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U.S. MARINE CORPS. 1ST. DIVISION.

FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATION.

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Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
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1. REPORT DATE 1942		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Report on Guadalcanal Operation Volume 1				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) United States Marine Corps 1st Division				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES JFSC WWII Declassified Records.					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 71	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

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U. S. MARINE CORPS. FIRST MARINE DIVISION.

FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATION. PHASE I.

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DIVISION COMMANDER'S FINAL REPORT ON GUADALCANAL OPERATION

PHASE 1

EVENTS PRIOR TO H HOUR, 7 AUGUST, 1942.

GENERAL

The First Marine Division was brought to war strength at Marine Barracks, New River, N.C., between 7 December, 1941 and 1 May, 1942. Expansion from a small pre-war nucleus to a war strength division presented a serious problem in training, equipping, and quartering, which was further complicated by the early detachment of a provisional brigade for immediate service in the South Pacific. Formation of this brigade, built around the Seventh Marines (reinforced), withdrew from the division a disproportionate number of officers, noncommissioned officers and men trained and experienced in amphibious warfare. Early replacement of the loss being impossible, the division was reconstituted as a two regiment division with supporting units and remained so until the arrival of the Seventh Marines on Guadalcanal in September, 1942, returned it to the original triangular form of organization.

TRAINING AND STATE OF READINESS

All units of the Division (except the First Marines, which remained inactive until March, 1942) participated in intensive training during the period December, 1941 - April, 1942. Training was of a practical nature and included field exercises, combat firing and service practices for all arms and units. In addition to this training at New River each reinforced combat team of the Fifth Marines and one of the First Marines engaged in a ten day landing exercise at Solomons Island, Maryland, during March and April.

Although full advantage was taken of every opportunity and facility for training it was considered that the Division had not yet attained a satisfactory state of readiness for combat when first intelligence of the Lone Wolf plan was received in mid-April.

MOVEMENT OVERSEAS

The Lone Wolf Plan required the early movement of the division, (less 7th Marines reinforced) to New Zealand for the purpose of establishing a training base and

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conducting intensive amphibious training in preparation for active combat. It was estimated that no combat mission would be required of the Division prior to 1 January, 1943. In accordance with this plan necessary establishments were obtained in the vicinity of Wellington, New Zealand, and arrangements were completed for the reception of the Division which was scheduled to move overseas in two echelons. The first echelon (Division Headquarters, certain divisional units and Fifth Marines Reinforced) reached New Zealand on 14 June; the second echelon (First Marines, reinforced, Eleventh Marines, and remaining divisional units) arrived on 11 July. (Annex A).

PLANNING AND RECONNAISSANCE

PRELIMINARY ORGANIZATION

On 26 June, twelve days after the arrival of the First Echelon and while the Second was at sea enroute to the area the Division Commander was informed of a plan for an offensive operation in the South Pacific involving the employment of the First Marine Division reinforced by 2nd Marines, 1st Raider Battalion and 3rd Defense Battalion. This information was received from Commander South Pacific at a conference in Auckland attended by the Division Commander and Officers of his staff. The proposed theater of operations was to be the Solomon Islands, with the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area as the probable specific objective of a landing attack by the reinforced First Marine Division. D-day was tentatively set at 1 August, only three weeks after the prospective arrival of the Second Echelon in New Zealand. The state of readiness of the Division and the complicating logistical factors involved in an operation at so early a date were appreciated by all concerned but were dismissed from consideration in view of the urgency and high national importance of the projected undertaking.

The Division Commander returned to Wellington and active preparations for the operation was begun by all staff sections. There was no time for a deliberate planning phase, and in many instances irrevocable decisions had to be made even before the essential features of the naval plan of operations could be ascertained. Since the success of the operation would be singularly dependent upon surprise, it was considered necessary for all preparations to be surrounded by the utmost secrecy. For this reason preliminary measures were carried out under the guise of preparations for a period of amphibious training.

By Operation Order 5-42, (Annex B) on 29 June, the Division was organized into two reinforced regimental combat groups, each comprising a headquarters and support sub-group and three reinforced battalion combat teams. Each sub-group and combat team was assigned to a designated transport. At this time only Group A, consisting of the Fifth Marines (Reinforced), was present in New Zealand, and by Mailgram Serial 290145 (Annex C) it was directed to begin embarkation on transports at Wellington on 2 July. As further information became available, a Divisional support group, comprising elements not previously assigned to Regimental combat teams was organized. It consisted of four sub-groups and a rear echelon. Each of the former was assigned for transportation to a transport or cargo vessel while the latter consisted of elements which were to remain in Wellington.

Operations Order 6-42, (Annex D) the first complete order of the operation was issued on 9 July. It directed that the force be embarked for a period of amphibious training or for employment in active operations.

INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY

There was little information immediately available either as to the character of the theater of operations or the enemy strength and activity therein. Other than a few photographs of the Tulage harbor area and the conventional small scale hydrographic charts there were no adequate maps available. Officer missions were sent to Australia, New Guinea, Noumea, and Auckland to exploit all available sources of information, and much valuable material was obtained. This included studies, photographs, and a fragmentary coastal mosaic of Guadalcanal. The services of several qualified Australians thoroughly acquainted with the Solomon Islands were made available by Commander Southwest Pacific. The same source provided useful estimates of the enemy strength and dispositions and prepared an excellent aerial mosaic and map of Guadalcanal both of which were reproduced in quantity. This cartographic material would have been of invaluable assistance but through a failure of intelligence liaison it failed to reach the division. (Annex E Intelligence)

PLAN OF OPERATIONS

Based on the foregoing and after a thorough appraisal of terrain and hydrographic conditions the following plan of operations was decided upon:

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To execute simultaneous landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal in order to seize these islands and destroy enemy forces thereon.

To land the First Marine Raider Battalion, followed by one infantry Battalion on Beach Blue on the southwest coast of Tulagi at H hour.

To land the First Parachute Battalion on Gavutu at H plus 4 hours to seize Gavutu and Tanambogo.

To protect the flanks of these major landings by landing small forces on Florida, in the vicinity of Halavo and Haleta respectively.

To land the remainder of the Division on Beach Red (on Guadalcanal 6,000 yards east of airfield) beginning at H plus 30 minutes to seize a beach head and then attack to the west capturing the airfield. (Annex R Sketch of Lunga Sound).

Although changed in certain minor respects, this remained the fundamental scheme for the employment of the division and it was embodied in Operation Order Number 7-42, First Marine Division, issued at Wellington on 20 July. (Annex F). It was considered that the northern attack (Tulagi-Gavutu-Tanambogo) would be more difficult initially than the southern attack (Guadalcanal) due to the restricted terrain and unfavorable hydrographic conditions which implied that any landing in this area must of necessity be made in the face of strong resistance. The more favorable terrain and the unlimited extent of beaches on the Guadalcanal side indicated that a landing at a point remote from the Lunga defenses would in all probability meet with little or no initial opposition. For this reason the best trained and longest organized battalions available were assigned to the northern attack. Events of 7 August indicated that these two assumptions were correct.

The Division Reserve (Second Marines, reinforced) was retained under control of commander, Task Force 62 for occupation of Ndani Island subsequent to D day if its release to the Division Commander for occupation of the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area proved unnecessary. However, prior to issue of Operation Order 7-42 the release of one team for the northern attack was secured.

NAVAL PLAN OF OPERATIONS

The basic Divisional Operation Order (Annex F) was incorporated by Commander Task Force 62 as Annex D (Landing Force Plan) of the order of the naval attack force which was issued on 30 July at Koro Island. This order enjoined the seizure of Tulagi, Gavutu and Guadalcanal by Task Force 62 (Naval Attack Force) supported by Task Force 61 (carriers). The organization of Task Force 62

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appears in Annex G.

The plan provided for two fire support groups for ships gunfire in support of the landing; one group (Group Love) to fire in support of the southern attack the other (Group Mike) to support the northern attack. (Annex H. Extracts from Ships Gunfire Plan). Air support provided by carrier based planes of Task Force 61 was to consist of two fighting squadrons and three dive bomber squadrons operating in support of the landing attack. Extracts of the aircraft support plan appear in Annex I.

LOGISTICS

The movement of the division to New Zealand had not been planned with a view to its immediate employment in active operations. The bulk of the personnel were organizationally loaded on two large passenger vessels (WAKEFIELD and ERICSSON) which had little cargo carrying capacity. As a result units were in large measure separated from their supplies and equipment which were dispatched on several cargo vessels (DEL BRAZIL, ELECTRA, LIPSCOMB LYKES, ALCYONE, LIBRA, MIZAR, and ALCHIBA). Furthermore the loading of these vessels in the United States was not under the control of the Division Commander. The movement had been planned and executed with the object of effecting an expeditious and economical removal of the Division, its equipment and supplies to New Zealand, where, it was anticipated, there would be ample time for a deliberate unloading, reclassification, and distribution of all types of material. In consequence the movement of the division involved marked departures from the well established principles of combat loading.

The change in plans brought about by the order for the Solomons operation thus created an unparalleled logistical problem. The Fifth Marines had reached New Zealand, had unloaded and was in a position to reembark at once. The units of the second echelon, however, had not yet arrived, and it was apparent that only a few days would be available for them to unload, classify equipment and supplies and reload for combat on designated ships of the transport force. The difficulties presented by the limited time available were aggravated by the restricted port facilities available in Wellington and by the fact that the exact loading of incoming ships could not be ascertained prior to their arrival.

In order to take full advantage of all time available, it was decided to embark combat group A (Fifth Marines Reinforced) at once, together with pertinent supplies and ammunition. (Annex C).

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In this way all port facilities could be made available for the exclusive use of the second echelon when it arrived. Accordingly Combat Group A was embarked in AMERICAN LEGION, FULLER, NEVILLE, and BELLATRIX, beginning 2 July. With the exception of shortages in certain items of supply this part of the embarkation proceeded expeditiously and smoothly. The shortages were largely made up through local purchase in Wellington, although in a few instances it was necessary to await arrival of Second Echelon supplies.

Loading and unloading operations in Wellington were centralized at one large wharf (Aotea Quay) capable of berthing five vessels at once. Combat loading necessarily took place simultaneously with the discharge of incoming cargo and the operation was exceedingly complex and most difficult to control. A working team of three hundred men was assigned to each vessel and maintained around the clock by a system of eight hour reliefs. Divisional transportation was augmented by vehicles of the First Base Depot and by a daily detail of thirty flat-topped New Zealand Army lorries which proved particularly useful in this type of work. Ammunition, organizational equipment, and gasoline dumps were established in open areas on the wharf. Rations and perishables were classified in a large warehouse which occupied one end of the wharf. The operation was directed by D-4 through a field officer in charge of each loading team, and the transport quartermasters of the various ships. Dock labor was restricted to skilled operators of special loading machinery, cranes, hoists, carriers, and stacking machines. Use of general civilian labor was rejected in favor of employment of troops as it had been found both inadequate and unreliable during earlier operations. Major M. W. Horton, an experienced officer of the New Zealand Army Transport Service assisted throughout the operation. Through his detailed knowledge of shipping, local port and labor conditions, availability of facilities and special machinery, he rendered invaluable aid to the Marine Corps during this period.

It was obvious from the beginning of the planning stage that the number of ships available for the operation would not be sufficient to meet the combat loading requirements of the entire division and that some units must be left behind. However to realize to the utmost the troop carrying capacity of the various vessels, all excess equipment and supplies were eliminated and even normal supplies were radically reduced. Seabags, extra clothing, bedding rolls, and company property were stored in Wellington, and such bulk supplies as rations and fuel were reduced from a normal 90 day to a 60 day basis.

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Only ten units of fire were embarked, three on each AP for the unit thereon, and seven on the supporting AK. (Annexes C and J) (See also Annex L Logistics).

SORTIE

Sortie from Wellington was originally set for 18 July, but with the arrival of the second echelon delayed until 11 July, it became evident that reembarkation and reloading could not be completed by the anticipated date and permission to delay the date of sortie until 22 July was secured. This necessitated a deferment of the projected D day from 1 August to on or after 4 August. On 22 July at 0900 the transport group carrying the division left Wellington under Naval escort bound for Koro Island in the Fiji group, there to rehearse and rendezvous with the remainder of Task Force 62 and the supporting naval air force, Task Force 61.

KORO ISLAND

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Rendezvous was effected on 26 July and from 28 July until 31 July rehearsals for the forthcoming operation were conducted at Koro. Coral conditions on the island beaches rendered them impractical for actual landing operations and to that extent the rehearsal period was unsatisfactory. It proved invaluable however, in providing an opportunity for familiarization with debarkation procedure, ascertaining debarkation intervals and the conduct and timing of largescale boat group movements. For the supporting forces the rehearsal provided an opportunity for naval gunfire bombardment practice and air support bombardment practice by carrier based planes. It also permitted the necessary exchange of staff visits and conferences between commanders of supporting, escort, and landing forces, during which further details of execution of the attack were agreed upon and minor changes carried into effect. Actual experience in the operation of boats for example, indicated the expectancy of a high percentage of boats inoperative due to mechanical failure, and in the light of this experience an effective and workable boat pool was established. Some slight changes in gunfire and air support plans were found necessary and it was decided that, in view of the dual nature of the attack, the time of landing at Guadalcanal would be set at "Zero-Hour" while the time of attack by the Northern group on Tulagi would be designated as "H-Hour".

As finally assembled for the Solomons operation, the United Nations forces consisted of Task Force 61 and 62. Task Force 61 consisted of the three carriers, SARATOGA, ENTERPRISE, and WASP, with a strong escort comprising

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NORTH CAROLINA, some cruisers and a number of destroyers. Task Force 62, which embarked the landing force, consisted of the following vessels of the navy.

Cruisers	Destroyers	Mine Sweepers
*Quincy	Hull	Hopkins
*Vincennes	Dewey	Trever
*Astoria	Ellet	Zane
San Juan	Wilson	Southard
Australia	Monssen	Hovey
*Canberra	Buchanan	
Hobart	Henley	
Chicago	Helm	
	Blue	
	Selfridge	
	Jarvis	
	Mugford	
	Patterson	
	Talbot	

Transports Cargo Vessels

American Legion	Ballatrix
Noville	Libra
Fuller	Alchiba
McCawley	Fomalhaut
Barnett	*Batelgouse
Elliott	Alhena
Crescent City	
President Hayes	
President Adams	
President Jackson	
*Zeilin	
Haywood	
Hunter Liggett	
Calhoun (APD)	
Gregory (APD)	
Little (APD)	
McKean (APD)	

* Third Defense Battalion embarked. Joined formation 1 August while en route Koro to Solomons.

██████████
Landing Force Elements embarked comprised the following:

1st Marine Division 12,900

less:

5th Bn., 11th Marines

1st Tank Bn. (less two cos)

Detachments

2nd Marines(Reinforced) 4,846

1st Raider Bn. 828

3rd Defense Bn. 972

Total----- 19,546

APPROACH

The entire force left the Koro area at sunset on 31 July and began the approach to the Solomons. The course followed took the convoy generally west by south from the Fijis to a point south of Rennel Island, thence due North to Savo Island. Weather conditions during the final two days of the approach were extremely favorable. The sky was generally overcast with low ceiling and intermittent rain squalls. There were no signs of hostile reconnaissance aircraft or submarines and nothing indicated that our approach had been observed. At 0300 on the morning of 7 August Savo Island appeared ahead and Cape Esperance was sighted to the Eastward, plainly visible in the light of the moon, then in its third quarter. The weather was clearing rapidly and visibility had improved to such an extent that even the most perfunctory observation could have detected our movement. At 0240, in accordance with the approach plan, Task Force 62 split into two groups, the Tulagi attack force passing to the north of Savo, the Guadalcanal attack Group passing to the south between Savo and Cape Esperance. Thereafter each group pursued its separate and divergent course toward its respective transport area.

At daylight fire support vessels, (cruisers and destroyers) began execution of the ships' gunfire support plan, subjecting hostile installations on both Tulagi and Guadalcanal to intense bombardment. The only enemy vessel encountered was a small supply ship carrying gasoline. It was set afire and sunk. Of the few enemy aircraft stationed in the area, only one got into the air and it was destroyed immediately after takeoff by cruiser anti-aircraft fire, off Lunga Point. The remainder were destroyed on the water or on their ramps at Gavutu by carrier aircraft.

Friendly spotting planes (SOC) were in the air at daylight, and the supporting carrier groups arrived in time to carry out their assigned missions. After their arrival, no further enemy aerial activity was noted and our dive bombers undertook the systematic attack on their prescribed targets without interference

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other than weak and ineffective anti-aircraft fire from Tulagi, Kukum, and the airfield.

At 0650 the transport area was reached. H-hour was set at 0800 and Zero-hour at 0910. Debarkation began immediately and proceeded smoothly and rapidly without hostile interference.

LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Battalions should be practiced in landing operations whenever opportunity presents itself and without regard to state of training. The limited exercises at Solomon's Island, Maryland, in March and April proved invaluable, even though at the time it was considered that the general state of training of the troops did not justify this advanced type of training.
2. Loading of supplies and equipment for overseas movement should be under the control of the unit concerned.
 - (a) Much confusion and loss of invaluable time in New Zealand is to be attributed to the fact that the Division did not have accurate knowledge of what was being sent into the theatre.
 - (b) Vital items of equipment were left in the United States to make room for items of minor importance or supplies procurable locally.
 - (c) The Transport Quartermaster who loads the vessel should accompany it to its destination to provide information upon which to base plans for berthing and discharge of cargo.
3. A minimum period of six weeks for planning and reconnaissance should precede embarkation for combat.
4. All information of the enemy and terrain should be verified by the force conducting the operation through the medium of aerial reconnaissance and on-shore patrols. Information of enemy strength on Tulagi proved highly accurate. That dealing with Guadalcanal proved most inaccurate, and this factor profoundly affected subsequent events. A longer period for planning and reconnaissance would have permitted measures for verification.
5. Use of persons possessing a detailed familiarity with the area of operations as guides and terrain advisers is of the utmost importance. A number of such persons were made available and accompanied the attack force. Their services were invaluable.
6. Cartographic materials of the widest variety reproduced in unlimited quantities are utterly essential. Lack of such materials severely handicapped all phases of the Guadalcanal operation. This lack was attributable to the limited time factor, imperfect liaison and failure to utilize available

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reproduction facilities.

7. The organization of the division into combat groups sub-divided into combat teams provided a sound basis for planning, supply and embarkation.

8. As a member of the operational staff, the Division air officer is extremely valuable. His planning and liaison functions can not be executed satisfactorily by a staff officer who is not an experienced Naval Aviator.

9. Whenever possible artillery units should be combat loaded, even when landing operations are not contemplated. This will make loading for combat easier and enable units to safeguard and service their own weapons.

10. The unsuitability of card-board or similar light paper containers for supplies cannot be stressed too strongly. In very few instances is there sufficient storage space for the supplies of a Marine Division in a loading area and the wastage resulting from the bursting of rain soaked paper cartons is serious. Rations and supplies landed on an operational beach are subject to unlimited abuse by weather and enemy action, and the light flimsy containers used in the Guadalcanal operation aggravated the waste.

11. Adequate space and facilities for division headquarters communication activities should be provided aboard the ship in which division headquarters is embarked and this ship originally should be equipped with adequate visual signalling equipment and operators. A headquarters ship would be the most desirable solution to the problem.

12. Upon embarkation the attack force should conduct a series of thorough rehearsals of the intended landing.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.

U.S. Marine Corps. 1st. Division 24 May, 1943.

From: The Commanding General.
To : The Commandant Marine Corps, Headquarters, U.S.
Marine Corps, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.
Via: The Commanding General 1st Marine Amphibious Corps.
Subject: Final report on Guadalcanal Operation Phase I.
Reference: (a) Art 10-21 Marine Corps Manual.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject report.

1. There is submitted herewith a report on activities of this division during the first phase of the Guadalcanal Operation. It covers the period 26 June to H-hour, 7 August and is an account of the planning, reconnaissance and approach periods which preceded the landing. Remaining phases of this report will be forwarded prior to 15 June.

2. The basic or covering report is annexed with numerous special reports, operation orders, and other documents. In many cases these contain recommendations and conclusions with which the undersigned is not necessarily in accord. This supplementary material is submitted because of its freshness of view point and as being of possible historical value. It is regretted that the exigencies of the campaign did not permit the keeping of a more exact account and that in many cases records were destroyed due to the danger involved in a large accumulation of documentary material in the presence of the enemy.

3. Phase V, which will conclude the report, will contain a final summary and restatement of conclusions and recommendations covering the entire period of the operation.

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Com7thFleet	1	CG2ndMarDiv	1
CG6thArmyUSA	6	CG3rdMarDiv	1
ComAirSoPac	3	CG4thMarDiv	1
CG1stMac	6	MarCorpsSchools	6
ComAmphForSoPac	3	File	1

LIST OF ANNEXES

- A Units in each echelon and movement overseas embarkation plan.
- B Operations Order 5-42.
- C Mail gram serial 290145.
- D Operations Order 6-42.
- E Intelligence Annex.
- F Operations Order 7-42.
- G Organization of Task Force 62.
- H Extracts from Ships' gunfire support plan
- I Extracts from air support plan.
- J Administrative Order 1a-42.
- K Personnel Annex.
- L Logistics Annex.
- M Medical Annex
- N Artillery Annex.
- O Communications Annex.
- P Fifth Marines Annex.
- Q First Marines Annex.
- R Sketch of Lunga Sound.

ANNEX A
UNITS IN EACH ECHELON AS EMBARKED
FOR MOVEMENT OVERSEAS

ADVANCE ECHELON

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) ELECTRA GROUP (MA 201)

Capt. James G. Frazer, USMC.

- ~~H&S Co 1st Eng Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Det 2d Fwd Ech 1st Base Depot~~ ✓
- ✓ ~~1st Fl Co A (Trans) 1st Serv Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Det Co A 1st Amph Trac Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Det Co A 1st Tk Bn~~ ✓

(b) DEL BRAZIL GROUP (MA 101)

LtCol. John D. Macklin, USMCR.

- ~~Det H&S Co 1st Eng Bn~~ ✓
- ~~2d Fl Co A (Trans) 1st Serv Bn~~ ✓
- (less Det)
- ~~Det Co A 1st Tk Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Det Co A 1st Amph Trac Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Det 2d Fwd Ech 1st Base Depot~~ ✓
- ~~Det 1st Fl Btry A Spl Wpn Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Casual Officers 1st Med Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Casual Officers Hq Co 1st Mar Div~~ ✓

(c) WAKEFIELD GROUP (MA 202)

Col. LeRoy P. Hunt, USMC.

- ~~5th Marines~~ ✓
- ~~2d Bn 11th Marines~~ ✓
- ~~1st Fl 1st Scout Co~~ ✓
- ~~1st Fl Btry A Spl Wpns Bn (less Det)~~ ✓
- ~~Co A 1st Tk Bn (less Dets)~~ ✓
- ~~Co A 1st Eng Bn (plus det H&S Co)~~ ✓
- ~~Co A 1st Pion Bn plus Co Comm Team~~ ✓
- ~~Co A (Trans) 1st Serv Bn (less 1st,~~ ✓
- ~~2d and 3d Flats)~~ ✓
- ~~Co A 1st Amph Trac Bn (less dets)~~ ✓
- ~~1st Med Bn (less Cos C, D, E, & Det)~~ ✓
- ~~1st Fl 1st M.F. Co~~ ✓
- ~~Det 1st Sig Co~~ ✓
- ~~Det H&S Co 1st Serv Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Hq Co 1st Mar Div~~ ✓

REAR ECHELON

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) LIFSCOMB LYKES GROUP (MA 102)

1st Lt Francis L. Orgain, USMCR.

- ~~1st Flat, Co B, 1st Tk Bn (less Det)~~ ✓
- ~~Det Co B, 1st Amph Trac Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Det 3d Flat, Co A (Trans) 1st Ser Bn~~ ✓
- ~~Det 11th Marines (four AA guns)~~ ✓

ANNEX A (Cont)

- Casual Officer, 1st Pioneer Bn
Casual Officer, Co E 1st Med Bn
- (b) ALCYONE GROUP (MB 203) Capt. Warren H. Edwards, USMCR.
Co B, 1st Amph Trac Bn (less 2d and
3d Plats)✓
3d Plat, Co A (Trans), 1st Serv Bn✓
(less det)
2d Plat, Co B, 1st Tk Bn✓
Det 11th Marines (four AA guns)
Det First Base Depot✓
Casual Officer, Co E, 1st Med Bn✓
Casual Officer, 1st Pioneer Bn✓
- (c) LIBRA GROUP (MB 204) Capt. Levi W. Smith, USMC.
Co C, 1st Engr Bn (less 2d & 3d Plats)✓
3d Plat, Co B, 1st Tk Bn✓
2d Plat, Co B, 1st Amph Trac Bn✓
(less det)
Det 11th Marines (four AA guns)
Det 1st Plat, Co B (Trans) 1st Serv Bn✓
Det 1st Base Depot✓
Casual Officer, Co E, 1st Med Bn✓
Casual Officers, 1st Pioneer Bn✓
- (d) ALCHIBA GROUP (MB 205) Capt. Francis H. Cooper, USMC.
Co B, 1st Tk Bn (less 1st, 2d & 3d Plats)✓
1st Plat, Co B (Trans), 1st Ser Bn✓
3d Plat, Co B, 1st Amph Trac Bn✓
2d Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn (less det)✓
Det 11th Marines (four AA guns)✓
Casual Officers, 11th Marines✓
Casual Officer, Co E, 1st Med Bn✓
Det First Base Depot✓
- (e) MIZAR GROUP (MB 206) LtCol. Walter W. Barr, USMCR.
1st Para Bn (less dets)✓
1st Amph Trac Bn (less Cos A & B)✓
Det Spec Wpns Bn (four AA guns)✓
Det H&S Co, 1st Ser Bn✓
- (f) ERICSSON GROUP (MC 301) Colonel Pedro A. del Valle, USMC.
11th Marines (less dets)
(11th Marines (less dets))✓
(5th Bn, 11th Marines)✓
(H&S Btry, 3d Bn, 11th Marines✓
(less det))
3d Bn, 1st Marines✓
1st Ser Bn (less dets)✓
1st Tk Bn (less dets)✓
1st Pioneer Bn (less dets)
1st Spec. Wpns Bn (less dets)✓
1st Sig Co (less dets)✓
1st Scout Co (less dets)✓
Co D, 1st Engr Bn✓

ANNEX A (Cont)

- Det Hdqtrs Co, 1st Mar Div
1st MP Co (less 1st Plat)
Co E, 1st Med Bn (less dets)
3d Plat Co C, 1st Engr Bn (plus det ✓
2d Plat Co C, 1st Engr Bn) ✓
Cos B & C, 1st Para Bn
Casual Officers, 1st Para Bn
(g) ELLIOTT GROUP (MC 302) LtCol. Edwin A. Pollock, USMC.
2d Bn, 1st Marines
Btry H 3d Bn, 11th Marines
(h) BARNETT GROUP (MC 303) Colonel Clifton B. Cates, USMC.
1st Marines (less 2d & 3d Bns) ✓
Btry G, 3d Bn, 11th Marines ✓
3d Plat, Co D, 1st Tk Bn ✓
Det H&S Btry, 3d Bn, 11th Marines ✓

ANNEX A (3)

ANNEX B

1990-5-80
076/285
[REDACTED]

First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force,
Wellington, N. Z.,
29 June 1942.

AE-003

OPERATION ORDER
No. 5-42

1. Effective at once the following Task Organizations within this Division are designated:

(a) COMBAT GROUP A Colonel LeRoy P. Hunt, USMC, AMERICAN LEGION

5th Marines	146 Off	3016 Enl	
2d Bn, 11th Marines	33 Off	560 Enl	
Co A, 1st Tank Bn	6 Off	138 Enl	
Co A, 1st Eng Bn	4 Off	110 Enl	
Co A, 1st Pion Bn (plus Comm Team)	8 Off	195 Enl	
1st Plat, Btry A, 1st Spec Wpn Bn	1 Off	43 Enl	
1st Plat, Co A, (Trans)	1 Off	38 Enl	
Co A, 1st Med Bn	7 Off	82 Enl	
Co A, 1st Amph Trac Bn	5 Off	114 Enl	
1st Plat, 1st Scout Co	1 Off	31 Enl	212
<u>Combat Team #1</u> LtCol. J. E. Maxwell, USMC, AMERICAN LEGION			212

1st Bn, 5th Marines	38 Off	895 Enl	
Btry D, 11th Marines	7 Off	140 Enl	
1st Plat, Co A, 1st Eng Bn	1 Off	26 Enl	
1st Plat, Co A, 1st Pion Bn	2 Off	50 Enl	
1st Plat, Co A, 1st Amph Trac Bn	1 Off	29 Enl	

Combat Team #2 LtCol. H. E. Rosecrans, USMC, NEWELL

2d Bn, 5th Marines	38 Off	895 Enl	
Btry E, 11th Marines	7 Off	140 Enl	
2d Plat, Co A, 1st Eng Bn	1 Off	26 Enl	141
2d Plat, Co A, 1st Pion Bn	2 Off	50 Enl	
2d Plat, Co A, 1st Amph Trac Bn	1 Off	29 Enl	

Combat Team #3 LtCol. F. C. Biebusch, USMC, FULLER

3d Bn, 5th Marines	38 Off	895 Enl	
Btry F, 11th Marines	7 Off	140 Enl	
3d Plat, Co A, 1st Eng Bn	1 Off	26 Enl	
3d Plat, Co A, 1st Pion Bn	2 Off	50 Enl	
3d Plat, Co A, 1st Amph Trac Bn	1 Off	29 Enl	

(b) COMBAT GROUP B Colonel Clifton B. Gates, USMC, McCANLEY

1st Marines	146 Off	3016 Enl	
3d Bn, 11th Marines	33 Off	560 Enl	
Co B, 1st Tank Bn	6 Off	138 Enl	
Co C, 1st Eng Bn	4 Off	110 Enl	
Co C, 1st Pion Bn (plus Comm Team)	8 Off	195 Enl	
3d Plat, Btry A, 1st Spec Wpn Bn	1 Off	43 Enl	
3d Plat, Co A, (Trans)	1 Off	38 Enl	
Co E, 1st Med Bn	7 Off	82 Enl	

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX B (Cont)

Co B, 1st Amph Trac Bn	5 Off	114 Enl
3d Plat, 1st Scout Co	1 Off	31 Enl
<u>Combat Team #4</u> LtCol. L. B. Crosswell, USMC, BARNETT		
1st Bn, 1st Marines	38 Off	895 Enl
Btry G, 11th Marines	7 Off	140 Enl
1st Plat, Co C, 1st Eng Bn	1 Off	26 Enl
1st Plat, Co C, 1st Pion Bn	2 Off	50 Enl
1st Plat, Co B, 1st Amph Trac Bn	1 Off	29 Enl
<u>Combat Team #5</u> LtCol. E. A. Pollock, USMC, ELLIOTT		
2d Bn, 1st Marines	38 Off	895 Enl
Btry H, 11th Marines	7 Off	140 Enl
2d Plat, Co C, 1st Eng Bn	1 Off	26 Enl
2d Plat, Co C, 1st Pion Bn	2 Off	50 Enl
2d Plat, Co B, 1st Amph Trac Bn	1 Off	29 Enl
<u>Combat Team #6</u> LtCol. W. N. McKelvy, Jr., USMC, McCawley		
3d Bn, 1st Marines	38 Off	895 Enl
Btry I, 11th Marines	7 Off	140 Enl
3d Plat, Co C, 1st Eng Bn	1 Off	26 Enl
3d Plat, Co C, 1st Pion Bn	2 Off	50 Enl
3d Plat, Co B, 1st Amph Trac Bn	1 Off	29 Enl

2. Until otherwise directed the above Task Organization will habitually be considered as operating units. Training will be so conducted as to facilitate their employment in active operations as such.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

W. C. JAMES,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution
Special

O F F I C I A L:

G. C. THOMAS,
LtCol., USMC,
D-3.

ANNEX C

FROM:	CG, 1st MARDIV	:	DATE:	29 JUNE 1942
TO :	CO, COMBAT GROUP "A"	:	MAILED AT:	HQ, WELLINGTON, N.Z.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

290145

1. On 2 July, 1942 effect movement Combat Group A to Wellington and embark in U.S.S. American Legion, U.S.S. Neville, U.S.S. Fuller, U.S.S. Bellatrix.

2. (a) Embark Combat Group A, less Combat Teams #2 and #3 and detachment Co A, 1st Med Bn (3 off - 41 enlisted) in U.S.S. American Legion

(b) Embark Combat Team #2 plus detachment Co A 1st Med Bn. (3 off - 41 enlisted) in U.S.S. Neville.

(c) Embark Combat Team #3 in U.S.S. Fuller.

3. (a) Utilize railway to fullest practical extent in movement. Commanding Officer, Combat Group A make necessary arrangements for trains direct with the New Zealand Railway Transport Officer.

(b) For equipment and supplies to be carried see administrative Order No. 1a-42, dated 29 June, 1942. Store excess baggage and equipment at base camps.

(c) Embark rations supplied by 1st Base Depot as follows:

Type "B" - 30 days in APs

30 days in AKs

Type "C" - 10 days in APs

Type "D" - 10 days in APs

(d) Gasoline and kerosene to be supplied by 1st Base Depot.

(e) Miscellaneous Group II supplies to be furnished by 1st Base Depot.

30 days in APs

30 days in AKs

ANNEX C (1)

ANNEX C (Cont)

(f) Ammunition:

3 Units of Fire in APs (2 Units of Fire to be supplied by 1st Base Depot)

7 Units of Fire in AKs to be supplied by 1st Base Depot.

(g) Sixty (60) days of clothing to be supplied AKs by 1st Base Depot. See Administrative Order No. 1a-42, dated 29 June, 1942 for items.

(h) Commanding Officer, 1st Service Battalion take over operation of Railhead at Paekakariki on 1 July, 1942.

(i) 1st Base Depot provide Commanding Officer Combat Group A with seventy (70) Rubber Boats (54 initially, remainder when available) and twenty (20) outboard motors.

(j) Ninety (90) days Medical Supplies to be provided by Division Surgeon.

(k) Rear Echelon remain in base camps. Instructions later.

ANNEX D

1990-5-80

076/302a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AE-017

First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force,
Wellington, N. Z.,
9 July, 1942.

OPERATION ORDER

No. 6-42.

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) COMBAT GROUP "A" (1st Mar Div Serial AE-003)
 (b) COMBAT GROUP "B" (1st Mar Div Serial AE-003)
 (c) SUPPORT GROUP Colonel P. A. del Valle, USMC
- SUB-GROUP #1 LtCol. E. H. Price, USMC, HUNTER LIGGETT
- | | | |
|--|--------|---------|
| Det, Div Hq Co | 26 Off | 80 Enl |
| 1st Sig Co (less Dets) | 4 Off | 102 Enl |
| H&S Co, 1st Eng Bn (less Dets) | 10 Off | 104 Enl |
| Co A (Trans) (less 1st, 2d & 3d Plats) | 5 Off | 108 Enl |
| H&S Co, 1st Serv Bn (less Dets) | 12 Off | 226 Enl |
| 1st Med Bn (less Cos A, C, D & E) | 8 Off | 90 Enl |
| 11th Marines (-1st, 2d, 3d & 4th Bns) | 48 Off | 880 Enl |
- SUB-GROUP #2 Major R. B. Luckey, USMC, HOLYWOOD
- | | | |
|--|--------|---------|
| Det Div Hq Co | 9 Off | 10 Enl |
| Det, 1st Sig Co | 3 Off | 50 Enl |
| 1st Para Bn | 20 Off | 345 Enl |
| Co D, 1st Eng Bn | 5 Off | 153 Enl |
| Repro Sec, H&S, 1st Eng Bn | 1 Off | 23 Enl |
| 1st Spec Wpns Bn (less 1st & 3d Plats, Btry A) | 25 Off | 391 Enl |
| Co A, 2d Med Bn | 7 Off | 82 Enl |
- SUB-GROUP #3 LtCol. G. R. Rowan, USMC, ALCHIBA
- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------|
| Det, 1st Sig Co | 2 Off | 18 Enl |
| 1st Pion Bn (less Cos A & C) | 18 Off | 269 Enl |
| 2d Plat, Co A (Trans) | 1 Off | 38 Enl |
| Det, H&S, 1st Serv Bn | 1 Off | 10 Enl |
| 1st Amph Trac Bn (less Cos A & B) | 14 Off | 227 Enl |
- SUB-GROUP #4 Capt. A. B. Gorham, USMC, FOMALHAUT
- | | | |
|------------------------------|-------|--------|
| Constr Plat, H&S, 1st Eng Bn | 2 Off | 93 Enl |
| Supply Sec, H&S, 1st Eng Bn | 1 Off | 12 Enl |
| Rep Sec, Co A, (Trans) | 2 Off | 37 Enl |
| Det, H&S, 1st Serv Bn | 1 Off | 10 Enl |
- (d) ALAN ECHILLON Colonel Wm G. Hawthorne, USMC
- | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------|---------|
| Div Hq Co (less Det) | 37 Off | 200 Enl |
| 1st Scout Co (-1st & 2d Plats) | 6 Off | 103 Enl |
| Det, 1st Sig Co | 2 Off | 8 Enl |
| 1st Tk Bn (less Cos A, B & C) | 18 Off | 206 Enl |
| Det, 1st Eng Bn | 0 Off | 10 Enl |
| Det, 1st Pioneer Bn | 0 Off | 10 Enl |
| Det, 1st Spec Wpns Bn | 0 Off | 10 Enl |

ANNEX D (Cont)

Det, H&S, 1st Serv Bn	0 Off	80 Enl
1st M.P. Co	6 Off	90 Enl
Det, 1st Med Bn	0 Off	6 Enl
Det, 1st Amph Trac Bn	0 Off	6 Enl
4th Bn, 11th Marines	20 Off	400 Enl
Det, 1st Marines	4 Off	150 Enl
Det, 5th Marines	4 Off	150 Enl
1st Base Depot	14 Off	150 Enl
1st Flat. Co B (Trans)	1 Off	38 Enl

1. Pertinent information will be furnished when and as available.

2. 1st Marine Division (less Rear Echelon) embarks, without delay, prepared for amphibious training in an area to be designated later or for employment in active operations, and establishes a Rear Echelon ashore.

3. (a) Combat Group A continue embarkation and assist other Task Organizations as directed.

(b)(1) Combat Group B on arrival Wellington debark all stores and equipment not absolutely essential to combat and send to storage. Establish unit personnel section ashore in accordance with Division Circular Number 6a-42.

(2) Organize Group in accordance 1st MarDiv Serial AE-003 and embark as follows:

Combat Team #4 in Barnett, (1st B 1st Reinf)
 Combat Team #5 in Elliott (2d Bn 1st Reinf)
 Combat Team #6 in McCawley (3d Bn 1st Reinf)
 Remainder of Combat Group in Barnett,
 McCawley and Libra.

(c)(1) Support Group on arrival Wellington debark. Send to storage all stores and equipment not absolutely essential to combat. Establish unit personnel sections ashore in accordance with Division Circular Number 6a-42.

(2) Embark Sub-Groups as follows:

Sub-Group #1 in Hunter Liggett
 Sub-Group #2 in Heywood (expected to be
 available 22 July) (16th (actual))
 Sub-Group #3 in Alchiba
 Sub-Group #4 in Fomalhaut.

(d) Rear Echelon on arrival Wellington debark. Move units to quartering areas in accordance with billeting plan furnished separately.

4. (a) Unloading and loading of equipment and supplies to be as outlined in "Landing Plan for Rear Echelon of 1st Marine Division, dated July 1, 1942."

(b) Equipment and supplies embarked to be in accordance with Division Administrative Order Number 1a-42, dated 29 June, 1942.

(c) Rations to be provided, if not already

ANNEX D (Cont)

embarked, by 1st Base Depot as follows:

Type "B" - 30 days in APs

30 days in AKs

Type "C" - 10 days in APs

Type "D" - 10 days in APs

(d) Gasoline, Kerosine, and Diesel oil to be supplied by 1st Base Depot as follows:

30 days in APs

30 days in AKs

(e) Ammunition:

3 Units of Fire in APs (to be supplied by 1st Base Depot if not already embarked).

7 Units of Fire in AKs (to be supplied by 1st Base Depot if not already embarked).

(f) Sixty (60) days of clothing to be supplied AKs by 1st Base Depot. See Administrative Order No. 1a-42, dated 29 June, 1942 for items.

(g) Commanding Officer 1st Base Depot provide 2d Bn, 1st Marines with sixty four (64) Rubber Boats and thirty (30) outboard motors and 1st Parachute Bn with thirty six (36) Rubber Boats and twenty (20) outboard motors.

(h) Ninety (90) days Medical Supplies to be provided by Division Surgeon.

5. CPs: 1st MarDiv, Hotel Cecil - Hunter Liggett
Combat Group A - American Legion
Combat Group B - Barnett
Support Group - Hunter Liggett

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

W. C. JAMES,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION

"Special"

OFFICIAL:

G. C. THOMAS,
LtCol., USMC,
D-3

ANNEX E
INTELLIGENCE

STEPS TAKEN IN STUDY OF THEATRE OF OPERATIONS

1. Preliminary collection of intelligence data---On the receipt on 26 June, 1942, of the initial order for the Guadalcanal-Tulagi movement, immediate steps were taken by the Intelligence Section to collect all available general information relative to terrain, landing beaches, climatic conditions, attitude of natives and relevant topics.

Existing U.S. Naval and Army Intelligence monographs were utilized. Extracts were obtained from the Pacific Islands Year Book, the Blue Book of the U.S.I.P. and the British Navy and Colonial Reports. Former residents, colonial government officials and merchant ships' officers from the Solomons area were contacted in New Zealand, mostly through the efforts of Colonel F.B. Goettge, Division Intelligence Officer, while on special mission to Auckland, N.Z., between the dates of 26 June and 10 July.

(Note: Colonel Goettge is missing in action and believed to have lost his life 12 August while leading a reconnaissance patrol on Guadalcanal).

The New Zealand Army assigned an intelligence officer, Lt. Dawson, to serve as liaison between the N.Z. Army, Navy and Air Force Headquarters and the First Marine Division.

From these activities two studies resulted, one of Guadalcanal on 11 July and the second of Tulagi on 13 July.

2. Liaison and reconnaissance missions. Procurement of guides and pilots---The principal intelligence liaison mission during Phase I was that undertaken by Colonel Goettge. Leaving Wellington on 26 June, he accompanied the Commanding General and other Division staff officers to Auckland to confer with ComSofac Headquarters. From there he flew to Melbourne, Australia, arriving 1 July, reporting to ComSouthwestPac Headquarters. During a week in Melbourne and several days in Sydney, Colonel Goettge interviewed many planters, traders, civil servants and ships' officers, all of whom had personal knowledge of the Solomons. Through cooperation of the Australian armed forces (A.I.F., R.A.A.F. and R.A.N.) and such commercial agencies as Laver Bros. and the Burns-Phillip South Sea Company, both having extensive properties in the Solomons, it was arranged to have eight (8) of these men commissioned or made petty officers in the Australian Armed Forces and attached to the Division as guides, advisers and pilots.

They reported at Wellington 15 July and rendered highly valuable services in the correction of maps, interpret-

ANNEX E (Cont)

ation of aerial photographs and general evaluation of enemy information received during the remainder of Phase 1, as well as in the subsequent phases of the operation after the landing.

At G.H.Q. in Melbourne, Colonel Goettge procured the latest Japanese Order of Battle for the Solomons group, New Guinea and Bismarck Archipelago area. This, together with the daily coast watcher reports and subsequent aerial reconnaissance of the Solomons area, served as the principal basis for the first estimate of the enemy situation in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi sector. The first estimate was written on Colonel Goettge's return to Wellington 11 July and a second for distribution to combat task forces on 28 July.

Aerial reconnaissance was conducted throughout Phase 1 by ComairSoPac, ComairSoWesPac, R.A.A.F. and R.N.Z.A.F. missions. Enemy ship movements, evidence of airfield construction and new installations were the particular objectives.

On 17 July, Lt. Colonel Merrill E. Twining and Major William J. McKean made an aerial reconnaissance flight in an Army C-17 from Port Moresby to the Tulagi-Guadalcanal area. No evidence of the existence of Japanese airfields on Guadalcanal--other than burned off areas behind the Lunga Point and Totore sectors--was observed. Photographs revealed no extensive beach defenses on the north coast of Guadalcanal.

(Three enemy Zero float planes, based at Gavutu, attacked the C-17, two of them being shot down and the third driven off.)

On his return to our task force via Townsville, Lt. Colonel Twining secured additional aerial photos of the Tulagi area and an important coastat strip of the Keli Point-Mantani-kau region on the Guadalcanal north coast.

3. Coast watching system---The invaluable service of the Solomon Island coast watching system during Phase 1 cannot be too highly commended. First set up to provide counter-espionage and to keep governmental authorities informed of any hostile danger or evidence of fifth column activity, the system had its origin in the Solomons area and South Pacific Island groups shortly after the outbreak of World War II in Europe. The British and Australian Colonial Governments maintained jurisdiction.

When the Japanese invaded the Solomons in early 1942, it was necessary to evacuate a number of these coast watchers. Others volunteered to remain at their posts. Captain M. Clemens, Guadalcanal District Officer, was one of the

ANNEX E (Cont)

latter. Through years of residence, he and other trusted persons on the island possessed an intimate knowledge of the terrain and natives. Equipped with radio transmitters, and assisted by trained native scouts, they were in a position to communicate frequently much vital information concerning enemy activity. These coast watchers were commissioned or made petty officers in the Australian Navy.

Under the direction of Lt. Commander Feldt at Townsville, Australia, the Solomon Island coast watcher radio net was monitored during Phase 1 through Effate, New Hebrides, and daily schedules were established. The reports, received even after the First Division's departure from Wellington, supplied the most authentic and detailed information of enemy ship and aircraft movements, estimates of enemy strength, new installations and construction and location of supply and ammunition dumps.

During the last week prior to "H" hour 7 August, three daily broadcasts were made by the Solomon C.W. net. Arrangements had been hastily made for these broadcasts to be relayed by special code to the flagship of Task Force 62 at sea. Unfortunately this code was not satisfactorily intercepted and the result was that the radioed reports, coming through roundabout channels via Australia and New Zealand, were delayed in reaching the Task Force in some instances, two or three days.

CARTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Throughout Phase 1, one of the most vital tasks confronting D-2 was that of providing maps and aerial photographs for distribution to lower echelons throughout the Division. Up-to-date maps were not available. Colonel Goettge and Lt. Colonel Twining secured some recently taken photos of the Tulagi-Gavutu area but there remained a woeful lack of any kind of photos of the north coast of Guadalcanal.

1. Maps---Two (2) existing U.S. Navy Hydrographic charts were the first to be utilized by D-2. One, H.O. Chart #2658 of Tulagi and Gavutu Harbors (Scale 1/12,000), proved to be a reasonably adequate if by no means ideal map for the impending operation. Although not accurately contoured and with corrections only up to 1910, the map did indicate approximate elevations. Fairly recent district and colonial maps of the Tulagi area showed buildings, roads and trails. These were transposed to the H.O. Chart. In addition, the recently acquired guides and pilots supplied valuable notes relative to landing beaches, coral reefs and surrounding waters.

The resulting map was reproduced by the Engineer Battalion Reproduction Unit for distribution to the Tulagi sea-

ANNEX E (Cont)

tor combat groups just before leaving Wellington.

Regarding the Guadalcanal area, three maps were made and reproduced before 22 July.

- (a) A U.S. Navy H.O. Chart #2916 of Guadalcanal and Florida was enlarged to double scale (1/108,643) but remained inadequate as to scale and contour lines and without up-to-date corrections.
- (b) Another available map was one prepared some years before by Colonial officials. At best only a crude sketch with rivers roughly drawn in, no contours, roads or trail markings, and of small scale (1" to 4 miles), this map was of little value.
- (c) The third map was drawn and reproduced by the D-2 Section's photo-litho unit and was a nine-sheet strip map (1/24,000), traced from an aerial photo brought from Australia by Colonel Goettge. This photograph, taken in late June, showed a narrow 2 to 2½ mile coastal strip along the north coast of Guadalcanal from Lunga Point east to Aola. Hastily traced from the photo and reproduced for distribution during the last week in Wellington, the map was actually only a rough uncontrolled sketch showing rivers, plains, coconut plantations and wooded areas. Sufficient depth from the shoreline could not be shown due to the limitations of the photograph and badly needed additional photos were not forthcoming.

Nevertheless, this third map had to serve as the standard and only suitable one for use by the lower echelons on the Guadalcanal landing operations.

2. Aerial photographs---Many more aerial photographs were obtainable for the Tulagi area than for the north coast of Guadalcanal, where virtually none was taken prior to "H" hour.

Colonel Goettge, as noted previously, was fortunate in securing a number of oblique and vertical photos of the Tulagi area and adjacent small islands from ComairSofac and from R.A.A.F. and R.N.Z.A.F. authorities but was able to get only a narrow coastal aerial mosaic strip of the north coast of Guadalcanal and a few obliques of the Lunga Point and nearby coastal sector. Urgent requests were made for additional photos, including over-lapping stereo-pairs to be taken on reconnaissance flights

ANNEX E (Cont)

up to "D-3" day. None was received except for two photographs taken 2 August by a B-17, which were developed aboard the USS Enterprise and forwarded by ComAirSofac.

These two photos, one of Tulagi and the other of Lunga Point-Kukum area were the first photos to reach the Division since those taken 24 June. Two previous ones had shown no evidence of enemy installations, airfield construction activity, gun emplacements, supply dumps.

The Photo sent from the Enterprise, taken about 1 August, did show in sharp detail the state of near completion to which feverish enemy activity had brought the new airfield. Other valuable up-to-date information regarding roads, bridges, fuel and supply dumps, wharves and probably AA emplacements was also revealed in this picture.

(Note: Prior to receipt of this photo, coast watchers had kept us accurately informed of such enemy constructions, beach defenses and supply points on Tulagi. Our information, however, was incomplete and hazy regarding Lunga Point-Koli Point area).

ANNEX F

First Marine Division
Fleet Marine Force
Wellington, N.Z.

OPERATION ORDER

No. 7-42

Maps: H.O. CHART #2896 (Solomon Islands) reproduced
by D-2 Section.

D-2 Section Map North Coast Guadalcanal
Island - Lunga Point to Aola,
9 Sections, 16 July, 1942, RF 1/24,000.

D-2 Section Map Tulagi and adjacent islands,
7/14/42, (4 sheets) c RF 1/12,000.

D-2 Section - Special map Tulagi - 1/12,000,
15 July, 1942.

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) COMBAT GROUP A Col. LeRoy F. Hunt, USMC.
(less Combat Team #2 (less Btry E 11th Marines))
- (b) COMBAT GROUP B Col. Clifton B. Cates, USMC.
- (c) TULAGI GROUP LtCol. Merritt A. Edson, USMC.
1st Raider Bn
Combat Team #2 (less Btry E 11th Marines)
- (d) GAVUTU GROUP Maj. Robert H. Williams, USMC.
First Parachute Battalion
- (e) SUPPORT GROUP Col. Pedro A. del Valle, USMC.
1st Eng Bn (less Cos A, B, & C)
11th Marines (less 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Bns)
1st Sol Wpn Bn (less 1st & 3d Pl Btry A)
1st Pion Bn (less Cos A & B)
- (f) DIVISION RESERVE Col. John M. Arthur, USMC.
2d Marines (Reinforced) (less Combat Team A)
- (g) FLORIDA GROUP Maj. Robert E. Hill, USMC.
Combat Team A.
- (h) TRIED DEFENSE BATTALION Col. Robert H. Pepper, USMC.

ANNEX F (Cont)

AE-0010

~~SECRET~~

1. See Annex A Intelligence.
Naval Attack Force will furnish naval gunfire and air support (see Annexes B and C gunfire and air support plans respectively). Minesweepers will cover landing of FLORIDA GROUP by concentrations on BUNCANA Island and GAVUTU.
2. This Division will attack and destroy the hostile garrisons of TULAGI, GUADALCANAL, GAVUTU, and MAKAMBO by simultaneous landings on D day. It will then organize and defend those islands.
For Transport Area, Line of Departure, beaches, objectives, Boundaries see Operation Overlay Annex D.
3. (a) Land on Beach RED at Zero Hour with 2 CTs in assault on a front of 1600 yards seize beachhead (see operation overlay). When passed through by Combat Group E, Combat Group A (less CTs #2 & 3) attack toward LUNGA with its right resting on the shore line. Seize the line of the TENARU RIVER. Combat Team #3 attack and seize line of woods running southeast from TEMAVATU (see operation overlay). Hold that line until relieved by Support Group. Then operate as directed by Task Organization Commander.
(b) Land on Beach RED at Zero hour plus 50 minutes (see operation overlay) pass through right of Combat Group A and attack on magnetic azimuth 260°. Seize grassy knoll 4 miles south of LUNGA POINT. Be prepared for further advance.
Formation - Column of battalions echeloned to left rear. Maintain contact with Combat Group A on right.
(c) Land on front of 500 yards on Beach BLUE at H hour, and seize that portion of TULAGI ISLAND lying northwest of line A (see D-2 Section Special Map TULAGI 1/12,000, 15 July 42). Fire GREEN STAR CLUSTER to call for five minutes air and naval bombardment of TULAGI southeast of line A, after H plus 1 hour. Upon completion of bombing and lifting of naval gunfire, attack and seize the remainder of TULAGI ISLAND. Upon completion seizure of TULAGI ISLAND 1st Raider Bn reembark at Beach Blue and report completion reembarkation to Division Headquarters, prepared for further landings.
Upon seizure of TULAGI, control passes to Commander Combat Team #2. Combat Team #2 then reembark sufficient troops and seize MAKAMBO ISLAND, then organize and defend those islands. Following seizure of TULAGI and MAKAMBO, and of

ANNEX F (Cont)

CAVUTU and TANAMBOGO by 1st Parachute Battalion, relieve 1st Parachute Battalion with one rifle company plus one machine gun platoon.

(d) Land on east coast of CAVUTU ISLAND at H plus 4 hours, and seize that island, then seize TANAMBOGO. Fire GREEN STAR CLUSTER to call for five minutes naval gunfire on TANAMBOGO ISLAND. Reembark upon relief prepared for employment elsewhere.

(e) Land on Beach RED on order, assume control of 2d and 3d Battalions 11th Marines, provide artillery support for the attack, and coordinate AA and close in ground defense of Beachhead area.

(f) Be prepared to land Combat Team B less all reinforcing units on CAVUTU ISLAND at H plus 4 hours. Be prepared to attach Combat Team C less all reinforcing units to the TULAGI GROUP.

(g) Land 1st Battalion 2d Marines (less one rifle company and one machine gun platoon) on promontory at x3022 at H hour plus 30 minutes and seize village of WALAVO. Then support by fire the attack of 1st Parachute Bn on CAVUTU. Land one (1) rifle company reinforced by one machine gun platoon at H minus 20 minutes in cove at W7837 and seize and hold point to southeast thereof.

(h) Execute following on order:

(1) Land Battalion less 1/3 AA elements on Beach RED. These pass to control CO Support Group on landing. Assist in AA defense of beach area.

(2) Land 1/3 AA elements on TULAGI and CAVUTU, and provide AA defense that area.

(X) (1) Land tanks with combat groups and move to cover near east boundary of beachhead. Tanks not to be committed except on division order.

(2) Land 1st and 3d platoons Battery A Special Weapons Battalion on flanks of beach and furnish AA defense beach area, 1st Platoon to right 3d platoon to left. These revert to battalion control upon landing of Headquarters 1st Special Weapons Battalion.

(3) Scout Cars will not land.

(4) All artillery of combat groups will be landed with those groups and pass to control 11th Marines upon landing 11th Marines Headquarters.

ANNEX F (Cont)

(5) Assistant Division Commander will command operations in TULAGI - GAVUTU - FLORIDA Area.

4. See Administrative Order.

5. (a) See Annex E, Signal Communication.

(b) Command Posts afloat:

1st Mar Div	MC CAVLEY (AP10)
Combat Group A	AMERICAN LEGION (AP35)
Combat Group B	BARNETT (AP11)
TULAGI Group	APD
GAVUTU Group	KEYWOOD (AP12)
Support Group	HUNTER LIGGETT (AP27)
Division Reserve	CRESCENT CITY (AP40)
FLORIDA Group	PRESIDENT JACKSON (AP37)
3d Defense Bn	ZEILIN (AP9)

(c) Axes of Signal Communication all units:
CP afloat - locations ashore to be reported.

(d) Use local time, zone minus eleven (zone suffix letter Love), in all communications within Division.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

W. C. JAMES,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEX G

TASK FORCE SIXTY-TWO
U.S.S. McCawley, Flagship

July 30, 1942.

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Transport Group Xray (62.1), Captain RUFFSNIDER.
(1) Transdiv airm (62.1), Captain THEISS.
FULLER (AP14), AMERICAN LEGION (AP35), BELLATRIX (AK20).
(2) Transdiv Baker (62.1.2), Captain McFEATHERS.
McCawley (AP10), BARNETT (AP11), GEO. F. ELLIOTT (AP13),
LIBRA (AK53).
(3) Transdiv Cast (62.1.3), Captain RUFFSNIDER.
HUNTER LIGHT (AP27), ALCHIBA (AK23), FORALHAUT (AK22),
BUTLER (AK28).
(4) Transdiv Dog (62.1.4), Captain KILAUD.
CRYSOENT CITY (AP40), PRESIDENT HAYES (AP39),
PRESIDENT ADAMS (AP38), ALICIA (AK26).
(b) Transport Group Yoke (62.2), Captain ASHE.
(1) Transdiv Easy (62.2.1), Captain ASHE.
NEVILLE (AP15), ZEILIN (AP9), WEYWOOD (AP12),
PRESIDENT JACKSON (AP37).
(2) Transdiv Twelve (62.2.2), Commander MADLEY.
COLHOUN (APD2), GREGORY (APD3), LITTLE (APD4), McKLAN (APD5).
(c) Fire Support Group Love (62.3), Captain RUFFKOHLE.
(1) Fire Section One (62.3.1).
QUINCY (CA39), 2 VOS Seaplanes.
(2) Fire Section Two (62.3.2).
VINCENT (CA44), 2 VOS Seaplanes.
(3) Fire Section Three (62.3.3).
ASEORIA (CA34), 2 VOS Seaplanes.
(4) Fire Section Four (62.3.4), Comdr. CHILLINGSWORTH.
HULL (DD350), DEWEY (DD349).
(5) Fire Section Five (62.3.5), Lt. Comdr. GARDNER.
WILET (DD398), WILSON (DD408).
(d) Fire Support Group Mike (62.4), Rear Admiral SCOTT.

ANNEX G (Cont)

SAN JUAN (CL54), NONSSEN (DD436), BUCHANAN (DD484).

(e) Minesweeper Group (62.5), Commander HATTE.
HOPKINS (DMS13), TREVOR (DMS16), ZANE (DMS14), SOUTHARD (DMS10),
BOVEY (DMS11).

(f) Screening Group (62.6), Rear Admiral CRUTCHLEY, R.N.
HMAS AUSTRALIA, HMAS CANBERRA, HMAS MOBART,
USS CHICAGO (CA29), DESRON FOUR.
2 VF Squadrons.
8 VOS Seaplanes, 5 from CHICAGO, 1 each from
AUSTRALIA and CANBERRA, 1 from VINCENNES.

(g) Air Support Group (62.7).
1 VF Squadron, plus 1 additional VF Squadron
for initial mission.
3 VSB Squadrons, plus 1 additional VSB Squadron
for initial mission.

(h) Landing Force (62.8), Major General VANDEGRIFT.

6 VOS Seaplanes, 3 each from ASTORIA and QUINCY.

(2) TULAGI Group (62.8.2), Brig. General RUFFENUS.

2 VOS Seaplanes from VINCENNES.

ANNEX H
EXTRACTS FROM SWIPS' GUNFIRE SUPPORT PLAN

First Marine Division
Fleet Marine Force
Wellington, N.Z.
20 July, 1942.

1. Following table indicates gunfire support which is to be furnished by WAF:

Time From	To	Fire Supp Gp or Sec	Type Fire	Unit Supported	Targets
Daylight D-day	Signal by Com Task Force 62	Sec #1 C	CB & DSF	Combat Group A&B	Of opportunity on GUADALCANAL
do	do	Sec #2 C	CB&DSF	do	Of opportunity on GUADALCANAL
do	H_10 min	Sec #3 C	CB&DSF	do	Of opportunity on GUADALCANAL
H_10 min	H_5 min	Sec #3	CSF	do	West 1/3 of Beach RED
H_10 min	H_5 min	Sec #4	CSF	do	East 1/3 of Beach RED
Daylight D-day	Signal by Com Task Force 62	Sec #4	AA	Task Force 62	AA protection transports and Troops
H_10 min	H hour	Sec #5	CSF	Combat Grp A & B	Center 1/3 Beach RED (M6344 to M6045)
Daylight D-day	Signal by Com Task Force 62	Sec #5	AA	Task Force 62	AA protection transports and Troops
H plus 30 min	Signal by Com Task Force 62	Group Mike	CSF	TULAGI Group	Designated by SFC Party
H_30 min	H_25 min	Group Mike	DSF	TULAGI Group	Hill at W8240 FLORIDA
H_20 min	H_15 min	Group Mike	DSF	TULAGI Group	Hill 208 at W9436 TULAGI
H_10 min	H_5 min	Group Mike	CSF	TULAGI Group	Beach BLUE (W9041 to W9239)

ANNEX H (Cont)

H hour	:H plus 5 :min	:Group Mike:DSF	:TULAGI :Group	:Hill 208 at :W9436 TULAGI
H plus 10 min	:H plus 15 :min	:Group Mike:DSF	:TULAGI :Group	:Radio Station :W9534 TULAGI
H plus 20 min	:H plus 25 :min	:Group Mike:DSF	:TULAGI :Group	:AA gun positions :at W9933 TULAGI
H plus 30 min	:H plus 35 :min	:Group Mike:DSF	:TULAGI :Group	:AA guns vicinity :X0133
Upon signal from TULAGI: (GREEN STAR CLUSTER)	:For 5 min	:Group Mike:CSF	:TULAGI :Group	:Radio Station :at W9534 - AA :gun positions :at W9933 - AA :gun positions :at X0133
X - 8 *	:X - 3 *	:Group Mike:CSF	:TULAGI :Group	:MAKABO ISLAND
H plus 3 hours 50 min	:H plus 3 :hours 55 :min	:Group Mike:CSF	:GAVUTU :Group	:Of opportunity :particular at- :tention NE half :GAVUTU ISLAND
On signal (GREEN STAR) CLUSTER) from GAVUTU	:For 5 min	:Group Mike:CSF	:GAVUTU :Group	:TANABOCO ISLAND

NOTE! Fire Support Sacs 1, 2, & 3, also deliver fires on targets designated by Shore Fire Control Parties.

- a. Target designation by grid coordinates
- b. Pyrotechnic signals:
 Fire prepared concentrations: GREEN STAR CLUSTER
 Cease fire or fire falling short: AMBER STAR PARACHUTE
 Signals will be repeated twice to insure understanding.

* X is time attack force reaches MAKABO

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDECRIFT:

H. O. JAMES
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,

ANNEX I
EXTRACTS OF AIRCRAFT SUPPORT PLAN

First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force,
Wellington, N. Z.
20 July, 1942.

The following support will be provided by aircraft:

- a. Beginning daylight D-day attack hostile aircraft and anti-aircraft installations in TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area.
- b. One liaison plane over GUADALCANAL area beginning H-30 minutes D-day to sunset and during daylight hours each day of operation thereafter for air - ground liaison with the forces in that area.
- c. One liaison plane over TULAGI-CAVUTU area beginning H-30 minutes D-day to sunset and during daylight hours each day of operation thereafter for air - ground liaison with the forces in that area.
- d. Nine (9) VF planes and nine (9) VSB over GUADALCANAL and nine (9) VSB planes over TULAGI area on call 1st MarDiv beginning H hour D-day for support missions and during daylight hours each day of operation thereafter.
- e. One artillery spotting plane over GUADALCANAL from H hour D-day to sunset and during daylight hours each day of operations thereafter spotting for the Support Group.
- f. Maintain fighter protection over the landing and transport areas beginning daylight D-day and during daylight hours each day of operations thereafter.
- g. Missions to assist in neutralization of hostile forces of TULAGI by bombing northeast side of TULAGI from SASAPI to southeast end of island from H-10 to H hour. Upon firing of one green star cluster, signal to be repeated, after H plus 1 hour, bomb targets of opportunity for five (5) minutes in area northeast side of TULAGI and southeast of Line A only (see Special Map TULAGI - 1/12,000, D-2 Section 15 July, 1942).
- h. Bombing or attack missions assist in the neutralization of hostile forces on CAVUTU from H plus 3 hours 48 minutes to H plus 3 hours 58 minutes attacking targets of opportunity.
- i. See Annex EASY, Signal Communications to 1st MarDiv Operation Order 7-42 for air - ground radio communication.
- j. See Annex GEORGE to 1st MarDiv Operation Order 7-42 for system of coordinates.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

W. C. JAMES
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEX J
Headquarters, First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force, Wellington, New Zealand,

29 June 1942.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

NUMBER.....1a-42....) : - Equipment and Supplies to be taken on
maneuvers.

REFERENCE: (a) Conf. Force General Order, No. 7-42, dated
February 25, 1942. SOP Supply and Evacuation.

1. It is directed that when operations of any nature are undertaken by this division all units will reduce their equipment and supplies to those items that are actually required to live and to fight.

2. Those articles and supplies which are not taken will be left in the base camps or stored with the 1st Base Depot.

3. Supply and Evacuation will be in accordance with reference (a).

4. To comply with paragraph 1 above the following will be used as a guide to reduce the equipment and supplies to be transported:

Group 1 Individual Equipment
Take all.

Group 2 Baggage
Enlisted: Extra summer service clothing
in knapsack
Commissioned:
Bedding roll, clothing roll
or handbag.

Group 3 Office Equipment
To be reduced to an absolute minimum.
Typewriters will be reduced to not to exceed 2 per battalion or similar organization; 4 per regiment or similar organization.

Group 4 Organization Combat
Take all

Group 5 Supplementary Equipment
Only such articles as are essential to combat or to maintenance.

ANNEX J (Cont)

Group 6 Mess Equipment

The following articles only:

Bag, water, sterilizing
Carrier, food, vacuum type
Kettle, camp
Mill, coffee.

*Outfit, cooking; pack Marine Corps No. 1.

*Organizations not equipped with this article may take the gasoline range or the Range, field (Buzzycot).

Group 7 Camp Equipment

Only such articles as are essential to combat or to maintenance, including Bakery Equipment. Under "tentage" paulins only will be taken.

Group 8 Transportation

Take all.

Group 9 Special Equipment

General:

Bags, sand - take all available.

Boats, rubber - "

Motor, outboard - "

Camouflage:

Take all available.

Chemical Warfare:

Take all available.

Engineer Equipment:

Take all available except Pier, temporary 10-20 ton.

Water Equipment:

Take that which is essential to purify or distill, and store water in the field.

Group 10 Ammunition

Three (3) units of fire in each A.P.

Remainder in AK's.

Group 11 Automatic Supplies

In accordance with Force General Order No. 7-42 (Standing Operating Procedure).

Group 12 Replenishment

Take all available except under "clothing" which will be limited to coveralls, shoes and socks.

ANNEX J (Cont)

Group 13 Post Exchange

items:

Thirty (30) days of following essential

Tobacco
Matches
Soap
Razor blades

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT:

W. C. JAMES,
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEX K

PERSONNEL

1. (a) On the morning of the seventh of August, 1942, the strength of the various task groupings of the Landing Force were as shown on the following table:

Combat Group "A", Col. Hunt	Off.	enl.
Fifth Marines (Reinforced) less 2d Bn.	164	3035
Combat Group "B", Col. Cates		
First Marines (Reinforced).	231	4299
Tulagi Group		
First Raider Battalion, Col. Edson	35	793
ADC Headquarters and 2d Bn. Fifth Marines	55	1144
Third Defense Battalion (less Guadal. det.)	23	469
Gavutu Group		
First Parachute Battalion, Maj. Williams	27	368
Division Support Group, Col. del Valle	172	
Total	174	2968
Division Reserve, Col. Arthur		
Second Marines (Reinforced) less 1st Bn.	166	3379
Florida Group, Maj. Hill		
First Bn, Second Marines	53	1242
Det. Third Defense Battalion, Guadalcanal Group	31	449
	<u>959</u>	<u>18146</u>

(b) Of the above 651 officers and 11814 men were attached to Units regularly assigned to the First Marine Division. The remainder 308 officers and 6332 men were attached to units which were assigned to the First Division for the operation, the Second Marines, reinforced, The First Marine Raider Battalion, and the Third Defense Battalion.

(c) Of the above groups practically all personnel participated in the landing with the exception of the Division Reserve, the Second Marines, reinforced, the three battalions of which were detached to support operations in the Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo Group and on Florida Island, a det of H&S Co 1st Engineer Battalion, the repair section Co "A" Transport, 1st Service Battalion, and the First and Second Platoon, 1st Scout Co. On the departure of the Transports the Second Marines, reinforced, less the three battalions, was transported to Espiritu Santo where it established a camp ashore. The First Division units were transported to Numea

ANNEX K (Cont)

where "A" Co. Medical, less det., and the Repair Section, Co "A" Transport were established ashore. The First and Second Platoons of the Scout Co. and the det. H&S Co, 1st Eng Bn. were retained aboard ship and was landed at Guadalcanal when supply of the Landing Force had been resumed by the Commander of the Amphibious Force.

2. Location of the Units of the Landing Force. At the time of receipt of the decision to execute landing in the Tulagi-Guadalcanal Area the elements of the Landing Force were disposed as follows:

First Marine Division, less Seventh Marines, reinforced.

Fifth Marines, reinforced Wellington, N.Z.

First Marines " at sea en route to " "

11th Marines, less 2 Bns " " " " " "

Division Special and Service

Troops, less units attached Seventh, Wellington and at sea en route there

Second Marines (reinforced) at sea en route San Diego to South Pacific

First Raider Battalion, Samoa

Fifth Defense Battalion

(b) The location of the various units of the Landing Force on the morning of the Landing is shown in Appendix "A", a Station List and Strength Report of the Landing Force issued after the rendezvous of the vessels of the Naval Attack Force.

ANNEX K (Cont)

COMBINED STATION LIST AND STRENGTH REPORT, FORWARD ECHELON, 1ST MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, AND ATTACHED UNITS; SUNDAY, AUGUST 2d, 1942:

	U.S.M.C.			U.S.N.			
	OFF.	WRNT.	ENL.	OFF.	ENL.	MISC.	TOTAL.
COMBAT GROUP "A":							
USS AMERICAN LEGION	LtCol. W. E. MAXWELL						
H&S Co 5th Marines (Less dets)	12	2	119	4	9		146
Weapons Co 5th Marines	9		188				197
1st Battalion 5th Marines	36	1	835	2	19		893
Co"A" 1st AmphTrBn(less 1st,2d,3d Plats)	2		26				28
Co"A" 1st EngBn (less 2d & 3d Plats)	2		56				58
H&S Btry, 2-11 (less det.)	9	1	108	1	3		122
"D" Btry, 2-11,	5	1	136		2		144
Det. Co"A" 1st MedBn.			10	4	34		48
1st Plst., Co"A" Spl WpnsBn.	1		41				42
Co"A" 1st PionBn(less 2d&3d Plats, plus							
H&S Co., 1st PionBn.	3		91	1	4		99
TOTALS:	79	5	1610	12	71	0	1777
USS NEVILLE:							
LtCol. H. E. ROSECRANS							
2d Battelion, 5th Marines	29	1	825	2	20		877
Btry "E" 2-11	5	1	134		2		142
2d Platoon Co "A" 1st EngBn.	1		26				27
2d Platoon Co "A" 1st AmphTrBn.	1		28				29
Det. Co "A" 1st MedBn.			10	3	34		47
Det. DivHQCo.	7	1	10				18
Det. 1st Signal Co.	1	1	5				7
2d Platoon Co "A" 1st PionBn.	2		50				52
TOTALS:	46	4	1088	5	56	0	1199
USS FULLER:							
LtCol. F. C. BIERBUSH							
3d Battelion, 5th Marines	33		850	2	20		905
Btry "F" 2-11	6		134		2		142
3d Platoon Co"A" 1st AmphTracBn.	1		29				30
3d Platoon Co"A" 1st EngrBn.	1		26				27
3d Platoon, Co"A" 1st PionBn.	2		49				51
Det H&SCo., 1st Pion Bn.	4	1		1			6
Det.H&SCo., 1st AmphTracBn.	3	2					5
Det.H&SCo., 5th Marines			1				1
TOTALS:	50	3	1089	3	22	0	1167
USS BELLATRIX:							
Maj. H. S. WALSH							
Co "A" 1st TkBn	6	1	135				142

ANNEX K (Cont)

COMBAT GROUP "A" (CONT'D)

1st Plat Co "A" (Trans)	1	38				39
1st Plat Co "A" 1st AmphTracBn	1	27				28
Det. DivHqCo.	1	3				4
Det. Btry "E" 2-11		3				3
Det. H&S Co 1st TkBn				2		2
Det. OrdPlat H&S Co 1st ServBn	1	4				5
1st Plat 1st SctCo	1	31				32
TOTALS:	11	1	241	0	2	255

TOTAL COMBAT GROUP "A":	186	13	4028	20	151	0	4398
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COMBAT GROUP "B":

USS BARNETT

LtCol. L. B. CRESSWELL

H&S Co 1st Marines (less Det)	13	2	124	6	9	154
WpnsCo, 1st Marines (75m/m Plat)	1	1	55			57
1st Bn, 1st Marines	34	3	863	2	20	922
Co "C" 1st PionBn (less 2d & 3d Plats) plus Det H&S Co						
1st PionBn.	5		89	1	4	99
Btry "G" 3-11 (plus Det. H&S-3-11)	10		157		2	149
Co "E" 1st AmphTracBn (less 2d & 3d Plats)	3		51			54
1st Plat Co "E" 1st TkBn	2		29			31
1st Plat Co "C" 1st EngBn	2		26			28
TOTALS:	70	6	1374	9	35	1404

USS ELLIOTT:

LtCol. E. A. POLLOCK

2d Bn 1st Marines	37	1	869	3	19	929
Btry "H" 3-11	6	1	137		2	146
2nd Plat Co "C" 1st Pion Bn	2		53			55
2nd Plat Co "C" 1st EngBn	1		26			27
1st & 2d Plats Wpns Co 1st Marines	2		67			69
2d Plat Co "B" 1st TkBn	1		28			29
Det. Co "E" 1st MedBn			10	3	35	48
2d Plat Co "B" 1st AmphTracBn		1	22			23
Det. DivHqCo.	1		1			2
TOTALS:	50	3	1213	6	56	1328

USS McCANLEY:

LtCol. W. N. McKELVY, JR.

3d Bn, 1st Marines (less Det. K-3-1)	34		813	2	20	869
Btry "I" 3-11	6		131			137
Det. H&S Btry 3-11			4		2	6
3d Plat Co "C" 1st PionBn	1		50			51
3d Plat "D" 1st AmphTracBn	1		20			21

ANNEX K (Cont)

COMBAT GROUP "B" (CONT'D)

Co "B" 1st Tkn (less 1st & 2d Plats & Dets.)	2	1	68				71
Det. Co "E" 1st Med'n			5	1	33		39
1 Sect. Co "A" (Trans)		1	20				21
2d Plat 1st SctCo.	1		30		1		32
Wons Co 1st Marines (less 75m/m Plat)	3		66				69
3d Plat Co "C" 1st Eng'n	1		26				27
Det. DivHqCo.	17	1	26	1	1	*1	47
Det. 1st SigCo.	3		35				38
TOTALS:	69	3	1294	4	57	1	1428

* One (1) Officer (R.A.A.F.)

USS LIERA:

Maj. L. J. FIELDS

H&S Btry 3-11	5	1	137	1	3		147
3d Plat Co "A" (Trans) (less 1 Sect)	1		18				19
Co "C" 1st Eng'n (less 1st, 2d & 3d Plats)			31				31
3d Plat Btry "A" 1st SplWons'n	1		42		1		44
Det. H&S 1st Marines			3				3
Det. OrdPlat 1st Serv'n	1		4				5
Det. DivHqCo.	1		1				2
Det. Co "E" 1st Med'n			3				3
Det. Co "D" 1st Amph Trac Bn			19				19
Det. Co "B" 1st Tkn Bn			7				7
TOTAL	9	1	265	1	4	0	280
TOTAL COMBAT GROUP "B"	198	13	4147	20	152	0	4530

SUPPORT GROUP:

USS HUNTER LIGGETT

LtCol. E. H. PRICE

H&S Btry 11th Marines	10	3	119	3	9		144
SplWons Btry 11th Marines	5	1	162				168
5th Bn, 11th Marines	24	1	604	1	9		639
H&S Co 1st Serv'n (less Det)	7	3	181	1	9		201
1st M.P. Co (less 2d & 3d Plats)	3		37				40
H&S Co 1st Eng'n (less Dets)	5	1	99		7		112
Det. 1st SigCo.	1	1	62				64
H&S Co 1st Med'n				2	11		13
"D" Co 1st Med'n			12	7	68		87
Det. Co "K" 3-1	2		56				58
Det. Co "A" (Trans) 1st Serv'n	1		15				16
Det. DivHqCo.	9	4	55	1			69
TOTALS:	67	14	1402	15	113	0	1611

ANNEX K (Cont)

SUPPORT GROUP (CONT'D)

USS HEYWOOD:

Maj. R. E. LUCKY

1st Sol Wpn Bn (less 1st & 3rd Plats

Btry "A")

19 3 379 2 9 412

1st Para Bn

21 3 348 3 20 395

2d Plat 1st M.P. Co

1 24 25

Det. Co "A" (Trans) 1st Serv Bn

8 8

Det. 1st Amph Trac Bn

4 1 5

Det. Div Hq Co.

1 3 1 5

Co "D" 1st Eng Bn

4 152 156

Det. H&S Co 1st Eng Bn

1 13 14

Det. 1st Sig Co.

2 1 46 49

Co "A" 2d Med Bn

12 7 70 89

TOTALS:

52 9 985 13 99 0 1158

USS ALCHIRA:

LtCol. G. R. ROWAN

1st Pion Bn (less "A" & "C" Cos &

Dets. H&S Co)

9 259 1 4 273

1st Amph Trac Bn (less "A" & "B" Cos

& Dets H&S Co & "C" Co)

4 2 218 9 233

Det. H&S Co 1st Serv Bn

10 10

Det. Div Hq Co.

1 1

Det. 1st Sig Co.

21 22

TOTALS:

13 3 509 1 13 0 539

USS FOMALHAUT:

Capt. A. D. GORHAM

Det. H&S Co 1st Eng Bn

3 2 99 1 1 106

Det. Ord Plat H&S Co 1st Serv Bn

4 4

Repair Section, Co "A" (Trans)

1 2 36 39

Det. 1st Amph Trac Bn

6 6

Det. Div Hq Co

1 2 3

Hq Det 1st Pion Bn

16 16

"A" Co Det. 1st Pion Bn

2 53 53

TOTALS:

7 4 214 1 1 0 227

TOTAL SUPPORT GROUP:

141 30 3110 30 226 0 3537

REGIMENTAL TROOPS:

CRESCENT CITY

Capt. DOYLE

H&S Co 2d Marines (less Det

Med Sect & Comm Plat)

13 1 155 3 12 184

Det. H&S Btry 3-10 (less Det)

4 46 1 51

Band

29 29

Wpn Co, 2d Marines (less 1st, 2d

& 3d Plats (AA&AT))

5 1 88 94

ANNEX K (Cont)

REGIMENTAL TROOPS (CONT'D)

HqCo Co "C" 2d TkTn (less det)	2	1	50	2	55
HqCo "A" 2d AmphTrTn (plus det H&S					
Co. 2d AmphTrTn Repair Sect)	2		30	2	34
Woso Co "D" 2d MedTn.				5 23	28
Collect Sect Co "D" 2d MedTn.				7	7
ServSect Co "D" 2d MedTn.			12		12
CoHqRepair Sect Co "C" 2d SerTn					
plus 4 men det MedTrans Sect &					
1 ambulance	2	1	58	2	63
1st Plat AA Btry "A" 2d SplWpnSqn	1		43	1	45
1st Plat AT Btry "B" 2d SplWpnSqn	1		31	1	33
Hq Co "A" 2d PionTn	1		26		27
Comm Team #1, CommPlat 2d PionTn			16		16
HqSect Co "D" 2d MedTn				2 6	8
Red Cross Representative					1
				1	1

TOTALS:	31	4	584	10	67	1	687
							687

AK GROUP:

USS ALHENA

Capt. SMITH

Hq Co "A" 2d EngTn	1		32	2	35
Hq Co "A" 2d PionTn	1		3	1	5
Co "C" ServTn, 2d Marines			48		48
Det. Co "A" 2d AmphTracTn			11		11
Det. H&S Co 2d Mar, R-4 Grp,					
PX Sect, Supply & ServSect,					
ServPlat, CommPlat & 2 Bakery					
Units	3		58		61

TOTALS:	5	0	160	1	2	0	168
							160

COMBAT TEAM "A":

USS PRESIDENT JACKSON

Maj. HILL

1st Tn, 2d Marines	34	1	873	2	19	*1	930
Det. H&S Btry 3-10	1		12				13
Btry "G" 3-10	6	1	134				141
Det. HqCo "C" 2d TkTn.			6				6
1st Plat Co "C" 2d TkTn.	1		23				24
1st Plat Co "A" 2d EngTn.	1		26				27
1st Plat Co "A" 2d PionTn.	2		50		1		53
1st Plat Co "A" 2d AmphTracTn.	1		30				31
1st Plat (AA&AT) RegtlWpnCo.	1		34				35
Collect Sect Co "D" 2d MedTn					11		11
1st Plat (less 1stSec Co "C" 2d SerTn,							
plus 3 men fr MedTransSect and 1							
ambulance.	1		23				24

TOTALS:	48	2	1211	2	31	1	1295
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ANNEX K (Cont)

COMBAT TEAM "H":

USS PRESIDENT HAYES

Major PRESSLEY

2d Bn 2d Marines	36	875	2	20	933
Det. H&S Btry 3-10	3	50	2	3	58
Btry "H" 3-10	6	134	1		141
Det. HqCo "A" 2d TkBn		6			6
2d Plat Co "C" 2d TkBn	1	23			24
2d Plat Co "A" 2d EngBn	1	26			27
2d Plat Co "A" 2d PionBn	2	50		1	53
2d Plat Co "A" 2d AmphTracBn	1	30			31
2d Plat (AA&AT) RegtlWpnsCo.	1	34			35
Collect Sect Co "D" 2d MedBn				11	11
2d Plat (less 1st Sect Co "C" 2d SeryBn), plus 3 men fr Med Trans Sect & 1 ambulance	1	23			24
H&S Co 2d Mar Pay Sect.			1		1
Red Cross Representative				1	1
Naval Gun Fire Observer				1	1
TOTALS:	52	1251	4	35	1346

COMBAT TEAM "C":

USS PRESIDENT ADAMS

LtCol. HUNT

3d Bn 2d Marines	36	875	2	20	933
Det H&S Btry 3-10	4	49	1	3	58
Btry "I" 3-10	6	134	1		141
HqDet Co "C" 2d TkBn		6			6
3d Plat Co "C" 2d TkBn	1	23			24
3d Plat Co "A" 2d EngBn	1	26			27
3d Plat Co "A" 2d PionBn	2	50		1	53
3d Plat Co "A" 2d Amph Trac Bn	1	29			30
3d Plat (AA&AT) RegtlWpnsCo.	1	34			35
Collect Sect Co "D" 2d MedBn				11	11
1st Sect, 1st Plat, 1st Sect 2d Plat Co "C" 2d SeryBn plus 3 men fr det MedTransSect & 1 ambulance		14			14
Red Cross Representative				1	1
Naval Gun Fire Observer				1	1
TOTALS:	52	1240	3	35	1330

TOTAL 2D MARINES REINFORCED:

188 10 4446 20 170 6 4840

1ST MARINE RAIDER BATTALION:

GROUP "A", USS LITTLE

Captain WELT.

Company "A"	5	130	3	138
Rubber Boat Section		1		1
Intelligence Section		3		3
Fwd Echelon Bn.Hq.	3	3		6

ANNEX K (Cont)

1ST MARINE RAIDER BATTALION (CONT'D)

Communications Platoon

TOTALS:

8	0	143	0	3	0	6	154
---	---	-----	---	---	---	---	-----

GROUP "B", USS COLLETT, Major NICKERSON

Company "B"

4

130

1

4

*6

145

Rubber Boat Section

1

1

Intelligence Section

3

3

Fwd Echelon, Tn. Hq.

2

2

Communications Platoon

1

5

6

TOTALS:

5	0	141	1	4	6	157
---	---	-----	---	---	---	-----

* Passengers (USMC): 5;

* Passengers (Australian): 1.

GROUP "C", USS GREGORY, Major BAILEY

Company "C"

4

131

1

4

*1

141

Rubber Boat Section

1

1

Intelligence Section

3

3

Fwd Echelon, Tn. Hq.

2

2

4

Communications Platoon

6

6

6

TOTALS:

6	0	143	1	4	1	155
---	---	-----	---	---	---	-----

* Passenger (Australian): 1.

COMBAT GROUP "D", USS MC KEAN, Major CHAMBERS

Company "D"

5

130

5

*1

141

Rubber Boat Section

1

1

Intelligence Section

2

2

Communications Platoon

5

5

5

TOTALS:

5	0	138	0	5	1	149
---	---	-----	---	---	---	-----

* Passenger (Australian): 1.

GROUP "E", (See "NOTE" below) Captain HERRING

Company "E"

5

147

1

2

155

Pioneer & Demolitions Platoon,

(less Gats)

2

50

52

Fwd Echelon, Tn. Hq.

1

4

5

Communications Platoon

1

1

1

TOTALS:

8	0	202	1	2	0	213
---	---	-----	---	---	---	-----

NOTE: Approximately 50% embarked on board USS NEVILLE, eff Wed., 29 July 1942.

Approximately 50% embarked on board USS KEYWOOD, eff Wed., 29 July 1942.

Not included in strength of these ships.

TOTAL 1ST MARINE RAIDER BN:

32

767

3

18

8

828

ANNEX K (Cont)

COMBAT GROUP "A"	186	13	4028	20	151	0	4398
COMBAT GROUP "B"	198	13	4147	20	152	1	4531
SUPPORT GROUP	141	30	3110	30	226	0	3537
2D MARINES (REENFORCED)	188	10	4446	20	170	6	4840
1ST RAIDER BATTALION	<u>32</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>767</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>828</u>
TOTALS:.....	745	66	16498	93	717	15	18,134

USS ZEILIN: Colonel PEPPER.

Third Defense Battalion

No figures available.

USS BETELGEUSE:

Third Defense Battalion

No figures available.

J. C. MURRAY, JR.,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
Division Adjutant.

ANNEX L

LOGISTICS

The necessity for combat loading the Division at Wellington was complicated by the late arrival of the rear echelon on ships that were not combat loaded. As a result the entire unloading took place on same quap and at the same time as the re-loading. Shelter for supplies was not available, rain was almost continuous, and, except for a few specially trained loading machine workers, it was impossible to use civilians in the loading. Half of the troops employed in the loading had just finished a long voyage on crowded transports, and morale on the whole was not high.

Weather conditions demonstrated the terrible unsuitability of paper or cardboard containers for expeditionary supplies, and the loss of these supplies on the Wellington docks was later to be felt by all hands. Regardless of weather conditions, the loading had to be continuous in eight hour shifts.

The Division 4 section set up a dock organization to bring order into the simultaneous loading and unloading. Transport Quartermasters supervised the loading of ships, and each eight hour relief was placed under command of a field officer on the dock. New Zealand Army motor transport, to the extent of thirty flat bedded trucks, was used daily. Also augmenting Division organic transport were about eighteen 10-wheelers of the First Base Depot. This heavy transport accomplished the transfer of the fuel, small arms, and high explosives, which had been stored by the first echelon at dumps within nine miles of the docks.

Insufficient space aboard the transports made it impossible to load all of the Division motor transport. Most of the quarter ton and one ton trucks were loaded by seventy-five per cent of the heavier vehicles had to be left with the rear echelon in Wellington. Two platoons of A company (motor transport) were loaded with the Combat Groups, along with one repair section. The entire loading operation was completed in approximately ten days.

For loading of fuel supplies, units of fire, rations, and clothing, see Annexes C and J.

SUPPLY-PHASE 1

WELLINGTON, N.Z.

The Division supplies and equipment were stored in wool warehouses in Wellington. High Explosives were in a gorge of an abandoned road. Small arms in beach cottages, and liquid fuels in an open dump, 4 miles, 7 miles and 9 miles, respectively,

ANNEX L (Cont)

distant from the dock.

A considerable amount of heavy equipment and organizational gear had not been moved from the dock and presented a serious problem of segregating the flow of material coming from storage and from ships arriving after loading operations began.

The urgency for speed was such that loading had to be continuous in 8 hour shifts regardless of weather conditions. Combat Group "A" was loaded from available supplies as nearly complete as possible. Shortages were to be made up after more material arrived. The weather was clear and material was loaded in good shape. By the time combat group "B" and the Support Group were to load, a "southerly" brought almost continuous cold, driving rain for about 10 days. Newly arrived ships had to be unloaded and the rain soaked paper containers of rations softened, swelled, and burst, and an indescribable mass of cereals, sugar, canned goods and paper pulp resulted. Cartons which arrived at the warehouse were piled high and, due to the softening effect of rain, later crushed under the weight, causing further loss. Loading, at this stage, was further complicated by ships shifting berths for new arrivals, and the confusion of completing the cargoes of partially loaded ships that were anchored in the stream.

Loading operations were hampered by weather, confusion of supplies, and poor control of labor. D-4 set up a dock organization to bring order out of chaos, consisting of T.I.s' working in 8 hour shifts, with an office on the dock to coordinate transport, allocate labor and serve as a clearing-house of information relating to ship-berthing, whereabouts of supplies, etc. D-4, or an assistant, kept in constant touch with the Dock-master. An immediate improvement was apparent.

The morale of troops, working at night in driving rain, was low and required constant vigilance on the part of officers and N.C.O.'s to keep men from drifting away to shelter.

MOTOR TRANSPORT

Division equipment and supplies were stored in warehouses and dumps, in or near Wellington, New Zealand. Ammunition and gasoline were 7 miles and 10 miles distant from the dock and created a heavy demand on transport. It was decided to use our own organic transportation right up to the time it had to be loaded, and to augment this by the 10-wheelers of the First Base Depot; (about 18) and by thirty (30) trucks daily, from the New Zealand Army.

ANNEX L (Cont)

The trucks furnished by the New Zealand Army were manned by their drivers and were of the $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton commercial type (2x4). New Zealand trucks were supervised by their own officers, with an NCO as dispatcher, cooperating with our dispatcher. New Zealand trucks, being equipped with flat bodies were excellent vehicles with which to haul gasoline drums and rations. Our own men were worked in 8 hour shifts around the clock, but we released the New Zealand trucks at 1800. However, on several occasions, they worked much longer hours than this, and accomplished a great deal of hauling.

An officer from motor transport was always on duty on the docks, in addition to the Division Motor Transport Officer, or his assistant. These officers kept the trucks moving, regulated traffic, and coordinated all the transportation.

The supplies and equipment of the rear echelon of the First Marine Division were piled on the docks to be sorted and reloaded. There was so much piled on the docks that it often was difficult to keep roads and lanes open to allow the trucks to circulate.

As a ship was ready to load the vehicles it was to carry, the Motor Transport Officer dispatched those vehicles to the ship's side. Most of the $\frac{1}{2}$ ton and 1 ton trucks were loaded, but only 25% of the larger vehicles could be carried. This caused many transportation difficulties during later operations.

There was insufficient space to load the entire division and its equipment, so it was necessary to leave the largest part of "A" Company (transport) in the rear echelon. Two platoons of this company were loaded with the combat teams, but in both cases complete equipment could not be loaded.

One repair section of this company was loaded in the Support group.

PIONEER

The problem presented at Wellington was to unload ships which had been organization loaded, sort the cargoes, set aside that to remain and combat load the same ships, all to be accomplished in the shortest possible time. The effort proceeded on a twenty-four hour basis regardless of the almost daily rain. The combination of haste, rain and the packaging of many items in cardboard cartons resulted in the loss of much food, clothing, stores and other material. Untreated cardboard cartons clearly proved unsatisfactory and the correctness of this contention was

ANNEX L (Cont)

demonstrated with every unloading.

In addition to organizational combat equipment, 90 days' supply was loaded throughout the convoy, 30 days' in the AP's and 60 days', plus heavy equipment, in AK's. Approximately ten days were required to complete the task using Marine labor.

ENGINEER ACTIVITIES (GUADALCANAL)

PHASE 1- WELLINGTON, N.Z.

At the time of receipt of initial instructions by the Engineer Battalion concerning the coming operation against the enemy, H&S Company and "A" Company were camped at PAEKAKARIKI, NEW ZEALAND. The other two companies (C & D) were enroute to WELLINGTON. All efforts at this time were devoted to checking up on equipment, unloading and sorting in preparation for combat loading. Much thought was given to decisions as to what equipment should be carried, in consideration of all available information as to possible characteristics of the operation. A fast-moving situation was indicated, which would not allow for all the heavy equipment which might be carried by an Engineer organization. It was hoped that most all of the construction of the airfield on our island objective would have been completed for us by the enemy prior to our arrival, but nevertheless, enough earth-moving equipment--or at least so much as was available--was combat loaded aboard the Fomalhaut, to be available if needed. Other essential considerations on equipment were in regard to water supply, bridges, and demolitions. All available Mobile Water Purification Units were loaded with H&S equipment, the smaller portable units generally being carried by the lettered companies, which were attached to combat teams with the two regiments. All available temporary bridge material, including the 10-20 ton Temporary Pier and the "Tubelox" Dock, was loaded by H&S Company. All companies were well equipped with both the large company demolition chests and the small portable M-1 kits. No major building construction was contemplated in the early phases and the companies were equipped accordingly.

"A" Company was attached to the Fifth Marines and "C" Company was attached to the First Marines. H&S Company and "D" Company remained in the capacity of support troops for the initial landing.

ANNEX M

MEDICAL EXPERIENCE

In preparation for duty beyond the seas the entire Division had been reviewed from a medical point of view and all personnel not physically fit (active venereal disease, patients in hospitals, and those individuals not physically equipped for tropical duty) were declared unfit for foreign duty. All hands had received full immunizing doses of small pox, yellow fever, and typhoid vaccines plus tetanus toxoid.

After arriving in New Zealand on 14 June the First Echelon was moved into camps under canvas or in two to four man huts. Climatic conditions were extremely bad, hasty field sanitation had to be set up, and the echelon had just completed a 25 to 29 day sea voyage under crowded transport conditions. In spite of these contributing factors, the sick list were for the most part upper respiratory infections, plus a few post-traumatic and acute surgical emergencies. The 500 bed New Zealand Casualty Clearing Hospital at Aotea Quay had been assigned to the division on arrival and was staffed by "B" Company, First Medical Battalion. Acute surgical emergencies were cared for by division staff surgeons at the Wellington Public Hospital, an arrangement in operation until the arrival of the Sixth Mobile Base Hospital in September, 1942.

With the exception of one transport load of the Second Echelon, the Division health standard remained high. It is significant to note that on its departure from Wellington, nearly one month after the First Echelon had landed, only twelve cases of venereal disease had been reported and these were left with the rear echelon. The Second Echelon arrived in Wellington on 11 July. Although the usual transport conditions of overcrowding and inadequate ventilation continued in this group of transports, the lack of food aboard the M. V. Ericsson was the outstanding medical problem of the entire convoy. Many men interviewed lost from 16 to 23 pounds during the trip without any contributing illnesses. Only two meals a day were served and one of these was often soup or scup and bread. Medical officers aboard estimated the daily value of the rations as less than 1500 calories. The bakery ran out of proper shortening ten days from San Francisco, and oil substitutes were used. These were believed to have been the cause of a diarrhea epidemic which affected about 40% of the command. Condemned eggs and rancid "reprocessed" butter were brought back to the ship before sailing and would have been used had not a strong protest been made to the Captain.

When the Division sailed on July 22, about half of its number had had continuous billets aboard crowded transports for one month, and the other half had lived aboard ship for seven of the previous nine weeks without opportunity for any physical conditioning. The voyage to the combat area was uneventful,

ANNEX M (Cont)

medically, except for the spasmodic appearance of mumps.

Plans were made for the combat care of 18,154 officers and men for a ninety day period, this number including the Second Marines (reinforced) and the First Marine Raider Battalion. An acute shortage of sulphanilamide powder caused by delayed deliveries before the Division left the United States was relieved by obtaining sixty pounds of the powder from the Abbot Drug Company Of New Zealand. Similarly, deficits in the number of hospital corps pouches were made up from New Zealand Army stores, as were deficits in identification tags.

ANNEX N

HEADQUARTERS, FOURTH BATTALION, ELEVENTH MARINES,
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

10 February, 1943.

From: Lieutenant Colonel T. B. Hughes, U. S. Marine Corps.
To : The Commanding General, First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force.

Via: The Commanding General, Eleventh Marines.

Subject: Commanding Generals' final report on Guadalcanal
operation.

Reference: (A) Division Special Order 12-43.

1. In compliance with reference (A) the following
report is submitted.

PHASE 1

During the first part of this phase, the trip from the United States to Wellington, N.Z., artillery units were scattered on various transports, and in many cases were separated from their combat equipment. This was not desirable, but was made necessary by the type of transports available. Wherever possible, artillery units should be combat loaded, even when landing operations are not contemplated. This will enable the units to safeguard and service their equipment, and make any reloading for combat easier. Unloading and reembarkation by combat teams at Wellington was seriously impeded as a result of the lack of combat loading on the initial trip.

Combat loading at Wellington was in general satisfactory. The following are the most serious problems which must be solved:

(1) H&S Batteries of the direct support battalions must be provided for. The officers and men of these batteries have important duties to perform during the period between embarkation and landing, and they must be given an opportunity to function. In one instance this battery and its equipment was spread over the three vessels normally assigned to a reinforced infantry regiment in order to equalize the loading. This prohibits any effective planning by the artillery battalion commander and results in loss of effectiveness of initial artillery support.

(2) Provision must be made to land the pack howitzers with prime movers in boats of the transport on which embarked. Reliance on boats from other transports for the artillery is a

ANNEX N (Cont)

dangerous procedure, and may result in a failure to land the artillery in time for effective support.

Provisions for landing the general support battalion (105mm howitzers) were not adequate, and must be improved. The heavier prime movers of this battalion require tank lighters, and sufficient of these must be provided.

(3) The initial loading of transportation, particularly on the transports carrying general support units, must be carefully planned, and artillery prime movers given high priority.

(4) The general support battalion, brought from 50% strength to full strength in Wellington, had received no training subsequent to its expansion, and was not ready to be used. Fortunately there was time after the initial landing to give the battalion some training before it was actually committed to action. Under no circumstances should this be repeated.

ANNEX O

Headquarters, First Marine Division
Fleet Marine Force
C/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

15 February 1943.

MEMORANDUM: D-3.

Subject: Guadalcanal Operation - report on Signal Communication during Phase I.

Reference: (a) Div Sig (Memo to C-of-S 1st MarDiv, 3 Aug 42.

Enclosure: A. Copy Div Sig O Memo to C-of-S 1st MarDiv, 3 Aug 42

1. Signal Communication.

(a) Phase I. Communications during this phase were through the Naval Communication System. After embarkation and sailing, difficulty in rapidly clearing dispatches was experienced due to ships' Visual Communication facilities being overburdened. Lack of adequate space for the operation of Division Headquarters communication activities was also a handicap.

Recommendations:

1. That the ship upon which a Division Headquarters is embarked be provided with adequate visual signalling equipment and operators.

2. That adequate space and facilities for Division Headquarters communication activities be provided aboard ship. See reference (a) which was given to the Commander Amphibious Force South Pacific.

R. HALL
for
E.W. SNEDEKER

ANNEX O (Cont)

Office of the Division Signal Officer
Headquarters, First Marine Division
Fleet Marine Force
C/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

082/271

3 August 1942.

MEMORANDUM: Chief of Staff.

Subject: Equipment and space requirements for signal communication activities aboard ship.

1. Essential requirements of equipment and space for the operation of Div signal communication activities aboard ship on which Division Headquarters is embarked, are as follows:

(a)(1) Three intermediate frequency radio transmitting and receiving equipments covering 2000 to 4525 kcs, installed in any suitable protected space with room for operators, checked and tested to insure proper operation without interference from other rad or electrical equipment installed on board. TBX rad equipments are now installed in the dummy stack for this requirement. It would be preferable for these equipments to be separated so that one shell would not put all three out of operation. An additional set should be provided as a standby set, and a portable frequency meter for frequently checking calibrations. (2) To insure more reliable communication, the above equipments should have greater transmitter power than the TBX, preferable between 50 and 100 watts, key or voice. This particularly applies to the set to be used for air-ground communication. The set for air-ground operation should be installed so that it can be controlled from the Div command post.

(b) One ultra-high frequency radio transmitting and receiving equipment, of about 10 to 20 watts, suitable for operation with landing force. Model TBY equipments is also most desirable.

(c) Space for message center, code clerk and messengers - approximately size of stateroom No. 10, and provided with one central table 4' x 8' and 8 chairs. This space should be adjacent to Division command post.

(d) Division Signal Office and Division Signal Quartermaster - space about the size of stateroom No. 10, with one bunk left in for use of CWO at night. Includes office space for Div Signal Officer, one assistant, Div Sig QM and three clerks. This space should be close to Division Command Post.

ANNEX O (Cont)

(e) Division Signal Company office - any convenient space approximately one half the size of stateroom No. 10.

2. Adequate night lighting must be provided for all the above activities. They should also be connected by telephone (not sound powered) service.

E. W. SNEDEKER

ENCLOSURE "A"

ANNEX F

GDG/eas FIFTH MARINES, FIRST MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

February 15, 1943.

RECORD OF EVENTS: 26 June, 1942 to 7 August, 1942.

June 27: Fifth Regiment received verbal warning order to be prepared to embark, as a combat group, at Wellington, on or about 1 July, 1942.

July 1 : Fifth Regiment, reinforced, embarked aboard ship as follows:
HQ 5th, H&S Co., and HQ of attached units ^{SHIP}USS AMER-
ICAN LEGION

Weapons Co., 5th	"
1st Bn, 5th Reinforced	"
2nd Bn, 5th Reinforced	USS Neville
3d Bn, 5th Reinforced	USS Fuller

July 2-22: Period devoted to loading equipment and supplies aboard ship. Bulk of loading completed by 13 July, but because of previous inavailability of supplies and equipment, and because of late arrival of reinforcing troops, limited loading continued until 21 July.

July 14-17: Debarkation of combat teams practiced in Wellington Harbor. Boat officers and crews drilled in control at rendezvous areas, and in approach formations.

July 19: Regimental and battalion commanders, and their executive and operations officers receive verbal attack orders for Tulagi-Guadalcanal operations.

Fifth Marines, reinforced, less 2nd Bn, designated as Combat Group A.

Second Battalion, tactically detached from Fifth Marines for Tulagi operation. A separate record of events is submitted for the period of 2nd Bn's detachment.

July 22: Task force sailed from Wellington, N.Z.

July 27: Arrived off Koro Island, Fiji Islands.

July 28: Combat Group A made a practice landing on Beach at NE corner of Koro. Landing schedule and initial scheme of maneuver same as those proposed for Guadalcanal operation.

Remarks: Boat Control by boat officers and flotilla Commander was unsatisfactory. C.T.-3 landed on wrong beach.

ANNEX F (cont)

Because of surf and beach conditions, landing was stopped when about 75% complete.

July 29: C.G. "A" re-embarked.

July 30: Debarkation, boat rendezvous, and approach practice, with actual naval gunfire rehearsal. No landing practice. All troops re-embarked.

July 31: Sailed from Koro Island. Troops informed of destination, objective, and plan of attack.

July 31-August 6: All available time devoted to familiarization of all officers and NCOs with plan of attack, enemy information, and study of terrain.

G. D. GAYLE,
Capt., U.S.M.C.,
R - 3.

ANNEX P (Cont)

Second Battalion,
Fifth Marines, First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force, C/O Postmaster,
San Francisco, California.

12 February, 1943.

RECORD OF EVENTS

- July 19, 1942 Verbal orders this date tactically detach Second Battalion of Fifth Marines, and attach it to Tulagi Group, under command of ADC, as CT #2.
- July 19, 1942 At King's Wharf. Working Parties on AK's. More Ships arrived; Naval escort, 3 DD's and 3 CL's dropped anchor in harbor. More ships arrived later this evening. Last day of liberty.
- July 20, 1942 At King's Wharf. Working parties on AK's, our ship receiving additional supplies and ammunition. Nothing Unusual to report.
- July 21, 1942 At Kings Wharf. Remainder of supplies brought aboard. General Rupertus and staff, LTC 1 Kilmartin and Flight Officer Spencer of RAAF, arrived on board at 1000. Ship left dock at 1200 and anchored in harbor. Preparations for getting underway.
- July 22, 1942 CL's and CA's underway at 0800. Neville underway at 0905. Troops received small Pox inoculations. Convoy consists of 12 AP's escorted by 5 cruisers (2 American, 3 Australian) and 17 destroyers.
- July 23, 1942 At sea. Gun and collision drills. Nothing unusual to report.
- July 24, 1942 At sea. Sea rather rough, several men seasick. General Quarters drill on ship.
- July 25, 1942 At sea. Rough seas breaking over bow, several staterooms flooded with water coming in through ports. Destroyer 308 pulled in close and transferred official mail at 1000.
- July 26, 1942 At sea. Clear weather, smooth seas. Debarkation exercises; troops, leave compartments by boat-loads, go to net from which they are to debark and return to compartment. Ships sighted off the starboard bow at 1345, an aircraft carrier,

ANNEX F (Cont)

a battleship (North Carolina) class, several cruisers, transports and destroyers. More ships in sight off port bow at 1445, carrier, cruisers and destroyers, convoy now numbers about 70 ships of all kinds.

- July 27, 1942 At sea. Convoy devided into groups Official mail from APD brought aboard at 0845. Debarkation exercises at 1000. An island was sighted at 1115 and later in the day some more islands were passed.
- July 28, 1942 At sea. Arrived in transport area off Koro Island about 0800. H hour for landing today set at 1230. Debarkation from ship begun at 1155. First wave landed at 1250, low tide, boats pulled up alongside coral, troops disembarked and crossed coral on foot and moved inland. Coconut trees on edge of island, 200 yards inland high grass (about 7 feet) and steep slopes made progress difficult. Evening meal consisted of "C" Ration. Night spent on island.
- July 29, 1942 On Koro Island. Boats from transport arrive on beach at 0800, troops began embarkation to return to ship. All troops aboard at 1030 Policing and servicing equipment. 103 personnel from 1st Raider Bn reported aboard, arrived last evening. Raiders sleeping on cots set on hatches. General Rupertus held conference aboard Neville at 1330 with Battalion Commanders of Tulagi group. Ships moved out to sea after sunset.
- July 30, 1942 At sea. Ships arrive in transport area off Koro at 0800. Planes from carriers in the sky, dive bombers practicing bombing and fighters rehearsing their strafing missions on Koro. H hour today is 1030, waves do not land on beach but approach to 2000 yards of the beach and return to ship. Warships fire on beach prior to H hour, each ship firing about 40 rounds of 5 inch.
- July 31, 1942 At sea, off Koro Island. 20 rubber boats transferred to the American Legion. Underway at 1730 headed south.
- Aug. 1, 1942 At sea, in convoy formation. Nothing unusual to report.

ANNEX P (Cont)

- Aug. 2, 1942 At sea, travelling in general direction of south-west. Nothing unusual to report.
- Aug. 3, 1942 At sea. Test firing of light machine guns and .50 caliber at 0930, off the Fort Quarter. New Caledonia sighted on horizon.
- Aug. 4, 1942 At sea. Several APD's pulled alongside and refueled.
- Aug. 5, 1942 At sea. Convoy in closer formation. Message of encouragement and good wishes received from Col. Hunt.
- Aug. 6, 1942 At sea. Unit preparing baggage, supplies, etc., for unloading tomorrow. Munitions, rations issued to men.

ANNEX Q

FIRST MARINES, FIRST MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE.

"HISTORY OF THE FIRST MARINE REGIMENT"

On 8 June 1942, this Regiment began the movement from New River across country to San Francisco after having completed four months of intensive training in jungle warfare with particular emphasis layed on the conduct of the individual marine under fire. The Regiment debarked by train from New River in three echelons, each leaving at specified times during the period up to and including 14 June, 1942.

The entire Regiment arrived in San Francisco and were embarked aboard ship by 20 June, 1942. Two days later this Regiment set sail under naval escort, bound for action against the enemy overseas.

PHASE I

(26 June, 1942--H hour 7 August, 1942)

We sighted land for the first time on 10 July and on the following day docked at Aotea Quay, Wellington, New Zealand. Orders were received to prepare for combat loading at once and for the formation of Combat Group B under the command of our Regimental Commander Colonel Clifton B. Cates. Combat Group B comprised three Combat Teams; Combat Team 4 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel L. B. Cresswell, Combat Team 5 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E. A. Pollock, Combat Team 6 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W. N. McKelvy, Jr., and the Libra Group aboard the supply ship USS LIBRA commanded by Major L. J. Fields. Combat Team 4 and H&S Company were assigned aboard the USS BARNETT, Combat Team 5 aboard the USS ELLIOTT and Combat Team 6 aboard the USS MAC CAULAY.

As the combat loading was in progress Division Operations Order No. 7-42 was received. It stated our objective; that the First Marine Division less the 7th Marines was to destroy the hostile garrisons on Guadalcanal Island, Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo and Florida, in the British Solomon Island Group. This Regiment with the 5th Marines was to attack on the northern coast of Guadalcanal, destroy the enemy garrison, seize and hold the airfield located there.

By 22 July the combat loading had been completed, a rear echelon consisting of Captain H. L. Heming, Pay Clerk J. Madey, Pay Clerk R. K. Patterson and 66 enlisted men had been assigned to remain at Wellington; Division Operation Order No. 8-42 had

ANNEX Q (Cont)

been received concerning the pending practice landings at Koro Island and Combat Group B was underway with naval escort protected by a naval task force. Strength of Regiment embarked; 131 officers; 2911 enlisted Marines--10 officers, 68 enlisted Navy and Pilot Officer Charles V. Widdy, RA-F.

D day for the first practice landing at Koro Island was 28 July, H hour, 1230. In accordance with Regimental Operations Order No. 3-42 all troops debarked and proceeded to the line of departure, but the landing was called off because of a dangerous beach. 30 July with H hour at 1030 all troops again debarked and proceeded to line of departure though no landings were effected. There was definite improvement over the landing operation of 28 July in the speed and efficiency with which the troops debarked from the ships and in the organization and timing of boat waves, etc.

2 August all officers were informed of our immediate objective in the Solomon Islands offensive. Next day that same information was released to all troops.

Preparations continued for D day which was announced to be 7 August.

In entirety phase 1 was preparation for the landing and the subsequent campaign on Guadalcanal. It was noted that the maps and photographs given to the Regiment would be insufficient for the mission to be accomplished. Not only were they inadequate in detail, variety of number, accuracy, they were also too small in scope. It was obvious that after approximately 1000 yards of advancing toward the objective, Grassy Knoll, this Regiment would be well off the maps and photographs and assaulting over unknown terrain.

It is recommended that in the next campaign the maps and photographs first of all cover completely the area in which this Regiment is to attack and secondly that they be very much more numerous and accurate.

It is also recommended that there be a greater emphasis on a coordinated map used by all units of the Division.

Sketch - Lunga Sound
(Not to Scale)

