, lest the judiciary, civilian institutions, civil society and the opposition are on one note. The current Judicial–ruling government crisis may again provide a vacuum in the army. If the above crisis prevails in country, the Chief Justice of Pakistan may, under article 90, request/order the army to supervise free and fair elections, if the Chief Justice declares the rule of the present government unconstitutional. There is only a remote possibility of this happening

I also argue that future coups in Pakistan are a very remote possibility because all four actors in Pakistan power politics—(1) The judiciary (2) the civil society and people (3) The opposition political parties and (4) The United States (who have always backed military regimes in Pakistan)—have emerged as strong critics of military rule. Further, geopolitical changes in the world and on the international scene do not favor the reemergence of military regimes. The military, under the present scenario, when the country’s economy is in dire crises, will never even venture to attempt a coup.

Lately, the judiciary has declared the previous rule of General Musharraf illegal. Also, the present Chief Justice, while recently addressing the graduating senior army officers at NDU Islamabad, pointed out that “Army takeovers in future will be unconstitutional and be considered as an act of treason.³³⁵” Recently, when the prime minister of Pakistan raised the alarm bells about a likely coup in the country, in response,

³³⁵ Dawn Official Correspondent, *The Daily Dawn Pakistan*, November 14, 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/11/14/military-intervention-2.html> (accessed January 20, 2012).

the chief justice remarked, “We assume that nothing will occur and only the constitutional order will prevail.”³³⁶ Earlier, all four coups had the backing of the judiciary.

The civil society and media, which were not strong earlier, have emerged as very strong institutions. In fact, the downfall of General Musharraf is attributed to a vibrant and active civil society in Pakistan. With freedom of the press and the introduction of 80 more TV channels and Internet access, it has become very difficult to hide anything from the public.³³⁷ I contend that the civil society, with the backing of the media, will resist any attempt of future coups. Recently, the army chief and the ISI have been openly criticized in the media, which is unprecedented in the history of Pakistan.

Earlier, the Pakistan army was supported throughout by the U.S. and Pakistani military regimes, and compared to civilian regimes, has been the largest recipient of U.S. aid.³³⁸ Cohen, points out that in “most of the last century, the United States has been a partner of the military dictators, whole heartedly embracing all four generals who have ruled Pakistan.”³³⁹ Presidents from Kennedy to Bush have invited them to state dinners and for intimate consultations, since the independence of Pakistan.³⁴⁰ However, lately, the U.S. government has also vowed to consolidate democracy in Pakistan.

In fact, the pressure by the United States to revert to the normalization of democratic rule began to mount on Musharraf soon after he took over. However, post-9/11 incidents and the U.S. war on terror helped strengthened Musharraf’s authoritarian rule, until 2008. I contend that, in the future, the Pakistani Army being a major component of the ongoing war on terror will not be enough a reason for the United States to compromise again on its stated democratic values. Also, the post-Bin Laden incident of May 2, 2011 with the chain of events that followed, brought U.S.-Pakistan military

³³⁶ Official Correspondent Dawn, “No Question of Military Take Over: CJ,” *The Daily Dawn* Pakistan, December 12, 2011 (accessed February 1, 2012).

³³⁷ Cohen, *The Future*, 3.

³³⁸ Cyril, “From Whom the Bell Tolls,” *The Dawn*, December 23, 2011 (accessed January 1, 2012).

³³⁹ Cohen, *The Future*, viii

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, viii.

relations to their lowest ebb.³⁴¹ The relations between the two countries have further deteriorated as a result of the unilateral operation of U.S. forces that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers on November 26, 2011.³⁴² The recent U.S. media reports against the Pakistan army have been a new phenomenon and change of indicators.³⁴³ I contend that future coups will not be supported by the United States.

I also do not agree to some of the recent assertions emanating from the U.S. press, which allege that a military coup might occur within the Pakistani army because of the inability of General Kayani to respond to U.S. actions in the aftermath of the Bin Laden incident and the attack on a Pakistani check post.³⁴⁴ The *Economic Times* of the United States in an article on June 11, 2011, with the heading of “General Kayani Fighting to Survive U.S. Media” states that “the prospects of the coup in the Pakistan army have started to look real after the Laden incident.”³⁴⁵ I argue that the Pakistani military is a professional military and strongly maintains hierarchical values and strictly follows chain of command. The chances of a coup within the military are negligible. The history of the Pakistani army shows that the halfhearted attempts at coups were unearthed during the planning process, against civilian regimes. It was the army who unearthed all the coups.

Additionally, international environments, including donor organizations, may also play a substantial role in extending any loans or aid in case of a coup. Yusuf Crookes, World Bank (WB) country director for Pakistan, states that his organization had already

³⁴¹ Fareed Zakaria, “Pakistan’s *Besieged Government*,” *The New York Times*, January 11, 2012 <http://www.newyorktimes.com> (accessed January 26, 2012).

³⁴² Official Correspondent, Head Lines, “Pakistan Reviews: Official U.S. NATO Ties,” *The Daily Dawn*, November 26, 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/11/26/pakistan-asks-U.S.-to-vacate-shamsi-airbase-within-15-days.html> (accessed January 21, 2012).

³⁴³ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁴ Ayaz, Amir, “Colonels Coups Chances Almost nil,” *The New Pakistan*, June 24, 2011. www.thenews.com.pk (accessed November 12, 2011).

³⁴⁵ Official Bureau, “General Kayani Fighting to Survive U.S. Media,” *The Economic Times*, June 17, 2011, www.economictimes.com. (accessed January 3, 2012).

reduced its lending during the last year of General Musharraf's tenure (2007–2008) as the bank was accused of extending assistance to Pakistan during the military regimes.³⁴⁶

As the saying goes, money is the sinew of war; therefore, it is essential for the government to gain control of all spending, including that of the armed forces. As Mr. Syed Fakhar Imam says, for the first time, some details of the defense budget were presented to Parliament in 2008, whereas previously only the total amount of expected expenditures was presented. In the same way, the ISI budget has also been discussed, a very positive step toward ensuring civilian control over the military and the intelligence.³⁴⁷

Recently, the opposition leader, Mian Nawaz Sharif, after the fourth coup against General Musharraf, has emerged as a strong critic of the military. Sharif has categorically mentioned that his party will prevent any future military role in politics while demanding that the military budget and ISI's budget must be discussed in parliament.³⁴⁸ Also, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the present ruling government of PPP has criticized the growing military role in politics and has recommended that measures be devised to confine the military within its own constitutional limits.³⁴⁹ The people have realized that thirty years of military rule in Pakistan has weakened democratic institutions and brought further misery to the people. I contend that the key to reducing military dominance in Pakistan is to reduce the tensions with India as well as Afghanistan. However, the chances of reducing tensions with India in the near future are not plausible.

³⁴⁶ Talat Masood, "Bridging the Civil Military Divide," *The News Pakistan*, 7 September 2009 (accessed January 12, 2012).

³⁴⁷ Iftikhar A. Khan, "Discussion on the Military Budget in Parliament," *Dawn*, 24 February 2010.

³⁴⁸ Badar Alam, "Confidant Nawaz Tread a Tricky Path," *The Dawn News*, February 4, 2012, and *The News Pakistan*, December 11, 2011.

³⁴⁹ Cyril Almedia, "For Whom the Bell Tolls," *The Dawn*, December 23, 2011.

Therefore, the military will continue to play a dominant role and will not act unless the corporate interests of the military, such as Afghan and Indian policy matters, are threatened.³⁵⁰ Also, other institutions in Pakistan are still weak and in the process of democratic consolidation.

F. CONCLUSION

This paper examines the causes of the first military coup in Pakistan: Why did it occur and why does the first military coup matter? The first chapter explains the theoretical reasons of military coups in the world in general. It argues that military intervention occurs for various reasons, which include military professionalism, corporate interests, patriotism, syndicalism, the rise of civil-military tensions, occasion, disposition and the opportunity to intervene, as various authors have noted. Then it explains the background and the reasons that led to the emergence of the Pakistan army as a more powerful institution compared to the civilians institutions. It shows that some of the root causes of the first coup in Pakistan lie in the pre-partition era and date back to the evolution of British civil-military relations in the sub-continent. The British had devised effective civilian control over the military as they recruited more troops from minority ethnicities areas, like Punjab, which later formed part of Pakistan. The British-devised policies also generated good will among the locals (recruitment areas) by offering more perks and privileges to soldiers. This resulted in the creation of a strong military bond between people of Punjab and the army. Most of the British recruitment areas later formed part of Pakistan. The inherited infrastructure of Pakistan, such as the political leadership (with no roots among the people), geographical boundaries, division of resources, lack of trained civil servants and external and internal threats, the outbreak of the Kashmir War, internal law and order problems, and finally the already-trained professional army were the contributory factors that made the Pakistani leadership dependent on army leadership at the time of partition.

³⁵⁰ Rana Shah, "The Rogue Democracy," *The News*, January 11, 2012,

Chapter II explains the causes of the first military coup in Pakistan. It argues that there were multiple causes of the first military coup. The Pakistani military was already professional and had inherited British traditions and professionalism. On the other hand, the political leadership, which had advocated for the cause of Pakistan, had no roots among the people. Pakistan's problems were compounded when its leaders died soon after partition, thus leaving a vacuum in the country. In the absence of a constitution, democracy could not really flourish as post-independence Pakistan had only one political party, i.e., the Muslim League. This created a vacuum readily filled by religious parties that succeeded in acting as major pressure groups, despite a poor track record in electoral representation. These events further led to the collapse of political institutions.

Other factors that saw the emergence of the powerful Pakistani army were the internal and external threats to the country. Soon after the independence of Pakistan, the Kashmir War started and events led the Pakistani to believe that Pakistan was facing existential threats from both India and Afghanistan. Internally, its two provinces were also facing insurgency. Thus, the first priority of the political leadership in Pakistan was to suitably equip the Pakistan army. Pakistan, in a quest for survival, military aid and training, formed alliances with the United States. The regular interaction of a weak army with a modern Western state made its leadership a modern thinker, while the society remained backward and illiterate.

In parallel, the issues of political authority, culture, language and economic justice gained eminence in the post-partition era. The majority Bengalis were marginalized and kept from the political process by delaying the formation of the constitution until 1956. After the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, the other politicians could not hold the parties together and kept fighting with each other. They preferred their own self-interests over national interests. The internal law and order situation, which could have been controlled politically, was controlled by involving the army and imposing frequent martial law. These events led army leadership and the people of Pakistan to believe that civilians were incompetent and the army could handle administrative affairs better. A decay in political institutions led to the rise of a strong bureaucracy and the army nexus, which further damaged the political institutions. The bureaucrats' military-nexus

emerged as a result of the political vacuum in the country. The bureaucrats, in collaboration with the military leadership, played an instrumental part in discrediting the politicians before the public. They replaced seven prime ministers and eight cabinets, within eleven years of the independence of Pakistan, and up until the first military coup by General Ayub Khan, in 1958.

I contend that the first coup in Pakistan was caused by weak political institutions and divided politicians who had no grass roots level support. A lack of institutional control and a delay in the formation of a constitution, plus a powerful and professional army, brimming with a sense of nationalism, also contributed to the coup. Other factors include syndicalism, patriotism and corporate interest, internal security and administrative duties that could otherwise have been resolved politically, and internal and external threats along with a clean and non-corrupt army that emerged as a savior of the state. External influences and modern education caused a division between the less educated society and the modern army. These events provided space to the army leadership, which found occasion, opportunity and the disposition to intervene and, thereby, effected the first coup in Pakistan.

My analysis of present civil-military relations in Pakistan indicates that future military intervention in Pakistan is a remote possibility as some of the institutions, like the judiciary and civil society, have come of age. However, the army will continue to remain a power broker and an arbitrator in the country's politics because of a lack of political culture and leadership. The people of Pakistan still view its army as a prestigious institution and the savior of the state. Chapter III explains the economic policies of Ayub Khan, Ayub's treatment of the ethnic minorities and civilians that led to the third military takeover, by General Yahya Khan. This chapter shows that the first coup, which had set up a cycle of coups, also gave rise to the second military coup because of a lack of institutional control and the authoritarian policies of General Ayub Khan. When Ayub took over the country, its overall political and economic conditions were in a poor state. The country's treasury was virtually empty. Ayub, using his administrative acumen, brought about a revolution in the economic policies of the country, which made Pakistan one of the fastest growing economies in Asia. Ayub also

utilized the U.S. and international donors' aid in bringing improvement in primarily the industrial sector. He also provided incentive, which saw a rise in middle urban class businessmen; however, Ayub's economic policies could not trickle down to poor regions like East Pakistan and the rural areas. High industrial growth relied on extracting resources from the rural areas of East Bengal, and low wage workers in the West, which led to disparities in the country that were not addressed as the country grew.

Ayub's government introduced the concept of a green revolution in the country by bringing revolutionary reforms in the agriculture sector. Ayub's land reforms act was only partially successful as it lacked implementation. In addition to economic disparities, the 1965 War proved disastrous for Pakistan's economy and to the image of Ayub Khan. The war had two effects: it not only stopped U.S. aid to Pakistan, but foreign investments were reduced by 25 percent. Ayub failed to provide basic facilities like health care and education to the common man. The main beneficiaries of Ayub's policies were twenty-two families, which included his close associates.

Despite having enabled a massive economic improvement in the country, Ayub's policies resulted in class and regional disparities as the major beneficiaries of his policies were the targeted industrialists and the urban population of the middle class. These beneficiaries included retired army officers and bureaucrats, while depriving the people from rural areas and Tehsils (small cities), including East Pakistan. Instead of undertaking development in all parts of Pakistan, Ayub mostly channeled development in West Pakistan. The export-oriented income from the agriculture sector of East Pakistan was spent on industrialization in West Pakistan, which further sowed the seeds of resentment in the majority Bengali population, and alienated them further. The post-1965 War period saw a major decline in the economy of the country and proved disastrous for Ayub's regime. The U.S. stopped the flow of aid as well as military supplies to Pakistan. Ayub's economic policies gave rise to socio-economic forces that caused mass political and socio-economic tensions in the country. Industrial workers, lower middle-class clerks, student unions and lawyers all played instrumental parts in the movement against Ayub.

These socio-economic forces were successfully exploited by politicians like Bhutto, which was one of the reasons for Ayub's downfall. Ayub's regime also came as a disappointment for the majority Bengalis as they initially viewed him as incorruptible and clean compared to other politicians. In 1962, his political system deprived the Bengalis from participating in decision making, in both political and socio-economic matters, at the national level. Ayub's economic policies also brought a wider gulf between both East and West Pakistan as all development was directed toward West Pakistan, while ignoring East Pakistan. He continued to spend more resources in West Pakistan and marginalized the Bengalis, while fuelling Bengalis sentiments. After the 1965 War, Ayub's policies further cut economic development in Pakistan. This exacerbated the differences between the economies of the two wings of Pakistan. I contend that some of the concerns raised by the Bengalis, such as unequal development and a smaller quota in the military, can be attributed to its geographical location and historical reasons that date back to the British recruitment policy. Similarly, the British disregarded Bengal, with regard to undertaking development, because of its geographic location. Ayub Khan was an authoritarian ruler. Therefore, he did not let democratic institutions nurture. Instead, he devised policies where most of the powers were centered on him. Ayub suppressed the opposition by making wider use of the state machinery and intelligence agencies, while introducing the concept of electoral participation known as the Basic Democracies System (BD). The BD system became instrumental in creating political culture in Pakistan. These BD members remained a political instrument to further Ayub's policies and help Ayub Khan in consolidating his hold on power. Ayub introduced draconian laws with a view to coerce the politicians, such as the "Public Representative Office Disqualification Act (PRODA)" and the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) under which politicians could be tried by the government. Ayub's policies kept the opposition divided, which allowed him to continue for eleven years as president. He rigged the 1966 elections, while utilizing state machinery. During this period, Fatima Jinnah, Bhutto and Mujib emerged as three political leaders from West and East Pakistan. By the end of 1968, Bhutto managed to successfully exploit the rising socioeconomic forces and mobilize public opinion in the

form of street protests. The country's economy came to a virtual halt due to almost daily strikes. By early 1969, Yahya Khan, who was the army chief, started taking note of the growing law and order situation in the country, as the army's prestige was being damaged under the name of Ayub Khan. Yahya Khan took over from Ayub in a peaceful coup in March 1969 and imposed martial law. The army took over once its prestige was being damaged under the name of army. The army also felt that it was in the best interest of the state to take over from Ayub Khan.

The fall of Ayub Khan can be attributed to a lack of political culture and institutional building, his discriminatory policies toward Bangladeshis, the unexpected results from the 1965 War and the signing of the Tashkent cease-fire agreement. Ayub's downfall also occurred because of the unequal distribution of income that gave rise to regional and class differences in a country that was successfully exploited by politicians. These inequalities and the treatment of minorities by the military regime of Ayub, led to the cause of the second military takeover. I contend that the roots of the first coup in Pakistan also lie in the first coup against Ayub Khan.

Chapter IV explains the background of the evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan. It analyses civil-military relations during the Bhutto's period, and after General Zia's period. This chapter also discusses present civil-military relations in Pakistan. It attempts to determine future military relations in Pakistan. Pakistan's first coup set up a pattern and created an imbalance where, in Pakistan, no foreign or domestic policy can be crafted without the approval of the military. Today, in the year 2012, fifty years later, a tussle between the prime minister and the army continues. The factors explained in Chapters I and II explain that the imbalance between civil-military relations in Pakistan is tilted toward the army's side. Bhutto, the first elected civilian leader, who enjoyed massive popularity after thirteen years of military rule, also missed the opportunity to bring institutional balance and political culture in the country. Bhutto revised the constitution, cut down the powers of the army chiefs, confined the military's role, and created parallel institutions to dilute the powers of the military. However, Bhutto was an authoritarian leader who, like his predecessors, failed to nurture the civilian institutions. Bhutto suppressed the judiciary, came down hard on the politicians and rigged the

elections, while using the state machinery. The sacking of the army generals by Bhutto also created civil-military friction. On July 5, 1977, the army overthrew Bhutto and took over the government by imposing martial law for the third time. The deadlock between the opposition and the ruling party provided space for the army, while the judiciary legitimized the coup, as per the practice in vogue. The coup was also legitimized and welcomed by the United States, which provided billions of dollars in military aid to the dictator. I contend that the tensions in civil-military relations and the deadlock with the politicians provided occasion, opportunity and disposition to the army to intervene and overthrow Bhutto.

Eleven years of Zia's doctorial rule in Pakistan further institutionalized the army's role in the country's politics. The army's leadership interaction with the United States on the strategic level further created an imbalance in civil-military relations in Pakistan. The Pakistani military also shaped itself into an autonomous political actor with all the capabilities to pull the strings of power politics from the sidelines, while transferring power to the civilians. Zia introduced a presidential system by bringing in constitutional amendments (article 58), which saw a continued power struggle between the civilian presidents, prime ministers, the judiciary, and the army from 1988–1997, until the Nawaz Sharif government's constitutional reforms, and did away with the powers of the presidents to dissolve assemblies. Between 1988 and 1997, four civilian governments were sent home as a result of the president and the prime ministers. The army's role, during this period, remained that of kingmaker and the ability to pull strings from the side lines. The army also played a contributory role in creating a new political party, IJI, later PML (N), in order to neutralize the power of Benazir Bhutto's government. The army, during this period, did not cause a coup, despite having been given many opportunities. This was because the army's corporate interests, such as major policy decisions on the budget, external and internal security, including the Kashmir policy situation, were in line with the army's policies.

Like Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif made the same mistake, by consolidating his powers rather than building institutions. The fourth coup occurred because of heightening civil-military tensions and over the issue of the Kargil War between the president and Army Chief Musharraf. These factors resulted in the coup d'état by Pervez Musharraf in October 1999. All the coups in Pakistan were validated by the Supreme Court. They were all welcomed by the people, as well.

General Musharraf had to resign because of movement in the civil society. After Musharraf, General Kayani took over as the army chief, in 2007. Kayani initially showed a real intent to remaining subservient to democratic civilian control. Kayani, instead, averted a major clash between the opposition, government and the judiciary in 2009, although this was a golden opportunity for the army chief to take over. He kept the military professional, sterile and apolitical, until the army's prestige and corporate interests began to be jeopardized by the civilian government. Publicly expressed concerns regarding clauses that impacted national security included in the so-called Kerry-Lugar bill, an attempt to bring the ISI under the control of the ministry of the interior by the prime minister, was refused by the army. The recent eruption of serious differences between the prime minister and the army over the famous "memo gate scandal" and the open criticism of the Prime Minister against the army are indicators that present civil-military relations between the two institutions are at their lowest ebb.

With regard to future civil-military relations in Pakistan, I contend that unless the military is kept autonomous, and its corporate interests are not threatened, the military will remain sterile and continue to cooperate with civilians. I also argue that future coups in Pakistan are a very remote possibility because all four actors in the Pakistan power politics, (1) The judiciary, (2) the civil society and people, (3) the opposition political parties and, (4) the United States, (who always back the military regimes of Pakistan), have emerged as strong critics of military rule. Further, the geopolitical changes in the world and international scenario do not favor the reemergence of military regimes.

Lately, the judiciary, the civil society, opposition and the United States have shown a strong aversion to military rule. These factors show that a military coup in the country is a remote possibility. A midlevel coup in Pakistan is not possible, either, as the Pakistani army is a professional and hierarchical institution. The chances of a coup within the military are negligible as the Pakistani military is a professional military and strongly maintains hierarchical values and strictly follows a chain of command. The process of democratic consolidation in Pakistan is far from over; the civilian institutions are weak and politicians are divided. Therefore, the Pakistani army will continue to play the role of a dominant political institution in the country in the near future.

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