

# **Men of Destiny: The American and Filipino Guerillas During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines**

**A Monograph**

**by**

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**AY 2011-02**

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 01-12-2011		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Monograph		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> JAN 2011 – DEC 2011	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  Men of Destiny: The American and Filipino Guerrillas During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines			<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Major Peter Thomas Sinclair, II			<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>		
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134			<b>8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>			<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>		
			<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>		
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> The American and Filipino guerrillas that fought against the Japanese occupation of the Philippines were key in providing direction to resistance efforts and in the eventual liberation of the islands. The guerrillas escaped the aggressive counter-guerrilla efforts of the Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese failure to deal with isolated soldiers and civilians provided the time they needed to organize into guerrilla groups and prepare for American forces liberation of the Philippines. This analysis of American and Filipino insurgents covers the effectiveness of Japanese counter guerrilla efforts, the intelligence structure created by General Douglas MacArthur's staff to support the guerrillas, the guerrilla's contributions to the liberation of the Philippines, and it examines how Americans would form guerrilla groups and fight as insurgents behind enemy lines if circumstances warranted. Additionally, it provides general insight as to how resistance movements form.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b>					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b>	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b>	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b>			<b>19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	61	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

# SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

## MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines

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## **Abstract**

**MEN OF DESTINY: THE AMERICAN AND FILIPINO GUERRILLAS DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES** by Major Peter T. Sinclair, II ,61 pages.

The American and Filipino guerrillas that fought against the Japanese occupation of the Philippines were key in providing direction to resistance efforts and in the eventual liberation of the islands. The guerrillas escaped the aggressive counter-guerrilla efforts of the Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese failure to deal with isolated soldiers and civilians provided the time they needed to organize into guerrilla groups and prepare for American forces liberation of the Philippines. This analysis of American and Filipino insurgents covers the effectiveness of Japanese counter guerrilla efforts, the intelligence structure created by General Douglas MacArthur's staff to support the guerrillas, the guerrilla's contributions to the liberation of the Philippines, and it examines how Americans would form guerrilla groups and fight as insurgents behind enemy lines if circumstances warranted. Additionally, it provides general insight as to how resistance movements form.

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## Introduction

Guerrillas have taken to the field of battle throughout history. Their locations and tactics may have changed over the years but the threat they present is a constant. An evident example comes from American history when civilians fought as guerrillas during the Revolutionary War against the British; however, this is certainly not the only time Americans fought as guerrillas. In reality, during World War II, Americans were put to the test as they fought alongside Filipino nationals as guerrillas in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation of the Archipelago.

The American and Filipino guerrillas were invaluable to the effort to liberate the Philippines from the Japanese occupation during World War II. The combined efforts of the various guerrilla groups directly contributed to the recapture of the Philippines by conducting intelligence operations and, when ordered, kinetic actions such as sabotage and ambushes against the occupying Japanese forces. The guerrillas, both American and Filipino, came from various walks of life. However, Wendell Fertig, the leader of the United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) in the island of Mindanao, surmised the sentiment of the leaders of these groups when he stated,

I am called on to lead a resistance movement against an implacable enemy under conditions that make victory barely possible even under the best of circumstances. But I feel that I am indeed a Man of Destiny, that my course is charted and that only success lies at the end of the trail. I do not envision failure; it is obvious that the odds are against us and we will not consistently win, but if we are to win only part of the time and gain a little each time, in the end we will be successful.<sup>1</sup>

The guerrillas not only had to fight against the Japanese, they had to settle disputes amongst themselves, survive the dangers of the jungle, and the stresses of conducting continuous

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<sup>1</sup> John Keats, *They Fought Alone: A True Story of a Modern American Hero* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott Company, 1963), 104.

operations for over two years. Their faith in eventual liberation from the Japanese and the fear of the consequences of failure allowed the guerrillas to persevere in the face of overwhelming odds.

Both the history of the fall and the eventual liberation of the Philippines suffer from some common historical misperceptions and myths. This monograph attempts to address the misperceptions surrounding the guerrillas that fought there and analyze their accomplishments. It is important to both address and analyze these misperceptions and myths to gain a pertinent understanding of their success. The first is the myth that the Japanese established total control over the Philippine archipelago. The second is that the occupation of the Philippines was uneventful for the Japanese after the surrender of American and Filipino forces and the soldiers accepted their fate as prisoners of war. The third and final myth is that General MacArthur and his staff did very little to support the guerrillas within the Philippines

To begin, the first myth is that the Japanese forces exhibited total control over the Philippine archipelago during its occupation. The reality is that while the Japanese did utilize harsh treatment in dealing with the Filipino population and American prisoners of war, the Japanese behavior only served to unite the isolated American citizens and Filipino civilians against them.<sup>2</sup> The Japanese were not monolithic in their views when it came to dealing with the local Filipino population. In fact, some of the Japanese leadership attempted to secure the support of the Filipinos with cooperation versus coercive measures. However, the common Japanese soldier undermined the efforts of those leaders. Additionally, there were never enough Japanese forces within the Philippines to pacify the population.

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<sup>2</sup> Both American expatriates and soldiers went on to become guerrillas during the Japanese occupations of the Philippines

The second myth was that after the surrender of American and Filipino forces, the defeated servicemen waited to be led to prison camps to await their fate. The truth is that throughout the Philippines, isolated soldiers and civilians were trying to survive. On islands other than Luzon, the Japanese bypassed complete units in order to focus their efforts on capturing Manila and to defeat the combined American and Filipino forces in the Bataan peninsula. These bypassed units simply dissolved and isolated Filipino simply returned home with their arms. The American soldiers evaded capture and tried to survive long enough to wait out the war, sail on to Australia, or formed a guerrilla movement to fight the Japanese. The time lag between the surrender and the Japanese forces rounding up the defeated units allowed small numbers of servicemen to make preparations to flee and survive in the jungle before they were forced into prisoner of war camps. These isolated soldiers faced common challenges and a similar path as they made the transition from defeated soldier to guerrilla fighter. The guerrilla movement went on to provide leadership for the civilian population of Filipinos and expatriates within the archipelago.<sup>3</sup> In some areas, the guerrillas and the civilians worked together to provide the basics of security and governance. The population worked with the guerrillas to provide material support and information on the Japanese. This self-organization and symbiotic relationship quickly turned into a resistance and guerrilla movement.

The third myth is a common belief is that General MacArthur, commander of the American and Filipino forces defending the Philippines, is despite his statement “I shall return,” did little to provide anything but moral support to those left behind in the Philippines. On the contrary, General MacArthur dedicated tremendous energy and efforts within his command to

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<sup>3</sup> The monograph describes the Philippines as an archipelago. This is due to the Philippines not actually being an independent country during the time frame covered within the monograph (1941-1945), but a Commonwealth with ties to the United States.



support the guerrillas and the civilian population within the occupied Philippines. He recognized early on the potential of forming a guerrilla movement on the archipelago and the impact these guerrillas could have in a future campaign, and thus dedicated a significant portion of his intelligence efforts to that end. MacArthur's intelligence staff developed an infrastructure to provide material and moral support to the guerrillas. Additionally, the intelligence staff organized to exploit the intelligence collected and provided by the guerrillas. The intelligence gathered by the guerrillas assisted in developing invasion plans and provided landing units timely updates as to Japanese composition and disposition in the immediate vicinity. MacArthur and his staff provided material support and guidance that led to the guerrillas conducting synchronized offensive operations against the occupying Japanese forces shortly before the American invasion.<sup>4</sup> MacArthur took a personal interest in the guerrilla's efforts and the guerrillas themselves over the course of the occupation and during the campaign to liberate the archipelago. MacArthur made every effort to visit with the guerrilla leaders as his forces came into contact with them during the campaign.<sup>5</sup> The guerrilla operations inflicted significant damage on the Japanese and hindered their ability to respond to the American landings.

The efforts of the guerrillas were indispensable in shaping the campaign to take back the Philippines and its future as a nation. The guerrillas had two specified tasks given to them by

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<sup>4</sup> William Wise, *Secret Mission to the Philippines: The Story of "Spyron" & the American-Filipino Guerrillas of World War II* (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse.com, 1968, 2001 Edition), 136.

<sup>5</sup> Mike Guardia, *American Guerrilla: The Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann* (Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2010), 127; Ira Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 299; Ray C. Hunt, and Bernard Norling. *Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 220; Edwin Price Ramsey, and Stephen J Rivele. *Lieutenant Ramsey's War: From Horse Soldier to Guerrilla Commander* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc, 1990, 2005 Edition), 320; Keats, *They Fought Alone*, 410. The meetings between General MacArthur and these guerrillas, as described by the citations above, were of a personal nature and described in detail with the exception of Fertig's meeting.

General MacArthur as they were able to establish radio contact with his headquarters. First, they were to gather intelligence while limiting their combat against the Japanese forces and prepare for offensive actions, such as patrolling and sabotage, in support of the American invasion.<sup>6</sup> The variety of intelligence operations the guerrillas conducted not only contributed to the American invasion, but also supported the self-preservation of the guerrilla groups as they provided early warning of Japanese attacks. Second, the guerrillas prepared for the day when they would be able to strike decisively against their Japanese occupiers by stockpiling arms, conducting training, and identifying targets for future strikes. They also had to conduct daily operations that included patrols, solving logistical problems, conducting a limited number of ambushes, and raids. The guerrillas also had to deal with civil-military issues between themselves and the local populace. These daily tasks conducted by guerrillas were often not in keeping with the explicit guidance from General MacArthur. The adoption of these tasks caused some friction between the guerrillas and MacArthur's staff as that staff thought it was a distraction from the specified tasks. However, these tasks were necessary and vital to shaping operations that allowed the guerrillas to carry out their specified tasks. Aggravating the circumstances further was that many of the commanders and their staffs hindered the guerrilla's efforts through their own ignorance of the guerrilla's situation and limitations. To MacArthur's credit, his personal interest in the plight of the guerrillas made them a priority for his staff and worked to help resolve issues in dealing with the

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<sup>6</sup> Charles A Willoughby, ed. *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines* (New York: Vantage Press, Inc, 1972), 70. According to Lapham the shift from intelligence gathering to kinetic operations occurred with a warning order telling the guerrillas on order, perform operations against the Japanese for four days without external support.

guerrillas, but despite this, there were times the “banality of evil” would show itself within staff processes directly influencing the guerrillas.<sup>7</sup>

As the invasion neared, over two years of preparation paid off as the guerrillas struck against the Japanese with large-scale sabotage and numerous small unit actions throughout the archipelago. The guerrillas caused great chaos, preventing the Japanese from being able to effectively defend the islands of the archipelago from seaborne invasion. The Japanese defeat in the Philippines was a foregone conclusion, but the guerrillas hastened the advance of the initial landing force. The third, and arguably the most important, impact is that the experience served as a crucible for what was to become the independent nation of the Philippines. The guerrilla movement served as a vetting process for many and an opportunity for fame for some the future leaders within the government and armed forces such as Ferdinand Marcos.<sup>8</sup> Additionally, guerrilla units that fought alongside United States Army units became units in the new Philippine Army. The three-year Japanese occupation of the Philippines, while painful, directly shaped the nation that it is today.

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<sup>7</sup> According to Keats an example of this includes Fertig’s radiomen having to transmit at the Army standard of 10 coded groups per minute (CGPM) to SWPA, HQ, instead of the 30 CGPM Fertig’s radio operators were capable of transmitting. Transmitting at 10 CGPM exposed Fertig and others to Japanese radio interception efforts. When Fertig objected to having to transmit at the slower rate, SWPA, HQ responded by stating that 10 CGPM was the Army standard and rejected the request by Fertig to have a more capable operator in Australia handle his radio traffic, 369. Another example, according to Volckmann, is staff officers 6<sup>th</sup> US Army not believing the causality figures that Volckmann’s guerrillas were inflicting on the Japanese. Volckmann’s guerillas responded by stacking the bodies of the Japanese soldiers “like cordwood” so they could be easily counted by 6<sup>th</sup> US Army staff officers. Afterwards, the 6<sup>th</sup> US Army staff stopped questioning the accuracy of the guerrillas accounts, *They Fought Alone*, 197.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling, *Lapham’s Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines 1942-1945* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 122. Conflicting reports exist about Marcos’s actions during the occupation cast doubt as to his true role. According to Lapham, Hunt arrested Marcos for a short time during the occupation. Once Marcos came to power, he used his position to rehabilitate his image as a guerrilla fighter in the eyes of the public and in historical records.

The narrative of the American and Filipino guerrillas is worth analyzing for a variety of reasons. It provides examples of how isolated military personnel may or should behave over long periods. Study also provides insight as to how guerrilla and insurgent groups form. The experience of the American and Filipino guerrillas may have been unique, but it provides a point of departure to understand and analyze how other insurgent groups self organize. By recognizing the steps a guerrilla movement takes during its formation, it offers opportunities for specific efforts either to support or undermine the groups. Furthermore, study of guerrillas operations in the Philippine Islands illustrates how conventional forces can utilize guerilla forces in an Unconventional Warfare role in support of conventional operations.<sup>9</sup>

## Literature Review

Sources on the subject of the American and Filipino activities during World War II have not been lost to time, but are difficult to come by. Different guerrilla bands faced difficulties in keeping records for a variety of reasons. These reasons included the risk of compromise, Japanese exploitation of documents, the need for the bands to keep moving to avoid capture, and the lack of the resources available to keep detailed records. These fears were for good reason. One major's captured diary, for example, led to the deaths of everyone named within at the hands of Japanese soldiers.<sup>10</sup> Another reason is the fact that potential authors faced capture or died before a chance

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<sup>9</sup> US, Department of the Army. *FM 1-02 Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2004), 1-193. According to FM 1-02, Unconventional Warfare (UW) is defined as "a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.

<sup>10</sup> Bernard Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon* (Lexington, KY, The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 216.

to write about their experiences.<sup>11</sup> As such, most of the sources regarding the odyssey of the guerrillas are from retrospective recollections of individual guerrillas and fragmentary documents rather than from the perspective of documents generated during the conflict. As vital as these documents are to understanding what occurred, a reader must consider each author's bias.<sup>12</sup> Adding to the difficulty in finding sources is that some of the guerrillas' personal accounts have been long out of print since their initial release. However, recent scholarship details the efforts of the guerrillas within Luzon and popular culture has recently dramatized their contributions in cinema.<sup>13</sup>

The sources used fall into three general themes. The first focuses on sources about the guerrillas or were those created by the guerrillas themselves. The second theme's area of concern revolves around includes sources pertaining to the efforts by General MacArthur and his staff to support the guerrillas behind enemy lines. The third and final theme relates to the activities of the Japanese during their initial invasion and their counter-guerrilla efforts. Some of the sources belong to more than one theme. The methodology behind these themes is to create the narrative of the guerrillas from the perspectives of the occupying Japanese, American forces, and the guerrillas themselves.

This monograph makes use of two types of primary sources. It uses historical After Action Reviews (AARs) of the combined intelligence activities from the Southwest Pacific Area Headquarters and personal accounts of the guerrillas' themselves. Major General Charles

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<sup>11</sup> Hunt , et al, *Behind Japanese Lines*, 71.

<sup>12</sup> This is not to disparage any of the authors. It is to explain how a guerrilla leader would act on order from a higher headquarters or good judgment and face criticism from others who are not in possession of all of the facts.

<sup>13</sup> *The Great Raid*, directed by John Dahl, Miramax, 2006, is one recent example. Additionally, a movie about the efforts of COL Wendell Fertig is currently in preproduction.

Willoughby, General MacArthur's Director of Intelligence or G-2, had his staff section create the After Action Reviews and are part of the nine volume set documenting all of the activities of the intelligence section of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) Headquarters. The AARs include *Intelligence Activities in the Philippines during the Japanese Occupation* and *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement of the Philippines*.

Personal accounts from guerrillas came out in book format years following the war. They are reliable only as the memories of the author and the personalities involved. After review, it appears that some of the friction between the different guerrilla bands carried over into print. There was no outright animus between the authors, but it is clear that they agreed to disagree in how to organize, how to carry out operations amongst or between themselves, and ultimately which guerrilla unit was the most effective. The best example of this was the tension that occurred between guerrilla leaders Robert Lapham, Ray Hunt, and Russell Volckmann. Lapham and Hunt describe in their works, *Lapham's Raiders* and *Behind Japanese Lines*, respectively, how Volckmann tried to incorporate their groups under his authority and went as far as threatening their followers with courts-martial if they did not acquiesce. This friction is helpful in that it provides counterpoints to available accounts and an understanding of what occurred from another's point of view. Admittedly, this friction is unhelpful in that each author leaves out facts that may cast him or her in an unfavorable light. The personal accounts written by former guerrillas and those who supported them often had the help of a professional author and attempted to place their efforts in the larger context of the campaign to retake the Philippines.

To begin, the first theme of texts centers on published accounts of and by guerrillas. The first published personal account was Ira Wolfert's *American Guerrilla in the Philippines*, published in 1945. It is the account of Iliff David Richardson during World War II as he went from PT boat captain to unwitting guerrilla after a failed attempt to escape the archipelago. Richardson's account is important because it describes how the guerrillas sustained themselves logistically, insight on guerrilla groups on the islands of Leyte and Mindanao, and epitomized the

conflict between South West Pacific Area's desire for intelligence and the reality of the necessity to conduct operations against the Japanese.<sup>14</sup> An example of the logistic efforts that the guerrillas undertook was the creation of an ordinance plant.<sup>15</sup> It took sixty guerrillas to manufacture an average of 160 bullets a day out of hand filed curtain rods.<sup>16</sup> The book also covers some of the personal aspects of fighting a war amongst the people as it details the romance that occurred between Richardson and a native Filipina. Wolfert's book also became the basis for a movie of the same name released in 1950.<sup>17</sup>

Major General Charles Willoughby's book, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement of the Philippines*, is actually nothing more than a reprint of portions from the aforementioned After Action Reviews.<sup>18</sup> His work offers very little in the way of refinement or expansion since the original After Action Reviews written in 1948. The only benefit this work provides is that it offers maps from other volumes of the After Action Reviews that relate to, but do not directly pertain to, the guerrillas or intelligence operations within the Philippines during World War II.

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<sup>14</sup> Wolfert, *American Guerilla in the Philippines*, 190. On the island of Mindanao, Richardson was an Ensign, United State Navy. On Leyte, he was a Major serving as the Chief of Staff for Colonel Kangleon, Philippine Army, Wolfert, *American Guerilla in the Philippines*, 170. The ranks of the guerrillas came from a variety of sources including, pre-war rank, self-appointment, appointment by subordinates, or ranks given by the leadership of the different guerrilla groups.

<sup>15</sup> Wolfert, *American Guerilla in the Philippines*, 145.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> *Internet Movie Database*. September 8, 2011. <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0042195/> (accessed September 8, 2011).

<sup>18</sup> Despite Willoughby's book being a reprint, for the sake of consistency, the source cited during the course of this monograph. This is because the page numbers from the original and the second printing do not match. However, the second printing contains both sets of page numbers from the original and second printing.

There are two works detailing the efforts of various guerrilla leaders and four personal accounts of second-generation guerrilla leaders operating in Luzon.<sup>19</sup> The first work is Bernard Norling's, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, detailing the efforts of remnants of the 26<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment and others as they formed the initial guerrilla groups. As the leadership of these groups were attrited by the Japanese, survivors of the groups were absorbed into others. Eventually, there were four dominate leaders within Luzon. The second book about the guerrillas of Luzon is Mike Guardia's recent work, *American Guerrilla: the Forgotten Heroics of Russell W. Volckmann*.<sup>20</sup> Guardia's work provides analysis of the leadership and efforts of then LTC Volckmann. The first account *Lieutenant Ramsey's War* by Edwin Ramsey details his efforts during the Japanese invasion, his escape, and how he became a guerrilla leader on Luzon. This work is important because he is the only guerrilla leader known to have incorporated lessons from Mao Tse-Tung's *On Guerrilla War* into his operations. A Huk guerrilla gave Ramsey a copy of Mao's work during some of the initial interactions between them.<sup>21</sup> *We Remained*, by Colonel Russell Volckmann, is personal account of how he came to lead the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP-NL).<sup>22</sup> Volckmann's efforts as a leader are of note because his group made the most pronounced change from conducting a guerrilla war against the Japanese to a conventional fight. The third work was by Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling's,

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<sup>19</sup> The difference between the two generations is that it was the first generation of leaders started guerrilla groups and the second generation of leaders was those who took the place of the first generation of leaders after their capture at the hands of the Japanese.

<sup>20</sup> The titles include *Lapham's Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines 1942-1945* with Robert Lapham and *Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines* with Ray C. Hunt.

<sup>21</sup> The Huks are communist guerrillas that still operate within the Philippines today. They tried to Co-opt the guerrilla movement within the Philippines for their own ends and became a significant threat to the American guerrillas.

<sup>22</sup> Volckman's work is important due to it providing insight on the formative experiences of the future author of *FM 31-20 Operations Against Guerrilla Forces* and *FM 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*.



*Lapham's Raiders*. Lapham's guerrillas were instrumental in the raid on the Cabanataun Prisoner of War camp and provided a majority of the forces utilized in the raid. The fourth work is Ray Hunt and Bernard Norling's *Behind Enemy Lines*. This work is significant because it shows the friction between the different guerrilla groups in Luzon.

Next, Scott Mills' *Stranded in the Philippines* is the tale of Professor Henry Bell and his family on Negros Island. *Stranded in the Philippines* is a narrative of Bell's time as a professor on the island until he and his family escaped due to Japanese forces placing a bounty on their heads because of his efforts as a resistance leader. *Stranded in the Philippines* incorporates an unpublished manuscript from Professor Bell, and interviews with his wife by the author. This work is important in that it describes civil considerations or the governance side of a guerrilla operation. He served in dual roles as the senior civilian of the island's government not to surrender and later as a major as the organization's supply officer.

Moving south to Mindanao, John Keats' book, *They Fought Alone*. *They Fought Alone* depicts the efforts of Colonel Wendell Fertig to create his unit, the United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP). This work took an unpublished manuscript from Colonel Wendell Fertig and interviews by the author and turned them in to a rich narrative rather than a detailed historical record. Admittedly, it is hard to determine where the story ends and facts begin. Keats admits within the preface that, "...this is not a work of fiction, although it is cast in the form of fiction."<sup>23</sup> Keats changed some of the names in an attempt to protect identities and recreated or created dialogue as a medium to articulate Fertig's efforts in forming the USFIP. Despite this, *They Fought Alone* provides perspective of events from Fertig's point of view and his thought processes, even if it is in an unorthodox medium. This work is valuable because it details the

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<sup>23</sup> Keats, Preface.

creation of the largest of the guerrilla groups operating within the Philippines.<sup>24</sup> In order to gain the support of local Filipinos and to gain a position of advantage over other guerrilla groups and bands of bandits, Fertig took up an offer to become a brigadier general in order to rein in and remove guerrillas and bandits who were preying upon the local population.<sup>25</sup> By accepting this appointment as general officer, Fertig earned the wrath of General MacArthur. The book notes that Fertig met General MacArthur after the initial invasion, but details surrounding what occurred during that meeting and the details as to when Fertig left the archipelago have been lost to time. The incident of Fertig's "promotion" and MacArthur's reaction is important because it illustrates some of the extremes that guerrillas and those who support them will face in carrying out operations.

These personal accounts highlight the key personalities of the guerrilla movement and are vital for understanding the larger movement. They provide context for one another and the period within these works cover the initial Japanese invasion up until their surrender. These works record the actions of the key decision makers during the occupation.

The second theme centers on General MacArthur's efforts to support the guerrillas. The first work in the second theme is William Wise's *Secret Mission to the Philippines*. This work details the infiltration of Lieutenant Commander Chuck Parsons back into the Philippines on his mission to meet and assess the various guerrilla groups in the southern Philippines.<sup>26</sup> It also

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<sup>24</sup> Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, 179. Fertig commanded approximately 33,000 guerrillas.

<sup>25</sup> According to Keats, Fertig did not dwell on "blue on blue incidents" in his account. One of Fertigs subordinates, Lang, claim the events occurred, but did not go into further detail. Willoughby's AAR did not cover the subject. It appears Fertig united the groups so quickly that anyone that offered resistance was quickly forgotten.

<sup>26</sup> Wise, *Secret Mission to the Philippines*, 75-174.

details how he and his family left the archipelago and serves as an example of the penetration missions into the Philippines conducted by the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) in support of guerrilla operations. Another important work following this theme was William Breuer's *MacArthur's Undercover War*. This work focuses on intelligence operations and efforts to support the guerrillas through a series of vignettes. These sources, along with Willoughby's book, are useful in detailing the penetration missions the Allies undertook in support of the guerrillas.

Finally, to understand the third theme regarding the activities of the Japanese during their initial invasion, their counter guerilla efforts and to put the guerrilla campaign in context with the larger war effort, secondary sources became vital. Secondary sources were necessary to account for the Japanese actions within the Philippines during World War II due to issues with translation and difficulty in acquiring primary sources. Despite this, there were enough facts gleaned from the references to build a narrative of what Japanese forces did, and more importantly, did not do during the invasion of the Philippines, their occupation, and their failure in quelling the guerrilla movement. John Toland's work, *The Rising Sun*, provides great insight to the inner machinations of the Imperial Japanese Army and the senior leadership of the nation during the war. Ken Kotani's book titled, *Japanese Intelligence in World War II*, details the intelligence apparatus of the Japanese during the war. It is invaluable in showing what the priorities of the Japanese government and armed forces were during the war. Kotani's book is also valuable in showing what were not priorities to the Japanese and what blind spots that created in strategic, operational, and tactical planning. These sources provided evidence of the Japanese efforts to defeat the guerrillas in the Philippines.

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Other useful sources include Rufino Pablico's *The Exiled Government* depicting the efforts of the Philippine Commonwealth's government in exile and how they tried to help the war effort. It is useful in that it describes the actions of the government in exile and how they tried to support the guerrilla movement. *Triumph in the Philippines*, by Robert Ross Smith serves as the official United States Army history of the campaign and offers some insight as to how the ground commanders viewed the guerrillas and how they planned to utilize them in the campaign.<sup>27</sup> It is useful that it provides the background for the efforts of the conventional forces' effort to retake the Philippines

Despite literature and sources being hard to come by, the story of the guerrillas and their efforts, viewed in context of the history and profession of arms, exist. Heretofore, the larger conventional fight to liberate the Philippines from the Japanese has been the focus of most writings. The writings above and this monograph attempt to remedy this gap within the historical record and the study of the profession of arms.

## **The Japanese Invasion and Counter Guerrilla Efforts**

Imperial Japanese forces were neither mentally prepared nor structurally organized to cope with any sort of guerrilla movement within the Philippines. Japanese leadership ignored the history of the Philippines and its pattern of resistance against the Americans after the Spanish-American War. Worse yet is that the Japanese leadership marginalized leadership within its ranks best disposed to dealing with the Filipino population and any American led resistance. Occupying Japanese forces in the Philippines ignored the needs of the population and rapidly turned most

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<sup>27</sup> However, Smith's work did not incorporate Willoughby's AAR on the guerrillas due to the AAR's classification at the time of writing.

Filipinos against them with harsh behavior used in daily interactions. Lastly, the structure of the Japanese intelligence services prevented them from being effective in controlling the population and locating guerrilla bands. In practice, the actions of the Imperial Japanese Army did everything to foment a sense of resistance amongst the Filipino population and isolated American servicemen.

One of the few Japanese officers that understood both the history and psychology of a civilian populace and English speaking forces was the commander of the invading 14<sup>th</sup> Japanese Army, Lieutenant General (LTG) Masaharu Homma.<sup>28</sup> Homma's life experiences left him uniquely suited to fight an English-speaking foe. These experiences also earned him the scorn of his peers. Born in 1888 to a farming family, a military career for Homma was unexpected.<sup>29</sup> Standing at over six feet tall, Homma's stature belied his calm and thoughtful nature, but his height never ceased in compelling deference from those around him.<sup>30</sup> Matching his stature, he possessed a gifted intellect. In 1907, Homma graduated second in his class out of 1,183 cadets and earned an appointment to the Army General Staff College in 1912.<sup>31</sup> He served as the Defense Attaché to Great Britain in 1917 and as an observer in other locations in the Commonwealth until the mid 1920's.<sup>32</sup> In addition to his military experiences, Homma was also a

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<sup>28</sup> John Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945* (New York, NY: Modern Library, 2003 Edition), 169.

<sup>29</sup> Norman, *Tears in the Darkness*, 347.

<sup>30</sup> Hampton Sides, *Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II's Most Dramatic Mission* (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 59.

<sup>31</sup> Norman, *Tears in the Darkness*, 347.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 347; Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1985), 109; Stevens, 24.

playwright.<sup>33</sup> His peers in the Imperial Japanese Army viewed Homma's experiences in the west and his taste for western culture as softening him.<sup>34</sup> This had so much of an impact on Homma's mental state that he tried to kill himself and remarried so he could be more in line with contemporary Japanese culture.<sup>35</sup> The sum of Homma's experiences gave him insight in dealing western foes, but it left him out of step professionally and culturally with his fellow officers. This caused Homma's peers and superiors to have lingering doubts as to his effectiveness.

In the inter-war period, Homma served in a variety of roles. He attended the Disarmament conference of the League of Nations.<sup>36</sup> Homma spent a majority of the 1930s responsible for Japanese propaganda efforts.<sup>37</sup> Another incident further damaged LTG Homma's reputation in the late 1930s. Homma went to Nanking as an investigating officer to look into alleged wrongdoing by Japanese forces during the fighting within the city. Homma was aghast by the atrocities he discovered and sent a detailed report back to Imperial General Headquarters. Homma's report led to the recall of over eighty officers involved in the "Rape of Nanking."<sup>38</sup> One of those eighty included a member of the Japanese Royal Family. Despite carrying out his assigned duties and following his conscience, Homma was scorned by his peers yet again for implicating his fellow officers in wrongdoing. As such, between this and Homma's earlier

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<sup>33</sup> Edward J. Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 339.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 340.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Sides, *Ghost Soldiers*, 59.

<sup>37</sup> Norman, *Tears in the Darkness*, 348.

<sup>38</sup> Edwin P. Hoyt, *Japan's War: The Great Pacific Conflict* (New York, NY: Cooper Square Press, 1986, 2001 Edition), 173.

behavior, the Japanese officer corps had growing doubts his character and his ability to be a team player.<sup>39</sup>

Despite these events, Homma was at the top of the list of possible commanders to take command of the 14<sup>th</sup> Japanese Army designated for the invasion of the Philippines. Homma's invasion of the Philippines was a shaping operation for the decisive operations of Major General Hitoshi Imamura's attack to take the resource rich Dutch East Indies and Major General Tomoyuki Yamashita's attack to drive the British out of Singapore and Malaya.<sup>40</sup> In the fall of 1941, the commanders received their orders for the upcoming invasions. Homma's stated mission was to conquer the Philippines with the capital of the Manila captured within fifty days from the first landing.<sup>41</sup> The other commanders accepted their orders without question whereas Homma made every objection to the timeline given.<sup>42</sup> Homma asked, "This figure of fifty days, how has it been arrived at?"<sup>43</sup> Homma further asked pointed inquires about the planning assumptions used and about the soundness of the judgment of those who believed that Manila would fall in seven weeks with only two divisions.<sup>44</sup> Homma asked these questions directly to General Gen Sugiyama, the Imperial Japanese Army Chief of Staff, in front of the other army commanders causing a significant loss of face.<sup>45</sup> The other army commanders were able to defuse the situation between Homma and Sugiyama, but the damage was done and left Sugiyama looking for any excuse to deal with Homma once and for all. This dispute is an integral point of contention

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<sup>39</sup> Character in this case is not ethics as it is as much as putting Japan and Japanese first before concerns.

<sup>40</sup> Norman, 56-57.

<sup>41</sup> John Costello, *The Pacific War 1941-1945* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1982, 2009 Editon), 185.

<sup>42</sup> Norman, *Tears in the Darkness*, 56.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 55-56. Gen is General Sugiyama's first name.

because it illustrates both the shortsighted perception the Japanese leadership possessed in regarding the capabilities and motivations of their enemy and the arrogance in believing this invasion would result in an easy victory would translate into an easy occupation. They grossly misunderstood the nature of the environment and problem faced in invading the Philippines. They never thought past the invasion to develop feasible plans for the occupation.

Homma's superiors were directly responsible for imposing the first difficulty he faced. Direct orders required his efforts to be terrain-focused, with victory defined as capturing Manila and not enemy-focused with the defeat of American and Filipino forces within the archipelago. In Homma's mind, this was an unrealistic timeline for the completion of the campaign to take the Philippines and he had already stated his objections to General Sugiyama. Homma realized it was perilous to object again. The tension between Homma and Sugiyama prevented Homma from asking for more resources and Sugiyama from understanding what was going on during the 14<sup>th</sup> Japanese Army's campaign to take the Philippines.

The second complication Homma faced was insufficient forces for the invasion and occupation of the Philippines. Homma's 14<sup>th</sup> Japanese Army comprised two divisions, the 16<sup>th</sup> and 48<sup>th</sup>, for its initial landings into the Philippines.<sup>46</sup> Additional units reinforced these divisions and brought the size of Homma's force to 43,000 soldiers.<sup>47</sup> Homma, faced General MacArthur and his 130,000 American and Filipino soldiers.<sup>48</sup> The majority of the American troops were within the Philippine Division. The division was the only combat ready division within the

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<sup>46</sup> Vincent J. Esposito, ed. *The West Point Atlas of War - World War II: The Pacific* (New York: Tess Press, 1959), 20.

<sup>47</sup> Peter F. Stevens, *The Twilight Riders: The Last Charge of the 26th Cavalry* (Guilford, CN: Lyons Press, 2011), 24.

<sup>48</sup> Esposito, *West Point Atlas*, 21.



archipelago to be at the time of the Japanese invasion.<sup>49</sup> The mission of the Philippine Army was to defend over 7,100 islands, covering 300,000 square kilometers.<sup>50</sup> Homma knew that it would be a loss of face if he continued in his objections to the campaign. He assumed risk in bypassing isolated American and Filipino units in his drive to take Manila. This risk manifested itself in bypassed units falling back either into the Bataan Peninsula or by becoming the cadre of what was to become guerrilla groups within the Philippines.

Halfway through Homma's campaign to take the Philippines, he received orders transferring the 48<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division back to Southern Area Army's control for operations elsewhere.<sup>51</sup> This effectively took approximately half of Homma's forces away before accomplishing the objectives of the campaign. The stated reason for this transfer was to start operations in Java ahead of schedule.<sup>52</sup> It is unknown if General Sugiyama or those loyal to him had a hand in the transfer, but they did not try to stop it. Ultimately, the 65<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade from Formosa replaced the 48<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.<sup>53</sup> The 65<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade was conducting peacekeeping operations from garrisons in Formosa and now had to transition to being an offensive force. The 65<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade only possessed rifles for half of its men and its commander, LTG Akira Nara stated, "The organization was absolutely unfit for combat."<sup>54</sup> The qualitative difference in the units and the number of soldiers provided to Homma left him unable to reduce the American and Filipino forces within the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Sarah Janssen, ed. *The World Almanac and Book of Facts* (New York: World Almanac Books, 2011), 823. By comparison, Italy is only slightly larger in land area than the Philippine Archipelago.

<sup>51</sup> Costello, *The Pacific War*, 185.

<sup>52</sup> Norman, *Tears in the Darkness* 73.

<sup>53</sup> Costello, *The Pacific War*, 185.

<sup>54</sup> Norman, *Tears in the Darkness*, 73.

quickly and served to lengthen the overall timeframe of the campaign. This change bought time for a small number of American and Filipino soldiers to break contact and to organize as guerrillas.

Elsewhere in the archipelago, the Imperial Japanese Army's delay in concluding the campaign bought time for American and Filipino forces to escape or desert and try their chances in the jungle. The change in the amount of forces assigned to the 14<sup>th</sup> Japanese Army also prevented Homma from conducting counter-guerrilla operations or to go after bypassed units after the fall of Corregidor as he was forced to deal with American and Filipino forces defending the Bataan Peninsula. Homma recognized that he had insufficient combat power to defeat quickly defending forces on Bataan and was forced to ask for more aid. In response, Prime Minister Tojo sent him a personal rebuke for his conduct of the campaign.<sup>55</sup>

The final obstruction preventing Homma from conducting counter guerrilla operations and attending to the issue of governance was the machinations of his own staff. Homma took a decidedly enlightened approach to dealing with the Filipino populace. Prior to the occupation of Manila, Homma ordered the forces that were to occupy the city to take a short halt in order for them to clean their uniforms and equipment.<sup>56</sup> This was not to impress the local population, but rather to instill discipline amongst his forces and to reinforce his orders not to pillage or harm the citizens of Manila.<sup>57</sup> Despite this and other efforts, Homma's efforts were for naught. A member of Homma's staff, Colonel Masanobu Tsuyi, issued execution orders for members of the Philippine government and set in motion the events that led to the Bataan Death March in

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<sup>55</sup> Toland, *The Rising Sun*, 266.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 259.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

Homma's name.<sup>58</sup> Homma gave orders forbidding the harsh treatment of prisoners while Colonel Masanobu circulated the battlefield and countermanded those orders either by issuing orders in Homma's name or by his authority as an officer detailed from the Imperial General Staff Headquarters.<sup>59</sup>

The Japanese also inadvertently set the conditions for a successful guerrilla movement by ignoring basic governance issues of the Filipinos and by concentrating their forces on Luzon. The Japanese never made governance of the archipelago a priority. The main issues facing the Filipino populace during the occupation were unemployment, lack of food, and a series of atrocities committed by Japanese forces.<sup>60</sup> Additionally, the Japanese made no effort to maintain pre-existing infrastructure during the occupation.<sup>61</sup> The Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 came before the planned date of Philippine independence from the United States on July 4, 1946.<sup>62</sup> Disbanding the Philippine Constabulary destroyed any sort of law enforcement within the archipelago.<sup>63</sup> The Philippine Constabulary was a police force created in 1902 by then Governor William Taft to start making the Filipinos responsible for law enforcement within the islands.<sup>64</sup> This left the population at the mercy of the bandit groups formed during the chaos of the invasion. In response, the population in some circumstances formed their own groups to

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<sup>58</sup> Hoyt, *Japan's War*, 275.

<sup>59</sup> Norman, *Tears in the Darkness*, 372.

<sup>60</sup> Rufino C. Pabico, MD, *The Exiled Government : The Philippine Commonwealth in the United States During the Second World War* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2006), 80.

<sup>61</sup> Hunt, et al, *Behind Japanese Lines*, 182.

<sup>62</sup> Pablico, *The Exiled Government*, 25.

<sup>63</sup> Wise, *Secret Mission to the Philippines*, 73.

<sup>64</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War: 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2000), 315.

provide law and order in their immediate locale.<sup>65</sup> Over time, most of these groups became full-fledged guerrilla units or merged with larger units as they sought out the leadership and expertise of American and Filipino soldiers and officers who had not surrendered.<sup>66</sup>

The structure of the Japanese intelligence apparatus also contributed to a successful guerrilla movement. Its low status within the Japanese bureaucracy and the bifurcated nature between the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy prevented it from becoming a credible threat to the guerrillas.<sup>67</sup> The Imperial Japanese Army had a Soviet focus due to the Japanese state of Manchukuo and did not establish an analytical cell focusing on the United States and its forces until 1943.<sup>68</sup> The reason for the delay could be due to the fact the Imperial General Headquarters did not desire to dedicate additional intelligence resources against an opponent they were already defeating. That left the Japanese Southern Area Army and 14<sup>th</sup> Japanese Army responsible for intelligence operations within the Philippines. The Japanese Southern Area Army was responsible for Signals Intelligence, but it had only 340 soldiers dedicated to the task for an area that stretched from Burma to the Philippines.<sup>69</sup> They provided radio direction finding and limited intercept capability for 14<sup>th</sup> Japanese Army. This direction finding capability provided actionable intelligence for ground commanders. The locations of possible guerrilla transmitters were subject to aerial reconnaissance and if that reconnaissance found something of note, a foot patrol went to raid the transmission site.<sup>70</sup> However, the aerial

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<sup>65</sup> Wise, *Secret Mission to the Philippines*, 73.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>67</sup> Ken Kotani, *Japanese Intelligence in World War II* (New York, NY: Osprey, 2009), 8.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>70</sup> Ramsey, et al, 252.

reconnaissance served as a warning and gave the guerillas the time and opportunity to relocate before a Japanese foot patrol could reach them.

For human intelligence, the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines focused on counter-intelligence activities rather than human intelligence collection. For counter-intelligence, the Imperial Japanese Army relied on the *Kempei-tai*, or military police.<sup>71</sup> The task of the *Kempei-tai* within the Philippines was to look for any Allied intelligence networks and attempt to locate any isolated American and Filipino soldiers. The harsh interrogation tactics used by the *Kempei-tai* only served to drive Filipinos that were on the fence into siding with the guerrillas and provided every incentive for isolated American soldiers to stay on the run. The *Kempei-tai* tactics, along with general abuse from Japanese soldiers, united the Filipino population against them. The harsh interrogation tactics included beatings, sleep deprivation, the use of stress positions, and sensory deprivation.<sup>72</sup> The *Kempei-tai* or Japanese soldiers employed these tactics if they did not kill a prisoner outright. The harsh treatment of the Filipinos at the hands of the Japanese and the *Kempei-tai* provided incentive for the Filipinos to resist the Japanese. This same harsh treatment gave isolated American soldiers even more motivation to remain on the run and help the Filipinos organize a resistance.

Homma was willing to address the needs of the population or at the very least take their perception into account. The Japanese lost any benefit of Homma's point of view when he was relieved of his command in the Philippines. Homma's relief compounded the situation and effectively ended any chance of a population-centric approach within the Philippines. Homma's replacement, LTG Shigenor Kuroda, let the archipelago suffer from benign neglect when he was

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<sup>71</sup> Kotani, *Japanese Intelligence in World War II*, 58.

<sup>72</sup> Norman, *Tears of Darkness*, 285-288.

in command.<sup>73</sup> His concerns and pursuits were for his personal enjoyment, not administration of the islands, and certainly not operations against the guerrillas.<sup>74</sup> Japanese forces did not believe they were facing a large-scale guerrilla movement, thus they refused to share intelligence and coordinate counter guerrilla operations across unit boundaries.<sup>75</sup> Japanese forces ignored the basic needs of the population and allowed discontent to grow.

Despite the Japanese shortcomings in dealing with the guerrillas, the Japanese did employ some effective measures in trying to contain and capture the guerrillas. Often these would be “false flag” operations where “guerrillas” loyal to the Japanese would attempt to infiltrate other guerrilla groups in order to gather intelligence and report to the Japanese about the guerrilla’s activities.<sup>76</sup> In one instance, the Japanese used a “Brigadier General Lin” near Manila to try to force guerrillas in the area into exposing themselves by meeting within an alleged ally.<sup>77</sup> Another example of how the Japanese attempted to control the population was by the creation of “Neighborhood Associations.”<sup>78</sup> These associations were a system of fifteen families reporting to a president, presidents reporting to a mayor, and a mayor reporting to the local Japanese commander.<sup>79</sup> The Neighborhood Associations were also obliged to provide guards and report on any suspicious activity to the Japanese.<sup>80</sup> In reality, the population was sympathetic and by the

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<sup>73</sup> Norman Rudi, *Lang: The WWII Story of an American Guerrilla on Mindanao, Philippine Islands* (McMillen Publishing, 2003), 51.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 518.

<sup>76</sup> Guardia, *American Guerrilla*, 52.

<sup>77</sup> Ramsey, et al, *Lieutenant Ramsey’s War*, 183.

<sup>78</sup> Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, 523.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

Japanese conceding the security of the trails and roads of the area to the Filipinos, they just made it that much easier for the guerrillas to move and operate. These were local solutions to the guerrilla problem, however no evidence exists that the Japanese applied tactics on a large scale.

The sum of the Japanese efforts during the invasion and the immediate aftermath indirectly contributed to the creation of the guerrilla movement within the Philippines during World War II. By providing Homma inadequate forces to prosecute the campaign, the Japanese set the conditions for bypassed units to form the core of guerrilla units and created sanctuaries for guerrilla groups to form and operate. Politics within the Japanese army undermined Homma by forcing him to be terrain centric and focused on speed rather than the enemy. The culture and politics of the Japanese Army prevented units from sharing information or conducting operations with one another to defeat the guerillas. No Japanese commander wanted to admit that he had a guerrilla problem on his hands and thus lose face. The harsh treatment of Americans and Filipinos by the Japanese provided every incentive for guerrillas and the population to resist as best they could. Despite some efforts at population control, the Japanese set the conditions for the guerrillas to flourish and to undermine their occupation.

The speed of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines along with their inability to quickly secure the rest of the archipelago due to the lack of manpower resulted in numerous isolated American and Filipino personnel. The Filipino personnel, by in large, went back to their homes to wait out the war. Americans, both soldiers and citizens, did not have that luxury. Those Americans who had evaded capture, despite different backgrounds and in being on different islands, had a similar experience to one another due to the desire to stay alive. The exodus that many of these Americans faced often led down the path of becoming a guerrilla out of necessity as other options were not available.

## The Path to Becoming a Guerrilla

The path to becoming a guerrilla within the Philippines was nearly a common one for all of those that decided to fight.<sup>81</sup> The course of the guerrillas started with individuals fleeing or escaping from Japanese forces. In some instances, this was a deliberate act, and in others, it occurred once they realized they were isolated from other American or Filipino forces. As these isolated personnel fled or prepared to flee, they encountered other personnel that decided not to surrender. These isolated personnel would hold an informal “War Council” between them in order to discuss future options.<sup>82</sup> These isolated personnel had four possible courses of action; surrender, hide or leave the archipelago, or resist. Word of the Bataan Death March had reached throughout the archipelago, ruling out surrender; hiding was possible and some people managed to evade the Japanese until the liberation of the Philippines. Many thought about escaping the Philippines for Australia, but deemed as impractical. However, some managed to successfully make the journey south.<sup>83</sup> Forming a resistance was viewed by many as the only practical course of action. A resistance movement would offer a degree of protection for the isolated personnel.

These resistance and guerrilla groups debated within themselves as to what sort of operations to conduct against the Japanese. Generally, they fell into two camps of either targeting Japanese units or gathering intelligence on the activities of the Japanese. Walter Cushing led the

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<sup>81</sup> The following is a synthesis of the various recorded personal experiences.

<sup>82</sup> Ramsey, et al., *Lieutenant Ramsey's War*, 85; Lapham, et al., *Lapham's Raiders*, 25.

<sup>83</sup> Arthur Whitehead, *Odyssey of a Philippine Scout: Fighting, Escaping, and Evading the Japanese 1941-1944* (Bedford, PA: Aberjona Press, 2006). This work is his personal account of how he escaped from the Philippines. As he made his way south through the Philippines, he had to intervene in the activities of local guerrilla groups along his journey in an effort to turn them from banditry and to prevent their abuses of the local population.



first known guerilla attack against the Japanese, occurring January 18, 1942.<sup>84</sup> Cushing, an American expatriate mining engineer, took it upon himself to ambush the Japanese with over two hundred of his employees. Later, he accepted a commission as a Major in the Philippine Army, as his band of guerrillas continued to maraud the Japanese behind their front lines<sup>85</sup> Cushing personally led an ambush that resulted in the death of a Japanese Major General and the securing of the general's personal papers.<sup>86</sup> Cushing continued his guerrilla efforts, even after the surrender of United States and Philippine forces to the Japanese. The surrender led Cushing to shift his operations from kinetic actions to countering the Japanese propaganda and to the gathering of intelligence.<sup>87</sup> However, by this time, the Japanese were making every effort to find Cushing. Cushing's spree ended in September 1942 when Japanese forces launched a raid against his hideout, but not before he personally killed six Japanese soldiers.<sup>88</sup> By the time of Cushing's death, guerrilla forces under his command had killed over five hundred Japanese forces during his nine months as a guerrilla leader.<sup>89</sup> Cushing's efforts as a guerrilla leader are representative of those guerrilla groups that chose a kinetic solution for dealing with the Japanese. The guerrilla movements that deliberately targeted the Japanese suffered their wrath as the Japanese sought retribution.

The remaining guerrillas underwent a Darwinian process as groups formed and reformed under the pressures of Japanese attacks. This process acted as vetting for the leadership of these

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<sup>84</sup> Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, 1.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 9 & 12.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

groups. Leaders assumed responsibilities and those who failed to provide leadership and results to the population or guerrillas lost followers. The leaders who were fair and could solve the daily issues of the population were successful in earning and keeping their support. Rank held little meaning; results were everything to the Filipinos. Learning how to conduct guerrilla warfare was a matter of trial and error for the most part as none of the American guerrillas were versed in the tactics of guerrilla warfare. An exception was Major Ed Ramsey on the island of Luzon. Ramsey was near a group of Huks who gave him a copy of Mao Tse Tung's *On Guerrilla Warfare*.<sup>90</sup>

Once the individual guerrilla groups reached a degree of stability, they would often encounter one another. In the best circumstances, the groups shared information and supplies with one another.<sup>91</sup> In other circumstances, the guerrilla groups would attempt to assert control or authority over one another. This was often due to the rank held by the guerrilla leaders did not match the reality of the group that they controlled. Pre-war rank often did not match to the span of control of the groups they led spans of control. This was counterproductive and was only solved when leaders were killed, captured, or when agents from the Allied Intelligence Bureau intervened and established clear line of command and control between the guerrilla groups and make them subordinate to SWPA, HQ.

As the guerrillas established themselves, they often they were the sole authority in certain places. As such, they took on a governance role with the population. Some guerrilla groups attempted to set up a civil government in their area. General Wendell Fertig was able to establish

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<sup>90</sup> Ramsey, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War*, 112. The Huks were Communist guerrillas that operated within Luzon before and after World War II.

<sup>91</sup> Pre-war social contact between the guerrillas helped to form ties and working relationships during the occupation. This contact occurred within the military and expatriate communities, but not between the two.

a civil government in the city of Oroquieta.<sup>92</sup> This civil government, led by Judge Sagun, oversaw a civil administration that handled such issues as pay for the guerrillas, a postal service, currency production, clothing, and law and order within guerrilla-controlled areas.<sup>93</sup> Major Ralph Praeger in central Luzon also established a civilian government as well.<sup>94</sup> Other guerrillas saw this as an impossibility and ruled under martial law, as it was unavoidable given the circumstances. Major Lapham surmised his role with the civilian population by stating he had, "...judged them (the Filipinos), sentenced them, married them, and buried them."<sup>95</sup> Guerrilla groups were often responsible for economic matters. Some guerrilla groups collected taxes.<sup>96</sup> The tax, called a "loyalty" tax, served more as a test to see who would support the guerrillas rather than a significant source of revenue.<sup>97</sup> Guerrilla groups tried to curtail any black market activities and some were engaged in price fixing. Most groups dispersed their operations to prevent an undue burden on the population that was supplying them with food. Other guerrilla groups went as far to print their own currency, in order to fund their own operations and replace currency put into circulation by the Japanese.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Keats, *They Fought Alone*, 153.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, 77. Major Praeger, a member of the 26<sup>th</sup> Cavalry Regiment, Philippine Scouts, was an impressive guerrilla leader that never lost his moral compass. He established a civilian government in area of operations in order to avoid declaring martial law, submitted his guerrillas to a civilian court, and even released Japanese POWs when he felt he could no longer care for them as he should according to the Geneva convention. Major Praeger conducted operations until his capture on August 30, 1943. He was held for a year before being brought before a summary court martial and sentenced to death nearly a year later.

<sup>95</sup> Lapham, et al, *Lapham's Raiders*, 89.

<sup>96</sup> Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines*, 145.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid. The "loyalty" tax worked out to be \$.10 USD in 1940.

<sup>98</sup> People used various types of currency within the Philippines during the occupation. The economy of Philippines during the occupation included: Pre-war Philippine currency, US Dollars, Japanese Yen, and Occupation Pesos used by the occupying Japanese forces.

The guerrilla groups grew in strength as they fought rivals of all sorts throughout the islands.<sup>99</sup> Guerilla groups reined in the excesses of predatory bands and their leaders. The examples of what occurred to Colonel Fenton and Major General Gabon are examples. Fenton's subordinates tried and executed by him and Gabon fled after his activities led to other guerrilla leads uniting against him. The guerrillas targeted other predatory groups. Major Lapham had a simple solution of using a night raid to kill the leaders and disarm their followers.<sup>100</sup> The survivors of these raids were given a simple choice, accept disarmament and release into the jungle or accept membership into Lapham's band of guerrillas.<sup>101</sup> Another example of a predatory or self-serving guerrilla leader was Captain Luis Morgan. Morgan served as the original chief of staff for Colonel Wendell Fertig on the island of Mindanao.<sup>102</sup> Morgan originally hoped to use Fertig as a figurehead while he secured his own power base. Fertig was wise enough to foresee this and made sure that he kept Morgan's ambitions in check. As things came to a head between them, Fertig plotted to have Morgan evacuated to Australia to serve as his liaison. Colonel Whitney of the PRS declined the request and recommended that Fertig use "extrajudicial" measures in dealing with Morgan.<sup>103</sup> Fertig did not want to deal with the fallout from Morgan's Moro supporters if he killed Morgan as Whitney suggested.<sup>104</sup> Fertig therefore placed Morgan on a submarine evacuating civilians and pretended that he did not get confirmation of Whitney's

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<sup>99</sup> Rivals in this case include other guerrilla leaders and bandit groups.

<sup>100</sup> Lapham, et al, *Lapham's Raiders*, 32.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Willoughby, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 532.

<sup>103</sup> Keats, *They Fought Alone*, 292.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 294.

order in time to prevent Morgan's departure.<sup>105</sup> Other sources claim that Fertig also resorted to force in dealing with guerrilla groups who were preying upon the population of the island.<sup>106</sup> It is unknown how much force other guerrilla leaders used in solidifying their positions, but it is not outside the realm of the possibility that others had to use force as well.

The process which transformed individuals into guerrillas succeeded in creating a force that functioned as a local government for the Filipinos and as an intelligence network for the Allies. The various guerrilla groups had reached this state by the time Allied agents were able to establish contact with them during the course of a series of penetration missions. Once the guerrillas established contact amongst themselves and General MacArthur's headquarters in Australia, then and only then could the guerrilla groups fully participate in the future liberation of the Philippines by American forces.

### **Major Guerrilla Formations<sup>107</sup>**

The guerrilla movement within the Philippines was the net result of individual men and women deciding to resist. However, the geography of the islands of the Philippines ensured that each movement would start in isolation from one another. In all, over fifty different known

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Rudi, *Lang*, 74.

<sup>107</sup> This section is representative, but not all inclusive of the groups that existed during the war. The Japanese destroyed a significant number of guerrilla groups or as attrition took its toll, remaining guerrillas joined larger, remaining groups. The groups listed below were some of those that participated in the liberation of the Philippines and assisted General MacArthur's forces as they battled the Japanese. These groups represent the end of a Darwinian process where earlier guerrilla groups and members did not survive the Japanese efforts to destroy them. This process, while unfortunate, refined the guerrilla groups into becoming an effective force.

recognized guerrilla groups operated within the Philippines during World War II.<sup>108</sup> General MacArthur attempted to organize these groups within ten military districts that mirrored the organization of the pre-war Philippine Army with significant, but not total success. The guerrilla groups would control what they could, but the imposition of unit boundaries from the outside did not match realities within the islands. Despite the initial isolation of one guerrilla movement from another and later attempts to organize these groups from the outside, it is possible to categorize the guerrilla movements in three broad categories based on the three major island groups of the Philippine Archipelago. The three categories can be described as, groups that formed and operated while in contact with the Japanese on Luzon , those that formed on small islands initially bypassed by the Japanese, and on Mindanao where a large contingent of American forces were preparing themselves for continued operations. These three categories serve to illustrate the different environments that spawned the spontaneous growth of the various guerrilla movements.

The Philippines, an archipelago of over 7,000 islands, can be broken down into three island groups. From north to south, they are named; the Luzon region, the Visayas island chain, and the Mindanao region. These three regions contain over 7,000 islands within the archipelago. The first island group, the Luzon region, contains the northern most islands and includes the capitol of Manila. During the Japanese invasion, a majority of the fighting took place in this area and during the occupation; the Japanese garrisoned the majority of its forces here.

The large number of United States and Filipino forces defending Luzon resulted in a majority of the guerrillas coming from the ranks of isolated soldiers and bypassed units such as

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<sup>108</sup> Robert B. Asprey. *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*. Vol. 1 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975), 514.

the 26<sup>th</sup> United States Cavalry Regiment, the “Philippine Scouts.”<sup>109</sup> The large number of bypassed units and isolated officers, contributed to a plethora of guerrilla units perpetually squabbling in an attempt to assert their authority over one another. The large density of both guerrillas and Japanese forces created an environment that resulted in a turnover of guerrilla leadership as the Japanese conducted counter guerrilla operations.

Three significant guerrilla groups already operated within the Luzon region by the time of the Americans invaded. The first and largest group on Luzon was the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP-NL) under then Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann. Volckmann’s forces numbered over 20,000 guerrillas.<sup>110</sup> Volckmann came to assume command of the group after the capture of Colonels Moses and Noble by the Japanese in June of 1943.<sup>111</sup> The Japanese captured the Colonels after they tortured the information out of a scout that the Colonels had dispatched.<sup>112</sup> The second group was the East Central Luzon Guerilla Area (ECLGA) under the command of Major Edwin Ramsey, from the 26<sup>th</sup> United States Cavalry Regiment.<sup>113</sup> Ramsey commanded over 13,000 guerrillas.<sup>114</sup> The third group was The Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces (LGAF) under the command of Major Robert Lapham.<sup>115</sup> His forces

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<sup>109</sup> The Philippine Scouts was an elite unit and contained the best that both the United States Army and Philippine Army had to offer. It was predominately made up of American officers and Filipino Non-Commissioned Officers and soldiers. For more information on the subject of the Philippine scouts, the recently released work by Peter F. Stevens, *The Twilight Riders: the Last Charge of the 26<sup>th</sup> Cavalry*, (Guilford, CN: Lyons press, 2011) can provide further information.

<sup>110</sup> Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, 179.

<sup>111</sup> Russell W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three years behind enemy lines in the Philippines* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.), 119.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ramsey, et al, *Lieutenant Ramsey’s War*, 176.

<sup>114</sup> Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, 179. Additionally, according to Stevens, Ramsey also holds the distinction of carrying out the last mounted cavalry charge in United States Army history.

<sup>115</sup> Lapham, et al., *Lapham's Raiders*, viii.

numbered over 13,000 guerrillas as well.<sup>116</sup> Another group that served to complicate the efforts of the guerrillas on Luzon was the Hukblajaps or Huks for short. These communist guerrillas fought against both the Japanese and other guerrilla bands. The Huks posed a significant threat to the guerrilla groups as that they would attempt to deliberately interfere with operations or prey upon guerrilla units after they came into contact with Japanese forces.<sup>117</sup> Despite this threat, the guerilla efforts were able to overcome the resistance of the Huks and were able to concentrate on fighting the Japanese.

The second island group is the Visayas. It contains the islands of Negros, Leyte, Samar, and Cebu, amongst others. The Japanese bypassed these islands during the initial invasion, and during the occupation, only garrisoned them with token forces. Consisting primarily of former Philippine soldiers and constabulary members, the guerrilla movement that grew on the island of Negros occurred by accident. Silliman University was the nexus for the movement that followed. Military age males, who had that attended ROTC classes together and played college football, took to fighting the Japanese that landed on the island almost immediately. American missionaries who were on the faculty of the university felt compelled to provide direction to this movement, lest youthful enthusiasm for fighting the Japanese trump good sense and provoke a violent response from the Japanese.<sup>118</sup> Eventually, Colonel Abcede, a 31-year-old officer from the Philippine Army, commanded the groups on the island and they numbered over 12,000 in total.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, 179.

<sup>117</sup> Willoughby, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 453.

<sup>118</sup> Scott A. Mills, *Stranded in the Philippines: Professor Bell's Private War Against the Japanese*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 43.

<sup>119</sup> Willoughby, *The Guerrillas Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 512-520.



Colonel Ruperto Kangelon, Philippine Army, commanded the guerrilla movement on Leyte.<sup>120</sup> He escaped Japanese captivity and was in hiding with his family on the island when others asked him to assume command of the guerrilla effort. Kangelon was finally convinced to come out of retirement and hiding by an AIB agent on a penetration mission to become a leader again. It was through his leadership as the senior officer on the island that he unified the various guerrilla groups and restored discipline to their ranks. Kangelon commanded over 3,000 guerrillas on Leyte and his forces helped provide intelligence used in the liberation of the island in October 1944.<sup>121</sup>

By the time of the liberation of the Philippines, the guerrilla movement on Cebu was led by LTC James Cushing, who along with his two brothers, made the transition from civilian mining engineers to guerrillas. He and his brothers each led their own group on different parts of the Philippines. At its peak, Cushing's command numbered over 5,500 and contained Cebu City, the second largest city in the Philippines.<sup>122</sup>

The last and southernmost island group is the Mindanao region. Mindanao's separation from the other islands, concentration of American and Philippine units, and the relatively late investment by Japanese forces allowed a guerrilla movement to grow and rapidly flourish. The commander of the forces on the island was a former civilian mining engineer by the name of Wendell Fertig. After evading capture, he encountered a local guerrilla band that wanted to name him as their leader and appoint him to the rank of Brigadier General. Realizing that he had no other way to control the excesses of some of the guerrillas on the island, Fertig accepted the

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<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 444.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 445.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 479.

appointment. Fertig had to deal with the constant scheming of Captain Luis Morgan as Morgan attempted to undermine Fertig's authority and take over the guerrilla group for himself. Fertig exercised his newfound authority and personality to neutralize disaffected guerrilla bands. Fertig commanded over 33,000 guerrillas at one time on Mindanao.<sup>123</sup>

Fertig also had to contend with the Moro population in southwest Mindanao. His solution to the difficulties in dealing with a population mixed along religious lines was to organize them into Muslim and Christian units. Fertig appointed a fellow American expatriate, Charles Hedges, to lead the Moro guerrilla unit.<sup>124</sup> Hedges was able to maintain the loyalty of the Moros and channeled their efforts into fighting the Japanese; this, however was rumored to be due to a promise made by Hedges to the Moros for the establishment of their own government after the war.<sup>125</sup>

## **Allied Support of the Guerrilla Effort Within the Philippines**

Contrary to the popular myth, the Allies did a great deal for the guerrillas within the Philippines. General MacArthur and his staff established a large intelligence structure with portions of it dedicated to intelligence gathering and to the material support of the guerrillas on the Philippines. MacArthur deliberately set out to foment and support a guerrilla movement, not just collect intelligence. This intelligence structure provided the means and organization of supplying the various guerrilla groups throughout the Philippines and endeavored to unify the guerrilla's intelligence collection efforts. Additionally, the agents that the Allied Intelligence

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<sup>123</sup> Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, 179.

<sup>124</sup> Willoughby, *The Guerrillas Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 535.

<sup>125</sup> Keats, *They Fought Alone*, 214.

Bureau (AIB) sent into the Philippines to make contact with the guerrillas were instrumental to settling disputes between the various guerrilla groups and leaders.<sup>126</sup> The AIB agents were key in establishing clear command and control relationships between the various guerrilla groups and leaders. The leadership and assistance provided by the AIB agents allowed for the guerrillas to get past the issue of who was in command of whom and concentrate on the task of defeating the Japanese.

The start of the guerrilla movement actually began with some decisions and orders issued by General MacArthur himself. On February 15, 1942, General MacArthur ordered a LTC Everett Warner to create the 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment on Luzon with the explicit mission of conducting guerrilla operations behind Japanese lines.<sup>127</sup> LTC Warner may have been a bad choice to be a guerrilla leader, as his alcoholism did not engender the support of the Filipinos, but even Warner recognized that the first order of business was not to directly attack the Japanese, but to gather intelligence and report to General MacArthur.<sup>128</sup> However, when General MacArthur departed the Philippines, he had no idea if LTC Warner's unit or others would survive, let alone become guerrillas.

To facilitate the need for information and intelligence, General MacArthur had his senior intelligence officer, Major General Charles Willoughby, create an intelligence gathering structure, named the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB)The AIB was responsible for supervising

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<sup>126</sup> "Agent" in this context can also mean operative. "Agent" in this context is not the modern usage used to describe a recruited source, but rather the term "agent" is used within the monograph as the same manner as it was used during the time frame covered within the monograph, World War II.

<sup>127</sup> Norling, *The Intrepid Guerrillas of North Luzon*, 72.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, 72-73.

and supporting agents within the SWPA area of operations.<sup>129</sup> These AIB agents were responsible for conducting clandestine operations including sabotage and intelligence collection.<sup>130</sup> The AIB was also responsible for, "...render(ing) aid and assistance to local efforts [guerrillas] in enemy-occupied territories."<sup>131</sup> On July 6, 1942, the AIB started operations under the control of Colonel G.C. Roberts, Australian Army.<sup>132</sup> Captain Allison Ind, United States Army, was the deputy controller and finance officer. Regional desks covered areas formerly controlled by the Dutch and British.<sup>133</sup>

The Philippines created a special requirement for the AIB. Due to the potential for large numbers of isolated personnel and General MacArthur's personal interest in retaking the Philippines, The Philippine Regional Section (PRS) was created on 15 May 1943 and placed under the direction of Colonel Courtney Whitney.<sup>134</sup> Whitney, a World War I fighter pilot and civilian lawyer who had practiced within the Philippines for fifteen years, proved to be a good selection. From his time in the Philippines, Whitney knew key personalities within the

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<sup>129</sup> William B. Breuer, *MacArthur's Undercover War: Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret Missions* (Hoboken, NJ: Castle Books, 1995), 34. Before General MacArthur and Major General Willoughby could establish the AIB, they had to deal with William Donovan and his Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Donovan wanted to get his new organization into war in the Pacific. However, the OSS did not have assets or experience to help General MacArthur. In fact when while negotiations between the OSS and General MacArthur's staff was underway as to who would take the lead in intelligence operations against the Japanese, facts forced the OSS into admitting that they lacked expertise in the area. The OSS expertise and background information on the Pacific included a locked four-drawer file cabinet with only one intelligence file within. After this incident, it solidified the argument that General MacArthur and his staff be solely responsible for intelligence operations against the Japanese, not the OSS, 34.

<sup>130</sup> Willoughby, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 94-95.

<sup>131</sup> Breuer, *MacArthur's Undercover War*, 37.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> Willoughby, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 94.

<sup>134</sup> Breuer, *MacArthur's Undercover War*, 114.

archipelago and those would be likely to serve as an intelligence agent. Additionally, Whitney had the task of making contact and supporting the guerrilla groups within the Philippines.

However, MacArthur's desire for secrecy placed the chain of responsibility for the PRS outside that of the AIB. Colonel Whitney reported to General Richard Sutherland, General MacArthur's Chief of Staff, regarding the activities of the PRS.<sup>135</sup> Whitney kept the AIB informed of the PRS operations only as necessary to deconflict operations between the two.<sup>136</sup> Despite the bifurcated reporting channels, the PRS and AIB were effective in gathering intelligence and supporting the guerrillas within the Philippines.

The AIB and PRS established links to the guerrillas through a series of penetration missions to the Philippines.<sup>137</sup> Intermittent radio contact forced the AIB into sending agents in to the islands order to verify and vet the identity of the guerilla leaders and the capability of the guerrilla units that had formed during the Japanese occupation. Between the AIB and PRS, they carried out nineteen penetration missions infiltrating twenty-two agents.<sup>138</sup> Both organizations recruited agents from American expatriates who had lived within the Philippines, Filipinos living outside of the archipelago at the time of the invasion, and Filipinos that were able to escape from Japanese forces.

These agents went to the Philippines to establish a network to facilitate the collection of intelligence and covert actions, establish communications within the islands and back to

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> According to Keats, it looks as though this arrangement was due to a personality conflict between Whitney and Willoughby and Willoughby's belief that the guerrilla's efforts in the Philippines were a lost cause.

<sup>137</sup> The AIB and PRS conducted the penetration missions sequentially, not simultaneously into the Philippines.

<sup>138</sup> Willoughby, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 47.

Australia, and prepare for the exfiltration of individuals necessary for planning the liberation of the archipelago.<sup>139</sup> They also went forward to vet guerrilla groups, but often had to rise to the challenge of settling disputes between rival groups as to what guerrilla leader was in charge of whom within a local area. The leverage these agents had over the various guerrilla groups was access to supplies and official recognition.<sup>140</sup> If a guerrilla leader was not willing to take direction from General MacArthur's headquarters, then their guerrilla group would not receive supplies from official sources or enjoy an official mandate for their activities. The agents wielded access to supplies and official sanctions as a tool and quickly brought the groups under the direction of the South West Pacific Area headquarters.

As the agents traveled and made contact with the various guerrilla groups, they often found themselves in the middle of power struggles. Even more important than access to the supplies that the agents offered, was their leadership in solving command relationship issues between the various guerrilla groups. The first of these agents was Captain Jesus Villamor.<sup>141</sup> Villamor was an inspired choice for selection as an agent. Villamor earned his place in the history of the Philippines as a fighter pilot during the initial Japanese invasion. He managed to shoot down a Japanese Zero fighter in an obsolete fighter and quickly became a hero and celebrity to the Filipinos.<sup>142</sup> Eventually, his skills as a pilot and the loss of his plane placed him in a group due to head to Australia. Once there, he was recruited into the AIB and started training for future missions.

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>140</sup> Breuer, *Secret War*, 110.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 49.

<sup>142</sup> Mills, *Stranded in the Philippines*, 89.

The now Major Villamor and his party of five landed on the island of Negros in the Visayas on December 27, 1942. Villamor's fame made him immediately recognizable and he had to conduct operations through his runners in order to avoid detection from the Japanese.<sup>143</sup> The runners brought to Villamor news of fragmented and feuding guerrilla groups in the area. Villamor faced American Colonels Harry Fenton and James Cushing fighting for control within the island of Cebu and a self-appointed Major General Gabriel Gabon, a Filipino who attempted to use his rank to live a life of comfort for himself and his men during the occupation on the island of Negros.<sup>144</sup> Recognizing that conflicts were counterproductive, Villamor called a conference of the guerrilla leaders of the island in order to resolve the issues dividing them once and for all in May 1943.<sup>145</sup> Villamor threatened the summoned leaders at gunpoint, and assumed command by his authority as a personal representative of General MacArthur.<sup>146</sup> A Japanese raid broke up the meeting, forcing Major General Gabon to flee before he could protest further. This left Villamor as the sole commander of the guerrillas on the island.<sup>147</sup> Villamor then declared Gabon's group as an "obstacle" and isolated Gabon's group from any supplies.<sup>148</sup> Gabon subsequently fled to the island of Bicol after his key subordinates joined Villamor's group and later fell victim to the Japanese.<sup>149</sup> Villamor served as the commander of the guerrillas on Negros

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<sup>143</sup> Willoughby, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 46.

<sup>144</sup> According to Willoughby, the issue between Fenton and Cushing resolved itself when Filipino subordinates held a court martial, convicted and executed Fenton during Cushing's absence. Cushing then was compelled to go through the same process against the Philippine conspirators, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 478.

<sup>145</sup> Mills, *Stranded in the Philippines*, 123

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid*, 124.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid*, 125.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid*, 126.

<sup>149</sup> Willoughby, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 515.

until an illness forced him to place a local leader in charge and left the island October 20, 1943.<sup>150</sup>

Major Villamor's efforts and personal leadership were key in establishing clear lines of responsibility and areas of operations for the guerrillas in the Visayas region of the Philippine Archipelago.

Another agent key in supporting the guerrillas was Lieutenant Commander Charles Parsons. Parsons conducted penetration missions to Mindanao to verify the guerrilla groups operating on the island and positively identify the group's leadership, Colonel Wendell Fertig.<sup>151</sup> This mission was of particular importance to General MacArthur and his staff because Fertig had promoted himself to Brigadier General in order to unify the guerrilla effort on the island of Mindanao.<sup>152</sup> Their concern was for Fertig's emotional state and his ability to exercise the authority he assumed. Parson's time while living on the islands and personal contacts left him uniquely suited to judge the emotional state and the effectiveness of the guerrillas. In the pre-war Philippines, Parsons had many roles, to include serving as the Panamanian proconsul in order to help deal with that nation's shipping concerns.<sup>153</sup> It was this last role that allowed Parsons to flee the islands; when the Japanese questioned him during the occupation; he just showed them his Panamanian diplomatic passport and spoke Spanish.<sup>154</sup> It was a convincing enough act that the Japanese repatriated him and his family to Panama.<sup>155</sup> After debriefing by the Army intelligence

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<sup>150</sup> Mills, *Stranded in the Philippines*, 126.

<sup>151</sup> Wise, *Secret Mission to the Philippines*, 76.

<sup>152</sup> Keats, *They Fought Alone*, 88.

<sup>153</sup> Wise, *Secret Mission to the Philippines*, 36.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.



section, Parsons came to General MacArthur's attention and he sent the message "SEND PARSONS IMMEDIATELY."<sup>156</sup>

Parsons reached Australia and joined the AIB with the task of preparing a penetration team to infiltrate Mindanao.<sup>157</sup> Parsons was later picked to lead the same team and infiltrated the island of Mindanao.<sup>158</sup> Parsons' team brought with them four tons of needed supplies to Fertig and his guerrillas in February 1943.<sup>159</sup> While four tons was a relatively small amount, the morale boost it provided was significant, as it was the first physical contact with allied forces since the Japanese started their occupation. Parsons' penetration mission to Mindanao and vetting of Fertig came at a key time. Parsons' visit lent legitimacy to Fertig and his guerrilla organization at a key time as that the supplies Parsons brought helped solidify Fertig's position as a leader when he was facing challenges from his Philippine subordinate, Captain Luis Morgan. In reciprocation, Fertig was able to give Parsons use of a diesel powered boat to move about the coast of Mindanao to aid in the reconnaissance of possible landing sites and subordinate guerrilla groups.<sup>160</sup> In this case, both the guerrillas and the AIB agents were able to assist each other in the accomplishment of their missions.

Another important agent was Lieutenant Bartolomeo Cabangbang's and his penetration mission to Luzon. Cabangbang, like Villamor, was a pilot, captured by the Japanese during the defense of the Philippines, and later paroled into the service of the Philippine Constabulary on

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 70.

<sup>157</sup> Brewer, *MacArthur's Secret War*, 84.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 86.

<sup>159</sup> Keats, *They Fought Alone*, 190; Willoughby, *The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines*, 47.

<sup>160</sup> Brewer, *MacArthur's Secret War*, 87.

Cebu Island.<sup>161</sup> Soon afterwards, he fled from his job and joined a local guerrilla group.

Cabangbang made his way to Negros where Villamor recruited him to become an agent for the AIB. Cabangban's leadership was instrumental to the guerrilla effort within Luzon. The overall guerrilla effort on Luzon suffered from the various guerrilla groups trying to absorb and establish dominance over one another. This was due to do guerrilla leadership attempting to become the sole military authority on the island. Cabangbang brought with him the message that each group would report directly to South West Pacific Area, Headquarters (SWPA, HQ) directly and that the groups must stop attempts to absorb other groups.<sup>162</sup> The exasperated Cabangbang asked SWPA, HQ to send a more senior officer to straighten out the command and control relationships.<sup>163</sup>

Despite this, the message that Cabangbang delivered, as General MacArthur's herald, was enough for the groups to give up attempts at unification and for those groups to ignore those guerrilla leaders that persisted in unification efforts. While the guerrilla groups operated independently, Cabangbang's efforts unified them in common purpose.

The AIB agents solved many of the command and control issues between the various guerrilla groups, thereby increasing their effectiveness. Just as important was the supplies that the agents provided to the guerrilla groups. The guerrillas did not need supplies in order to survive, but they needed supplies to carry out operations and recruit the population to their cause. Most of the guerrillas day-to-day needs were supplied by scrounging, foraging, and by sympathetic members of the local population. The guerrillas also utilized ingenious methods of creating ersatz replacements for what they could not supply themselves initially such as handmade bullets,

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<sup>161</sup> Schaefer, Chris. *Bataan Diary: An American Family in World War II, 1941-1945* (Houston, TX: Riverview Publishing, 2004), 246.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 254.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 255.

currency, and explosives. Fertig and Davidson, for example, established an ordinance factory on Mindanao.<sup>164</sup> This factory was responsible for creating repair parts for rifles and cartridges for firing.<sup>165</sup> The guerrillas made cartridges by hand from curtain rods.<sup>166</sup> Most guerrillas used the arms they had with them when they evaded the Japanese and took Japanese arms with them from successful ambushes. Submarines delivered supplies the guerrillas once AIB agents had made contract. During resupply missions, the submariners would invite American guerrilla leaders aboard for a little hospitality. Often this would take the form of food, new uniforms, news from home, and a shower. As the situation matured, the submarines would take letters and mail from the guerrillas for delivery home. These letters were often the first news families would receive that their loved ones were alive and continuing to fight. In addition to the supply runs, the submarines performed additional service by infiltrating AIB agents and exfiltrating servicemen and civilians from the Philippines. As a sign of gratitude to the submarine crews that brought supplies, Colonel Fertig brought fresh produce to the crew. This also demonstrated Fertig's ability to marshal the resources and respect of the people to his superiors.<sup>167</sup>

The AIB's task was to supply the guerrillas with key types of equipment and supplies that they could not manufacture or find on their own, specifically medicine, weapons, ammunition, and most importantly, radio equipment.<sup>168</sup> AIB also brought with them an inspired selection of items in an attempt to win over the Filipino population, such as sending a quantity of wheat flour so that the predominately Catholic population of the islands could make Communion wafers for

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<sup>164</sup> Keats, *They Fought Alone*, 151.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

<sup>167</sup> Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines*, 172-173.

<sup>168</sup> Wise, *Secret Mission to the Philippines*, 77.

Mass.<sup>169</sup> Another issue was the nature of arms and ammunition the AIB provided to the guerrillas. Size constraints limited what a submarine would carry, therefore volume was more a concern rather than weight. This translated into the AIB providing Thompson submachine guns and ammo for the guerrillas rather than the requested shotguns and shells, because a submarine could simply carry more rounds than shells for the same amount of space.<sup>170</sup> Another factor affecting aid given to the guerrillas is that the AIB did not want to provide too much arms and ammunition. This was due to the AIB's fear that the guerrillas would conduct ambushes against the Japanese and provoke retaliation rather than the given mission of intelligence gathering.<sup>171</sup>

The guerrillas received with mixed feelings the propaganda items sent by the AIB. The propaganda took the form of packs of matches, chocolate, and other sundry items that had "I shall return" printed on them.<sup>172</sup> AIB also sent a "Free Philippines" magazine to the islands.<sup>173</sup> Some of the guerrilla groups were not pleased with what the AIB sent. The propaganda was the first batch of supplies that some guerrilla groups received and provided no value other than to keep the morale of the local population up, provide clues to the Japanese forces as to the extent of the guerrillas influence and proof that the guerrillas had been in contact with the outside world. As a retort, Colonel Volckmann, who was especially incensed by this disregard to their needs that he sent back, on the next supply submarine, a native pipe with a container of tobacco and printed on

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 176.

<sup>171</sup> Keats, *They Fought Alone*, 199.

<sup>172</sup> Wolfert, *American Guerrilla in the Philippines*, 174. General MacArthur uttered these words as a pledge to liberate the Philippines from the Japanese.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

the side it read, "WE REMAINED." After this, the AIB supplied the guerrillas with what they needed.<sup>174</sup>

The AIB and the PRS were General MacArthur's primary instrument in providing support and direction to the various guerrilla groups within the Philippines. The agents from these organizations settled disagreements between different guerrilla groups and brought them under MacArthur's authority. The agents' intervention in command and control issues amongst the guerrillas allowed them to focus on the tasks of collecting intelligence on the Japanese and preparing to conduct offensive operations in support of the liberation of the Philippines. The supplies, specifically the radio equipment, brought in by the agents during their penetration missions, maximized the guerrilla's potential in their role of gathering intelligence. The assistance and intervention of the AIB and PRS meant the difference between survival and success to the guerrillas as they worked against the Japanese occupiers.

## **The Guerrilla Contribution to the Liberation of the Philippines**

The guerrillas contributed to the efforts to liberate the Philippines in a variety of ways. These took the form of the specified tasks given to them by General MacArthur prior to and during, and campaign to liberate the Philippines. Additionally, the guerrillas undertook other tasks that allowed them to gain and maintain support of the local population. Some on General MacArthur's staff held these governance tasks and limited raids in a dim light. They felt that they were a distraction from the specified tasks of intelligence collection or undermined the postwar

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<sup>174</sup> Volckmann, *We Remained*, 172.

Philippines.<sup>175</sup> The net result of the guerrilla's efforts was that they helped MacArthur in an operational sense by facilitating the initial invasion of the Philippines and by keeping the population's morale up during the occupation.<sup>176</sup> Strategically, the guerrillas contributed in shaping the post war Philippines by being a crucible for the future post-war leaders to establish themselves and guerrilla units becoming the cadre of the post war Philippine Army.

As the various guerrilla groups and General MacArthur's headquarters contacted one another, orders issued to the guerrillas gave them instruction for their role in the liberation of the Philippines. The immediate task given to the guerrillas was to gather intelligence while minimizing contact with the enemy.<sup>177</sup> The second task was to prepare for a supporting role during the campaign to retake the Philippines. The third task, which came after the initial landing, was to support the American ground forces to the best of their ability. For this role, direction of the guerrillas stopped coming from General MacArthur's headquarters, but the Army headquarters in the area, either the 6<sup>th</sup> or 8<sup>th</sup> United States Army depending on the location of the guerrillas within the Philippines. This signified the shift in the guerrilla's role from a resistance effort to that of a conventional force.

The guerrillas gathered intelligence on behalf of the AIB. Intelligence gathered by source networks, supporting coastwatchers, and by the guerrillas being in the right place and the right time to exploit fortuitous events. Volckmann's USAFIP-NL had a source network of approximately 100 agents while other groups would have sources that would provide early

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<sup>175</sup> Wolfert, *American Guerrilla*, 170.

<sup>176</sup> The dropping of atomic weapons on Japan compelled their surrender on August 15, 1945. However, word had not reached the Japanese forces fighting in the Philippines of the event and fighting lasted in the Philippines until September 1, 1945.

<sup>177</sup> Mills, *Stranded in the Philippines*, 79.

warning of a Japanese attack.<sup>178</sup> Volckmann's radio network was part of a larger radio network that encompassed 126 radio stations and 27 weather-monitoring stations.<sup>179</sup> The guerrillas also worked with AIB agents to identify suitable landing sites.<sup>180</sup> Other sources of intelligence came from the guerrillas being in the right time and place to capitalize on events. In November 1944, Volckmann's guerrillas were able to reach the site of a Japanese plane crash within their area of operations. Inside the plane were documents detailing General Yamashita's planned defense of Luzon.<sup>181</sup> They were able to translate the documents and radio the information back to SWPA, HQ for exploitation.<sup>182</sup>

A similar incident happened on the island of Cebu. LTC James Cushing's men were able to rescue the passengers of a Japanese cargo plane that had crashed just offshore. One of the passengers was Admiral Fukudome, Chief of staff to Admiral Koga, head of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Koga died in the crash and Fukudome did not have the opportunity to destroy the documents detailing the defense of the Philippines or the cipher used to encode them.<sup>183</sup> Cushing secured the documents and attempted to get them and Koga into the hands of the Allies. The local Japanese commander had other plans. LTC Seito Onishi issued the ultimatum for Cushing to turn over Koga, or Onishi would start killing off the local population in thirty-six hours.<sup>184</sup> General MacArthur ordered Cushing not to turn over Koga. Cushing did not have the troops to hold off a

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<sup>178</sup> Volckmann, *We Remained*, 130.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*, 180

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 181-182.

<sup>181</sup> Breuer, *MacArthur's Secret War*, 193.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.* Volckmann's guerrillas were unique in that they had a Japanese expatriate working in their headquarters. He earned Volckmann's and the others trust by interrogating prisoners and translating documents for the guerrillas.

<sup>183</sup> Toland, *The Rising Sun*, 478.

<sup>184</sup> Breuer, *MacArthur's Secret War*, 153.

Japanese infantry battalion and he was not going to consign hundreds of Filipinos to their deaths. Cushing agreed to the exchange, but not before his guerrillas got the plans and cipher to Fertig, who in turn sent them out on a submarine specifically detailed for the purpose.<sup>185</sup> For Cushing's efforts, MacArthur demoted him from LTC to Private for disobeying a direct order.<sup>186</sup> The guerrillas on Cebu saw this as an insult and impractical and simply allowed Cushing to remain as their leader.

The dilemma for the guerrillas was that they were attempting to accomplish their assigned missions while carrying out the necessary survival tasks and also trying to maintain the support of the population. The guerrillas felt that in order to maintain the support of the population, they needed to conduct a limited amount of attacks against the Japanese. SWPA, HQ felt that intelligence collection should be a priority and attacks against the Japanese held to a minimum.

The various guerrilla groups throughout the Philippines had received a warning order prior to the invasion from SWPA, HQ to be on order to conduct four days of offensive operations without outside assistance.<sup>187</sup> Guerrillas throughout the Philippines received orders to carry out their sabotage plans starting on January 4, 1945.<sup>188</sup> Some instances occurred where communication issues delayed the receipt of orders or due to guerrilla leaders being on the move.<sup>189</sup> The phrase within the order that summarized General MacArthur's intent to the

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<sup>185</sup> Toland, *The Rising Sun*, 480.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid. Whitney was able to get Cushing "reinstated" after the war and Cushing retired with his family within the Philippines.

<sup>187</sup> Lapham, et al, *Lapham's Raiders*, 163. Hunt, et al, *Behind Japanese Lines*, 183. It is of note that the guerrilla groups within the archipelago received this order over the period of a few months.

<sup>188</sup> Lapham, et al, *Lapham's Raiders*, 167.

<sup>189</sup> Ramsey, et al, *Lieutenant Ramsey's War*, 301.



guerrillas stated, “Unleash the maximum possible violence against the enemy.”<sup>190</sup> The guerrillas relished the chance to inflict damage against the occupying Japanese forces. The impending Allied invasion removed any fear of Japanese retribution. Targets for the guerrillas included supply depots, telegraph lines, airfields, and rolling stock.<sup>191</sup>

The guerrillas also contributed intelligence directly to invading American forces. There were instances of guerrillas taking small launches out to United States Navy ships informing them that they had landing sites secured from the Japanese. In other instances, the guerrillas were able to provide landing forces on the composition and disposition of Japanese forces further inland.<sup>192</sup>

Another example of the assistance provided by the guerrillas was their participation in the raid to liberate American POWs held by the Japanese at the Cabanatuan POW camp.<sup>193</sup> The guerrillas not only provided troops and auxiliaries to help move the soon to be former POWs, but also had insight on the camp that proved useful during the raid.<sup>194</sup> One of the guerrilla commanders, a Captain Juan Pajota, told the commander of 6<sup>th</sup> Ranger Battalion, LTC Henry Mucci that the Japanese guards were distracted by American airplanes flying over the compound and that an over flight could provide time for the Rangers to close from the tree line to the perimeter of the camp.<sup>195</sup> LTC Mucci thought enough of the idea to request an over flight of the

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<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.

<sup>192</sup> Wolfert, *American Guerilla in the Philippines*, 196.

<sup>193</sup> Sides, *Ghost Soldiers*, 21.

<sup>194</sup> Lapham, et al, *Lapham's Raiders*, 179. The breakdown of forces that participated on the raid included 122 Rangers, at least 250 guerrillas, and 150 stevedores.

<sup>195</sup> Sides, *Ghost Soldiers*, 179.

POW camp to coincide with the raid.<sup>196</sup> The over flight was approved and distracted the Japanese guards allowing the Rangers to gain entrance to the camp and liberate the prisoners.

The guerrillas shifted roles as they came under the control of either the 6<sup>th</sup> or 8<sup>th</sup> US Army, as both armies moved inland from their beachheads. The armies had different uses for guerrillas. The guerrillas performed duties as guides, translators, and guards for rear areas. After Volckmann's forces had been assigned to 6<sup>th</sup> United States Army, he reached out to its attached 308<sup>th</sup> Bomb Wing and established operating procedures and a network of Forward Air Controllers to provide close air support to the guerrillas.<sup>197</sup> In Luzon, a striking transition occurred as the guerrillas fought alongside conventional forces. Due to intelligence gathered by his guerrillas, LTC Volckmann realized early on that his area of operations would be the site of General Yamashita's defense. As such, the operations of his guerrilla groups unfolded into two steps after the landing. The first step would have Volckmann's guerrillas fight within their districts in order to harass, pin down, and interdict the Japanese forces before they could reach the initial beachhead.<sup>198</sup> Elsewhere similar phenomena occurred. In the 8<sup>th</sup> United States Army's area of operations, Fertig's forces conducted operations clearing Japanese garrisons and landing sites.<sup>199</sup> The second step involved the guerrillas fighting as a unit. The USAFIP-NL actually fought as a roughly division sized unit from June 1, 1945 until the surrender of Japanese forces on September

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<sup>196</sup> Ibid., 180; 6<sup>th</sup> US Army agreed and sent a P-61 Black Widow, a night fighter, to overfly the camp during the day. The novelty and uniqueness of this fighter was more than enough to distract the Japanese at the time of the raid as its pilot performed a twenty-minute display of acrobatics to distract the Japanese guarding the camp. The raid resulted in the liberation of 513 American POWs.

<sup>197</sup> Guardia, *American Guerrilla*, 127.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., 129.

<sup>199</sup> Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 621.

1, 1945.<sup>200</sup> Other guerrilla units had to contend with the Japanese without any outside support. They were part of an economy of force mission or the conventional fighting ended before they could fully participate. The guerrilla effort ended in the Philippines with the surrender of General Yamashita's forces to Lieutenant Colonel Volckman's forces in Northern Luzon on September 1, 1945.<sup>201</sup> The effort of the guerrilla leaders did not end with the surrender of the Japanese. The post-war environment left the guerrilla leaders dealing with property issues, integration of guerrilla units into the new Philippine Army, and legal status. Thankfully, the next two presidents of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas and Ramon Magsaysay, had ties to the guerrilla movement during the Japanese occupation and they facilitated the integration of the guerrillas into the Philippine Army, dealt with compensation for the guerrillas, and absolved the guerrillas of possible illegal actions taken during the occupation.<sup>202</sup>

## Conclusion

The guerrilla groups on the Philippines did contribute to the efforts to liberate the archipelago from the Japanese occupation. They contributed by gathering intelligence vital to the planning of the liberation of the Philippines and by keeping the population of the Philippines' hopes alive of an eventual liberation. The guerrillas also were key in keeping the population safe from bandits and the Japanese by establishing or supporting local civil-military governments in the areas they controlled.

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<sup>200</sup> Guardia, *American Guerrilla*, 129.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 146.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 151-156; No American went to trial. Generals MacArthur and Eisenhower were disinclined to allow or move forward with any legal proceedings against any American guerilla. Magsaysay created a board of inquiry to deal with the guerrillas in order to find those people who used the occupation as an opportunity for criminal activities.

The guerrilla movement in the Philippines was able to capitalize on the shortcomings of the Japanese campaign to take the Philippines and its later counter-guerrilla efforts. The unwillingness of the Japanese to admit or even discuss the issue of the guerrillas between units allowed the guerrillas the time and space they needed to form, grow, and operate. The harsh treatment of the Filipinos and American POWs at the hands of the Japanese provided every motivation to resist. The Japanese never gained complete control of the archipelago allowing the guerrillas to start groups and for General MacArthur and his staff to take advantage of the inherent chaos.

The support provided to the guerrillas by the Allies allowed the guerrillas to maximize their effectiveness in gathering intelligence and as a conventional force. The Allies helped the guerrillas by clearing up command issues, providing arms, and radios. Guerrilla leaders took broad latitude in their decisions and those decisions will need to be endorsed or even tolerated by an outside authority. Even if this latitude is given, the guerrilla leaders will make decisions out of necessity that may not be in keeping with laws, ethical standards, and professional standards. Examples include the elimination of enemy collaborators, extra-judicial punishment, and the assumption of civil responsibility and the authority that comes with it. The guerrilla leaders would act within the bounds of their conscience and what they felt they could justify to an outside authority after the war. They were reasonable men living in unreasonable times and forced to make the best ethical decisions they could.

Another lesson that the guerrillas of the Philippines provide is an example of the roles a guerrilla movement can take when dealing with a civilian population. The examples of civilian participation within the governance issues within the Philippines during the Japanese occupation are an example of how a guerrilla movement can win the support of a local population. The guerrillas directly influenced the economy, law and order issues, and worked with the population to address their needs.

Higher headquarters can specify to a guerrilla band as to what operations should occur. However, the leaders of that headquarters need to be mindful of the supporting day-to-day tasks that the guerrillas must undertake in order to gain and maintain the support of the population. The guerrillas must have the freedom of action to work on population support so they can have the ability to carry out the tasks assigned to them from a higher authority.

The guerrillas efforts in the Philippines helped to keep order during the occupation by establishing local governments of various natures and by providing security to the local population from bandits, criminals, and occupying Japanese forces. In return, the population supported the guerrillas with food, shelter, support, and in their own way, security by creating sanctuaries from which the guerrillas could operate. Operationally, the guerrillas contributed to the campaign by providing intelligence, conducting acts of sabotage and raids that hindered the Japanese response to the American invasion. In some instances, the guerrillas helped by performing reconnaissance of landing sites and in some instances securing the sites before the Allies would land on them. Strategically, the guerrillas contributed in shaping the post war Philippines by being a crucible for the future post-war leaders to establish themselves and guerrilla units becoming the cadre of the post war Philippine Army.

Analyzing how the guerrilla movement formed on the Philippines provides insight as to how other insurgent/guerrilla/terrorist groups can form elsewhere. The path that the guerrillas of the Philippines took during their formation provides examples of steps that other guerrilla or insurgent groups may take during formation. From attempting to answer how this guerrilla group and other groups form, possible defeat mechanisms or mechanisms of support can be determined and possibly exploited.

The tasks the guerrillas carried out in governance and raising units directly impacted the shape of the post-war Philippines. Filipino guerrilla leaders transitioned from fighting, into the post war government. Examples include Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines and Macanio Penalta, Philippine Secretary of Defense.<sup>203</sup> Guerrilla units, such as the USAFIP-NL became units in the new Philippine Army.<sup>204</sup> The impact of the guerrilla movement on the Philippines influences the country today as it is dealing with Moro separatists in the Mindanao region.

The story of the guerrillas of the Philippines during World War II provide another example of a resistance forming along with the guerrilla movements within Yugoslavia and on the Eastern Front between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. What makes the guerrillas of the Philippines different from these other examples is that the majority of the guerrillas came from countries with a democratic background. It is worth further research comparing the growth of these various movements to see if there are any common themes.

Ultimately, the lessons that guerrillas learned can teach others, but these lessons come at a high price. It came at the expense of the population of the Philippines living under a brutal occupation for over two years. The lessons came at the price of the lives of the POWs and the guerrillas fell victim to the cruel whims of the Japanese. The success of the guerrillas came at the expense of the lives of the first generation of guerrilla leaders. Praeger, Moses, and Noble were guerrilla leaders that paid with their lives for a free Philippines. The organizations they formed

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<sup>203</sup> Lapham, et al., *Lapham Raiders*, 241.

<sup>204</sup> Guardia, *American Guerrilla*, 150. After the war, certain American guerrilla leaders headed back to the Philippines in order to straighten out issues involving pay, rank, and equipment. Furthermore, these leaders dealt with false claims from Filipinos who claimed to be guerrillas.

contributed to victory over the Japanese and contributed to the Philippines taking its place in the community of nations.

## List of Acronyms

AIB	Allied Intelligence Bureau
COL	Colonel
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy
LGAF	Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces (commanded by Robert Lapham)
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTG	Lieutenant General
PRS	Philippine Regional Section
USAFIP-NL	United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (commanded by COL Russell Volckmann)
USFIP	United States Forces in the Philippines (commanded by COL Wendell Fertig)



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