



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW YORK STATE
ENHANCED SECURITY GUARD TRAINING
LEGISLATION AND ITS EFFICACY ON SECURITY
OFFICER PREPAREDNESS**

by

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December 2011

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GUARD TRAINING LEGISLATION AND ITS EFFICACY ON SECURITY
OFFICER PREPAREDNESS**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the results of a survey instrument administered to a random sample of New York City security officers in order to understand the relationship between job training and turnover and, in turn, the effect of high turnover on the preparedness and effectiveness of that population in performing its duties. Replicating a 2004 survey sponsored by the New York City Public Advocate Office, which exposed poor training and rampant turnover among security guards and resulted in the August 2005 New York State Enhanced Security Guard Training legislation, this thesis seeks to determine changes in and correlations among those phenomena by employing bivariate analysis, independent t-test, and Cronbach's Alpha methods. The data analysis reveals correlations between employment conditions—including training and advancement opportunities—and retention, and thus contributes to the discourse surrounding the role of private-sector and nonsworn personnel in the Homeland Security Enterprise.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APPL	Area Police Private Security Liaison
ASIS	American Society for Industrial Security
BATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
BID	Business Improvement District
CBRN	Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CIKR	Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
CIMS	Critical Incident Management System
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	Department of Justice
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FPO	Federal Police Officer
GAO	U.S. Government Accountability Office
GSA	U.S. General Services Administration
HRD	Human Resource Division
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICS	Incident Command System
KSA	Knowledge, Skills, Abilities
MTA	Metropolitan Transportation Authority
NIMS	National Incident Management System

NIPP	National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NRF	National Response Framework
NYPD	New York Police Department
PA	Port Authority
RTCC	Real Time Crime Center
SEIU	Service Employees International Union
TASP	Terrorism Awareness for Security Professional
TRIPS	Threat Reduction and Infrastructure Protection
UK	United Kingdom
UPS	United Parcel Service
USMS	United States Marshal Service
UTL	Universal Task List
VBIED	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. DEMANDS PLACED ON LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

Since September 11, 2001, there have been increased demands placed on local law enforcement agencies in the domain of terrorism prevention. One of the demands is the identification and assessment of risk to critical infrastructure. Although local law enforcement has the ability to assess these locations, they do not have the capacity to protect these locations. The private sector owns and operates 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). The majority of these locations are protected by private security companies, putting these private security officers on the front line of preventing a possible attack on one of these critical facilities. Neither law enforcement nor private security can accomplish these endeavors alone.

Law enforcement agencies do not have the resources to staff these facilities. According to a review of the most recent U.S. data on employment in local and state law enforcement, the years 2000 through 2004 showed a period of slow growth. The number of sworn police officers in state police organizations increased by one to two percent and six percent for sheriffs' departments. In contrast, the number of sworn officers decreased in 20 of the nation's 50 largest police departments, including six of the seven largest. The New York Police Department saw a 10.7 percent decrease in sworn officers, with even greater declines in Newark in New Jersey (down 11.4 percent), Cleveland (down 14.4 percent), Nassau County in New York (down 15.3 percent), and Detroit (down 15.5 percent) (Reaves, 2007, p. 4). The New York Police Department has continued this downward trend in sworn officers. As of July 1, 2010, the NYPD Personnel Bureau reported that in 2001 there were 40,800 sworn officers, which was the Department's highest number (Seifman, 2011). The current level of sworn officers is 34,385, a 16 percent decline in personnel from the highs of 2001. In addition to the 16 percent decline in personnel, there is the potential for continued declines due to the fact that 11,534 officers are eligible to retire between 2010 and the end of 2013. This figure is an estimate based on the size of the police academy classes hired twenty years earlier in 1990, 1991,

1992, and 1993 and a police officer's eligibility to retire after twenty years' service in New York City. (NYPD Personnel Bureau, personal communication July 1, 2010). This decline is equal to one-third of the current active force strength. The current staffing levels and the recruitment and retention problems that law enforcement agencies are encountering leads this author to believe that the need exists to develop partnerships with private sector security. These partnerships could help supplement the decline in personnel needed to protect these critical infrastructure facilities.

Although private security officers could help supplement law enforcement in a partnership, private security officers currently do not have the training, expertise, or knowledge gathered from intelligence information to effectively protect these facilities on their own. This lack of expertise is due to a number of factors, including low wages paid to security officers and minimal benefits, which usually causes a high turnover rate. The national annual median wage for a security officer/guard in 2008 was \$23,820 (Occupational Employment and Wages: Security Guards, 2009, p. 1). During that same year the median wage of a landscaper/grounds keeper was \$23,480 (Occupational Employment and Wages: Landscaping and groundskeeping workers, 2009, p. 1). With such poor wages and benefits, few security officers stay on the job for long, often resulting in inexperienced, poorly trained officers. A recent report on the private security services industry in the United States estimates that annual employee turnover in the industry exceeds 100 percent for many security companies and can be as high as 300 to 400 percent for smaller firms. These turnover rates rival those of the fast-food industry and pose a serious risk to public safety as private security officers often are first responders to life-threatening emergencies (Service Employees International Union [SEIU], 2010, p. 1).

B. PROBLEM SPACE

1. Problem

The Public Advocate for the City of New York, in an attempt to address these issues, conducted a research study in 2004/2005 and determined that the standards and training for its security officers needed improvement. It concluded that, despite the heightened security alerts that the city had been under since 2001, neither the city leaders nor private building owners had taken the initiative to train security officers to respond to terrorism, interface with police, or work with firefighters during an emergency. The Public Advocate's Office interviewed over 100 privately contracted security officers who worked in 39 major Class A commercial buildings¹ and found that minimal training and limited enforcement of training requirements, combined with low pay, had left New York with a private security force that was ill-prepared to protect its public (Sheppard & Mintz-Roth, 2001, p. 1).

This report came to a number of conclusions, such as that security officer's wages were low and that healthcare benefits were unfavorable or not offered. Turnover was rampant: nearly one-quarter of security officers stayed at their job for one year or less. The high turnover rate in New York was due to low wages and lack of opportunity. New York State's low training standards had not been revised since 1992 and were outdated. Most of the security officers surveyed reported having less training than New York State required. The training that was required failed to emphasize terrorism awareness, or working with the police and firefighters.

Given the enormity of the responsibility for the protection of the public and the fact that most of the infrastructure is privately owned, representing billions of dollars to the United States economy, this privately owned infrastructure represents nearly every imaginable potential target for terrorists. There is a need to develop some minimum

¹ Class A buildings are the most prestigious buildings competing for premier office users with rents above average for the area. Buildings have high quality standard finishes, state of the art systems, exceptional accessibility, professionally managed and a definite market presence.

training standards and other professional guidelines for security officers since countless lives are at stake. Many reports and studies herein make reference to both security officers and security guards. For the purpose of this research study, these titles will be considered interchangeable.

The Public Advocate of the City of New York, in conjunction with the New York City Council, made recommendations based on research findings and New York City Council Resolution-569/04 (resolution calling upon the New York State legislature to allow municipal legislative bodies to adopt more stringent legislation in relation to training, background checks, and licensing/registration for private security personnel) (New York City Council, 2004). A recommendation was made to the state legislature to adopt legislation requiring additional hours of prelicensing instruction in addition to the eight hours of training required at the time. The Public Advocate and the City Council recommended that the training curriculum be revised and strengthened to reflect current security concerns, such as terrorism, and that the curriculum be updated regularly to address evolving trends.

New York State did not institute all of the recommendations that the City Council and the New York City Public Advocate made. However, New York State did make available a tax break for building owners who had their security officers participate in a 40-hour enhanced security training course. In addition, if the security officer participated in the training, a compensation of increased hourly wages was awarded. There are a number of reports and studies relating to the benefits of job training.

Time spent in training, training methodologies, and type of training were determined to be significant in their relationship to job training satisfaction. The most preferred training methodology by employees was face-to-face instruction by an

instructor or job coach in both studies. Schmidt found a correlation between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction in both studies.²

In the study conducted in 2007, Schmidt determined that his results concurred with prior studies conducted on professional occupations, suggesting that the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction is similar for employees in a variety of occupational categories.

2. Argument

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) prepared a report in 2004 titled “Guarding America: Security Guards and U.S. Critical Infrastructure Protection.” This report stated that the effectiveness of critical infrastructure guards in countering a terrorist attack depends on the number of guards on duty, their qualifications, pay, and training (Parfomak, 2004, p. 2). This is true not only for security officers protecting critical infrastructure but for security officers in general. The dynamics of the threat have changed a bit; the threat is purely economic damage through fear, as stated in the November 2010 issue of *Inspire* magazine. The modus operandi is through the dispersal of explosive packages, dubbed Operation Hemorrhage by Qa’Idah al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula. In the November 2010 special issue the group boasts about how it only spent \$4,200 to take down one United Parcel Service (UPS) plane and shipped explosives on two others, a UPS plane and a FedEx plane (Qaeda, 2010, p. 7). Their intent is to attack the American economy, as depicted in a picture in the same magazine of a bar of gold spilling blood (Qaeda, 2010, p. 9). These packages would have eventually and could still be shipped to a facility that in all likelihood is protected by security officers who have to either detect or respond to the aftermath of the explosion of one of these devices. In addition, the current target spectrum has been expanded to include private organizations that can have an effect on the U.S. economy.

² In two studies conducted in 2004 and 2007, Schmidt came to similar conclusions. He found a significant relationship in 2004 and a high correlation in 2007 between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction among employees. The survey conducted in 2004 was a sample of customer and technical service employees in nine different organizations in the United States and Canada. The sample size in the 2004 study was 552 employees with 301 employees responding to the surveys (Schmidt, 2004). The same data set was also used in the 2007 study (Schmidt, 2007).

Security officers are on the front lines with regard to detecting and possibly thwarting a terrorist incident at a facility that they are protecting. If an incident happens at their facility, security officers will most certainly be the first on the scene. Tenants or personnel assigned to these facilities will be looking for guidance from these security officers. Because of this, it is important that security officers receive the proper training to enable them to handle these situations professionally.

Half of all the states lack any requirement for training security officers, and 14 require less than three days of general security officer training. Despite the size of the security industry and its impact on public safety, there are few local, state, or federal standards in the United States to maintain quality. There are few legal standards to determine who should be able to serve as a security officer and what type of safety training and other skills officers should have. Therefore, training is often left in the hands of security contractors who want to keep costs to a minimum and put security officers on the job quickly in order to overcome high-turnover rates (SEIU, 2010, p. 1).

Although security officers are the first line of defense in the protection of critical infrastructure, no new standards have been established to address the lack of proper training. A wide chasm in requirements for training and background checks exists among the states, and there has been no unifying force to address these issues. The federal government has issued a directive in an attempt to address the issue of critical infrastructure protection but no directives to address the lack of a minimum national criterion for security officers employed to protect the infrastructure.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the basis for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) responsibilities in the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources. The act assigns the DHS the responsibility for developing a comprehensive national plan for securing critical infrastructure and key resources. In response to this, DHS issued recommendations for jurisdictions seeking to improve collaboration with their private-sector agency counterparts (Homeland Security Act, 2002).

In 2003, the president issued presidential directives to address a number of issues facing this nation after 9/11, as depicted in Figure 1. Presidential directives are presidential orders that establish national policies, priorities, and guidelines to strengthen U.S. homeland security. One of the issues addressed by the presidential directives was critical infrastructure and key resources protection. The national approach for critical infrastructure and key resources protection was provided through the unifying framework established in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 [HSPD-7]. This directive established policy for enhancing protection of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources and mandated a national plan to actuate the policy. In HSPD-7 the President designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal official to lead CIKR protection efforts among federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector (HSPD-7, 2003, p. 1). HSPD-7 establishes a central source for coordinating best practices and supporting protective programs across and within government agencies, as well as establishing structures to enhance close cooperation between the private sector and government at all levels to initiate and sustain an effective CIKR protection program (Chertoff, 2009, p. 16). HSPD-7 mandated development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan as the primary vehicle for implementing the CIKR protection policy.

While HSPD-7 does not require specific action from the private sector, it sets the groundwork for agencies to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure. HSPD-8 establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies and is a companion directive to HSPD-5 (HSPD-8, 2003, p. 1).

Goal in Context




Figure 1. Goal in Context, Department of Homeland Security

In HSPD-5, the president specifically directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to create a comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS) to provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. HSPD-5 also requires the DHS secretary to coordinate efforts to develop and implement the National Response Plan, which is now known as the National Response Framework (NRF) using the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to provide the structure and mechanisms for policy and operational direction (HSPD-5, 2003, p. 3). NIMS provides a uniform doctrine for command and managerial control, including incident command, multiagency coordination, and joint information systems to respond to and recover from a domestic

incident (Chertoff, 2009, p. 74). NIMS provides a common flexible framework within which government and private entities at all levels can work together to manage domestic incidents of any magnitude (Chertoff, 2006).

The central component of NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS). The ICS was refined over many years by incident commanders at the federal, state, and local levels and was being successfully implemented throughout the country prior to being included in NIMS. The ICS provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual responders and agencies as they respond to and help manage an incident (Townsend, 2006, p. 13).

The protection of critical infrastructure has been discussed since September 11, 2001. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets defines building human capital as related to personnel surety as the fundamental need to ensure that trustworthy, reliable, and trained personnel are available to protect critical infrastructure and key assets from terrorist attack.

Private sector owners and operators rely on skilled employees to protect critical infrastructure. Security personnel and first responders in particular require adequate training, equipment, and other support to carry out their responsibilities effectively and with some degree of assurance that their personal security will not be in jeopardy while accomplishing their mission. (National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, 2003, p. 28)

In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted. A section of this act, section 6402, was named the Private Security Officer Act of 2004. This section authorized a fingerprint based criminal-history check of state and national criminal-history records to screen prospective and current private security officers (Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act, 2004). This section allows states to be able to opt out of the provisions of this act or to conduct checks under the auspices of Public Law 92-544, which gives the states the statutory authority to perform state and national fingerprint checks. The problem with the Private Security Officer Act of 2004 was that there was no uniformity on the type of background checks being conducted, if any at all. Some states conduct state background checks, some states

conduct federal background checks, and some states conduct no background checks. Another issue not addressed is the requirement for training individuals as required under the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, which states, “There is an urgent need for ongoing training of security personnel to sustain skill levels and to remain up-to-date on evolving terrorist weapons and tactics” (National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, 2003, p. 29). These individuals were hired to protect what has been designated as critical infrastructure under HSPD-7. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, along with HSPD-5, 7, and 8 were the precursors to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

The federal government addressed the issues of background checks and training in 1995 after the Oklahoma City bombing with regard to federal facilities and security officers hired to protect them under President Bill Clinton (Reese and Tong, 2010, p. 1). The Private Security Officer Act of 2004 did not address these same issues in the same way.

a. Federal Minimum Security Standards

After the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, President Clinton directed the Department of Justice (DOJ) to assess the vulnerability of federal facilities to terrorist attacks and violence and to develop recommendations for minimum security standards (Reese and Tong, 2010, p. 1). Prior to this bombing of a federal facility, the federal government had no established security standards for federally owned or leased facilities (United States Marshals Service [USMS], 1995, p. 1-1). The Marshals Service within the Department of Justice (DOJ) was tasked with conducting security assessments of federal facilities after the bombing of the Murrah Building (GAO, 2002, p. 5).

The USMS assembled two working groups to accomplish these tasks, a standard committee and a profile committee. The profile committee was tasked with conducting a survey of a representative sample of federal facilities to determine their existing situations and to identify future security enhancements and costs to protect these

facilities. The other working group was the standards committee, which consisted of security specialists and representatives from DOJ, including representatives from the FBI. This committee also included representatives from the U.S. Secret Service, the General Services Administration (GSA), the State Department, the Social Security Administration, and the Department of Defense. This committee was tasked with identifying and evaluating the various types of security measures that could be used to counter potential vulnerabilities at federal facilities. The committee, after conducting its review and identifying vulnerabilities at federal facilities, established recommended minimum security standards for federal facilities (USMS, 1995, p. 2-6). The recommended minimum security standards included physical measures to be implemented at federal facilities and the establishment of standardized qualifications and training requirements for unarmed and armed contract security officers employed to protect federal facilities. In addition, the committee also recommended security officers' attendance at annual security awareness training and the establishment of law enforcement agency and security liaisons for the purpose of intelligence sharing (USMS, 1995, p. 2-9).

The standards committee also recommended that the Federal Protective Service (FPS) be responsible for providing security services for General Service Administration-controlled federal facilities through the use of both federal police officers (FPOs) and contract security officers. There was also the recommendation that FPS should improve the standards for contract security officers by raising the hiring qualifications and providing enhanced training (USMS, 1995, p. 4-5).

The federal government implemented the recommendations of the USMS Vulnerabilities Assessment and now requires that all security officers protecting federal facilities undergo background suitability checks and complete approximately 128 hours of training before being assigned to a post or an area of responsibility. The Federal Protective Service is responsible for the protection of federal facilities and overseeing the security contractors who are hired to provide additional services, as recommended by the standards committee. The required training is provided by the contractor or FPS; the

training includes eight hours of x-ray and magnetometer training, and guards must pass an FPS-administered written examination and possess the necessary certificates, licenses, and permits as required by the contract.

Figure 2 shows the training and certification that FPS requires its security officers to obtain before standing post, and which in addition they must maintain during the course of their employment. FPS also requires its security officers to complete 40 hours of refresher training every two to three years, depending on the terms of the contract. Some of the key responsibilities of FPS's security officers include controlling access, enforcing property rules and regulation, detecting and reporting criminal acts, and responding to emergency situations involving the safety and security of the facility. Security officers may only detain, not arrest, an individual, and their authority typically does not extend beyond the facility (GAO, 2009, pp. 7, 8).


These federal facilities are located in regions all over the country, as depicted in Figure 3. They are located in close proximity not only to state and city facilities but also to privately owned facilities; however, the requirements for the security officers hired to protect these facilities is not the same. A security officer hired in New York State is required to complete eight hours of classroom training and an additional 16 hours of on-the-job training, for a total of 24 hours of training and an eight-hour annual refresher training course. Even discounting the 40 hours of firearms training from the federal requirement, the security officer is still required to complete 88 hours of training before taking a post in a federal facility, as compared to the eight hours required in New York State for an unarmed security officer. The federal requirement for security officers also requires 40 hours of refresher training every two to three years, compared to eight hours a year in New York State. These buildings being protected—whether federal, state, city, or privately owned facilities—can be located right next to each other: the preparedness of the individuals protecting them is different, but the responsibilities are the same. As stated earlier, some states have no requirements for security officer training.

Training		Certifications	
Contractor Provided		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DHS background investigation • Medical examination certificate • Domestic violence declaration • Passing score on written examination • Firearms qualification certificate • Expandable / straight baton training certificate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPR training certificate • Basic training certificate • Firearms training certificate • Government provided training certificate • Magnetometer / x-ray training certificate • First aid training certificate
FPS Provided		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 64 hours basic training • 32 hours live firearms training • 8 hours classroom firearms training • 8 hours basic baton training • 8 hours government training • 8 hours x-ray and magnetometer 	

Source: FPS.

Figure 2. Guard Training and Certification Required by FPS.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 laid the groundwork for the establishment of public/private partnerships to help protect and prevent a terrorist attack on the critical infrastructure that was identified and prioritized under HSPD-7. The Homeland Security Act built onto the already established principles of the community policing initiatives that had been established in the 1980s. These initiatives were originally established to engage the community and the private sector/private security in joint efforts to reduce crime.



Sources: GAO analysis of FPS data and Map Resources.

Figure 3. Number of FPS Guards and Federal Facilities with Guards by Region.

To prevent terrorism, the DHS recommended that public and private agencies carry out the following:

Prepare memoranda of understanding and formal coordination agreements describing mechanisms for exchanging information regarding vulnerabilities and risks;

Use community policing initiatives, strategies, and tactics to identify suspicious activities related to terrorism;

Establish a regional, prevention information command center;

Coordinate the flow of information regarding infrastructure.

b. Traditional Law Enforcement Practices

Traditional law enforcement practices were reactive. They emphasized measures such as arrest rates and response times as measures for responses to crime. Community policing was designed to encourage police to proactively solve community problems by addressing the factors that contribute to crime, rather than police response to crime. Community policing can be defined as a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques that proactively address the immediate conditions, such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime, that give rise to public-safety issues (Community Policing Defined, 2010, p. 3).

Through this transformation, community policing theoretically reflects the background of American policing and contributes to the reduction in crime by partnering with the community and private security companies. It requires a shift in thinking for police departments, particularly large metropolitan police departments. The police departments' law enforcement mission was transformed into a tool for public safety. The transformation was often awkward, especially in the 1980s and '90s, when many departments saw this transformation as diminishing their authority and opportunity to work independently (Community Policing, 2010). By the year 2000, the Bureau of Justice Assistance had issued guidelines for partnerships between law enforcement and private security organizations. The guidelines were titled "Operation Cooperation."

In the guidelines, public law enforcement is defined to include local and state police departments, sheriffs' departments, and federal agencies such as the FBI, ATF, Customs Service, Secret Service, Marshals Service, and many others. Private security is defined to include corporate security departments, guard companies, alarm companies, armored-car businesses, investigative firms, security equipment manufacturers, and others (Building Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships to Prevent and Response to Terrorism and Public Disorder, 2004, p. 2). Operation Cooperation represented a major national initiative to encourage partnerships between law enforcement and private security professionals. The driving force behind the initiative was a passion among practitioners who saw the potential for great benefit to be

gained from public-private teamwork. Before 9/11, the goal to be gained by these security companies and the companies they represented was increased security and a reduction in crime (Connors et al., 2000, p. 1). The partnership could translate into a reduction in losses for the represented companies.

Seven years had passed since the introduction of the initiative Operation Cooperation when a study conducted by Community Oriented Policing Services on private security/public policing partnerships suggested that only five to ten percent of law enforcement chief executives participate in any collaborative partnerships with private security. A further review of the data reveals that in 2000 there were 60 law enforcement/private security partnerships. By the year 2007, there were 450 partnerships, a 650 percent increase. Such improvements seem impressive until one realizes that there are 17,876 state and local law enforcement agencies in the United States. Thus, only 2.5 percent of state and local law enforcement entities have formed a public/private partnership (Reaves, 2007, p. 1). Adding the federal agencies into the data, the percentage drops even further.

If law enforcement/private security partnerships are equal to 2.5 percent of local and state law enforcement agencies, and these local and state law enforcement agencies have the primary responsibility for protecting the critical infrastructure in their jurisdiction, of which 85 percent is privately owned, then the question can be raised as to who is actually protecting the critical infrastructure in 82.5 percent of these jurisdictions since law enforcement does not have the manpower to physically protect these facilities. Is it the security officer with limited experience and limited or no training? In addition, this security officer would have no access to current intelligence information due to the lack of a formal partnership.

Both quantitatively and qualitatively, the private security field is less well known than law enforcement. The last major study to estimate the size of the private security field was published in 1985 (Cunning & Taylor, 1985) and updated in 1990 (Cunning, Strauchs, & Van Meter, 1990). It is difficult to estimate the number of private security practitioners in the field today. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that its occupational category known as security guards and gaming surveillance officers

employed more than 1.1 million persons in 2008. That category likely includes no more than half of those employed in private security overall. “Enhancing Private Security Officer Surety,” a report for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, found that in the five states it studied, guards constituted only one-half to one-third of the total number of security employees. The rest are security workers in such fields as alarm installation and monitoring, access control, closed-circuit television (CCTV), locks and safes, for example, as well as managers of security firms and security departments within larger organizations (Consortium, 2009, p. 37). One can infer from this report and a review of the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates for security officers and gaming officers that the total number of U.S. security employees could certainly be 2 million or more (Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010–2011, p. 6). This is equal to more than twice the number of law enforcement officers. The ability to tap this relatively unused resource is a great force multiplier.

3. Conclusion

The causes of terrorism are beyond the capacity of local law enforcement, and the events of 9/11 demonstrated that globalization has changed our security as it has changed our economy. The demands being placed on local law enforcement agencies have changed as a result of the expanded duties and new and ever-changing homeland security concerns. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many police agencies redirected police officers from neighborhood patrol to guarding public buildings because critical infrastructure protection is largely the responsibility of the local police and governments (Geller & Stephens, 2003). This responsibility has become increasingly difficult to staff due to decreases in manpower in local police agencies. Although there has been a slight increase in sworn officers in state and sheriffs’ departments, the number of sworn officers has decreased in 20 of the nation’s 50 largest police departments, including six of the seven largest (Reaves, 2007. p. 4). Public/private partnerships could help supplement these declines in personnel.

Currently no paradigm exists for how to systematically manage a police department to respond both to local needs and to unprecedented national requirements issued under the Department of Homeland Security. These new demands are unpredictable, frequently changing, and unsupported by any long-term commitments of funding and training (Babbara et al., 2005, p. 27). In an effort to counter these uncertainties and the requirements being placed on local government and law enforcement, the proper training of security personnel could help supplement law enforcement in the protection and prevention measures being implemented to better protect their constituents from a natural or manmade disaster.

Even if a police department fully understands its future personnel needs and can identify adequate numbers of appropriate personnel to fulfill these needs, its ability to meet force management objectives is often complicated by budgetary difficulties at the local, state, and federal levels. The economic condition of a city can fluctuate, and police departments may have to make unplanned cuts, including reducing the authorized number of recruit slots. Federal grants are sometimes available to hire new police officers, but these grants expire and cities cannot always take on the increased cost for the new officers. Such difficulties can constrain the department's ability to recruit new officers to cover the range of local, state, and national missions requested of them (Babbara et al., 2005, p. 12).

Major attacks like 9/11 and others have shown that terrorism is no longer purely a political and a media phenomenon—it is also an economic one. The potential economic impact of terrorism on the private sector offers police an opportunity to engage the business community in conversations about not only street crime and neighborhood security but also terrorism. The concept of a community must be conceived more broadly in this effort of preventing terrorism than in preventing ordinary crime. The counterterrorism community includes private-sector infrastructure and multinational corporations. Security policymakers must promote partnerships not only with private citizens but with business leaders and corporate-security chiefs (Riebling, 2006, p. 4).

Collaboration is needed because the dynamics of the threat have changed: the threat is purely economic damage through fear, as pointed out in the November 2010 issue of *Inspire* magazine. The modus operandi is the dispersal of explosive packages dubbed Operation Hemorrhage by Qa'Idah al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula. Intelligence analysts conducting further reviews of the November 2010 issue of *Inspire* concluded that with a general but growing concern that operatives in Yemen may again try to send package bombs or biological or chemical agents through the mail to Wall Street bankers; in February 2011 they issued a threat warning to this effect. The FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force and NYPD officials have briefed bank executives and their security departments on the nature of the threat information (Gordon, 2011, p. 3). An NBC terror consultant also pointed to the web writings of al Qaeda blogger Abu Suleiman Al-Nasser, who recently wrote, "Rush my Muslim brothers to targeting financial sites and the program sites of financial institutions, stock markets and money markets." Banks like Goldman Sachs, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, Barclays, and others have received updated security briefings (Dienst, 2011). As a precaution, police are urging Wall Street banks to further increase security in and around mail rooms and package delivery.

Security officers are on the front lines with regard to detecting and possibly thwarting a terrorist incident on a facility that they are protecting. If an incident happens at their facility, security officers will most certainly be the first on the scene. Tenants or personnel assigned to these facilities will be looking for guidance from these security officers. Because of this, it is important that security officers receive the proper training to enable them to handle these situations professionally and enable them to properly assist emergency personnel.

The effectiveness of critical infrastructure security officers in countering a terrorist attack depends on the number of security officers on duty, their qualifications, pay, and training (Parfomak, 2004, p. 2). This is true not only for security officers protecting critical infrastructure but for security officers in general.

In 1993, after a vehicle with an improvised explosive device entered the underground parking facility at the World Trade Center and detonated, it took nearly four hours in dark, smoky, poorly lit stairwells to evacuate the occupants from those facilities. After that attack the Port Authority made improvements to aid in evacuation procedures for the complex.

After the 1993 incident, the trade center's security officers were given extensive training, including a 40-hour course that taught them which floors were blocked by fire doors and how to evacuate thousands of tenants/workers in an orderly fashion. Training updates and drills continued monthly. Experts say that the security officers at the World Trade Center complex became the best trained in the country. And on September 11, 2001, "that training saved thousands of lives," says Jeff Schlanger of the risk consulting company Kroll, based in New York. Security officers helped guide thousands of workers/tenants to safety before the towers fell (Hall, 2003, p. 3).

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the line between life and death was very thin in comparison. Everyone in the north tower on the ninety-second floor died. Everyone on the ninety-first floor lived. When a second jet hit the south tower sixteen and a half minutes later, the pattern was virtually the same. In each tower, 99 percent of the occupants below the crash survived. At the point of impact and above, survival rate was limited to just a handful of people in the south tower.

Most of the dead were in the north tower, the first one hit and the second to collapse. Of the 1,434 who died in the north tower, 1,360 were from the crash site and above, 72 were below the crash line, and two were undetermined versus 599 in the south tower, 595 above the crash site and 4 below the crash line (Craighead, 2003, p. 372). (Locations could not be determined for 147 of the building occupants.) The *USA Today* analysis shows that two-thirds of south-tower occupants evacuated the upper floors during the sixteen-and-a-half minutes between the attacks. In the north tower, an average of 78 people died per floor at the crash area and above, compared with 19 people per floor in the south tower.

The physical changes that the Port Authority implemented after the 1993 bombing included reflective paint on stairs, railings, and stairwell doors, bright arrows to guide people along corridors to stairway connections, and the installation of loudspeakers so that building managers could talk to people in their offices as well as in hallways. All these changes contributed to the successful evacuation of these buildings. The people above the impact point of the south tower had sixteen-and-a-half minutes to evacuate to a point below the seventy-eighth floor in order to have any chance of survival. The impact point in the south tower was between the seventy-eighth and eighty-fourth floors (Cauchon, 2001, p. 2).

The evacuation of the north and south towers on September 11 was also considered a success, and nearly everyone who could get out did get out. That success was attributed not only to the physical changes that the Port Authority had made but also to the revisions to the evacuation plan, which included building evacuation drills and additional training for security personnel in these evacuation procedures. Those changes saved hundreds, possibly thousands, of lives. The sturdy construction of the buildings contributed to the fact that the buildings stood just long enough to give the potential survivors a chance to get out using the stairwells that were engineered bigger than the building codes required.

Most important, building management took evacuations seriously. Evacuation drills were held every six months, sometimes to the irritation or amusement of occupants. Each floor had “fire wardens,” sometimes high-ranking executives of a tenant, and they were responsible for organizing an evacuation on their floors. “They had done a great job,” says Brian Clark, a fire warden and executive vice president of Euro Brokers, located on the eighty-fourth floor of the south tower. “People knew where the stairs were” (Cauchon, 2001, p. 2).

Four hundred seventy-nine rescue workers died making the evacuation a success. Among the 479 rescue workers were 343 New York City firefighters, 37 Port Authority police officers, and 23 New York City police officers. The sacrifice of New York firefighters and police is well known. But 113 others, from low-paid security officers to white-collar workers at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the buildings’

owner, stood their ground with firefighters and police during the evacuation of the towers and gave their lives in the process (Cauchon, 2001, p. 1). Of the 113 others, six were from the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), and 13 were private security officers who worked at the World Trade Center complex and a security officer from a nearby building (Craighead, 2003, p. 372).

Protecting people and property from accidents and crime is the principal role of security officers. They patrol, monitor, and inspect property to protect against theft, fire, vandalism, and other illegal activity (Parfomak, 20204, p. 7). It is important to have continuity with regard to security officers who are patrolling and observing and protecting their assigned locations daily. The continuity of security officers working the same locations on a daily basis enables those officers to recognize individuals who belong at a facility and those who do not or who may be just visiting. Through training one can enable them to recognize when something just does not look right and to respond when things go bad. Making an investment in security officers by improving wages, benefits, health insurance, training, and career growth can improve job satisfaction and thus possibly limit turnover, thereby contributing to the continuity of the workforce in order to help prevent and respond to incidents.

The Public Advocate of the City of New York, in conjunction with the New York City Council, made recommendations based on research findings and New York City Council Resolution-569/04. Recommendations were made to the state legislature to adopt legislation requiring additional hours of prelicensing instruction in addition to the eight hours of mandated training that was required at the time. It was recommended that the training curriculum should be revised and strengthened to reflect current security concerns, such as terrorism, and that the curriculum be updated regularly to address evolving trends. It was also recommended that all private security officers in commercial office buildings be required to complete comprehensive New York State-approved security officer training programs. SEIU's Local 32BJ's 40-hour New York Safe and Secure program was recommended to be used as a model.

In addition, recommendations were made for the New York Police Department to strengthen its coordination with private security units and to unilaterally expand its coordination to work with heads of small as well as large security firms. It was recommended as part of a new citywide security protocol that the police, fire, and emergency response units and other first responders all coordinate their emergency response efforts with private security firms.

New York State did not institute all the recommendations made by the City Council and the New York City Public Advocate. However, New York State did make available a tax break for building owners who had their security officers participate in a 40-hour enhanced security training course.

In two studies conducted in 2004 and 2007, Schmidt came to similar conclusions. He found a significant relationship in 2004 and a high correlation in 2007 between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction among employees. The survey conducted in 2004 was a sample of customer and technical service employees in nine different organizations in the United States and Canada. The sample size in 2004 was 552, with 301 responding; this data set was also used in the 2007 study.

If there is a correlation between satisfaction with workplace training and overall job satisfaction, as stated in the previous studies, then we should see a similar outcome in a group of security officers who have received additional training and who were surveyed currently. The 2004 survey conducted by the New York City Public Advocate Office found that the officers were poorly trained and that there was a high turnover rate and low wages amongst the officers.

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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This review examines private security officer preparedness in the following subliterations: 1) government documents (mandates and directives), 2) government research, and 3) reports and journals.

A. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

The Homeland Security act of 2002 provided the basis for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) responsibilities in the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). This act assigns DHS the responsibility for developing a comprehensive national plan for securing CIKR and for recommending the

measures necessary to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other agencies of the federal government and in cooperation with state and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. (Homeland Security Act, 2002)

The national approach for CIKR protection is provided through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7. In HSPD-7 the president designates the secretary of homeland security as the principal federal official to lead CIKR protection efforts among federal departments and agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector (HSPD-7, 2003, p. 1). HSPD-7 establishes a central source for coordinating best practices and supporting protective programs across and within government agencies, as well as establishing structures to enhance close cooperation between the private sector and government at all levels in order to initiate and sustain an effective CIKR protection program (Chertoff, 2009, p. 16). HSPD-7 mandated development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) as the primary vehicle for implementing the CIKR protection policy. HSPD-8 establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies and is a companion directive to HSPD-5 (HSPD-8, 2003, p. 1).

HSPD-5 required DHS to coordinate efforts to develop and implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF) (HSPD-5, 2003, p. 3). NIMS provides a uniform doctrine for command and managerial control, including incident command, multiagency coordination, and joint information systems to respond to and recover from a domestic incident (Chertoff, 2009, p. 74).

The protection of critical infrastructure has been discussed since September 11, 2001, and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets defined building human capital as it is related to personnel surety because there is a fundamental need to ensure that trustworthy, reliable, and trained personnel are available to protect critical infrastructure and key assets from terrorist attack.

Private sector owners and operators rely on skilled employees to protect critical infrastructure. Security personnel and first responders in particular require adequate training, equipment, and other support to carry out their responsibilities effectively and with some degree of assurance that their personal security will not be in jeopardy while accomplishing their mission. (National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, 2003, p. 28)

In 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted. Section 6402 of this act was named the Private Security Officer Act of 2004. This section authorized a fingerprint-based criminal history check of state and national criminal history records to screen prospective and current private security officers (Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act, 2004). This section allowed states to opt out of the provisions of this act or to conduct checks under the auspices of Public Law 92-544, which gave the states the statutory authority to perform the state and national fingerprint checks. The problem with the Private Security Officer Act of 2004 was that there was no uniformity on the type of background checks being conducted, if any at all. Some states conduct state background checks, some federal background checks, and some conduct no background checks. Another issue never addressed in the act is a requirement for training individuals as required under the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (National Strategy for

the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, 2003, p. 28). These individuals were hired to protect what has been designated as critical infrastructure under HSPD-7. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, along with HSPD-5, 7, and 8 were the precursors to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).

The federal government addressed the issues of background checks and training with regard to federal facilities and security officers hired to protect them in 1995 after the Oklahoma City bombing under President Bill Clinton (Reese & Tong, 2010, p. 1). The Private Security Officers Act of 2004 did not address these same issues in the same way.

1. Government Research

The Public Advocate of the City of New York conducted a research study at the end of 2004 and reported on the study in February 2005. The study was conducted to determine the level of standards at which security officers were performing three years after the second attack on the World Trade Center and eleven years after the first attack. They determined that the standards were alarmingly low. The standards that were being looked at were training and background checks.

After conducting this research study in 2004, the New York City Public Advocate's Office concluded that, at a time when the Department of Homeland Security had kept New York City at a code orange terror alert, the City, businesses, and building owners should have had the utmost concern for the public's security. Many security officers who were interviewed reported having much less training than the state requires, or none at all, and had little to no background in pertinent areas such as antiterrorism protection. Twenty-five percent of officers surveyed had less than a year of experience at the building where they worked. The 2005 report was prepared to demonstrate why the security officer training standards and enforcement practices of 2004 needed to be improved. It was determined that the city's Class A building owners needed to play a more prominent role in developing and maintaining a professional security force because neither city leaders or private building owners had taken the initiative to train security

officers to respond to terrorism incidents, whether an attack or an individual conducting reconnaissance at the location. The security officers were not instructed on how to interface with police officers or work with firefighters during an emergency (Sheppard & Mintz-Roth, 2005, p. 1).

The New York City Public Advocates Office and the City Council were concerned because the area of Lower Manhattan, which has been the site of previous terrorist attacks (the 1993 bombing of and the 2001 aircraft attack on the World Trade Center), contains the headquarters of eleven Fortune 500 companies, the stock exchange, the financial district, and many high gross revenue, high employee count firms that are located in Class A buildings. Financial transactions of more than \$1 trillion are executed by firms and companies in this area daily. Clearly, this region fulfills all the target requirements of Al Qaeda and its followers—the United States economy (J. Miller, 2007).

In conducting this literature review, I found very few research reports pertaining to security officer training, although many reports state that security officers require training. The NYC Public Advocates Office prepared its report to demonstrate the need of current security officer training standards and enforcement practices for improvement. It compared New York City's security standards to other large domestic and international cities and explained why New York City's Class A building owners needed to play a more prominent role in developing and maintaining a professional security force. The Public Advocates Office made recommendations, and some of those recommendations have been enacted, such as the New York State Enhanced Security Guard Training Program. Further research can now be conducted to determine whether those recommendations were effective.

The Public Advocates Office recommended that all private security officers in commercial office buildings be required to complete comprehensive New York State-approved security officer training programs and suggested Local 32BJ's Thomas Shortman Training Fund 40-hour New York Safe and Secure program as a recommended example. The 40-hour training course includes state-of-the-art segments on terrorism, evacuation procedures, and coordination with police, fire, and emergency personnel

during an emergency. The 40-hour Thomas Shortman Security Officer Training course eventually became the model for the New York State Enhanced Security Guard Training Program. The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program was implemented to support and complement the existing security officer training and counterterrorism efforts in New York State. The program does this by providing training and education designed to improve observation, detection, and reporting skills and improve coordination with local police, fire, and emergency services. In addition, the program provides and improves skills in working with advanced security technology, including surveillance and access control procedures. The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program and its precursor, the Thomas Shortman Security Officer Training course, both require forty hours of training, with a minimum of three hours devoted to terrorism awareness.

New York State believes that because 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States belongs to private enterprise and corporations, those security officers are literally one of the nation's first groups of defenders and play an integral role in prevention and deterrence efforts. They also believe that success in prevention and deterrence of both general crime and terrorist acts begins with the establishment of a baseline and the maintenance of a robust all-hazards and all-crimes management infrastructure. The professional security officer industry in New York State, with an excess of 140,000 certified security officers, constitutes that baseline.

New York State established the Enhanced Security Guard Training Program to provide security officers with the basic awareness of terrorism issues that can potentially affect responsibilities within the purview of their employment. The program was designed to improve observation, detection, and reporting capabilities while enhancing coordination capability with other emergency-response professionals. In addition, this program was designed to elaborate on previously provided instruction, thereby elevating participants' familiarity with access control issues and security technology.

The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program provides instruction in the following topical areas: Information and Intelligence Sharing; Terrorism Indicators and Trends; WMD Standardized Awareness Training; Anti-Surveillance Strategies; Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability Assessments; Safety and Security—

Emergency Planning; National Incident Management (NIMS) training to include, IS-700 National Incident Management System—An Introduction; and ICS-100 Introduction to Incident Command System (ICS); the Fundamentals of Patrol; Criminal and Civil Law—Powers and Limitations; Cooperation and Coordination in Public Relations; and Basic First Aid (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 4).

The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program is intended to support and complement the current security officer training and counterterrorism efforts in the State of New York. Through this program security officers will gain an increased level of training and knowledge pertaining to security concerns and terrorism-related issues in support of their role as security specialists and their responsibilities within the purview of their profession.

The New York State Office of Homeland Security Enhanced Security Guard Training Program is an extension of previously provided training as governed by New York State law. Therefore, security guards participating in this course of instruction must have satisfactorily completed all necessary training requirements (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 14).

This program of instruction is consistent with and in recognition of HSPD-8, which calls for a National Preparedness Goal that establishes measurable priorities, targets, and a common approach to developing needed capabilities. The goal utilizes a capabilities-based planning approach to help answer the questions “How prepared are we?”, “How prepared do we need to be?”, and “How do we prioritize efforts to help close the gap?” A central objective of capabilities-based planning is the identification of target level of capability that federal, state, local, and tribal entities must achieve to perform critical tasks for homeland security missions. Capabilities are combinations of resources that provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from performance of one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and performance standards. Version 1.0 of the Target Capabilities List (TCL) identifies 36 target capabilities (HSPD-8, 2003).

Additionally, the program recognizes and is consistent with the Universal Task List (UTL), which “defines what tasks need to be performed by Federal, State, local, and tribal jurisdictions and the private sector to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from events defined in the National Planning Scenarios” (United States Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2007).

In addition to compliance with the guidance obtained from HSPD-8, the Enhanced Security Guard Training program was developed in accordance with compliance standards of HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, so as to ensure standardization and conformity with nationally accepted practices and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Enhanced Security Guard Training program, 2006, pp. 5, 6).

As an incentive for building owners, New York State provided a tax benefit to building owners who enabled their security officers to attend the enhanced training. Under the Enhanced Security Guard Tax Credit Program, certain qualified building owners who own buildings 500,000 square feet or more that are protected by qualified and trained security officers may claim a credit against the tax imposed by article 9-A of the New York State tax law. The amount of credit allowed is \$3,000 for each qualified security officer who is employed for a full year and has received the Office of Homeland Security Enhanced Security Guard Training.

The incentive for the security officers upon completion of the training is an increase in their hourly wages. In an effort to help reduce turnover, New York State required that the officer who completed the enhanced training was required to remain employed with the sponsoring employer for one year.

2. Reports and Journals

The literature review in this section encompasses a number of reports and studies relating to the benefits of job training. Some of the literature is new, while some of it, from the early 1980s, is somewhat dated. Training, as defined in one report, is the process of learning, as well as the application of acquired knowledge aiming at better

performance of employees. It is training and development programs that bring change in terms of attitudes, knowledge, and behavior of employees (Siddiqui, 2009, p. 1). There is a consistent correlation across the literature between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction among employees.

Training can also help to improve job satisfaction, as found in two studies from 2004 (Schmidt, 2004) and 2007 (Schmidt, 2007). Schmidt found a significant relationship in 2004 and a high correlation in 2007 between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction among employees in customer contact positions. Schmidt found that the results of his studies concurred with prior studies conducted for professional occupations (Ellinger, Ellinger, & Keller, 2003; Tansky & Cohen, 2001). These reports suggest that there is a correlation between the finding in this report and the two prior studies, suggesting that the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction is similar for employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmidt, 2007, p. 492).

This is significant considering that part of the recommendations made by the New York City Public Advocates Office was the need for improved training for New York City security officers. At the time of that study, a high turnover rate among the security officers surveyed was noted. It would be interesting to see whether the improved training had any effect on the turnover rate of security officers.

Hypothesis #5: As the level of job satisfaction decreases the level of employee turn-over increases.

Training is a process of learning, as well as the application of acquired knowledge aimed at improving employee development. Training is defined as a learning process that involves the acquisition of knowledge, sharpening of skills, concepts, rules, or changing of attitudes and behaviors to enhance the performance of employees. Training is about the acquisition of knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) through professional development. It is the training and development programs that bring about the change in terms of knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of employees. As a result of these programs,

the employees are not only well acquainted with what is expected of them and how they need to enhance their skills and competencies, but they also achieve overall organizational development (Siddiqui, 2009, p. 1).

B. THE ROLE OF TRAINING

What are KSAs?

The below definitions are defined by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management:

KSAs—Knowledge, Skill, Ability

Specific KSAs are needed in performing certain jobs. Individual KSAs are demonstrated through qualifying experience, education, or training.

KSAs are further defined:

Knowledge: A body of information applied directly to the performance of a function, usually factual or procedural in nature. An example is knowledge of emergency/evacuation procedures for a building to effectively respond during an emergency.

Skill: An observable competence to perform a learned psychomotor act, the proficient manual, verbal, or mental manipulation of data or things. An example is having the skill to operate personal computers.

Ability: The competence to perform an observable behavior or a behavior that results in an observable product; it is the power or capacity to perform an activity or task. An example is the ability to use a variety of scanning instruments at different check points while performing perimeter security for a facility (United States Office of Personnel Management, 2011).




Figure 4. The Role of Training (From Introduction of Training, 2011, p. 1.)

Besides knowledge, skills, and ability needed in performing certain jobs, there is a process by which individuals make decisions about their own behavior in an organizational setting. This process of decision making about one's own behavior has three concepts that serve as building blocks for the theory of expectancy. The first concept to be discussed is the performance outcome expectancy concept. In an individual's mind every behavior has associated with it certain outcomes, whether they are rewards or punishments. An individual may believe that if they increase productivity they will receive a bonus, or an individual may believe that certain levels of performance may lead to disapproval or approval from fellow workers or supervisors. Each performance can be seen as leading to a number of different kinds of outcomes and outcomes can differ in types.




Figure 5. Basic Motivation-Behavior Sequence (From Leavitt, Pondy, & Boje, 1989, p. 7.)

Valence (value, worth, attractiveness to a specific individual) is another concept in the expectancy theory. Each outcome has a different valence for each individual because it is based on an individual's perceptions and needs, which are different because they in turn reflect other factors in the individual's life. A pension plan may have great valence for an older worker but little valence for a young employee on his first job. Some individuals may value a chance for promotion while others may not.

The third concept of the expectancy theory is the effort-performance expectancy. This expectancy represents the individual's perception of achieving such behavior and the probability that they will succeed.

Nadler and Lawler have stated that by putting these three concepts together, it is possible to make a basic statement about motivation. To attempt to behave in a certain way is greatest when the individual believes that the behavior will lead to outcomes (performance-outcomes expectancy), the individual believes that the outcomes have positive value for them (valence), and the individual believes that they are able to perform at the desired level (effort-performance expectancy). An individual given a number of alternative levels of behavior will choose that level of performance that has the greatest motivational force associated with it (Leavitt, Pondy, & Boje, 1989, p. 6). More

than 50 studies have been undertaken to test the validity of the expectancy theory approach for predicting employee behavior, most of which support the validity of this theory (Mitchell, 1974).

A trained and skilled employee is far better than one who is untrained and unskilled. The employee becomes more competent and has the potential to perform his assigned tasks independently. Employees who are trained need less supervision than those who are not—a major benefit of training and development programs. A trainee acquires new knowledge, skills, and attitudes and applies them in job situations. Training is a way to create confidence among employees so that they can operate and complete their tasks effectively and efficiently (Siddiqui, 2009, p. 2).

A number of studies have been conducted on the correlation between job satisfaction and employee turnover rates, training and organization commitment, and compensation, work motivation and job satisfaction, and the field of study has ranged from health care workers, small businesses to large organizations, and fast-food franchises. The studies were conducted in England, France, Greece, and the United States. Some of the studies found that the results concurred with prior studies conducted on professional occupations (Ellinger, Ellinger, & Keller, 2003; Tansky & Cohen, 2001), suggesting that the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction is similar for employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmid, 2007, p. 492).

In a study conducted in 2000 by Eagan, Lashley, and Thomas on the benefits of training in leisure retailing (a case study of McDonald's restaurants in the United Kingdom), alternative measures other than the somewhat narrow financial indices employed in earlier attempts were used to show potential returns on investment in training. The model argues that training shapes individual behavior, which in turn results in benefits that include improved productivity, employee satisfaction, reduced staff turnover, improved service quality, increased customer satisfaction, reduced waste, and fewer accidents, as well as improved employee flexibility and willingness to accept strategic and organizational change. In these circumstances training played a key role in leisure retail organizations aiming to gain competitive advantage through service quality

and employee performance. The purpose of the study was to examine the extent to which the anticipated benefits of training materialized in practice. The authors applied the benefits model to 12 case study restaurants in the Midland region of the United Kingdom and found evidence to suggest that low levels of training gave rise to high levels of staff turnover and that providing good training has a positive effect on staff retention (Eaglen, Lashley, & Thomas, 2000, p. 334).

If there is a correlation between satisfaction with workplace training and overall job satisfaction, as stated in the previous studies mentioned, then we should see a similar outcome for a group of security officers who have received additional training in loss prevention and customer service/relations, terrorism awareness/prevention, or emergency response to incidents if they were surveyed now.

Hypothesis #3: The completion of additional training in loss prevention and customer service/relations, terrorism awareness/prevention, or emergency response to incidents increases the level of job satisfaction.

In an attempt to find the relationship between workplace learning and job satisfaction in small to midsize businesses, Robert Rowden conducted a study in 2002 of twelve small to midsize companies that agreed to participate in the study. These companies were located through a variety of methods, including personnel contacts, colleagues, and cold calling. No criteria for selection was used other than size (fewer than 200 workers). This study established strong links between workplace learning and job satisfaction in these small to midsize businesses. Previous to this study it was the conventional wisdom that small to midsize businesses do little to develop the human resources in their organizations. This study does not support that thinking. The respondents in this study reported extensive incidents of formal, informal, and incidental learning in the workplace, with incidental learning having the greater place among them. In addition, the respondents also reported a feeling of overall job satisfaction, with recognition, work enjoyment, supportive work environment, and benefits as a big part of their perception of satisfaction. The study also found that job satisfaction can be attributed in large part to the availability of learning opportunities on the job (Rowden,

2002, p. 423). Increased competition, globalization, and speed of change have helped highlight the importance of the capacity for learning in small to midsize businesses as a key to both survival and success (Dunphy, Turner, & Crawford, 1997).

Bartlett conducted a study in 2001 study in the health care field on the relationship between training and organizational commitment; it examined the relationship between employee attitudes toward training and feelings of organizational commitment among a sample of 337 registered nurses from five hospitals. Using social-exchange theory as a framework for his investigation, Bartlett found that perceived access to training, social support for training, motivation to learn, and the perceived benefits of training are positively related to organizational commitment. Using a three-component model of organizational commitment, Bartlett found that the strongest relationships appear with the affective form of commitment. The relationship between perceived access to training opportunities and the affective form of organizational commitment is moderated by job satisfaction but not job involvement, and training and development contribute to desired workplace attitudes, including organizational commitment, which may in turn influence behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover rates (Bartlett, 2001, p. 335). Regardless of whether increased commitment is an objective of training activities, organizational commitment was acknowledged as an influence on the training process.

Howard reviewed Bartlett's work in an invited reaction and found that the Bartlett article is framed in terms of demonstrating the use of organizational commitment as an alternative training outcome to help justify the investment that organizations make in training and development. In his conclusion Howard did not agree with Bartlett's recommendation that Human Resource Division (HRD) practitioners use organizational commitment and other work-related attitudes regularly as outcome measures; however he did agree with most of the other implications that Bartlett discussed (Howard, 2001, p. 359).

The study "Commitment In The Workplace: Theory Research And Application," conducted by Meyer and Allen in 1997, demonstrates ways in which the positive effects of training on organizational commitment can be enhanced (Meyer & Allen, 1997, p. 75).

The results of a 2009 study of Malaysian public service managers also suggests that organizational learning plays an important role and significantly contributes to organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and work outcomes (Rose, Kumar, & Pak, 2009, p. 61).

In another study that applied the theoretical framework based on expectancy and discrepancy theories to examine how the elements of total compensation might influence work motivation and job satisfaction, the relationship between the elements of total compensation, work motivation, and job satisfaction were analyzed. Proposals were developed to predict the conditions of compensation efficiency on work motivation and job satisfaction in the cultural context of employment in France. Two samples of employees, 269 exempt (not paid for overtime) and 297 nonexempt (paid for overtime), were studied separately.

The three principle conclusions of the study were that:

Under certain conditions, individualized compensation of exempt employees can be a factor of work motivation;

Flexible pay of nonexempt employees neither motivates nor increases job satisfaction;

Benefits of exempt and non-exempt employees neither motivate nor increase job satisfaction (Igalens & Roussel, 1999, p. 1016).

A survey conducted in 2004 by the New York City Public Advocate Office reported that the officers were poorly trained and that there was a high turnover rate due to low wages and limited benefits and health care among the officers. To test this theory that high turnover is related to job satisfaction, another question that can be asked is whether providing benefits and health insurance to employees increases their level of job satisfaction and whether, as the level of job satisfaction decreases, the level of employee turnover increases. Another hypotheses to be tested is whether, as the level of compensation increases, the level of job satisfaction also increases. An additional aspect to explore is, when increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of

loss prevention and customer service/relations training, terrorism awareness/prevention training, or emergency response to incidents, whether that training increases the level of training participation.

A 2007 study by Sahinidis and Bouris of 134 employees and lower managers of five large Greek organizations—after they had completed a training program in an effort to measure the employees’ perceived training effectiveness in relationship to employee attitudes—found a strong relationship between employee perceived training effectiveness and motivation, job satisfaction, and commitment. This study also found that, although there was no causal relationship found, the magnitude of the correlations indicates that the concepts examined are inextricably related and the relationships ought to be taken seriously by practicing managers, as well as academics (Sahinidis & Bouris, 2008, p. 74).

A meta-analytic review of 106 articles and book chapters on participation was conducted. However, many of these materials were found not to be appropriate for meta-analysis. From the process of literature search and elimination, the reviewers found 47 studies that contained quantifiable estimates of the relationship between participation in decision making and satisfaction or productivity. Of these, nine studies were experimental or quasi-experimental studies with subjects who were not organizational members, 13 were field experiments in which participation was manipulated in an organization, and the rest were correlational. This research was found to support some current wisdom about the effects of participation (Miller & Monge, 1986, p. 748). The meta-analysis provides some support for the conclusions reached by (Locke & Schweiger, 1979) that participation has an effect on both satisfaction and productivity and that its effect on satisfaction is somewhat stronger than its effect on productivity.

C. CONCLUSION

In summation, most of the literature from 2003 to 2007 seems slightly dated, following which the frequency of reporting tends to drop off. A review of the government documents reveals a rush after 2001 to prepare strategies for guidance in the protection of critical infrastructure. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical

Infrastructure and Key Assets was followed by HSPD-5, HSPD-7, and HSPD-8, prepared in 2003. These four components, along with a few others, were the basis for the National Infrastructure Protection Plan prepared in 2009.

These strategies and directives speak about training with regard to critical infrastructure protection, but there is very little evidence that this type of training is being conducted at the security officer level, even though those individuals are on the front lines with regard to protecting critical infrastructure. For example, HSPD-5 required DHS to coordinate efforts to develop and implement the National Incident Management System (NIMS) a key feature of which is the Incident Command System (ICS). Very little research appears to exist regarding the training of individuals beyond first responders in the NIMS system and the Incident Command System.

There seems to be a disconnect in the literature between the standards imposed for security officers employed to protect federal facilities, as opposed to security officer standards in general.

The 2004 study of the Public Advocate of the City of New York made recommendations, some of which were implemented. Further research at this time could determine whether those recommendations were effective. This study also noted that there was a high turnover rate among security officers surveyed.

The Sasha Corporation reviewed a compilation of 15 studies on the cost to replace an \$8.00-per-hour employee in the United States. Per these studies the cost ranges from \$3,500 on the low end of the survey to as much as \$25,000 on the high end, when additional costs are factored in, such as loss of productivity, advertising, temporary staff, recruitment, and training. On average the cost of replacing an \$8.00-an-hour employee over the 15 surveys was \$9,444.47; averaging the surveys using only the lowest 10 of the 15 surveys gives an estimated cost of \$5,505.80 (Compilation of Turnover Costs Studies, 2009, p. 2). This can represent a significant cost to a company, considering that some estimates for security officer turnover range from 100 percent to as high as 300 to 400 percent annually for smaller firms (SEIU, 2010, p. 1) and that in general the compilation

of studies reviewed by the SASHA Corporation on the cost of employee turnover are correlated to salary of the employee; therefore, as the cost per hour for the employee increases, so does the cost to replace that employee.

The cost of employee turnover has a cumulative effect on a company: even with the reduction of one worker, a company's productivity starts to slip. The current staff is required to work additional hours to cover the vacancies, which starts to affect morale. The time it takes to find a replacement, screen and interview the applicants, and then train them for the position is not cost beneficial to a company. It might be worthwhile to invest in one's workforce if that investment increases motivation, job satisfaction, and productivity, and thus has the potential to reduce the turnover rate of employees. The cost of such an investment should be weighed against the cost of employee turnover.

Prior studies have indicated that there is a correlation between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction. One of the recommendations made by the Public Advocates Office was the need for increased training for security personnel. An interesting question is whether the improved training has any effect on the employment and job satisfaction rate of security officers.

III. METHODOLOGY

This study is being conducted on the occupation of security officer in order to increase the current field of research in this area and because of the increased responsibilities being placed on security officers since September 11. A number of measures and recommendations with regard to training and preparedness of security officers were made for implementation in 2005 by the New York City Council and the New York City Public Advocates Office, which found that security officers were undertrained, underpaid, and unprepared to protect the constituents of New York City. The report found that the security officers were not trained to respond to terrorism, interface with police, or work with firefighters during an emergency. The Public Advocates Office and the City Council also found a high turnover rate among security officers in New York City to which low wages and lack of opportunities contributed.

This survey research will be used to better understand factors influencing job satisfaction and employee turnover rates, in particular how various levels of training and compensation and the provision of health care benefits influence security officer job satisfaction. Survey research was selected to better understand the perceptions of a random sample of security personnel and to understand the factors influencing job satisfaction and turnover. The 26-item survey instrument that was developed was submitted for review by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) local 32bj and the Thomas Shortman Training Program, the training program for SEIU. The purpose of having SEIU 32bj and the Thomas Shortman Training Program review the survey instrument was to make sure that it accurately reflected security officers' duties and responsibilities. SEIU local 32bj represents the security guards during contract negotiations and provides training and benefits to its constituents. SEIU 32bj and the Thomas Shortman Training Program reviewed the survey instrument, made recommendations, and approved the survey instrument for distribution to its members.

A. SAMPLE

A random selection (sample population) of 401 security guards was taken from a larger population of security officers assumed to contain high levels of variance in terms of the level of training received. Random selection was used to mitigate potential selection biases that might result from purposeful or convenience sampling and that might create issues related to internal validity. Random sampling was also selected to ensure that participants would remain anonymous.

B. DATA COLLECTION

A 26-item survey instrument was administered to the sample population during their in-service training at Union local 32bj. The instructors who provide the in-service training distributed and collected the returned surveys to help maintain the anonymity of the respondents. A majority of the 26-item survey questions was based on the Likert five-point scales; some of the questions are response questions. A complete list of questions is available in Appendix B.

C. DATA ANALYSIS

All useable surveys were parsed into two groups, those who have received the 40-hour Enhanced Security Officer training and those who have not. Both descriptive statistics were used to better understand variance within the sample population; t-tests were used to better understand how the group that had received training compared with the group that had not received training, and regression analysis was used to explore possible correlations among the factors influencing job satisfaction and security guard turnover and the following hypotheses:

H1—Providing health insurance to employees increases the level of job satisfaction.

H2—As the level of compensation increases, the level of job satisfaction also increases.

H3—The completion of additional training in loss prevention and customer service/relations, terrorism awareness/prevention, or emergency response to incidents increases the level of job satisfaction.

H4—When increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of loss prevention and customer service/relations training, terrorism awareness/prevention training, or emergency response to incidents, training increases the level of training participation.

H5—As the level of job satisfaction decreases, the level of employee turnover increases.




Figure 6. Thesis Research, Hypotheses

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IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DATA

Before comparing two groups using independent t-tests and exploring bivariate analysis among the variables under study, the author used Cronbach's Alpha to better understand whether the survey items measuring a particular construct such as job satisfaction move together or are measuring the same thing. Based on the value of the Alpha, the author was able to generate composite variables for job Satisfaction and compensation/benefits. The author also identified another variable: training efficacy. Below are the results.

A. JOB SATISFACTION

In terms of job satisfaction, the author used Cronbach's Alpha against all five survey items and obtained an Alpha value of .750, which suggests that all five items move together and are measuring the same thing.

Note: A Cronbach's Alpha value of .70 or higher is considered adequate for social science research. This particular statistic does not tell us whether these five questions are only measuring job satisfaction, only that all five items move together and are measuring the same thing.

Table 1. Cronbach's Alpha Job Satisfaction

Reliability Statistics	
Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.750	5

Based on the results of this test, the author calculated a composite variable, "Job Satisfaction Composite," by calculating the mean across all five survey items.

B. COMPENSATION

Wages had a mean value of 4.26 and did not move with other compensation variables.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Wages

Descriptive Statistics					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Compensation1_Wages	341	1.00	5.00	4.2698	.97193
Valid N (list wise)	341				

In terms of “Compensation Raises, Compensation Benefits, and Compensation Heath Insurance,” the author used Cronbach’s Alpha against all three survey items and obtained an Alpha value of .774, which suggests that all three items move together and are measuring the same thing.

Table 3. Cronbach’s Alpha Compensation Raises, Benefits, and Health Insurance

Reliability Statistics	
Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.774	3

Based on the results of this test, the author calculated a composite variable “Compensation Benefits Composite” by calculating the mean across all three survey items.

C. EMPLOYEE TURNOVER

Using a perceived measure of employee turnover is not ideal, but without actual numbers, the author decided to work with perceived turnover and qualify each statement that references this variable. Cronbach’s Alpha was used to determine whether the two survey items measuring turnover move together. An Alpha score of .607 indicated that the two items do not move together and are not measuring the same thing.

Table 4. Cronbach's Alpha Reliability Turnover

Reliability Statistics	
Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.607	2

Since the item measuring "Employee Turnover Percent" used a seven-point scale, it was dropped from the analysis, and the item "Employee Turnover Ratio" was retained for the analysis.

D. TRAINING EFFICACY

One item was used to measure the efficacy of training among private security guards: "This amount of training is sufficient to prepare you to meet your security guard responsibilities?"

1. Comparing Two Groups (Independent t-test) 40-Hour Training

Before comparing the group that participated in the 40-hour training program with the one that did not participate in the program, all scales were converted from ordinal to interval measures to facilitate using the independent samples t-test. All surveys that included neutral values (3) were omitted, all values 1 and 2 were collapsed to 0, and all values 4 and 5 were collapsed to 1. Collapsing the scale reduced the number of usable surveys to 181. After collapsing the scales, an independent sample t-test was run. While there was a difference in the means between groups (40-hours enhanced training versus no 40-hours enhanced training) for "Job Satisfaction" and "Compensation/Benefits," Leven's test for equality of variance among groups was above .05 for all items, and all significance measures exceeded .05. This suggests that the independent t-test statistic does support reporting difference between groups.

Table 5. Group Statistics 40-Hour Enhanced Training and Turnover Rate

Group Statistics					
	Training: Forty hour Enhanced Security Guard Training	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Employee Turnover2_Rate	no	84	.5833	.49597	.05411
	yes	97	.5876	.49482	.05024
Training: Sufficient to prepare you to meet your responsibilities	no	84	.7500	.43561	.04753
	yes	97	.7423	.43966	.04464
Job Satisfaction Composite	no	84	.8929	1.40582	.15339
	yes	97	.6619	.68821	.06988
Compensation Benefits Composite	no	84	.8095	1.45000	.15821
	yes	97	.4639	.54125	.05496

2. Bivariate Analysis

A set of bivariate tests (correlations) were run on the following survey items: “Employee Turnover Rate,” “Training Efficacy,” “Job Satisfaction,” and “Compensation/Benefits.”

The correlation between “Compensation/Benefits” and “Job Satisfaction” is significant at the .01 level and suggests that “Compensation/Benefits” explains 39 percent of the variance in “Job Satisfaction.”

The correlation between “Training Efficacy” and “Job Satisfaction” is significant at the .01 level and suggests that “Training Efficacy” explains 17 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction.”

The correlation between “Training Efficacy” and “Compensation/Benefits” is significant at the .01 level and suggests that perceived level of training efficacy explains 11 percent of the variation in the perceived value of “Compensation/Benefits.”

Table 6. Independent Samples Test

Independent Samples Test										
		Levene's Test for Equality		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig.(2tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
									Lower	Upper
Employee Turnover2_Rate	Equal Variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	.013	.908	-.058 -.058	179 175.206	.954 .954	-.00430 -.00430	.07383 .07384	-.14998 -.15003	.14139 .14144
Training_Sufficient to prepare you to meet your responsibilities	Equal Variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	.056	.813	.118 .119	179 175.768	.906 .906	.00773 .00773	.06525 .06521	-.12103 -.12096	.13649 .13642
Job Satisfaction Composite	Equal Variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	.130	.719	1.433 1.370	179 116.681	.154 .173	.23100 .23100	.16124 .16855	-.08718 -.10282	.54919 .56482
Compensation Benefits Composite	Equal Variances assumed Equal variances not assumed	2.324	.129	2.179 2.064	179 102.943	.031 .042	.34561 .34561	.15858 .16748	.03268 .01344	.65853 .67777

A set of bivariate tests (correlations) were run on the survey items measuring “Job Satisfaction” to better understand how much of each “Job Satisfaction” item is being explained by all another “Job Satisfaction” items. After running all pairs, it appears that the item “Necessary Instruction to do a Good Job” explains .512 or approximately 50 percent of variation in “Proud to be an Employee Here,” and “Communications from Top Management” explains .514 or approximately 50 percent of “Necessary Instructions to do a Good Job.”

Table 7. Correlations: Compensation/Benefits and Job Satisfaction, Training Efficacy and Job Satisfaction, Training Efficacy and Compensation/Benefits

Correlations

		Employee Turnover2_Rate	Training: Sufficient to prepare you to meet your responsibilities	Job Satisfaction Composite	Compensation Benefits Composite
Employee Turnover2_Rate	Pearson Correlation	1	.042	-.047	-.036
	Sig. (2- tailed)		.440	.383	.508
	N	341	341	341	341
Training; Sufficient to prepare you to meet your responsibilities	Pearson Correlation	.042	1	.175**	.118*
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.440		.001	.030
	N	341	341	341	341
Job Satisfaction Composite	Pearson Correlation	-.047	.175**	1	.393**
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.383	.001		.000
	N	341	341	341	341
Compensation Benefits Composite	Pearson Correlation	-.036	.118*	.393**	1
	Sig. (2- tailed)	.508	.030	.000	
	N	341	341	341	341

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

3. Correlations

The first significant correlation between “Instruction to do a Good Job” and “Proud to be an Employee Here” suggests that “Instruction to do a Good Job” explains 42 percent of “Proud to be an Employee Here.” If we interpret “Instruction to do a Good Job” as those who received training, then the data suggest that training is an important factor influencing “Proud to be an Employee Here.” Since “Proud to be an Employee

Here” holds together with the other items measuring “Job Satisfaction” (Alpha .750), this suggests that training has a significant influence on “Job Satisfaction.” Taking the next step, we would like to see a strong correlation between “Job Satisfaction” and “Employee Turnover Rate.” Since the relationship between “Employee Satisfaction” (all five items) and “Employee Turnover” was not supported by the data collected in this study, the data that was collected represented perceived measures of employee turnover versus actual measures of employee turnover. Based on the limitations associated with measuring perceived employee turnover, prior studies identified in the literature are used to support the relationship.

There have been a number of studies conducted on the correlation between job satisfaction and employee turnover rates, training and organization, commitment and compensation, work motivation and job satisfaction. The field of study has ranged from health care workers, small business to large organizations, and fast-food franchises. The studies were conducted in England, France, Greece, and the United States. Some of the studies found that the results concurred with prior studies conducted on professional occupations (Ellinger, Ellinger, & Keller, 2003; Tansky & Cohen, 2001), suggesting that the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction is similar for employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmidt, 2007, p. 492). The relationship between perceived access to training opportunities and the effective form of organizational commitment is moderated by job satisfaction but not job involvement, and training and development contribute to desired workplace attitudes, including organizational commitment, which may in turn influence behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover rates (Bartlett, 2001, p. 335).

In a study conducted in 2000 by Eagan, Lashley, and Thomas on the benefits of training in leisure retailing (a case study of McDonald’s restaurants in the United Kingdom), the authors used alternative measures other than the somewhat narrow financial indices employed in earlier attempts to show potential returns on investment in training. The model argues that training shapes individual behavior, which in turn results in benefits that include improved productivity, employee satisfaction, reduced staff turnover, improved service quality, increased customer satisfaction, reduced waste, and

fewer accidents, as well as improved employee flexibility and a willingness to accept strategic and organizational change. In these circumstances training plays a key role in leisure retail organizations who are aiming to gain competitive advantage through service quality and employee performance. The purpose of the study was to examine the extent to which the anticipated benefits of training materialized in practice. The authors applied the benefits model to 12 case study restaurants in the Midland region of the United Kingdom and found evidence to suggest that low levels of training give rise to high levels of staff turnover and that the provision of good training has a positive effect on staff retention (Eaglen, Lashley, & Thomas, 2000, p. 334).

The second significant correlation between “Communications from Top Management” and “Necessary Instruction to Do a Good Job” suggests that “Communications from Management” explains 49 percent of “Instructions to do a Good Job.” This may be interpreted as management effectiveness in communicating training goals for a particular job or position. This also supports the idea that training may be perceived by management and employees as closely related to a job or position, rather than a particular set of program goals or a program brand. This particular interpretation requires further investigation.

The third significant correlation between “Use of Skills” and “Proud to be an Employee Here” (significant at the .01 level) suggests that “Use of Skills—possibly from training” influences 45 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction.”

Table 8. Correlations: Job Satisfaction

Correlations

	Job Satisfaction 1: Good use of my skills and abilities	Job Satisfaction 2: Proud to be an employee here	Job Satisfaction 3: Capable employees selected for promotions	Job Satisfaction 4: Necessary instruction to do a good job	Job Satisfaction 5: Communications from the top management adequate
Job Satisfaction 1: Pearson Good use of my skills and abilities on	1	.453**	.188**	.290**	.355**
Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000
N	341	341	341	341	341
Job Satisfaction 2: Pearson Proud to be an employee here	.453**	1	.327**	.418**	.427**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.000	.000
N	341	341	341	341	341
Job Satisfaction 3: Pearson Capable employees selected for promotions	.188**	.327**	1	.380**	.450**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.000	.000
N	341	341	341	341	341
Job Satisfaction 4: Pearson Necessary instruction to do a good job	.290**	.418**	.380**	1	.494**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000		.000
N	341	341	341	341	341
Job Satisfaction 5: Pearson Communications from the top management adequate	.355**	.427**	.450**	.494**	1
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	
N	341	341	341	341	341

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

E. CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

Security officers' wages have improved since 2004 although 53.4 percent of the respondents are still not satisfied with their wages, even though 54 percent of the respondents reported making more than \$16 an hour, more than the national average.

1. Compensation/Benefits

The range for compensation of wages available on the survey instrument ranged from under \$10 an hour to more than \$16 an hour. Fifty-four percent or 184 respondents reported making more than \$16 an hour. Ninety-three respondents (27.2 percent) reported making between \$14 and 16 an hour.

A review of the statistics reveals that 81.2 percent of the security officers surveyed reported earning \$14 or more an hour, with 54 percent reporting that they make more than \$16 an hour, equivalent to more than \$33,280 a year. The national annual median wage for a security officer/guard in 2008 was \$23,820 (Occupational Employment and Wages: Security Guards, 2009, p. 1). The majority of the officers surveyed reported making more than the national median wage; some reported making close to \$20 an hour. Some of the differences can be attributed to location and the higher cost of living in the surveyed area (New York City and metro area).

A review of the 341 respondents' answers revealed that when security officers were asked whether they were satisfied with these wages, 27 percent or 92 respondents were satisfied with their current wages; 53.4 percent or 182 respondents were not satisfied with their current wages.

The security officers were asked whether benefits (sick days, holidays, and vacation days) offered are fair and reasonable when compared to similar employers in this area. One hundred seventy-one officers (50.1 percent) believed that benefits offered

were fair and reasonable when compared to similar employers in the area. One hundred eight officers (31.7 percent) did not believe that benefits offered were reasonable when compared to similar employers in the area.

When security officers were asked whether they were satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their employer, 38.4 percent or 131 respondents were satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their employer, while 39.9 percent or 136 respondents were not satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their employer.

2. Turnover

The security officers in this survey were asked whether there is a high turnover rate among security officers where they work. In response, 41.9 percent or 143 respondents believe that there is a high turnover among security officers where they work, and 28.7 percent or 98 respondents did not believe that there was a high turnover where they work.

When asked the percentage of annual turnover among security officers where they work, 56 percent of the respondents reported that they believe that the annual turnover rate where they work is below 40 percent, and 75.4 percent of the respondents reported that they believe the annual turnover rate is below 60 percent. Further turnover rates were reported as follows:

- 23.5% (80): less than 20 percent;
- 32.5% (111): above 20 percent but below 40 percent;
- 19.4% (66): above 40 percent but below 60 percent;
- 14.3% (49): above 60 percent but below 80 percent;
- 6.2% (21): above 80 percent but below 100 percent;
- 2.05% (7): above 100 percent, but below 200 percent;
- 2.05% (7) above 200 percent.

The security officers in this survey were asked a series of questions to determine what they thought were the contributing factors to employee turnover where they work. The first question was whether the turnover rate among security officers where they work

attributable to wages. In response, 35.5 percent or 121 of the respondents believed that turnover was attributable to wages, while 40.5 percent or 148 of the respondents believed that the turnover rate where they worked was not attributable to wages.

The second question asked whether the turnover rate among security officers where they work was attributable to benefits (sick days, holidays, and vacation days). In response, 40.8 percent or 139 of the respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work was attributable to benefits, while 38.4 percent or 131 believed that the turnover rate where they worked could not be attributed to benefits.

The third question asked whether the turnover rate among security officers where they work could be attributed to health insurance. In response, 32.3 percent or 110 of the respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work could be attributed to health insurance, and 42.8 percent or 146 respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work could not be attributed to health insurance.

The fourth question asked whether the turnover rate among security officers where they work could be attributed to a lack of career growth. In response, 53.1 percent or 181 respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work was attributable to lack of career growth, while 25.2 percent or 86 respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work was not attributable to lack of career growth.

Question five asked whether the turnover rate among security officers where they work was attributable to a lack of training opportunities. In response, 13.5 percent or 46 respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work was attributable to lack of training opportunities, and 55.7 percent or 190 respondents believed that the turnover rate where they work was not attributable to lack of training opportunities.

3. Training

The security officers were asked how many hours of training they received before starting their current job. In response, 48.7 percent of the respondents reported receiving 24 hours or more of training, while 51.3 percent reported receiving less than 24 hours of training. In addition, 11.1 percent or 38 respondents reported receiving 8 hours or less

training; 25.5 percent or 87 respondents reported receiving between 8 and 16 hours of training; 14.7 percent or 50 respondents reported receiving 16 to 24 hours of training; 27.3 percent or 93 respondents reported receiving 24 to 40 hours of training; and 21.4 percent or 73 respondents reported receiving more than 40 hours of training.

The security officers were asked whether they felt that the amount of training they have received is sufficient to prepare them to meet their security officer responsibilities. In response, 70.1 percent or 239 respondents believed that the training they have received is sufficient to prepare them to meet their responsibilities as a security officer, and 18.5 percent or 63 respondents did not believe that the training they have received is sufficient to prepare them to meet their responsibilities as a security officer.

Training composite was created to measure 18 different types of training that was available to these security officers. These included loss prevention techniques, customer service and tenant relations, security technology, report writing, working with police, working with firefighters, working with emergency response units, suspicious packages, suspicious people, terrorism-related emergencies, patrolling inside and outside of facilities, reporting emergencies, building evacuations, NIMS training, CIMS training, performing regular emergency drills, enhanced security guard training, and terrorism training from the NYPD Shield Program. This composite was formulated using a Likert five-point scale, and the types of training were measured by the amount of different types of training received by the security officer. If a security officer received between one and three types of training, that would be equal to 1 on the Likert scale. Four to seven types of training equals 2, eight to eleven types of training was equal to 3, twelve to fifteen types of training was equal to 4, and sixteen to eighteen types of training was equal to 5 on the Likert scale. Of the security officers, 72.7 percent reported receiving between 8 and 18 of the different types of training that were available to them. Further, 2.1 percent or 7 respondents reported receiving 0 types of training; 7.9 percent or 27 respondents reported receiving 1 to 3 types of training; 17.3 percent or 59 respondents reported receiving 4 to 7 types of training; 26.1 percent or 89 respondents reported receiving 8 to 12 types of training; 30.5 percent or 104 respondents reported receiving 12 to 15 types of training; 16.1 percent or 55 respondents reported receiving 16 to 18 types of training.

a. *Loss Prevention*

One hundred seventy-nine respondents (52.5 percent) reported receiving loss prevention training.

b. *Customer Service and Tenant Relations*

Two hundred sixty-nine respondents (78.9 percent) reported receiving training in customer service and tenant relations.

c. *Training with Security Technology*

Two hundred fifteen respondents (63 percent) reported receiving training with security technology, e.g., CCTV.

d. *Training in Report Writing*

Two hundred sixty-nine respondents (78.9 percent) reported receiving training in report writing.

e. *Training for Working with the Police*

One hundred eighty respondents (52.8 percent) reported that they had received training for working with the police.

f. *Training for Working with Firefighters*

One hundred sixty respondents (46.9 percent) reported that they had received training for working with firefighters.

g. *Training for Working with Other Emergency Response Units*

One hundred seventy respondents (49.9 percent) reported receiving training for working with other types of emergency response units.

h. Reporting Emergencies

Two hundred seventy-three respondents (80.1 percent) reported receiving training in how to report emergencies.

i. Training in Conducting a Patrol Inside and Outside a Facility

Two hundred ninety-two respondents (85.6 percent) reported receiving training in how to conduct a patrol inside and outside a facility and what to look for.

j. Training in Identifying Suspicious Packages

Two hundred fifty-three respondents (74.5 percent) reported receiving training in identifying suspicious packages.

k. Training in Identifying Suspicious People

Two hundred sixty-six respondents (78 percent) reported receiving training in identifying suspicious people.

l. Training in Handling Terrorism-Related Emergencies

Two hundred twenty-three respondents (65.4 percent) reported receiving training regarding handling terrorism-related emergencies.

m. Training in Building Evacuations

Two hundred seventeen respondents (63.6 percent) reported receiving training in building evacuations.

n. Conducting Regular Emergency/Evacuation Drills

One hundred forty-nine respondents (43.7 percent) reported conducting emergency/evacuation type drills.

o. Forty-Hour Enhanced Security Guard Training

One hundred seventy-eight respondents (52.2 percent) reported that they had received the 40-hour enhanced security guard training.

p. NIMS Training

With regard to the National Incident Management System (NIMS) a key feature is the Incident Command System (ICS), which is supposed to be part of the 40-hour enhanced security guard training. Although 52.2 percent of the respondents reported having received the enhanced security officer training, only 24.6 percent of the respondents reported having received training in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS).

Eighty-four respondents (24.6 percent) reported receiving NIMS training.

q. CIMS Training

Seventy-six respondents (22.3 percent) reported receiving CIMS training.

r. Training from the NYPD Shield Unit

Ninety respondents (26.4 percent) reported receiving training from the NYPD Shield Unit.

Compensating for security officers who are assigned to the airports (152) that are under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority of New York and the New Jersey Police, and analyzing the data for security officers who work in buildings under the jurisdiction of the NYPD, one sees a slight uptick in the percentage of security officers trained by the NYPD Shield Unit to 31.2 percent. In addition, there were 31 security officers who had previously received this training from the NYPD Shield Unit before going to work in the airports.

The training provided by the NYPD Shield Unit includes Terrorism Awareness for the Security Professional, Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device Security Checkpoint Operations Course, Surveillance Detection for Commercial Infrastructure Operators and Security Staff, and Detecting Hostile Surveillance.

4. Job Satisfaction

When asked whether the present job makes good use of the respondent's skills and abilities, 51.9 percent or 177 respondents reported that their present job makes good use of their skills and abilities; 28.2 percent or 96 respondents reported that their present job did not make good use of their skills and abilities.

When asked whether they were proud to be an employee at their present job, 62.4 percent or 213 respondents were proud to be an employee in their present job; 14.7 percent or 50 respondents were not proud to be an employee in their present job.

When asked whether the most capable employees are always the ones selected for promotion, 30.2 percent or 103 respondents believed that the most capable employees are always the ones selected for promotion, while 52.2 percent or 178 respondents did not believe that the most capable employees are always the ones selected for promotion.

When asked the question "When assigned work I've never done before, I get the necessary instruction to do a good job," 56.3 percent or 192 respondents believe that when assigned work they have never done before they get the necessary instruction to do a good job, and 28.2 percent or 96 respondents believe that when assigned work they have never done before, they do not get the necessary instruction to do a good job.

When asked the question, "Communications from the top management are adequate for me to know what is going on in the organization," 47.2 percent or 161 respondents think that communications from top management are adequate for them to know what is going on in the organization, while 34.9 percent or 119 respondents do not think that communications from top management are adequate for them to know what is going on in the organization.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. SECURITY OFFICER RESEARCH STUDY (2011)

A total of 401 surveys were distributed; of those 341 or 85 percent were completed in their entirety and used as the sample population. The sample population of security officers captured during this research study was drawn from different working backgrounds and assigned to work at a number of different types of facilities. The sample population, although approximately three times larger than the original, was in fact statistically equivalent to the original survey with regard to the number of respondents who work in commercial office buildings in Manhattan—102 in 2004 and 95 in 2011 respectively.

The group that participated in the 40-hour training program was compared to the one that did not was evaluated (52.2 percent or 178 respondents reported that they had received the 40-hour enhanced security guard training). While there was a difference in the means between groups for “Job Satisfaction” and “Compensation/Benefits,” Leven’s test for equality of variance among groups was above .05 for all items, and all significance measures exceeded .05, suggesting that the independent t-test statistic supports a reporting difference between groups toward the following hypothesis: When increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of terrorism training, the level of training participation increases, and as the level of compensation increases, the level of job satisfaction also increases.

The completion of additional training in loss prevention and customer service/relations, terrorism awareness/prevention, or emergency response to incidents increases the level of job satisfaction and in addition, by providing benefits and health care, also increases the level of job satisfaction. The correlations between “Compensation/Benefits” and “Job Satisfaction,” “Training Efficacy” and “Job Satisfaction,” and “Training Efficacy” and “Compensation/Benefits” are significant at the .01 level and suggests that “Compensation/Benefits” explains 39 percent of the variance in “Job Satisfaction” and supports Hypothesis #1, that providing compensation and

benefits to employees increases the level of job satisfaction and Hypothesis #2, as the level of compensation increases the level of job satisfaction also increases. “Training Efficacy” explains 17 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction” and supports Hypothesis #3, that the completion of additional training increases the level of job satisfaction. The perceived level of training efficacy explains 11 percent of the variation in the perceived value of “Compensation/Benefits” and supports Hypothesis #4, when increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of training, the level of training participation increases.

If we interpret “Instruction to do a Good Job” as an identification of those who received training, then the data suggest that training is an important factor influencing “Proud to be an Employee Here.” Since “Proud to be an Employee Here” holds together with the other items measuring “Job Satisfaction” (Alpha .750), this suggests that training has a significant influence on “Job Satisfaction.” This first significant correlation between “Instruction to do a Good Job” and “Proud to be an Employee Here” suggests that “Instruction to do a Good Job” explains 42 percent of “Proud to be an Employee Here.” That conclusion supports Hypothesis #3—that the completion of training increases the level of job satisfaction—and thus supports Schmidt’s 2007 findings suggesting that the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction is similar for employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmidt, 2007, p. 492). Another significant correlation found in this study was that between “Use of Skills” and “Proud to be an Employee Here” (significant at the .01 level), which suggests that “Use of Skills—possibly from training” influences 45 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction.”

In an attempt to measure Hypothesis #5—as the level of job satisfaction decreases, the level of employee turnover increases—we would expect to see a strong correlation between “Job Satisfaction” and “Employee Turnover Rate.” Since the relationship between “Employee Satisfaction” (all five items) and “Employee Turnover” was not supported by the data collected in this study, the data that was collected represented perceived measures of employee turnover versus actual measures of employee turnover. Based on the limitations associated with measuring perceived employee turnover, prior studies identified in the literature are used to support the

relationship. There have been a number of studies conducted on the correlation between job satisfaction and employee turnover rates, training and organization commitment, and compensation, work motivation, and job satisfaction, and the field of study has ranged from health care workers, small business to large organizations, and fast-food franchises. The studies were conducted in England, France, Greece, and the United States. The studies found that there was a correlation between job satisfaction and employee turnover rates; some of the studies found that the results concurred with prior studies conducted on professional occupations (Ellinger, Ellinger, & Keller, 2003; Tansky & Cohen, 2001). The relationship between perceived access to training opportunities and an effective form of organizational commitment is moderated by job satisfaction but not job involvement, and that training and development contributes to desired workplace attitudes, including organizational commitment, which may in turn influence behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover rates (Bartlett, 2001, p. 335).

The significant correlation between “Communications from Top Management” and “Necessary Instruction to Do a Good Job” suggests that “Communications from Management” explains 49 percent of “Instructions to do a Good Job.” This may be interpreted as management effectiveness in communicating training goals for a particular job or position. This also supports the idea that training may be perceived by management and employees as closely related to a job or position rather than a particular set of program goals or a program brand. This particular interpretation would require further investigation.

B. COMPARISON OF THE 2004 AND 2011 RESEARCH STUDIES

In 2011, a random selection (sample population) of 401 security guards was taken from a larger population of security officers; in the 2004 research study a random selection of 102 security guards was taken from a larger population. Although the sample populations in all likelihood in these two surveys have different respondents, there is a possibility that respondents were captured in both surveys because the sample population of in both surveys was obtained through a similar larger population obtained from SEIU local 32bj.

Random sampling was used to ensure that participants would remain anonymous, and thus it was impossible to confirm whether participants had contributed to both of these research studies. Random selection was also used to mitigate potential selection biases that might result from purposeful or convenience sampling and that might create issues related to internal validity.

Considering that the larger population used in this research is similar in its work experience and backgrounds to the larger population used in the 2004 study, the author was able to compare the results of the 2004 study to the results of the current study even though the same sample population is not being measured in both studies.

A review of the comparisons reveals that security officers have made some strides toward continuity of the workforce by decreasing turnover through increased wages and benefits. They have also increased preparedness through training, 80.1 percent or 273 respondents reported receiving training in how to report emergencies. Respondents have also received training in identifying suspicious people and packages, not just reporting incidents: 74.5 percent or 254 respondents reported receiving training in identifying suspicious packages; 78 percent or 266 respondents reported receiving training in identifying suspicious people. Seventy-three respondents (21.4 percent) reported receiving more than 40 hours of training compared to only 6 percent of officers in 2004.

A review of the statistics for working with emergency response units reveals some improvement in this area and plenty of room for continued improvement. One hundred eighty respondents (52.8 percent) reported that they received training for working with the police; 46.9 percent or 160 respondents reported that they received training for working with firefighters, and 49.9 percent or 170 respondents reported receiving training working with other types of emergency response units. Two hundred thirty-nine respondents (70.1 percent) believed that the training they have received is sufficient to prepare them meet their responsibilities as a security officer.

Table 9. Comparison of 2004 and 2011 Security Officer Research Studies

<p>2004 Interview Question: Most guards report having less training than the state's low requirement.</p> <p>2004 Findings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12% of security officers report having no training at all. • 17% have less than the state's required 8-hours of pre-hire training. • On average, security officers reported having 19 hours of training while having been in their job for 2.3 years. By state law, a security officer in their his second year of employment should have 40 hours of training. Only 6% of officers we spoke to report having 40 hours of training or more. <p>2011 Findings: The security officers were asked how many hours of training they received before starting their current job.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 11.1% or 38 respondents reported receiving 8 hours or less training. • 51.3% reported receiving less than 24 hours of training • 27.3% or 93 respondents reported receiving 24–40 hours of training • 21.4% or 73 respondents reported receiving more than 40 hours of training
<p>2004 Interview Question: Training fails to emphasize terrorism, working with police, or firefighters.</p> <p>2004 Findings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Only 37% of security officers report being trained to work with police officers. • 37% report being trained to work with firefighters. • Just 56% were trained to handle terrorism-related emergencies. • 51% knew how to coordinate with emergency response units. <p>2011 Findings:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 52.8% or 180 respondents reported receiving training for working with the police. • 46.9% or 160 respondents reported receiving training for working with firefighters. • 65.4% or 223 respondents reported receiving training regarding handling terrorism related emergencies. • 49.9% or 170 respondents reported receiving training working with other types of emergency response units.

2004 Interview Question:

Instead, training emphasizes reporting emergencies rather than helping with them.

2004 Findings:

- 79% have been trained to report emergencies, after: 1.) identifying suspicious packages; 2) identifying suspicious people
- 33% have not been trained to help evacuate the building.
- 40% do not participate in regular emergency drills in their building.

2011 Findings:

- 80.1% or 273 respondents reported receiving training in how to report emergencies.
 - Respondents have also received training in identifying suspicious people and packages, not just reporting incidents:
 - 74.5% or 254 respondents reported receiving training in identifying suspicious packages.
 - 78% or 266 respondents reported receiving training in identifying suspicious people.
 - 63.6% or 217 respondents reported receiving training in building evacuations.
 - Compensating for personnel assigned to airports: 28% have not been trained to help evacuate the building.
 - 56.3% do not participate in regular emergency drills in their building.
 - Compensating for personnel assigned to airports: 42.4% do not participate in regular emergency drills in their building.

Training composite was created to measure 18 different types of training available to these security officers, including loss prevention techniques, customer service and tenant relations, security technology, report writing, working with police, working with firefighters, working with emergency response units, suspicious packages, suspicious people, terrorism-related emergencies, patrolling inside and outside facilities, reporting emergencies and building evacuations, NIMS training, CIMS training, performing regular emergency drills, enhanced security guard training, and terrorism training from the NYPD Shield Program.

This composite was formulated using a Likert 5-point scale. The types of training were measured by the number of different types of training received by the security officer. 1–3 types of training equals 1 on the Likert scale; 4–7 types of training equals 2, 8–11 types of training equals 3, 12–15 types of training equals 4, and 16–18 types of training equals 5 on the Likert scale. 72.7% of the security officers reported receiving 8–18 of the different types of training available to them.

- 2.1% or 7 respondents reported receiving 0 types of training.
- 7.9% or 27 respondents reported receiving 1–3 types of training.
- 17.3% or 59 respondents reported receiving 4–7 types of training.
- 26.1% or 89 respondents reported receiving 8–12 types of training.
- 30.5% or 104 respondents reported receiving 12–15 types of training.
- 16.1% or 55 respondents reported receiving 16–18 types of training.

2004 Interview Question:

Wages are low and healthcare benefits are unaffordable or not available.

2004 Findings:

- Reported wages ranged from the federal minimum wage of \$5.15 to \$16.25 per hour, while average wage was \$9.86 per hour. Most officers work 40-hour weeks.
- 43% receive health insurance provided by their job. Many choose not to participate in healthcare plans because they are too expensive.

2011 Findings:

The range for compensation of wages available on the survey instrument was from under \$10 an hour to more than \$16 an hour.

- 54% or 184 respondents reported making more than \$16 an hour.
- 27.2% or 93 respondents reported making \$14–\$16 a hour.
- 81.2% of the security officers surveyed reported earning \$14 or more an hour, with 54% reporting that they make more than \$16 an hour, equivalent to \$33,280+ a year. The national annual median wage for a security officer/guard in 2008 was \$23,820. The majority of the officers surveyed reported making more than the national average; some reported making close to \$20 an hour.

The security officers were asked whether they were satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their employer.

- 38.4% or 131 respondents were satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their employer.

2004 Interview Question:

Turnover is rampant: nearly one-quarter of security officers stay at their job one year or less.

2004 Findings:

- 25% of officers surveyed have less than a year of experience at the building where they work.
- Buildings replace nearly all of their security staff every 1–2 years and one-quarter of those positions are replaced four times per year. Other studies have reported even higher turnover rates.

Low wages, reported by nearly 80% of security officers, and lack of benefits, reported by more than half, were cited as the main causes of turnover.

2011 Findings:

When asked the percentage of annual turnover among security guards where respondent works:

- 23.5% or 80 reported that the turnover rate was less than 20%.
- 56% of the respondents reported that the annual turnover rate was below 40%.
- 75.4% of the respondents reported that the turnover rate was below 60%.
- 35.5% or 121 respondents believed that turnover was attributable to wages.
- 40.8% or 139 respondents believed that the turnover rate was attributable to benefits.
- 32.3% or 110 respondents believed that the turnover rate was attributable to health insurance.
- 53.1% or 181 respondents believed that the turnover rate was attributable to lack of career growth.
- 13.5% or 46 respondents believed that the turnover rate was attributable to lack of training opportunities.

Areas in which security officers are still lacking include building evacuations and conducting emergency drills, the two preparations that were credited with saving thousands of lives in the World Trade Center Buildings on September 11. Compensating for personnel assigned to airports (152): 28 percent of the respondents who work in buildings have not been trained to help evacuate the building they work in, and 42.4 percent of the respondents do not participate in regular emergency drills in their building.

With regard to National Incident Management System (NIMS), a key feature is the Incident Command System (ICS), which is supposed to be part of the 40-hour enhanced security guard training. Of the respondents surveyed, 75.4 percent reported that they have not received receiving training in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS).

In summary, these findings confirm the fact that security officers have made some strides with regard to their preparedness levels as compared to the findings of the research study conducted in 2004. In some categories of preparedness, such as conducting emergency drills, however, they have a long way to go. There was some improvement in the area of working with police and firefighters. To further measure preparedness levels, a training composite was created to measure 18 different types of training available to these security officers. The composite was formulated using a Likert 5-point scale, and the number of different types of training received by the security officers was measured. The percentage of security officers who reported having receiving between 8 and 18 of the different types of training was 72.7 percent, a significant improvement from 2004, where on average the security officers reported having 19 hours of training while having been on the job for 2.3 years.

There has also been some improvement in the salaries of the security officers surveyed: 81.2 percent of the security officers reported earning \$14 or more an hour, with 54 percent reporting that they make more than \$16 an hour, the equivalent of \$33,280+ a year. The national annual median wage for a security officer/guard in 2008 was \$23,820. The majority of officers reported making more than the national average, and some reported making close to \$20 an hour. This is a significant finding, considering that 35.5 percent or 121 respondents in this study believed that turnover was attributable to wages, compared to 80 percent of the respondents in the 2004 study.

With regard to turnover rates, there has been some perceived improvement, as reflected by the fact that 23.5 percent or 80 respondents reported that the turnover rate was less than 20 percent; 56 percent of the respondents reported that the annual turnover rate where they work was below 40 percent, and 75.4 percent of the respondents reported

that the annual turnover rate was below 60 percent. These results are limited by the fact that the security officers were asked not hard statistics but what they believed the annual percentage was where they work. Sometimes perception is reality, however: when compared to a recent report on the private security services industry in the United States, which estimated that annual employee turnover in the industry exceeds 100 percent for many security companies and can be as high as 300–400 percent for smaller firms (SEIU, 2010, p. 1), there seems to have been some improvement. This may be the subject of possible further research.

Another surprising fact was that 53.1 percent or 181 respondents believed that the turnover rate was attributable to the lack of career growth, another possible subject of further research in this area.

C. THE NYPD RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS

The initiatives to be discussed were born out of the recommendations of the New York City Council and the New York City Public Advocates Office, as a result of the 2004 research study. The actions taken by the NYPD as result of these recommendations for training and liaison programs with private security contributed to the current preparedness levels of these security officers and bears mentioning. The questions asked on the survey instrument about whether these security officers received this training are not measurable past the level of descriptive statistics for the purpose of this study, but they could be the bases for further research.

The New York City Council and the New York City Public Advocates Office made two recommendations in 2005 that directly affected the New York Police Department. They were:

- 1) The New York Police Department should strengthen coordination with private security units and unilaterally expand its coordination to work with heads of small as well as large security firms.

2) As part of a new citywide security protocol, the police, fire, and emergency response units and other first responders should coordinate their emergency response efforts with private security firms.

In response to these recommendations, the NYPD consolidated its existing efforts with the private security industry that had originally been developed under community policing guidelines to help reduce crime. After September 11, the NYPD dramatically expanded its contacts with the private security sector through the Area Police Private Security Liaison (APPL) network, site security surveys, and regional infrastructure protection courses presented by the Counterterrorism Bureau. The growing worldwide terrorist threat and the recommendations made by the City Council and the Public Advocates Office required that the NYPD take its cooperation with private security to a new level. NYPD-Shield, established in July 2005, became the answer to that challenge.

1. The NYPD Shield Program

NYPD Shield was not intended to replace existing programs with the private security industry. Rather, it was established to bring all existing programs together under one umbrella and to serve as a clearinghouse for threat updates and key information on new briefings, industry-specific seminars, and the latest offerings from the Counterterrorism Bureau (Kelly, 2010).

The NYPD Shield program is a force multiplier that significantly increases the effectiveness of the NYPD counterterrorism efforts by partnering with the private sector and other public agencies. Through training, conferences, and analytical briefs, the Shield program provides a venue for information sharing on emerging and evolving terrorist threats that may impact New York City.

The program began in July 2005 with an initial enrollment of 800 members and has grown to more than 10,135 members. The Shield program has trained 17,070 people and conducted 633 training classes in terrorism awareness for security professional (TASP), vehicle-borne improvised explosive device security checkpoints (VIBED), detecting hostile surveillance, introduction to critical infrastructure protection, building

design for homeland security, surveillance detection for commercial infrastructure operators and security directors and managers, and active shooter incidents.

There have been 25 conferences conducted and attended by 7,946 members. Conference presenters are usually members of the department with subject-matter expertise. Presentations include analysis of historical terrorism trends globally, as well as recent regional and domestic threats and events. Special conferences have been provided on the Times Square bombing, Mumbai, and school shootings.

Analytical briefings are provided on a weekly basis, but they can be provided sooner on an event-specific incident basis. The analytical briefs are researched and prepared by intelligence research specialists assigned to the counterterrorism division. Those specialists prepare and make available to members sector-specific briefings (cyber security, CBRN, etc.), weekly regional reports (Iran, Iraq, Arabian Peninsula, Africa, etc.), incident-specific reports (Times Square bombing, Mumbai, etc.), and they also prepare reports on trends and analysis (NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau, 2010).

The NYPD Shield program offers six training opportunities for personnel within the corporate and private security and management sectors. In addition, the program offers two courses in port security. The requestor of the training must be employed in a corporate capacity, typically as a security director with an established proprietary or contractual security force within New York City. A private security vendor is not eligible unless sponsored by its corporate employer. The available training includes:

Terrorism Awareness

The course discusses how to recognize and identify terrorist-related physical and behavioral indicators, collect and process information, make appropriate notifications, and when necessary, take action during a terrorist attack. The topics discussed include introduction to terrorism, improvised explosive devices, indicators of suicide attacks, and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.

Device Security Checkpoint Operations Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosives

This is an important course due to the number of underground parking garages in New York City. In the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the terrorist used an improvised explosive device secreted in a Ryder rental van that entered the underground parking facility and detonated, creating a five-story-deep crater. The bomb was a 1,500-pound urea nitrate–hydrogen gas–enhanced device that killed seven people, injured 1,042, and stranded many more. The intent of the bombers was to detonate the bomb in the underground parking garage, causing the north tower (Tower One) to fall into the south tower (Tower Two), bringing them both down and killing thousands of people.



Figure 7. 1993 Bombing of the World Trade Center (From ATF, 1993)

The Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Security Checkpoint Operations Course is provided to corporate and private security personnel. The VBIED course is designed to provide hands-on instruction at the facility where the security officers work so that an assessment of the conditions at that facility can be included in the course plan.

The course is also designed to provide hands-on instruction regarding vehicle-borne explosive recognition. During the first phase of instruction, the student is provided various techniques and methods pertaining to the use of proper vehicle inspection during the utilization of security checkpoints at high-profile events and critical infrastructure locations.

The second phase of instruction focuses primarily on the hands-on aspect of vehicle searches. The instruction and training include the various methods of explosive concealment in various types of vehicles; the use of proper interviewing techniques of operators and passengers of suspicious vehicles is demonstrated.

Detecting Hostile Surveillance

Detecting Hostile Surveillance is a course provided to law enforcement, corporate and private security directors, and managers. The course is broken into two phases. The first phase focuses primarily on the techniques used to detect hostile surveillance by identifying threat indicators, hostile surveillance methods, and staging locations. The second phase includes a practical exercise by conducting a brief facility and area analysis in which the participants track and analyze potential hostile surveillance.

The participants who complete this course are better able to identify hostile surveillance and demonstrate an ability to produce an effective facility and area analysis that can assist their organization and the law enforcement community to prevent and interrupt terrorist activity before it strikes.

Surveillance Detection for Commercial Infrastructure Operators and Security Staff

The surveillance detection course is designed for commercial infrastructure operators and security staff. It provides a foundation for developing and applying plans that include the fundamentals of surveillance detection, recognizing the indicators of an imminent attack, implementing appropriate responses, and reporting observations with the necessary details to aid law enforcement officials.

This course consists of learning modules that cover the following topic areas: attack methodology, attack cycle, pre-incident indicators, vulnerability analysis, vulnerability analysis exercise, area analysis, red zone analysis, identifying hostile surveillance positions, red zone design practical exercise, surveillance detection, surveillance detection position practical exercise, developing a surveillance detection plan, observation and reporting. Each of these modules of instruction incorporates practical hands-on learning exercises to reinforce the concepts and skills taught. This course ends with a capstone field exercise so that the participants can apply the lessons learned.

Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Protection Course

This course is intended to equip members of the law enforcement and corporate-security community with the skill set required for deterring, detecting, and identifying potential terrorist activity. This course also introduces the principles of risk assessment (an examination of the vulnerabilities associated with the infrastructure of a facility), basic methods of security, and the major components of a municipality's critical infrastructure.

Building Design for Homeland Security Course

The goal of this course is to enhance the understanding of the participants in the measures and technology available to reduce risk from terrorist attack. Included in this understanding is the process for assessing risk to focus upon which mitigation measures have the greatest applicability and benefit. The participants learn the design approaches to mitigate man-made hazards and comprehend the tradeoffs needed to optimize various design requirements.

Since September 11, the NYPD has restructured its mission to include counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection. It proactively identifies and assesses the location and targets in New York City that are most vulnerable to a terrorist attack, and it partners with key private and law enforcement personnel for the protection of the city's assets.

2. Lower Manhattan Security Initiative

The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative was also developed in response to recommendations that were made in an effort to coordinate the NYPD response efforts with the private security firms in lower Manhattan. This partnership was formed from necessity in order to develop a comprehensive plan to protect lower Manhattan and the corporate entities that do business there. The plan that was implemented included consolidating existing private/public security cameras and building an intelligent closed-circuit TV system (CCTV) to protect lower Manhattan against terrorist events.



Figure 8. Lower Manhattan Security Initiative Command Center
(From NYPD, 2010)

The New York Police Department, in partnership with private corporate security companies, is in the process of building a closed-circuit TV (CCTV) surveillance system that will be more sophisticated and effective in identifying and alerting users to a possible threat or incident than the closed-circuit TV system used by police in London and other British cities. Although the NYPD Lower Manhattan Security Initiative CCTV system

was modeled after the London system, it is not quite as extensive in the number of cameras incorporated into the system at this time. The NYPD Lower Manhattan Initiative currently has more than 2300 cameras controlled and operated by a combination of private and public entities (CounterTerror NYC, 2011). A total of 3,000 cameras from both NYPD and private stakeholders will be deployed to the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative catchment area by 2011. The catchment area covers a 1.7-square-mile area from the tip of Manhattan on the south to a line parallel to Canal Street from the East River to the Hudson River. The area covered by this system is some 1.7 square miles, and it is considered to be an area of extremely high interest to terrorists.



Figure 9. Lower Manhattan Security Initiative Command Center
(From NYPD, 2010)

The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative is a public/private partnership between the NYPD and private security companies located in lower Manhattan. The NYPD assists the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative participants in developing and exercising their detailed business continuity plans. The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative command

center/coordination center enables information sharing between NYPD and the stakeholders. Private-sector personnel are colocated with police personnel in the center. The center is the intake point for the CCTV feeds. The stakeholders get real-time access to those feeds with real-time event tracking. The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative coordination center is also the command center for the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative patrol resources. The private security companies as stakeholders also get briefings and intelligence updates, and text alerts are given to key executives of both private and public center entities regarding new threats and other urgent matters. There are weekly conference calls with NYPD officials and the opportunity for training for the private security personnel.

Before September 11, responses to terrorism followed the old incident model. Police reacted to individual terrorist incidents, such as the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, the Tokyo subway nerve agent attack in March 1995, the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995, and the Olympics in 1996, as incidents and crime scenes. Law enforcement did not systematically assess and identify terrorism as a problem, analyze the wealth of information bearing on it, partner with communities to craft responses, or regularly evaluate its own efforts. Law enforcement was trained to respond to incidents of terrorism. However, the mission of law enforcement since September 11 has been to detect, preempt, and disrupt terrorist operations.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELECTION AND TRAINING GUIDELINES FOR PRIVATE SECURITY OFFICERS

A review of the comparisons reveals that security officers have made some strides toward continuity of the workforce by decreasing turnover through increased wages and benefits. Preparedness through training has also increased. The original hypothesis was that, if there is a correlation between satisfaction with workplace training and overall job satisfaction, as stated in the previous studies, then we should see a similar outcome for the group of security officers with additional training who were surveyed now.

The New York City Public Advocate made an additional recommendation that the state legislature should adopt legislation requiring additional hours of prelicensing

instruction—beyond the currently mandated eight hours—as part of a new minimum requirement to become a security officer. This recommendation is valid not only for New York State but for other states as well because the selection and training criteria for a private security officer varies from state to state. The selection and training criteria also vary between federal buildings and state and local buildings; it ranges from comprehensive training requirements for every private security officer to little or no training for private security officers. There is a need, therefore, to establish minimum national criteria for the selection and training of all private security officers.

The sample population in this study was separated into two groups: those who participated in the 40-hour training program and those who did not participate in the program. While there was a difference in the mean between groups for “Job Satisfaction” and “Compensation/Benefits,” independent t-test statistics did support reporting a difference between groups.

This study revealed that there is a correlation between “Compensation/Benefits” and “Job Satisfaction.” “Training Efficacy” and “Job Satisfaction,” and “Training Efficacy” and “Compensation/Benefits” that was significant at the .01 level, suggesting that “Compensation/Benefits” explains 39 percent of the variance in “Job Satisfaction” and that providing compensation/benefits to employees increases the level of job satisfaction; as the level of compensation increases, the level of job satisfaction also increases. “Training Efficacy” explains 17 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction” and supports the conclusion that the completion of additional training increases the level of job satisfaction. The perceived level of training efficacy explains 11 percent of the variation in the perceived value of “Compensation/Benefits” and supports the theory that when increases in compensation are rewarded based on the completion of training, the level of training participation increases, and as the level of compensation increases, the level of job satisfaction also increases.

This first significant correlation between “Instruction to do a Good Job” and “Proud to be an Employee Here” suggests that “Instruction to do a Good Job” explains 42 percent of “Proud to be an Employee Here,” which supports the conclusion that the completion of training increases the level of job satisfaction, thus supporting Schmidt’s

2007 finding suggesting that the relationship between job training satisfaction and overall job satisfaction is similar for employees in a variety of occupational categories (Schmidt, 2007, p. 492). The third significant correlation (significant at the .01 level) between “Use of Skills” and “Proud to be an Employee Here” suggests that “Use of Skills—possibly from training” influences 45 percent of the variation in “Job Satisfaction.”

The results of this study support the establishment of a private security officer selection and training guideline as recommended by the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS). This would help develop and encourage the adoption of minimum national criteria for the selection and training of all private security officers and thus contribute to better preparedness levels and continuity of the workforce.

ASIS has concluded that the development of minimum criteria has become essential to enable the private security industry to meet the needs of providing effective security to its clients, as well as meeting the demands associated with new homeland security initiatives. Effective security in today’s environment requires that security officers be familiar with all aspects of a facility’s security system in order to be able to assess and contain potential threats. Security officers are required to be well versed in emergency procedures and able to work with an organization to ensure that emergency procedures can be implemented successfully. They also need to be able to work closely and effectively with public safety personnel (ASIS, 2004, p. 11).

The ability of U.S. companies to contribute to the homeland security project and protect the nation’s critical infrastructure depends largely on the competence of the private security officers that they employ. Therefore, private security officers and applicants for private security officer positions should be thoroughly screened and trained.

The private security industry is currently having difficulty retaining personnel. These additional screening processes could alleviate some of the turnover by weeding out unqualified individuals during the background and training process. It may also cause a shortage of personnel. With the natural order of supply and demand, it could be argued

that a shortage of qualified individuals could be a catalyst for improving the problem of low salaries. If salaries are improved, more qualified applicants for the positions may potentially be attracted.

The real constraint in implementing the screening and training criteria is the fact that the security industry is regulated by the state in which it is working. Some of the big security companies have security contracts in a number of different states, requiring conformity to the different regulations imposed by each state. To address these issues, ASIS revised its Private Security Officer Selection and Training Guidelines in 2010 (ASIS GDL PSO-2010). “Committee members realized there isn’t a one-size-fits-all approach to officer selection,” said Bernard D. Greenawalt, CPP, vice president, Securitas Security Services USA Inc., and chairman of the PSO Guideline Committee. “Not every company’s security requirements are the same and criteria vary from state to state. This revised guideline offers companies the flexibility to implement the strategies that meet their specific business and security needs” (Moeser, 2010, p. 1.)

These guidelines are recommendations for minimum selection and training qualifications to help improve the performance of private security officers and the quality of security services. They provide the framework for private security officer job descriptions and recommended minimum selection criteria, as well as an outline for the design and delivery of private security officer training by employers and other agencies (ASIS, 2010, p. 1).

In developing these new guidelines, ASIS relaxed its 2004 recommendation of establishing a requirement that each private security officer receive 48 hours of training within the first 100 days of employment (ASIS, 2004, p. 16). ASIS is now recommending that pre-assignment training be in accordance with all applicable legal requirements, that on-the-job training be commensurate with position requirements (e.g., 8–16 hours), and that annual training be sufficient to maintain job proficiency (e.g., 8 hours) (ASIS, 2010, p. 8). These current guidelines are in slight contradiction to the federal requirements for security officers. The federal requirements require that all security officers protecting federal facilities undergo background suitability checks and complete approximately 128 hours of training before being assigned to a post or an area of responsibility. Even

discounting the 40 hours of firearms training from the federal requirement, the security officer is still required to complete 88 hours of training before taking a post in a federal facility. In addition, ASIS also recommends that private security officers pass a written and/or performance examination(s) to demonstrate that he/she understands the subject matter being taught.

E. FUTURE RESEARCH

With regard to turnover rates, there has been some perceived improvement, as reflected in the fact that 75.4 percent of respondents reported that they believed the annual turnover rate was below 60 percent. When compared to a recent report on the private security services industry in the United States—which estimated that annual employee turnover in the industry exceeds 100 percent for many security companies and can be as high as 300–400 percent for smaller firms (SEIU, 2010, p. 1), there seems to have been some improvement. The results of this study were limited by the fact that the security officers were asked what they perceived the annual turnover rate to be.

The second significant correlation between “Communications from Top Management” and “Necessary Instruction to Do a Good Job” suggests that “Communications from Management” explains 49 percent of “Instructions to do a Good Job.” This may be interpreted as management effectiveness in communicating training goals for a particular job or position. This also supports the idea that training may be perceived by management and employees as closely related to a job or position rather than a particular set of program goals or a program brand. This particular interpretation would require further investigation.

The NYPD Shield program and the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative were born out of the recommendations of the New York City Council and the New York City Public Advocates Office as a result of the 2004 research study. The actions taken by the NYPD as result of these recommendations regarding training and liaison programs with private security contributed to the current preparedness levels of these security officers and bear mentioning as the basis for further research. Lastly, the fact that 53.1 percent or

181 respondents believed that the turnover rate was attributable to lack of career growth makes it fertile ground for further research in this area.

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APPENDIX A. RESEARCH STUDY (2004) AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. PUBLIC ADVOCATE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 2004 RESEARCH STUDY

Between October 14 and October 19, 2004, researchers from the Public Advocate's office interviewed 102 security officers who worked in 39 of Manhattan's most prominent and iconic Class A commercial buildings and landmarks. These officers worked for the city's largest private security contractors, including Copstat (22 percent of officers interviewed), Securitas (17 percent), Mulligan (15 percent), Topguard (14 percent), Summit (7 percent), and Classic (7 percent).

Summary of Findings:

- Security officers' wages were low, and healthcare benefits were unaffordable or not offered.
- Turnover was rampant: nearly one-quarter of security officers stayed at their job one year or less.
- Most officers reported having less training than New York State requires.
- Training failed to emphasize terrorism awareness, working with police, or firefighters.
- Security officers were told to report emergencies, rather than taught their role in responding to them.
- New York's low training standards have not been revised since 1992 and are outdated.
- The state legislature needs to update the curriculum and address terrorism in security guard training.
- The New York Department of State does not sufficiently police contractors to ensure that the security officers they employ are fully licensed and trained.
- High turnover in New York is due to low wages and lack of opportunities.

- Other large cities like Chicago and San Francisco use industry-specific minimum wages, which help promote a more stable workforce (Sheppard and Mintz-Roth, 2005, p. 1).

Interview Findings:

1. Most guards report having less training than the state's low requirement.
 - 12% of security officers report having no training at all.
 - 17% have less than the state's required 8 hours of pre-hire training.
 - On average, security officers reported having 19 hours of training while having been in their job for 2.3 years. By state law, a security officer in his second year of employment should have 40 hours of training. Only 6% of officers we spoke to report having 40 hours of training or more.
2. Training fails to emphasize terrorism, working with police, or firefighters.
 - Only 37% of security officers report being trained to work with police officers.
 - 37% report being trained to work with firefighters.
 - Just 56% were trained to handle terrorism-related emergencies.
 - 51% knew how to coordinate with emergency response units.
3. Instead, training emphasizes reporting emergencies rather than helping with them.
 - 79% have been trained to report emergencies, after:
 - Identifying suspicious packages;
 - Identifying suspicious people.
 - 33% have not been trained to help evacuate the building.
 - 40% do not participate in regular emergency drills in their building.
4. Wages are low and healthcare benefits are unaffordable or not available.
 - Reported wages ranged from the federal minimum wage of \$5.15 to \$16.25 per hour, while the average wage was \$9.86 per hour. Most officers work 40-hour weeks.
 - 43% receive health insurance provided by their job. Many choose not to participate in healthcare plans because they are too expensive.

5. Turnover is rampant: nearly one-quarter of security officers stay at their job one year or less.

- 25% of officers surveyed have less than a year of experience at the building where they work.
- Buildings replace nearly all of their security staff every one to two years, and one quarter of those positions are replaced four times per year. Other studies have reported even higher turnover rates.
- Low wages, reported by nearly 80% of security officers, and lack of benefits, reported by over half, were cited as the main causes of turnover (Sheppard and Mintz-Roth, 2005, p. 6).

Recommendations:

- The state legislature should adopt legislation requiring additional hours of pre-licensing instruction—beyond the currently mandated eight hours—as part of a new minimum requirement to become a security officer.
- The Department of State’s Division of Licensing should strengthen and expand its auditing of security companies to ensure that all security officers are properly licensed and trained. Spot checks may be an effective tactic.
- The Office of Public Safety within the Department of State’s Division of Criminal Justice Services should revise and strengthen the training curricula to reflect current security concerns, such as terrorism, and update the curriculum regularly to address evolving threats and concerns.
- All private security officers in commercial office buildings should be required to complete comprehensive New York State–approved security officer training programs. A good example is Local 32BJ’s Training Fund 40-hour New York Safe and Secure program that includes state-of-the-art segments on terrorism, evacuation procedures and coordination with police, fire and emergency personnel during an emergency.
- As called for in City Council Resolution 569, the state legislature and the governor should allow municipal legislative bodies to adopt more stringent legislation in relation to training, background checks and licensing/registration for private security personnel to address the deficiency of current security measures.
- The New York Police Department should strengthen coordination with private security units and unilaterally expand its coordination to work with heads of small as well as large security firms.

- As part of a new citywide security protocol, the police, fire, and emergency response units and other first responders should all coordinate their emergency response efforts with private security firms (Sheppard and Mintz-Roth, 2005, p. 2).

Appendix A



Public Advocate for the City of New York

Security Guard Survey, October 2004

Date: _____ { ID: _____ }
Tel. no. called (for internal use only): _____

Hi, I'm calling from the Public Advocate's Office. We got your number from your union (Local 32BJ), and we're calling to ask if you have a few minutes to answer a few questions about your job as a security guard. Your answers will be kept anonymous and confidential. We plan to use the answers from this study to advocate for making the city safer by more appropriately meeting your needs as a security guard.

Demographics:

1. What building do you work in? _____
2. Who is your employer? _____
3. How many years have you worked in this building? _____ (yrs)
4. How many years have you worked as a security guard:
... in NYC? _____ (yrs) ... outside NYC? _____ (yrs)
5. How many hours per week do you work this job? _____ (hrs)
☐ Under 20 ☐ 20-35 ☐ 35-40 ☐ 40-50 ☐ Over 50
6. What is your hourly wage rate? _____ (\$)
☐ Under \$7 ☐ \$7-8 ☐ \$8-9 ☐ \$9-10 ☐ \$10-11 ☐ More than \$11
7. Does your company give annual costs of living raises? ☐ Yes ☐ No
8. Do you have health insurance provided by your job? ☐ Yes ☐ No
9. Is there a high turnover rate among security guards where you work?
☐ Yes ☐ No
→ If Yes, why? (Check all that apply:)
☐ Wages ☐ Benefits ☐ Respect ☐ Other (_____)
10. Do you work other jobs in addition?
☐ Yes ☐ No
→ If Yes,
 - How many hours do you work per week in other jobs? _____ (hrs)
☐ Under 20 ☐ 20-35 ☐ 35-40 ☐ 40-50 ☐ Over 50
 - Why do you work other jobs? (Check all that apply:)
☐ Need more income ☐ Benefits ☐ Career Growth ☐ Other (_____)

11. What impact, if any, do your pay, hours, & benefits have on your work as a guard?

12. What impact, if any, does working other jobs have on your work as a security guard?

Training:

13. How many hours of training did you receive when you started your current job?
_____ (circle one: hours/days)
14. Do you believe this amount of training is sufficient? ☐ Yes ☐ No
15. Have you been trained in:
- | | | |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| a. Loss-prevention techniques? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| b. Customer service & tenant relations? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| c. Security Technology? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| d. Report Writing? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| e. Working with police? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| f. Working with firefighters? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| g. Working with Emergency Response Units? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| h. Suspicious packages? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| i. Suspicious people? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| j. Terrorism-related emergencies? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| k. Patrolling inside and outside? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| l. Reporting emergencies? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
| m. Building Evacuations? | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes | <input type="checkbox"/> No |
16. Do you have regular emergency drills: ☐ Yes ☐ No
If Yes, how often? ☐ Monthly ☐ Twice a year ☐ Annually ☐ Other _____
If Yes, when was the most recent one? _____ (mo/yr)
17. Have you been involved in crime or loss-prevention efforts in your building?
☐ Yes (What kinds? _____) ☐ No
18. Have you undergone more emergency training since 9/11? ☐ Yes ☐ No
If Yes, what kinds? _____ (use **a-m** codes from #15)
19. In which areas, if any, do you believe you and your co-workers need additional training? _____ (use **a-m** codes from #15)

Thank you for participating in this survey!

Figure 10. Security Guard Survey, October 2004

B. ENHANCED SECURITY GUARD TRAINING PROGRAM

New York State believes that because 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States belongs to private enterprise and corporations, those security officers are literally one of the nation's first groups of defenders and play an integral role in prevention and deterrence efforts. The state also believes that success in prevention and deterrence of both general crime and terrorist acts as well begins with the establishment of a baseline and the maintenance of a robust all-hazards and all-crimes management infrastructure. The professional security officer industry in New York State, with in excess of 140,000 certified security officers, constitutes that baseline.

New York State established the enhanced security guard training program to provide security officers with the basic awareness of terrorism issues that can potentially affect responsibilities within the purview of their employment. The program was designed to improve observation, detection, and reporting capabilities, while enhancing coordination capability with other emergency-response professionals. In addition, this program was designed to elaborate on previously provided instruction, thereby elevating participants' familiarity with access control issues and security technology.

The enhanced security guard training program provides instruction in the following topical areas: Information and Intelligence Sharing; Terrorism Indicators and Trends; WMD Standardized Awareness Training; Anti-Surveillance Strategies; Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability Assessments; Safety and Security—Emergency Planning; National Incident Management (NIMS) training to include, IS-700 National Incident Management System—An Introduction; and ICS-100 Introduction to Incident Command System (ICS); the Fundamentals of Patrol; Criminal and Civil Law—Powers and Limitations; Cooperation and Coordination in Public Relations and Basic First Aid (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 4).

Purpose:

The Enhanced Security Guard Training Program is intended to support and complement the existing security officer training and counterterrorism efforts in New York State by providing training and education designed to:

- Improve observation, detection, and reporting skills;
- Improve coordination with local police, fire, and emergency services;
- Provide and improve skills in working with advanced security technology, including surveillance and access control procedures, consisting of instruction requiring at least forty hours of training, including 3 hours of training devoted to terrorism awareness; and
- Has been certified as a qualified program by the state office of homeland security (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 4).

Goals:

The enhanced security guard training program is intended to support and complement the current security officer training and counterterrorism efforts of the state of New York. Through this program security officers gain an increased level of training and knowledge pertaining to security concerns and terrorism-related issues in support of their role as security specialists and the responsibilities inherent within the purview of their profession.

Cognitive Goal:

To provide participants with the basic knowledge and capability to detect and discern potential criminal and terrorist-related activities through a cohesive industrywide effort, promoting a robust environment of prevention and deterrence.

Affective Goal:

To provide participants with an appreciation for the complexity and enormity of criminal and terrorism-related activities, as well as an awareness of ongoing counterterrorism efforts on a local, state, and national level (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 9).

Enhanced Security Guard Training

Program of Instruction:

- Section 1—Course Introduction/Historical Perspectives
- Section 2—Criminal and Civil Law

- Section 3—Information Gathering and Sharing
- Section 4—Terrorism Indicators and Trends
- Section 5—Anti-Surveillance Efforts
- Section 6—Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability Assessment Awareness
- Section 7—Security and Safety Emergency Planning
- Section 8—Fundamentals of Patrol—Access Control
- Section 9—Fundamentals of Patrol—Communications, Cooperation, and Public Relations
- Section 10—WMD Standardized Awareness
- Section 11—IS-700 National Incident Management System (NIMS): An Introduction
- Section 12—ICS-100: Introduction to ICS
- Section 13—Basic First Aid

Additionally the participants will be able to:

- Identify/list information sharing strategies available within NYS;
- Identify/list communication avenues within NYS to report suspicious or potential criminal or terrorist related activity;
- Distinguish/explain the difference between information and intelligence;
- Describe/explain common methods of operation of terrorist groups;
- Describe/explain potential indicators of a suicide/homicide bomb attack;
- Describe/explain the importance of pre-operational surveillance;
- Describe/explain the methods utilized to protect critical infrastructure and key assets;
- Describe/explain what Risk and Vulnerability Assessments are;
- Describe and explain the purpose of the National Incident Management System NIMS;
- Describe and explain basic Incident Command System (ICS);
- Describe in detail the importance of Access Control;
- Identify and list local resources available to professional security personnel for information resources and support;

Discussion Material:

As events that may impact the role of security specialists are capricious and may shift on a frequent basis, discussion will be generated on a daily basis (where appropriate), consistent with current events to aid attendees in better understanding their evolving role as security specialists.

Participant Evaluation and Responsibilities:

Participant's successful achievement of goals will be evaluated through a combination of psychomotor, cognitive, and affective evaluation consistent with the desired learning outcome of each individual section and or module.

Additionally participants are required to complete course evaluations consistent with Kirkpatrick's four-level model of evaluation (level one—reaction), and student evaluations that focus on:

- The participant's knowledge at the beginning of this program;
- The participant's knowledge at the conclusion of this program;
- The value of the materials, information and knowledge conveyed during this instruction; and
- The relevance of the instruction in relation to the participant's duties and responsibilities at a specified work location.

Participant Requirements:

All course participants must be Security Guards as defined in the New York State General Business and Executive Laws or management/staff members working within, for, or with a licensed security entity.

The New York State Office of Homeland Security Enhanced Security Guard Training Program is an extension of previously provided training as governed by New York State law. Therefore, security guards participating within this course of instruction must have satisfactorily completed all necessary training requirements (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 14).|

This program of instruction is consistent with and in recognition of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8), which calls for a National Preparedness Goal that establishes measurable priorities, targets, and a common approach to developing needed capabilities. The goal utilized a Capabilities-Based Planning approach to help answer the questions “how prepared are we?”, “how prepared do we need to be?” and “how do we prioritize efforts to help answer to close the gap?” A central objective of Capabilities-Based Planning is the identification of target level of capabilities that Federal, State, local, and tribal entities must achieve to perform critical tasks for homeland security missions. Capabilities are combinations of resources that provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome resulting from performance of one or more critical tasks, under specified conditions and performance standards. Version 1.0 of the Target Capabilities List (TCL) identifies 36 target capabilities (HSPD-8, 2003).

Additionally, this program recognizes and is consistent with the Universal Task List (UTL) which “defines what tasks need to be performed by Federal, State, local, and tribal jurisdictions and the private sector to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from events defined in the National Planning Scenarios” in the following areas:

Common

- Planning (Training) (All Modules)

Prevent Mission Area

- Information Gathering and Sharing, Section 3
- Terrorism Indicators and Trends, Section 4
- WMD Standardized Awareness, Section 10
- Anti-Surveillance Efforts, Section 5
- Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability Assessments, Section 6
- Fundamentals of Patrol—Access Control, Section 8
- Fundamentals of Patrol—Communications, Cooperation, and Public Relations; Section 9

Protect Mission Area

- Information Gathering and Sharing, Section 3

- WMD Standardized Awareness, Section 10
- Prevention and Physical Security—Vulnerability Assessments, Section 6
- Security and Safety Emergency Planning, Section 7
- Fundamentals of Patrol—Communications, Cooperation, and Public Relations; Section 9

Respond Mission Area

- WMD Standardized Awareness, Section 10
- Security and Emergency Planning, Section 7
- IS-700 National Incident Management System (NIMS), An Introduction, Section 11
- ICS-100: Introduction to ICS, Section 12
- Fundamentals of Patrol—Communications, Cooperation, and Public Relations; Section 9
- Basic First Aid, Section 13

In addition to compliance with and guidance obtained from HSPD-8, this program was developed in accordance with compliance standards of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, so as to ensure standardization and conformity with nationally accepted practices and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, pp. 5, 6).

Guidance was also obtained from the Office for Domestic Preparedness (Grants and Training), Emergency Responder Guidelines; *Awareness Level*, as follows:

- Recognize Hazardous Materials Incidents.
- Know the protocols used to detect the potential presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) agents or materials.
- Know and follow self-protection measures for WMD events and hazardous materials events.
- Know procedures for protecting a potential crime scene.
- Know and follow agency/organization's scene security and control procedures for WMD and hazardous materials events.

- Possess and know how to properly use equipment to contact dispatcher or higher authorities to report information at the scene and to request additional assistance or emergency response personnel (Enhanced Security Guard Training Program, 2006, p. 6).

APPENDIX B. SECURITY GUARD SURVEY (2011)

Appendix B



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The National Homeland Security Education

Security Guard Survey, 2011

Date: _____

Control No. _____

Naval Postgraduate School

Consent to Participate in Anonymous Survey

You are invited to participate in a research study entitled Security Officer 2011. This survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip any questions or stop participating at any time without penalty. Your responses are anonymous. Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected against release to unauthorized persons; however, there is a minor risk that data collected could be mismanaged.

If you have questions regarding the research, contact Rudy Darken, darken@nps.edu, 831-656-7588. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Naval Postgraduate School IRB Chair, CAPT John Schmidt, jkschmid@nps.edu, 831-656-3864.

Demographics:

1. What is the Classification of the building you work in?

☐ Office Building ☐ Public/Gov't Facility ☐ School ☐ Airport

Compensation:

2. What is your hourly wage rate?

☐ Under \$10 ☐ \$10-12 ☐ \$12-14 ☐ \$14-16 ☐ More Than \$16

3. The benefits offered here are fair and reasonable when compared to similar employers in this area?

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
☐ 2. = disagree
☐ 3. = undecided
☐ 4. = agree
☐ 5. = strongly agree



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4. You are satisfied with raises in union contract.

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
☐ 2. = disagree
☐ 3. = undecided
☐ 4. = agree
☐ 5. = strongly agree

5. Health Insurance:

Are you satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by your employer?

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
☐ 2. = disagree
☐ 3. = undecided
☐ 4. = agree
☐ 5. = strongly agree

6. Employee Turnover:

What is the percentage of annual turnover among security guards where you work?

- ☐ 1) <20%
☐ 2) Above 20%, but below 40%
☐ 3) Above 40% but below 60%
☐ 4) Above 60% but below 80%
☐ 5) Above 80% but below 100%,
☐ 6) Above 100% but below 200%
☐ 7) Above 200%

7. There is a high turnover rate among security guards where you work.

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
☐ 2. = disagree
☐ 3. = undecided
☐ 4. = agree
☐ 5. = strongly agree



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The Division of Homeland Security Education

8. The turnover rate among security guards where you work is attributed to wages.

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided
- ☐ 4. = agree
- ☐ 5. = strongly agree

9. The turnover rate among security guards where you work is attributed to benefits (sick, holiday, and vac.).

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided
- ☐ 4. = agree
- ☐ 5. = strongly agree

10. The turnover rate among security guards where you work is attributed to health insurance.

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided
- ☐ 4. = agree
- ☐ 5. = strongly agree

11. The turnover rate among security guards where you work is attributed to a lack of career growth.

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided
- ☐ 4. = agree
- ☐ 5. = strongly agree

12. The turnover rate among security guards where you work is attributed to a lack of training opportunities.

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided



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☐ 4. = agree

☐ 5. = strongly agree

13. Do you work other jobs in addition? ☐ Yes ☐ No

- If you do work other jobs; how many hours do you work per week in other jobs?

☐ Under 20 ☐ 20-35 ☐ 35-40 ☐ 40-50 ☐ Over 50

If you work other jobs; you work those jobs for:

a. More income

☐ 1. = strongly disagree

☐ 2. = disagree

☐ 3. = undecided

☐ 4. = agree

☐ 5. = strongly agree

b. Benefits (sick, holiday, and vac.)

☐ 1. = strongly disagree

☐ 2. = disagree

☐ 3. = undecided

☐ 4. = agree

☐ 5. = strongly agree

c. Health insurance

☐ 1. = strongly disagree

☐ 2. = disagree

☐ 3. = undecided

☐ 4. = agree

☐ 5. = strongly agree

d. Career growth

☐ 1. = strongly disagree

☐ 2. = disagree

☐ 3. = undecided

☐ 4. = agree



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☐ 5. = strongly agree

e. Training opportunities

☐ 1. = strongly disagree

☐ 2. = disagree

☐ 3. = undecided

☐ 4. = agree

☐ 5. = strongly agree

Training:

14. How many hours of training did you receive before you started your current job?

☐ 8 hours or fewer ☐ 8 to 16 hours ☐ 16 to 24 hours ☐ 24 to 40 hours

☐ More than 40

15. This amount of training is sufficient to prepare you to meet your security guard responsibilities?

☐ 1. = strongly disagree

☐ 2. = disagree

☐ 3. = undecided

☐ 4. = agree

☐ 5. = strongly agree

16. Have you been trained in?

a. Loss-prevention techniques

☐ Yes

☐ No

b. Customer service & tenant relations

☐ Yes

☐ No

c. Security Technology

☐ Yes

☐ No

d. Report Writing

☐ Yes

☐ No

e. Working with Police

☐ Yes

☐ No

f. Working with Firefighters

☐ Yes

☐ No

g. Working with Emergency Response Units

☐ Yes

☐ No

h. Suspicious Packages

☐ Yes

☐ No

i. Suspicious people

☐ Yes

☐ No

j. Terrorism-related emergencies

☐ Yes

☐ No

k. Patrolling inside and outside

☐ Yes

☐ No



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- l. Reporting Emergencies ☐ Yes ☐ No
- m. Building Evacuations ☐ Yes ☐ No
- n. NIMS Training ☐ Yes ☐ No
- o. CIMS Training ☐ Yes ☐ No
17. Do you have regular emergency drills? ☐ Yes ☐ No
- If Yes, how often? ☐ Monthly ☐ Twice a year ☐ Annually ☐ Other _____
- If Yes, when was the most recent drill? _____ (mo/yr)

18. Have you been involved in crime or loss-prevention efforts in your building?
- ☐ Yes (What Kinds)? _____ ☐ No

19. Have you undergone more emergency training since 9/11? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If Yes, What kinds? (Use A-O codes from question #16) _____

20. Have you received NYS 40 hr. Enhanced Security Guard Training? ☐ Yes ☐ No

21. Have you received terrorism training from the NYPD Shield Program? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If Yes, which training courses?

- ☐ Terrorism Awareness for the Security Professional
- ☐ Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device Security Checkpoint Operations Course
- ☐ Surveillance Detection for Commercial Infrastructure Operators and Security Staff
- ☐ Detecting Hostile Surveillance

Job Satisfaction:

22. My present job makes good use of my skills and abilities.

- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided
- ☐ 4. = agree



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- ☐ 5. = strongly agree
23. I am proud to be an employee here.
- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided
- ☐ 4. = agree
- ☐ 5. = strongly agree
24. The most capable employees are always the ones selected for promotions.
- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided
- ☐ 4. = agree
- ☐ 5. = strongly agree
25. When assigned work I've never done before, I get the necessary instruction to do a good job.
- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided
- ☐ 4. = agree
- ☐ 5. = strongly agree
26. Communications from the top management are adequate for me to know what is going on in the organization.
- ☐ 1. = strongly disagree
- ☐ 2. = disagree
- ☐ 3. = undecided
- ☐ 4. = agree
- ☐ 5. = strongly agree

Thank you for participating in this survey! You can reply to this email or send your response to npschds@gmail.com

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APPENDIX C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM 2011 RESEARCH STUDY

A. POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS

A total of 401 surveys were distributed, and 341, or 85 percent of them, were completed in their entirety. The sample population of security officers that was captured during this research study was from different working backgrounds and assigned to work at a number of different types of facilities. These facilities included office buildings that were located mainly in Manhattan, including the World Trade Center construction site, public/government facilities, schools, and airports. The airports that were captured in this random sampling of security officers included JFK Airport and LaGuardia Airport in Queens, New York, and Newark Airport located in New Jersey. Of the 341 respondents, 152 or 44.6 percent reported working in airports, 73 or 21.4 percent worked in public/government facilities, 95 or 27.9 percent worked in office buildings, and 21 or 6.2 percent worked in a school as depicted in Table 10.

Table 10. Building Classification

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Airport	152	44.6	44.6	44.6
Public/Gov't Facility	73	21.4	21.4	66.0
Office Building	95	27.9	27.9	93.8
School	21	6.2	6.2	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

B. COMPENSATION

1. Wages

The range for compensation the survey instrument was from under \$10 an hour to more than \$16 an hour. Of the sample population of 341, 184 or 54 percent of the respondents reported making more than \$16 an hour, 93 or 27.2 percent of the

respondents stated that they made between \$14–\$16 a hour, 43 or 12.6 percent of the respondents stated that they made \$12–\$14 a hour, 14 or 4.1 percent of the respondents stated that they made \$10–\$12, and 7 or 2.1 percent of the respondents stated that they made under \$10 a hour as depicted in Table 11.

Table 11. Hourly Wage Rate

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Under \$10	7	2.1	2.1	2.1
\$10–12	14	4.1	4.1	6.2
\$12–14	43	12.6	12.6	18.8
\$14–16	93	27.3	27.3	46.0
More than \$16	184	54.0	54.0	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

One hundred eighty-two or 53.4 percent of respondents indicated dissatisfaction or strong dissatisfaction with their wages; 92 or 27 percent of the respondents indicated satisfaction or strong satisfaction with their current wages; and 67 or 19.6 percent of the respondents were undecided, as depicted in Table 12.

Table 12. Satisfaction with Wages

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	106	31.1	31.1	31.1
Disagree	76	22.3	22.3	53.4
Undecided	67	19.6	19.6	73.0
Agree	73	21.4	21.4	94.4
Strongly agree	19	5.6	5.6	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

2. Benefits

The security officers were asked whether benefits (sick days, holidays, and vacation days) offered are fair and reasonable when compared to similar employers in their geographic area. A review of the 341 respondents' answers revealed that 108 or 31.7 percent of the officers disagreed or strongly disagreed or did not believe that benefits were reasonable when compared to similar employers in the area. One hundred seventy-one of the officers or 50.1 percent agreed or strongly agreed or believed that benefits were fair and reasonable when compared to similar employers, and 62 of the officers or 18.2 percent were undecided, as depicted in Table 13.

Table 13. Reasonable Compensation Benefits

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	56	16.4	16.4	16.4
	Disagree	52	15.2	15.2	31.7
	Undecided	62	18.2	18.2	49.9
	Agree	145	42.5	42.5	92.4
	Strongly agree	26	7.6	7.6	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

3. Health Insurance

The security officers were asked whether they were satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by your employer. A review of the 341 respondents' answers revealed that 136 respondents or 39.9 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed or were not satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their employers. One hundred thirty-one respondents or 38.4 percent agreed or strongly agreed and were satisfied with the level of health insurance provided by their employers, and 74 respondents or 21.7 percent were undecided as depicted in Table 14.

Table 14. Satisfaction with Health Insurance Benefits

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	72	21.1	21.1	21.1
Disagree	64	18.8	18.8	39.9
Undecided	74	21.7	21.7	61.6
Agree	110	32.3	32.3	93.8
Strongly agree	21	6.2	6.2	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

C. EMPLOYEE TURNOVER

1. Turnover Rate

The security officers in this survey were asked whether there is a high turnover rate among security officers where they work. A review of the data from the 341 respondents reveals that 143 respondents or 41.9 percent of the sample population agrees or strongly agrees that there is a high turnover among security officers where they work. Ninety-eight respondents or 28.7 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that there was a high turnover where they work, and 100 respondents or 29.4 percent were undecided as depicted in Table 15.

Table 15. Employee Turnover Rate

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	39	11.4	11.4	11.4
Disagree	59	17.3	17.3	28.7
Undecided	100	29.3	29.3	58.1
Agree	117	34.3	34.3	92.4
Strongly agree	26	7.6	7.6	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

2. Turnover Percentage

When asked the percentage of annual turnover among security officers at the respondents' place of employment, of the 341 respondents in the sample population, 80 or 23.5 percent reported that the turnover rate was less than 20 percent; 111 or 32.5 percent reported a turnover rate of above 20 percent, but below 40 percent; 66 or 19.4 percent reported a turnover rate of above 40 percent, but below 60 percent; 49 or 14.3 percent reported a turnover rate of above 60 percent but below 80 percent; 21 or 6.2 percent reported a turnover rate above 80 percent but below 100 percent; 7 or 2.05 percent reported a turnover rate above 100 percent but below 200 percent; and 7 or 2.05 percent reported a turnover rate above 200% as depicted in Table 16. A total of 56 percent of the respondents reported that they believed that the annual turnover rate where they work was below 40 percent, and 75.4 percent of the respondents reported that they believed the annual turnover rate was below 60 percent.

Table 16. Employee Annual Turnover Percentage

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid <20%	80	23.5	23.5	23.5
Above 20%, but below 40%	111	32.6	32.6	56.0
Above 40% but below 60%	66	19.4	19.4	75.4
Above 60% but below 80%	49	14.4	14.4	89.7
Above 80% but below 100%,	21	6.2	6.2	95.9
Above 100% but below 200%	7	2.1	2.1	97.9
Above 200%	7	2.1	2.1	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

3. Factors Contributing to the Perceived Turnover Rate

The security officers were asked a series of question about what they thought were the contributing factors to employee turnover where they work. The first question asked was whether the turnover rate among security officers where they work is attributable to wages. Of the 341 respondents 138 or 40.5 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that the turnover rate where they work was attributable to wages. One hundred twenty-one or 35.5 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that turnover was attributable to wages, and 82 respondents or 24 percent were undecided as depicted in Table 17.

Table 17. Employee Turnover Attributable to Wages

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	37	10.9	10.9	10.9
Disagree	101	29.6	29.6	40.5
Undecided	82	24.0	24.0	64.5
Agree	95	27.9	27.9	92.4
Strongly agree	26	7.6	7.6	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

The second question asked whether the turnover rate among security officers where respondents work is attributable to benefits (sick days, holidays, and vacation days). Of the 341 respondents, 131 or 38.4 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that the turnover rate where they work was attributable to benefits. One hundred thirty-nine or 40.8 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that turnover was attributable to benefits, and 71 or 20.8 percent of the respondents were undecided, as depicted in Table 18.

Table 18. Employee Turnover Attributable to Benefits

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	43	12.6	12.6	12.6
Disagree	88	25.8	25.8	38.4
Undecided	71	20.8	20.8	59.2
Agree	104	30.5	30.5	89.7
Strongly agree	35	10.3	10.3	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

The third question asked was whether the turnover rate among security officers where respondents work is attributable to health insurance. Of the 341 respondents, 146 or 42.8 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that the turnover rate where they work was attributable to health insurance. One hundred ten or 32.3 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that health insurance was a contributing factor to turnover, and 85 or 24.9 percent of the respondents were undecided, as depicted in Table 19.

Table 19. Employee Turnover Attributable to Health Insurance

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	38	11.1	11.1	11.1
Disagree	108	31.7	31.7	42.8
Undecided	85	24.9	24.9	67.7
Agree	78	22.9	22.9	90.6
Strongly agree	32	9.4	9.4	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Fourthly respondents were asked whether the turnover rate among security officers where they work is attributable to a lack of career growth. Of the 341 respondents, 86 or 25.2 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that the turnover rate where they work is attributed to lack of career growth. One hundred eighty-one or 53.1 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the turnover rate where they work is attributable to lack of career growth, and 74 or 21.7 percent of the respondents were undecided, as depicted in Table 20.

Table 20. Employee Turnover Attributable to Lack of Career Growth

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	28	8.2	8.2	8.2
Disagree	58	17.0	17.0	25.2
Undecided	74	21.7	21.7	46.9
Agree	129	37.8	37.8	84.8
Strongly agree	52	15.2	15.2	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

The fifth question asked was whether the turnover rate among security officers where respondents work is attributable to a lack of training opportunities. Of the 341 respondents, 190 or 55.7 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that the turnover rate where they work is attributed to lack of training opportunities. Forty-six or 13.5 percent

agreed or strongly agreed that lack of training opportunities contributed to the turnover rate where they work, and 105 or 30.8 percent of the respondents were undecided, as depicted in Table 21.

Table 21. Employee Turnover Attributable to Lack of Training Opportunities

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	63	18.5	18.5	18.5
Disagree	127	37.2	37.2	55.7
Undecided	105	30.8	30.8	86.5
Agree	37	10.9	10.9	97.4
Strongly agree	9	2.6	2.6	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

D. TRAINING

1. Hours of Training Received

The security officers were asked how many hours of training they had received before starting their current job. Of the 341 respondents, 38 or 11.1 percent reported receiving 8 hours or less of training. Eighty-seven or 25.5 percent of the respondents reported receiving between 8 and 16 hours of training. Fifty or 14.7 percent of the respondents reported receiving 16 to 24 hours of training. Ninety-three or 27.3 percent of the respondents reported receiving 24 to 40 hours of training, and 73 or 21.4 percent reported receiving more than 40 hours of training, as depicted in Table 22. Of the respondents 48.7 percent reported receiving 24 hours or more of training, while 51.3% reported receiving less than 24 hours of training

Table 22. Training Hours Received before Current Job

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	8 or <	38	11.1	11.1	11.1
	8 to 16	87	25.5	25.5	36.7
	16 to 24	50	14.7	14.7	51.3
	24 to 40	93	27.3	27.3	78.6
	> 40	73	21.4	21.4	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

2. Sufficient Training Received

The security officers were asked whether they felt that the amount of training they have received was sufficient to prepare them to meet their security officer responsibilities. Of the 341 respondents, 63 or 18.5 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that the training they have received was sufficient to prepare them to meet their responsibilities as a security officer. Two hundred thirty-nine or 70.1 percent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the training they have received was sufficient to prepare them to meet their responsibilities as a security officer. Thirty-nine or 11.4 percent of the respondents were undecided, as depicted in Table 23.

Table 23. Training Sufficient to Meet Security Guard Responsibilities

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	26	7.6	7.6	7.6
	Disagree	37	10.9	10.9	18.5
	Undecided	39	11.4	11.4	29.9
	Agree	170	49.9	49.9	79.8
	Strongly agree	69	20.2	20.2	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

3. Composite of Training

A training composite was created to measure 18 different types of training available to these security officers, including loss prevention techniques, customer service and tenant relations, security technology, report writing, working with police, working with firefighters, working with emergency response units, suspicious packages, suspicious people, terrorism-related emergencies, patrolling inside and outside facilities, reporting emergencies, building evacuations, National Incident Management System (NIMS) training, a key feature of which is the Incident Command System (ICS), Critical Incident Management System (CIMS) training, performing regular emergency drills, 40-hour enhanced security guard training, and terrorism training from the NYPD Shield program. This composite was formulated using a Likert 5-point scale, and the types of training were measured by the number of different types of training received by the security officer. One to three types of training equals 1 on the Likert scale. Four to seven types of training equals 2, eight to eleven types of training equals 3, twelve to fifteen types of training equals 4, and sixteen to eighteen types of training equals 5 on the Likert scale.

Of the 341 respondents, 7 or 2.1 percent reported receiving zero types of training. Twenty-seven or 7.9 percent reported receiving 1 to 3 types of training. Fifty-nine or 17.3 percent reported receiving 4 to 7 types of training. Eight-nine or 26.1 percent reported receiving 8 to 12 types of training. One hundred four or 30.5 percent reported receiving 12 to 15 types of training, and 55 or 16.1 percent reported receiving 16 to 18 types of training, as depicted in Table 24. Of the security officers 72.7 percent reported receiving between 8 and 18 of the different types of training that were available to them.

Table 24. Training Composite

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0	7	2.1	2.1	2.1
	(1) 1–3	27	7.9	7.9	10.0
	(2) 4–7	59	17.3	17.3	27.3
	(3) 8–11	89	26.1	26.1	53.4
	(4) 12–15	104	30.5	30.5	83.9
	(5) 16–18	55	16.1	16.1	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 25, 179 or 52.5 percent reported receiving loss prevention training. One hundred sixty-two or 47.5 percent of the respondents reported that they did not receive loss prevention training. Two hundred sixty-nine or 78.9 percent of the respondents reported receiving training in customer service and tenant relations. Seventy-two or 21.1 percent of the respondents reported that they did not receive customer service and tenant relations, as depicted in Table 26.

Table 25. Training in Loss Prevention Techniques

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	162	47.5	47.5	47.5
	Yes	179	52.5	52.5	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 26. Training in Customer Service and Tenant Relations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	72	21.1	21.1	21.1
	Yes	269	78.9	78.9	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 27, 215 or 63 percent reported receiving training with security technology, e.g., CCTV, and 126 or 37 percent reported they did not receive training in security technology. Two hundred sixty-nine or 78.9 percent reported receiving training in report writing, and 72 or 21.1 percent reported that they did not receive training in report writing, as depicted in Table 28.

Table 27. Training in Security Technology

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	126	37.0	37.0	37.0
	Yes	215	63.0	63.0	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 28. Training in Report Writing

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	72	21.1	21.1	21.1
	Yes	269	78.9	78.9	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 29, 180 or 52.8 percent reported that they received training for working with the police, and 161 or 47.2 percent reported that they did not receive training for working with the police.

With regard to working with firefighters, of the 341 respondents 160 or 46.9 percent stated that they received training, and 181 or 53.1 percent reported that they did not, as depicted in Table 30.

With regard to working with other emergency response units, 170 or 49.9 percent reported receiving such training, while 171 or 50.1 percent reported that they did not receive such training, as depicted in Table 31.

As for reporting emergencies, 273 or 80.1 percent reported receiving such training. Sixty-eight or 19.1 percent reported that they did not receive such training, as depicted in Table 32.

Table 29. Training in Working with the Police

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	161	47.2	47.2	47.2
	Yes	180	52.8	52.8	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 30. Training in Working with Firefighters

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	181	53.1	53.1	53.1
	Yes	160	46.9	46.9	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 31. Working with Emergency Response Units

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	171	50.1	50.1	50.1
	Yes	170	49.9	49.9	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 32. Training in Reporting Emergencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	68	19.9	19.9	19.9
	Yes	273	80.1	80.1	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 33, 292 or 85.6 percent reported receiving training in how to conduct a patrol inside and outside a facility and what to look for, while 49 or 14.4 percent reported that they did not receive such training.

With regard to suspicious people and suspicious packages, 254 or 74.5 percent reported receiving training in identifying suspicious packages, and 87 respondents or 25.5 percent reported that they had not received this training, as depicted in Table 34.

Two hundred sixty-six or 78 percent of the respondents reported receiving training in identifying suspicious people, and 75 or 22 percent reported that they had not received training in identifying suspicious people as depicted in Table 35.

Table 33. Training in Patrolling Inside and Outside a Facility

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	49	14.4	14.4	14.4
	Yes	292	85.6	85.6	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 34. Training in Identifying Suspicious Packages

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	87	25.5	25.5	25.5
	Yes	254	74.5	74.5	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 35. Training in Identifying Suspicious People

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	75	22.0	22.0	22.0
	Yes	266	78.0	78.0	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 36, 223 or 65.4 percent reported receiving training regarding handling terrorism-related emergencies, and 118 or 34.6 percent reported that they did not receive such training.

With regard to building evacuations, 217 or 63.6 percent of the respondents reported receiving training in building evacuations, and 124 or 36.4 percent reported that they had not received training in building evacuations, as depicted in Table 37.

When asked whether they conducted regular emergency/evacuation drills, 149 or 43.7 percent of the respondents reported conducting emergency/evacuation type drills, while 192 or 56.3 percent of the respondents reported that they did not conduct regular emergency/evacuation drills, as depicted in Table 38. Some respondents even wrote on the survey sheets that they have never conducted emergency/evacuation drills.

Table 36. Training in Handling Terrorism-Related Emergencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	118	34.6	34.6	34.6
	Yes	223	65.4	65.4	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 37. Training in Building Evacuations

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	124	36.4	36.4	36.4
	Yes	217	63.6	63.6	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 38. Training in Conducting Regular Emergency Drills

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	192	56.3	56.3	56.3
	Yes	149	43.7	43.7	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Of the 341 respondents in Table 39, 178 or 52.2 percent reported that they had received the 40-hour enhanced security guard training. One hundred sixty-three or 47.8 percent reported that they have not received such training.

With regard to National Incident Management System (NIMS), a key feature of which is the Incident Command System (ICS), which is supposed to be part of the 40-hour enhanced security guard training, 84 or 24.6 percent of the respondents reported receiving such training, and 257 or 75.4 percent reported that they have not received such training, as depicted in Table 40.

With regard to the Critical Incident Management System (CIMS), 76 or 22.3 percent of the respondents reported receiving such training, and 265 or 77.7 percent reported that they did not receive such training, as depicted in Table 41.

Table 39. Forty-Hour Enhanced Security Guard Training

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	163	47.8	47.8	47.8
	Yes	178	52.2	52.2	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 40. Training in NIMS

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	257	75.4	75.4	75.4
	Yes	84	24.6	24.6	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 41. Training in CIMS

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	265	77.7	77.7	77.7
	Yes	76	22.3	22.3	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Of the 341 respondents, 90 or 26.4 percent reported receiving training from the NYPD Shield Unit as depicted in Table 42. The training that is provided by the NYPD Shield unit includes Terrorism Awareness for the Security Professional, Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Security Checkpoint Operations Course, Surveillance Detection for Commercial Infrastructure Operators and Security Staff, and Detecting Hostile Surveillance. Two hundred fifty-one or 73.6 percent reported that they did not receive this training. Compensating for guards who are assigned to the airports (152), which are under the jurisdiction of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police, and analyzing the data for security officers who work in buildings under the jurisdiction of the NYPD, a slight uptick is apparent in the percentage of security officers trained by the NYPD Shield unit to 31.2 percent. In addition, there were 31 security officers who had previously received this training from the NYPD Shield unit before going to work in the airports.

Table 42. Terrorism Training from NYPD Shield Unit

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	251	73.6	73.6	73.6
	Yes	90	26.4	26.4	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

E. JOB SATISFACTION

1. Skills and Abilities

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 43, 96 or 28.2 percent reported that they disagreed or strongly disagreed that their present job makes good use of their skills and abilities. One hundred seventy-seven or 51.9 percent of the respondents reported that they agreed or strongly agreed that their present job made good use of their skills and abilities, and 68 or 19.9 percent of the respondents were undecided.

Table 43. Good Use of Skills and Abilities

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly disagree	47	13.8	13.8	13.8
	Disagree	49	14.4	14.4	28.2
	Undecided	68	19.9	19.9	48.1
	Agree	167	49.0	49.0	97.1
	Strongly agree	10	2.9	2.9	100.0
	Total	341	100.0	100.0	

2. Employee Satisfaction

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 44, 50 or 14.7 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that they were proud to be an employee where they worked. Two hundred thirteen or 62.4 percent agreed or strongly agreed that they were proud to be an employee where they worked. Seventy-eight or 22.9 percent of the respondents were undecided.

Table 44. Proud to Be an Employee Here

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	19	5.6	5.6	5.6
Disagree	31	9.1	9.1	14.7
Undecided	78	22.9	22.9	37.5
Agree	171	50.1	50.1	87.7
Strongly agree	42	12.3	12.3	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 45, 178 or 52.2 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed when asked whether the most capable employees are always the ones selected for promotions. One hundred three or 30.2 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the most capable employees are always the ones selected for promotions, and 60 or 17.6 percent of the respondents were undecided.

Table 45. Most Capable Employees Selected for Promotion

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	83	24.3	24.3	24.3
Disagree	95	27.9	27.9	52.2
Undecided	60	17.6	17.6	69.8
Agree	86	25.2	25.2	95.0
Strongly agree	17	5.0	5.0	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

3. Instruction and Communications Sufficient

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 46, 96 or 28.2 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed when asked whether, when assigned work they have never done before, they get the necessary instruction to do a good job. One hundred ninety-two or 56.3 percent agreed or strongly agreed that, when assigned work they have never done before, they get the necessary instruction to do a good job, and 53 or 15.5 percent of the respondents were undecided.

Table 46. Necessary Instruction When Assigned New Jobs

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	39	11.4	11.4	11.4
Disagree	57	16.7	16.7	28.2
Undecided	53	15.5	15.5	43.7
Agree	160	46.9	46.9	90.6
Strongly agree	32	9.4	9.4	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Of the 341 respondents as depicted in Table 47, 119 or 34.9 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that communications from the top management are adequate for them to know what is going on in the organization. One hundred sixty-one or 47.2 percent of the respondents reported that they agreed or strongly agreed that communications from the top management are adequate for them to know what is going on in the organization. Sixty-one or 17.9 percent of the respondents were undecided.

Table 47. Communications from Top Management Adequate

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Strongly disagree	63	18.5	18.5	18.5
Disagree	56	16.4	16.4	34.9
Undecided	61	17.9	17.9	52.8
Agree	134	39.3	39.3	92.1
Strongly agree	27	7.9	7.9	100.0
Total	341	100.0	100.0	

Table 48 depicts the descriptive statistics for the sample population of 341 completed surveys from the 401 surveys that were distributed to security officers. The chart also depicts the statistical range for each question asked and the maximum and minimum of the N group 341. In addition, Table 48 also depicts the statistical mean and the standard error for the mean, as well as the standard deviation and the variance for that sample population.

Table 48. Descriptive Statistics Standard Deviation Chart

Descriptive Statistics								
	N	Range	Min.	Max	Mean		Std. Deviation	Variance
	Stat.	Stat.	Stat.	Stat.	Stat.	Std. Error	Stat.	Stat.
Bldg classification	341	3.00	1.00	4.00	1.9560	.05338	.98569	.972
Comp: Wages	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	4.2698	.05263	.97193	.945
Comp: Benefits	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.0968	.06709	1.23884	1.535
Comp: Raises	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	2.4809	.06932	1.28008	1.639
Health insurance	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	2.8358	.06804	1.25652	1.579
Turnover: Percentage	341	6.00	1.00	7.00	2.6158	.07707	1.42321	2.026
Turnover: Rate	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.0938	.06111	1.12850	1.274
Turnover: Wages	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	2.9179	.06200	1.14494	1.311
Turnover: Benefits	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.0000	.06593	1.21752	1.482
Turnover: Insurance	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	2.8768	.06305	1.16421	1.355
Turnover: Career	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.3490	.06336	1.17006	1.369
Turnover: Training	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	2.4194	.05392	.99563	.991
Training: Hrs before current job	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.2229	.07236	1.33622	1.785
Training: Sufficient	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.6422	.06205	1.14577	1.313
Training: Loss prevention	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.5249	.02708	.50011	.250
Training: Customer service & tenant relations	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.7889	.02213	.40872	.167
Training: Security technology	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.6305	.02618	.48338	.234
Training: Report writing	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.7889	.02213	.40872	.167

Training: Working w/ police	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.5279	.02707	.49996	.250
Training: Working w/ firefighters	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.4692	.02706	.49978	.250
Training: Working w/ emer. response	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.4985	.02712	.50073	.251
Training: Suspicious packages	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.7449	.02364	.43658	.191
Training: Suspicious people	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.7801	.02246	.41482	.172
Training: Terrorism-related	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.6540	.02580	.47641	.227
Training: Patrolling	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.8563	.01902	.35130	.123
Training: Reporting emergencies	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.8006	.02167	.40015	.160
Training: Bldg evacuations	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.6364	.02609	.48175	.232
Training: NIMS	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.2463	.02337	.43151	.186
Training: CIMS	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.2229	.02257	.41679	.174
Training: Reg. emergency drills	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.4370	.02690	.49674	.247
Training: 40-hr enhanced security guard training	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.5220	.02709	.50025	.250
Training: NYPD Shield	341	1.00	.00	1.00	.2639	.02390	.44141	.195
Training Composite	341	5.00	.00	5.00	3.2346	.06794	1.25468	1.574

Job satisfaction: Good use of skills and abilities	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.1290	.06149	1.13542	1.289
Job satisfaction: Proud to be an employee here	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.5455	.05451	1.00666	1.013
Job satisfaction: Capable employees selected for promotions	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	2.5865	.06714	1.23990	1.537
Job satisfaction: Necessary instr. to do a good job	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.2610	.06419	1.18542	1.405
Job satisfaction: Communications from top mgment adequate	341	4.00	1.00	5.00	3.0176	.06887	1.27175	1.617
Valid N (list wise)	341							

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