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**RETURN OF THE LOST BOYS TO SOUTH SUDAN: A
STRATEGY TO BUILDING A STRONGER SOUTH SUDAN**

by

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December 2011

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BUILDING A STRONGER SOUTH SUDAN**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates why the Lost Boys, a group of young South Sudanese refugees who have long expressed a desire to return home, are not returning in numbers. It finds that variables generally cited in the existing literature (family ties, securing, occupational opportunities and patriotism) have similar values for those who have resettled permanently in the US, those who have returned to South Sudan, and those who have expressed interest in returning but not done so. Personal factors such as age, marital status, income and education levels are found to contribute to overall risk averseness, which is highest among the resettled and lowest among the returned.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2000, the United States resettled a group of young South Sudanese men known as the Lost Boys in the US. Since their arrival, many of the Lost Boys have spoken of returning to South Sudan to help with the reconstruction after getting an education in the US. The governments of South Sudan and the United States support their return. But only few Lost Boys returned so far, even though South Sudan peacefully became an independent country in July, 2011.

This thesis investigates why the Lost Boys are not returning in numbers and finds that a number of factors influence their decision to return and the implementation of the actual repatriation. Family ties, occupational opportunities, security and patriotism all appear to be on the minds of the vast majority of the Lost Boys, with personal factors apparently intervening to produce the individual's decision about repatriation. On average, those in limbo are younger, more likely to be single and childless, poorer and less educated than the returned. Taken together, this suggests that they tend to be more risk averse, and thus that policy interventions designed to reduce the risk associated with repatriation would serve to increase the return home of the Lost Boys.

Based on these findings, this thesis recommends that the government of South Sudan, the Lost Boys and the United States government work together to create a repatriation program for the Lost Boys desiring to return.

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this thesis are entirely those of the author, and in no way do they represent the official position of the Sudan People's Liberation Army or the government of the Republic of South Sudan.

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to the late Dr. Garang De Mabior. You are a true Scholar, a Freedom Fighter, and indeed, a visionary leader. Your struggle to liberate and educate your people, the South Sudanese, prevailed, and thus, your people are now free, and some can read and write.

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Latitia Lawson, and my second reader, Professor Ann Clunan, for guiding me while working on this thesis.

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I. INTRODUCTION

On May 16, 1983, the people of South Sudan (the now Republic of South Sudan) revolted against the government of Sudan, citing racial and religious discrimination by the Arab dominated government as their reason for taking up arms. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) with its base in Ethiopia, launched attacks on government forces, marking the beginning of the second Sudan civil war. As the SPLA intensified its operations against the government's troops, the Khartoum government resorted to arming nomadic gangs (the Murahiliin) from the Arab Baggara tribe to fight the SPLA and attack Southern civilians. Collins asserts:

Most Murahiliin raids followed a similar pattern, one that was adopted by the Janjawid in Darfur fifteen years later. They would attack a Dinka village at dawn, kill all adult males who could not escape, rape the women, and enslave the children. The village would be burned, the wells stuffed with dead Dinka males, schools and clinics destroyed, and the huge herds of cattle rounded up as loot.¹

Murahiliin attacks on Southern villages resulted in massive displacement. Families were destroyed, and children were either taken as slaves, or left wandering on their own after their parents were slaughtered. In 1986–87, more than 250,000 Southerners left their villages to find refuge in SPLA liberated areas in the country.² It was in these Murahiliin raids that the young South Sudanese boys and girls who would become known as the “Lost Boys” were separated from their families. The SPLA convinced the Ethiopian government to accept South Sudanese refugees, and the exodus of the Lost Boys began. The trek to Ethiopia was a deadly adventure for the young unaccompanied minors. As young as they were (most were between six and 11 years of age), many were unable to survive a thousand miles journey to Ethiopia. According to

1 Robert O. Collin, *A History of the Modern Sudan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

2 Collin, *A History of the Modern Sudan*, 174.

Collin, “For every ten Dinka fleeing from Bahr al-Ghazal to Ethiopia only four arrived in the Ethiopian refugee camps, and of those who made it, one in four soon died from malnutrition or diseases.”³

The Lost Boys started arriving in Ethiopia in 1987 and settled in Panyidu refugee camp. Here, they were organized into thirteen large groups each headed by caretakers appointed by the SPLA. There was no food, no clothing, and no shelter. One of the first aid workers to visit the camp reported seeing “only naked bodies, very thin, of boys, as far as the eye could see. They did not even have *tukls* [huts] to live in.”⁴ These boys were sleeping in the cold, eating leaves from trees, and drinking straight out of the Nile River. After months of waiting, they were finally rescued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which supplied food, tents, blankets and clothes. The transition from eating leaves to eating dry corn mixed with beans and oil was tough and many more died in the first few weeks after the aid arrived. Diarrhea and other stomach illnesses were the main causes of death in the next few months.⁵ By early 1989, when UNHCR and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) opened schools in Panyidu, there were approximately 15,000 to 30,000 Lost Boys living there. Most came from remote villages where there were no schools, and thus saw going to school as a privilege.

In early 1991, the Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Mariam was removed by its own rebels, who expelled the SPLA and the Southern Sudanese refugees. The Lost Boys started marching toward Kenya, which agreed to the SPLA’s request to take them in. On their way, they were frequently attacked by Southern militias allied to the government in Khartoum, and again preyed by lions and other wild animals. They finally arrived in Kenya in early 1992 settling in Kakuma refugee camp. UNHCR again rushed in to supply basic needs and UNICEF again provided schools. After living in Kakuma for

3 Collin, *A History of the Modern Sudan*, 176.

4 Human Rights Watch/Africa, “The Lost Boys: Child Soldiers and Unaccompanied Boys in Southern Sudan,” Human Rights Watch Children's Rights Project, Vol. 6, No. 10 (1994).

5 Personal experience.

nearly a decade, the Lost Boys were granted priority resettlement status in the United States in 2001. Currently, there are approximately 3,800 of them living in the United States.

Since their arrival in the United States, the Lost Boys have shown interest in returning to South Sudan to help with the post-war reconstruction effort. Many documentaries, memoirs and articles about and by Lost Boys indicate their widespread interest in returning to South Sudan to help with the reconstruction efforts. In 2004, Leslie Coffe asserted, “All hoped they would get a high school and university education in the US and one day return to Sudan.”⁶ Tom Luster, Desiree Qin, Laura Bates, Deborah Johnson, and Meenal Rana report that Lost Boys “want to get their U.S. citizenship, finish their degrees, and then go back to Sudan to be with their family and also help rebuild their country.”⁷ Karen Magro found “a strong tie to family and friends back home; some of those interviewed expressed a strong wish to return to the Sudan to help rebuild the country.”⁸ With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, Lost Boys started returning to South Sudan.

The interim government of South Sudan (GoSS), established by the CPA, immediately expressed interest in facilitating their return. The late President of South Sudan, First Vice President of Sudan, and head of the SPLA/SPLM, Dr. John Garang De Mabior said at the signing of the CPA:

As for those who [are]in the Diaspora, I would like to address them and assure them that the government of southern Sudan as well as the

6 Leslie Goffe, “Sudan’s ‘Lost Boys’ in America,” BBC, 2004.

7 Tom Luster, Desiree B. Qin, Laura Bates, Deborah J. Johnson, and Meenal Rana, “The Lost Boys of Sudan: Ambiguous Loss, Search for Family, and Reestablishing relationships With Family Members,” *Family Relations*, 57 (2008): 444–456.

8 Karen Magro, “Building Bridges to Social Inclusion: Researching the Experiences and Challenges of the Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan Community in Winnipeg” (Working Paper No. WP01-09, University of Winnipeg, 2009).

government of national unity will [need] their skills and I take the opportunity of this forum to appeal to all our Diaspora to return home and build our country.⁹

General Oyai Deng Ajak, Minister for National Security in the Republic of South Sudan, and former Minister for Investment in the GoSS and former Chief of Staff of the SPLA, noted in 2009 that the Lost Boys and Girls “have grown up men and women well equipped with skills to serve this country. Many of those refugees and youths are now in a position to make important contributions to the rebuilding of the Southern Sudan.”¹⁰

The new Republic of South Sudan which became independent on July 9, 2011 also sees the important of the Lost Boys and the rest of its diaspora in rebuilding the post-conflict South Sudan. Thus, it is stated in the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), 2011–2013 that “educated and skilled South Sudanese from the Diaspora represent the best opportunity for building strong institutions.”¹¹ Early this year, the interim government of South Sudan invited a group of Lost Boys graduates from different field of studies to help evaluate the performance of the government of South Sudan over the six years of interim period. In August, 2011, the government of the Republic of South Sudan Embassy in Washington DC announced its pilot program, the South Student Loan Forgiveness to “encourage and obtain skilled South Sudanese professionals and graduates in the Diaspora in order to contribute to development and nation building of South Sudan.”

The United States, a major player in, and guarantor of, the CPA, and the country that resettled the largest number of Lost Boys, also supports their return to South Sudan. In 2007, Representative Frank Wolf of Virginia introduced a bill in the House of Representatives called “Return of the Lost Boys and Lost Girls of Sudan Act,” which would have “established a program to assist Sudanese refugees in the United States

9 John Garang, (Speech during the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Nairobi, Kenya, January 9, 2005). <http://www.sudantribune.com/TEXT-Garang-s-speech-at-the,7476> (Accessed December 13, 2010).

10 Oyai Deng, (Speech given during the conference with the USAID, Juba, South Sudan, June 15, 2009), www.gurtong.net (Accessed December 14, 2010).

11 South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), 2011–2013, <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Medium%20Term%20Capacity%20Development%20Strategy.pdf> (Access Match 21, 2011).

known as the ‘Lost Boys and Lost Girls of Sudan’ to voluntarily return to Southern Sudan to assist in reconstruction efforts in southern Sudan.”¹² Although this bill never became a law, official interest in the Lost Boys remains high. Participating in the “Way Forward on Darfur and South Sudan Pittsburgh Summit,” organized by the Lost Boys and others in the Southern Sudanese and Darfurian Diasporas in March 2010, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Scott Gration declared that “Members of the Diaspora have a tremendous amount of knowledge and expertise to offer, and I look forward to continuing to engage with them throughout my tenure as the Special Envoy to Sudan.”¹³

Emerging from 22 years of civil war, South Sudan is one of the least developed places on earth. Paul Collier asserts, “The new government of Southern Sudan inherited an economic landscape that was virtually lunar: no provision whatsoever of public goods. No roads, no schools, no health care: nothing, not even buildings.”¹⁴ Moreover, the majority of the country is illiterate as many Southern Sudanese did not get a chance to go to school as a result of the two decades of war; and thus there is no skilled workforce to start rebuilding the country. In 2006, The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) reported:

The momentum from the establishment of GoSS to the function of the ministries has been slow. Ministries were established in October 2005. Several partner ministries however continued to have a paltry staff size of between 5–10 staffs. Appointments to various positions has been slow, probably evidence of a fledging Ministry of Public Services, which continues to hamper the performance of the Ministries. Most if not all ministries are in nascent stages and will require significant inputs in

12 H.R. 3054 [110th]: Return of the Lost Boys and Lost Girls Act. This Bill was introduced by Rep. Frank Wolf [R-VA10] on July 16, 2007. It never became a law. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-3054> (Accessed December 29, 2010).

13 Scott Gration, “The Importance of the Diaspora Community,” U.S. Department of State, March 25, 2010, http://blogs.state.gov/sudan/index.php/site/entry/diaspora_community/ (Accessed December 24, 2010).

14 Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009).

capacity building to get them up and running. This lack of capacity of partner ministries (human and material resources) continues to hamper work that should be done with them.¹⁵

Currently, the government of South Sudan depends partially on experts from the neighboring countries, such as Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia to help run the country in areas where high skilled workers are needed. These foreigners are working in almost every ministry of the government. Foreigners are also the ones running all the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Southern Sudan. John Agou reported:

From the man who cleans the street, to those who push trolleys at the airport, to cab drivers, to foremen, to those running local newspapers, to those holding senior positions in both local and international non-governmental organizations, to those managing the lucrative restaurants and hotels businesses in Juba; to the executive secretaries to the ministers, chairpersons of commissions and corporations; all are foreigners.”¹⁶

In August, 2010, the interim government of South Sudan announced that it would “identify and select up to 200 highly qualified civil servants from the neighboring countries in Africa for a rapid intervention to support the civil service institutions in the region.”¹⁷ With only three functioning universities, it will take time to produce an indigenous skilled workforce. In the short term, the repatriation of the educated diaspora, including the Lost Boys, could fill the gap.

The people of South Sudan overwhelmingly voted for secession (99 percent) in January 2011 and South Sudan officially became an independent country on 9 July 2011. There is however a consensus that an independent South Sudan will be weak, potentially negatively impacting the region and the interests of its international allies, such as the United States. It is already a hiding place for regional terrorist groups, such as the Lord

¹⁵ UNFPA Southern Sudan Office, Juba (Briefing note on Southern Sudan, October 2006), <http://countryoffice.unfpa.org/sudan/drive/UNFPASouthernSudan.pdf> (Accessed December 14, 2010).

¹⁶ John Agou Wuoi, “South Sudan Government Needs to Regulate Employment in Public and Private Sectors,” *The New Sudan Vision*, March 24, 2009, http://www.newsudanvision.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1609:john-agon-agou-wuoi-the-new-sudan-vision-nsv-wwwnewsudanvisioncom&Itemid=44 (Accessed December 25, 2010).

¹⁷ James Gatdet Dak, “South Sudan to Deploy 200 Highly Qualified Civil Servants from Foreign Countries,” *Sudan Tribune*, August 14, 2010, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35955> (Accessed December 25, 2010).

Resistance Army of Uganda, and could easily become embroiled in civil and/or international conflict, potentially destabilizing the entire region. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the United States and the government of the Republic of South Sudan to work together to create a strong stable South Sudan that can positively contribute to regional stability and the international war on terrorism, and to leverage all possible resources including the Lost Boys to this end.

Despite the high levels of interest in repatriation among the Lost Boys, the government of the Republic of South Sudan and the U.S. government, the vast majority remain in the US almost a decade later. Why are the Lost Boys not returning in larger numbers?¹⁸

There is a consensus in the literature that the explanation of the level of willingness of refugees to return to their home countries is complex and includes economic, social, personal and political factors. There is also a consensus that ‘pull’ factors are more important than ‘push’ factors.¹⁹ “Push factors are those that drive a person away from his place of residence, while pull factors are those which draw him to a new destination.”²⁰ “[T]he attractions or positive attributes of the home society ‘pull’ factors - have more influence in return migration decisions than factors inherent in the host societies.”²¹

¹⁸ John Agou Wuoi, “South Sudan Government Needs to Regulate Employment in Public and Private Sectors,” *The New Sudan Vision*, March 24, 2009, http://www.newsudanvision.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1609:john-agon-agou-wuoi-the-new-sudan-vision-nsv-wwwnewsudanvisioncom&Itemid=44 (Accessed December 25, 2010). James Gatdet Dak, “South Sudan to deploy 200 Highly Qualified Civil Servants from Foreign Countries,” *Sudan Tribune*, August 14, 2010, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35955> (Accessed December 25, 2010).

¹⁹ Richard Black, Khalid Koser and Karen Mung, “Understanding the Decision to Return,” Home Office; Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, London; Nina Toren, “Return to Zion: Characteristics and Motivations of Returning Emigrants,” *Social Forces* 3 (1976): 546–558; George Gmelch, “Return Migration,” *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 9 (1980): 135–159; Russell King, “Generalization from the History of Return Migration,” In Ghosh, Bimal (Ed.), *Return Migration: Journey of Hope or Despair?* Geneva: International Organization for Migration and the United Nations, pp. 7–146; Haour-Knipe and Davies, “Return of Migration of Nurses,” International Center for Nurse Migration (2008).

²⁰ Nina Toren, “Return to Zion: Characteristics and Motivations of Returning Emigrants,” *Social Forces*, 3 (1976): 546–558.

²¹ George Gmelch, “Return Migration,” *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 9 (1980): 135–159.

There is some debate however about *which* pull factors are most important. King finds that non-economic factors, such as the desire to be with family, are stronger determinants than economic factors.²² Black finds peace and security in the home country is the most important factor, followed by family ties. Toren argues that the relative importance of particular pull factors varies with the economic success of refugees:

Return migration from the U.S. to Israel is motivated mainly by the attraction of the country of destination. A subclassification of the push-pull dichotomy reveals that: (1) the decision of the more successful return migrants is primarily influenced by occupational opportunities back home; (2) the less successful are motivated chiefly by patriotic attachment and loyalty to the home country.”²³

Finlay diverges slightly from the consensus, finding that the pull factors of political indoctrination (being constantly reminded that they were the future of their home country by its leaders, a form of manufactured patriotism) and desire to be with family were “strong motivators,” but that policy intervention “was the immediate catalyst” for the return decision among the Southern Sudanese doctors she studied.²⁴ Finlay’s finding that policy intervention was the deciding factor on the return decision among the Southern Sudanese doctors contradicts Black’s previous finding that policy incentives had no influence on the decision to return among his subjects. Instead, Black concludes that those who decide to return would do so, with or without assistance. Black however reported his subjects suggesting that any kind of assistance would help in the process of returning and re-integration.²⁵ These findings suggest that more attention needs to be paid to factors that may intervene between the desire and even decision to return and actually returning.

²² Russell King, “Generalization from the History of Return Migration,” In Ghosh, Bimal (Ed.), *Return Migration: Journey of Hope or Despair?* Geneva: International Organization for Migration and the United Nations, pp. 7–146.

²³ Toren, Return to Zion,” 546.

²⁴ Juli L. Finlay, Rodney A. Crutcher and Neil Drummond, “Garang’s Seeds: Influences on the Return of Sudanese-Canadian Refugee Physicians to Post-Conflict South Sudan,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 24 (2011).

²⁵ Black, “Understanding Voluntary Return,” 27.

In summary, the existing literature identifies four pull factors in decisions to repatriate (family ties, peace and security, occupational opportunities, and patriotism), as well as policy interventions that encourage or facilitate repatriation.

This thesis endeavors to expand upon this research, by focusing explicitly on barriers to return among Lost Boys, refugees who report a desire to repatriate but are nevertheless not returning in numbers. The values on the factors identified in the existing literature are likely to be similar for all Lost Boys, since they are refugees from the same society. Yet, there is significant variation in decisions about repatriation among individual Lost Boys. This suggests that personal factors interact with more structural pull factors to produce decisions about repatriation. I surveyed 46 Lost Boys resident in eight U.S. states and 17 resident in Juba, South Sudan, asking them about factors influencing their decision making about repatriation to South Sudan, and collecting potentially explanatory personal information from them. (Survey questions attached as Appendix A). I also interviewed five leaders of Lost Boys Associations in the United States, and conducted informal group discussions in Boston, Brockton, Lynn, Arlington and Roxbury, Massachusetts, and in Grand Rapids, Michigan to follow up on survey responses. Group discussions involved three to 15 participants. All interviewed subjects requested to remain anonymous, and are therefore identified by numbers only in the following analysis. Surveys results are analyzed in the following chapter. Chapter III derives policy recommendations based on the findings.

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II. DATA ANALYSIS

The dependent variable in this study is repatriation. It has three possible values: a decision not to repatriate, an unimplemented decision to repatriate, and an implemented decision to repatriate. I will refer to these categories as resettled, in limbo, and returned. Among my respondents, seven (11 percent) are resettled, 39 (62 percent) are in limbo, and 17 (27 percent) are returned. It is important to note that I was able to survey a larger proportion of Lost Boys in South Sudan (where they are concentrated in the capital city) than in the U.S. (where they are more widely dispersed), so the percentages do not accurately reflect the balance of decisions with the Lost Boys community as a whole: the percent that have returned is overstated, thus reducing the percentages for resettled and in limbo in my sample. Therefore, the following discussion will explore differences in the make-up of each of these three categories on the DV.

Surveys asked about pull factors cited in the literature: family ties, the security situation in post-war South Sudan, and occupational opportunities. The more potentially sensitive issues of patriotism and indoctrination were raised in focus group discussions. Personal data collected on age, family situation, and educational and occupational success allows an exploration of if, and if so how, these personal factors interact with the pull factors already identified in the literature. Some Lost Boys were indeed boys, as young as seven, when they left South Sudan, while others were already young men. This means that many of them are just now entering the age of productive adulthood, while others have spent two decades of their adult lives in the U.S. Does this affect decisions about repatriation? Do those who have decided not to repatriate and/or those who have decided to repatriate but not done so, have fewer family ties in South Sudan, as the existing literature would suggest? What about their family ties in the U.S.? Does variation in economic and/or educational success in the U.S. affect repatriation decisions? Finally, no policy interventions have been implemented thus far, so this variable cannot be a factor explaining variation in the dependent variable. However, interviews suggest specific ways in which such interventions could move many from limbo to returned.

A. PUSH FACTORS

1. Family Ties

Lost Boys have been returning to South Sudan on short visits since the CPA was signed in 2005. They gave a number of reasons for those visits, such as just visiting the homeland to see what is left of it after all those years of civil war, but among the more common reasons was to find surviving family members whom they had been separated from during the civil war. One participant explained that he returned to “check out the general situation in South Sudan with the hope to return in the near future.”²⁶ A second participant reported that he returned to South Sudan in 2009 and met his mother, a brother and two sisters whom he had not seen since 1987.

I did not even know that my mother was alive until I got a call from one of my uncles in South Sudan telling me that she is alive along with my two sisters and a brother. After talking to my mother on the phone I decided to get a plane ticket to go and meet them in person. I’m now working to save more money and move to Southern Sudan. I don’t want to be disconnected with them again. It has been always my goal to return back home and learning that they were alive motivated me even more.²⁷

Another participant, who lost all of his family except his father, reports a similar urgency in repatriating.

My father is the only surviving one. All members of my family died including my mother, my sisters, and brothers, and my father said that I have to go back and restart our family since he cannot bear more children. He is worried that if I get married and stay in America, I would never be part of Southern Sudan again, leave alone my children who would be born and grow up in the West. I also want to take care of him for the rest of my life. In addition, it is my role as a Dinka man to take care of my old father.²⁸

Surveys and group discussions however suggest that family ties in South Sudan cannot account for the variation in repatriation decisions. Eighty nine percent of the resettled have close family members and relatives in South Sudan, and 100 percent of

²⁶ Lost Boys, group discussions, Arlington, Massachusetts, September 18, 2010.

²⁷ Lost Boy, personal communication, Grand Rapids, Michigan, August 20, 2010.

²⁸ Lost Boy, personal communication, Arlington, Massachusetts, September 18, 2010

them send remittances annually to support extended families. They believe that they can best support South Sudan through remittances and acting as ambassadors promoting good relations between South Sudan and the United States. One resettled participant said that he and other South Sudanese were putting together a group to lobby for the recognition of the independence of the Republic of South Sudan. To him, this is a contribution that many of his fellow South Sudanese living in the region have little capacity to achieve.

It is a mistake to think that the struggle ends with the referendum. We don't even know if the world is going to recognize Southern Sudan as an independent state. These are areas where people like me who decide to remain in the West will always help.²⁹

Another resettled participant explains:

Southern Sudan needs all of us, but you can still help wherever you are around the world. You do not have to be in Southern Sudan to help. We helped during the war when we were not even in Southern Sudan. I send money to my family in Southern Sudan almost every month. That is help. The children I'm supporting now in Southern Sudan will graduate and join the rest of Southern Sudanese in developing the nation. I would not be able to support them if I leave my job here and return to Southern Sudan. I would be paid little, or I may not get a job at all [in South Sudan]. I work with important Americans and I tell them about Southern Sudan and how good Southern Sudanese people are, and that is another help.³⁰

Similarly, 87 percent of those in limbo have close family members and distant relatives in South Sudan, and 93 percent send remittances. Most in limbo respondents report annual remittances of \$2,000 to \$5,000, with 22 percent sending \$6,000 to \$10,000. Average remittances are around 10 percent of income, and mostly (78 percent) go to helping resident relatives, although this group also reports (22 percent) investing in business in anticipation of their own return. All of those who reported sending no remittances were either students or unemployed.

Just like the other two categories, the returned are well connected to South Sudan. All have close family members and relatives in South Sudan, and all sent remittances to

²⁹ Lost Boys, group discussions, Grand Rapids, Michigan, August 20, 2010.

³⁰ Ibid.

South Sudan when they were still in the U.S. Thus, ties to family in South Sudan do not help explain the variation in repatriation decisions (see Table 1).

Table 1. Family Ties

	Resettled	In limbo	Returned
Family	89%	87%	100%
Remittances	100%	93%	100%
To family	100%	78%	88%
Investment	0%	22%	12%

2. Occupational Opportunities

More than a quarter (28 percent) of those in limbo cited limited occupational opportunities as a reason for not having returned to South Sudan. Informal discussions and interviews revealed that concerns were somewhat different from the anticipated job scarcity. Discussion participants were less concerned with the supply of jobs than a perceived lack of government interest in employing them in existing jobs. Government ministries are by far the largest employer in Southern Sudan. Lost Boys who raised this point had been to South Sudan several times looking unsuccessfully for employment. Job openings are usually posted outside the employer’s gates, so job seekers must visit every potential employer, weekly, if not daily. But finding a vacancy is just the first step in the process. Applicants are generally directed to drop their job applications with particular individuals or offices, but one generally has to know someone in the ministry to gain access from the armed guards posted at the gates. As a result of their long residence in the U.S., Lost Boys lack such socio-political connections and seek to gain entry into the system based solely on their qualifications. Discussion participants suggested that they have virtually no chance of success, speaking of spending hours each day outside government ministries in Juba looking unsuccessfully for jobs.³¹

Testimony like this was common among discussion participants who had returned to Southern Sudan to look for jobs and failed to find one. An angry participant reported

³¹ Lost Boys, informal discussion, Brockton, Massachusetts, September 21, 2010.

that finding a job in Southern Sudan is “not about what you know, but about who you know.” One reported spending three months in Juba looking for a job, before having to return to the United States to reestablish himself here. As a result of this experience, he now considers himself permanently settled in the United States unless something change about jobs allocation in South Sudan:

I’m getting old and I cannot keep moving between two countries; I have to settle, and after not finding a job in Southern Sudan, I have no choice, but to settle in the United State. There is pure nepotism involved in how people get jobs in Southern Sudan and as long as that does not change, there is no reason for people like me who do not know anybody in the government to return. We will not find jobs. I know friends [Lost Boys friends] who got jobs in Southern Sudan just because they know people. I know that because I’m more educated than them and I know their uncles and friends who hold high positions in the government.³²

Another participant complained that getting a job in South Sudan is “not about what you know, it is about who you know.”³³

However, 70 percent of returnees said that they had similar concerns before they returned, and the 18 percent still unemployed continue to have such concerns. Only 18 percent of returnees secured jobs before returning to South Sudan, and all of these work for the government of South Sudan and all reported securing these positions through relatives and friends working for the government. This confirms that there is high level of nepotism in allocating jobs in South Sudan. Those with relatives and close friends in high government positions easily get jobs than those who do not know anyone in the government, regardless of qualifications. One unemployed returnee laments:

I have been wondering myself why I thought it was going to be easy to find a job in Southern Sudan. Certainly, it would have been easier for me to find a job in D.C than here. No doubt that despite our potentials, skills, experiences and professional training as Lost Boys, finding a job in Southern Sudan will still remain a challenge leading to a lot of frustration.

³² Lost Boy, personal communication, Boston, Massachusetts, September 24, 2010.

³³ Ibid.

Finding a job there will be one of the hurdles that will prevent many who are not courageous enough to come down here without having secured a job first.³⁴

Those in limbo also complained about the government giving jobs to foreigners when they have the qualifications needed for taking up those jobs. Some go so far as claiming that this is a government strategy to keep them out of the country. Some informants cited the recent decision by the government of South Sudan to recruit 200 qualified civil servants from neighboring countries as an evidence of the unwillingness of the government to employ expatriate the Lost Boys. One believed that the government should have first consulted with the Lost Boys to find out if such qualified individuals could be found among them. “We have people with college degrees and some who even have graduate degrees, so we can do the job, but the government did not ask for volunteers among us,” he explained. The government wants Ugandans and Kenyans to take those jobs, not us,” he continued. As a result of this assessment, this in limbo respondent reports that he will return only if/when he has a job in South Sudan secured. “I heard from my colleagues who went back to Southern Sudan and try to get jobs how hard it is to find a job there, so I cannot just walk away from my job to go and suffer,” he explained.³⁵ Another frustrated in limbo participant concludes:

The government has a good reason not to employ Lost Boys. We would want to change things and they do not want that. We would want pure democracy, transparency, reduction of corruption and things like that. Kenyans and Ugandans just work for the government without demanding anything because they are not citizens. They just do what they are asked to do.³⁶

However, since these concerns were reported by a much larger proportion of returnees than those in limbo (70 percent v. 28 percent), occupational opportunities, the lack thereof, and/or the challenge in securing them cannot explain variation in

³⁴ Lost Boy, personal communication, an email from one of the Lost Boys looking for a job in South Sudan who heard about my research, December 4, 2010.

³⁵ Lost Boys, personal communication, Grand Rapids, Michigan, August 19, 2010.

³⁶ Ibid.

repatriation decisions. However, the words of the current job seeker in Juba suggest a potential partial explanation: the few returnees may simply be more courageous, or more precisely less risk averse, than the many in limbo.

3. Peace and Security

Concerns about the potential for the resumption of the war between the rump Sudan and South Sudan were also commonly expressed. A few respondents were also concerned about internal insecurity within South Sudan.³⁷ One of the resettled said he had grown accustomed to peace and prosperity in the United States, and felt he would not survive tribal conflicts in Southern Sudan, which he described as “brother killing brothers.” The same participant added that his Lost Boys friends in the United States are from different southern tribes, but live in peace and support each other. “This is the life I want,” he concluded.³⁸

Internal conflict remains a challenge to the newly independent South Sudan. Rebel groups that defected from the SPLA before independence threaten the stability of the country. The South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) of General Athor Deng continues to operate in Unity and Jonglei states, despite the amnesty and reintegration offered to all rebel groups by the president on Independence Day. Tribal conflict also remains a major internal security threat after independence, especially that associated with cattle raiding. Five hundred and seventy eight people, including women and children were killed in a single recent attack. However, like family ties and occupational opportunities, insecurity does not seem to explain why some Lost Boys decided to remain in the United States, while most are in limbo, and still others have returned, since it was a concern for similar percentages of those in limbo and those who have returned (36 percent v. 29 percent).

³⁷ Lost Boys, personal communication and informal discussion, Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Boston, Massachusetts, August 19, and September 24, 2010. Ongoing tribal conflicts have resulted in the death of thousands of Southern Sudanese in the five years following the signing of the CPA.

³⁸ Lost Boys, informal discussion, Boston, Massachusetts, September 25, 2010.

4. Patriotism/Indoctrination

Discussion participants and interviewees identified service to South Sudan as an important factor in their decision to return (both those in limbo and those who have actually returned). They believe they have skills and education needed for the reconstruction of South Sudan, and are eager to contribute to post-war reconstruction efforts. These responses consistently suggested genuine patriotism, with no respondent reporting being motivated by calls from the South Sudan government or anyone else.³⁹

I came to the United States and it is a good thing, but I want to return to Southern Sudan and do my part in developing our country. I have a degree from the U.S. and Southern Sudan needs people like me. Our country is behind in development because of the war and it will need all its sons and daughters to develop it. I'm already thinking about how I can help, and I think returning back and be on the ground is the best way to help.⁴⁰

A second participant explained that the signing of the CPA was a call for all South Sudanese living abroad to return and rebuild South Sudan and that he is willing to answer that call.

Even when I was in refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya, I always knew that I would go back to Southern Sudan. I just did not know when. But when the CPA was signed, I knew it was time to go back and give my people what I learned all these years while I was out of the country. I'm not the only one educated, we [Lost Boys] are all educated and I think we should all go back because I believe we can make a big change as a group.⁴¹

Another informant said that his education would enable him to help other South Sudanese. "I did not go to school just to help myself. I went to school to help my people back home too, and when Southern Sudan becomes an independent country in July, I will go back. This is what I have been waiting for."⁴²

³⁹ There could still be an element of indoctrination, perhaps unconscious, given the attention the Lost Boys have received over the last two and a half decades.

⁴⁰ Lost Boys, personal communication, group discussion, Roxbury, Massachusetts, September 24, 210.

⁴¹ Ibid.

However, as noted above, the resettled also cite patriotic motives for remaining in the U.S.—to lobby for South Sudan and act as its ambassadors. In addition, helping with the reconstruction was the leading reason given by those who have returned for returning. It was cited by 40 percent, with an additional 12 percent citing patriotism more generally, for a total of 52 percent. (In comparison, 24 percent cited family reunion, 12 percent business opportunities, and 12 percent occupational opportunities.) Therefore, like the previous pull factors, patriotism cannot account for the variation in repatriation decisions.

B. PERSONAL FACTORS

1. Age

Overall, 75 percent of my sample group was under 31, 22 percent 31–40 and five percent over age 40. The resettled group was comprised of 13 percent under 31, 74 percent 31–40, and 29 percent over 40. Of those in limbo, 82 percent were under 31, 18 percent 31–40 and none over 40. Fifty three percent of the returnees were under 31, 35 percent between 31 and 40, and 12 percent over 40. It is notable that all of the respondents over 40 have made a firm decision on repatriation—one way or the other. In addition, on average the returned population is older, and the resettled population much older than those in limbo. This suggests that Lost Boys who were already entering adulthood when they came to the U.S. are generally more likely to choose resettlement over repatriation. Age may work in the other direction for those with more of a commitment to repatriation: having decided to repatriate, their relatively advanced age may press them to assume the risk of implementing that decision immediately. With more productive years ahead of them, those in limbo may be less risk acceptant (see Table 2).

Table 2. Age

Age	Resettled	In limbo	Returned
Under 30	14%	82%	53%
30-40	57%	18%	35%
Over 40	29%	0%	12%

2. Nuclear Family

While extended family ties did not explain repatriation decisions, nuclear family (wives and children) seems to have a strong influence. Eighty five percent of the resettled are married, compared to only 15 percent of those in limbo and 18 percent of the returned. Similarly, 85 percent of the resettled have children, compared to only 15 percent of those in limbo and six percent of the returned. In interviews, married resettled participants cited concerns about their children's welfare as a cause of their reluctance to return to South Sudan. One reported that he had been interested in returning to South Sudan with his wife after finishing college, but changed his mind after having a child. "I felt like my son has a better future here in the U.S. than in South Sudan," he said.⁴³ Another married participant asserts that it is much easier for a single Lost Boy to maneuver between South Sudan and the U.S. since they have no dependents to worry about. "When you are married and have children, you have to consider them when making plans," he explained.⁴⁴ Concerns about the welfare of nuclear family seem to hold for the returned as well. None of the married returnees had their spouses or children with them in South Sudan. Two of the three married returnees left their families in the United States, and the third has his family in neighboring Kenya, which is more secure and more developed than South Sudan, where his children are going to better schools and have access to better health facilities than would be the case in South Sudan. Married returnees reported wanting to establish themselves, with jobs and homes, before bringing families to South Sudan. Still, being married with children is a strong predictor of a decision to resettle permanently in the U.S., while not explaining differences between those in limbo and the returned. This finding seems to support the intuition above about risk aversion. Those with families are generally far less willing to risk the future of their children on what all agree is an uncertain repatriation exercise (see Table 3).

⁴³ Lost Boy, Personal communication, Arlington, Massachusetts. September 18, 2010.

⁴⁴ Lost Boys, informal discussion, Boston, Massachusetts, September 25, 2010.

Table 3. Marital Status

Marital Status	Resettled	In limbo	Returned
Married	85%	15%	18%
Children	85%	15%	6%

3. Success

Surveys also suggest a causal relationship between income and repatriation decisions. College graduates in South Sudan earn an average of \$15,000 a year. Thus, repatriation is expected to lead to significant income loss for most Lost Boys. For my sample as a whole, 14 percent earned over \$50,000/year in the U.S., 58 percent \$25–50,000, and 28 percent less than \$25,000. Among the resettled, 30 percent earn more than \$50,000, 40 percent \$25–50,000, and 30 percent less than \$25,000. Among those in limbo, eight percent earn more than \$50,000, 68 percent \$25–50,000, and 24 percent less than \$25,000. Finally, among the returnees, 24 percent earned more than \$50,000, 47 percent \$25–50,000, and 29 percent less than \$25,000 when they were in the U.S. (In South Sudan six percent now earn more than \$50,000, 35 percent \$25–50,000 and 59 percent under \$25,000.) This suggests that top income earners are more likely to have made and implemented a firm decision about repatriation—one way or the other. Their higher incomes give them a reason to resettle, or the economic security to risk repatriation. Interestingly, the lowest income earners make up virtually the same percentage of each decision category (28–30 percent). For many of these, expected earnings in South Sudan are not significantly below current earnings, so their repatriation decisions seem to be based on something else. The fact that more than 2/3 of those in limbo are in the *middle* income group suggests that middle earners are more risk averse than both higher and lower earning groups, reinforcing other findings of this study (see Table 4).

Table 4. Annual Income

Annual Income	Resettled	In limbo	Returned
Under \$25,000	30%	24%	29%
\$25,000-\$50,000	40%	68%	47%
Over \$50,000	30%	8%	24%

Level of education seems to have a similar influence on repatriation decisions. Thirteen percent of the resettled, 35 percent of those in limbo and 12 percent of the returned have high school certificates. Seventy four percent of the resettled, 61 percent of those in limbo, and 53 percent of the returned hold college degree. Thirteen percent of the resettled, four percent of those in limbo and 35 percent of the returned hold graduate degrees. On average, the resettled are more educated, and the returned much more educated, than those in limbo. Those with more education have more confidence in repatriating, with brighter prospects of getting a job in South Sudan or getting another one in the U.S. if necessary, but also more of a reason to remain resettled. Those in limbo are less well educated, and thus have less incentive to remain resettled, but also take on more risk if they repatriate unassisted (see Table 5).

Table 5. Highest Degree

Highest Degree	Resettled	In limbo	Returned
High School	13%	35%	12%
College	74%	61%	53%
Graduate	13%	4%	35%

Overall, these findings suggest that policy interventions to reduce economic risk would significantly increase repatriation. The significant correlation between age, and especially marriage and children, also suggests that the efficaciousness of such interventions is likely to decline over time, as those in limbo become older, marry and have children, and thus less inclined to risk the futures of *their children* by repatriating, even with assistance.

C. POLICY INTERVENTION

Risk adversity arose in relation to both security and economic risks associated with repatriation. However, only the economic risks are amenable to policy intervention (while reducing insecurity for all citizens is, of course, a major policy objective of the government of South Sudan). The specifics of potential policy interventions are discussed in chapter three. In this section, the policy-relevant factors are simply developed in a bit more detail. As noted above, those in limbo are particularly concerned about their ability to access jobs in South Sudan without the personal/family networks that appear to active in allocating jobs, and policy interventions could be brought to bear on this, especially programs to match job seekers to jobs before they leave their current employment in the U.S.

In addition to the inaccessibility of jobs, in limbo informants reported two more specific resource constraints: outstanding school loans and repatriation expenses. Two felt unable to leave their jobs in the United States until they had repaid student loans because of concerns about default adversely affecting their credit and potentially complicating their return to the United States should their attempt to establish themselves in South Sudan fail. These two participants believe this constraint to be widespread among those with student loans (which includes 62 percent of those in limbo). This again supports the interpretation of the evidence above, in that it indicates both resource constraint and risk aversion among this group. Sixty five percent of the returned reported having outstanding student loans that they are struggling to keep up with, so the dominant explanatory factor for those in limbo seems to be risk aversion rather than resource constraint. In August 2011, the government of the new Republic of South Sudan recently created the South Sudan Student Loan Forgiveness Program “to ease the student loan financial obligation” for skilled workers and professionals in the South Sudanese Diaspora to facilitate their repatriation. At the time of writing, it is too soon to know how effective this program will be. The second additional financial constraint was the high cost of travelling to and living in South Sudan. The experience of those who have been to Juba looking for jobs that other Lost Boys report being aware of, suggests to them that the job search may take a significant period of time or even fail entirely, leading to more

costs associated with traveling back to the U.S. and initiating another new job search there. Travel expenses and high cost of living in South Sudan were also reported by the returnees as challenges. Eighty two percent of the returnees reported personally paying for their travel and living expenses, while only the 18 percent that secured government jobs before returning had their travel and living expenses paid for by the government. This again suggests that the dominant factor for those in limbo is risk aversion, although, as noted above, the returnees are also somewhat wealthier on average than those in limbo, and thus more able to afford transition costs. No policy interventions to support transition costs have yet been adopted, but these findings suggest that they would be helpful in facilitating increase repatriation.

Finally, the survey asked whether respondents were concerned about potential complications regarding U.S. citizenship, in expectation that risk aversion might be a factor on this issue. Interestingly, despite the overall findings about risk aversion, less than 10 percent of those in limbo reported concerns about citizenship. Interviewed respondents generally believe that they can easily maintain dual citizenship. Some said that while it might be an issue in the long term, they were not worried about it now. Others were not concerned at all. All of the returned are U.S. citizens. This suggests that citizenship has no influence on repatriation decisions.

D. CONCLUSION

The overall findings in this chapter suggest that repatriation decisions are indeed influenced by personal factors interaction with the pull factors identified in the existing literature. Family ties, occupational opportunities, security and patriotism all appear to be on the minds of the vast majority of my respondents, with personal factors apparently intervening to produce the individual's decision about repatriation. All of these personal factors appear to work through their impact on the individual's level of risk aversion/tolerance. The clearest impact is that of marriage and children. Those with wives and children were far less likely to risk repatriation, specifically because they were averse to risking their *children's* futures. Next income, and to a lesser extent education, appear to have a more complicated impact on risk aversion. Older respondents have

either decided to remain in the U.S. or have returned to South Sudan, suggesting that they feel more pressed to choose a permanent life course quickly. Those in limbo are on average younger than both the resettled and returned, suggesting perhaps that they feel they have time to wait for the risks associated with repatriation to decline (or not) before making a move to South Sudan (or potentially renouncing their tentative decision to do so). Similarly, both the resettled and returned groups were on average wealthier and better educated than those in limbo. This implies brighter job prospects in both the U.S. and South Sudan, which again appears most to lead to a firm decision to repatriate or not. Those in limbo are somewhat less wealthy and less educated on average, which makes repatriation riskier for them, while they are financially less able to absorb potential risk. Thus, the findings overall suggest that policy interventions that reduce risk would likely move many of those in limbo to repatriate.

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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

These findings expand upon existing knowledge by revealing that the pull factors that have been shown to influence repatriation act not only on those who repatriate, but also on those who do not, or find themselves in limbo, desiring to return but feeling unable to do so. The research is consistent with previous findings suggesting that we should see more, and more rapid, repatriation when refugees have strong family ties and good job prospects in a secure homeland that they love. But it goes beyond this finding to reveal the decision-calculus of individual refugees who are similarly situated vis-à-vis these pull factors, finding that variations in risk aversion associated with personal factors (marital status and parenthood, age, education and income) explain *which* refugees repatriate and which resettled, as well as why many may end up trapped in limbo between resettlement and repatriation.

As noted in chapter one, strong interest in facilitating repatriation of the Lost Boys has been expressed by the governments of both their home and adoptive countries. The findings in chapter two allow us to consider how specific policy interventions by these governments might be formulated to advance this goal, helping the Lost Boys to find their way home finally.

In an initial effort to attract educated members of the Diaspora in the United States, the new government of the Republic of South Sudan created the South Sudan Student Loan Forgiveness Program in August 2011 “to ease the student loan financial obligation for skilled, professional and graduates of South Sudanese in Diaspora in order for them to return home to help with the nation building.”⁴⁵ While this is likely to be helpful, it is unlikely to be enough, since it targets only one of the risk factors blocking voluntary repatriation. To maximize the efficaciousness of its efforts, the government of the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) should directly engage the Lost Boys. This could be done through the establishment of a dedicated repatriation office in the RoSS Embassy in Washington, which could be run by representatives elected by the Lost Boys themselves

⁴⁵ South Sudan: *Government Launches Educational Loan Repayment.*

as a confidence building measure. Since finding jobs in South Sudan is one of the major factors hindering the repatriation of the majority of the Lost Boys, this office should be tasked with identifying and matching qualified (in limbo) Lost Boys with available jobs in South Sudan. Job applications could be submitted to the office, which would then contact government offices, NGOs, businesses, and aid organizations in Juba for job openings and match applicants with available jobs. Employers in Juba could also send job vacancies to the repatriation office in Washington to be matched to Lost Boys applicants.

One of the eligibility requirements in the existing student loan forgiveness program is that the applicant agrees to work in South Sudan for a specific amount of time, determined by the amount of loan being repaid by the government of the RoSS. Since finding a job is thus a requirement of loan forgiveness, the office described here should work in collaboration with the loan forgiveness office to find jobs for the Lost Boys who want to participate in that program as well.

Another repatriation office should be established in Juba to facilitate identification of employment opportunities and provide other repatriation support. For this to work effectively, the government of the Republic of South Sudan needs to provide those working in this office with special status/identification cards that allow them easy access to all ministries. This office could also establish a website through which potential employers could access the curriculum vitae of Lost Boys. The office could also establish strong relations with both the RoSS's Ministry of Labour and Public Service and Human Resources Development, tasked with carrying out and overseeing government recruitments and general capacity building in order to have access to government jobs.⁴⁶ In addition to finding jobs, this office could also support reintegration through receptions and orientations reintroducing returnees to culture and life in Juba, arranging for their stay for the first month until they get their first pay check, introducing them to their work places, and giving them other support they may need while adapting to new homes and jobs. The Lost Boys office in Juba could also help in monitoring the Loan Forgiveness Program in Juba by keeping a database of Lost Boys participating in the program.

⁴⁶ These two offices could also serve as direct links between the government of Southern Sudan and the diaspora on other matters, such as voting in national elections.

The program could be financed by the government of South Sudan, intergovernmental organizations involved in funding other repatriation programs (including the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, and the International Office on Migration), and/or bilateral donors, including especially the United States. The United States government could also support the repatriation effort by explicitly allowing the Lost Boys to maintain dual citizenship as a mean of reducing the uncertainty associated with repatriation. The African Development Bank recently expressed interest in collaborating with the government of South Sudan in helping the members of the diaspora, and the Lost Boys in particular, return, as part of it support package to South Sudan's development efforts.⁴⁷

Lost Boys should also engage the government of South Sudan to support their return, through the National Lost Boys Association in collaboration with the state-level Lost Boys Associations. An online version of the survey done for this research could be used to validate the general level of willingness of the Lost Boys to return to South Sudan, and confirm the primary obstacles to return. The National Lost Boys Association could also compile data on Lost Boys with graduate and college degrees seeking skilled employment in South Sudan, and submit a repatriation proposal to the governments of the U.S. and South Sudan. This alone might prime the pump for the repatriation program described here.

The return of the Lost Boys and other qualified South Sudanese living abroad is crucial to building a stronger South Sudan that would support regional stability, and effectively participate in the global war on terrorism. The Lost Boys, the government of the Republic of South Sudan and the United States government are all aware of the important role the Lost Boys could play in the development and rebuilding of South Sudan, and it is hoped that the above recommendations will spur initiative in designing a successful repatriation program for the Lost Boys, which could then be broadened to the rest of the South Sudanese diaspora.

⁴⁷ Personal meeting with one of the experts from the African Development Bank tasked with engaging the government of the Republic of South Sudan on the return of the qualified members South Sudanese diaspora, August 31, 2011.

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APPENDIX A. SURVEY

The purpose of this survey is to collect information from the Lost Boys of Sudan living in the United States. The survey will be used to determine the level of interest among the Lost Boys in returning to South Sudan, as well as the constraints to their return.

The individual conducting the survey is 1st Lieutenant Thon Agany Ayiei, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Republic of South Sudan. Lieutenant Ayiei is a graduate student at the Naval Postgraduate School doing his masters degree in Security Studies, and writing his thesis on the return of the Lost Boys to South Sudan based solely upon personal interest in the subject. The data collected will be used for this purpose only.

Section 1 Personal Background:

Q 1.1 Are you a Lost Boy/Lost Girl? Yes. _____ No. _____

Q 1.2 Gender: Male _____ Female _____

Q 1.3 Age _____

Q 1.4 State of residence in the United States

Q. 1.5 Years in the United States _____

Q 1.6 Are you a U.S. citizen? Yes _____ No. _____

Q 1.7 What is your current marital status? Married _____ Single _____

Q 1.8 If you are married, what is the citizenship of your spouse?

Country of citizenship _____

Q 1.9 How many children do you have?

Number of children _____

Q 1.10 What is your annual household income?

(1) Under \$25,000 (2) \$25,000 - \$50,000 (3) \$50,000 – \$100,000 (4) \$100,000 – \$150,000 (5) \$150,000 – \$200,000 (6) Above \$200,000

Section 2 Education:

Q 2.1 What is the highest level of educational attainment you have received?

1. Primary school certificate 2. Secondary/high school certificate/diploma
3. Bachelors degree 4. Masters degree 5. Ph. D.

Q 2.2 In which country did you receive your most recent qualifications?

Q 2.3 How did you pay for your school?

1. Myself 2. Loans from family/friends 3. Loans from government/private company 4. Private scholarship 5. Government 6. Other (please Specify)

Section 3 Professional History:

Q 3.1 Do you have a paid job or own a business?

Yes ____ No. ____

Q 3.2 What is your current occupation?

Q 3.3 What best describes your employer?

1. Government 2. University 3. Industry/Business 4. Non-profit organization/charity 5. International Organization 6. Myself 7. Other (please specify)

Section 4 Social Network in the United States:

Q 4.1 Are your parents here in the United States?

Yes ____ No. ____

Q 4.2 How many brothers and sister do you have in the United States?

Q 4.3 How many close friends do you have in the United States?

Section 5 Relationship with Southern Sudan:

Q 5.1 How many times have you been to Southern Sudan in the last 3 years?

Q 5.2 How much time did you spend in Southern Sudan in the last 12 months?

Q 5.3 Have you made any investment in Southern Sudan?

Yes _____ No. _____

Q 5.4 If yes, please specify the type of investment.

1. House **2.** Land **3.** Business **4.** Other (please specify)

Q 5.5 would you like to return permanently to Southern Sudan? Yes. ____ No. ____

Q 5.6 If yes, why are you not back in Southern Sudan already? Please circle all that apply.

1. Lack of financial support **2.** Issues concerning citizenship **3.** Concerns about not finding a suitable job in Southern Sudan **4.** Security

5. Other (please specify)

Section 6 Remittances:

Q 6.1 Did you send any money to Sudan in the last 12 months?

Yes ____ No ____

Q 6.2 If yes, about how much did you send to Sudan in the last 12 months?

Amount in U.S. dollars _____

Q 6.3 What were the purposes for sending the money? Circle all that apply.

1. General expenses of immediate family **2.** School fees **3.** Wedding expenses **4.** House building **5.** Business capital **6.** Other (please specify) _____

Date: _____

APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

The purpose of this survey is to collect information from the Lost Boys of Sudan living in the United States. The survey will be used to determine the level of interest among the Lost Boys in returning to Southern Sudan, as well as the constraints to their return.

The individual conducting the survey is 1st Lieutenant Thon Agany Ayiei, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Southern Sudan. Lieutenant Ayiei is a graduate student at the Naval Postgraduate School doing his masters degree in Security Studies, and writing his thesis on the return of the Lost Boys to Southern Sudan based solely upon personal interest in the subject. The data collected will be used for this purpose only.

Name: _____

Nationality: _____ State: _____

Level of Education: _____

Occupation: _____

Are you a Lost Boy/Lost Girl? Yes. ____ No. ____

If yes, would you like to return permanently to Southern Sudan? Yes____ No____

If yes, why are you not back in Southern Sudan already?

If you are not a Lost Boy/Lost Girl, do you think Lost Boys have a role to play in the post-war reconstruction effort in Southern Sudan?

What are the challenges Lost Boys may face when returning to Southern Sudan?

How can the U.S. government and the government of Southern Sudan help the Lost Boys return to Southern Sudan?

Date: _____

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