




RTO TECHNICAL REPORT

TR-HFM-140

Psychosocial, Organizational and Cultural Aspects of Terrorism

(Aspects psychosociaux, organisationnels
et culturels du terrorisme)

Final Report of the NATO Human Factors and
Medicine Research Task Group 140.



Published November 2011





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Final Report of the NATO Human Factors and
Medicine Research Task Group 140.

Edited by:

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The Research and Technology Organisation (RTO) of NATO

RTO is the single focus in NATO for Defence Research and Technology activities. Its mission is to conduct and promote co-operative research and information exchange. The objective is to support the development and effective use of national defence research and technology and to meet the military needs of the Alliance, to maintain a technological lead, and to provide advice to NATO and national decision makers. The RTO performs its mission with the support of an extensive network of national experts. It also ensures effective co-ordination with other NATO bodies involved in R&T activities.

RTO reports both to the Military Committee of NATO and to the Conference of National Armament Directors. It comprises a Research and Technology Board (RTB) as the highest level of national representation and the Research and Technology Agency (RTA), a dedicated staff with its headquarters in Neuilly, near Paris, France. In order to facilitate contacts with the military users and other NATO activities, a small part of the RTA staff is located in NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The Brussels staff also co-ordinates RTO's co-operation with nations in Middle and Eastern Europe, to which RTO attaches particular importance especially as working together in the field of research is one of the more promising areas of co-operation.

The total spectrum of R&T activities is covered by the following 7 bodies:

- AVT Applied Vehicle Technology Panel
- HFM Human Factors and Medicine Panel
- IST Information Systems Technology Panel
- NMSG NATO Modelling and Simulation Group
- SAS System Analysis and Studies Panel
- SCI Systems Concepts and Integration Panel
- SET Sensors and Electronics Technology Panel

These bodies are made up of national representatives as well as generally recognised 'world class' scientists. They also provide a communication link to military users and other NATO bodies. RTO's scientific and technological work is carried out by Technical Teams, created for specific activities and with a specific duration. Such Technical Teams can organise workshops, symposia, field trials, lecture series and training courses. An important function of these Technical Teams is to ensure the continuity of the expert networks.

RTO builds upon earlier co-operation in defence research and technology as set-up under the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) and the Defence Research Group (DRG). AGARD and the DRG share common roots in that they were both established at the initiative of Dr Theodore von Kármán, a leading aerospace scientist, who early on recognised the importance of scientific support for the Allied Armed Forces. RTO is capitalising on these common roots in order to provide the Alliance and the NATO nations with a strong scientific and technological basis that will guarantee a solid base for the future.

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Preface

The Human Factors and Medicine Research and Technology Task Group 140, Psychosocial, Organizational and Cultural Aspects of Terrorism began meeting formally in November 2006 in Rome, Italy at the NATO Defence College (where it opened its proceedings for the Defence College members to attend and learn from the presenters) and it continued meeting twice annually finishing with the group's last meeting in June 2009 in Athens, Greece. The group included membership from Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Israel, Jordan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as temporary membership from Greece and Switzerland (two individuals who attended and contributed but did not continue as they were not formally nominated by their Nations as members).

In all of the meetings of the RTG-140 members shared rich presentations from the members of the current state of research in their fields of expertise and the new developments in the rapidly expanding fields of counter-terrorism and the studies of extremism. As these fields continue to develop at a very fast pace keeping abreast of the ever changing conditions they were studying, the presentations were always state of the art and preceded scientific work that was later to appear in academic or government reports. Many of these updated and summarized presentations are now included in this final report.

Overall the group's goals were three fold:

- 1) To map current social scientific expertise, knowledge and research activities on psychosocial, cultural and organizational aspects of terrorism including:
 - The motivations, ideologies, objectives, behaviour, and operation of terrorists – the individual actors, leadership, networks and their constituencies;
 - Processes of radicalisation recruitment, membership, and disengagement;
 - Factors influencing the resilience and regeneration of terrorists group/networks; and
 - Determinants of resilience within civil society and the military.
- 2) To identify gaps in knowledge and make recommendations for future scientific research in regard to the above topics.
- 3) To define and explore strategic, operational and tactical implications, including:
 - Recommendations for the development and refinement of concepts and doctrines;
 - Military and inter-agency training and education;
 - Military posture (e.g., minimizing the negative impact of military presence and operations);
 - Social influence and perception management (PSYOPS, INFO OPS, PI, media, etc.); and
 - Lessons learned about terrorism and counter-terrorism.

The RTG-140 determined to make full use of NATO assets in pursuing these objectives and also to contribute back to NATO in an ongoing manner. This meant the group consciously chose to meet in Paris at the RTA headquarters and invite the RTA coordinator to be present in meetings, to meet in Brussels HQ and invite NATO experts to take part, and to meet at the NATO Defense College where experts were also invited to listen to and take part in discussions when the scientific presentations were occurring. Likewise the group coordinated their activities with the Science Division as well in order to advise and sponsor two Advanced Research Workshops, one on civil and military resilience to terrorism and the other on radicalization/disengagement. Unfortunately due to one of our members dropping out who had responsibility for coordinating the resilience workshop only the radicalization/disengagement workshop was planned within the time frame of the RTG-140 lifespan. The ARW on radicalization/disengagement entitled **Home-grown Terrorism: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe** focused on indigenous

terrorism in Europe. It took place successfully and resulted in an edited volume of the conference proceedings also entitled **Home-grown Terrorism: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe** which is based on presentations in the group along with presentations of the invited experts who took part in the group's sponsored ARW. (This volume is co-edited by the chair of the RTG-140.) Coordination with the NATO Science division was also made in order that the RTG-140 could invite the best experts in the field from NATO Nations to help inform on these important topics taking advantage of the budgets that the Science Division has, while also contributing back to the Science Division by creating an edited volume of the Advanced Research Workshop.

The group also attempted to bring science back to the military level by conducting a survey of the military best practices regarding teaching of psycho-social cultural and organizational aspects terrorism/counterterrorism in military establishments within NATO and Partner Nations looking especially at those with deployed troops. This was done with the intent of being able to identify gaps in knowledge and teaching and to fill them with knowledge available to the group as well as to learn what are the best practices in this area and share them more widely in the NATO military community. The survey and research plan was coordinated and approved by participating members and was designed and carried out partially in the US but then discontinued due to difficulties carrying it out internationally. Unfortunately this task met insurmountable obstacles in that the Nations that agreed to participate found that their military establishments preferred to keep such information classified and did not participate in the survey making it impossible to proceed further on this task.

The membership of the RTG-140 was also opened to Partner Nations and to the Mediterranean Dialogue Nations with the express intent of including Middle Easterners and Muslims in the group to help balance some of the strong tendencies in the terrorism field to blame Islam itself as the basis for some forms of terrorism. We were very pleased to have Jordan and Israel both join, with Jordan honoring us by sending Princess (and General) Aisha al Bint as a member.

The RTG-140 membership is pleased to present the following final report to NATO with the hopes that it will benefit the NATO Nations, their Partners and Dialogue Nations in understanding and combating radicalization leading to extremism and terrorism worldwide. Special thanks are due to all the contributing authors, including the guest authors from the US, UK and Israel (Bruce Hoffman, Robert Lambert, Jonathan Githens-Mazer, Reuven Paz, and the Siraat team) all who had specific expertise that they were generously willing to contribute to this final product.

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Special thanks to our research intern, Beatrice Jacuch, who served the Programme Committee by assisting the Editor and by putting the report into NATO format.



Psychosocial, Organizational and Cultural Aspects of Terrorism

(RTO-TR-HFM-140)

Executive Summary

The NATO Human Factors and Medicine, Research and Technology Task Group 140, Psychosocial, Organizational and Cultural Aspects of Terrorism, has convened regularly since November 2006. As a group, the members explored together the latest scientific expertise, knowledge and research activities pertaining to the motivations, ideologies, objectives, behaviour, and operation of terrorists; the individual actors, leadership, networks and their constituencies; the processes of radicalisation recruitment, membership, and disengagement; factors influencing the resilience and regeneration of terrorists group/networks and the determinants of resilience within civil society and the military.

In meetings, group members presented cutting edge counter-terrorism and terrorism related research that addressed these topics. These uniformly outstanding presentations regularly preceded scientific work that appeared in academic journals or government reports – providing member Nations with some of the latest theory and field research available today. Updated and summarized versions of several such presentations, along with all of the contributions from the group members (along with some additional contributions from invited authors) make up this diverse and state-of-the-art report to NATO from the HFM-140's activities. It is a comprehensive look at terrorism, radicalization, counter radicalization, and deradicalization and also addresses resilience to terrorism. It examines the role of instigators, ideologues, supporters and operators, and the effects of terrorism on those who combat it, those who work in high threat security environments, and on the general public. Reports regarding Europe, Pakistan, and the Middle East, highlight changes in terrorism leadership, groups, strategies, ideologies, recruitment and the use of the Internet. The group presents holistic models of terrorism as well as resilience to terrorism, with research into counter-terrorism efforts within prisons, in communities and attempts to understand the motivations and psychology of terrorists and their victims.

During its term HFM-140 contributed significantly and frequently to NATO, e.g. holding meetings near key NATO sites and inviting regional NATO officials and experts to participate; collaborating with NATO's Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPSP) to conduct an Advanced Research Workshop on the topic of Terrorism: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalization among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe which was a resounding success and producing a volume of pioneering research published under the auspices of the NATO SPSP. Likewise HFM-140 was very pleased to reach out to the Mediterranean Dialogue nations and have Jordan and Israel both join, and was deeply honoured to welcome Jordan's Princess Gen. Aisha al Bint to HFM-140 ranks.

Special thanks are due to all contributing authors, including the guest authors from the US, UK and Israel (Bruce Hoffman, Robert Lambert, Jonathan Githens-Mazer, Reuven Paz, and the Siraat team) all of whom generously contributed their special expertise to this report. HFM-140 is pleased to present this report to NATO and hopes that it will benefit NATO members as well as their partner and dialogue nations.

Aspects psychosociaux, organisationnels et culturels du terrorisme

(RTO-TR-HFM-140)

Synthèse

Le groupe de travail 140 de la Commission sur les Facteurs Humains et la Médecine de l'organisation pour la technologie et la recherche de l'OTAN, centré sur l'aspect psychosocial, organisationnel et culturel du terrorisme s'est réuni régulièrement depuis novembre 2006. Les membres du groupe ont examiné ensemble les dernières découvertes, connaissances scientifiques et activités de recherche concernant les motivations, idéologies, objectifs, comportements et activités des terroristes, les acteurs individuels, les dirigeants, les réseaux et leurs soutiens, les processus de radicalisation, de recrutement, d'appartenance et de désengagement, et les facteurs influençant la résilience et la régénération de groupes/réseaux terroristes et les facteurs déterminants de résilience au sein de la société civile et de l'armée.

Lors des réunions, les membres du groupe ont présenté les toutes dernières recherches sur le terrorisme et le contre-terrorisme qui concernaient ces sujets. Ces présentations, toutes remarquables, précédaient régulièrement la publication de travaux scientifiques dans des revues universitaires ou des rapports officiels – fournissant aux pays membres quelques-unes des dernières théories et études de terrain disponibles aujourd'hui. Des versions mises à jour et résumées de plusieurs de ces présentations, au même titre que toutes les contributions des membres du groupe (avec quelques contributions supplémentaires d'auteurs invités), complètent ce rapport varié sur l'état actuel des connaissances de l'OTAN découlant des activités du groupe HFM-140. Il s'agit d'un panorama complet du terrorisme, de la radicalisation, de la contre-radicalisation et de la déradicalisation, et qui traite également la résilience au terrorisme. Ce panorama examine le rôle des instigateurs, idéologues, soutiens et opérateurs et les effets du terrorisme sur ceux qui le combattent, sur ceux qui travaillent dans des environnements de fortes menaces sécuritaires et sur le grand public. Des rapports concernant l'Europe, le Pakistan et le Moyen-Orient soulignent les changements au niveau des dirigeants du terrorisme, des groupes, des stratégies, des idéologies, du recrutement et de l'utilisation de l'Internet. Le groupe a présenté des modèles globaux du terrorisme et de résilience au terrorisme, en se penchant sur les efforts de contre-terrorisme dans les prisons et les communautés et en essayant de comprendre les motivations et la psychologie des terroristes et de leurs victimes.

Pendant son mandat, le groupe HFM-140 a apporté un appui appréciable et fréquent à l'OTAN, en se réunissant, par exemple, près de sites principaux de l'OTAN et en invitant officiels et experts régionaux de l'OTAN à participer, en collaborant avec le Programme pour la science au service de la paix et de la sécurité (programme SPSP) pour diriger un atelier de recherche avancée sur le thème du terrorisme, intitulé « Comprendre et combattre les causes de la radicalisation parmi les populations immigrées ou issues de l'immigration en Europe », qui a été un succès retentissant, et en rédigeant un volume de recherches novatrices publiées sous les auspices du programme SPSP de l'OTAN. De même, le groupe HFM-140 a été très satisfait d'inclure des pays du dialogue méditerranéen en réunissant la Jordanie et Israël et il a été extrêmement honoré d'accueillir la princesse Aïcha al Bint de Jordanie au sein du groupe HFM-140.

Des remerciements particuliers vont à tous les auteurs ayant participé, y compris les auteurs invités des Etats-Unis, du Royaume-Uni et d'Israël (Bruce Hoffman, Robert Lambert, Jonathan Githens-Mazer, Reuven Paz et l'équipe du Siraat), tous ayant généreusement apporté leurs compétences spéciales à ce rapport. Le groupe HFM-140 est heureux de présenter ce rapport à l'OTAN et il espère qu'il sera bénéfique aux membres de l'OTAN ainsi qu'à leurs pays partenaires et de dialogue.

TR-HFM-140 OVERVIEW

The NATO RTG-140 report begins with a focus on radicalization looking first at the work of author **David R. Mandel (CANADA)** who examines the role of instigators in promulgating terrorism. Mandel points out that instigators are rarely studied but important actors because unlike the terrorists they urge into action, they are non-interchangeable actors. Likewise while they often do not enact violence themselves, they are important catalysts for violence that are poorly understood and understudied. Instigators, according to Mandel, legitimize collective violence giving moral authority to individuals to participate directly in collective violence, and they also often shape bystanders' reactions to these events and establish the social parameters for depersonalization and stigma.

Yoram Schweitzer (ISRAEL) examines new developments in al Qaeda following the shift of al Qaeda operatives from Iraq to Pakistan and Afghanistan. He details the top leadership capabilities, goals and affiliate organizations as they relate to current trends. He points out that the central leadership of al Qaeda while weakened continues to lead often by staging mass propaganda hits that serve as models for its loosely affiliated off-shoot organizations. Schweitzer details how al Qaeda makes use of weak states for sheltering its activities and training activities. He also discusses the intentions of al Qaeda toward Israel and the effects of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza on boosting anti-Israeli propaganda.

Bruce Hoffman (UNITED STATES) argues against the "leaderless jihad" viewpoint of al Qaeda and its affiliates pointing out that the recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai were planned, premeditated, and executed by trained people operating under command and control and using sophisticated weapons and tactics in an extremely effective manner – thus, this event had all the fingerprints of an existing mature, capable organization with training camps, a headquarters, and leadership to plan and direct the operation, knowledge of surveillance tradecraft, and members with the ability to repel determined counterattacks, namely al Qaeda. He acknowledges that there are existing threats from home-grown terrorist groups (and mentions the foiled attacks in the Bronx and Fort Dix, New Jersey as examples), but emphasizes that the most consequential current threat is from an established terrorist organization with strong leadership; that is, al Qaeda.

Brynjar Lia (NORWAY) argues for three main reasons why al Qaeda continues to be popular around the world and continue to gain membership and support. He explains how the simple narrative of al Qaeda resonates strongly with deeply held grievances in the Muslim world and how al Qaeda has created for itself a powerful and captivating image. That it is seen as the most feared terrorist organization also according to Lia, exerts an immense attraction on young people. In some countries in Europe, Lia argues, it has become "cool" to be a jihadi. Likewise not being nationalistic in focus al Qaeda thrives because it is open for virtually everyone, irrespective of ethnicity and nationality. As long as one is willing to accept its extremist ideology, anyone can in principle become an al Qaeda member. Lia also outlines the weaknesses of al Qaeda which include the difficulty in justifying killing civilians, schisms among the leadership, and its unwillingness to prepare for a transition into a political movement that does not engage in terrorism.

Reuven Paz (ISRAEL) argues that the Internet has become the Open University for Militant Jihadi Studies and quotes one of the militant jihadis as writing "This is a non-central university, with no geographic borders, which has its presence everywhere and each person zealous for his religion and Nation can join it... This university has its own presidency, whose role is to incite, guide, indoctrinate, and encourage the awareness of the Mujahidin. Its presidency is the leadership of the Mujahidin headed by Osama bin Laden... The university includes several faculties, among them electronic militant jihad, martyrdom, and the technology of side bombs and car bombs." Paz states that the for the credibility of information obtained from open Internet sources run by such groups is high and that study of their sources can yield an extremely wide range of information. This is because such groups are on the run, function as fugitives and are repressed in their own societies and thus have no other forum for openly recruiting and indoctrinating members. Likewise

many of their Internet forums reveal what the current debates and arguments among leaders are as well as doubts and motivations for those who follow. The difficulties in studying these open source materials include that most of the high level debate takes place in Arabic and the groups are highly fluid and adapting constantly to current counter-terrorism trends and events requiring that one immerse oneself in a thorough study of their history and current status.

Laila Bokhari (NORWAY) details the multi-faceted and troubled situation in Pakistan emphasizing the interaction of religion with military and state institutions that have in some contexts supported groups and ideologies that are now threatening national stability. She describes extremist groups and leaders vying for power and Islamic legitimacy among the radicalized pockets of the population that they influence. She outlines the complex interactions between these groups which alternately compete and also come together in a cooperative way that makes them a credible threat to the central state authority of Pakistan.

Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer (UNITED KINGDOM) outline some of the similarities between those who carried out and supported the 7/7 bombings and the Provisional IRA movement which also attacked London commuters pointing out how the key motivators for each group appears to be grievance and shame. The authors state that in the decade preceding 7/7 bin Laden's brand of propaganda had become common coinage for a number of Muslims throughout the UK, most notably Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Abdullah el Faisal. These instigators all became prominent local propagandists who effectively pre-figured the al Qaeda message but argued the same message – that political grievance and the shame of defeat are assuaged in an act of reciprocal violence. The authors argue that UK Muslims have a high level of frustration about a lack of any effective response to state violence against Muslims and that this parallels frustrations in the past over the tough government response to Provisional IRA terrorist prisoners' demands for political status, and in the latter case this was turned into a successful recruitment strategy by the Provisional IRA. Likewise the authors argue that one of al Qaeda's aims was that Mohammed Sadiqqi Khan, the eldest 7/7 bomber, should achieve the same heroic status as Bobby Sands and for the same purpose. According to the authors, both the Provisional IRA and al Qaeda illustrate how a weaker party in asymmetrical conflict might adopt terrorist tactics so as to balance asymmetry by making enemy civilians suffer as much as those in whose name the terrorist group claims to act.

Siraat (UNITED KINGDOM) is a Muslim community action and research team in Europe that is working to prevent and counter violent extremist thought and action. The authors argue that Salafism is often blamed as the ideological basis of the global militant jihad but that this is incorrect. They argue that the *Salafi* methodology is actually protective for Muslim believers against joining groups that espouse takfiri ideologies (i.e., declare other Muslims as infidels and able to be killed) and those that promulgate militant jihadi terrorism (i.e., suicide terrorist operations, terrorist beheadings, bombings, assassinations, killing civilians). The authors argue that ironically those who follow the Salafi teachings which return to the understanding of Islam as the early generation understood and practiced it are less likely to be recruited or engage in terrorist groups than are converts or those who are moderate Muslims with a poor understanding of their faith. The authors argue that strict Salafis do not pledge allegiance to other groups or leaders and are prohibited from rebelling against the leader of a Muslim country regardless of how unjust and oppressive that leader is, and especially if the Muslims do not have the ability to remove a particular leader from power. Salafis are supposed to take into account the benefits and harms of any action which is done in the name of advancing the religion and do not endorse harming other Muslims nor creating chaos. Salafis do not agree with the targeting of civilians and non-combatants in warfare based on the evidences from the Qur'an and Sunnah. The confusion arises between mainstream Salafis and the militant *jihadi-takfiri* extremist narrative that has adopted established Islamic lexicology and terminology in an attempt to promote itself as being the most authentic and correct interpretation of the religion. As a result, in order to gain legitimacy to these claims, such violent extremist narrative ascribes itself to Salafism. This is why we find references to the 'Salaf' (the righteous predecessors) and 'Salafi' (one who takes his example these early righteous generations) replete within the discourse of Abū Qatāda, Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī, Abū Mus'ab as-Sūrī, Ayman adh-Dhawāhirī and many others.

This is however incorrect and the Salafi scholars answer their militant jihadi claims asserting that they are incorrect in their interpretations of jihad and in claiming Salafi Islam as the foundation for their terrorist beliefs and actions.

Albert Jongman (NETHERLANDS) provides a comprehensive look at radicalization, counter radicalization, and deradicalization inside the Netherlands, detailing how recent events, including several assassinations, have heightened tensions with Muslim immigrant descent segments of the population. Tensions and intolerance were in clear evidence in the 2006 elections with immigrants descent populations clearly pitted against right wing anti-immigrant groups which gave rise to campaigns to focus on youth and radicalisation. The Dutch government also increased Internet surveillance for awareness and early warning of potential attacks. The arrest and trial of members of the Hofstad group, a home-grown terrorist group foiled when a member assassinated a controversial filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, resulted in a number of changes to anti-terrorism legislation, including redefinition of crimes (including membership in a terrorist group) and criminals (including supporters/financiers of terrorism) and judicial, law enforcement, legislative, and intelligence reforms that focus on pre-emption and anticipation versus reaction. The view of the Dutch government is that a holistic approach is warranted for terrorism, one that deals with the underlying grievance causing the violence (e.g., poverty, alienation, marginalization, and segregation) – a hard-learned lesson from violence events in the 1970s related to grievances held by the Moroccan immigrant community. This approach is based on a more nuanced understanding of radicalization and is broader than simply regarding terrorism as a law enforcement problem – resulting in new ways of counterterrorism coordination and cooperation within the Netherlands. Their strategy is to focus on prevention of radicalization in Muslim youths and abolishing – hotspots to accomplish three goals: prevent attacks, be adequately prepared for a large attack, and pay attention to the causes of terrorism. Some policies, like restrictive immigration and asylum policies have unintended consequences: more illegal immigrants. The four cities in which the majority of Muslims live, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht, all have tailored initiatives to improve relationships between groups and deal with socio-economic problems and counter segregation. Jongman explains that the government uses national surveys assessing the level of fear of terrorism and feeling of security and reduction in social problems in urban problem areas (including school dropout and poverty rates, rates of dependence on social security, segregation levels, and crime) to assess the efficacy of their counterterrorism efforts. Current challenges include the lack of integration of African first and second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands (especially Somalis, who he states are clannish and tend to be more lonely/alienated), the Moroccan community (who he states are responsible for majority of crime and violence problems), and the threats made by al Qaeda of retaliatory attacks in the Netherlands for their involvement in the Afghanistan conflict.

Anne Speckhard (UNITED STATES) argues that there is a lethal cocktail of terrorism made up of the terrorist group, individual, ideology and social support, and that individuals may have their own vulnerabilities and motivations for becoming terrorists that mesh with the groups motivations and are supported by its ideology and made easier by the degree of social support which it enjoys within the community. She states that motivations for terrorism in conflict zones is usually trauma and revenge driven whereas in non-conflict zones it's much more mediated by issues of marginalization, frustrated aspirations, discrimination, desire to belong, thirst for heroism, etc. She argues however that militant jihad groups are adept at bringing images and stories from the conflict zones into non-conflict zones and capitalize on the strong emotional responses and even secondary traumatization that occurs by showing potential recruits such images. Speckhard goes on to outline disengagement and deradicalization programs that can occur in militaries, prisons, community settings and over the Internet. She details many of the prison programs that are currently in existence and writes about her own involvement in designing and pilot testing the detainee rehabilitation program which was put into effect for over 20,000 detainees held by US forces in Iraq. She states that this was the first program to intensively use a psychological intervention coupled with Islamic challenge which is usually the predominant aspect of other programs and argues for the reasons why psychological treatment is also a necessary component to reverse ideological indoctrination and address the original vulnerabilities that first drew the individual to the terrorist group and its ideology.

Sherifa Zuhur (UNITED STATES) argues that ideology is of extreme importance in understanding Islamic radicalization and those who become radicalized into militant jihadi terrorism. Extremists call for a restoration of God's sovereignty, and thus their movement is one of purist reform. Zuhur states that while there are many ideological differences among groups and regions that the "new militant jihad" sees Muslims embroiled in a global conflict, the 'New Jihad' has correctly identified local Muslim governments as being influenced, and subservient to Western powers. These groups, according to Zuhur, believe these rulers to have acted against Islam, in their national programs, actions such as the peace treaties with Israel (for Egypt and Jordan), by promoting legal reforms not in accord with *shari'ah*, or because of their corruption. Prejudices stirred up by ignorant or intolerant figures are difficult to dispel where people have little or no contact with the other groups, and when it is reasonable for them to believe that Israel oppresses Palestinians, or that Western Christians hate Muslims. *Takfir*, which she defines as the action of calling a Muslim an infidel, or non-believer and as such he may be the object of jihad; i.e., he may be killed for offenses to Islam. Most of the 'new jihads' identify the local Muslim governments as made up of apostates through the process of takfir, thus legitimizing violence on these authorities and their police, judges, or other agents. The secularization of assimilated Muslims is unlikely according to Zuhur who states that the "Islamic world" is so impacted by Islamic revival and devoid of counter-ideologies. Likewise she argues that it is a mistake for policymakers to grant too much importance to government supported religious figures in the hopes that they will influence those who might be attracted to extremist ideology, as they are often discounted by those drawn to militant jihadi groups. The most effective speakers in this process, according to Zuhur are those who have been part of movements and recanted as opposed to governmental *`ulama* (clerics).

Laurie Fenstermacher (UNITED STATES) gives a holistic model for understanding radicalization into terrorism and outlines the factors involved. She lays out the essential components, the environments in which terrorism emerges and the factors which trigger radicalization so as to increase susceptibility to recruitment and group mobilization and goes on to outline the prevailing theories related to all of these factors. Any model of radicalization must according to Fenstermacher consider at a minimum, the group, the individual actors, their motivations and goals, the supporters, and environmental factors and ideology which ties all of these together. Fenstermacher finishes her paper with an elegant discussion of various models as they apply to this area of study.

David R. Mandel (CANADA) discusses the signal value of the terrorist threat and what it portends for the future. Stating that the statistical risk of terrorism in the U.S. is comparable to that of being killed by lightning or an allergic reaction to peanuts, concern about terrorism as a form of threat, both by government officials and members of the public, reflects, according to Mandel much about its psychosocial nature. The threat of terrorism, unlike the threat of lightning, seems to stem in large measure from the signal it sends, and from our own ability to imagine terrorists increasing the frequency and magnitude of their mayhem unless counter-terrorism measures are taken to stop them. Mandel argues that there is reason to hypothesize that perceived risk or threat might be amplified by feelings of fear and attenuated by feelings of anger and gives experimental evidence to support these hypotheses.

Anne Speckhard (UNITED STATES) sets out a model for psycho-social resilience to terrorism identifying and discussing the variables that impact resilience, stating that the concept of resilience implies adaptability and a certain ability to "bounce back" in the face of a challenge or stressor. In this model resilience is likewise defined as dynamic variable, one that is influence by many co-variates and that exists on a continuum of adaptability. To be resilient an individual or society must in the face of a challenge, retain flexibility, adaptability, functionality and empathy. To lose any of these is to lose resilience. Conversely for these traits to be present, or even to develop or to increase in the face of a stressor is to show positive resilience. Likewise, a loss of resilience is indicated by the appearance of pathological symptoms: of posttraumatic stress (including flashbacks, high arousal states, loss of concentration, irritability, etc.), dissociation (a separation of normal cognitive functions, emotional numbing, inability to think, etc.), anxiety, depression, and panic, all of which interfere with and create a loss of normal functioning and/or an increase in xenophobia. According to this

model the variables that affect resilience to terrorism on both a societal and individual level include ten main variables which both affect resilience to a stressor, and may also be affected in turn by a traumatic stressor event. These ten variables are each discussed with implications for governments to consider steps for promoting and enhancing resilience to terrorism.

Tayseer Elias Shawash (JORDAN) and Anne Speckhard (UNITED STATES) discuss the 2005 al Qaeda attacks in Jordan and analyze the results of research by Dr. Shawash following the attacks on the resilience of those affected studying two groups: civilians and emergency work force that assisted in the attacks. In addition to the loss of family members by death, economic, educational and health losses were all significant for the victims of these attacks. Posttraumatic and generalized anxiety responses, as well as somatization were common although they diminished for many over time. Civilians generally did worse than the emergency workers, although both groups suffered. In Jordanian society, friends, family, community and religion all played important roles in bolstering resilience. Traumatized victims who were in clear need of psychotherapy often refused treatment due to issues of stigmatization in Jordanian culture. Jordanian government officials played an important role in helping victims, setting up charities for them, and in responding with an increase in security at public events.

Anne Speckhard (UNITED STATES), Gino Verleye (BELGIUM) and Beatrice Jacuch (POLAND) present analysis of an exploratory study of resilience of civilian and military personnel working a high threat environment (Iraq). The model of resilience presented in a previous chapter was tested in this study as well as the ability to conduct a survey on resilience to a high threat environment remotely through the Internet. The researchers found ample evidence of posttraumatic and acute stress responses in this sample, although these diminished over time. Even one month past the event, twenty-one percent of the respondents evidenced thoughts of the traumatic event intruding in their minds. In regard to the traumatic event(s) twenty-six percent of the sample said they tried not to think about it; twenty-seven percent avoided talking about it; and twenty-one percent avoided reminders of it. Twenty-one percent felt unease and uncertainty about the future in response to the event. Thirty percent of the sample said their sleep patterns were disturbed in response to the event; fifteen percent had trouble concentrating; thirty percent were jumpy or easily startled; and nineteen percent were easily agitated or angered in the months enduring beyond one month following exposure to the traumatic event. Additional posttraumatic responses were reported by the sample with the most reported symptom being fear that it could happen again; reported by fifty-seven percent of the sample in the first month after exposure, with that diminishing to twenty percent beyond one month after exposure. Psychosomatic symptoms included more than normal fatigue (thirty-eight percent diminishing to twenty three percent); stomach distress or nausea (twenty one diminishing to ten percent); general aches in the body (fifteen diminishing to eight percent); headaches (twelve diminishing to nine percent) dizziness or difficulty breathing (six diminishing to four percent); and panic attacks (seven diminishing to three percent). Becoming fearless was endorsed by twenty-nine percent of the sample in the first month after exposure diminishing to twenty-five percent of the sample in the months following. Likewise twenty percent of the respondents said they became excited by danger and sought it out more following the exposure in the first month with this diminishing to seventeen percent for the months following beyond one month. Coping mechanisms were also explored and it was noted that many of the respondent would have liked a professional intervention to help them cope with their distress.



Chapter 1 – RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATO

The suggested recommendations for NATO from this research Task Group were many and varied. In addition to the carefully written recommendations contained in the chapters members additionally submitted the following recommendations for consideration by NATO policy makers in regard to these topics.

In terms of Science Policy and the following recommendations were given:

- The study of radicalization, terrorism and extremism has only just begun. It would be useful for NATO to engage the academic community to a far greater degree in assessing the problems, their causes, and what can be done about them. At a minimum NATO should sponsor activities that develop descriptive standards for key terms that characterize modern-day conflicts. For instance the term radicalization needs to be properly defined for use within NATO. A critical analysis of existing motivational theories of violent conflict should be conducted. This analysis should examine both the theoretical strengths and weaknesses and also the extent to which empirical evidence confirms or refutes these theories' hypotheses. In essence, this is needed to move terrorism studies in the direction of terrorism science.
- At the same time NATO Nations are all facing issues of radicalization, extremism and terrorism and many are engaged in fighting insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan and will be likely involved in other conflicts where terrorism is a key element. Case studies, in depth analyses and lessons learned by engaging programs to prevent, counter and reverse radicalization are all useful and should be shared among Nations. Science occurs on many levels – from the in-depth case study method to the controlled experimental design and all are valuable inputs to understanding these phenomena better. The academic community can play a very important role in supporting these goals and should be fully engaged by NATO.
- Terrorism and radicalization are multi-faceted phenomena and require an interdisciplinary approach to address the problems. Experts with deep expertise in pertinent areas need to be engaged, even those who may not have written anything on terrorism per se. The NATO scientists engaged, at a minimum, need to be able to identify these areas of expertise and forge the links. Advanced Research Workshops are a good mechanism for that.
- In regard to the RTG process members felt that better planning for actual NATO-sponsored research and some level of funding and commitment from the Nations is needed to conduct joint research among the NATO Nations. Ideally an RTG should make plans for collaborative work to be fleshed out early on, including feasibility assessments, and meetings should be opportunities to review research progress, plan next stages, etc., but this requires solid commitments by the Nations involved in and sending representatives to the meetings for: funding support, consistent attendance and commitment to the process and a willingness to share data.
- Since NATO RTGs are, by definition, multi-national teams, they can do research that individual researchers would find impossible to achieve. For example, this group might have devised a public opinion survey, like the Eurobarometer, that has questions designed to test specific hypotheses about support for terrorism in the general public, which would be administered in member countries in their native languages. Right now, we have to rely on limited tests based on incidentally relevant questions posed by researchers in other multi-national projects, like the World Values Survey, Eurobarometer, Afrobarometer, etc. Such efforts should leverage expertise in academia, as well.

In terms of short-term policy measures to actually counter terrorism the following recommendations were given:

- Increase efforts to identify and render harmless potential “radicalisation-entrepreneurs” by either prosecuting them, or guiding them to find more constructive ways to act out their activism. Many of

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATO

the “home-grown” terrorists who resonate to ideological messages of such groups as al Qaeda might benefit from opportunities to take part in a “humanitarian jihad” – something akin to the US sponsored Peace Corps where young passionate people could be sent off to help build countries and address their concerns about injustice, poverty and conflicts in constructive ways rather than get involved in destruction.

- De-legitimization of extremist messages – this requires identifying where such messages are spread from – opinion makers, radical clerics, youth leaders, etc. Finding ways of hampering the proliferation of violent extremist messages on the Internet, maybe through increasing “positive” messages as a counter-balance. Likewise it is possible to de-legitimize militant jihadi messages by using emotionally engaging footage that terrorist groups like to use but pairing it with a different message, one that does not endorse killing civilians and that shows the destruction that terrorist groups are causing.
- Identifying “radical voices” and working to curb them. An important target group is charismatic “gate keepers” such as radical clerics, “jihad veterans” (people who have returned back from Iraq for instance in the Yemen context – and Guantanamo returnees), and leaders in militant milieus who play a vital recruitment role.
- Prevent the establishment of facilities and sanctuaries (empty, negative, secretive meeting places, in which radicals can spread their violent messages, their violent ideology, indoctrinate new members and socialize them into a violent extremist (“jihadist”) worldview. Develop healthy meeting places for discussion, activity and learning – sports, vocational training, languages, media training, etc.
- The development of youth leadership programmes: many of the target group interviews focus on the need for skills and training – vocational training, leadership skills, political management skills, administration skills, i.e., develop “cultures” of positive exchanges and learning centres.

Awareness-raising programmes:

- Many of the target groups focus on the need for places to learn and discuss issues at stake for youth – *meeting places* for discussion, places to “eliminate negative feelings”, have outlets for opinions, media training, key concerns are often seen to be: corrupt leaders, lack of democracy, lack of places to be heard, apathy.
- Awareness campaigns – sending positive messages through media, TV, internet – make youth create the message to be sent out, media training, journalism skills with the goal to create awareness and ownership of their own futures.

Recommendations were also made to design and study resilience to terrorism across multiple NATO Nations, including Partner Nations, in order to learn more about the responses to terrorism and what are the best means to bolster resilience. This RTG made steps in that direction but was unable to conduct a multi-national study with no funding.

Likewise NATO troops continue to be involved in high threat security environments. Many militaries study resilience in these situations for their troops but fail to study their civilian counter-parts who have less training to deal with serving in a high threat environment and who may be far more deeply affected. This group sponsored the beginnings of research in both of these areas but was limited in what could be done without proper funding.

NATO should also sponsor multi-national research looking at how terrorist messages engage vulnerable recruits within NATO Nations and how messages could be tested in small focus groups and also over the Internet to learn if they too could resonate with the same types of individuals while engaging them in constructive, versus violent responses.

Mediterranean Dialogue and Gulf Cooperation countries should also be more deeply engaged in the RTG groups studying terrorism and radicalization as the ideological basis of the militant jihad stems from Arab scholars and activists and these countries have valuable experience in dealing with prison, military and society radicalization and efforts to curb it.

There are many factors involved in disengagement and de-radicalization from extremists and terrorists groups. These issues should be studied across the Nations and experts should be brought together to discuss best practices, cutting edge ideas and experiences with such efforts.

The RTG-140 group had a great deal of expertise among its members. It would be wise to disseminate the findings of the group through a lecture series follow on activity and to reformulate another group, or groups that can study resilience in high threat security environments, where terrorism takes place and that can organize to continue to study radicalizations and efforts to fight terrorism, as well as disengagement and de-radicalization efforts.



Chapter 2 – THE ROLE OF INSTIGATORS IN RADICALIZATION TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM

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2.1 INTRODUCTION

Psychological theory geared towards understanding collective violence, whether by violent state or non-state actors, has tended to focus on three groups: victims, perpetrators, and bystanders [1],[2],[3]. In this paper, I propose that the category “perpetrators” needs to be refined or, rather, divided [4],[5],[6]. Specifically, those who instigate collective violence need to be distinguished from those who subsequently carry it out. We may call the former *instigators* and the latter *perpetrators*.

The main point is that instigators play a critical role in the *origination* of collective violence, whereas perpetrators play a critical role in its *execution*, and the latter tend to operate in the service of instigators. Of course, in some instances, the two sets of agents overlap. The lone-wolf terrorist (e.g., Theodore Kaczynski) epitomizes the case of strong, if not perfect, overlap, but also illustrates its limits. As the complexity of terrorist operations and the size of a terrorist organizations increase, the likelihood of instigators and perpetrators being one and the same steeply diminishes. As organizations grow, they also tend to grow more complex and, accordingly, the functions of their various members tend to become more differentiated. This is no different for organizations of violence. Hence, we should not be surprised to see a division of labor there too.

2.2 INSTIGATORS: WHY STUDY THEM? WHY DON'T WE STUDY THEM?

Given that it is the goals, plans, and acts of instigators that set in motion a complex, causal chain of events leading to collective violence, the importance of understanding the “psychology of instigation” should be evident. The significance of examining instigators, however, has often been downplayed in favor of understanding how presumably ordinary members of society can be led into becoming perpetrators of collective violence. For example, as Staub [3] stated in reference to the Holocaust, “there will always be wild ideas and extreme ideologies. For us the question is how the German people came to follow a leader and a party with such ideas, and how they came to participate in their fulfillment” (p. 98). The implication here is that what is really important is not why Hitler was possessed by those “crazy ideas”, but rather why he was able to influence other “normal” people to follow him. By extension, this argument suggests that instigators are less worthy of research attention than the mass of perpetrators that may follow them, or the even greater mass of bystanders who may either support or oppose them, because instigators tend to be abnormal – possessed as they were by “wild ideas”.

One reason for this focus is social psychology’s aim of formulating accounts that generalize to the mass of ordinary people. Instigators of collective violence, with their “wild ideas” and “extreme ideologies” do not seem to fit this mold. These theorists do not deny the importance of instigators, but view them as largely inexplicable in terms of the psychological processes used to describe “ordinary individuals”. Consider Stanley Milgram’s statement that “the psychological adjustments of a Wehrmacht General to Adolf Hitler parallel those of the lowest infantryman to his superior, and so forth, throughout the system. *Only the psychology of the ultimate leader demands a different set of explanatory principles*” [[7], my italics].

Another reason for the reluctance to focus on instigators may be the concern that people will misconstrue explanations of their behavior as exculpatory statements. Indeed, this concern may be well founded:

Miller, Gordon, and Buddie [8] observed that explaining a perpetrator's behavior increased the likelihood of condoning that behavior. Of course, the same argument could be used to justify why it would be better not to even try to explain perpetrators behavior.

Other possible reasons include the fact that perpetrators greatly outnumber instigators, and perpetrators tend to carry out the actual killings; thus, they may seem more important to understand. I would argue, however, that it is precisely because instigators can lead so many others to participate in acts of collective violence, or stand idly by while it unfolds, that we need to try to understand them as well as their followers and bystanders. In effect, if a behavioral science of the instigator was developed to the point where we were able to at least indicate with a fair degree of reliability which aspiring instigators were most likely to foment violent extremism, then such models might one day provide useful strategic and operational intelligence for counter-terrorism operations.

Studies of the integrative complexity (i.e., the degree of differentiation and integration of ideas or perspectives) of state leaders suggest that the goal of moving beyond post-hoc explanatory theories of motivation for violent extremism to indicative models of adversarial intent may be attainable. Several archival studies of leaders' or senior officials' statements across different historical periods during times of inter-state crises reveal that the decision to go to war is usually preceded by a significant decline in integrative complexity [9],[10],[11] (for a recent review, see [12]). Using this kind of dynamic, "state-based" analysis, along with "trait-based" profile analyses of state and non-state leaders, micro-level early warning models of instigators of violent extremism might one day be developed (for a comparison of state and trait approaches to measuring leaders' complexity, see [13]).

2.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF INSTIGATORS

2.3.1 Non-Interchangeability

A defining feature of instigators, which serves to distinguish them perpetrators, is the non-interchangeable role that they serve in the development of collective violence. Underscoring this point, Ian Kershaw [14] states "whatever the external circumstances and impersonal determinants, Hitler was not interchangeable". The same could not be said even for top-ranking Nazi perpetrators of the Final Solution, such as Himmler or Heydrich. In rerunning history with Hitler, one can imagine substitutions for the others that would still leave the core features of the historical episode intact. Perhaps a substitution of Heydrich would have slowed the Final Solution and saved many lives that were lost, but it would not have prevented the Holocaust – at least, that is not easy to imagine *but for* Heydrich. In a similar vein, we can easily imagine substitutions of individual 9/11 terrorist hijackers and, yet, still imagine that the attacks would have taken place in essentially the same manner with different perpetrators. The same cannot be said for bin Laden. That is, it is much easier to imagine: "No bin Laden, no 9/11". The more general point is that most perpetrators of violent extremism, including high-level bureaucrats of systems of collective violence, will pass a counterfactual test of "undo-ability", whereas most instigators will fail the same test.

I am not aware of any study that has formally tested the non-interchangeability of instigators hypothesis. Nevertheless, I suspect that if one were to elicit the views of terrorism and political violence scholars or counter-terrorism practitioners about the non-interchangeability of instigators and perpetrators, a reliable and large difference would be found. This hypothesis could quite easily be tested in future research.

2.3.2 Catalysts of Violence

Instigators often achieve their non-interchangeable position by appealing to a mass audience. They may offer hope to their followers, usually in times of social crisis in which many are searching for meaning and a sense of belonging in their lives. This hope is energizing and provides a common vision, but it is often a vision that rests on hatred, distrust, and justification of violence. Hitler capitalized on Germany's high

propensity for violence during a period of dramatic social unrest and consolidated immense power in the process. In exchange, he imparted a new form of coherence to an unstable social system, albeit one that culminated in incalculable misery and destruction and that proved to also be unstable. In so doing, his role was figural against a background of other enabling conditions and transformed those conditions. As Yehuda Bauer put it, Hitler was “the radicalizing factor” [15]. Bauer’s statement is indicative of an important point about instigators. It is characteristic of instigators, but not perpetrators, that they serve a *catalytic* or *radicalizing* role in the development of collective violence. The characteristic fits bin Laden as well: his key role as al Qaeda’s first in command, quite arguably, has been to incite and sustain widespread hatred toward the West and Israel. That is why the periodic releases of his tapes calling for renewed *jihad* have been damaging even if they are short on specifics. They inspire the idea, “Be creative. Find your own way of carrying out *jihad*. That is *your* duty to God.”

The catalytic function served by instigators does not mean, however, that they are “initial causes” of collective violence. Rather, instigators increase the *propensity* for collective violence and intentionally act to *accelerate* its pace and *direct* its focus once it has started. For example, the racial anti-semitism propagated by the Nazis under Hitler had as one of its own proximal causes the many anti-semitic German writings and speeches of the late 1800s. If Hitler had not been exposed to these ideas as a young adult, it is unlikely that he would have turned out to be “Hitler” [5]. Few instigators of collective violence construct their justifications for violence without influence from a mix of ideas that have already permeated the instigator’s culture to some extent. In this sense, instigators can be seen as the conduit between the cultural background and the expression of violence that they help bring to the foreground.

2.3.3 Cross-Spectrum Power Holders

In his analysis of power in contemporary societies, Alvin Toffler [16] defined three forms: *low-grade* power relies on physical force or the threat of violence, *medium-grade* power relies on control of capital wealth, and *high-grade* power relies on access to, and control of, information and knowledge. A critical factor that distinguishes instigators from other perpetrators is the acquisition of power across this power spectrum. Instigators are likely to achieve higher positions of authority than perpetrators (including dictatorial or even quasi-messianic status). The roles that even high-ranking perpetrators take on tend to be shaped and sanctioned by these ultimate leaders [17]. Unlike most perpetrators, instigators may attain the power to mobilize armies, paramilitary forces, and the police. Although the ability to achieve control over state apparatus may be limited for non-state instigators, their power in this regard will still tend to be greater than that of the perpetrators they lead.

Instigators are likely to have greater powers than perpetrators in many other respects as well. They tend to have better control over sources of financing and use of organizational resources. If they rise to power as state leaders they will have greater powers to change laws, while as non-state actors they will have greater powers to challenge the validity of existing laws that do not serve their interests. Unlike perpetrators, a key task of instigators is to influence the attitudes of the masses in ways intended to serve their strategic intent. In short, instigators not only have the power to authorize individuals to participate directly in collective violence, they also have greater powers than perpetrators to shape bystanders’ reactions to these events and establish the social parameters for depersonalization and stigma [18] and dehumanization and moral exclusion [19]. In other words, whereas perpetrators with the support of their bureaucratic apparatus carry out violence, instigators play a key role in establishing the social preconditions whereby that violence is likely to be perceived as justified by sufficient numbers of active participants and passive bystanders to make its operational and strategic success possible.

2.3.4 Propagators of Nationalism

As LeBon [20] emphasized over a century ago, the effective instigator energizes his followers by agitating their emotions and by appealing to the sentiments that guide their reason. In modern history, *nationalism*

has been one of the most effective political strategies for accomplishing this goal [21],[22], and its success is fundamentally due to its psychological power.

On the one hand, nationalism creates an egotistic sense of in-group cohesion by emphasizing the shared greatness of a people. On the other hand, it exacerbates feelings of threat by pointing to the nation's precariousness, feelings of hatred and a desire for revenge by pointing to those deemed responsible for its hardships and failures, and feelings of insult due to the belief that one's Nation has not received the respect it deserves.

As Isaiah Berlin noted long ago in an essay entitled, *The bent twig: On the rise of nationalism* [23], nationalism is often motivated by some form of collective humiliation. The same message was articulated decades later in Staub's [3] book, *The Roots of Evil*, and later still in Stern's [24] *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*. It is interesting to note that when bin Laden in his August 23, 1996, *Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two Holy Mosques* issued a call for *jihad*, the call was for "a guerrilla war, where the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in it" [25]. That is, bin Laden appealed not to Arab or Muslim states, but to the "Moslem nation".

Chiot [26] has documented that, in case after case, twentieth-century tyrannies have been characterized by a combination of perceived national superiority coupled with perceived national threat and/or a collective sense of insult from the outside world. The Nazi image of a German master race threatened by an international Jewish plague that mocked Germany and her people illustrates the point. Similarly, bin Laden points to the "humiliation and disgrace" hurled on the Islamic world by the West "for more than eighty years" [27]. The reference to "eighty years" may not be evident to most Westerners of our generation, but it would not fail to have significance for Muslims likely to recall that in 1918 the Ottoman sultanate, the last Muslim empire, was defeated, occupied, and later partitioned by the British and French empires into Iraq, Palestine, and Syria (and later Lebanon). As Bernard Lewis [27] points out, these insults must be understood in historical context, both in terms of the geopolitical reality that since the birth of Islam, Muslim empires ruled most of the civilized world for the next millennium and were exporters of civilization to the emerging West, and also in terms of the religious tradition of *jihad*, with its dual connotations of militant struggle and duty to God.

According to bin Laden, "hostility toward America is a religious duty, and we hope to be rewarded for it by God" [28]. The reframing of calls for violence as "duties" or "moral obligations" is a popular technique of instigators to legitimize collective violence. By linking the perpetration of terrorism to a religious duty, bin Laden uses God as the ultimate authority. In effect, bin Laden has claimed that if you fail to try to kill Americans, you have failed in your duty to God. Such messages can instill powerful feelings of moral obligation to an ideal or cause. Hannah Arendt [29] noted in her famous report of the Adolf Eichmann trial how a strong sense of obedience to Hitler and his ideals served as an important source of Eichmann's diligence in overseeing the transport of Jews to death camps during the Holocaust – so much so that Eichmann was willing to violate orders by his superior, Heinrich Himmler, toward the end of the Holocaust to stop transporting Jews to the death camps in order to follow what he believed was Hitler's wish.

Nationalism and religious fundamentalism play upon a key aspect of human social cognition – the tendency to categorize individuals into groups. As we know from Tajfel's [30] classic work using the minimal group paradigm, people will discriminate in favor of in-group members and against out-group members even when the basis of social categorization is trivial (such as when an experimenter tells participants that their test scores reveal a preference for paintings by either Klee or Klimt). Nationalism is particularly effective at creating this sense of *us* versus *them* because nations (unlike states) tend to be defined in terms of features that are of high personal and social importance, such as ethnicity, race, religion, ideology, and language [31]. Consequently, the nation is likely to be seen not merely as an aggregate but as a cohesive *entity* [32]. For example, German *völkisch* nationalists conceived of their nation as an organic whole whose members were united by blood bonds that went back to the beginning of human history [33]. Religious

fundamentalism goes even further: not only are there blood bonds, there are also duties to God that serve to unite the *ummah* or nation of Muslim believers.

2.4 WHAT MOTIVATES THEM? PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS

For those of us who share very different political views, social perspectives, and cultural ideals from the instigators and their movements we wish to better understand, it may be tempting to think that instigators are savvy manipulators of the public that use nationalism merely as a means of political expediency and power grabbing. To be sure, successful instigators will use the sentiments of the masses to gain power and will most often do so strategically. But, it would be short-sighted to think that instigators were merely being Machiavellian, but that, privately, they were unconvinced of their own arguments. Rather, it appears that in many cases the motivation to instigate comes from a genuine sense of the same sentiments that instigators propagate or incense in their supporters.

Surely, there are numerous psychological factors that play a role in each case history. As I have examined elsewhere [5], Hitler's rage seems to have been provoked in no small measure by an extreme form of *threatened egotism*, which as Baumeister, Smart, and Boden [34] define, refers "both to favorable appraisals of self and to the motivated preference for such favorable appraisals, regardless of whether they are valid or inflated" (p. 6). These authors have reviewed considerable literature indicating that violence is more likely to be carried out by people with high but unstable self esteem than by people with either high and stable self esteem or low self esteem. In a similar vein, a recent vignette study conducted by my colleagues, Chelsea Ferriday and Oshin Vartanian, and I demonstrated that expressions of aggression (namely, willingness to deliver painful noise stimuli as feedback) toward another person were particularly likely if that person had just delivered negative feedback on the actor's performance to him or her in a public context and if the recipient of that feedback (that is, the participant) scored relatively high on a scale of narcissism [35].

There is of course an interesting parallel between this person-level characterization of the threatened egotist (or narcissist) and the group-level characterization of the threatened nation. Both share the elements of positive self-regard and a need for such positive appraisals, coupled with a sense of frustration that their deserved standing has been marred. But, it is unclear how well-threatened egotism serves as an important psychological factor if we look across the spectrum of instigators. For instance, whereas Hitler met with much personal failure and was on the brink of destitution by the start of WWI [14], bin Laden came from one of the wealthiest Saudi families. On the other hand, bin Laden suffered a huge loss when his father divorced his mother and she was cast out. This may very well have caused a deep threatened sense of self. The hypothesis that threatened egotism played a key role in bin Laden's rise as an instigator, intriguing as it is, nevertheless remains speculative at this time.

Perhaps a more likely generalizable candidate for the indication of figures who may turn out to be instigators of collective violence is totalistic thinking, by which I refer to a constellation of factors including intolerance of ambiguity, an undifferentiated view of key issues, and an overriding confidence in the veracity and moral soundness of one's own belief and the falsity and moral corruptness or "evilness" of those who adopt alternative views [4]. Totalistic thinking has been central to many examples of armed conflict and collective violence. For Hitler, Germany was locked in a mortal struggle with two possible outcomes: utopia or perdition, with the Jew as the mortal enemy of the German (*Mein Kampf* means "my struggle"). For bin Laden, the struggle is between the true Moslem believers and the rest of the infidel world (one connotation of the term *jihad* is "struggle").

Two key factors emerge as important aspects of the instigator's justification for violence. First, there is a reduction of alternative perspectives to two sides that are seen as diametrically opposed and, thus, not in a position for negotiation. One's own side is unequivocally good, while the other is evil [4]. Second, the stakes of the conflict are perceived as no less than existential in nature, thus conveying the clear message: *If the ends were ever to justify the means, the time is now*. Victory is thus associated with continued survival,

while defeat is paramount to death. These aspects of the totalistic mindset may prove to be important preconditions for “radicalization” [36], that imprecise term often used these days to convey what goes on before the terrorists’ bombs go off.

For instance, there is mounting experimental evidence that having one’s attention directed to one’s mortality can affect attitudinal support for violent measures (for a review, see [37]). For example, Pyszczynski et al. [38] found that Iranians reminded of their impending death offered stronger support for martyrdom missions to kill Americans than Iranians not reminded of their death. These authors also found that American conservatives reminded of their mortality were more likely than control participants to support extreme military operations aimed at capturing or killing bin Laden that would also kill thousands of innocent people. The all-or-nothing “heaven or hell” rhetoric of instigators may reflect a similar process in which the morality of one’s in-group (e.g., “the Aryan nation” for Hitler) is imagined as inevitable unless perceived threats from potentially hostile adversaries are effectively eliminated. To date, no published studies have examined the effect of *collective* morality salience on support for violence, although my colleagues, Emily-Ana Filardo and Oshin Vartanian, and I are currently conducting an experiment that examines this issue.

As well, as noted earlier in this paper, considerable research has already documented that inter-state crises that culminate in war are usually accompanied by a significant decline in the integrative complexity of at least the leader of the aggressor state [9]. Other work taking a trait rather than state approach has also shown that low conceptual complexity (essentially a trait variant of integrative complexity) is associated with higher distrust and aggressiveness [12],[39]. Hermann [40] has shown that leaders adopting an independent style – namely, low conceptual complexity coupled with a high need for power, high perceived control, in-group favoritism, and out-group distrust – were more likely to pursue hostile policies toward other countries than leaders who had a participatory style consisting of the opposite characteristics. In a related vein, Smith, Suedfeld, Conway, and Winter [41] found that, compared with Middle Eastern Islamist non-terrorist organizations, Middle Eastern Islamist terrorist organizations referred more positively to their own moral, religious, and aggressive values (and more negatively to the religious values of “infidels”), used more imagery for power, achievement, and in-group affiliation, and communicated at a lower level of integrative complexity.

These studies and many others support the idea that acceptance of violence as a means of dealing with conflict may be foreshadowed by an increase in a totalistic frame of reference that has little tolerance for alternative perspectives or shades of gray, especially when coupled with a high need for power and a perceived zero-sum competition with out-groups. Future research ought to examine both the stable characteristics of instigators of extremist violence, employing appropriate matched controls where possible, and how changes in these characteristics predict (or postdict) changes in support for violent measures. Such research is challenging because researchers with the technical skills to conduct archival research using thematic content analytic techniques (e.g., integrative complexity coding) may lack access to complete and accurately translated tracts of text. In order to do so effectively, behavioral scientists with the requisite skills may need to team up with governmental defence and security organizations. Such scientist-practitioner partnerships will be important if we want to move beyond vague stage models of “the radicalization process” and arrive at a deeper understanding of the instigation and perpetration of violent extremism.

Ultimately, the hope is to move past merely post-hoc explanations of violent extremism and collective violence to models that offer some predictive or at least indicative utility as early or urgent warning systems for extremist violence. If instigators act as catalysts for such violence and play a non-interchangeable role, as I have argued in this paper, then forecasting their intent and behavior ought to be a high priority for those tasked with countering terrorism and violent extremism.

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Chapter 3 – CURRENT TRENDS IN AL QAEDA AND GLOBAL MILITANT JIHAD ACTIVITY

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3.1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a serious academic discussion about the al Qaeda organization (or AQC – al Qaeda Central) has been underway, one that has also found its way into the popular media. It has focused on whether AQC has ceased functioning as an active organization and turned into an icon only, and whether its role as leader of the global militant jihad has been assumed by a mass movement run by a network of people, groups, and organizations whose members have undergone a process of self-radicalization. A response to this question may be found in an analysis of the activities of al Qaeda and its affiliates, but also depends on understanding the concept of struggle according to al Qaeda and its relationship with its affiliates. Al Qaeda views itself as the leader of the global militant jihad movement and as a role model for its affiliates. As such, the organization has sought to stage dramatic and innovative terrorist attacks that would pave the way for its collaborators without insisting on exclusivity for acts undertaken in the name of global militant jihad. Moreover, al Qaeda has encouraged independent activity, which is often carried out without its approval or knowledge.

Al Qaeda, well-aware of its limited power and resources, has always viewed its own terrorist acts, and the terrorist acts it encourages others to undertake, as a tool to launch an historic process whose final objective is restoring Islam to its former primacy and glory. Al Qaeda does not feel it necessary to carry out many attacks, and prefers to focus on a limited number of showcase attacks. Terrorism, viewed by al Qaeda as “propaganda by the Deed” is the first in a chain reaction meant to enhance its destructive and moral effect and launch a sophisticated, global propaganda system. This system is directed by the organization with the assistance of its production company, al-Sahab, through internet sites and Arab satellite channels, primarily al Jazeera. It is no coincidence that al Qaeda contributes as many resources and efforts to mounting these productions as it does to mounting terrorist attacks.

The discussion that follows focuses on the central arenas where al Qaeda and its global militant jihad affiliates were active in 2008; an assessment of the expected trends in their activities in coming years; and an examination of the threat they represent.

3.2 AL QAEDA AND THEIR AFFILIATES: THEATERS OF ACTIVITY

In recent years, al Qaeda and its affiliates have focused their activities primarily in Iraq and the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as other local arenas.

3.2.1 Iraq

The American-led coalition invasion into Iraq supplied al Qaeda with a golden opportunity to extricate itself from its difficult position and the pressure exerted on it after the severe blow it and its Taliban sponsors suffered following the 9/11 attacks.

AlfQaeda did not invest the bulk of its resources or dedicate its most senior commanders to the war in Iraq, and most have remained protected in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly in the border area between them.

However, al Qaeda commanders have invested significant informational/propaganda efforts to stress the extreme importance of the campaign in Iraq as the central arena for the contest between the Islamic world, led by global militant jihadists, and the West together with its Arab allies. With the assistance of recruiting and logistics networks directed by supporters around the world, the struggle in Iraq has become a locus attracting Muslim volunteers worldwide seeking to join the militant jihad activity there. Moreover, the fighting in Iraq over the past five years has largely drawn the coalition forces' attention away from their initial objectives and depleted the resources – in terms of money, manpower, equipment, and time – allocated to wage a focused war against al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The massive presence of Western forces in Iraq has helped al Qaeda operate its affiliates in the country against the invaders. The fact that “the distant enemy” (i.e., the United States and its allies) came to a region considered to be holy Muslim ground (*wakf*) in the heart of the Arab Levant gave al Qaeda “home court advantage” in attacks. In addition, it helped strengthen its basic narrative: the prosecution of a holy war by means of legitimate “armed military resistance”. Al Qaeda took advantage of this opportunity to prepare highly skilled cadres with combat experience and train them in terrorist and guerrilla warfare for future use in the global militant jihad. Furthermore, the fighting in Iraq afforded al Qaeda an opportunity to demonstrate and entrench the act of self-sacrifice in the path of God (*istishhadia*) that has become its trademark through intensive use of suicide attackers, most of them from the ranks of the foreign volunteers, who were sent to their targets by al Qaeda in Iraq (Figure 3-1).




Figure 3-1: Suicide Attacks in Iraq 2003 – 2008.
(Source: Terrorism and Low Intensity Warfare Project
database at the Institute for National Security Studies)

The fighting in Iraq has provided al Qaeda’s elaborate and effective propaganda machine with a wealth of visual material documenting the terrorist and guerrilla activities against the foreign forces. In recent years, these materials have served al Qaeda in its psychological warfare as it celebrates a heroic narrative of the “Muslim mujahidin” rendering powerful blows against the invading “infidels”. There is no doubt that the raw materials photographed during the fighting in Iraq, posted on many internet sites around the world identified with the global militant jihad, represent one of the concrete achievements of the organization and are likely to serve it in the future.

The removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq did not hurt al Qaeda, as it had viewed him as one of the heretical Muslim leaders who do not lead their lives according to the laws of Islam. However, the rise of the Shiites to the top of the Iraqi regime and their cooperation with the United States and its allies turned the Shia into a legitimate target of attacks. Many Iraqi citizens, particularly those who joined the new regime and the security and police forces, were also placed on al Qaeda's enemy list in Iraq and many acts of terrorism targeted them.

Al Qaeda operatives' murderous activities and provocative conduct in Iraq against the local population have angered many Iraqi citizens. Thus starting at the end of 2005, a rift gradually occurred between al Qaeda operatives in Iraq and the heads of the Sunni tribes there who, until then, cooperated with them. The revolt of these Sunni tribal leaders dubbed "the revival of the Anbar movement" and supported and funded by the US and coalition forces that were strengthened by the surge, and aided by Iraqi security forces, bore fruit and helped to weaken al Qaeda. 2007 symbolized a further and more advanced stage of al Qaeda's weakened capabilities in Iraq. Based on assessments submitted 2008 this year by senior American officers and administration personnel, a guarded analysis suggests that the organization is on the brink of collapse in most parts of Iraq.

Another sign of the organization's weakness and the blow rendered to its operatives is the rise in 2008 in al Qaeda's use of female suicide bombers, the highest in comparison with previous years (Figure 3-2). Such a step usually attests to operational difficulties in organizations dispatching suicide missions. In addition, al Qaeda's declaration of the establishment of Islamic Caliphate in Iraq in 2005, supported by the AQC, has remained an empty slogan, in part because of the organization's current distress.




Figure 3-2: Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 2000 – 2008.
(Source: Terrorism and Low Intensity Warfare Project
database at the Institute for National Security Studies)

3.2.2 Afghanistan, Pakistan and the FATA Border Region

In recent years al Qaeda has strengthened its hold on the FATA "no man's land" and enhanced its infrastructure there. The area is formally under Pakistani sovereignty, but functions largely as an ex-territorial autonomous region with the central government in Islamabad wielding no authority over it, both because of its topography and its unique ethnic composition. The evidence thus far points to the fact

that this is the area where bin Laden and most of the senior al Qaeda operatives are in hiding, along with members of the former Taliban regime who fled there in late 2001. This region serves as a base for the planning of the joint activities of al Qaeda and the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban. Since this is presumably the al Qaeda and Taliban stronghold, the past year saw clashes between Pakistani military forces and Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Furthermore, since the prevailing opinion was that Pakistan has not taken sufficient steps against al Qaeda and the Taliban, the US has carried out aerial attacks there.

Over the last two years the relationship between al Qaeda and the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban has grown much closer, to the extent of establishment of joint war rooms, joint planning and participation in raids, and joint fighting against Pakistani regular forces. The most obvious manifestation of al Qaeda's influence on the activities of the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban was the upgrading, in both number and intensity, of the terrorist attacks perpetrated by these elements within Afghani and Pakistani cities. The two Taliban organizations added suicide bombing to their repertoire and made it a primary combat tactic. This was particularly obvious in Afghanistan which, until recent years, did not suffer from this type of activity, not even during the ten years of warfare against the Soviet military (1979 – 1989), the subsequent civil war that raged until the Taliban took charge, or during the years of Taliban rule. Starting in 2005, with al Qaeda's assistance and encouragement, Afghanistan was flooded by a wave of dozens of suicide bombings (Figure 3-3), in some cases due to the direct involvement of senior al Qaeda personnel. The total of 249 suicide bombings in Afghanistan over the past three years is an extraordinarily high number, relative to other arenas in the Middle East and around the world, with only Iraq in the same league. Most of the suicide bombers, young Pakistanis recruited at *madrassas*, are joined by a small number of foreign volunteers dispatched by the Taliban, with al Qaeda's fingerprints all over this activity.

Total: 280




Figure 3-3: Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan, 2000 – 2008.
(Source: Terrorism and Low Intensity Warfare Project
database at the Institute for National Security Studies)

Likewise, Pakistan, which in the past experienced only a small number of sporadic suicide bombings within its borders, has over the last two years seen a sharp increase in the number of suicide attacks carried out under the influence of the association between al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban (Figure 3-4). Al Qaeda has been directly linked – and took public credit – for the suicide attack that took place at the

Danish embassy in Islamabad on June 2, 2008, in which eight people were killed and twenty-seven injured. Al Qaeda had specifically threatened Denmark, in response to a cartoon in a Danish newspaper that the organization deemed an insult to Islam and an offensive portrayal of the prophet Muhammad. Furthermore, al Qaeda, led by the head of the organization's operational division in Pakistan, Osama al-Kini, staged a brazen attack at the Marriott Hotel, which killed fifty-four, including five foreigners – among them the Czech Ambassador – and injured two hundred and sixty-six.

Total: 131




Figure 3-4: Suicide Bombings in Pakistan, 2000 – 2008.
(Source: Terrorism and Low Intensity Warfare Project
database at the Institute for National Security Studies)

3.3 AL QAEDA INFLUENCE ON TERRORISM IN OTHER ARENAS

Al Qaeda has invested significant efforts in uniting the various militant jihad movements under a single umbrella organization. This was meant to close ranks among the militant Islamic organizations that identify with the idea of global militant jihad so as to be better able to plan and coordinate their activities and promote their joint agenda. This unification trend is not new, with precedents in 1998 when the organization started to launch independent suicide bombings. That same year, al Qaeda launched the umbrella organization called the International Front for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jews, and in June 2001, the formal unification between al Qaeda and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, commanded by Ayman Zawahari, was made public, and Qaedat al-Jihad was founded.

In recent years, al Qaeda has also established relationships with other umbrella organizations, in particular with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which includes operatives from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Mauritania, and of course al Qaeda in Mesopotamia (al Qaeda in Iraq), which includes Iraqi, Kurdish, and Jordanian operatives as well as volunteers from other Muslim countries. By virtue of these alliances, and through their ties with al Qaeda their reciprocal relationships, these organizations have upgraded their level of operational activity. This has expanded their scope of activity and the inclusion of strategic, political, and financial targets for attack, such as political leaders, energy targets, infrastructures and tourist areas, international and foreign military forces, with, of course, suicide bombing – al Qaeda's trademark – as the preferred method.

While al Qaeda's activity in Iraq since the 2003 war is well known, its activity in the Islamic Maghreb has aroused growing interest in recent years because of the rise in volume and quality of operations. Its major, though not exclusive locus of activity has been Algeria. Since the organization announced in January 2007 the unification between it and al Qaeda, it has upgraded the level of its targets to the most senior echelon of the Algerian regime (the president and prime minister) and the country's institutions (the Supreme Court). Furthermore, it has extended its activity against foreign and UN targets. After the unification, the organization started to stage suicide attacks along the al Qaeda model. Al Qaeda had similar influence on the Moroccan branch of the umbrella organization, and it, too, has intensified its activity in recent years, with several attempts at suicide bombings against targets in the Moroccan regime and security establishment as well as activity against foreigners. Some were successfully executed and some were foiled. Additional terrorist activity was carried out by the umbrella organization in Tunisia (the hostage taking of Austrian tourists) and Mauritania (a shooting attack against the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott).

Another al Qaeda theater has been the Arabian Peninsula. In Saudi Arabia, authorities succeeded in foiling terrorist activities of the local branch of al Qaeda by arresting many members of the organization and by launching an aggressive counter-propaganda and re-education campaign within areas supporting al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Further south, the activity this year of the Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IJY) stood out in particular. Even though this organization is not under the direct command of al Qaeda, it did adopt al Qaeda's agenda, especially after 2007 when bin Laden's former secretary became its leader. Along with attacks against senior governmental targets in Yemen, the organization staged a dramatic suicide attack against the American embassy in Sana'a in September 2008, killing nineteen. In his annual security estimate, the head of the CIA noted that global militant jihad organizations are growing stronger in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Africa, too, is an important arena of activity for al Qaeda, and the organization, as it is wont to do, is nurturing its prior connections with local organizations and past operatives to help carry out attacks in Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia. The breakdown of the central government in Somalia has encouraged the growth of local militant jihad organizations, some of which have carried out suicide bombings against institutional targets including the presidential palace, and foreign targets such as the Ethiopian embassy and UN offices in which twenty-eight people were killed, including a senior in the Somaliland (Somalia's northern provinces) government and UN personnel.

The Islamic Jihad in Uzbekistan (IJU) is another organization to whom al Qaeda has grown closer and that has accordingly refined its activity to match the agenda of global militant jihad. This organization broke away from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) because of internal differences as to whether to focus on the Islamic agenda in Uzbekistan or to dedicate itself to global Islamic activity, and in recent years has operated in the FATA region alongside Taliban and al Qaeda forces. Its operatives have participated in attacks in Uzbekistan, Germany, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. For example, the Afghanistan attack which occurred on March 3, 2008 in the Sabari district in the eastern Afghan province of Khost was committed by a German citizen of Turkish descent who carried out a suicide bombing against American soldiers. Also, a dramatic attack against American targets in Germany, including a military base and a club frequented by American soldiers, was foiled. The attack was supposed to be carried out by a terrorist network recruited, trained, and operated from afar by the organization. In Europe, security forces still view terrorist networks directed by al Qaeda and global militant jihadists as an acute threat, after the exposure in 2008 of a number of terrorist networks in Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Turkey.

3.4 AL QAEDA, GLOBAL MILITANT JIHAD AND ISRAEL

3.4.1 Loci of Threats Against Israel

It is difficult to assess how the horrific photographs from Operation Cast Lead, Israel's 2008 – 09 Gaza incursion, together with the venomous anti-Israeli commentary broadcast via propaganda networks,

especially Arab and Muslim media, might affect the decision of al Qaeda leaders, some of whom also joined in these attacks, to translate this propaganda into action and try to extract revenge from Israelis and Jews. It is possible that al Qaeda or its affiliates might decide to take advantage of the anti-Israel atmosphere to attack targets identified with Israel as well as earn propaganda points sure to accrue from such actions, and in order to refute claims against them that they are doing nothing to assist the Palestinians other than provide verbal support. Kidnapping of Israelis by factions identified with global militant jihad, a threat that skyrocketed in the past year, continues to represent a steady threat because of militant jihadists' desire to demonstrate their willingness to assist the Palestinians and because of their understanding that such actions would touch a particularly sensitive nerve in Israeli society.

3.4.2 Al Qaeda Seeks to Encroach on Israel

It seems that through its regional affiliates, al Qaeda has intensified its efforts to penetrate Israel's borders in order to inflict harm on Israeli citizens. It has also tried to attack Israelis visiting Arab countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel. A few years ago a number of attacks against Israeli tourists, attributed to global militant jihadists, were carried out in Jordan and Egypt, and especially in Sinai.

Previous rockets firings in the past from Jordan and Lebanon towards Israel should be seen in this context. Lebanon continues to be the arena for global militant jihadists involved in rocket attacks against Israel. In 2008 too, a number of rockets were fired towards northern Israel from Lebanon; the launches were attributed to the al-Ansar Divisions which identifies itself with the global militant jihad. Also during the IDF operation in the Gaza Strip (December 27, 2008 – January 17, 2009), a number of rockets were fired from southern Lebanon towards northern Israel while others were discovered before being launched. At this stage, it is not clear if the attackers were global militant jihadists, but the threat of continued rocket fire towards Israel remains. Interestingly, bin Laden, who views Lebanon as a convenient springboard to harm Israel, has violently condemned Hizbollah and Iran, calling them allies in a American-Israeli plot in planning the Second Lebanon War. The purpose of this war, according to bin Laden, was ostensibly to prevent al Qaeda and its affiliates from approaching Israel from Lebanon's southern border by means of the subsequent ceasefire agreement formulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1701. While his notion of a fourfold plot sounds surreal, it reflects his frustration with al Qaeda's affiliates' limitations in attacking Israel from Lebanon, and at the same time clearly expresses his intentions. Another arena for locals identified with the global militant jihad stream is the Gaza Strip, where there are a number of groups such as the Army of Islam (relying mostly on members of the Dughmouh clan), the Sword of Islam, and the Army of the Believers – al Qaeda in Palestine. These groups, whose size is unknown or estimated to consist of a few dozen operatives at most, engage in sporadic terrorist activity. In addition to firing Qassam rockets, these activities include kidnapping foreign citizens, burning schools, harassing internet cafés, and acting as morality police.

Al Qaeda's hope that Hamas' June 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip would allow its own supporters more convenient access to engage in anti-Israel activity was not fulfilled. Because of its desire to be the sole ruler of the Gaza Strip, Hamas has prevented groups in the Strip identified with the global militant jihad to act against Israel autonomously and without its permission, out of concern that such a situation might embroil it with Israel at a disadvantageous time and place. Speaking to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, the head of Israeli intelligence said that while Hamas has enabled al Qaeda operatives from abroad to enter the Gaza Strip and has even allowed groups identified with it to shoot rockets towards Israel from time to time, whenever any of them has challenged its authority, Hamas has not hesitated to use brutal force to suppress the challenge, as happened with the Dughmouh clan.

In the past year, attempts to band together into cells to carry out attacks were exposed in the West Bank region and among Israeli Arabs of Bedouin descent identified with global militant jihad, but these were foiled in time. The difficulties al Qaeda has in operating against Israel across Israel's borders stems from the fact that Israel's neighbors, foremost Egypt and Jordan, who are also fighting the growing threat of

global militant jihad against their own regimes and within their sovereign territories, are acting decisively to stop al Qaeda activity and to protect their citizens and the tourists visiting their countries. Syria and Lebanon are, likewise, engaged aggressively in attempts to foil global militant jihadist intentions to operate against Israel within their own territory and areas they control, out of a concern of entering into confrontations with Israel. Even Hamas acts aggressively in the same spirit, and it seems that it will continue this policy in the future, unless circumstances radically change.

3.4.3 The Threat to Israel from Global Militant Jihadists from Across its Own Borders

This threat is ongoing but is not expected to become more severe unless there are significant changes in Israel's relations with its neighbors, because of the mutual interest of Israel and its neighbors to avoid embroilments between them.

Egypt and Israel see eye-to-eye on the question of the danger posed by the strengthening of global militant jihadists in Egyptian territory and particularly in the Sinai region. Sinai is not well controlled by Egypt, and therefore the region is prone to trouble. Nonetheless, recently the region has become the focus of more attention on the part of the Egyptian security services and greater vigilance on the part of Israeli intelligence and security services, which repeatedly issue warnings to Israeli citizens to avoid visiting recreational sites in Sinai.

Jordan and Israel also share a common interest in preventing any global militant jihadist activity within the kingdom and from Jordan against Israel, and cooperate closely in order to foil any such eventuality.

In *Lebanon* there is a danger of escalation by global militant jihadists who have intensified their activities in both northern and southern Lebanon and who, from time to time, even launch rockets towards Israel. The ability of the Lebanese military to stop their activities will determine the level of threat that these represent for Israel. Paradoxically, Hizbollah shares Israel's interest in preventing the strengthening of global militant jihadists in Lebanon and having them engage in activity against Israel, especially if this is liable to lead to an armed conflict with Israel, which is not to Hizbollah's advantage.

Syria, too, does not allow global militant jihadists to operate against Israel from its territory, first because Syria does not allow any element to operate from within its borders against Israel lest this embroil Syria in a confrontation, and second because it views the militant jihadists as a threat to Syria's own regime. In the course of 2008, Islamists carried out a number of severe terrorist attacks against the Syrian regime. Nonetheless, the Syrian regime enabled global militant jihadists to use its territory as a passageway to the fighting in Iraq, and therefore particular alertness on Israel's part is required lest these elements attempt to operate against it, against Syria's wishes. Should political contacts between Syria and Israel progress over the next few years, it becomes virtually certain that these factions will launch attacks, hoping to provoke the sort of reaction from Israel that would completely destabilize talks with Syria.

Despite the hostility and violent clashes between Hamas and Israel, Hamas' primary interest is presumably in preventing independent activity against Israel on the part of al Qaeda and global militant jihadists operating in the Gaza Strip that is outside Hamas' own control. This interest outweighs Hamas' desire to harm Israel, and therefore, unless Hamas-Israel relations suffer a steep deterioration, global militant jihadist organization in the Gaza Strip, and certainly al Qaeda itself, will not be granted a free hand in operating against Israel from there.

3.4.4 The Threat of a Showcase Terrorist Attack on Israeli Territory

Despite the limitations regarding the possibility of al Qaeda or its affiliates staging a dramatic attack on Israeli sovereign territory, it is clear that such an operation continues to represent a desirable goal on their

part. Their ability to realize such intentions depends largely on their ability to receive internal assistance, (e.g., from Israeli Arabs, Palestinians entering Israel as laborers or as illegal residents), or as has already happened in the past, through foreign citizens. To date Israel's security services have succeeded in foiling these intentions, but obviously there is clear and present danger. In recent years, the initiative to act against Israel has come primarily from local Palestinians, and their contacts were mainly in the junior ranks of global militant jihadists and not with al Qaeda itself. Should this relationship develop, especially with al Qaeda's mechanism dedicated to staging attacks abroad, the threat level will, of course, rise.

3.5 CONCLUSION

3.5.1 Loci of Global Threats

From the vantage point of late 2008, it is clear that despite the ongoing efforts of the international coalition against terrorism to overcome al Qaeda and its affiliates, these are still far from conceding defeat and may be expected to be the primary threat in terms of international terrorist activity in the years to come. The main threat from terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and its affiliates stems from their desire to affect the entire system of international relations and to undermine the current world order. To do so, they do not hesitate in carrying out mass terrorist attacks of a level unknown in the past against anyone opposed to their worldview and chosen path.

There are a number of critical threat areas with long-term significance from al Qaeda and their cohorts in the coming years.

3.5.2 Intensified Activity in Uncontrolled Areas in Fragile States

Al Qaeda and global militant jihadists are particularly active in places where there are Muslim populations and the central government lacks full control and effective enforcement capabilities. Al Qaeda takes advantage of this situation to foment trouble among the local populace and to recruit volunteers into their ranks. It thus appears that in the coming years the central arena of struggle of al Qaeda and its Taliban partners will likely be in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda is preparing for the intensification of the expected war against it and its Taliban associates on the part of NATO forces, the United States military, and Pakistani forces, as reflected in the declarations of senior American officials in the new administration and in the decision to send thousands more American soldiers into the region. Al Qaeda is also expected to contribute to the ongoing spate of suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to undermine the stability of the ruling regimes of these countries.

3.5.3 Activity to Undermine the Regimes of Central Muslim States, Primarily Pakistan – A Nuclear Weapons State

A primary threat coming from al Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the border area is that the security situation in Pakistan and its surroundings may deteriorate and ultimately result in the rise to power of radical Islamic elements instead of the current president, Zardari. Such a scenario is liable to allow radical elements access to the country's arsenal of nuclear weapons.

3.5.4 Absorbing New Cadres and Sending Them to the West

Al Qaeda can be expected to assimilate into its ranks new volunteers from all over the world, and in particular fighters who are veterans of the war in Iraq in order to insert them into areas of conflict involving Muslims. At the same time, it will likely train the most suitable new recruits to operate under the cover of their foreign citizenships, European or other, to carry out terrorist attacks abroad, whether under the command of al Qaeda's dedicated terrorist mechanism abroad or as part of independent global militant jihad terrorist networks.

3.5.5 Efforts to Carry Out Showcase, Mass-Casualty Attacks in a Western Country

An attack on that order of magnitude would again place al Qaeda on the map of international terrorism and serve as model for its affiliates. Al Qaeda's success in carrying out a dramatic large scale terrorist attack in the near future is largely dependent on its ability to rehabilitate its special division for terrorist attacks abroad. This group was heavily damaged in recent years by the assassinations and arrests of many of its senior commanders and most experienced veteran operatives. It would seem that al Qaeda is not going to relinquish the notion of staging such attacks, despite the constraints and pressures applied to it, in order to continue fulfilling its vanguard role. It largely depends on the creation of the suitable operational conditions in one of the arenas where the organization is active. In its annual security estimate, the CIA estimated that al Qaeda was preparing for a dramatic, spectacular attack.

3.5.6 Continued Efforts to Undermine the Stability of the "Heretical" Regimes in Middle Eastern Countries to Replace Them with Muslim Regimes Ruled by Islamic Law

On the basis of the "Zawahiri doctrine", al Qaeda is expected to continue assisting terrorist acts of global militant jihadists against the leaders of regimes and central government institutions in the Middle East as well as Africa in order to replace them with regimes that uphold Islamic ritual law. Attaining the rule of one or more primary Muslim countries in order to establish an Islamic regime is one of the cornerstones of Zawahiri's philosophy expressed in his book, *Knights Serving Under the Flag of the Prophet*. Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North African countries have all been potential candidates.

Al Qaeda and its Salafi-jihadist militant affiliates will, in the foreseeable future, continue to present multiple threats, on multiple fronts, to the west, its allies, and to prospects of a more moderate global order. Of all the threats they present, none is more pressing for most nations in the world, and for members of all religions numbered among AQ's multiplying enemies, than terrorism that could inflict a catastrophe on the human race: unconventional, and, especially, nuclear terrorism. AQ and its affiliates, then, must be met with a general mobilization of forces that are determined to curb and defeat it. Victory in this struggle it is more important to the world's safety today than ever in the past.

Chapter 4 – GOOD-BYE TO ALL THAT: THE END OF THE LEADER-LESS MILITANT JIHAD vs. LEADER-LED MILITANT JIHAD DEBATE

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Among the fatalities of the tragic November 2008 attacks in Mumbai was the so-called “bunch of guys” theory. Like the scores of dead and hundreds of wounded, it too was the victim of a terrorist operation that was as planned and premeditated; executed by trained commando-like teams deployed as part of an evident command and control apparatus that orchestrated their deployment and coordinated their assaults. Schooled in the use of automatic weapons and apparently well-versed in close quarters combat tactics, the gunmen were able to stand their ground against furious security force response and counter-assault. The operation also showed detailed surveillance, directed intelligence gathering and meticulous logistical preparation. In sum, the fingerprints of an existing, identifiable terrorist organization, complete with the training camps needed to prepare the attackers, the operational headquarters to plan and direct the operation and the knowledge of surveillance tradecraft to successfully effect them, are literally all over the operation.

In contrast, the “bunch of guys” theory of leaderless jihad claimed that terrorism in the 21st Century had drifted from the provenance of top-down direction and implementation provided by established, existing organizations to an entirely bottom-up, loosely networked phenomenon of radicalized individuals gravitating towards one another with a shared penchant for violence. These collections of individuals were defined as the new threat we all had to prepare for: self-selected, self-radicalized, and mostly self-trained wannabes with a limited capacity for violence who were allegedly multiplying and spreading to challenge both the more traditional conceptions of terrorism and the attendant countermeasures and security force responses based upon this anachronistically organized style of terrorism. Indeed, with the rise of the leaderless jihad, it was argued, organizations had become as immaterial as they were superfluous. The main terrorist threat had now become decidedly low-level; easily addressed by local police forces with modest resources rather than by standing militaries and the vast array of kinetic instruments at their disposal.

A debate of sorts over the organizational vice leaderless nature of contemporary terrorism had arisen over the past year or so. At congressional hearings and conferences, in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* and the *New York Times*, among the variety of informed and distinctly uninformed blog and web sites arrayed across the Internet, as well in the corridors of power in the globe’s national capitals, the issue was discussed and contested. On 26 November 2008, however, it was resolved in Mumbai by the terrorists themselves. In a blaze of automatic weapons’ gunfire and hurled hand grenades, they settled the matter – and drove home their point over the course of a further 48 hours, ceasing only when Indian security forces had shot dead the last gunmen holed up in a waterfront, luxury hotel.

Mumbai saw the eclipse of leaderless jihad as the salient terrorist threat today as disciplined teams of well-armed, well-trained terrorists simultaneously spread throughout the city to execute their mission at least ten different targets. In each case, they stood their ground and inflicted the carnage and bloodshed they were trained to accomplish. And, at the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower and Oberoi hotels, the terrorists not only effectively resisted counterattack by Indian security forces, but impeded and inflicted serious losses on those same forces – including the deaths of the city’s top police counterterrorist commanders. The leader of an Indian Marine commando unit marveled as the fighting finally wound down how the terrorists were “very, very familiar with the hotel layout. . . . They were a very, very determined lot.

They were moving from one place to the other. . . . Not everybody can fire AK-47 weapons like that. They were trained somewhere.” Thus the delusional theories about the diminishing role of organizations in orchestrating terrorist violence were blown away, too.

At the same time, it must be emphasized that a continuing risk from home-grown extremists clearly still exists and cannot be dismissed or ignored. The 2007 plot by six self-identified Islamic militants to attack Fort Dix, New Jersey is a case in point. Another is the half-baked plot to attack two synagogues in The Bronx, New York that was foiled in May 2009 by the FBI after an informant penetrated the motley cell. But while authorities must continue to worry about attacks by “amateur” or wannabe terrorists like these, their focus – preparations and response capabilities – will inevitably have to be geared to the more “professional”, trained, disciplined and deployed terrorists as it is doubtful that home-grown terrorists could amass the numbers and have the requisite skill-set required to hit multiple target sites with the ferocity that the Mumbai attackers exhibited. Indeed, whether in Britain or in Germany, in recent years the more competent and ambitious indigenous terrorists have repeatedly found it necessary to take advantage of the training opportunities that only actual, existing terrorist organizations can provide in real life, and not Internet-enabled, so-called virtual, training camps.

4.1 AN EMERGENT CONSENSUS

One has to wonder in fact if there is any professional intelligence agency or senior official who still believes that the most consequential terrorist threat emanates from bunches of guys and not from established terrorist organizations like al Qaeda? In one of his last major public addresses before stepping down as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in November 2008, Michael V. Hayden, variously explained how “al-Qa’ida [sic], operating from its safehaven in Pakistan’s tribal areas, remains the most clear and present danger to the United States today”; that, “If there is a major strike on this country, it will bear the fingerprints of al-Qa’ida”; and, that, “Today, virtually every major terrorist threat my Agency is aware of has threads back to the tribal areas.” Revealingly, Hayden did not even mention once the threat from “bunches of guys” or self-radicalized, self-selected individuals belonging to a social network rather than a bona fide terrorist organization. His words are all the more important, not only for their timing – coming just two weeks before the Mumbai attacks – but also because when the DCIA talks he is not speaking only for himself but is inevitably expressing the collective wisdom of the world’s most powerful intelligence service.

Nor were these conclusions exclusively the domain of allegedly “blinkered” American intelligence chiefs and their agencies who, critics often claim, “see al Qaeda everywhere and in every plot and attack”. The Netherlands’ General Intelligence and Security Service (*Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst*, or AIVD), for example, is among the most professional and prescient of the world’s intelligence and security agencies. Though far smaller than many of its Western counterparts, it is an elite and perspicacious service that is as impressive for its early identification and incisive analysis of emerging trends as it appears genuinely able to “think out of the box”.

The radicalization phenomenon, for instance – involving home-grown, domestic threats by organizationally unaffiliated militants – that is now so ingrained in our thinking and assessments of contemporary jihadi threats, was first publicly highlighted by the AIVD seven years ago in its *Annual Report 2002*. Thus, as far back as 2001, AIVD agents and analysts had detected increased terrorist recruitment efforts among Muslim youth living in the Netherlands whom it was previously assumed had been assimilated into Dutch society and culture. This assessment was proven tragically correct in November 2003 when a product precisely of this trend that the AIVD had correctly identified, a 17 year-old Dutch-Moroccan youth named Mohammad Bouyeri, brutally murdered the controversial film maker, Theo van Gogh, as he rode his bicycle along an Amsterdam street. Accordingly, any assessment of current jihadi trends by the AIVD is to be taken very seriously, indeed.

The 2007 AIVD *Annual Report 2007* highlighted five principal international developments in jihadi terrorism that are of enormous consequence to the security of the West and the U.S. as well as the Netherlands. The sober AIVD analysts took particular note of the following disquieting trends:

- 1) “There has been a shift in the source and nature of the threat”, the report argues. “Whereas it used to come principally from autonomous local networks, internationally-oriented local networks now also present a danger to the West.”
- 2) “From the known threats in neighbouring [sic] countries, the AIVD can discern a shift in the international orientation of these networks. In the past, they were concerned mainly with supporting and sometimes recruiting for the violent jihad in traditional conflict zones. Now, though, they also seem to be focusing upon traveling abroad for training before returning to pursue their struggle in the West. This appears to have added a new dimension to the jihadist threat.”
- 3) “The degree of influence on European jihadist networks and individuals from Pakistan and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is increasing.”
- 4) **“The AIVD has discerned signs that core Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan is recovering, and that its influence as one of the primary sources of inspiration for jihadists around the world has further increased”** [my emphasis].

The AIVD’s assessment is particularly noteworthy in that it dovetailed very closely with the publicly released key judgments of the seminal July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) produced by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC). This capstone document, representing the collective wisdom of the American intelligence community, had similarly concluded that the threat posed by al Qaeda to the U.S. homeland and elsewhere had increased as a result of the movement having re-grouped and re-organized along the lawless frontier spanning both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The 2007 NIE had forcefully argued that:

- “Al-Qa’ida [sic] is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities.”
- “[Al-Qa’ida] has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership.”

And, the 2008 AIVD Annual Report both confirmed and reiterated these key trends. “An analysis conducted in 2008 by the AIVD and verified by fellow services”, it states:

“... indicates that core Al-Qaeda’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks has increased in recent years ... One development of particular concern is the growing evidence that people from Europe are undergoing military training at camps in the border region. As a result, the ability of (core) Al-Qaeda and its allies to commit or direct attacks in Europe could increase. Not only might the trainees themselves carry out such actions upon their return to Europe, but they could also guide or support others.”

4.2 A FUTURE OF MORE OF THE SAME

Nor is there much likelihood of the organizational salience in terrorism changing in the future – at least not for the next 16 years. According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s authoritative assessment of global trends to the year 2025, “Terrorist and insurgent groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groups – that inherit organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks” Admittedly, while the report also mentions the continuing threat posed by “newly emergent collections of the angry and

disenfranchised that become self-radicalized”, its emphasis clearly is on the continued predominance of, and the more serious threat posed by, organized terrorism and the operational entities that orchestrate it rather than by “bunches of guys”.

In this respect, the dramatically and tragically successful Mumbai attacks contrasted to the amateurish, botched Bronx synagogues plot is a timely and powerful reminder that in terrorism, organizations most certainly still matter.

Chapter 5 – EXPLAINING AL QAEDA’S CONTINUED APPEAL¹

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5.1 INTRODUCTION

Despite its seemingly extreme ideology and its even more extreme use of political violence, al Qaeda has been able to elicit sympathy and support from a surprisingly large number of people. Suspected al Qaeda members have been arrested in dozens of countries around the world, and opinion polls in both Western and Middle Eastern countries have showed that relatively large numbers of young Muslims express sympathy with al Qaeda. In other words, we have a situation where al Qaeda has killed civilians on a massive scale, including a large number of Muslims, but it still seems to enjoy relatively widespread support. How can we explain this apparent conundrum?

I argue in this paper that al Qaeda’s continuing appeal is a result of three key factors.

- Firstly, al Qaeda *propagates a simple popular message*, which resonates strongly with deeply held grievances in the Muslim world. The organisation strives to follow the popular mood in many respects.
- Secondly, al Qaeda has created for itself *a powerful and captivating image*. It has become the world’s most feared terrorist organisation, which exerts an immense attraction on young people. In some countries in Europe, it has become “cool” to be a jihadi.
- Thirdly, the strength of al Qaeda’s appeal lies in *its global character*; unlike most terrorist groups of today, membership in al Qaeda is open for virtually everyone, irrespective of ethnicity and nationality. As long as one is willing to accept its extremist ideology, anyone can in principle become an al Qaeda member.

These three factors: *simple message*, *powerful image* and *global character* lie at the very core of al Qaeda’s appeal today. By studying these factors in more detail, we may also find clues to identifying al Qaeda’s inherent weaknesses. I will return to these weaknesses at the end of my talk.

5.1.1 Al Qaeda’s Simple Populist Message

Al Qaeda’s core message is so powerful and resonates strongly among young Muslims in most parts of the world because of the simplicity of its message and its linkages with real-world grievances. During the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s, militant Islamist groups condemned the rulers in Muslim countries as apostates, hypocrites, and collaborators. They called for overturning Muslim regimes and preached the need for an Islamic state. Their theoreticians talked about abstract notions such as excommunication (in Arabic: *takfir*), and God’s sovereignty on earth (in Arabic: *hakimiyya*), concepts which were formulated by Sayyid Qutb back in the 1960s. The problem for these militants, however was that this message did not resonate with ordinary Muslims. Very few Muslims were ready to sacrifice their lives for the abstract notion of an Islamic state. Furthermore, there is a religious taboo against internal strife among Muslims, (in Arabic: *fitna*), and militant Islamists who justified the killing of other Muslims, often found themselves isolated and marginalised.

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EXPLAINING AL QAEDA'S CONTINUED APPEAL

Al Qaeda has so far shrewdly avoided ideological missteps and failures of previous Muslim extremist groups. It has not propagated the revolutionary anti-regime Qutbist ideology of previous jihadi groups. Instead, al Qaeda has consistently rallied its followers around a simple populist pan-Islamic message, which is that “Islam is under attack”, militarily, religiously, and economically. Al Qaeda has focused almost exclusively on the foreign or “Crusader” occupation of Muslim lands, foreign desecration of Islam’s holiest places, and how foreigners plunder the Islamic world’s natural resources, especially oil. (However, as we shall see, this “far enemy”-focus seems to be changing.)

This choice of focus on foreign occupation, religious desecration and economic imperialism is not coincidental. Al Qaeda strategist Abu Musab al-Suri, has written extensively on why this choice of focus is so important for al Qaeda. He correctly observes that very few Muslim youth will sacrifice their lives for the abstract notion of an Islamic utopian state. Many more, however, are willing to die for *al-Aqsa*, and to sacrifice themselves for liberating Palestine or other countries under occupation such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Al-Suri’s conclusion is that Muslims are deeply touched by anything that smacks of foreign occupation. Hence, he urges al Qaeda to harness the power of pan-Islamic sentiments and the strength of popular Muslim solidarity in order to rally a mass following.

These identities are key to understanding the power of al Qaeda’s propaganda. Al Qaeda’s simple message of foreign occupation, desecration and exploitation resonates deeply among Muslims today. The reason for this is simple: there is some truth to it. The Western world, led by the United States, has a strong and visible presence in this part of the world, militarily, economically and politically. There are US-led military coalitions occupying Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States supports Israel militarily and economically and politically even if the latter continues to maintain an illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories. The ruling elites in many Muslim countries are not elected, corruption is widespread, and there is a widespread belief – right or wrong – that the United States keeps these regimes in power to secure its access to the region’s oil reserves. The list of widely shared popular grievances against the United States’ foreign policies in the Islamic world is very long. Hence, it is very easy for al Qaeda to find good arguments for its propaganda messages.

5.1.2 Al Qaeda’s Image

Let me turn to al Qaeda’s second key selling point, namely its *image*. Today, new information technologies are revolutionising our lives, at least in the way we communicate and socialise. Especially young people seem to live a considerable part of their lives in the virtual world of Facebook, or in other cyber communities. Furthermore, the new information technologies allow more and more people to disseminate their message to a global audience. In other words, the mass media is changing rapidly. The major news agencies face competitors and the battle for capturing people’s attention is tougher than ever. Hence, image and branding have become absolutely vital components in any marketing campaign which aims at promoting a product or an idea through mass media.

Terrorism and violence has always attracted the media’s attention, but al Qaeda has succeeded more than any other terrorist group in modern history in captivating and thrilling the world by its acts of violence. From its very inception, al Qaeda has given top priority to carrying out spectacular and unprecedented attacks. Until al Qaeda gained a foothold in Iraq, its total number of attacks was actually very small. Its operations were, however, audacious, and almost mind-boggling in devastation. Al Qaeda is very innovative in the art of terrorism. Its bombing of the USS Cole warship in Yemen and the September 11th attacks on America were unprecedented acts of terrorism. The attacks on America made al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden a household name all over the world, and a powerful media image of al Qaeda was created. Overnight, al Qaeda succeeded in elevating itself to a “vanguard” among Muslim extremist groups, and managed to outbid groups with more limited regional objectives.

Al Qaeda’s acts of violence provoked massive countermeasures by the United States and its allies. You will recall that the Bush Administration stated that 9/11 was not an act of terrorism, it was “an act of

war". By using the word "war" about 9/11, the US President de facto declared that al Qaeda was its main counterpart in the ensuing global confrontation, which became known as "the Global War on Terror". In other words, the whole world witnessed a new drama unfolding. And it was al Qaeda and the United States who starred in this drama, nobody else. Needless to say, this contributed immensely to al Qaeda's popularity skyrocketing and making its brand name the strongest on the market.

The ensuing US-led military interventions on Afghanistan and Iraq further elevated al Qaeda's status to almost mythical proportions. Not only did these invasions serve as "evidence" that al Qaeda's rhetoric about the aggressive Western world was true; the invasions also demonstrated the power of al Qaeda to provoke the sole remaining super power to drain its military and human resources in endless and costly occupation. The invasion of Afghanistan also had the effect of weakening many of al Qaeda's potential competitors, who had regional agendas and had opposed an attack on the United States. These groups lost their sanctuaries in Afghanistan and their remnants gravitated towards al Qaeda.

5.2 AL QAEDA'S GLOBAL OUTREACH

Let us now turn to al Qaeda's third selling point, namely its *global outreach*. Hardly any terrorist group of today is truly multi-national with branches all over the world. Most violent extremist groups are diehard nationalist extremists who would never accept foreigners in their ranks. Al Qaeda is an exception. From its very inception, al Qaeda has been a multi-national and multi-ethnic enterprise, even if Arabs, especially Saudis and Egyptians, have always dominated the upper echelons of the organisation. The fact that membership in al Qaeda is open for virtually everyone, irrespective of ethnicity and nationality, is a key selling point for al Qaeda, because it strengthens the credibility of its pan-Islamic rhetoric. It greatly expands the recruitment base for the organisation. As long as one is willing to accept its extremist ideology, anyone can in principle become an al Qaeda member. Hence, al Qaeda has succeeded in recruiting Muslim followers from Mauritania to Indonesia. Furthermore, a substantial number of Western converts have played a role in al Qaeda, the American Adam Gadahn being the most famous example.

However, al Qaeda's global outreach goes beyond its appeal to Muslims of every shade and origin. The organisation has also worked consistently over the past two decades to establish cooperative networks with other groups of Muslims extremists in many parts of the world, from South-East Asia to Northern Africa. Some of these groups have merged with al Qaeda like the *Islamic Jihad Group* in Egypt. Others have renamed their organisations in order to become "al Qaeda's branches" such as the Algerian *Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat*, and yet others, maintain close collaborative relationships such as the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and the Pakistan. This vast array of cooperative relationships underscores how important such alliances are to al Qaeda. It is precisely this ability to find reliable local partners that is al Qaeda's strength and weakness. In the past, al Qaeda succeeded in finding local partners by offering training facilities, military expertise, and financial support. In recent years, the organisation also offers media services and increasingly also its brand name to local groups who are willing to work with al Qaeda. Al Qaeda's ability to sustain cooperative relationships with local partners and insert itself as a relevant actor in local and regional contexts is key to its survival.

A final aspect of al Qaeda's image building is its exploitation of the Internet. I believe that al Qaeda's appeal owes a great deal to its shrewd media strategies. The importance of "the jihadi web" for al Qaeda's widespread appeal cannot be overstated. The organisation has demonstrated an ability to exploit the potential of the Internet for a wide variety of purposes. Al Qaeda and its numerous online sympathisers are producing enormous amounts of material on the Internet. The scope of this material is far too extensive and variegated to be discussed in this short paper. Suffice it to state that al Qaeda's Internet resources include thousands of audiovisual products, tens of thousands of audio-files, and probably millions of written documents. They span a wide range of genres, all designed to cater to the needs of jihadi sympathisers, recruits, operatives, and not the least, the recruiters.

5.3 AL QAEDA'S WEAKNESSES

Let me conclude this paper by offering a few thoughts on al Qaeda's current and future weaknesses, especially in terms of its appeal. A major weakness of groups like al Qaeda is that it is always difficult to justify the killing of civilians. You will recall that there were mass demonstrations in Jordan and Morocco against al Qaeda following terrorist attacks by al Qaeda-related groups. A number of leading militant ideologues, from Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in Jordan and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif in Egypt to Salman al-Awda in Saudi Arabia, have severely censured al Qaeda for its acts of violence. Such criticism does not go unheeded. Ayman al-Zawahiri felt compelled to respond to al-Sharif's criticism in a 200 page document that was posted on the Internet last year. Al-Zawahiri even described the document as the most painful text he had ever written.

Such schisms are not new to al Qaeda. In fact, the CTC study *Cracks in the Foundation*, based on declassified al Qaeda documents retrieved from Afghanistan, reveals that there has been far more internal dissent in al Qaeda than has hitherto been acknowledged. These internal tensions started right after al Qaeda's foundation, and have been a recurrent feature of al Qaeda. Interestingly, over the past few years, we have seen signs of policy disagreements between al-Zawahiri and bin Laden on al Qaeda's future course of action. The first such disagreement was evident in statements following the Lal-Masjid showdown in Pakistan during the summer of 2007, when bin Laden called for a jihadi uprising in Pakistan, while al-Zawahiri urged that all efforts be concentrated on supporting the Afghan Taliban. In general, bin Laden appears to push for jihad against the "near enemy" far more aggressively than al-Zawahiri. Al Qaeda's second-in-command has also called upon his followers to explore ways of non-violent activism, in particular in Egypt, while bin Laden dismisses demonstrations and protest campaigns as a diversion and a waste of time.

This brings us to another inherent weakness of al Qaeda: namely its unwillingness to prepare for a future transition to politics. Al Qaeda's appeal is totally dependent on the continuation of violence. Its brand-name is simultaneous car bomb attacks with suicide bombers, not state building and party politics. Bin Laden has said that al Qaeda's victory is simply to inflict pain and economic losses on the enemy and undermine his political resolve. As a religiously linked ideological movement, al Qaeda clearly finds it difficult to articulate political strategies. While al-Zawahiri and other al Qaeda strategists have outlined rational strategies for liberating Islamic territory and building a state-like entity, other ideological voices in al Qaeda dismisses the term strategy as a Western invention. For them, the strategy of al Qaeda is simply to please God through its continued destruction of its named enemies.

At some point, al Qaeda's image will inevitably fade; all extremist ideologies have a limited life span, so does al Qaeda's extremist interpretation of Islam. Some time in the future, al Qaeda will lose its attraction among the youth, and to pose as a jihadist will no longer be "cool". Already, al Qaeda is slowly but steadily becoming yesterday's enemy. Bin Laden statements are no longer top news stories, and even fewer journalist pour over the contents of al-Zawahiri's most recent speeches. At the same time, the 'Obama factor' has greatly improved the image of the United States internationally and undermines the credibility of al Qaeda's hate propaganda.

It may be that the lack of political visions in al Qaeda will doom the organisation before it loses its captivating image. Already, we find that opinion polls in the Middle Eastern countries show that people only support al Qaeda because it is anti-American. Very few people would like to see Osama bin Laden as their ruler. Hence, it is not very likely that al Qaeda should be willing to negotiate seriously with the United States, nor is it likely that the US would negotiate with al Qaeda, although the issue has now been raised in Britain. However, al Qaeda's biggest problem is that several of its key regional partners in Iraq and Afghanistan are contemplating the idea of negotiating a political solution with their enemies. This spells trouble for al Qaeda. If the Taleban movement agrees to a ceasefire and enters into serious negotiations with the Karzai government, al Qaeda will no longer be useful to the Taleban. On the contrary, the Taleban might

consider al Qaeda a major liability which it needs to get rid of. Or alternatively, the Taleban might begin to view individual al Qaeda fighters as bargaining chips, which can be handed over for a suitable price. Both outcomes are of course very bad for al Qaeda's future.

For now, however, this is still an unlikely scenario. Even if the sympathy for al Qaeda appears to be on the wane and its ideological message has come under attacks, the organisation will continue to enjoy a degree of support. The Gaza war earlier this year was clearly a vitamin injection to al Qaeda's propaganda campaign. More generally, as long as the United States and its Western allies continue to maintain a strong and high-profile military, political and economic presence in the Islamic world, al Qaeda is ensured a certain minimum level of support.

EXPLAINING AL QAEDA'S CONTINUED APPEAL



Chapter 6 – READING THEIR LIPS: THE CREDIBILITY OF MILITANT JIHADI WEB SITES AS ‘SOFT POWER’ IN THE WAR OF THE MINDS

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6.1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years the term ‘Soft Power’ has been widely used in relation to the war of minds within the global war against global [militant jihadi] terrorism. Soft Power is the ability to achieve your goals by attracting and persuading others to adopt them. It differs from ‘hard power’ – the ability to use economic and military steps and might to impose your will. Both hard and soft power are important in the war against terrorism, but attraction is much cheaper than coercion, and an asset that needs to be nurtured and exercised. Attraction, by both sides, depends on credibility. However, contrary to the use of soft power in the context of the war against the militant jihadis, few scholars deal with the other side – the goals and credibility of the soft power of the jihadi militants. Most security services, intelligence communities, and most other experts, tend to occupy themselves with the militant jihadi hard power – terrorism.

The credibility of information obtained from open sources has always been an issue for intelligence and security communities. Intelligence communities – some of which served totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany or Stalinist Soviet Union – were often known as ‘masters of disinformation.’ Western intelligence communities and security services have not always granted much more credibility to open sources than the KGB and its former Eastern block sister services. Not only were Western agencies well aware of the complicated relations between intelligence and the media, but they frequently utilized the media for psychological warfare. Hence they, too, were suspicious of the credibility of open sources, as well as of the tricky process of distinguishing between information and disinformation.

6.2 MILITANT JIHADI SOFT POWER

The culture of militant global jihad is a young phenomenon in the Islamic world, which thus far is advocated only by a small minority of Muslim groups, movements, scholars, and individual sympathizers. However, various factors have widened the rank and file of supporters and sympathizers of this culture. These include the extensive use of terrorist tactics, primarily suicide-martyrdom operations; the insurgency in Iraq; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; growing anti-American and anti-Western sentiment; social and economic frustrations among Muslims; and growing multi-national integration between Muslim communities in the West or in regions of conflict in the Muslim world. Global militant jihad is deeply rooted in interpretations of the earliest sources of Islam and Islamic history, and adheres to the strictest doctrines of Salafist scholars; it is primarily a doctrinal development that requires legitimacy on the part of clerics and scholars, in the form of interpretations, rulings, and preaching. It embodies the Islamists’ struggle to revive the Islamic civilization through global united solidarity and brotherhood on the one hand, and the demonization of whomever the current version of the “eternal enemy” is, on the other. Most importantly, however, this process takes place publicly. Since we deal with movements and groups that are persecuted everywhere, and since they have no access to formal media, the Internet is their only alternative, and they use it in the most efficient way they can.

In the past decade the “global war on terrorism” and the exceedingly easy access to Islamic and Islamist media through the Internet, have produced a synergy that has affected the attitude towards open sources of

information. The highly intensive and efficient use of the Internet by Islamic movements and groups in general, and the wide scope of Islamist terrorist groups in particular, provide us with an extremely wide range of information, information that also affects intelligence communities. In addition, the Western media relies on information from the militant jihadi web sites as well, and thus provides them with an enormous exposure. Yet it seems that Western intelligence and security services have still a long way to go before they can fully rely on the information available in militant jihadi web sites. Two main obstacles stand in their way of exploiting the information available on these web sites:

- First, the global militant jihadi phenomenon is relatively new and unfamiliar to many Western analysts. The number of Western analysts who can fully understand this phenomenon is still quite small, even though there are many so-called “experts” on terrorism. Furthermore, it is a very dynamic phenomenon and controversial even among the various militant jihadi groups themselves. It is admittedly very difficult to understand the differences, disputes, argumentations, and mindset of the militant jihadis in all their complexities. The modern militant jihad movement is an “ideological umbrella” than to a homogeneous movement, which makes swimming in this deep ocean a challenging task. The dynamic nature of the militant jihadi phenomenon is also a function of the militant jihadists’ “relationship” with the “enemy” – whose definition is flexible – and a response to its “aggressive nature”, especially since 2001. In the eyes of most of the militant jihadis, theirs is a struggle within an asymmetric war of self-defence.
- Secondly, despite its global nature and aspirations, the militant jihadi phenomenon developed within the Arab world and is being exported to the larger Muslim world. The militant jihad is, therefore, almost entirely conducted in Arabic, and its content is intimately tied to the socio-political context of the Arab world. The American and Western occupation of Iraq and the militant jihadi insurgency that followed increase the importance of the Arab element in this phenomenon. Likewise, most of the supporters of global militant jihad groups involved in various forms of terrorism among Muslim communities in the West are Arabs or of Arab origin. Most Western intelligence and security analysts are still unable to read the information in the original Arabic language, and lack the knowledge, insights, and tools required to analyze Islamist radical groups and their mindset.

6.3 MILITANT JIHADI USE OF THE INTERNET: THE OPEN UNIVERSITY FOR MILITANT JIHADI STUDIES

There are several main reasons why militant jihadi movements, groups, clerics, and scholars, turned the Internet into their main, and sometimes only, soft power vehicle for propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, and teaching of their messages. Besides the known advantages of this medium of communication, several additional factors should be noted:

- Most Arab and Muslim countries face jihadist extremist opposition groups that are oppressed and persecuted, rendering the Internet their only alternative to spread their messages. Most extremist citizens or groups are prevented from freely publishing books and newspapers, or from giving open lectures. Moreover, in most Arab and Muslim countries these elements have no access to the traditional means of Islamic religious indoctrination, such as mosques, Friday sermons, religious universities and colleges, or religious ceremonies.
- The nature of militant jihadist ideology and doctrines, as well as a core militant jihadi mission is to create a transnational global solidarity and brotherhood within the entire Muslim nation (*Ummah*). To that end, the Internet is currently the best means to promote this goal cheaply and rapidly, while reaching the broadest possible audience. The Internet is the best means available to these groups to create and consolidate a spectrum of doctrines, new interpretations, and a multitude of new groups, but also to create an image of a large volume of activity. In addition, the Internet is intensively surfed and read by the global media. Every militant jihadi event or message is instantly exposed to the world, circulated by news agencies, and cited in Muslim countries whose populations may not read Arabic.

- The past decade has witnessed a rise in the significance and weight given to this medium in the eyes of militant jihadis, due to a number of highly important events, including the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “global war on terrorism”; the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and militant jihadi terrorist operations all over the globe. These events reinforce the image of a global clash of religions and civilizations; the sense among large segments of the Muslim public that they face “a war against Islam” disguised under the cover of fighting global terrorism; and the rise of militant jihadi terrorism as a global strategic factor in the West. The dynamic of the mutual relationship between the militant jihadi groups that use the Internet and the global media is growing.
- The first strategic priority the global militant jihadi doctrines is to target the Arab and Muslim youth – the largest, most educated – and, in terms of the Internet – most connected segment of Muslim societies. Besides, the use of the Internet for various goals and the access to it in many Arab and Muslim countries are growing rapidly, alongside growing developments in education for many of these audiences, including females.
- These groups are, above all, targeting their own societies and not Western regimes and their citizens. The Internet may be used to intimidate the Western public, given their wide exposure to the global media and the huge effect that exposure has upon the sense of security in the West. Militant jihadis know that the widely circulated video clips of beheaded and executed foreigners and Muslims in Iraq, Pakistan, or Afghanistan terrorize Western audiences. Even so, the main reason why militant jihadis circulate these clips, photos, audio material, books, articles, or military manuals, is to **indoctrinate** their own Arab and Muslim audiences; plant feelings of pride, a sense of belonging, and a new identity in their minds; and recruit their support. The Internet provides, by far, the best means to achieve the desired goal of virtual **nation-building** of the Muslim nation – *Ummah* – an aspiration anchored in the doctrines of the militant jihadi-Salafi currents. In other words, the Internet is the global Open University for Militant Jihad Studies.

One of the documents of indoctrination published in 2003, and recently re-circulated by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) talks about the nature of the university of global militant jihad. The author, using the pseudonym Ahmad al-Wathiq bi-Allah, then deputy director of GIMF, presents al Qaeda as an “organization, state, and university”: “Since the operation of USS Cole [November 2000] and the glorious events of Manhattan [September 2001] until the present events of this blessed month, [Ramadan 2005] hundreds of Muslims from all over the world join this global militant jihadi university, in which they study all the studies of the jihad, its rules and disciplines ... This is a non-central university, with no geographic borders, which has its presence everywhere and each person zealous for his religion and nation can join it ... This university has its own presidency, whose role is to incite, guide, indoctrinate, and encourage the awareness of the Mujahidin. Its presidency is the leadership of the Mujahidin headed by Osama bin Laden ... The university includes several faculties, among them electronic militant jihad, martyrdom, and the technology of side bombs and car bombs.”

The article bears propagandist overtones, but it clearly summarizes the indoctrinative nature of global militant jihad, and thus, the center of gravity of this phenomenon, i.e., the Muslim audience. If this is the main audience then there is almost no room for disinformation. An intensive reading of these web sites, and especially of the most radical 15 – 25 militant jihadi forums and dozens of message groups, reveals a highly serious approach and attitude of their participants, i.e., those who are targeted by this global indoctrination. In some Muslim communities in the West, but especially in the Arab world, we can assess the growing role of this indoctrination in the increasing willingness to support, justify, and volunteer to join militant jihadi terrorist groups. Since 2001, these militant jihadi web sites have gradually replaced the institution of the madrasa as a tool for the recruitment of the first generation of militant jihadis in the 1980 – 90s. The Internet, in fact, has become **one global madrasa**.

Another example of a publication by GIMF – an analysis of the global strategy of al Qaeda – is even more lucid. Under the title “Al-Qaeda’s War is Economic not Military”, the author, a Saudi scholar and supporter of global militant jihad, analyzes the significant role that indoctrination plays in the global movement:

“We should direct some of these efforts to other targets that could serve another goal, namely to promote the glory of the Muslims, especially among the youth, who are swimming in the oceans of pleasures and lust. Those youth are in fact unused petrol, while many efforts are dedicated to confront those clerics who are selling their minds to the dictatorships, and who are useless too. These moral attacks would have a tremendous impact on the souls of the defeated youth.

Many idle youth were motivated to join the [militant] jihad by photos or videos such as of the USS Cole, or Badr al-Riyadh, or by watching the crash of the planes into the high buildings of Manhattan. Those youth, even though they were not fully aware of the impact of the attacks upon them, turned their minds and bodies towards the [militant] jihad. Here comes the role of indoctrination and developing the thinking of these people. It is a mistake to leave these youth with their superficial understanding of the nature of the war.

Whoever listens to the calls of Osama bin Laden senses in his words his care for the indoctrination of the supporters of the [militant] jihadi current, like for example in the Gulf States, in order to target the oil fields. Bin Laden could direct the Mujahidin through personal secret messages. However, he wanted the indoctrination to be public, in order that the crowds of people, who wait for his speeches through the TV channels or the Internet, would internalize his targets and follow them. If these messages would be clandestine and then the oil fields would be attacked, the masses of sympathizers might not approve it and might even turn to the opposite side and withdraw their support. Public statements by the Sheikh or the many videos of the Mujahidin can avoid such a negative impact of such an attack.”

The huge number of new interpretations, doctrines, and debates with other Islamic Sunni groups or scholars – Salafis, Brotherhood, Wahhabi reformists, and others, innovations in the terrorist *modi operandi*, and their widespread public presence on the Internet, brought about two contradictory developments. The first was a tendency for militant jihadis – scholars or laymen supporters – to view the swell of opinions and intellectual dialogue as a current or movement in the process of consolidation, with the unifying goal, doctrines, and means of Tawhid. The other represented the emergence of a growing number of internal debates emerging either against a background of intensive, controversial terrorist/Jihadi activity, or as the result of external pressures by Islamic establishments and institutions, governments, or parts of Muslim societies.

Since September 11th, 2001, this contradiction has been present in the public opinion of many a Muslim public, and even government. On the one hand there was a growing anti-American sentiment, which emerged as a result of events in Iraq. It led to the support of many Islamic scholars, Arab officials, and a majority of the Muslim public for the jihad in Iraq. This was in addition to negative sentiment related to Israel and Palestine, which was a traditional axiom. On the other hand many innocent elements of Arab and Muslim populations suffered from indiscriminate terrorism on the part of some militant jihadis, which received total legitimacy from most of the militant jihadi-Salafi scholars.

The emergence of the Internet as “the open university for militant jihad studies”, with dozens of thousands of students, inflamed two significant processes:

- The emergence of a militant jihadi community with growing signs of solidarity and brotherhood. This community was extensively encouraged to take part in the debates, as the “virtual jihad” became a legitimate branch of the “militant jihadi war for minds”.
- The emergence of a set of militant jihadi “Internet scholars” whose main target was to indoctrinate the militant jihadi-Salafis, direct them, and consolidate the militant jihadi current.

Both groups of scholars and “students” developed a strong belief in an apocalyptic future, which effectively “hotwires” the militant jihadi-Salafi arena. This continuously stokes expectations of the defeat of the United

States in Iraq; the fall of the U.S. as an empire in the same fashion as the Afghan defeat of the Soviet Union and contribution to its subsequent fall; support for new spectacular terrorist attacks on American soil; terrorist attacks in Europe against countries that take part in the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, support Israel, or are supposedly “oppressing” the Muslim communities in Europe by imposing new laws (the veil, immigration, limiting civil rights in the name of the “war against terrorism”, outlawing Muslim charities, or by publishing anti-Muslim cartoons); the use of WMD; the collapse of Arab and Muslim apostate governments; the establishment of Shari’ah-ruled Islamic states, and so on and so forth. Through this hotwiring of the sense of an apocalypse, and the growth in the number of militant jihadi groups, scholars, supporters and sympathizers, self-radicalized youth, and laymen whose knowledge of Islam is poor, the arena is broadened and inflamed with debates, competitions, and an appeal to basic desires.

In the past years, the development of a growing number of topics under public debate within the militant jihadi-Salafi current has been prominent. During 2007, one of the most significant controversial topics among Jihadi-Salafi scholars and groups has been the existence of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), the state declared in the al-Anbar area controlled by al Qaeda and its affiliates. Another ongoing debate is over the killing of Muslims in general, and innocent ones in particular. The phenomenon of debates over “sacred and untouchable topics” including serious militant jihadi-Salafi scholars started about two years ago. The latter likely exploited the fact that the killing of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in June 2006 created a new situation in Iraq, which is still the most significant model of militant jihadi struggle. Zarqawi became a model-myth that paved the way to the establishment of the ISI. However, the absence of his authoritarian personality from the scene opened the door to increasing criticism over some of his violent doctrines and further inner debates.

Of note here is the diversity of the origins of the militant jihadi-Salafi current, the flexibility of its development, and the transition from a very marginal Islamic trend to the frontline of the face of Islam, primarily in the Western societies. Many in the West now view Islam as a religion whose ideology is supposed to be moderate and peaceful, but which in fact is moving towards the most extremist and violent end of the spectrum, making a clash inevitable.

6.4 THE DOCTRINAL SOURCES OF MILITANT JIHADI-SALAFISM

The doctrinal sources require a separate presentation. Nevertheless, their diversity is part of the issue at stake. They include three different branches, whose connection to classical, pure, political, or reformist Salafism can be scrutinized:

Egypt, through the more extremist parts of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood – mainly Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Qader bin Abd al-Aziz (a.k.a. Dr. Fadl), Egyptian exiles in Saudi Arabia – and the self radicalized fathers of the Egyptian Jihad and Gama`at Islamiyyah – the Palestinian Saleh Sariyyah, the Engineers Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj and Shukri Ibrahim, and in a later period the physician Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Saudi Arabia, through its modern Wahhabi Tawhid led by the prominent Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz and a huge class of his disciples, created among other issues, the “Movement of Awakening” (*Harakat al-Sahwah*), led by the two “twin” Sheikh Salman al-Awdah and Safar al-Hawali. During the 1990s, they were legitimized by two other classes of Neo-Wahhabi scholars. Some were older clerics, such as Muhammad bin `Uthaymin, Abd al-Aziz bin Jarbou`, or Saleh al-Fawzan; and younger ones, who in part participated in the Jihad in Afghanistan, such as Ahmad al-Khaledi, Naser al-Fahd, Yousef al-Uyeri, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Abu Jandal al-Azdi, and many others.

Palestine, led by the “Palestinian Trio” of Abdallah Azzam, Omar Abu Omar ‘Abu Qutadah’ and, above all, Issam al-Burqawi ‘Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’. The latter is the spiritual father of the fusion between the Wahhabi Tawhid and the violent Takfiri Jihad. This branch consists primarily of Jordanian-Palestinians, such as Abu Omar Seyf or Abu Anas al-Shami, whose role has been

significant in both Chechnya and Iraq. They were an inspiration to a new generation of militant jihadi clerics who graduated from Saudi Islamic universities.

The most important element of this militant jihadi “texture” of principles and doctrines is that they lost any sign or traces of the original reformist Salafism. They turned the militant jihad into a dynamic that claims to purify the Muslim society through the actions of a small elitist fighting group and by claiming to attempt to follow the exact steps of the Prophet and his companions – the “Pious Generation” (*Al-Salaf al-Saleh*). Being a militant jihadi-Salafi means, above all, creating the “best” approximation of the first ideal generation of Muslims, primarily in the militant dimension. However, this created another greenhouse of militant jihadi doctrines – the principle of *Takfir* (ex-communication) of every infidel whatsoever, but also of every Muslim who does not follow the militant jihadi-Salafi doctrines. There is a kind of a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary touch to it all, with the signs of the destruction of the “old society”, while building the new type of Muslims and Muslim society. It very much has the flavor of “New Soviet Society”, and “Soviet Man”. Such a society is bound to remain in a permanent state of war with a diverse group of enemies. These enemies are an ever growing list of “others”, all of whom do not approve of the present-day militant jihadi doctrines. This takfiri element comes primarily from the teachings of Abdallah Azzam, but also from the original Wahhabi zealotry, which dominates the Saudi sources of militant jihadi-Salafism and many of the militant jihadi scholars and terrorists.

The apostasy of the rest of the Muslim society, in militant jihadi eyes, created a situation in which, in the short time between 1995 and 2005, the definition of the “enemy” of Islam and the “true believers” was widened to include even the vast majority of the Muslim society. Doctrines used to develop some of the ideas of militant jihadi-Salafism, such as the social justice of Sayyid Qutb, were neglected in favor of the “magic touch” of violent jihad. The Takfiri element of the militant jihadi-Salafis is the primary source of diversity and controversy between those who support the search for unity/Tawhid and those who support the purification of society from apostate elements, even by killing innocent Muslims, or Shi’is, Sufis, Yazidis, or Sunni Muslims whose sole sin is being employed by companies that provide services to Americans in Iraq or the Iraqi and Afghan governments.

During 2005 – 2006, there were several instances of harsh criticism of Zarqawi himself, his anti-Shi’ah policy, and his violent and extremist *Takfir*. Some of this criticism came from leading scholars of al Qaeda and global militant jihad, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Basir al-Tartousi in London, and Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, Zarqawi’s mentor in Jordan. In the case of the latter (currently imprisoned) individual, the criticism was made in public. However, Zarqawi and his followers in Iraq enjoyed such prestige and popularity as to receive full support in militant jihadi forums, based on the principle that “the Mujahidin in the field know best how they should act”. It was almost like the Islamic principle of “*Allahu A`lam*” – Allah knows best – and in this case – “the Mujahidin know best”. The so-called but respected “Saloon scholars”, were asked politely to keep silent and respect the wishes and strategy of the fighters in the field. The killing of Zarqawi in June 2006 did not change the strategy of al Qaeda in Iraq substantially, especially in terms of anti-Shi’ah actions, the terrible violence against civilians, and the continued espousing of the principle of *Takfir*.

However, despite the success of Zarqawi’s violent anti-Shi’ah policy and operations and its ongoing application by his successors, there appears to be a decline in the religious position, prestige, and legitimacy of this policy. The shift from “Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers” to the “Islamic State in Iraq” in October 2006 increased the anonymity of the present leadership of the Iraqi al Qaeda on the one hand, and the independence of other militant jihadi insurgent groups, on the other. Zarqawi’s successor “Abu Hamza al-Muhajir” is in fact totally anonymous, the same as the “Imam” of the ISI, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. His prestige, if at all, comes from his so-called Qurayshi-Hashemite origin. The other prominent “Amir al-Mu`minin” – Mulla Omar in Afghanistan – is not regarded as a serious religious cleric or scholar, despite his success or that of his commanders since early 2006 in leading the Taliban and supporters of al Qaeda into a growing insurgency in Afghanistan, using the same *modus*

operandi as the Iraqi al Qaeda. For the vast majority of supporters of global militant jihad on the net, Mullah Omar is more a symbol of the sense of the militant jihadi apocalypse, similar to Osama bin Laden, who still owes his loyalty to Omar.

In the absence of dominant personalities such as Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, and due to the anonymity of his successors who refrain from any public appearances, some of the other militant jihadi or Islamic groups of the Sunni insurgency allowed criticism of al Qaeda or even entering into clashes with its members, which were followed by retaliatory violent attacks by al Qaeda. The position of al Qaeda as the leading force of the militant jihadi insurgency has been challenged and the attempt to impose the ISI upon all Iraqi Sunni militant jihadis, has, thus far, failed.

The absence of dominant scholars such as the late Saudi Yousef al-Uyeri, the Jordanian Abu Omar Seyf, or the Saudi Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who are all dead, and the Saudi Abu Jandal al-Azdi, the Jordanian/Palestinian Abu Qutada, and the Jordanian/Palestinian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, who are or were for a long time imprisoned, created a big vacuum. This vacuum opens the door for increasing public criticism and debates within the militant jihadi-Salafists on the one hand, as well as making them more vulnerable to outside criticism and attacks by Saudi Salafists and affiliated scholars, on the other.

6.5 TOWARDS MILITANT JIHADI-SALAFI PLURALISM?

These debates and criticism find fertile ground in the virtual jihad on the net. It should be noted that supervisors of the various militant jihadi forums do nothing to block or hide them, allowing the development of a sense of greater **pluralism** among the community of the E-Jihad and a kind of “**virtual democracy**” within this growing community. This sense of pluralism also enables the emergence of “semi-parties” of pro- and anti- positions on very significant issues crucial for the militant jihadi global arena: the ISI, Sunni-Shi'ah conflict, Iran, Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, suicide bombings outside of Iraq or against civilian Muslims, Saudi Arabia, extremist *Takfir*, other trends of Salafism, and the authority of Islamist scholars, including militant jihadi-Salafi ones.

It is hard to say if there is a direct hand behind this “pluralism” – is it a result of the growing use of the Internet, or of the “competition” between different militant jihadi forums, which want to serve as greenhouses for broad platforms for militant jihadi ideas?. In some cases it might also be the result of confusion and a lack of a clear position on the part of the web supervisors themselves. From a few cases of supervisors and webmasters who were arrested – such as the Moroccan Younis al-Tsouli in London (Irhabi 007), or the Tunisian Mohamed Ben El Hadi Messahel (Tunisian Admirer of the two sheikhs – *Muhibb al-Shaykhayn al-Tunisi*, who was sentenced in March 2007 in Morocco to 12 years in prison for a terrorist plot) – we can see that their religious knowledge was poor. They were mainly devoted to the cause, self-radicalized, and proud to be militant jihadis, but had a poor understanding of militant jihadi doctrines. However, Saudi webmasters such as the late Yousef al-Uyeri or the one referred to as “*Al-Muhtasib*”, who was recently released from a two year prison term in Saudi Arabia, were serious Islamic scholars, even though they had no formal Islamic education. It is difficult to say if this phenomenon is harmful for the Mujahidin in the long-run, or not.

Furthermore, from reading between the lines of some posts in militant jihadi forums, we can come to the conclusion that many of these supervisors know each other, if not in person, at least through email links. We can view personal comments or greetings that demonstrate a level of familiarity, beyond mere affiliation, brotherhood or solidarity. Hence, it appears there could be a guiding hand behind the policy of pluralism. It is obvious that, at least in the field of publishing statements, declarations, video and audiotapes, and other material of a propagandistic nature, a well-organized order has emerged, manifesting an absence of competition or rivalry, but rather respect for each other, and cooperation under the leadership of the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF). This order might also be a result of the fact that

there is a growing awareness of the importance of this mission in the militant jihadi “war of the minds”, and its recognized legitimacy as an integral part of militant jihad.

It seems that effective and easy use of the E-Jihad helps in creating a kind of “militant jihadi virtual state” that is open to a pluralistic views and positions within the joint militant jihadi mission of *Tawhid*.

6.6 INTERNET MILITANT JIHADI SCHOLARS

Against the above-mentioned background, there is also the evolving phenomenon of “Internet militant jihadi scholars” who appear by their real names or pseudonyms, but gain a growing respect from their virtual audience. This is also a new phenomenon which seems to exert more influence upon the “laymen” supporters of global militant jihad.

As mentioned above, the E-Jihad, or the ever-so widespread use of the Internet by militant jihadis and their sympathizers, seems to create a process of pluralism, which results in an increasing number of topics being debated, even those of a “sacred cow” nature, within a framework that is seeking maximal doctrinal unity. However, this pluralism has so far remained “within the family”, and has not been causing splits or gaps in the ideological umbrella of the militant jihadi-Salafi current. This may well go on for as long as the fight looks promising and successful, driven by the characteristic sense of the apocalypse.

6.7 CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, global militant jihad must use open indoctrination in order to sustain and broaden its audience in general, especially for its younger generations. Open indoctrination is incompatible with disinformation. Therefore, even though we should be selective and careful in our selection of which information on militant jihadi web sites we follow, once we have established the authenticity of a militant jihadi web site, we can be reasonably certain that the words we read “from their lips” are credible. Such an authenticity may be established by information provided by material from arrested webmasters or the content and details of debates over these sites. The militant jihadist instigators cannot allow themselves to mislead the “Solid Base” – *Al-Qaeda al-Sulbah* – the base of the future pioneering militant jihadi generations. Furthermore, we should understand the role in the militant jihad played by the present ideological umbrella. This role is not merely one of terrorism but, and perhaps more importantly so, as a crucial pillar in building the current solidarity among Arabs and Muslims, as well as in the nation-building process of the future Muslim Caliphate. In April 1988, Dr. Abdallah Azzam, the spiritual father of modern global militant jihad, wrote so very clearly in the article in which he established the idea of al Qaeda (*Al-Qa'idah al-Sulbah*):

“The Islamic society cannot be established without an Islamic movement that undergoes the fire of tests. Its members need to mature in the fire of trials. This movement will represent the spark that ignites the potential of the nation. It will carry out a long Jihad in which the Islamic movement will provide the leadership, and the spiritual guidance. The long Jihad will bring people’s qualities to the fore and highlight their potentials. It will define their positions and have their leaders assume their roles, to direct the march and channel it ...

Possession of arms by the group of believers before having undergone this long educating training and indoctrination – *Tarbiyyah* – is forbidden, because those carrying arms could turn into bandits that might threaten people’s security and do not let them live in peace.”

Militant jihadi terrorism in Muslim lands and against Muslims is one of the “Achilles heels” of al Qaeda and global militant jihad and a good reason for criticism, sometimes by militant jihadi scholars. Since the bombings in London and Amman in 2005 and due to the murderous attacks against Shi’i civilians in Iraq, there is growing debate and criticism between two schools within al Qaeda or global militant jihad.

These two schools are centered around, on one hand older scholars such as Abu Basir al-Tartousi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, and on the other hand the group of Saudi militant jihadi-Salafi scholars, who fully support what we may call the “Zarqawi doctrine” – the indiscriminate violence against everyone who does not support the militant jihadi-Salafi ideas. The “Zarqawi doctrine” is quite similar to the Algerian Takfir of the 1990s; hence, the debate between Al-Omar and Al-Libi on the Algerian background is significant. It is also important since Iran and the Shi’a were “upgraded” to the status of “top enemies” by the successors of Zarqawi in Iraq who are backed by Arabian militant jihadi-Salafi scholars, such as the Kuwaiti Hamed al-Ali and several “Internet scholars” such the present ideologue of al Qaeda, Abu Yahya al-Libi.

The question of what the position is of the old central leadership of “mainstream al Qaeda”, especially Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the “Amir” of the Islamic State in Iraq, who is anonymous to the militant jihadi audience, seems so far to follow the “Zarqawi doctrine”. On 8 July 2007, in his last videotaped speech on the militant jihadi Internet, he even threatened the Iranian government – the “Persian dogs” as he called them – and gave Iran an ultimatum of two months to withdraw its support from the Iraqi Shi’is, and “to stop interfering directly and indirectly in the affairs of the Iraqi State of Islam”. His call was aimed at “all Sunnis, and the Salafi-militant jihadist youths in particular in all parts of the world, to get ready for this war and make the preparations for it. I ask you not to spare any effort once our instructions are given to you.” Abu Omar was talking as a self-appointed “Amir” of an entire Islamic Caliphate in all parts of the Muslim world, not just the Islamic state in Iraq. This was the first time that such pretentiousness was manifested by a leader recognized by al Qaeda, and raises another question as to the control of “mainstream al Qaeda” over the militant jihadi insurgency in Iraq, or in other regions such as the Maghreb, Lebanon, or Somalia.

Al-Baghdadi has recently diverged from past speeches about the Iraqi Shi’as, trying to distinguish between the Shi’a leadership and the public. In the meantime, we are witnessing a growing use of indiscriminate suicide bombings and attacks against Muslims in other parts of the Muslim world, in Algeria, Somalia, Pakistan, and most recently in Libya. Algeria has traditionally been a model for Arab movements, both nationalist and Islamist, and several of the leading militant jihadi-Salafi scholars (Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Abu Qutadah al-Filastini, Abu Basir al-Tartousi) were deeply involved with its militant jihadi groups and their internal conflicts and debates. It seems that, out of all the militant jihadi insurgencies and terrorism, Algeria is still held as a model, and supporters of al Qaeda proudly point to the renewed militant jihad there as a great achievement. On 8 August 2007, a member of a militant jihadi forum posted a statement issued by the al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, in which the group claimed responsibility for attacking a patrol of the Algerian police in northeast Algeria. A 13-minute and 27-second video, which is part of the “Under the Shadow of the Swords” series, was provided and showed the attackers without masks, as well as the terrain, the equipment used, and the equipment gained. One of the striking things about this video was the self-confidence shown by the Algerian group. The Algerian model is also important when viewed against the background of the recent failure of al Qaeda and global militant jihad to find a model similar to Algeria and gain a foothold in Palestine. Hamas is not only a “thorn” in the face of al Qaeda’s ambitions, but is also criticized a lot by al Qaeda’s scholars for many of its “sins”. One of the harshest critics was Abu Yahya al-Libi himself, in a long videotape in April 2007.

In the past two years, Abu Yahya al-Libi has played a significant role not only in defending and promoting the positions of al Qaeda and global militant jihad, but also as one of the “theologians” of global militant jihad responding to attacks by opposing Muslim clerics. The fact that he belongs to the first generation of al Qaeda members grants him more influence with the supporters of global militant jihad, especially through the Internet. In the two years since his escape from prison, he joined the ranks of the militant jihadi-Salafi scholars that advocate the “Total Jihad” – the focus on permanent violent jihad in every region of conflict between Muslims and “infidels”. The extent of his formal Islamic education is not at all clear. Nevertheless, his readers on the Internet do not pay attention to his academic credentials, but only at the bottom line of his conclusions – the legitimacy for the “total Takfiri Militant Jihad”, where the rules of engagement permit any action that promotes the militant jihadi target, or “catch as much as you can and do not miss any opportunity to fight”.

However, it should be noted that for those who try to understand the mindset of the militant jihadi scholars through their indoctrination over the Internet, Abu Yahya al-Libi and his colleagues make it an easier task than the ambivalent and double-language writings of their scholar counterparts, especially the Saudis. The role of the “Internet scholars”, either well-known ones who appear by their real names, or those who hide in militant jihadi forums behind pseudonyms, is to back and legitimize the extreme positions which their audience wants to hear. Such writings are an integral part of what has recently become a legitimate branch of militant jihad – the militant jihadi propaganda underpinning a sense of identity and belonging to a growing number of “students” in the Open University for Militant Jihad Studies. Zealot scholars like Al-Libi, model topics like Algeria, or numerous videotapes from Iraq or elsewhere, are part of a system that hotwires the imagination of radicalized youth, who can join militant jihad from home. They are no longer regarded as dodgers from jihad or *Mutaqa`idin*, the term first coined by Sayyid Qutb for those who do not join the military jihad. The “total jihad” of al-Libi, including that in Muslim countries and against Muslim “apostates”, enables them to channel their emotions of frustration, personal or social stress, hatred, and fears, into a legitimate jihad, religiously approved by real or false scholars.

The long-term jihad, which the West – and indeed much of the world – is currently facing, uses the Internet to provide both militant jihadists and the rest of the world a wide spectrum of diversified information. Western intelligence and security analysts can learn a great deal about modern militant jihad by reading the lips of jihadi clerics, scholars, operatives, commanders, leaders, as well as the response of their growing audience. Improving their ability to do so, and above all in the original language, must be a priority.

Chapter 7 – PATHWAYS TO JIHAD: RADICALISATION AND THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

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7.1 INTRODUCTION

Both in the academic and policy worlds increased attention is put on the need to understand the underlying grievances and processes of radicalisation that may lead to violent extremism and terrorism. This is true both on a local and global scale. In addition, both national governments and multi-lateral organisations are attempting to come up with programmes to counter radicalisation. More research is needed to understand these processes so as to design good programmes. Furthermore, the understanding of radicalisation and de-radicalisation must be holistic, in that there will be a need for multi-disciplinary approaches. By understanding the processes at play, one can also understand the multiple motivations factors one is up against.

The following text aims to address some of the issues relevant to radicalisation in that it may lead to violent extremism and terrorism. This work is based on both the author's own research and on findings by colleagues within the field of radicalisation and conflict, and sets the background for an ongoing discussion of the issues at stake. The findings are based on field research mostly in Muslim majority countries or in Europe among Muslim populations. A major part of the research conducted by the author is based on fieldwork in Pakistan. This text concludes by trying to identify some practical steps forward which may guide policy recommendations.

7.2 DEFINING RADICALISATION

As with violent extremism and terrorism, radicalisation has been seen as a difficult concept to define. It opens up a whole range of debates and sensitivities. The way we use and explain terms is important. Being sensitive enough, so as not to stigmatise, and specific enough to guarantee academic nuances, is important. However, for practical usefulness, and in order to try to identify those vulnerable to radicalisation and/or violent extremism it becomes essential to try to define what we mean. One definition of radicalisation is that it is the process through which *individuals* and *groups* become increasingly more radical. The word “radical” is, however, debatable. How do we distinguish between ideas that are radical in the sense that they may lead to violent behaviour, and ideas that are seen as merely healthy deviations from the mainstream or conventional thought? Importantly, “healthy radical views” may lead to positive change and development of a system and/or a society. We want to live in pluralistic societies, with debates and different voices. However, radical and extreme views may also lead down a negative path to intolerance, hatred and violence – and thus be damaging for any society. It therefore becomes important to see vulnerable populations as those capable of expressing needs, grievances and frustration leading to being attracted to, and involved in, violent extremism. The challenge becomes to pick up on those vulnerabilities and grievances before they lead to negative expressions in the form of hate-related crime or violence. Ideally, what a society would want is that such expressions of vulnerabilities and grievances be expressed through available non-violent channels.

A definition suggested in a country assessment tool on countering radicalisation developed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sees radicalisation as “*the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas that could lead to acts of terrorism*”. The emphasis is here put on the fact that we are not necessarily talking of a criminal act *yet* (unless one criminalises ‘hate-speech’ because of its link to

inciting violence). Even if difficult to “measure” and define, it is important to separate between peaceful and violent radicalisation and extremism. It is not wide-open “radicalisation” that is the problem, rather it is that which will lead to violence. The challenge arises in identifying the very vulnerabilities that may lead people or groups down this path.

The social psychologist Fathali Moghaddam speaks of radicalisation as “a staircase to terrorism”: it is the narrow path that an individual may follow towards a life of terrorism with the terrorist act being the uppermost and final step. Seeing radicalisation as a process is important, yet one also has to avoid regarding all radicals as suspects, and thus capable of becoming violent.

7.2.1 Features of Radicalisation

When speaking of radicalisation we see it as a process, or rather: *many processes*. There may be several entry and exit points – and importantly, not all lead to violence and also: the exit points may not be similar to the entry points. There are also examples of disengagement processes at play – exits or de-radicalisation processes which are helpful to look at.

Human beings do not exist in a vacuum. Their decisions are shaped by the social, economic, cultural and political environment in which they operate. Mapping what one may call the ‘enabling environment’ in which radical opinions and views, political violence and terrorism become attractive can be as critical to understanding the process of radicalisation as it is to analyse individual histories and group processes. In fact, the study of terrorism and political violence has benefited enormously from a multi-disciplinary approach, and the same is true for research into the phenomenon of radicalisation. It therefore becomes important to look at the local, regional, national and even global context that we operate in.

There are no simple explanations for radicalisation. Researchers agree that radicalisation is caused by a complex array of factors that varies from place to place, from situation to situation. Increasingly it is seen that while aspects vary from place to place there may be *some* generic factors we can analyse further. We will look at some of these below. Assessing vulnerability to radicalisation entails being open to address a number of factors that may lead to grievances. However, in this chapter, it is ultimately vulnerabilities that *may* lead to violent expressions that we are interested in – and looking to try and prevent.

Youth are an especially receptive group of people to new ideas and influences. They have demands and wishes – and are receptive to role models – positive and negative ones. There have been several attempts to “profile” those whom we see as potential terrorists. As the cadre of people arrested and sentenced increases, it is, however, seen that it is difficult to identify any clear “target groups”. The demographics of those being arrested are so diverse that many counter-terrorism officials and analysts say they have given up trying to predict what sorts of people are most likely to become terrorists. Age, sex, ethnicity, education and economic status have become more and more irrelevant. But still there are some indications. A recently completed Dutch study of 242 Islamic radicals convicted or accused of planning terrorist attacks in Europe from 2001 to 2006 found that most were *men of Arab descent who had been born and raised in Europe and came from lower or middle-class backgrounds. They ranged in age from 16 to 59 at the time of their arrests; the average was 27 years old. About one in four had a criminal record.* One guiding principle for terrorist groups is, however, always to maintain the psychological edge and the upper hand by doing things that are surprising to the enemy. This is why in many areas we have seen younger and younger people being recruited as suicide bombers and women becoming attractive as recruits, yet this is still rare. Similar research was done by Marc Sageman of more than 400 militant jihadists around the world. He writes:

“Most people think that terrorism comes from poverty, broken families, ignorance, immaturity, lack of family or occupational responsibilities, weak minds susceptible to brainwashing – the sociopath, the criminals, the religious fanatic, or, in this country, some believe they’re just plain evil. Taking these perceived root causes in turn, three quarters of my sample came from the upper or middle

class. The vast majority – 90 percent – came from caring, intact families. Sixty-three percent had gone to college, as compared with the 5 – 6 percent that’s usual for the third world. These are the best and brightest young people of their societies in many ways.”

While young women are seen to be increasingly targeted as potential recruits to terrorist movements, and we have recently seen examples of female suicide bombers in the Palestinian context, in Iraq and Kashmir, the majority of the recruits are still young men, mainly 18 – 34 years old. It is, however, seen that recruits in many parts of the world are becoming increasingly younger.

Few terrorists seem to be poor; on the contrary, terrorists themselves seem to be well-educated and middle class. It is perhaps not wise to confuse the possible causes of terror with the identity of terrorists. To quote Karin von Hippel, “While terrorists themselves may not be poor and uneducated, we do have evidence that they tend to use the plight of the poor as one justification for committing violence and for broadening their appeal.” Therefore, we know that poverty and inequality are both used as a pretext for terror – and may recruit sympathizers – and in some cases “canon-fodder”.

The above factors clearly show that it is difficult to design “one-size-fit-all” programmes. Counter terrorism programmes should therefore be designed according to distinct needs and requirements (and often parts of countries will need to be treated differently from other parts). While there will be factors that we can identify that may be generic, it is, however, important to see that each situation has its unique characteristics, background and dynamics. Particularities in a specific country or region must be kept in mind (demographics, unemployment rates, etc.). Importantly also, there may be factors which are linked or interconnected. Taking a broad view of what factors may lead to radicalisation therefore becomes important.

As will be discussed below, and exemplified with the Pakistan case, we see that there may be a multiplicity of causal pathways producing radicalisation. Similarly, despite the image Moghaddam suggests through his reference to a “narrow path”, radicalisation processes do not follow a fixed linear trajectory. There may be situations that can cause sudden turn-arounds, fast-forwards or other shifts in the process. One such factor may be *closeness to a latent or an active conflict*. Another is the *level and acceptance of violence* in any given society.

It is recognised that there may be a multiplicity of causal pathways producing radicalisation, and it is agreed that countering terrorism – yes, even preventing radicalisation – may begin with the de-legitimisation of extremist messages. Changing a narrative – the way a truth is shaped, formed and expressed – may here be an essential ingredient in a counter-radicalisation strategy.

7.2.2 Steps to Radicalisation

In the following we will try identify some of the steps we see that may lead a young person down a road to further radicalisation. The aim will of course be to hope to stop the process of radicalisation before a person becomes pushed and/or pulled into accepting and legitimising violent ideas and promoting violent behaviour.

7.2.2.1 One: Underlying Grievances

What factors and circumstances generate frustration and grievances? These are often defined as *structural factors in a society* – factors which are grave enough for a large number of people to become frustrated or feel anger or apathy. The underlying factors may be real or perceived, but are factors that may lead to conflict, feelings of alienation, humiliation, and discrimination. It is in this context we can see that underlying issues such as the level of poverty and the lack of “democracy” become important. While there is not seen to be any direct correlation between poverty and terrorism, poverty – or relative and *perceived poverty* – is often used as a factor relevant as an underlying grievance – a factor that may be used by others

to explain the need for violence – a call for justice as a result of *perceived or real injustices*. General (long-term) frustration over national or global politics or historical events are also factors that may be underlying conflicts in society, as well as leading to feelings of humiliation – or apathy. Humiliation and apathy may go hand-in-hand, with violence as a way out of apathy. Events such as ongoing “atrocities against Muslims globally” and “corruption and occupation” may thus lead to feelings of humiliation and in turn apathy. We can divide the structural grievances into four components that will be issues to address and may inform a programme design:

A political dimension – key concerns are issues of governance, political systems, representation, the rule of law, power-sharing and conflict-management – *do people feel represented? Do they trust their leadership?*

A security dimension – key concerns are issues of conflict and violence and the role of the security sector (police, army, intelligence, etc.) – *do people feel secure? Do they feel secure for their children’s future?*

A socio-economic dimension – key concerns are issues of welfare and livelihood, including employment opportunities and access to social services and education – *are people employed? Under-employed? Can people realise their dreams, expectations?*

A cultural and religious dimension – key concerns are issues of religious observance, traditional forms of culture, external cultural influences, and public debate on religion and culture – *can people voice their opinions? Feelings of humiliation? Can people practice religion as they want? Are religious leaders representing them?*

7.2.2.2 Two: Triggering Events and Circumstances

While many may feel injustice, anger and frustration, not all turn to violence. A next step is to analyse *what makes a frustrated person violent??* The role of the surrounding environment here becomes important – who are the peers, friends, leaders, role-models? Are there individuals or groups who are able to frame certain claims activists make on behalf of their audiences (media, elites, sympathetic allies and potential recruits)? The importance of communication – and of instigators – cannot be understated. Many speak of a moral awakening, “a crisis” of moral shocks, but they will have to be made aware of how to ‘operationalise’ this frustration and awareness. These ‘shocks’ may be the images of “suffering” by victims or the use of “victim symbols” from Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, etc. As such there may be certain events in the local, regional or global picture that can provoke a person to action.

The “religious call” here becomes a factor. Often we see leaders using religious symbols, arguments and interpretations to explain certain factors, or to motivate for action. This is powerful, and if no one questions this logic it is often seen as a “truth”. Religious leaders in some societies enjoy immense power, their word and role therefore becomes important – both in potential radicalisation and in avoiding such radicalisation. Importantly it is often believed that a sense of unfairness and injustice has given rise to victimisation, fueling grievances in the Muslim world which may further be framed in religious terms. Religion is rarely the cause per se of terrorism and political violence but rather it may provide the narrative and language, the sentiments and emotions, through which political conflicts are expressed. Importantly it may also create a ‘following’ and a community of sympathisers.

Unemployment and under-employment are often seen as a key factor to radicalisation. Not only can it feel humiliating to go for long periods unemployed, also it may create apathy and a yearning to be taken seriously. Involvement in militant organisations may be an option for engagement and usefulness. Radicalisation may therefore also be a result of a lack of other career options. Again, an issue may also be violent behaviour as a way out of apathy.

7.2.2.3 Three: Operational Factors

Finally, what makes a radical person pick up and justify violence? These may be factors in the surroundings of the person – but importantly there need to be certain factors that “operationalise the triggers” – that may push a person further into an organisation – or that make a person actually seek out a movement. With youth this is especially seen as a vulnerable factor – as youth often go in search of groups, movements, other young people “to belong to”, to listen to or to be heard.

There are a few factors which here become important: Group dynamics in social movements can be extremely strong. We see here processes of socialisation at play, many join in with friends, or follow family members into a path or community. This may create strong in-group/out-group feelings – the creation of a distinct collective identity – through the use of “noms de guerre” (special pseudonyms), group affiliation, training, “brothering”. Group boundaries are also solidified and become less permeable.

In some societies – or within certain groups of society – glorification of violence and “martyrdom” worshipping have become parts of life. This may be within sub-groups of society or movements. A group may take on rituals glorifying terrorism that can lead to a distancing from the rest of society and legitimising violence. These rituals – such as those experienced at training camps, educational propaganda programmes and through cleansing rituals, are seen to include a process in which evil is made to look good or members are lead to believe that what they are doing is “necessary evil”.

A further factor may be the way groups can bring about moral exclusion through processes in which people dehumanize the enemy others, and/or dissociate themselves from the wider society or from certain moral issues.

7.3 CAUSES OF TERRORISM

There is quite a bit of academic literature on the subject of what causes terrorism, i.e., the underlying causes that may lead to violent extremism. The following section is taken from a study conducted at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) based on research from various areas around the world. The section above on identifying features of radicalisation and the following section on causes of terrorism may together create a basis for working out possible policy options. Some findings in the following sections are informed by a recent United Nations study on Radicalisation and Extremism that may lead to Terrorism (UN Global Strategy on Counter Terrorism – Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that may lead to Terrorism). Further discussion of this work follows below.

Some agreed-upon factors which may be relevant to radicalisation and identifying vulnerable youth in a societal context are as follows:

“Relative deprivation and inequality: Widespread perceptions of deprivation and inequality, especially among culturally defined groups, serve as the basic condition for participation in collective civil violence. Terrorism may be part of this violence.

Terrorism by spoilers: Peace processes based on negotiated settlements are frequently accompanied by increased levels of terrorism by rejectionist groups.

The contagion theory: The occurrence of terrorism in one country often leads directly or indirectly to more terrorism in neighbouring countries. Terrorists learn from one another, and new tactics are usually quickly emulated. Spill-over occurs in a variety of ways.

Terrorism and mass media: Paradigmatic shifts in modern mass media appear to influence patterns of terrorism, by enhancing its agenda-setting function, increasing its lethality, and by expanding its transnational character.

Rapid modernisation makes societies more exposed to ideological terrorism. Societal changes associated with modernisation create new and unprecedented conditions for terrorism such as a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences. Socially disruptive modernisation may also produce propitious conditions for terrorism, especially when it relies heavily on the export of natural resources, causes widespread social inequalities and environmental damage, and creates mixed market-clientalist (often very corrupt) societies.

Poverty, weak states, and insurgencies: Poor societies with weak state structures are much more exposed to civil wars than wealthy countries. Economic growth and development undercut the economics of armed insurgencies. Economic growth and prosperity also contribute to lower levels of transnational terrorism.

Democratisation: States in democratic transition are more exposed to armed conflict and terrorism than democracies and autocracies. Because of pervasive state control, totalitarian regimes rarely experience terrorism. States with high scores on measures of human rights standards and democracy are less exposed to domestic ideological terrorism. Levels of transnational terrorism also seem to be highest in semi-authoritarian states, especially when undergoing a democratisation process.

Political regime and legitimacy: Terrorism is closely linked to a set of core legitimacy problems. Lack of continuity of the political system and a lack of integration of political fringes, tend to encourage ideological terrorism. Ethnic diversity increases the potential for ethnic terrorism. A high density of trade union membership in a population has tended to contribute to a lower level of domestic ideological terrorism.

The ecology of terrorism: Technological developments offer new and more efficient means and weapons for terrorist groups, but also increase the counter-terrorist capabilities of states. Transnational organised crime and terrorism are partly inter-linked phenomena, and growth in transnational organised crime may contribute to increased levels of terrorism.

Hegemony in the international system: An international state system characterised by strong hegemonic power(s) is more exposed to international terrorism than a more multi-polar system. High levels of bipolar conflict in world politics invite the use of state-sponsored terrorism as a means of war by proxy. A strongly unipolar world order or a world empire system, on the other hand, will experience high levels of transnational anti-systemic 'anti-colonial' terrorism.

Economic and cultural globalisation: Economic globalisation has mixed impacts on transnational terrorism, depending on how globalisation is measured. Cultural globalisation, measured by the rate of INGOs, tends to cause higher levels of transnational terrorism, especially against US targets.

The proliferation of weak and collapsed states seems to have a facilitating influence on terrorism. Failed or collapsed states, caused by civil wars, underdevelopment, corrupt elites, etc., may contribute to international terrorism in a variety of ways.

Ongoing and past wars: While terrorism in some cases is an armed conflict in its own right, terrorist motivations are often rooted in ongoing or past wars in one way or another. Armed conflicts also have various facilitating influences on transnational terrorism."

These are all factors that may help explain the context within which radicalisation may occur. Below we will look at Pakistan to help exemplify some of the above.

7.4 THE CASE OF PAKISTAN

Research has been conducted by the author in Pakistan in the period 2005 – 2009. The field work explores both individual and group levels of radicalisation and violent extremism in Pakistan. Key questions are:

What processes and dynamics make individuals join radical movements, what is their reasoning, what happens, how and why? Further: What is the context in which groups and individuals become radicalised? On one of the research trips to Pakistan, interviews were held with former militants of the group *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba*. One of the interviewees said: “My only struggle, my only jihad today, is to spread the message that the real struggle is not with a weapon in hand, but to teach the real words of the Holy Qur’ān.” However, some see this very differently. Some are convinced that: “My struggle, my jihad, is to tell you, my sister, the right way.” Jihad is seen as a legitimate struggle with all means necessary: “We all have our jihad – it depends what you are chosen for – but if the cause is for God – all means may be necessary”. The individual voices within a landscape can help explain what factors and interpretations are in play, and the climate in which one operates.

The research conducted concentrates on in-depth interviews within radical Islamist circles in Pakistan. The aim is to gain a better understanding of what the different factors for joining a violent jihad may be. What are the motivations, and what makes violent jihad a legitimate approach for some people? Importantly, here we are looking at *violent* radical Islamists. At some point during the interviewed person’s life he or she has had the conviction that picking up a weapon, whether it be him/herself, or others, is the right way of jihad. Today, some have changed their minds, while others are in the “formation process” – *the process of radicalisation*. Some are – or have been – leaders, some motivators, some “connectors” and some “foot-soldiers”.

The political setting in Pakistan is vital to understanding the rise of jihadi groups in the country. Historically, Pakistan served as the key channel for the transmission of resources to the Mujahidin resistance during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Its *madrassas* have nurtured the backbone of what was to become the Taliban, and from the mid-1990s until 2001 Pakistan supported the Taliban regime. Some claim this is an ongoing phenomenon. Pakistan also struggles with severe Shiite-Sunni sectarian conflicts, and it is heavily affected by the ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, especially the border regions where the popular sympathy for the Taliban is high. Finally, Pakistan has its conflict with India over the issue of Kashmir. Since its birth in 1947 Pakistan has had a constant struggle with itself about how being an Islamic state should influence its own identity as a state and its policies. Today, Pakistan finds itself at the forefront in the US-led “Global War on Terror” as a close ally to the USA, which, in turn, has deepened cleavages in the Pakistani political landscape – aggravated in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in recent months.

Much of the academic work undertaken on radical Islamism and terrorism in Pakistan has focused on the historical and political context, the groups’ infrastructure, ideology, development and choice of targets. With this ongoing study the aim is to explore “the individual and group levels” of Pakistani jihadism through interviews with individuals and to have them tell their “stories”. What processes and dynamics make individuals join radical movements, what is their reasoning, what happens, how and why?

The processes of socialisation and education have been seen by many as being crucial. Leaders, trainers and educators may have a certain amount of influence on the individual. The interviews conducted are both with *leaders* who may see their roles as being to legitimise, convince and educate, and also with *individual* men and women who have taken part in some way or other in the struggle.

There are some characteristics which should be underlined with regard to the cases. Historically, there has been a relatively high degree of social acceptance for “jihad” (as defined by the jihadi groups) in Pakistani society. The country’s history with Afghanistan, the jihadist politics of President Zia ul-Haq and the centrality of Kashmir in its policies, may offer some explanation for this fact. The recent shift with the Musharraf-led and more recent Government being a close ally to “the greatest Satan” (i.e., USA) is, arguably, uniting the opposition and the religious groups – emphasising the acceptance of a need to “have your voice heard”. However, the definition of legitimate means in jihad is quite different and is explored in the interviews.

When asked, “Where you find your legitimacy and justification for your chosen path?” Some go back to their childhoods, their family ties and societal settings; others say it is the meeting with religion which provides them with a fundamental cause. For some of the mothers of the martyrs, religion gives them a strong sense of justification and a glorification of their sons as martyrs. Most of the people I have met readily share their argument for acceptance. However, others have come to violent jihad as a way to seek adventure or to prove their manhood. Answering the question as to whom one is doing it for, surprisingly the answer is a mix of “my country”, “my parents” and “my religion”. This reveals a sense of *mixed motivations for different purposes*.

As has been seen above, there are theoretically various ways of trying to understand or to look at factors that may motivate someone to partake in terrorism. Research shows that one may divide causes into two general categories: First, *underlying reasons*; grievances that give rise to terrorism, which may include political, historical injustices, alienation and humiliation. These can be seen more as structural challenges, including lack of democratic institutions, foreign occupation, corrupt regimes, unresolved conflicts, discrimination and atrocities against fellow Muslims. Secondly, there may be “happenings” that cause a sudden moral awakening – a sudden sense of anger and revenge – or a feeling of injustice.

Quintan Wiktorowicz calls this “*a crisis that produces a cognitive opening ... that shakes previously accepted beliefs and renders individuals more receptive to possible alternative views and perspectives*”. These factors may include a financial (sudden unemployment or no possibility of social mobility), socio-cultural (humiliations, racism, cultural weakness), political (marginalisation, torture, discrimination, corruption) or personal (death or family-tragedy, victim of a criminal activity) crisis. Although Wiktorowicz’s empirical research is focused on Europe, his theoretical framework is useful in understanding what may be factors at an individual level. Marc Sageman discusses in his work on understanding terror networks the importance of social networks – both at the levels of family and friends. Jessica Stern has, through her interviews with religious terrorists, asked questions as to why some people respond to grievances by joining religious terrorist groups. She also asks the question, as does Wiktorowicz, as to why some remain “free-riders” while others participate more actively. It was not uncommon, on the streets in Pakistan, to hear critical questions asked about the Musharraf Government – and the “Mush-Bush-Israel-India alliance” – including questions that imply sympathy for the Taliban or al Qaeda. But what makes some people give up their “ordinary” lives and choose to join extreme religious groups? Furthermore, what explains the interest that some people show for these movements, and how do they get in touch with them? Similarly, how are they convinced that this interpretation of Islam is the right one?

Motivations can be found at *different* levels and are often *mixed*: religious, political, financial, cultural or socio-psychological. In most of the cases we have found various motives, often alternating. That is, some people point to the corruption of the Government, “the biggest Satan of them all America”, charismatic leaders who convince them, and *also* to religion as a way of legitimising an activity. These are the more external factors. Then there is a different layer which is more personal: the person’s background and personal experiences.

One of the main questions in the research has been: What is *jihad* for you, and why is jihad seen as a duty? The ways the interviewees have reasoned have differed. Some have begun by talking about their background, their family stories, their educational background and the people who were important to them in their lives. However, the religious imperative is in most cases an underlying factor, which in different contexts is used either as a true motivation, explained as “the luggage of a Mujahid” by sympathizers of Maulana Masaud Azhar or as “Islam’s neglected duty”, by a former member of *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin*. For some, though, the religious motive seems to come after the political imperative, more as an attempt to legitimise a conviction.

Some have explained jihad as “the tax that Muslims must pay for gaining authority on Earth. The imperative to pay a price for Heaven, for the commodity of Allah is dear, very dear.” Others have

pointed to the “moral obligation of jihad” as being equally important as the duties of prayer and charity within Islam, but that “only a very few are lucky to be the *chosen*”. One former jihadist clearly stated that he joined for fear of being punished in the after-life, while another, according to his mother (and in letters from him to his mother) wanted his family to earn respect and honour in this life. Desire for adventure and the glamour of belonging to a militant group have also been instrumental reasons. As one interviewee, a former jihadist, said: “to be in the Military was my greatest dream, when I failed the test to enter the Pakistani Army, I found somewhere else to prove my manhood. Guns and violence were appealing. And I thought I would come back and be cheered as a hero – for my country, my people and my religion”.

Networks have been important factors for some in explaining how they became involved in certain activities. Family ties, for example, daughters, sons or cousins of political figures, and friendship ties are also, for some, seen as bringing them into contact with terrorist activity.

The process of recruitment to radical Islamist organisations has been a key point of discussion. The interviews have shown that recruitment to jihad occurs both in a top-down and a bottom-up pattern – that is, there have been both push and pull factors, often operating at the same time: the people interviewed claim their personal conviction, but emphasise the importance of someone introducing them to the “possibilities”.

The individuals met and interviewed for this study all have different backgrounds and ways of interpreting their current situations. This is partly due to them being in very different situations at the moment. The various mothers of martyrs view their situation differently as some of them today live under the protection of a religious party (e.g., *Jamaat-i-Islami*) while others have not received the same honour and pride that was promised their sons. Likewise, two men with similar stories of fighting in both Kashmir and Afghanistan, at about the same time, have today two different outlooks on life. One is ready for “another cause worthy to fight a jihad and die for” – and mentions the possibility of Iraq – while the other says he has lost ten years of his life and his jihad today is to work in his car repair shop and to tell young people not to waste their lives nor to listen to manipulative religious leaders who are only working for their own interests and agendas.

The sample of interviews shows unique individual stories. They are different people, with different stories and all represent different ways of explaining their definition, understanding and motivation for jihad. By sitting over long periods of time with the individuals, many in their own familiar settings, one can come to learn a lot about the roles that psychology, group dynamics and the importance of socialising – and external factors, such as friends, role models, leaders – play in shaping various actors. One of the things the research has aimed to identify, is the question of at what point do the various people make the *link* to violent jihad – or terrorism. How do they explain this *meeting* – and how do *they themselves* explain the different factors which have come to play in this struggle?

“We all have our jihad – it only depends what you are chosen for”, one *Jamat-ud-Dawa* leader explains. He continues: “The power of what can be done for God has been sanctioned by the divine mandate or conceived in the mind of God”. “This is why it is difficult for secularists to understand”, he says. The challenge in conducting these kinds of interviews is in meeting the “other” in their cognitive world. How much empathy can you feel – and how much is needed to be able to portray a picture of the cases as they themselves want to be portrayed? Through the interviews we have attempted in coming a step closer to an understanding of the people and the mental and social processes that occur in the course of being introduced to radical groups. Behind most decisions and acts there are individual stories. The aim of the project has been to come closer to these –and may in turn teach us lessons to understand and identify the questions at stake.

7.5 CONCLUSIONS

7.5.1 In Search of Programmes and Policy Options

Vulnerability to radicalisation is an important yet difficult area of study. The challenge lies in trying to identify those who *may* be pushed or pulled towards radicalism, and the question remains: who is particularly susceptible to radical ideologies? Research shows that there is no clear profile as to who may become radicalised – some patterns may however be identified. It is essential to avoid stereotypes and generalisations that may cause further radicalisation by contributing to feelings of victimisation.

Possible indicators may include:

- Perceptions of marginalisation, exclusion or discrimination (levels of disaffection in society).
- Inability to affect political changes through legitimate and peaceful means (political representation, having a voice). This contributes to a feeling of powerlessness.
- Harsh treatment by the security services (self or family members).
- Unemployment and lack of opportunities for work and education.
- Religious or ethnic persecution (representation, places of worship).
- A generational gap / generational conflicts (estranged youth, possible areas for youth participation).
- Lack of access to social services (general society) results in a feeling of being locked in.
- A sense of alienation, which is rarely related to their socio-economic circumstances (political, cultural).
- Alienation: radicals tend to act outside traditional community bonds, such as family, mosques and other associations (how to engage those who do not get involved in groups, etc.).
- The group effect: the process of radicalisation may take place in the framework of small groups of friends who possibly knew one another before and may have had a common place of meeting or been part of a network of petty delinquency (levels of crime in society/neighbourhood).

Possible entry points for a study of radicalisation may thus include the following issues:

- What is the composition of current radical groups? Background, firmly anchored or an alien body in society? farmers, urban youth, students? (developing a demographic profile) – identifying role models and leaders of such groups.
- Emerging radicals – finding the vulnerable – identifying those groups in society that are *frustrated, disaffected and disillusioned* – and how they involve themselves in society.

Practical Steps and Policy Options

As part of the UN Global Strategy on Counter Terrorism a working group on radicalisation and extremism that may lead to terrorism has conducted a study of member-states policies in the area. A recent report identified eleven key strategic issues (or types of programmes) which one can draw experiences from both in terms of preventing radicalisation ('counter-radicalisation') and 'de-radicalisation'. These include:

- Engaging and working with civil society.
- Prison programmes (e.g., working with juveniles).
- Education programmes.
- Promoting an alliance of civilisations and inter-cultural dialogue.

- Tackling economic and social inequalities.
- Global programmes to counter radicalisation (as part of development aid).
- The Internet.
- Legislative reforms.
- Rehabilitation programmes.
- Developing and disseminating information (awareness campaigns).
- Training and qualifying agencies involved in implementing counter-radicalisation policies.

There are quite a few factors and policy options we here see repeating themselves. The report provides an overview of non-coercive counter-radicalisation policies and programmes implemented by countries around the world. They involve a whole array of actors and require a cross-departmental approach to many of the issues. The approaches also demonstrate that radicalisation processes are complex and multi-faceted and may follow different dynamics in different places. The report has also shown, however, that even though no one theory can explain all forms of terrorism and no one approach can address all the conditions that may lead to it, some common understanding and policies have begun to emerge. The above list is an indication of this.

Importantly, as has been seen by the above-mentioned cross-country survey conducted by the United Nations, increased attention is being given in a wide variety of states to non-coercive approaches to violent extremism that aims to prevent disaffected individuals to violence in the first place: “This reverses a previous reliance on “hard approaches” and highlights a growing recognition among many states that military and other suppressive approaches alone are insufficient, and in some cases may even be counter-productive”. Below are a few recommendations which may help shape or lay out policy.

Short-Term Policy Measures

- Increased efforts to identify and render harmless potential “radicalisation-entrepreneurs” by either prosecuting them, or guiding them to find more constructive ways to act out their activism.
- De-legitimization of extremist messages – this requires identifying where such messages are spread from – opinion makers, radical clerics, youth leaders, etc. Finding ways of hampering the proliferation of violent extremist messages on the Internet, maybe through increasing “positive” messages as a counter-balance.
- Identifying “radical voices”. An important target group are charismatic “gate keepers” such as radical clerics, “jihad veterans” (people who have returned back from Iraq for instance in the Yemen context – and Guantanamo returnees), and leaders in militant milieus who play a vital recruitment role.
- Prevent the establishment of facilities and sanctuaries (empty, negative, secretive meeting places. in which radicals can spread their violent messages, their violent ideology, indoctrinate new members and socialize them into a violent extremist (“jihadist”) worldview. Develop healthy meeting places for discussion, activity and learning – sports, vocational training, languages, media training, etc.
- The development of youth leadership programmes: many of the target group interviews focus on the need for skills and training – vocational training, leadership skills, political management skills, administration skills, i.e., develop “cultures” of positive exchanges and learning centres.

Awareness-Raising Programmes

- Many of the target groups focus on the need for places to learn and discuss issues at stake for youth – *meeting places* for discussion, places to “eliminate negative feelings”, have outlets for opinions, media training, key concerns are often seen to be: corrupt leaders, lack of democracy, lack of places to be heard, apathy.
- *Awareness campaigns* – sending positive messages through media, TV, internet – make youth create the message to be sent out, media training, journalism skills with the goal to create awareness and ownership of their own futures.

There is a lot that could be done to counteract the spread of radicalisation – a main feature however lies in isolating the violent actors, but involving mainstream society in an effort to build a healthy environment for debate and increased awareness of the issues that may cause grievances and lead to frustration and disaffected populations in our societies.

Chapter 8 – RE-VISITING 7/7, GRIEVANCE AND SHAME

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For the conspirators who killed fifty two London commuters on 7 July 2005 ‘suicide bombing’ was a tactical choice informed by the guiding strategy of an influential terrorist movement, al Qaeda. In the suicide bombers’ post-dated videos there is clear evidence that they drew inspiration from Osama bin Laden’s propaganda statements claiming legitimacy for the tactic. 7/7 would be justified by the men who carried it out in exactly the same way bin Laden rationalised 9/11 and 3/11:

What happened in September 11 [New York / Washington] and March 11 [Madrid] is your own merchandise coming back to you. We hereby advise you ... that your definition of us and of our actions as terrorism is nothing but a definition of yourselves by yourselves, since our reaction is of the same kind as your act. Our actions are a reaction to yours, which are destruction and killing of our people as is happening in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine ... It suffices to see the event that shocked the world – the killing of the wheelchair-bound old man Ahmad Yassin – Allah’s mercy upon him – and we pledge to Allah to avenge [his murder] on America, Allah willing ... [1].

Legitimacy here is premised on reciprocity. Political grievance and the shame of defeat are assuaged in an act of reciprocal violence:

By what measure of kindness are your killed considered innocents while ours are considered worthless? By what school [of thought] is your blood considered blood while our blood is water? ... Therefore, it is [only] just to respond in kind, and the one who started it is more to blame ... [1].

Moreover, in the decade preceding 7/7 bin Laden’s brand of propaganda had become common coinage for a number of Muslims throughout the UK. Most notably Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Abdullah el Faisal, became prominent local propagandists who effectively pre-figured the al Qaeda message. Significantly, Jamal Lindsey, one of the 7/7 suicide bombers first became enamored of this world-view when he attended talks by Abdullah el Faisal. More crucially, to the extent that some reliable evidence has subsequently emerged it appears the bombers themselves may have been trained for this particular task by experienced al Qaeda operatives. In contrast, in other al Qaeda inspired terrorist conspiracies in the UK would-be suicide bombers appear to have failed in their tasks because of a lack of training the 7/7 bombers received. More clearly, the choice to carry out a ‘suicide’ attack meant that Mohammad Siddique Khan, Shezad Tanweer, Jamal Lindsey and Hasib Hussain, the perpetrators of 7/7, demonstrated a willingness to die along with their victims. For the victims themselves the chosen method of detonating a bomb had exactly the same impact on them as terrorist bombs that killed and injured other London commuters at other times, planted by members of the Provisional IRA who planned instead to escape alive. On reflection it may be that the two terrorist methods have more in common than just the identical impact on innocent victims. Certainly, there is a small but growing body of literature that acknowledges the risk of death all terrorists face when manufacturing or planting bombs [2],[3].

The point of interest for the authors of this chapter is that grievance and shame appear to be key motivational factors for both Provisional IRA and al Qaeda terrorists who have attacked London commuters with bombs at different times and in respect of campaigns that are otherwise conceptualized as belonging to separate typologies – most typically ‘radical nationalism’ (in the case of the Provisional IRA) and ‘religious and quasi-religious extremism’ (in the case of al Qaeda) [4].

It will not, however, be possible to do more than outline the possibility that grievance and shame were key factors in the mindsets of two distinct terrorist movements who merely chose to attack commuters in the

same city. The government's refusal to hold any authoritative enquiry into 7/7 has led to uncertainty and confusion about the background to the attacks. In addition, an unintended outcome of the government's position has been an alarming growth of 'conspiracy theories' gaining root in British Muslim communities. Instead of the clarity and transparency Lord Scarman and Lord Macpherson brought to bear on events of equal concern to minority communities, in respect of 7/7 Muslim communities have been forced to rely instead on government narratives that carry no credibility [5],[6]. Typically, conspiracy theories consist of variations on the themes of false evidence (e.g., the invalidity of CCTV evidence of the 7/7 bombers at Luton railway station) and a hidden State hand (e.g., a covert US or Israeli action). Early investigative accounts of 7/7 were similarly dismissive of government credibility but perhaps overly focused on the Iraq War as a single explanatory cause (see for example Rai, M., 2006. *7/7 The London Bombings Islam and The Iraq War*. London: Pluto Press). In contrast this chapter seeks to present bottom-up community and practitioner perspectives that might have been adduced in evidence if ever a public, judicial enquiry had been held.

In the first instance it is reasonable to assume that a judge enquiring into the causes of 7/7 would have interrogated the veracity and meaning of the video messages left by the perpetrators. Muslim community witnesses might have been called to comment on them. Indeed, on the evidence of community interviews conducted by the authors it is fair to suggest that the judge would have been encouraged to understand that the frustrations about a lack of any effective response to state violence against Muslims – as enunciated by the bombers – was commonplace:

Oh Muslims of Britain – you day in day out on your TV sets watching and hearing about the oppression of the Muslims. From the east to the west yet you turn a blind eye as if you never heard anything or as if it does not concern you. You have preferred the duniya (world) to Allah and his messenger (PBUH) and to the hereafter... (Tanveer).

A judge, we venture to suggest, might have come to appreciate that the legitimacy of 7/7, in the eyes of the conspirators, would have turned on their willingness to accept that the tactic was halal (lawful) in the context of their religious understanding. Khan, of course, argues that it is halal, ridiculing Muslim scholars who say it is haram as cowards.

In the same way it is reasonable to suggest that an experienced High Court judge would have been willing to hear evidence from counter-terrorism practitioners who dissented from prevailing 'new terrorism' and 'war on terror' paradigms that dismissed experience of Provisional IRA terrorism as irrelevant [7]. Instead the judge would have been reminded that a tough government response to terrorist prisoners' demands for political status was turned into a successful recruitment strategy by the Provisional IRA and that one of al Qaeda's aims was that Mohammed Sadiqqi Khan, the eldest 7/7 bomber, should achieve the same heroic status as Bobby Sands and for the same purpose. That, counter-terrorist practitioners would have argued, was the prime purpose of the video in which Khan explained the reasons for his pending terrorist enterprise [7].

Intriguingly, Khan's explanation both for taking part in terrorism and for taking his own life bears striking similarities to Bobby Sands' case. To demonstrate this it is helpful to compare extracts from Khan's video performance with extracts from Bobby Sands' prison diary – a record written in secret that had a subsequent major impact in elevating Sands' to heroic status for a generation of PIRA volunteers. Both terrorists, Khan and Sands, insist they are part of oppressed communities that have to resort to violence to oppose the overwhelming might and treachery of an inherently hostile neo-colonialist power. In Kahn's words: "Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight." In Sands' words: "I am a casualty of a perennial war that is being fought between the oppressed Irish people and an alien, oppressive, unwanted regime that refuses to withdraw from our land." [8].

Both are self-consciously approaching death as a form of martyrdom so as to elevate themselves to an imagined moral high ground. In Khan's words: "I and thousands like me have forsaken everything for what we believe." In Sands' words: "I am a political prisoner because I believe and stand by the

God-given right of the Irish nation to sovereign independence, and the right of any Irishman or woman to assert this right in armed revolution. That is why I am incarcerated, naked and tortured.” Interestingly, in the prison diary of one al Qaeda suspect there is a self-conscious alignment with Bobby Sands and other non-Muslim ‘freedom fighters’.

Both Khan and Sands highlight the significance of their respective religious allegiances. In Khan’s words: “It is very clear, brothers and sisters, that the path of jihad and the desire for martyrdom is embedded in the holy prophet and his beloved companions”. In Sands’ words (in the final days of his hunger strike):

I can ignore the presence of food staring me straight in the face all the time. But I have this desire for brown wholemeal bread, butter, Dutch cheese and honey. Ha!! It is not damaging me, because, I think, ‘Well, human food can never keep a man alive forever,’ and I console myself with the fact that I’ll get a great feed up above (if I’m worthy). But then I’m struck by this awful thought that they don’t eat food up there. But if there’s something better than brown wholemeal bread, cheese and honey, etc., then it can’t be bad ... I am standing on the threshold of another trembling world. May God have mercy on my soul.

Both aspire to lead by example. In Khan’s words: “Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood ... By preparing ourselves for this kind of work, we are guaranteeing ourselves for paradise and gaining the pleasure of Allah.”. In Sands’ words, “I have considered all the arguments and tried every means to avoid what has become the unavoidable: it has been forced upon me and my comrades by four-and-a-half years of stark inhumanity.

Both are anxious to attack religious leaders in their own communities who fail to support the terrorist movement. In Khan’s words, “... by turning our back on this work, we are guaranteeing ourselves humiliation and the anger of Allah. Jihad is an obligation on every single one of us, men and women”. Whereas, he says, “our so-called scholars of today are content with their Toyotas and semi-detached houses” in their desire for integration. They are useless. They should stay at home and leave the job to real men – the true inheritors of the prophet”. In Sands’ words, “I was very annoyed last night when I heard Bishop Daly’s statement (condemning the hunger-strike). Again he is applying his double set of moral standards. He seems to forget that the people who murdered those innocent Irishmen on Derry’s Bloody Sunday are still as ever among us; and he knows perhaps better than anyone what has and is taking place in H-Block. He understands why men are being tortured here – the reason for criminalisation. What makes it so disgusting, I believe, is that he agrees with that underlying reason. Only once has he spoken out, of the beatings and inhumanity that are commonplace in H-Block”. And both men, Khan and Sands, it follows, are self-evidently addressing themselves to supporters and would-be recruits rather than a wider public.

Which brief comparison between Khan and Sands is merely to suggest that the two men shared one key commitment that marks them off from the majority of their compatriots who shared their unremarkable attachment to anti-colonial politics – a willingness to become martyrs for their cause. Moreover, according to the same counter-terrorist evidence it may also be prudent not to place too much emphasis on the fact that only one of the two terrorists was a suicide bomber. On this evidence it may be important to recall that Sands belonged to a movement that was often indifferent to civilian deaths notwithstanding claims that it sought to limit this risk by way of coded warning calls to the police. Rather, it may be illuminating to reflect on what both movements have in common and perhaps the best way to conceptualise this convergence is in terms of what has been called ‘asymmetric conflict’ [4].

Thus, by adding notions of ‘status asymmetry’ and ‘two-way asymmetry’ to the conventional militarised typology of asymmetrical warfare Stepanova facilitates an enhanced understanding of asymmetry as it is actually experienced by state and especially non-state actors involved in conflict. Demonstrating a welcome grasp of the level of strategic thinking that guide all terrorist movements Stepanova incorporates terrorist ideology into a new account of asymmetrical conflict that is thereby competent to explain the tactical use of terrorism, not least the tactic of suicide bombing. A key step in her argument involves

recognising that asymmetry has a qualitative, as well as a quantitative dimension. Innovatively, she extends 'conflict in which extreme imbalance of military, economic and technological power' to include 'status inequality; specifically, the inequality between a non- or sub-state actor and a state' (Stepanova, 2008, 19). This is an important development of the concept of asymmetrical conflict because it facilitates an examination of what she calls the 'ideological disparity' separately and in conjunction with the 'structural disparity' between 'stronger' state and their 'weaker' non-state opponents. Stepanova also places emphasis on the increased tactical advantages non-state actors are likely to achieve over their state opponents the more they adopt structures that are dissimilar to those used by their opponents. Both the Provisional IRA and al Qaeda illustrate how a weaker party in asymmetrical conflict might adopt tactics so as to 'balance this asymmetry by making enemy civilians suffer as much as those in whose name the terrorist claims to act' [4].

At the very least a High Court judge might have been prepared to accept that the 7/7 suicide bombers were less alien to the Provisional IRA terrorists than the British Prime Minister insisted upon. Before 9/11 Tony Blair entered into negotiations with men who led a movement that had killed and maimed British civilians by terrorist bombs. He was determined to endorse a disproportionate and draconian response to 9/11 led by the US on the basis that the perpetrators were wholly beyond civilized politics and negotiation. In doing so he was at pains to distinguish them from the Provisional IRA. In consequence after 7/7 he was equally determined that the perpetrators' claim to have acted in response to the war on terror – most especially the invasion of Iraq – would be denied:

But, coming to Britain is not a right. And even when people have come here, staying here carries with it a duty. That duty is to share and support the values that sustain the British way of life. Those that break that duty and try to incite hatred or engage in violence against our country and its people, have no place here. Over the coming months, in the courts, in parliament, in debate and engagement with all parts of our communities, we will work to turn those sentiments into reality. That is my duty as prime minister'.

Again, it is reasonable to suppose that a judge would at least have assessed the cogent argument made by al Qaeda propagandist in explanation of 7/7:

Britain is the one who taught America how to kill and oppress Muslims in the first place. By drawing on experience gained during hundreds of years of blood soaked colonial history. Lest we forget Britain is today besides prosecuting its occupation of Southern Iraq, the one heading the NATO occupation of Afghanistan and relieving the bloodied and bruised Americans in the south and east of the country. We haven't mentioned the fact that these actions of the Americans and the British are prohibited by the same international law treaties which they hypocritically claim to uphold and protect. Which they impose on others even as they themselves violate them with impunity.

In fairness to the Blair government there is no doubt that it heard from some critical Muslim voices (for example Iniyat Bunglawala representing the Muslim Council of Britain) in the immediate aftermath of 7/7. Voices prepared to explain how widespread community anger at Britain's role in the war on terror was providing propaganda and recruitment success for al Qaeda in Britain of the kind delivered by Adam Gadahn:

What I am saying is that when we bomb their cities and civilians as they bomb ours. Or destroyed their infrastructure or transportation like they did ours. Or kidnapped their non-combatants like they kidnapped ours. No sane Muslim should shed tears for them. They should blame no one but themselves because they are the ones who started this dirty war. They are the ones who will end it. By ending their aggression against Islam and Muslims. By pulling out of our region. By keeping their hand out of our affairs. Until they do that neither Forest Gate style police raids. Neither Belmarsh or Guantanamo cells nor the mosque or Imams advisory counsel will be able to prevent the Muslims exacting revenge on behalf of their persecuted brothers and sisters.

However, it seems reasonable to suppose that a High Court judge following in the footsteps of Lord Scarman and Lord Macpherson would have given more weight to critical community voices prepared to deliver messages that challenged the government's narrative. More crucially a public enquiry would have been bound to listen to community voices that were excluded from the government's post 7/7 community forum. Ironically, while the community figures invited to meet with the Home Office after 7/7 had no first-hand experience of al Qaeda activity in the UK, two minority sections of the community, Salafis and Islamists, had an abundance of valuable experience that spoke directly to the problem [7],[9]. For example, from Salafis in Brixton (an area of prime importance to Lord Scarman and Lord Macpherson) a judge would have heard how Salafis had been challenging the pernicious influence of extremists they called 'takfiris' in their communities for the best part of a decade. Evidence would have emerged of their work with al Qaeda operatives Abdul Raheem (otherwise shoe-bomber Richard Reid), Zacarius Moussaoui (convicted in relation to 9/11) and their challenge to the men who introduced 'takfiri' ideas to British Muslim youth – most notably Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Abdullah el Faisal. Similarly Islamists in Finsbury Park had first had experience of how they had successfully challenged Abu Hamza's violent supporters that would have been crucial to any full understanding of the problem and the best remedies to tackle it.

Evidence would have emerged describing how Osama bin Laden's powerful propaganda messages had already provided fuel for local events in Britain such as Abu Hamza's meeting at the Finsbury Park Mosque on the first anniversary of 9/11 which was provocatively billed, 'a towering day in history'. While this event alerted the wider community to the activities of Abu Hamza and like-minded extremists the fact is that Abu Hamza (along with Abdullah el Faisal and Abu Qatada) had by then assiduously cultivated small but strong UK followings over a long period of time, throughout much of the 1990s. One of their great attributes as leaders was to help young Muslims with a wide range of welfare issues. Very often new converts to Islam no less than Muslims newly arrived in London would need help with religious practice, diet, housing, benefits, relationships, employment and many other matters upon which their new leaders were adept at providing practical help often at times and in places where more conventional religious leaderships might be found lacking. Whereas many mainstream Muslim leaders appeared remote and detached the three London-based extremists were approachable, demonstrative and in touch with street issues. For instance, many firsthand accounts pay tribute to Abu Hamza's and Abdullah el Faisal's skills in helping young Muslim's move away from drug and alcohol use (and related crime) and into strict religious observance. Which is not to overlook a sinister, instrumental purpose but rather to acknowledge the calibre of their inter personal and leadership skills when dealing with young people.

In addition, Abu Hamza skillfully used a close circle of loyal followers to act as intermediaries and conduits for communication with his wider following. A first floor office at the Finsbury Park Mosque also served as a headquarters for his regime and a place to hold interviews. Many Muslim newcomers to the UK (especially from Algeria) knew that Finsbury Park Mosque would be a good place to seek help and shelter immediately upon arrival. Similarly Abu Qatada established a regular presence at a youth club (the Four Feathers) near Baker Street and the Regent Park Mosque (officially the London Central Mosque). His lack of fluent English was more than compensated by his reputation as a senior scholar and the willingness of loyal supporters to translate his teachings for eager audiences. At different times Abdullah el Faisal established strong community bases in Willesden, Edmonton and Brixton. All three, however, were mobile and travelled regularly to Muslim communities around the UK. One interviewee recalls attending an event in Luton in 1996 when Abu Hamza called on his audience to support the blind Egyptian Muslim scholar Omar Abdel Rahman (referred to as Sheikh Omar) who was then standing trial for seditious conspiracy in the USA arising from investigations into the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993:

Abu Hamza made it clear that he knew Sheikh Omar and that they had spent time together during one of the Sheikh's visits to London. Typically, Hamza accused the US of framing Sheikh Omar while at the same praising the attack on the World Trade Centre as a brave and just act.

This is just a small sample of the kind of evidence an experienced High Court judge might have heard in a public enquiry into the background and the causes of 7/7. In Bradford we have spoken to Salafis and Islamists who have felt too threatened as members of a ‘suspect community’ to liaise with police or government after 7/7. Given Lord Macpherson’s strong admonition of the Metropolitan Police for ‘institutional racism’ in 1999 we wonder what a similar judge might have made of the government’s failure to listen to minority Muslim community voices in the aftermath of 7/7. Perhaps the only defence the government might offer is provided by top-down think tanks like Policy Exchange where there is absolute clarity that the same Islamist and Salafi ‘minority voices’ are as extreme and obnoxious as the British National Party [10]. Here again, a judge would have provided equal clarity for counter-terrorism practitioners and the public by adjudicating on the issue. Instead, nearly four years after 7/7, Policy Exchange and its acolytes, continue to dictate the debate in terms many Muslims describe as Islamophobic. Perhaps therefore a public enquiry is still viable as well as being overdue. Even at this late stage, it may be the only forum in which community conspiracy theories and self-serving top-down narratives can be laid to rest. Once that ground has been cleared it may become a little easier to approach the tactic the 7/7 bombers adopted on their own terms.

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Chapter 9 – WHY THE SALAFIS ARE NOT A TERROR PROBLEM

Siraat

Siraat is a Muslim community action and research team in Europe that is actively working to prevent and counter violent extremist thought and terrorism.

Within the “war on terror” scenario the *Salafī da’wah* and tradition has been seen as a methodology which is the main cause, thrust and impetus for terrorism and political violence and as even promoting such radical views. A large body of research has been authored which seeks to claim that the *Salafī* way is indeed an extremist radical belief system which eventually manifests itself with political violence and terrorism. A number of papers by Mitchell D. Sibling, Arvin Bhatt (2007), Jocelyn Cesari (2008), Marc Sageman (2004), Vincenzo Olivetti (2001), Anne Sofie Roald (2004) and Stemann (2006). Even though they aimed to understand the process by which Muslim youth become attracted to more extreme understandings and interpretations of Islam, it fell far short of doing the subject any justice and greatly misunderstood much in this regard as normative practices within Islam was denoted as in some way seen as subversive.

One of the evident problems with such analyses is that the *Salafī* methodology is seen as being the main catalyst for terrorism and then examples are sought to present what they consider to be ‘Salafī’. Here is where the problem lies, as the two analysts Silber and Bhatt, make reference to samples which are not ‘Salafī’ in the slightest and are rather *takfīrī*, *militant jihādī*, *ikhwānī* (i.e., *followers of the Muslim Brotherhood*), *Qutbī* (i.e., adherents to the ideology of Sayyid Qutb) and even at times *Tablighī*. Yet all of it is placed under their inadequately defined category of ‘Salafism’.

This study hopes to critically assess some of the claims about Salafism found within the literature and explore the reality of the *Salafī* way in regards to issues related terrorism, political violence and extremism. Let us begin with a basic definition of what *Salafī da’wah* is: the Islamic preaching which emphasizes a return to understanding Islām as the early generation understood and practiced it. Then let us actually quote from the leading and well-known *Salafī* scholars themselves, who the *Salafis* hold to be their reference points – in order to assess the assertion that adopting *Salafī* Islām leads to political violence and terrorism. As a result, it will be evident that the *Salafī da’wah* and methodology is one of the main barriers to the spread of terrorism among Muslim believers in the world today [1]. Indeed, the more stricter and serious the *Salafī*, the less likely the person will fall into radicalisation or terrorism:

Ironically, this means that the most “radical” of the salafis are the most immune to jihadist teachings, and the more “moderate” Muslims are those more open to other militant streams of thought and who may provide slightly more fertile recruiting grounds for the militant jihadis [1].

These are for the following reasons:

- Strict *Salafis* are primarily religious and not at all entrenched in political activity, political involvement and rhetoric; let alone terrorism. Politics is not their first port of call, their first priority is rather to educate and cultivate Muslims upon *tawheed* (Islamic monotheism) and adhering to the *Sunnah* of the Prophet Muhammad (*sallallāhu ‘alayhi wassallam*) along with purifying the beliefs of Muslims is their focal emphasis.
- *Salafis* frown upon forming political parties and groups which are based on partisan loyalties.
- *Salafis* criticise clandestine meetings in order to put into place a strategic political plan, these are disliked according to the classical and traditional scholars. Umar ibn Abdul-Azeez, considered by some as being the fifth rightly guided Caliph, stated: “If you see a people meeting secretly regarding (matters of) the religion to the exclusion of the common people then you should know that they are misguided.” [2]

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- *Salafis* frown upon pledging allegiance to heads of organisations, groups and political parties. This is due to the biased partisanship and bigotry which is involved with such groups and because allegiance should only be given to the Muslim head of state or leader.
- *Salafis* hold it to be un-Islamic to stage a revolt or rebellion against the leader of a Muslim country regardless of how unjust and oppressive that leader is, and especially if the Muslims do not have the ability to remove a particular leader from power.
- *Salafis* are supposed to take into account the benefits and harms of any action which is done in the name of advancing the religion and do not endorse harming other Muslims nor creating chaos.
- *Salafis* do not agree with the targeting of civilians and non-combatants in warfare based on the evidences from the Qur'ān and Sunnah.
- Those who claimed to be *Salafi* and then began adopting the methodology of Sayyid Qutb were those who eventually avoided referring to themselves as being 'Salafi' and rejected its well known principles. Unfortunately then, these individuals did end up leaving the *Salafi* way and some began to support erroneous ideas of jihad which the *Salafi* scholars did not endorse whatsoever.

The confusion arises between mainstream Salafis and the militant *jihadī-takfīrī* extremist narrative that has adopted established Islamic lexicology and terminology in an attempt to promote itself as being the most authentic and correct interpretation of the religion. As a result, in order to gain legitimacy to these claims, such violent extremist narrative ascribes itself to Salafism. This is why we find references to the 'Salaf' (the righteous predecessors) and 'Salafi' (one who takes his example these early righteous generations) replete within the discourse of Abū Qatāda, Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī, Abū Mus'ab as-Sūrī, Ayman adh-Dhawāhirī and many others. This has been noticed by Salafi scholars themselves; for instance Shaykh 'AbdulMālik ar-Ramadānī al-Jazā'irī, a contemporary Algerian *Salafi* scholar, stated about the Algerian *takfīrī* group known as the '*Salafi Group for Da'wah and Combat*':

How can, with all of this, making permissible the blood of the police and killing them be clean (i.e., permitted)? Then they live on stolen monies which have been ransacked from people by force and they destroy the souls of the Muslim soldiers ... As a result, we do not however absolve ourselves from 'Salafiyyah' as it is the truth, yet we absolve ourselves for Allāh from the 'Salafist Group for Dawah and Combat' and from all those who grasp weapons today in our country against the system or the people. I say this so that the creation know that the ascription of those revolutionary groups (i.e., the GSPC) to Salafiyyah is a distortion of Salafiyyah, just as how ascribing deviant Muslims to Islam is also a distortion of Islam, blocking the true path of Allāh and causing people to flee from the victorious ones (Firqat un-Nājiyyah). However, Salafiyyah is Salafiyyah, just as Islām is Islām, even though it is distorted by the deviants [3].

This has been highlighted by Wiktorowicz who emphasized that in "many cases, scholars claiming the Salafi mantel formulate antipodal juristic positions, leading one to question whether they can even be considered part of the same religious tradition." [4]. This in many ways is similar to how extremist white supremacist groups claim Christianity yet devise views which are so radically different from mainstream Christianity that such interpretations render the movement as a different belief system in totality. It is, perhaps, pertinent to cite Shaykh 'Alī Hasan al-Halabī al-Atharī's definition of Salafism (Salafiyyah) in order to capture a comprehensive but concise view about the mainstream Salafi movement and its adherents:

I will present example of this with three types of people who utilize the term without due right:

First: Whoever ascribes to Salafiyyah (Salafism) methodologies which oppose what the 'Ulama and seniors of the Salafi da'wah traverse, not to mention oppose their proofs and evidences. Such as some of the violent armed groups in Algeria and the likes. I wish to suffix that the reason for those (violent armed) people falsely ascribing themselves to Salafiyyah is only due to the fact that they want to distinguish themselves from other older partisan groups present, such as *Ikhwān ul-*

Muslimeem [Muslim Brotherhood], *Hizb ut-Tahreer* and others. The evidence of this is: many of them changed their ascriptions and their skins as soon as they had the opportunity to! Another point to mention is that: Salafiyyah is not a *hizb* (partisan political group) that has a legislative structure which is difficult to penetrate, rather it is an academic and proselytising methodology which all are able to be a part of, not to mention be covered in its dust and hide behind its door. Therefore, the real affair of one who covers himself, with the gowns of Salafiyyah, is only exposed by the level of his agreement with the manhaj of the Salaf us-Sālih in: the *Usūl* of understanding and *istidlāl* (deriving rulings); and respect for the people of knowledge who have carried the manhaj throughout every time and place. Respect of the ‘Ulama is *taqdeer* (holding them in high estimation) and not *taqdees* (veneration) of them. As for what is inside a person, who ascribes himself to Salafiyyah, then we defer his case to the Lord of the Worlds as He knows better about us and him [5].

This definition of Salafism, from an insider perspective, is in stark contrast to outside perspectives on the Salafi movement. When examining much of the existing material on Salafism, especially that which blames the Salafis for terrorism, there is clearly a paucity of primary evidence from the scholars of Salafism themselves [6].

Moreover, much of the academic writing constantly mention the word ‘Salafi’ and claim that certain terrorists subscribed to the *Salafi* way yet many researchers have neglected any reference whatsoever to the well-known *Salafi* scholars over the last decade and their stances on terrorism and extremism. *Salafi* scholars such as Imām ‘Abdul’Azeez Bin Bāz, Imām Muhammad Nāsiruddīn al-Albānī, Imām Muhammad bin Sālih al-’Uthaymeen, Imām Muqbil bin Hādī al-Wadī’ī and other contemporaries such as Shaykh ‘Abdul’Azeez Āli-Shaykh, Shaykh ‘AbdulMuhsin al-’Abbād al-Badr, Shaykh Rabī’ bin Hādī al-Madkhalī, Shaykh Sālih al-Fawzān, Shaykh AbdulMuhsin al-’Ubaykān, Shaykh AbdulMālik ar-Ramadānī, Shaykh AbdusSalām as-Sihaymī, Shaykh Khālīd al-Anbarī, Shaykh Ali Hasan al-Halabī al-Atharī, Shaykh Mashhoor Hasan Āl Salmān, Shaykh Saleem al-Hilālī, Shaykh Sālih Āli-Shaykh, Shaykh ‘Abdul’Azeez bin Rayyis ar-Rayyis, Shaykh AbdusSalām Burjis and many others – are regarded as the heads of the *Salafi* methodology and tradition. They are all well known for their stances against terrorism, extremism, political agitation and the like; we will mention some of their statements later. Yet many academics have not referred to these *Salafi* scholars whatsoever and merely equated the *Salafi* tradition with terrorism and violence – this is inappropriate. Writers should therefore be more careful in their studies before labeling, as it is rather simplistic to merely say that something is “Salafi” when in fact such an organisation for example does not even refer to itself as being “Salafi”. So for example, Silber and Bhatt referred to “Salafi NGOs” when in fact such “NGOs” belong to the *Qutbī* ideology. Kumar Ramakrishna states in his paper *Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in South-East Asia* states:

A brief exposition of terminology is called for. Islamic fundamentalism (or Salafi Islam) is not all monolithic. Salafi Muslims, who take the injunction to emulate the Companions of the Prophet very seriously, may express this piety simply in terms of personal adherence to implementing shariah-derived standards of worship, ritual, dress and overall behavioural standards. The majority of Salafi Muslims, in fact, may be considered as “neo-fundamentalists” who possess “neither a systematic ideology” nor “global political agenda” [7].

First of all it is important for us to look at the efforts of the bona-fide Islamic scholars of the Salafi tradition in opposing extremist ideologies which have been responsible for the misconceptions about Islām today. The Salafi scholars have been the most vocal in their condemnations since the mid-1990s when many people had not even heard of the likes of Bin Lādin! The former *Mufī* of Saudi Arabia, Imām ‘Abdul’Azeez ibn ‘Abdullāh ibn Bāz (*rahimahullāh*) one of the main Salafi scholars, stated in the late 1990s in regards to Usāmah Bin Lādin, Muhammad al-Mas’arī and Sa’d al-Faqeeh:

These publications from al-Faqeeh, al-Mas’ari or other callers to evil, *bātil* (falsehood) and division must be totally destroyed and no lenience should be shown to them. It is incumbent to

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advise and guide them to the truth and warn them from this *bātil*. It is not permissible for anyone to co-operate with them in this evil, they must be advised and referred back to (true) guidance. And leave this *bātil*. And my advice to al-Mas'ari, al-Faqeeh, Ibn Lādin and all who traverse their way is that they leave off this dangerous path, to fear Allāh and be warned of His Wrath and Anger, to return back to (true) guidance, to repent to Allāh from they have done before [8].

Imām Bin Bāz also stated this in the Arabic newspaper *al-Muslimūn* and also reported in *ash-Sharq al-Awsat*, on 9 Jumadā al-Ulā 1417 AH corresponding to 21 September 1996 CE. It can be heard in audio where Imām Bin Bāz further emphasizes that no co-operation should be made with the likes of Usāmah Bin Lādin due to their harms for safety and security, this was way before any 'investigative report' or 'think tank into global tolerance' even cared about the likes of Bin Lādin. Imām Bin Bāz also stated:

From that which is known to anyone who has the slightest bit of common sense, is that hijacking airplanes and kidnapping children and the like are extremely great crimes the world over. Their evil effects are far and wide, as is the great harm and inconvenience caused to the innocent; the total effect of which none can comprehend except Allāh. Likewise, from that which is known is that these crimes are not specific to any particular country over and above another country, nor any specific group over and above another group; rather, it encompasses the whole world. There is no doubt about the effect of these crimes; so it is obligatory upon the governments and those responsible from amongst the scholars and others to afford these issues great concern, and to exert themselves as much as possible in ending this evil [9].

Imām Bin Bāz also stated with regards to the terror attack in Riyadh in 1416 AH/1995 CE that:

There is no doubt that this incident is great evil which is based upon causing major corruption, major evil and serious transgression. And there is no doubt that this incident can only be done by one who does not believe in Allāh or in the Last Day, with correct and sound faith, performing such a criminal and filthy act which has brought about great harms and corruption. Only those with filthy souls filled with hatred, envy, evil and corruption, and devoid of (sound and correct) faith, would do the likes of such actions. We ask Allāh for well-being and safety and to help the people in authority in all that will affect those people because their crime is severe and their corruption is huge. There is no power or movement except with Allāh! How can a believer or a Muslim perform such a serious crime which is based upon such huge transgression, corruption and destroying lives and injuring others without due right?

He further stated:

I exhort all who know anything about these (terrorists) to convey that info to the relevant people. It is upon all who know about their condition and about them should convey that about them, because this is from the avenue of co-operation in order to prevent sin and transgression and in order to secure safety of the people from evil, sin and transgression; and to establish justice from the transgressions of those oppressors ... There is no doubt that this is from the greatest of crimes and corruptions on the earth and those who commit such actions are more deserving to be killed and restrained due to the heinous crime that they have committed. We ask Allāh that He makes them fail and that He shackles them and their likes and that He saves us from their evil and the evil of those like them and that He totally destroys their plots, indeed He is Lofty and Majestic, Generous and Kind [9].

Therefore there is a clear delineation between such politically violent orientated groups and Salafism. As for movements which over emphasize politics, rebellion and upheaval then their declared political emphasis should not be considered as "Salafi-politicos" as Wiktorowicz had initially coined. In acknowledgement of this, McCants, Brachman and Felter recommended the following as a means of reducing the popularity of Jihadis amongst Salafis:

Label the entire Jihadi Movement “Qutbism” in recognition that the Jihadis cite Sayyid Qutb more than any modern author. Muslim opponents of the Jihadis (including mainstream Wahhabis) use this term to describe them, a designation Jihadis hate since it implies that they follow a human and are members of a deviant sect. Adherents of the movement consider “Qutbi” to be a negative label and would much rather be called Jihadi or Salafi [10].

To generally categorise Salafis as belonging to the same broad entity as the violent *Jihadi-takfiris*, the overly political-inspired *Qutbīs* and other similar movements obfuscates the clear parameters between movements that have been polemical in their opposition to violent extremism and those seeking to justify it.

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WHY THE SALAFIS ARE NOT A TERROR PROBLEM



Chapter 10 – RADICALISATION AND DERADICALISATION: DUTCH EXPERIENCES

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10.1 INTRODUCTION

Since 9/11 the Netherlands has experienced a number of traumatic terrorist incidents that shocked and polarised society. The incidents triggered a wave of investigations and studies by journalists, academics, government, NGOs and think tanks which has resulted in an extensive body of knowledge on radicalisation leading to terrorism. In 2003 the Dutch government reformed its counterterrorism structure which resulted in the appointment of a National Coordinator for Counterterrorism tasked with the coordination of Dutch CT-policy. The Hofstad-group was a group emerging from the Moroccan community in the Netherlands and engaged in terrorist activities. Members were arrested and convicted to long prison sentences. While the current terrorist threat is still significant (one level below critical) the threat has gradually shifted from home-grown groups to the danger of groups that may come from abroad. Salafist jihadi groups are likely to use the provocative video “Fitna” produced by Minister of Parliament (MP) Geert Wilders to justify attacks directed against Dutch interests. Partly as a result of an extensive awareness campaign the popular concern about terrorism has diminished and the feeling of security among the general public has improved. In general Dutch society remains peaceful with a far lower level of political violence than other European countries. Over the last three years there have been no terrorist incidents with a Salafist jihadi background and in 2008 only four suspects were arrested.

Two assassinations of public figures said to be critical of Islam, one a politician that occurred in 2002 and the other a journalist and film director that occurred in 2004, led to a situation that has been described by commentators as a “pressure cooker”. Since then the pressure has gone down but it is still significant. Over the last few years Dutch authorities have been specifically focused on the reduction of tensions in society and improving relationships between groups with different ethnic backgrounds. This is consistent with the view of the government that counterterrorism policy is much broader than just law enforcement. This approach is based on lessons learned from a short terror campaign involving the Moluccan community in the late 1970s. At that time, the Dutch authorities also chose to use psychological and socio-economic approaches to reduce tensions and improve the situation of the Moluccan community in order to reduce their motivation for violence.

A third assassination in 2005 received far less international media coverage. The victim was an activist who ran an investigative unit doing research on the behaviour of the Dutch police and intelligence services. The case was solved when the perpetrator was traced in Spain and arrested. It turned out that he had a personal grudge against the victim due to the fact that he was expelled from an activist group in the 1980s after being suspected of being a police informer. Personal problems also contributed to his motivation for revenge.

In October 2007, Bilal Bajaka, a young Dutch Muslim from Moroccan descent, entered a police station in Amsterdam, pulled a knife and stabbed two police officers. In self-defence, one of the officers shot the man, who died on the spot. It turned out that Bajaka was a suicidal schizophrenic who had just left a psychiatric clinic where he had been treated for mental problems. The incident triggered riots among young Muslims in immigrant neighborhoods in Amsterdam and fuelled tensions between Muslims and non-Muslim communities in the Netherlands.

The most lethal incident in the Netherlands since 9/11 occurred during the Queen's Birthday celebration (April 30, 2009) when a desperate man crashed his car through a watching crowd in an attempt to hit an open bus with the complete royal family. A total of eight people died including the perpetrator. Sixteen others were injured. Several investigations are still ongoing. So far there are no indications that he had a political motive. The incident will have far reaching consequences for security measures during future large scale public events involving royalty or other important public figures.

The last three incidents illustrate how incidents unrelated to radicalisation or terrorism but rather resulting from personal problems, can trigger intense public debate, fuel tensions between different communities and lead to other types of violence. In the same vein, this paper will "paint the picture" of the various contextual factors, issues, events, personalities and policies that are important for understanding how people move through radicalisation as well as the holistic approach that the Netherlands is employing to deal with terrorism.

10.2 PUBLIC AWARENESS CAMPAIGN

The increased tensions from the assassinations and a series of terrorist threats forced the government to initiate a public awareness campaign. It took quite some time before the decision was made as the government wasn't sure such a campaign would be effective. After opinion polls and discussions in focus groups, it finally agreed to organize a campaign under specific conditions. It did not want to have a one-off information campaign without any follow-up; thus, it decided on a three year campaign with a certain dynamic that should be evaluated. The results were to be used as a basis for refining the information strategy. The government also decided to focus and tailor the campaign for specific groups (e.g., youths) with message(s) will be translated for specific audiences and will be communicated via different channels. The campaign costs were 4.8 million euro over a period of three years. A special website was established: <http://www.nederlandtegenterrorisme.nl>. The first stage of the campaign focused on newspaper advertisements, radio commercials and house-to-house pamphlets. In the second stage, the campaign was deepened by focussing on specific partner groups and a special focus on youths. In the third and last stage new television and radio commercials are focused on the results and the development of the campaign. In this stage new strategic choices will also be debated.

Partly due to this campaign, the fear of terrorism has diminished (from a peak in 2005 when the Dutch population had the highest ratings in Europe) and the general public in the Netherlands feeling of security has improved. Thirteen percent of the population still fears a terrorist attack in the Netherlands. In 2008, 35 percent of the population felt secure everywhere in the Netherlands. This was a five percent improvement from 2007. While overall fear levels have diminished, the Dutch are still second highest in Europe, after the Spanish in terms of feelings regarding fear of terrorism [1]. However, in general people are currently more concerned about economic developments than about terrorism.

People also are starting to think in a more nuanced way about the origin of terrorism and the consequences of radicalisation in the Netherlands. The majority of the survey respondents think that terrorists are not born as terrorists and radicalisation is not a unique characteristic of Islamist groups. The number of people concerned about radicalisation has decreased from 21 to 8 percent of the population, with estimates of radicalization in the Netherlands lower than in previous years. There is a general feeling that the terrorist threat is fueled from abroad.

10.3 GUIDELINES FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

The launching of the public awareness campaign coincided with a symposium attended by local administrative authorities in 2006. Speakers from the city of London were invited to inform the Dutch authorities about the handling of the metro and bus bombings in July 2005. The threat in the Netherlands

has convinced the government that counterterrorism policy warrants a broader approach than the traditional law enforcement approach. In an attempt to improve the integration of immigrants and provide a future perspective for an alienated and frustrated 2nd and 3rd generation, existing policies have to be adapted. New ways of cooperation have to be developed involving cooperation and coordination of new organizations on different administrative levels.

Traditionally, disaster management in the Netherlands is handled bottom-up. The scale of the disaster determines whether it should be handled on a higher (provincial) or even a national level. This approach does not work very well for terrorism. Depending on the type of terrorist attack (e.g., cross-border incidents) there should be immediate coordination at the national level. Also the triggering of agencies to take action, depending on an evolving scenario, can be better managed using a top-down approach. Effective public relation strategies should be ready for execution when a situation occurs.

The Dutch government decided to focus its policies on the prevention of further radicalisation of Muslim youths and the abolishment of so-called 'hot spots' of radicalization including the development of new ways to communicate between Muslims and non-Muslims and the involvement of people on different administrative levels. This approach has been working, as in its latest threat assessment the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism concluded that the four hotspots previously identified as hot spots are longer considered as such.

The majority of the Dutch Muslims live in the four major big cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague). These cities are currently involved in implementing various initiatives to not only improve the relationships between the various population groups but also to deal with the social and economic problems related to specific groups. Some cities have been better than others in countering segregation. This has impacted the outcome of recent municipal elections.

The Dutch government identified 40 large cities with districts that were problematic. These districts were classified as "backward" from a socio-economic point of view and were based on a variety of criteria. This backward socio-economic situation creates a breeding ground that may contribute to future radicalisation. The assumption is that, by improving the living conditions in these city districts, radicalisation can be prevented. The local authorities decide on their own what kind of projects they will support depending on local circumstances and budgets which face severe challenges in some cases.

10.4 SHIFT IN VOTING DURING 2006 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

A growing dissatisfaction of the general public with the national government has built up over the years and has affected the outcome of recent elections. The outcomes of the March 2006 municipal elections were viewed as a score card for the national government. The non-indigenous population did vote and showed a high voter turnout. This was promising as some radical Muslim clerics have argued that faithful Muslims should not participate in democratic elections. This is seen as a threat because of fears it may result in a parallel society.

The outcomes of the 2006 municipal elections were interpreted as a rejection of the national government. There were big losses for the parties of the governing coalition. The non-indigenous population voted massively (80%) for the left-wing Labour Party (Party van de Arbeid). Many votes of the non-indigenous voters went to non-indigenous candidates. In 39 cities, left-wing parties won an absolute majority. Despite these majorities, the PvdA formed coalitions with the Christian Democrats in many city councils. Commentators pointed at a danger of an ethnic division along party lines.

New parties for the non-indigenous population have been established that will participate in the next parliamentary elections. Some of them hope to gain a significant number of seats in parliament. One party, the Party for non-indigenous Dutch (PAN), includes in its party programme: the abolishment of the

obligatory integration course, the establishment of a Ministry for Cultural Development, the introduction of school uniforms, a general pardon for asylum seekers who have already lived at least than five years in the Netherlands and the integration of Turkey in the EU.

Many right-wing parties who did very well during the previous election were essentially punished in the election for their polarising policies during the past years. Many voters were fed up with this polarisation and were looking for a more democratic future focused on consensus. They expected better social conditions by voting for the left-wing parties.

Since the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, many observers and commentators have spoken about a so-called gap between the government and the people. During the election campaign politicians developed new ways to reach out to the people in an attempt to improve their political involvement. The gap still exists and the Party of Freedom (PVV) of PM Geert Wilders and the Proud on the Netherlands (TON)-movement of Rita Verdonk have tried to exploit the undercurrent of popular frustration about national politics. Geert Wilders, in particular, has been able to organize a new party focused on appealing to the right-wing of the political spectrum that has not fallen apart due to internal struggles and personal egos. Opinion polls indicate support for his party is increasing and it is seen as a threat to the governing coalition. The established political parties have difficulty in handling Mr. Wilders' provocative way of making politics.

The shift in voting was most clear for the ten major big cities in the Netherlands and had consequences for coalition formation. There are substantial differences in the political climates in these big cities. This climate was very dependent on the polemics between the cultural approach of the integration problem and the social economic approach. Each city has its own accents in this debate.

10.5 QUARTERLY THREAT ASSESSMENT

One of the outcomes of improved cooperation in the field of counterterrorism is the production of a national quarterly threat assessment. The assessments are based on the integration of contributions from the various intelligence agencies and the police based on relevant information concerning terrorism and radicalisation. On the basis of these contributions, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism formulates a comprehensive national assessment. An unclassified version is presented to the parliament.

Some of the highlights from the latest assessment are the following. The international jihadi threat is still one of the main components of the terrorist threat against the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad. Due to its military involvement in Afghanistan and alleged insults to Islam, the Netherlands and its interests are considered priority targets. The main theaters of the global jihad are the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, Northern Africa, Yemen, Iraq and Somalia. In these regions organisations are active that support the global jihad. They are seen as a threat to Western, including Dutch interests. As the American surge in Afghanistan is building, a new peak of violence is expected in Afghanistan during the summer. This may result in increased levels of anxiety and retaliatory attacks against coalition partners, including the Netherlands. The probability of a jihadi attack against Dutch interests is the highest outside of the country, particularly in regions where international jihadi organisations have built up terrorist infrastructures and may exploit local circumstances. On several occasions the Netherlands has been explicitly mentioned in threat videos and audio messages by jihadi organisations.

The local Dutch jihadi networks have kept quiet for some time and activities are largely focused on situations abroad. During the last reporting period no travel movements of Dutch jihadis to training camps abroad have been observed. Two Dutch jihadis remain in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. It is assumed that the presence of Dutch jihadis in foreign training camps or theatres of the global jihad may result in strategic or tactical coordination of attacks in the Netherlands. This may also be true for nationals of other Schengen-countries.

The presence of Salafis in the Netherlands is increasingly a topic of scientific research including efforts to try to clarify how Salafi Muslims experience and practice their religion. Preliminary results indicate that it is important to differentiate Salafi Muslims from Muslims in general. In addition results indicate that, apart from the group of intolerant “purists”, there are many believers who are willing to adapt their religion to the daily life in a Western society [2].

10.6 SENTENCING OF THE HOFSTAD GROUP

The Hofstad group was seen as a local Islamist terrorist organization comprised of nine persons, including Mohammed Bouyeri, Jason Theodore James Walters, Ismail Akhnikh, Mohammed Fahmi Boughabe, Nouredine el Fathni, Youssouf Ettoumi, Ahmed Hamdi, Zine Labine Aouraghe and Mohammed el Morabit. The name ‘Hofstad’ was a codename used by the Dutch domestic intelligence service (AIVD) as it started monitoring the group. Hofstad is the popular name for the city of The Hague, where some of the members had been active. The group was influenced by the takfiri ideology. Key member Mohammed Bouyeri was responsible for the murder of the Dutch writer and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004. Bouyeri was convicted in July 2005 for planning and carrying out the attack. Thirteen other suspects were taken into custody on various charges in connection with the murder. Nine of the total fourteen suspects were convicted for membership of a terrorist organisation and are currently serving various sentences from one year to life imprisonment [3].

As a result of the introduction of new anti-terrorism legislation the trial ended for the first time in a conviction. Although the general prosecutor was satisfied with the outcome, seven cases will be appealed. The prosecutor is seeking further clarification on a number of issues, including a clarification of the concept of a terrorist organisation and more clarity on the distinction between the separate support activities and the terrorist purpose of the possession of weapons.

The changes in penal law were the following:

- Participation in an organization with a terrorist goal will become punishable.
- The concept of participation was made more explicit and now includes financial and other forms of material support.
- Preparation of severe crimes will become punishable, including the financing of terrorism.
- Recruitment for the jihad will become punishable.
- Conspiracy will become punishable as a terrorist crime.
- The preaching of hate and incitement to violence will become punishable [4].

The judges indicated which evidence was convincing and legal. They also clarified that the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression are restricted at the moment that a violent act begins. The judges decided on a differentiated approach. Not everyone in the group received the same punishment. The judges decided that the Hofstad group was a criminal organisation with a terrorist purpose.

Jason Walters was sentenced for attempted murder but not for murder with a terrorist purpose. According to the judges he didn’t throw hand grenades to instil fear. Some commentators have criticised this ruling. Nouredine el Fahtni was deemed to be in possession of a weapon but the judge was not convinced that it had a terrorist purpose. Some commentators have questioned how this can be reconciled with the ruling that he was a member of a criminal organisation with a terrorist purpose.

Some observers did not agree with Mohammed Fahmi Boughabe’s sentence for possessing radical documentation. In fact these were Koran and Hadith texts. The sentence could be interpreted as an infringement on the right to freedom of expression. Members of parliament will investigate how the

current law can be adapted in order to prevent situations in which possession of ordinary religious texts could end in convictions.

In a recent assessment of Dutch anti-terrorism legislation researchers pointed at several ethical bottlenecks in the Dutch approach. Dutch counter-terrorism policy exhibits a proactive approach to combat terrorism from its inception, in addition to its perpetration. Judicial, legislative, law enforcement and intelligence reforms have been introduced in order to better tackle the threat of terrorism. Measures are no longer reactive by nature as they used to be in the past. Pre-emption and anticipation of terrorism is in evidence when analysing the newly introduced counterterrorist legislation. According to the researchers pre-emption and anticipation are an ethical bottleneck because they limit civil liberties, whether through legislation or police action. The pro-active character of Dutch measures allows for an a priori limitation of civil liberties and the manner in which these liberties can be taken away is not clear. Another trend is the lack of fair trials for those individuals who are detained on terrorism charges. Individuals have little recourse to defend themselves.

The case of the Hofstad group received a lot of international attention. As an autonomously operating network of Muslim immigrants, the Hofstad group was an example of a relatively new development, which other countries were afraid could also occur on their territory. An analysis of this Dutch example was believed to be essential to improving counterterrorism policies in other countries.

A number of persons with close ties to the convicted members of the Hofstad group network have not been convicted or were never arrested. Some of them are still under surveillance by Dutch authorities. As the most recent national threat assessment indicates they have kept quiet and focus on activities outside the Netherlands.

10.7 OBLIGATORY INTEGRATION COURSE

Currently restrictive migration and asylum policies introduced by the government are being implemented. The policies created new obstacles for migrants to enter the country. The new policies try to provide the migrants with a better idea of what it means to become part of Dutch society. Following the policies of several other countries, the government introduced an obligatory naturalisation ceremony. The government declared the 24th of August as 'naturalisation day'. The developments in the Netherlands are closely watched by other European countries. Some of them have already indicated that they want to introduce similar programs. One positive spin-off is the creation of new jobs in Morocco and Turkey. In these countries, new enterprises have emerged that help people prepare for the obligatory examination in order to increase their chances of passing the test.

10.8 ASYLUM FIGURES AND POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR THE NETHERLANDS

Asylum requests gradually increased since the mid-1970s. In the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s the figures increased exponentially and reached a peak in 1994 with a total of more than 50,000 requests. Since 2000 the number of requests decreased to about 10,000 requests, partially due to a more restrictive policy. New requests are highly dependent on wars elsewhere in the world and differences in national asylum legislation. Asylum seekers know about loopholes and find out about countries with the least restrictive policies.

According to the latest population projections the percentage of the non-indigenous population will rise in the coming years from 19 percent (3.1 million) to 30 percent (5 million) in 2050. The overall population will only slightly increase (with 800.000) to a peak of 17 million in 2050. Thereafter the population of the Netherlands is expected to decrease. The demographic changes will cause a number of social and

economic problems. The proportion of the elderly will significantly increase in the coming years, from 14 percent to a peak of 25 percent in 2040. Predictions indicate shortages on the labour market which will result in a demand for a more focused immigration policy. In the past decade the number of Dutch with a double nationality has more than doubled from 400.000 to 900.000. The previous government wanted to abolish the possibility of having two nationalities. The State Council, however, suggested that this is a bad idea and has asked for support for the idea that citizens can have more than one identity.

10.9 ILLEGAL ENTRY AND PERMISSION FOR MIGRATORY LABOUR

The estimates of the number of illegals in the Netherlands vary from 46,000 to 225,000; however, if the East and South Europeans are not included, the estimate is 125,000. Most illegal immigrants in the Netherlands came from Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. More restrictive entry policies usually result in increased number of illegals. Economists state that the presence of more people always results in more economic activity. They consider finding replacement workers as a temporary problem. In their view, more legal migration will result in less illegal jobs. Some experts say that closing the borders in Europe disturbs the self-regulating mechanism of emigration, allowing for high levels of exploitation as well as increasing numbers of people imprisoned.

Some say the Netherlands has the worst thinkable situation: closed borders and increasing pressure by a globalising economy. In 2006, the government decided to open the borders to admit workers from Eastern Europe. This was part of a larger trend as already one million East Europeans have been allowed into the European Union. The Netherlands handed out 30,000 work permits. Opening the borders is expected to increase that number to 70,000. This decision can have important consequences for specific economic sectors, e.g., transport. The current economic crisis is reducing employment opportunities and has forced many East Europeans back to their home countries.

10.10 CONCENTRATION OF THE NON-INDIGENOUS POPULATION IN THE MAJOR CITIES

The non-Western non-indigenous population in the Netherlands comprises little more than ten percent of the total population. The migrants are mainly concentrated in the four major big cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague. Although there are variations among the cities, a disturbing trend is that the level of segregation is increasing. This is a major issue that city administrations are trying to counter with some more successful than others. Rotterdam succeeded in reducing the level of segregation, while segregation levels for Turks and Moroccans in both Amsterdam and Utrecht increased. People from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles tend to be less segregated than Turkish and Moroccan people.

Another disturbing trend has been coined the ‘white flight’ from the big cities. The indigenous population is moving away and being replaced by non-indigenous people. High percentages live on or below the poverty standard (Moroccans: 46 percent, Antillians: 43 percent, Turkish: 38 percent, Surinam: 36 percent). The big cities focus attention on the youths of the non-Western non-indigenous population groups to try to reduce social problems. City councils try to improve the indicators for social problems including: school drop-out rates, rates of youths without beginner’s qualifications, poverty rates, rates of dependence on social security, segregation rates, and crime rates.

10.11 MUSLIMS IN THE NETHERLANDS

Compared to other countries in Europe the Netherlands has the highest concentration of Muslims (5 percent) after France (8 – 9 percent). By taking a closer look at the map of the Netherlands we see that the strongest concentrations of the 857,000 Muslims are in the Western and Southern part of the country, especially in the big cities Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht and Rotterdam.

The largest groups originate from Turkey (328.000) and Morocco (296.000). Other major groups come from Iraq (42.000), Afghanistan (36.000), Surinam (32.000), Iran (28.000) and Somalia (25.000). Surinam was a former colony of the Netherlands. Many people from Surinam decided to come to the Netherlands after their country became independent. The other four countries are theaters of the global jihad and have experienced prolonged periods of armed conflict causing population displacement and refugees.

According to the Dutch Minister of Integration, between 20,000 and 30,000 of them are potentially attracted to Salafi ideologies, and yet another 2,500 might be susceptible to violent radicalisation. The latter figure represents only a mere 0.3 percent of the total Muslim population in the Netherlands [5].

Tinka Veldhuis and Edwin Bakker described the potentially violent tensions and conflicts in which Muslims were involved, both within and between social groups, and the underlying mechanisms that are responsible for causing inter-group conflicts. They focused on three different categories of events: Muslims 'attacking' non-Muslims, non-Muslims 'attacking' Muslims and confrontations between or within Muslim communities.

The authors describe the activities of a number of radical Muslim organisations that have a presence in the Netherlands, including the al-Jama'a al-Islamiya (AJAI), Arab European League (AEL), Group Islamique Armé (GIA), Hamas/al-Aqsa Foundation. Hizb-al-Tahrir, Hofstad group, the Islami Büyükdöğü Akincılar Cephesi (IBDA-C), Milli Görüş, the Piranha group / Samir Azzouz and the Teblig movement (Islami Cemiyet ve Cemaatlar Birliği).

The fact that the release of the anti-Islam movie 'Fitna' did not lead to angry responses by Muslim communities may indicate two things in the view of Veldhuis and Bakker. Either the idea of intolerance and polarisation has been exaggerated, or Dutch society has gradually rediscovered its traditions and the importance of adhering to common rules and values and showing a minimum level of respect and understanding.

10.12 AFRICANS IN THE NETHERLANDS

There is a large population of Africans in the Netherlands. Some came as migrants others as refugees or asylum seekers. Their integration in the Dutch labor market is not very good. Unemployment is high and many work below their educational skills. The Netherlands have a number of well-known universities and schools that attract students from Africa. The distribution of these communities throughout the Netherlands is quite different. The Angolese, Congolese and Sudanese are more widely distributed throughout the country; whereas the Ethiopians/Eritreans and Nigerians are mainly concentrated in the four big cities. Due to better economic opportunities, large numbers of the Somalis moved to the UK during the past few years. In general, non-asylum groups (Ghanese, Nigerians) are much better integrated than the asylum groups (Sudanese, Somali). The speed of the integration process is very much dependent on the motivation for migration. War and refugee trauma may hinder employment possibilities. Most Africans immigrants in the Netherlands have a stronger sense of community than is common in the indigenous population. The Somali community shows a higher level of organisation which is possibly related to their clan structure. Nonetheless, many Africans in the Netherlands tend to feel quite lonely. Male Somali, Congolese and Angolese youths in the 10 – 25 years age category exhibit higher crime rates than other groups. This may be related to the lack of norms in their home country due to the perennial existence of armed conflict.

10.13 MOLUCCAN AND OTHER COMMUNITIES

The real question after viewing the data on immigration and asylum is what this means in terms of a terrorist threat. The Netherlands had its first experiences in the 1970s with a problematic immigrant

community that resulted in episodes of terrorism [6]. At that time the perpetrators were the second generation South Moluccans. Their parents were given the choice in the 1950s to come to the Netherlands after refusing to become part of the new independent Indonesian republic. They lived for a long time in poor housing conditions and were not very well integrated into Dutch society. The anger about their situation resulted in several terrorist attacks, including the occupation and hostage taking of a school and the hijacking of a train. This was the first time the Dutch government had had to decide about the deployment of military force to end the hostage taking of passengers in a train and had a traumatic impact on society. These experiences with terrorism within their borders resulted in an extensive government program to improve the situation of the Moluccan community. This turned out to be an effective approach as no more serious violence occurred, although there a latent wish still exists for an independent Moluccan republic. The annual Moluccan demonstration in The Hague sometimes ends in limited clashes with the police; however, since the late 1970s no new terrorist attacks by Moluccans have been recorded. The lessons learned from this period are currently applied in dealing with the second and third generation of Moroccans. Government policies are implemented based on the assumption that social-economic and psychological approaches will reduce the motivation to engage in violence.

10.14 MOROCCAN COMMUNITY

The Moroccan community is currently considered to be the most problematic. Many Moroccans came to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s when there was a big labor shortage. They came as migrant workers and many believed that it would be a temporary affair and that they would return to their home country. However, many decided to stay in the Netherlands and brought their families over. It is the second and a third generation that is now responsible for many of the current crime and violence problems being experienced currently.

Many youths reject their parents and Dutch society which, in their view, does not offer them a future. They have developed a kind of ‘counter culture’. In trying to develop a new kind of identity some of them came into contact with radical jihadist ideology which provides them with readymade answers for their problems. Contact with this ideology is facilitated by the Internet and other means of modern communication technology. Through web-pages and chat-rooms they develop their own ideology that justifies violence and motivates them to engage in terrorist acts. The process of becoming radicalized to the point of engaging in collective violence can commence with self-recruitment; however, more and more research indicates that group dynamics and the role of so-called “spiritual guides” play decisive roles. Several radical networks have emerged with a multi-ethnic character in which Moroccans play a dominant role. Further radicalisation could cause one or more of these networks to engage in violent activities.

Veldhuis and Bakker described the radicalisation process as follows: “radicalisation is a gradual process that has no strictly specified beginning or end. It is a twofold process including a shift in thinking towards fundamentalism and a heightened readiness to act on behalf of a cause. Secondly, its gradual nature indicates that in most cases, the direct causes or triggers of radicalisation are unclear and can even be unknown to the radicalising person. Rather, radicalisation is the product of a combination of causal factors that interact and that is unique for every individual. People are drawn to radical movements or ideologies for different reasons, of which some are more conscious than others. Whereas some are primarily inspired by ideological or political motivations, others might simply be attracted by action and adventure or seek group membership to obtain a positive identity. Even more so, radicalisation can occur beyond the consciousness of the relevant person, who might not be aware that he or she is in a process of radicalisation.” [7]

The European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation also emphasized in its final report the diverse paths of radicalisation. “What follows from the understanding that terrorist groups may consist of different types of individuals who undergo diverse paths of radicalisation is not that it is futile to develop strategies of prevention to target all these diverse types but rather that it is necessary to develop

several specific measures which may fit each separate type of dimension and to be prepared to adapt to changes. Some of these types are affected by social and economic interventions, others by psycho-social factors and by ideological and political issues. Thus, preventive strategies have to be tailored to the specific drivers behind each main type of activist and the specifics of the various groups.” [8]

10.15 EXPANDED DEFINITION OF TERRORISM

Due to European pressure the official Dutch definition of terrorism has been expanded in recent years. Traditionally a distinction was made between terrorism and what was called politically motivated activism. As the Netherlands for a long time had no home-grown terrorist movements the authorities did not want to see activists who used a certain degree of violence immediately labelled as terrorists. The majority of Dutch activists stuck to the unspoken rule that no violence against persons would be used during their activities. There are, however, a number of cases where their activities could have ended in fatalities. The assumption in the 1970s and 1980s was that calling activists “terrorists” would drive them underground. Due to international pressure it is no longer possible to maintain the distinction. For a long time animal activism in the Netherlands was not called terrorism, as it is in some other European countries where activists are willing to cross the threshold of personal violence. As the activities of Dutch animal activists have become more violent, political pressure has been building to treat them as terrorists. The Dutch domestic intelligence agency was forced to spend more energy on the issue and to increase its investigative efforts.

10.16 RECENT TERRORIST INCIDENTS INVOLVING DUTCH

Those who consult the MIPT terrorism knowledge database will find very few terrorist incidents in the Netherlands. Dutch people have a higher chance of getting involved in terrorism when they are abroad. The Dutch like to travel and are very active abroad in all kind of activities including NGO work. As Salfist jihadi terror organisations no longer consider relief organisations as neutral actors in the situation of armed conflict, relief workers have increasingly become targets of terrorism. In a rising number of occasions Dutch citizens were targeted. Arjan Arkel worked for the NGO Doctors without Borders in Chechnya. He was kidnapped and held hostage for over a year. In the end a ransom was paid after which he was released. A Dutch speed-skating coach who had contacts in Moscow finally succeeded in speeding up the negotiations. Another Dutchman joined an international tourist group which traveled through the desert in northern Africa. The group was kidnapped and held hostage by the Algerian Salfist Group for Predication and Call (GSPC). Due to successful mediation by the son of Moammar Gaddafi, the German government paid a ransom after which the group was released. Currently the successor of the GSPC, the AQIM is holding another group of European tourists hostage. They have threatened to kill a British citizen if the British government does not release from prison the radical cleric Abu Qatada al-Falastini. Over the years jihadi organisations have discovered that the kidnapping of foreigners can be a profitable tactic and may help to finance their operations. Several jihadi organisation have introduced this tactic, causing a rise in kidnappings of foreigners.

The first big shock after 9/11 for Dutch society was the assassination of politician Pim Fortuyn, just a few days before parliamentary elections in 2003 in which it is likely he would have become the leader of the party which won by a large margin. He was killed by a left-wing environmentalist. If it would have been a Muslim migrant, it could have caused a severe violent backlash against the Muslim community. The assassination was a big shock because many believed that this kind of violence was not possible in the Netherlands. For many people, Fortuyn was the personification of a new strong leader who would introduce new groundbreaking changes. Many people still believe that his death prevented important political change. Although his party won a significant victory in the elections, it fell apart quickly due to internal disputes.

10.16.1 Assassination of Theo van Gogh

Pim Fortuyn was one of the persons who put many important issues on the political agenda, resulting in heated debates about dealing with the social and economic problems related to the presence of the non-Western non-indigenous population groups. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali refugee who studied political science in the Netherlands, became a member of parliament. She became the spokeswoman for the emancipation of Muslim women. In order to put this topic on the political agenda she decided to make a short movie. Film director Theo van Gogh was asked to produce the short ten minute movie. They decided on a movie with a certain shock value. When it was broadcast, it led to angry reactions by Muslims. The anger over the film, in part, triggered the assassination of Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutchman of Moroccan origin who was thought to be well-integrated. Ayaan Hirsi Ali became an international celebrity and her movie and books have garnered many prizes. She has become a scapegoat for many radical Muslims who want to take revenge on her. Since the death of Theo van Gogh she has been under 24/7 protection and can no longer move around in the country without bodyguards. She had plans to produce a second edition of the movie. As a result of the commotion related to the Mohammed cartoons in Denmark, she postponed her plans and has focused on writing books which have been translated in many languages and sold very well.

Since the murder of Theo van Gogh there has been a lot of debate on whether the killing was an indication of a new trend. The question was posed as to whether radical Muslims would focus their attention on public figures that do play a role in public debates about immigration/asylum and integration issues. The tactic fits strategy papers of Islamist organisations that assume that by targeted killings of public figures, societies can be destabilised. This destabilisation would be the first phase of a struggle that has three stages. These strategy papers also suggest how targeted killings can be executed most effectively. It is not known if Mohammed Bouyeri read these suggestions, but the way he executed the murder of van Gogh was done in a very calm and controlled way. He left a last will stuck with a knife on the dead body and walked away in the direction of a park. He had expected to be killed by the police. He was shot in the leg and survived. From prison he succeeded in writing a paper that has been smuggled to friends who have placed it on the Internet. The text may inspire others to execute new attacks.

10.17 NEW PHASE OF THE GLOBAL JIHAD IN EUROPE

According to the French historian and Islam expert Gilles Kepel, three phases of the global jihad can be distinguished [9]. Whether jihadists focus on the ‘near’ enemy or the ‘far’ enemy is a continuing debate within the various jihadist organisations, including al Qaeda. Some of them focus on the ‘near’ enemy while others focus on the ‘far’ enemy. According to observers jihadists tend to shift from the ‘near’ enemy to the ‘far’ enemy if they come under severe pressure in their own home country. As this pressure varies from country to country, it is logical that we’ll see great variation among various jihadist organisations.

But after Madrid and London, the assassination of Van Gogh and the various plots that have been prevented, it has become very clear that Europe has become a theater for the jihad. The Norwegian researcher Peter Nesser studied jihadi plots and attacks in Europe. He categorised them in three periods and found that the plots and attacks have spread to an expanding circle of countries in Europe [10].

1994 – 1996: Europe functioned as an arena for local jihad, when GIA activists took their local, Algeria-based, struggle to France, in an attempt to deter the former colonial power from further involvement in the conflict between local Islamists and the secularist military regime.

1998 – 2003/2004: Europe functioned as arena for global jihad, when several terror networks linked to and trained by AQ planned and prepared mass casualty attacks against the interests and citizens of the US, Israel, and to a minor extent, France.

2003/2004 – 2007: Europe became a target for global jihad, when AQ inspired Islamist militants planned, prepared, and executed attacks against European countries that contributed to the US-led Global War On Terror (GWOT). Many of these militants were recruited and radicalised within Europe's jihadi underworld, and they appear to have been motivated principally by European participation in the invasion of Iraq.

10.18 PROCESSES OF RADICALISATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

The Dutch government and the Dutch intelligence agencies have been very active in analysing the current threat from jihadist organisations in order to understand the process of radicalisation and in developing countermeasures. A number of key reports and policy memoranda were written with recommendations that are currently being implemented [11]. One of the outcomes of these analyses was that countermeasures will only have effect when they are differentiated and multi-disciplinary. This approach has been successful to a certain degree. Administrative countermeasures taken against a number of radical mosques have reduced radicalisation. Radical Muslims became more aware of the measures and have taken their own precautions. Recent reports indicate that mosques controlled by Salafis are very active in da'wa activities and try to influence other more moderate mosques and organisations. Another trend is that Moroccan groups have tried to persuade Turkish groups to fulfil their Muslim duties. This would be in line with the development we have seen in London with attacks being executed by cells with varying ethnic backgrounds.

The traumatic attacks and the tense situation in the Netherlands have resulted in a wave of academic research on radicalisation, terrorism and counterterrorism. Muller, Rosental and de Wijk have been responsible for the most interesting collection of nearly 1000 pages of research results [12].

Many Dutch researchers participated in a project financed by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework programme. The FP6-project Transnational Terrorism Security and the Rule of Law had its final conference in February 2009 in Brussels. During the two day event experts took part in seven plenary and discussion sessions, providing relevant insights in the current state of affairs. Topics included media and terrorism, radicalisation and counter-radicalisation, security and ethics of counter-terrorism measures, among others. A comprehensive final publication of the research findings will be released later in 2009. The project has its own website with all deliverables and background papers including one on causal factors of radicalisation, containing two case studies on Mohammed Bouyeri and Samir Azzouz. The website also contains a concise report of the final conference.

In one of the workshops interesting insights were presented on the research of successful and failed terrorist plots in Europe. A quarter of the studied plots in some way involved al Qaeda. Furthermore, it was revealed that while home-grown terrorism is indeed rising, the phenomenon is certainly complemented by 'fly-in' terrorists [13].

10.19 DUTCH DEBATE ABOUT COUNTERTERRORISM

In the fall of 2003 a memorandum of the Minister of Justice sketched the new counter terrorism approach of the Dutch government. He defined three counterterrorism goals:

- 1) Prevention of terrorist attacks;
- 2) Preparation of consequence management of an attack with large scale consequences; and
- 3) Attention for the causes of terrorism.

For each of these three goals specific projects have been developed. A national coordinator for counterterrorism was appointed and tasked to structure the activities of the twenty different agencies involved in counterterrorism activities divided over five different ministries.

There has been a debate behind the scenes whether this coordinator and his new organisation should be developed into a separate homeland security department. No further developments in this direction have occurred since the last elections.

10.20 THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

One of the main new features of Dutch counterterrorism policy is the development of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb). This has forced the twenty involved agencies to cooperate in a national framework and has resulted in a national policy. Authority structures and responsibilities are now more clearly defined. Different generic attack scenarios have been developed in order to see at which moment certain measures have to be taken in the preventive sphere, in the crisis management sphere once an attack is ongoing, or in the investigative sphere once an attack has occurred. The scenarios are regularly updated as new assessments become available.

In May 2009 the government published a National Risk Assessment which includes 33 disaster scenarios. The scenarios are divided in thematic sections, including climate change and polarisation and radicalisation.

A number of specific projects have been formulated that are currently being implemented. The Dutch approach to terrorism is much broader than traditional law enforcement. In order to reduce the terrorist threat, developments in the major big cities have to be closely watched. Further segregation has to be prevented and more efforts should be made to integrate the non-indigenous population groups. More attractive alternatives should be provided to youths so that they no longer have to choose between crime or making a jihad. The government is fully aware that this is only possible when Muslim organisations are actively involved in tackling the existing problems.

10.21 PRIORITIES IN COUNTERTERRORISM

Intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been active in defining specific projects in order to focus their limited manpower capabilities on what they consider the most dangerous issues. A major innovation was the introduction of the so-called CT-infobox. This means that several agencies sit physically together in one building with their own information systems that are not connected. But by sitting together they can consult each other on suspect individuals in order to prepare comprehensive CVs of terrorist suspects. These files can be used to make decisions whether legal or administrative action can be taken against a specific person. The method was developed bottom-up and has been gradually expanded. Memorandum Of Understanding's (MOUs) have been developed with the aim of bringing in more government agencies. Also specific research tools have been developed to analyse the information in the databases of the participating agencies.

The NCTb identified the internet as a hotspot of radicalisation. Research on the Hofstad group found that it acted as a virtual organisation and that it followed a multi-media strategy. The group provide foreign productions, including translations and sub-titles, developed its own productions, developed its own web pages, distributed material via public web sites, and made use of encryption. Most interestingly research on the group discovered that material by the group on the internet contained clues about future terrorist attacks. This underlines the important of internet surveillance. After the arrest of Mohammed Bouyeri his computer was confiscated. The documentation on his hard disk was submitted for to an Islam expert of Utrecht University for an analysis. Ruud Peters was able to identify important triggers and events that played a role in the radicalisation process of Bouyeri [14].

Another important investigation was done by Albert Benschop of the University of Amsterdam. As an internet researcher he monitored developments on radical Muslim websites and was able to analyse the development stages of jihadi web-pages in the Netherlands. He identified three important shifts. In 2002

he saw a change in the terrorist threat from an exogenous to an endogenous threat. In 2003 he saw for the first time an explicit focus on the Netherlands as a target for attacks. In the third quarter of 2005 he identified the first independent Dutch jihadi web site. These developments resulted in three overlapping periods: the first period was dominated by foreign-oriented web pages in the Netherlands. In the second period Dutch jihadi sites with a foreign orientation emerged. Finally, Dutch jihadi sites emerged with a focus on the Netherlands [15].

Over the last few years the NCTb has coordinated an informal task group monitoring radical discourse on the internet and formulating policies to counter them. During its work it has identified five categories of sources of radical discourse. For each category different approaches are necessary to counter them. The five categories are: interactive mainstream sites (e.g., Hyves, YouTube); Opinion sites (e.g., Telegraaf, Elsevier, GeenStijl, Fok.nl, Marokko.nl); Hot spots of radicalisation (e.g., thabaaat.net, Stormfront, Holland Hardcore); Radical/jihadi material sites (freewebs, geocities, tripod); and finally: Closed sections of radical websites (e.g., password protected virtual networks for insiders).

The NCTb has been involved in a number of activities related to radicalisation via the internet. In its quarterly threat assessments the NCTb reports on ongoing developments based on internet monitoring. The Dutch government has introduced a reporting station on Cyber Crime (MCC). The NCTb will raise awareness of the MCC and inform the public what kind of activities can be reported. When violations of the law are reported a Notice and Take Down (NTD) procedure can be initiated. During the last year the Dutch police have been involved in a large international project to counter child pornography. An extensive study was written by the WODC on filtering of child pornography on the internet which contains important lessons for countering radical expressions on the internet. The government has formulated a specific memorandum on the maintenance of law and order and internet which contains a number of specific countermeasures. The government has developed a legal framework for the Notice and Takedown procedure. The Dutch police have been involved in the so-called Check the Web project. It has created an ICT-portal with EUROPOL, and has participated in a research project on the as-Sahab media production branch of al Qaeda. The government took steps to ratify Art 7 of the Treaty of the Council of Europe (penalisation of documentation that may contribute to the preparation of a terrorist crime) and to integrate the EU framework decision on counterterrorism (penalisation of the training for committing a terrorist crime) in national legislation. Finally, the Dutch government participates in the UN working group on countering the use of Internet for terrorist purposes.

The experiences of the internet working group of the NCTb have resulted in important lessons. The working group will focus its activities on the following three issues. First, it will work on a joint assessment and identification of the hotspots of radicalisation on the internet. Secondly it will develop more coordinated negotiations with providers in order to promote self-regulation and the facilitation of information on signals of radicalisation. Finally it will initiate research into other means than criminal law to influence radical expressions on the Internet.

10.22 CONCLUSIONS

- 1) The threat situation in Europe is worsening and possibly shifting to new areas. During 2008 only one Islamist attack was recorded in Europe, in the United Kingdom. During the same year a total of 187 radical Muslims were arrested, the majority in France, Spain and Belgium. Many of them were involved in terrorist fundraising and logistical support activities. Sketchy information about Islamist terror cells that have been disrupted over the last years indicate that attack planning for new devastating attacks, including suicide attacks, continues.
- 2) By looking at social-economic and demographic trends a number of factors are advantageous to the Muslim population in Europe. In terms of numbers their position will get stronger. If governments

want to reduce radicalisation in the sub-communities of Muslims that are at risk they'll have to spend more efforts on social-economic issues and on integration. Counterterrorism is much broader than just law enforcement as the Dutch experience has shown. The body of knowledge that has been produced on radicalisation during the last years has resulted in a more nuanced and realistic Dutch public opinion about the situation. The level of fear has been reduced and the general feeling of security has improved. The situation is still fragile and unexpected events could easily trigger a backlash. New provocations by rightwing politicians could be exploited by radical organisations and could be used by terror organisations to justify new attacks. The response to 'Fitna' has shown an increasing level of resilience in the Dutch Muslim community.

- 3) The challenge for many European governments, including the Dutch government, is to reconcile a more restrictive immigration policy with a more effective integration policy for the non-indigenous population groups, especially those who are Muslim. The Dutch authorities have made gradual progress in this field although there are still many problems to be solved. A small cadre of hardcore Moroccan youths is still causing headaches for the authorities.
- 4) For decades the different cultural, ethnic and religious groups in the Netherlands lived together peacefully and did not experience serious violent conflict. Compared to other European countries the Netherlands has experienced hardly any violence between social groups and had only limited experiences with inter-group violent conflict. The traumatic incidents of the past years led to tensions and conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims and eroded the idea of the Netherlands as a peaceful and tolerant country. The restrained response to 'Fitna' may however indicate a gradual rediscovery of its traditions and the importance of adhering to common rules and values and showing a minimal level of mutual respect and understanding. As Geert Wilders has announced the production of a second edition of Fitna, it remains to be seen if this trend can be maintained.
- 5) During the past few years the terrorist threat has gradually shifted from domestic home-grown groups to ad-hoc coalitions of external networked groups that adhere to the ideology of the global jihad and are inspired by messages of the core-al Qaeda leadership. Afghanistan currently has become the main theater of the global jihad where a decisive struggle is to be expected. As the coming period probably will show an increase in the level of violence this may trigger retaliatory attacks against European coalition partners, including the Netherlands. According to Dutch assessments an implicit hierarchy in targets is in use by AQ depending on the number of military personnel involved in Afghanistan. For that reason it is likely that other countries, like the United Kingdom and Germany, will be hit first. The upcoming elections in Germany are another reason that this country probably will be hit first because AQ considers it to be the weakest link in the chain. The terror network is no longer completely dependent on European volunteers to execute attacks in Europe. There are indications that it is willing to use 'ready-made' terrorists from among the Taliban to execute attacks in Europe.

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Chapter 11 – PRISON AND COMMUNITY-BASED DISENGAGEMENT AND DE-RADICALIZATION PROGRAMS FOR EXTREMIST INVOLVED IN MILITANT JIHADI TERRORISM IDEOLOGIES AND ACTIVITIES

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The last two decades have witnessed an explosive and dramatic leap in the growth of violent terror groups working in behalf of the global militant “jihad”. The tactics employed include kidnappings; beheadings; assassinations; bombings in civilian areas and the use of suicide missions labeled by the perpetrators as “martyrdom missions”. Whereas in the past terror groups were less “religious” in their espoused ideology, more nationalistic in their membership, and local in their goals, we have seen in the past two decades that the ideology of al Qaeda and related militant jihadist groups is religious, and the groups are also global in reach and not limited to addressing local grievances (although they often make use of these issues to draw in and motivate new recruits).

As we increasingly begin to understand the processes of and threats from violent radicalization, governments in Western, as well as Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian societies, have begun to understand that it is necessary to mount an equally and as comprehensive a fight against violent radicalization. This fight should include four main areas:

- 1) Preventing radicalization, particularly among vulnerable populations;
- 2) Immunizing society against violent ideologies;
- 3) Identifying and disengaging (by arrest, amnesty programs or simple intimidation); and
- 4) Attempting de-radicalization of those who are on the brink of or already have committed violent acts in behalf of the militant groups.

11.1 DE-RADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM TERRORISM

To truly win against terrorism it is necessary to delegitimize it as a tactic. We must always keep in mind that terrorist groups exist because they have some political goal, some desire for power that drives them to violent action. Some groups exist as a result of serious grievances, real and perceived, and should, wherever possible, be channelled into laying down arms and achieving their goals through the legitimate political process. Individuals who engage in terrorism do so because somehow their individual vulnerabilities and desires have meshed with those of a group and they become engaged in the terrorism trajectory.

De-radicalization is a complex process and involves addressing the psychological state and makeup of the individuals involved in terrorism and those who are moving along the terrorist trajectory. Disengagement from terrorism is also an option but unlike de-radicalization it is behavioural only. Disengagement involves either the abandonment of violence, or abandonment of a group that is advocating or actively involved in violence, but entails no real and enduring change of mind and heart [1],[2],[3].

Disengagement sometimes occurs through intimidation. For those who are afraid of law enforcement the thrill of being involved in a terror cell can fade in the face of potential incarceration. These individuals may disengage from the group simply as a result of intimidation while continuing to hold extremist views and

continuing to be vulnerable to easy reactivation for a terrorist attack – by virtue of continued contact with, but minimal activity within a terrorist cell. For some disengagement occurs with arrest and imprisonment although the actors may still be highly extremist in their mindset and even “infect” many others while in prison: recruiting for the group and perhaps even directing terrorist activities on the outside from prison as they wait out their sentence. This was the case for many Palestinian terrorists who were arrested and held for years in Israeli prisons. Some smuggled in phones and directed militant activities from inside the prisons while others recruited new members. Ahmed Sadat the leader of the PFLP commented to me in 2004, “The prison became our best university for finding and teaching recruits. The Israelis did us a favour in that regard.” [4]

There are ways to disengage individuals and groups from terrorism and even to de-radicalize/change their belief that terrorism is a legitimate activity. These include:

- 1) Delegitimizing the ideologies themselves;
- 2) Understanding and tailoring strategies to address the various conduits used for persuading and motivating recruits (in the case of the militant jihad these conduits are through face-to-face recruitment, media glorification or terrorism and the Internet);
- 3) Disengaging recruits from active roles through intimidation, imprisonment, amnesty programs;
- 4) Providing activities that attract them away from violence and into non-violent solutions;
- 5) De-radicalizing/rehabilitating those who have been imprisoned through prison programs; and
- 6) Prevention of radicalization on a societal wide level with special emphasis on vulnerable prison inmates, gangs, military members, and youth.

Disengagement from terrorism is certainly a worthy goal. However, without an ideological shift de-radicalization does not occur and those who have disengaged from terrorism appear to just as easily re-engage. And those that reengage can be the most lethal of all actors volunteering for suicide missions in order to avoid what some have termed “another kind of death” meaning enduring imprisonment, torture or living with extreme posttraumatic stress responses [4]. Furthermore disengagement is simple to assess whereas the profound and long-term attitudinal, belief and behavioural changes involved in de-radicalization are both far more difficult to achieve and to assess.

The remainder of this paper will focus on all of the above. Two types of disengagement/de-radicalization programs will be described. The first deals with community-based models, while the second set of approaches deals with prison-based programs. Since much has been written in this volume on the role of the media and internet in recruiting [5] and space is limited, community-based models will focus only on recruiting in the military and on the street and omit media and internet approaches.

11.2 COUNTERING RECRUITMENT/RADICALIZATION IN THE MILITARY

One of the calls to the militant jihad includes the seeking out and recruiting of key individuals who are inside militaries or soon will be, to convert them to extremism and to use their training and insider position to fight against their own countries and to fight against others as well. Following the identification of Zarkawi as the leader of AQ in Iraq, the Jordanian government understood that it needed to institute prevention programs within its military to find and work with those military recruits who may be influenced by and act upon militant jihadi ideologies. They developed a program for special forces recruits with psychological and ideological components to help detect those with doubts about being in the military, and to prevent their recruitment into militant jihadi groups through awareness and an understanding of the

validity (or lack thereof) of the associated persuasive religious arguments. It is run by a military psychologist and cleric who gives lectures to the new recruits and invites them to consider those family members, friends and colleagues who consider their military commitments as “Takfir” or apostate activities. The psychologist and cleric engage heavily with the military recruits to teach them that their military service to the state is indeed legitimate under Islam and that militant jihadi violence is illegitimate.

Western Muslims as well are vulnerable to both recruitment and retaliation. Those who consider or actually join the military in countries involved in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan may find themselves attacked by other Muslims for taking part in military missions in Islamic countries. Several Muslim military members in the UK told the author in June 2008 that they do not admit even to their own families, that they are in the military, in order to avoid harassment and prevent harm to themselves and their families [6]. European militaries need to take these concerns seriously by appointing Muslim imams as chaplains to support and protect their charges from becoming radicalized or suffering from harassment.

11.3 THE STREETS – COMMUNITY-BASED MODELS OF INTERVENTION

While surveillance and infiltration of terrorist groups is necessary, it is possible to use parallel efforts for positive intervention when authorities identify young people that are becoming involved in militant jihadi activities. Youth workers (psychologists, social workers, imams and education specialists) can be sent to talk with those at risk and help them with the problems that make turning to such groups and ideologies attractive in the first place. Youth workers can be mentored and trained to staff youth centers and to work on the streets, engaging with extremists and those vulnerable to extremism to turn them back from belief in, and engaging in militant jihad. By these efforts, it may be possible to thwart or reverse radicalisation of young Muslims, who have not yet been arrested, but are known to hold extremist views or to support violent activities and have the potential, audacity and determination to become personally engaged in or critically supportive of political violence/terrorism.

Community-based counter-radicalization programs are active in both the Netherlands and the UK. The Dutch police understand that community policing is crucial and have instituted a program that mobilizes social services (housing, schooling, welfare benefits, etc.) as a means of prevention for those identified by the police as dangerously close to committing themselves to violence in behalf of the militant jihad.

The UK built a program modeled after the Dutch and also developed community-based programs for dialogue and outreach to prevent the spread of militant jihadist ideologies as well as to directly address extremists themselves. In the UK initiative, when a potential extremist is identified by policing initiatives, they are either marked for security surveillance, or if they have not gone too far down the terrorist trajectory, moved through a process in which they are warned that, while they have not yet broken any laws, they appear to need monitoring and assistance. Social services are then mobilized to deal with any social needs such as housing, educational services, social work, etc.

Just as deconstructing Internet militant jihadi materials is potentially a powerful method for countering its power to radicalize, deconstruction of the militant jihadi ideology is also a useful prevention activity in schools and mosques to protect vulnerable and young populations who are likely viewers of such materials by helping them to see the emotional manipulation and to provide a better path to take in response to the call to militant jihad. Just as we have anti-AIDs campaigns for young people, such materials could be widely used in schools to inoculate youth against the call to militant jihad [3].

It is important for countries to identify their “hotspots” and communities vulnerable to militant jihadi ideologies and consider programs that go well beyond simple criminal surveillance. The few Somali immigrant youth that went on “jihad” in Somalia after living in the US are an example of a population that some experts, including this author, had expressed concerns for years before they ever activated [7],[8].

11.4 PRISON REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

Prison authorities in many countries are struggling with how to best address militant jihadi prisoners and those vulnerable to their aggressive recruitment tactics. Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Malaysia, Jordan, the United States, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar, Netherlands, the UK and many other countries have all begun to address the need for prison rehabilitation and prevention programs to address and remediate the spread of militant jihadi activities within prisons. The author designed and pilot tested one of these rehabilitation programs in Iraq.

The spectrum of extremism in prisons ranges from those who entered prison as dedicated militant jihadists, having been imprisoned for some terrorist related act, to those who merely supported such groups for opportunist reasons. Those who have “blood on their hands” or who are already seriously indoctrinated and committed violence on behalf of the militant jihad can be called “hard core” extremists. The “hard core” also include those who actively propagate the ideology and have been intimately involved in terror operations: as strategists, recruiters, and actual operatives.

Next to these “hardcore” prisoners are those who have fallen under their influence. These usually include Muslims who reverted to Islam while in prison and new converts to Islam, both of whom were imprisoned for other reasons (i.e., non-terrorism related criminal acts). If left under the influence of militant jihadi leaders inside prison, they have a strong chance of becoming indoctrinated by militant jihadists and leaving prison as future “hard core” militant jihadis. Richard Reid, the infamous shoe bomber is a good example of this group.

Somewhere between the “hard core” and those under their influence are the opportunists – a group imprisoned for security related crimes who may have served militant jihadi groups but who were not motivated by the militant jihadi ideology. They are the ones that will lay an IED, run guns, or carry out other criminal activities for money but they are not particularly interested in the “cause”. This latter group is criminal in nature and motivated by money, involved with drugs, gun running, gang and criminal activities in general. Their motivations for assisting terrorists are mercenary rather than ideological, although once in prison they, too, are vulnerable to becoming more ideologically committed to militant jihadi ideas.

Lastly, in some countries, individuals are imprisoned for having militant jihadi materials in their possession. These prisoners have not actually acted on or been involved in terrorist acts and are often not seriously dedicated to militant jihadi ideologies.

One of the greatest challenges the author found when designing the detainee rehabilitation program in Iraq was sorting the prisoners and assessing the factors that served as catalysts for starting and staying on the terrorist trajectory, the level of commitment, and the motivations at each stage in the process. This understanding is necessary to successfully derail the person from engaging in terrorism. The rehabilitation needs vary: those who are ideologically indoctrinated need to have their world view addressed, whereas those for whom trauma was a primary catalyst for engaging in terrorism are in need of posttraumatic stress therapy. Those who have purely mercenary motives are unlikely to disengage from terrorism and might even be drawn further into the militant jihad by a program that addresses only ideology. These individuals may need skills training and psychological assistance to reorient to a different, non-violent means of earning an income.

The major aspects of nine programs for countering militant jihadi extremist ideologies and their followers inside prisons are briefly described. These programs are specifically designed as rehabilitation or “treatment” programs for extremist prisoners and also function to prevent the spread of militant jihadist ideologies inside the prison population. In the latter case, they may target prisoners who have converted or “reverted” to Islam and endorse militant jihadi ideologies. They were developed primarily with local issues in mind to combat the militant jihadist threat inside their own countries.

11.4.1 Saudi Arabia

The Saudi program is the most well-known and longest standing. It was developed in response to increasing Saudi concern over “jihadists” who received military training and were ideologically indoctrinated in Afghanistan and returned to the kingdom disgruntled and advocating for it to be overthrown. In response to this societal challenge, a group of well-known clerics began a prison-based de-radicalization program. These clerics visited the prisoners individually to engage militant jihadis in discussions about their beliefs.

Saudi clerics, some of the most respected Islamic scholars in the world, engaged in respectful discussion with extremist prisoners and carefully challenged them in instances where the militants’ views did not coincide with authentic teachings of Islam. The Saudi clerics were often able to win these debates and move them to a more moderate stance of no longer endorsing terrorism. The credibility of the clerics involved is paramount and may not translate to other locations. As a matter of fact, when clerics from the Saudi program were invited to speak with Saudi prisoners in Guantanamo and in Iraq they found that, when they were up against the “hard core” al Qaeda (AQ) prisoner, their program was far less effective and often not effective at all. The prisoners in Guantanamo and Iraq took the ideological stance that the Saudi clerics had been co-opted by the Saudi royal family, who they view as apostates (or “Takfeer”), not true Muslims. However, the Saudi clerics were able to reach a few less “hard core” prisoners at Guantanamo and, as a result, gained important intelligence from them that led to further arrests of terrorist operatives.

The Saudis have the resources to offer substantial incentives to their prisoners for positive participation in the “reform” process. These include arranging marriages for single disadvantaged prisoners (no small thing in Saudi where failing to find a wife can be a serious frustration), offering new cars and jobs upon release – all things to help ex-prisoners settle down and start a family – and also making financial provisions for the wives and families of the married extremists prisoners. This enables the Saudi clerics to be able to offer material incentives as genuine expressions of their concern. Likewise, the Saudi system is able to keep close tabs on prisoners who are released, monitoring their communication and movements to ensure they do not resume their extremist memberships and activities. This is a disincentive for the groups as well, as they can be discovered and arrested for try to recruit a released militant inside Saudi.

An important point to note about the Saudi program is that it began solely with the involvement of clerics but, as time went on, the clerics understood that a purely ideological (in this case Islamic) approach was not sufficient. As a result, they invited psychiatric and psychological professionals to help assess the prisoners throughout the treatment program and have in the last years added many psychological aspects to their program including art therapy [9]. The Saudi program also has a prevention component and aftercare with a halfway house (that includes art therapy, play station, religious lectures that aids in the transition from prison, including for those released from Guantanamo [10]. The head of the family members and graduates of the program also must sign a pledge renouncing terrorism, with the head of the family stating he will be responsible for the prisoner once released into their care [11].

At present prisoners complete the program in eight to twelve weeks [11]. The prison-based program started in 2004 and has graduated more than three thousand prisoners, The current claim made by the Saudi prison program is for 80 to 90 percent effectiveness with recidivism of only thirty-five of these as of 2008 [12]. One must keep in mind however that this figure is based on a prison population that aims mainly at moderate extremists – that is those who were arrested for having connections to extremist militant groups or having militant jihadi materials in their possession and makes little to no inroads with “hard core” operatives. Indeed the thirty five reported by Boucek were all for security related offences, but another nine prisoners graduating from the program were rearrested for returning to the militant jihad [11]. One infamous case, Said Ali al-Shihri (otherwise known as Abu Sayyaf al-Shihri) was released from Guantanamo to Saudi Arabia in 2007 and passed through the Saudi rehabilitation program before resurfacing in Yemen as the deputy leader of al Qaeda’s Yemeni branch, where he is suspected

of involvement in the deadly bombing of the United States Embassy in Sana, Yemen in September 2008 [13].

11.4.2 Singapore

The Singaporeans have a rehabilitation program similar to the Saudis, having modeled it after theirs. It was begun in 2002 in response to thwarted suicide bombing attacks on four key positions inside Singapore including the US embassy involving 15 Jamaya Islamiya Singaporeans in their mid to late twenties. The existence of home grown militant jihadis on home soil came as a great shock to the Singaporean government. Singaporean system also involves incentives such as providing financial provisions for the wives and families of the prisoners, offering the wives jobs while the prisoner was still in prison and providing when necessary employment for prisoners upon release. The prisoners are also strongly encouraged to continue meeting with the prison clerics weekly for the year after their release to ensure that they do not revert back to any militant jihadi ideas [14]. It also provides prisoners with a library and academic courses [11]. The Singaporean program also claims huge success, with thirty two of fifty-five prisoners released [11]; however, their program works only with thwarted terrorists not those who had engaged in violence. Also, Singapore is a society in which it is easy to monitor prisoners (including their communications and movements) after their release.

11.4.3 Malaysia

The Malaysians claim their prison program is based on the Singapore system. The Malay prison system is a long-term, 2 – 3 year treatment program. “Treatment” in the Malay system is based upon group lectures, individual counseling sessions with one or multiple clerics, and perhaps most importantly, physical “discipline” (beatings) of prisoners who do not comply with the state sponsored Islamic teachings against militant jihad. The Malaysian prisoners generally comply with treatment, if only to simply avoid being beaten for any overt resistance to it. It is unclear if the program has truly been successful.

11.4.4 Indonesia

Indonesia’s program, started in 2002, involves the participation of former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members who work to convince suspected terrorists that Islam does not support terrorism in return for incentives such as reduced sentences or assistance for their families. The most famous of these is a former high ranking militant, Nasir Abas, allegedly involved in the Bali bombing and a former mujahedeen in Afghanistan who “de-radicalized” on his own as a result of his disgust with the wholesale attacks and killing of civilians that he never endorsed [11]. Abas et al. uses three arguments to convince militant jihadis to give up their allegiance to the movement: that militant jihad and attacking civilians is not Islamic; that all westerners are not bad, and that militant jihad has given a bad face to Islam, doing it a disservice. He admits many militants dismiss him but that he can make an impact in some cases [15].

The Indonesian program is based on two key tenets: one that only radicals can de-radicalize militant jihadi prisoners because they have credibility; and that the state must re-establish trust and legitimacy (through incentives, etc.) to foster the cooperation of former militants/terrorists. For that reason the program gives considerable support, medical care and education to prisoners’ family members and to the prisoners themselves. Abas and his group of former militant jihadis argue against the need for an Islamic state, stating that the government is not apostate [16]. According to Sidney Jones, an Indonesia-based analyst for the International Crisis Group only of a few of the “hard core” have been reached, the rest are not responsive to this program [9].

11.4.5 Egypt

In 1997, leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) started a massive de-radicalization program in which they declared a unilateral ceasefire, and from which sprang twenty-five volumes containing Islamic

arguments of why the use of violence against the state, society and others was illegitimate and not based in Islam. The Egyptian prison authorities allowed the leaders to organize large study groups inside the prison where they could gather their followers to tell them that what they had originally been taught about the militant jihad was no longer considered legitimate, nor Islamic. Following in the footsteps of EIG, the imprisoned leaders of the al- Jihad organization also started a massive movement in 2007 renouncing violence [1]. This shook al Qaeda to its core. The recanting and subsequent writings of Sayyid Imam al-Sharif in particular created a furor within the global militant jihadi movement. This was because he was known previously for having authored what some refer to as the “bible” of jihad, and many of those involved in the formation of al Qaeda previously had strong ties with the al-Jihad group. Indeed Zawahiri, the main current ideologue of al Qaeda was so concerned that he wrote an entire volume to answer al-Sharif’s recantation of the militant jihad, questioning the piece and asking if perhaps its author was hooked up to the torture machine to have written it.

The Egyptians are well known for their frequent use of torture to elicit information from and to “turn” militant jihadi prisoners. One man, imprisoned for teaching the Salafi version of Islam, told the author, “I was arrested and held for five years. They would take us in up on the roof and douse us with freezing cold water and leave us there in the cold, along with many other ways of torturing us.” [17]. The Islamist movement in Egypt, many whose members spent considerable time in prison and were tortured spawned two distinct paths. Those who were released from prison or evaded arrest fled Egypt and some of them became the basis of the modern day AQ movement.

For both of the Egyptian groups recanting from terrorism there were two important reasons for giving up political violence: torture and imprisonment (strong state repression) and the realization, gained from extensive study in prison, that violent militant jihadi ideas were not only counterproductive (i.e., often resulting in torture and death) but also were not justified by Islam. When interviewed, leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group recall feeling horrified as their followers moved from attacking political leaders, regarded as legitimate targets, to indiscriminate attacks against civilians, which they believed to be inconsistent with the teachings of Islam.

According to Egyptian authorities this prison program has reached hundreds successfully. Their success is likely due to the scholarship of the leaders and the fact that they are respected leaders and insiders to the movement as well as charismatic. The success of the Egyptian model unfortunately highlights the potential power resulting from the coupling of imprisonment, torture and heavy state repression with self education and charismatic leaders dispersing their new found wisdom to their followers. It is unlikely any Western state would want to emulate all aspects of this program, especially the repression, even with the high success rates. As an Egyptian ex-prisoner who was tortured in prison told this author, “I did not believe in terrorism and never preached it and I still do not, it is not Islamic.” Asked if he continues to preach non-violent Salafi views after his release he answered, “No, I am too afraid to preach anything, I never want to return to prison” [17]. We can hope most tortured prisoners are like him, but we know from actual research that is not the case – some become even more hardened and dedicate themselves to suicide missions rather than to risk recapture [18].

11.4.6 Yemen

Yemen boasts great success from a prison system that is very similar to the Saudis in that it engages militant jihadi prisoners in respectful dialogue with imminent clerics who, like the Saudis, have the authority, education and experience to debate Islamic issues. In the case of Yemen success is reported even with the “hard core” who are claimed to have reverted to a moderate stance of Islam [19]. Intelligence data however reveals that in fact many of these “hard core” militants simply left Yemen upon release and turned up in Iraq and other jihadi hotspots. It appears that the Yemeni government turned a blind eye to this, pleased to have the militants out of the country and engaged elsewhere.

11.4.7 United Kingdom

The UK began its program to combat militant jihadi ideologies inside the prisons in 2005 – 2006. The UK program currently focuses on new Islamic converts who have endorsed militant jihadi ideologies. These prisoners meet individually with prison imams who ask them about their beliefs and present them with Salafi-based critical analysis methods to judge the authenticity of Islamic teachings and whether they are consistent with the Qur’ān and the verified teachings (Hadiths) of the companion of the Prophets. Likewise, militant jihadi teachings are challenged carefully by presenting the context in which the Quranic verses and Hadiths used by terror groups are appropriately applied and highlighting where they have been misapplied. The goal is to empower the convert to think for himself and drop his mistaken commitment to militant jihadi beliefs. The UK program imams admit that in all cases they are able to identify psycho-social factors and vulnerabilities that create a “hook” for the militant jihadi teachings but that they themselves do not address these factors other than to identify them, discuss them briefly with the prisoners and refer them for state sponsored social work assistance. The UK program is completely non-coercive and voluntary and operates for the most part as individual religious counseling/mentoring but also includes sermons and group discussions where appropriate.

11.4.8 United States

In Fall of 2006 the United States Department of Defense, under the initiative of General Garner, committed to investigate existing prison de-radicalization programs and to model one for use with the 20,000 + security detainees in Iraq. The US program was designed by the author, with the help of UK imams involved in the Scotland Yard project, and pilot tested in summer 2007. The four to six week intensive program was the first of its kind to incorporate a comprehensive religious and psychological approach from the start – combining religious challenge by Muslim imams with psychological counseling to inmates to help address the many psychological traumas and vulnerabilities that led them to involvement with terrorism and insurgency. The goal of the program is to challenge and move the detainees to make a profound shift from embracing violence to adopting a non-violent stance. Changes are assessed relative to pre-treatment assessments by both psychologists and imams. Due to the huge numbers of detainees involved, most sessions occur in groups of no more than ten detainees and individual sessions only occur on an “as needed” basis. Treatment is full day; half religious, half psychological. The program is completely voluntary, but detainees are motivated by the potential of accelerated release from detention and amnesty. The program also has an economic and educational component designed by the military to improve detainees’ literacy (in Arabic) and to train them in useful skills for employment upon release. While the desire was to include family and tribal members in the treatment, the distances involved, particularly for those detainees housed in Camp Bucca, precluded doing so.

The challenges of designing and carrying out a large scale rehabilitation program inside an active conflict zone are many. All those released will be going back into an environment where the original catalysts for activating into terrorism and political violence may still be present.

Of the 20,000 + detainees held by the US at that time it was estimated between five to fifteen percent were “hard core”, i.e., dedicated to militant jihadi ideologies and the rest were engaged in sectarian violence (including Shia militants) and economic opportunists. Likewise 800 juveniles were among the detainees. Thus the program was tailored for three populations: hard core, moderates and juveniles.

The eight hundred juvenile detainees, ages 13 – 18, were a huge concern as they were separated from family and school for a considerable period of time during a critical period in their development. The program for juveniles included continuing their education, along with psychological and religious counseling. Classrooms and sports were organized for the juveniles including math, science, social sciences, language, and soccer. The juveniles were given group counseling treatment by clerics. Psychological counseling was provided to address traumas, psycho-social needs and vulnerabilities, sense of identity and future purpose and plans for exiting prison. The juveniles responded well to the program.

The program for the “hard core” prisoners was similar to the juveniles including both Islamic lessons and psychological treatment of their traumas. They were taken in groups through a series of lessons organized around themes relating to militant jihad and Islamic teachings that were designed to engage them in discussions, challenge militant jihadi ideologies and turn them to relinquishing sectarian and militant jihadi violence. Some of the imams that worked with them were respected Salafi scholars with years of Islamic study and also prior involvement in the militant jihad, thus they had an insider position to work from. The psychological track addressed the multitude of traumas that may have given rise to their willingness to commit to violence, as well as the traumas that occurred during arrest and incarceration, grief and loss issues, their desires for revenge, their sense of identity, meaningfulness, life mission, and future purpose. The psychology track worked to create positive identity and future alignments, to reorient them to non-violent problem solving and to empower the militant jihadis to consider alternative non-violent pathways to changing their society and to address injustices.

The “moderate” prisoners were provided with a shorter program that addressed Islamic values and provided psychological counseling to create a sense of identity and self empowerment that precluded commitment to violence. This group was given only a limited Islamic challenge because they were not ideologically committed to the militant jihad and there was no point to needlessly expose them to this ideology.

The program was designed to operate on the highest levels of human rights standards with no violence or coercion involved and full disclosure of the programs’ goals and contents, voluntary participation, informed consent and the ability to opt out at any time. Likewise careful precautions were taken to warn detainees who were receiving counseling that given prison surveillance admitting to crimes they hadn’t already admitted to in previous interrogation sessions might be problematic for them, that it was better to work on these issues without directly admitting to criminal involvement.

Initial results were very promising, with 6,000 detainees released nine months after program commencement, although most of these were low security risks rather than “hard core”. Of the original group released, only 12 of these inmates were rearrested – much lower than the usual recidivism rate from previous years of close to 200. Major General Douglas Stone, commander of detention facilities in Iraq, reported that improved security in the areas of the country many inmates were returning to also helped in keeping the recidivism rate lower [9]. Overall, the program appeared to work for releasing low security risk detainees and inside the prison also showed some success for reaching “hard core”.

11.4.9 Turkey

Turkey also has a prison program. One of its distinctive features is the use of family members to effect changes in the prisoners. Mothers, in particular, are brought into sessions to “talk sense” to their sons. Since the mother-son bond is so strong in Turkish culture a mother’s strong emotional pleas to her son to give up commitment to the militant jihadi ideology can be quite persuasive, especially if she shows the suffering his imprisonment has caused her and their family.

11.5 FEATURES OF PRISON REHABILITATION PROGRAMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUCCESS

Prison de-radicalization programs are a great challenge and the ingredients of a successful prison rehabilitation program are many and varied. There are features common to all programs – building rapport and challenging the Islamic basis of the militant jihadi ideology, but there are also distinctive features that can be used to increase the success of a program. Table 11-1 gives a list of the potential ingredients of a successful prison rehabilitation program.

Table 11-1: Features of Some Prison Rehabilitation Programs for Militant Jihadis.

Country	Re-Education	Incentives	Re-Integration	Other Features
Saudi Arabia	Use of highly respected clerics	Arranged marriages Financial support	New car/job upon release Halfway houses Lectures to aid transition	Includes input from psychologists and psychiatrists Monitor movements and comms
Singapore	Individual discussions with clerics	Family assistance Jobs for wives	Jobs upon release Ongoing education	Monitor movements and comms
Malaysia	Up to 3 yrs. Counseling with clerics Group lectures			Brutal treatment of non-compliant prisoners
Indonesia	Uses former radicals (such as Nasir Abas)	Reduced sentences Family assistance Medical care Education		Few successes to date
Egypt	Study groups, led by Egyptian Islamic Group			Brutal tactics including torture Mixed results (including contributing to the formation of AQ)
Yemen	Discussions with clerics			Some success but “hard core” tend to leave country
UK	Individual meetings with Imams Salafi-based Sermons and groups sessions		State sponsored social work	Conducted by imams from the same communities as the radicalized prisoners
USA	Religious sessions with Imam Psychological counseling	Accelerated release Potential amnesty Education Participation in sports (juveniles)	Job training Literacy training (Arabic)	Three different programs: - Hard Core - Moderates - Juveniles
Turkey	Use of family members, especially mothers			

A prison program must first of all be voluntary and involve informed consent as well as give profound respect to human rights. While some may argue the “ticking bomb” reason for torture or advocate “soft torture”, serious al Qaeda participants are usually prepared for both. There is evidence that many al Qaeda operatives are trained to endure interrogation and even torture and to organize themselves into functioning recruitment cells inside prison walls. Physical abuse, isolation and coercion may work to elicit confessions but they may also harden prisoners and drive them to suicide or “martyrdom” roles if they return to terrorism upon release. Likewise, photos and video footage from Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib

give clear evidence that any mistreatment of prisoners can easily become a lightning rod for further global radicalization.

Detainees in Iraq who told the author about being mistreated (hit, held in stress positions, not allowed to clean themselves according to Islamic rules or pray, locked in small spaces, photographed naked among mixed gender groups, mocked while naked, etc.) made clear that such mistreatment can push some but not all prisoners into further radicalization and can do the same for their relatives and others who learn of it. The same was true in our Chechen sample – a group of suicide bombers volunteered for their missions either after being tortured or having a family member tortured in prison. Conversely, three former al Qaeda operatives who spoke with the author in Iraq shared that the decency, respect and extension of human care by their interrogators in prison turned them away from the movement [20].

A successful program must find a way to successfully sort through and identify prisoners or detainees according to their level of radicalization. This requires an assessment tool which should be used pre, post and during treatment. The program must be tailored to address the process of engagement in the movement; original and current motivators; and the level or current engagement and find ways to activate potential motivations for disengagement/de-radicalization. For the program to work well the militant jihadis must be approached contextually, addressing the issues that are important to them (anger over occupation, violation of sacred values, trauma, desire for revenge, search for meaning, need for belonging, need for a father figure, marginalization, discrimination, etc.). Motivational incentives that address their needs and motivations for having become involved work the best.

A common element of all of the programs is that they rely upon a relationship built with the prisoner, often by a cleric or imam brought in specifically for this purpose, but at times also involving a psychologist or an entire team of mentors. These individuals first build rapport in group or individual sessions which takes place anywhere from daily to weekly. Many programs at present are religious only and use imams solely to challenge the militant jihadi worldview. This is a serious limitation as the road to radicalization involves many group dynamics and individual vulnerabilities that are best addressed using psychological methods in conjunction with imam involvement. Many psychological tools (cognitive therapy, guided imagery, etc.) can be used to help militant jihadi prisoners envision restoring themselves to a non-violent stance, rebuilding to engage with their social environment positively.

A program is also only as good as the quality of the people that carry it out. Charismatic persons, those with maternal or paternal streaks, and a sense of personal authority and maturity are also likely to have better success as prisoners are often drawn to such persons. Respect for age and strong family ties are often a cultural feature of those who join the militant jihad, thus experience and age can be serious asset. In the case of religious challenge it is important to realize that hard core militant jihadis who know their Koran well will likely demand a very highly trained imam to speak with them and are unlikely to respect anyone other than a Salafi scholar. Likewise when sectarian violence is a huge issue as it has been with al Qaeda in Iraq it may be difficult to use Shia staff for Sunni prisoners because they may be rejected or threatened.

A few programs make use of family members and tribal leaders both in the treatment and in the release process, releasing the prisoner into the hands of the tribe or family who pledged to keep watch over the released prisoner and prevent him from further involvement. In Iraq it was very clear that the prisoners were very worried about loved ones at home, particularly female relatives that were perhaps living without male protection while the inmate was imprisoned. Making use of this concern through family involvement and monitored phone calls and making use of the strong desire to return home puts a strong motivation to good use.

The roles that a militant jihadi will hopefully move into once disengaged/de-radicalized are also important to consider. Amnesty, jobs programs and continued mentoring upon release are all important considerations.

Economic incentives for taking part in some programs such as the Saudis include providing jobs and even a car upon release which help make the transition from prison. Likewise skills training in computers, language, and literacy or a trade all provide increased likelihood of being gainfully employed upon release. A few programs include after release mentoring programs and frequent check-ins to ensure the changes occurring inside prison continue after release. All of these measures are likely to secure long-term compliance.

Lastly, a good program may not do well if the prison authorities are not behind the program. Guards that are disrespectful or abusive can easily undo positive movement in treatment sessions. Likewise isolating prisoners taking part in the program, surveillance, getting medical care and training for those who need extra care, getting the proper space to carry out the program, prison access and protection for staff, etc., all require close alliance with the prison authorities as does assessing who should be taking part in the program.

Sabotage of prisoner reform is also a serious factor to consider. In Iraq those who were suspected of turning against the other Takfiri prisoners were subjected to sharia courts and had their arms broken or worse. It is wise to isolate those taking part in a program from those who are not in order to avoid such punishments and to keep them from being harassed and re-indoctrinated while going through the program.

Assessing success in any prison program is extremely difficult. Prisoners are highly motivated to lie especially if they believe that they can gain amnesty and early release. Probably the best measure of a reformed jihadi is observation over time to see if there has been a real change of behavior, mind and heart. This may be easier to detect in group sessions and with clandestine surveillance than in individual sessions where the prisoner may learn to manipulate his mentor.

Likewise a successful program cannot be condemned by some level of recidivism. Thousands of prisoners in Iraq were released after going through the Detainee Rehabilitation Program; however, release alone is not signify success and release does not mean that they did not return to terrorism – only that they were not detected. Previously incarcerated terrorists are likely to be very careful to avoid arrest again. Detainees released from the Saudi and Yemen programs have been found to have returned to the militant jihad, just as detainees released without treatment from Guantanamo and other programs returned to their former roles.

11.6 CHALLENGES

The challenges to counter-radicalization programs whether they be prison or community based are multiple. First of all women are rarely addressed in either venue and women are increasingly playing a role in militant jihad: as motivators of men (even offering themselves as marital/sexual prizes to those who commit to self “martyrdom”), trainers of children, interpreters and teachers of militant jihad and as “martyrs” and operatives themselves. In Iraq arresting and detaining even clearly guilty women as prisoners was a highly radicalizing event and one that made it difficult for the women to return to society as it was assumed they had been sexually molested while in prison.

Another challenge with counter-radicalization programs is that the ideology and recruitment strategies that governments are confronting are highly fluid and difficult to address with static programs. The programs must constantly keep up with the changeable nature of the threat they are addressing. The militant jihadi discourse and their tactics change by the month. For instance when the Egyptian al-Sharif disavowed jihad a great debate broke out among militant jihadis into which even Zawahiri stepped to weigh in. These are things that practitioners must be aware of in order to take full advantage of them.

There is much concern as well among Western countries for making use of the Salafi clerics who are probably most able to engage seriously indoctrinated militant jihadis in meaningful discourse since the Salafi stream so closely runs alongside the Takfiri ideologies that allow the killing of Muslims, civilians, women and children. While Western governments often fear Salafists we may find that fear handicaps us from using our best allies in fighting militant jihadi ideologies. Another concern is that no matter what the

de-radicalization program, if it is true to Islamic scriptures there are calls to jihad when Islam, Islamic lands and Islamic peoples are under attack, so it is hard to put all of these ideas to rest when dealing with truly occupied Muslim lands. In these cases the best Islamic arguments for giving up violence is that it is against Islamic scriptures to fight a losing battle with an overwhelming enemy when great losses will be sustained; in these cases Muslims are instructed to make peace until their strength is regained (or the issue becomes moot if the occupation is ended).

There are also serious concerns about the spread of militant jihadi ideologies inside prisons. Often prisoners ingeniously find the means to pass tapes, lectures, phones, and other means of communicating their virulent ideologies within and outside of prison walls. Prison officials can respond by moving prisoners although unless they are all successfully identified this strategy may leave untraced ideologues in place and as a result exposes two new prisoner group to experienced ideologues. Or they can isolate militant jihadi prisoners in cells and prisons dedicated only to them but this may lead to human rights outcry by society at large as it did in the Netherlands. Without active measures to counter in prison recruitment it is likely that some prisoners will emerge more dangerous than they went in.

Certainly there is a strong need for prevention, inoculation and de-radicalization programs to attract and work with militant jihadis on the street, over the Internet, in prisons, in militaries, on the Internet and wherever else they may be active in order to try to turn them back from terrorism and political violence. Let us have the courage to try and the hope that we succeed in these efforts to protect our citizens from militant jihadi terrorism.

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Chapter 12 – IDEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR ISLAMIC RADICALISM AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DERADICALIZATION

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The flavor *du jour* in discussions of Islamic terrorism features a de-emphasis on the ideological component, drawing instead upon epidemiological and criminological concepts; approaching Mexican drug gangs and Islamic extremists as being more similar than they are different. This aids a network scrutiny and suggests buy-out rather than ideological deradicalization. Such new abandonments of the idea “turf” as in the anthropological/revived development theory approach which treats recruits as “accidental” ones and which emphasizes state-building as if it can be devoid of ideology are profoundly troubling. Perhaps despair over the ideological strength of Islamic extremism has set in, or policymakers seek more modest successes, which through media amplification could trump the failure to catch Osama, discourage the emergence of his ilk or Al-Qai’dism generally. Clearly the debate about how to best dampen enthusiasm for violent radicalism in immigrant communities and countries of origin continues.

While for some years, the approaches to global jihadism languished in a pervasive indictment of Islamic ideas and recent history, the ‘new’ answer – refocusing away from ideology – will do little to deradicalize those committed to these movements, and we must always remember that large numbers of violent radicals are not necessary to wreak havoc, a relatively small number can do so.

Not all extremist groups are identical; nor do they emerge from the same intellectual or political sources, even though some common themes exist in the histories of older, and newer [1] groups. Movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Front Islamique du Salvation fought over the implementation or actions of secular Western-style Muslim governments; Islamist student movements confronted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and early Islamist militants like Qassam’s Brigades or Tahrir al-islam confronted the Israelis. Then new radical Islamist groups confronted Muslim leaders they believed to be misdirecting their societies like Takfir wa al-Higrah, the Military Academy Group and Jihad Islami in Egypt. In Saudi Arabia an ultra- or neo-Wahhabi movement arose in 1979, while in Tunisia, Turkey, and Syria other radical Islamist groups emerged as well. All discussions generated by these earlier roots of radicalism circulate around:

- a) Resistance to Western political domination;
- b) Resistance to Western ideological and cultural domination;
- c) Reactions to the end of clerical influence in education and law under modern states;
- d) The failures of modern, Western-style, non-Islamist, and even religious Islamic (as in Saudi Arabia) governments to create deep national loyalties;
- e) The social shock of modernization, rural-urban migration, the continuity of poverty and failure of national governments to meet popular needs;
- f) The failure of revolutionary, leftist, Arab-nationalist, and other political movements to achieve social and political change and right grievances such as the dispossession of the Palestinians; and
- g) The failure of local governments to democratize or significantly increase political pluralism.

These circumstances (listed above) that promote recruitment and push radicals into activism (or militance) existed prior to, and exert pressure simultaneously with Islamist extremist messages. They may limit or enhance the Islamic aspects of ideological attraction to movements, helping to explain variations in recruitment from individual to individual, and one geographic area or political setting to another. The ideology would not be as attractive (or alternatives so unappealing) without the compelling nature of

these circumstances. Thus any discussion of ideology should see it as a multi-directional process in which extremist ideology attracts adherents and other available “ideologies” or social and political memberships repel or fail to attract. It is also multi-directional in its interaction with local political, social, or movement situations or events. That is why deradicalization may not be effective if all it does is to address “improper aspects of belief” or create a new orthodoxy.

With this context in mind, let us address the aspects of ideology contained in the New Militant Jihad as expressed in several waves of thought since 1979, the late 1980s, early 1990s or later depending on which group we consider. The determination to fight and attack Westerners or their representatives or alleged pawns, was the “new” aspect of an extant Islamic extremism. This discussion will emphasize the elements common to the ideological position of many groups, necessarily blurring some distinctions.

12.1 HAKMIYYA

Extremists have (along with conservative Muslims) defended the true sovereignty of Allah (God) (*hakmiyya*) as compared to the secularized nation-state and its civil laws. The main problem here is the distinction between true Islamic practice and the lifestyle, laws, or license permitted by the local government. Extremists call for a restoration of God’s sovereignty, and thus their movement is one of purist reform. This principle was emphasized by Abu al-A’la Mawdudi in his arguments for Pakistan to become an Islamic state and also appeared early on in the discourse of Hassan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood. The 1970s-era of Islamic radicals determined that only overthrowing local governments (fighting the near enemy via *jihad*) which had so secularized as to be apostates would bring about the sovereignty of God. The other steps concern the restoration or purification of Islamic law (*shari’ah*) and establishment of the form as well as intent of an Islamic state.

Confronting this ideological emphasis is not easy. The secularization and recreation of assimilated Muslims as urged by some US think tanks simply will not fly in the today’s Islamic world, so impacted by Islamic revival and devoid of counter ideologies. The best that can be hoped for is to emphasize the history of temporal power through Islamic history and the need for moderation.

12.2 ISLAMIC SOCIETY

All actions above are to be undertaken to re-Islamize or Islamize society. A truly Islamic society will uphold the *hisba* (commanding the good and forbidding the evil) by following *shari’ah*, and will cleanse itself of the unbridled materialism that has led Muslims to stress wealth and status rather than piety. This is why extremist groups engaged in *jihad*, or battling to consolidate power whether in a neighborhood, village or larger area insist on social and legal changes on the turf they rule ensuring more pious behavior rules, laws, according to the group’s interpretation. The only difference between the norms instituted in the Swat Valley, by the Taliban, by Somali groups and that in an officially Islamic setting such as Saudi Arabia is in the degree of moderation tolerated. Because there always were, and are Islamic principles that support such moderation [1], it is incorrect to paint the extremists (along with the so-called ‘Wahhabis’) as totalitarians as some authors do [3],[4]. These arguments confuse the beliefs of ordinary Muslims with the preoccupations of radicals [5].

The longing for a truly Islamic society, means that deradicalization of ideas which come to be accepted by the local population as “Muslim” is problematic and state interventionism, or other means of directly addressing the ideological issue to be reformed are necessary.

12.3 NECESSITY FOR JIHAD

Jihad’s purpose to purify and restore Islamic society is described above. The most important advent for contemporary Islamic extremism was its insistence that *jihad* is inevitable and necessary, as is martyrdom,

because of the heightening of global conflict – the West’s intolerance for Islam. Even so, the New Mujahidin have focused rather exclusively on militarism or focoism [6], almost for its own sake, and as a way of distinguishing themselves from the *qa'iduna* (those Muslims who sit on the sidelines and refuse to fight) [7] such as the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood. The insistence on jihad, and discourse of a perennial and generational jihad distinguishes actors willing to moderate violence in return for pursuing political participation in the existing system, from others who continue to emphasize jihad. They describe a jihad that is revolutionary, Trotskyist in its “eternal” quality.

Again, this is a recurring theme in Muslim history. So what is ‘new’ about it? Abd al-Salam al-Farag of the Gama`at Islamiyya explained the necessity for jihad in a crucially influential pamphlet. His argument was not unlike Muhammad abd al-Wahhab’s (currently scholars often argue that either the radical Egyptians influenced bin Laden, or it was his underlying neo-Wahhabi beliefs that simply combined with the influence of other activists). Jihad had become a forgotten duty (*al-farida al-gha'iba*) [7],[9] indeed, Muslim reformers had earlier argued that the overall struggle to be a good Muslim could supplant jihad as war-fighting, and only activists with inspired strategic messages, attainable local military goals (like Ibn Sa`ud), or the bitter radicalization acquired through state torture and imprisonment (as in Egypt) awakened the call to ‘war-fighting’ jihad.

The literature, and the Egyptian recanting and Saudi deradicalization campaigns all note that there are doctrinal differences between ‘classical jihad’ and its interpretation in the new *fiqh al-jihad* (jurisprudence of jihad) by contemporary extremists [7],[10]. However, the militants are right and those seeking to defuse violence are also correct – jihad has been authorized for Muslims and was an important part of Islam’s response to attack, as well as for its expansion. Bin Laden and Zawahiri successfully counter Saudi governmental arguments about the exclusivity of Islamic knowledge, [7] or that jihad can only be led by a proper Muslim leader, by challenging the Saudi leadership and claiming that it has compromised its stewardship of the Holy Places by allying with the West, and pointing to the official `ulama as being tamed servants of the state. The texts explaining jihad and *siyar* (Islam’s ‘law of nations’) show that there were rules and limitations, [11] but also that boundaries of jihad (or just causes for war) were under dispute even in medieval times.

A very important distinction is the need for jihad as an individual or a collective duty. When it is an individual duty, then every Muslim, man, woman and child can participate in jihad and the discouragement of participants who had debts or dependents is nullified. Because Muslims are interpreting today’s crisis as just such a situation, we have seen women’s participation in jihad and a general fever of volunteerism. Where one could argue that only collective jihad is doctrinally valid [10] it would be better to engage in popular discussions and peacemaking aimed at determining practical solutions to the crises.

12.4 OCCUPATION OF MUSLIM LANDS AND ONSLAUGHT ON MUSLIM PRACTICES

The occupation of historically Muslim dominated lands, the dar al-Islam and direct attacks on life and livelihood of particular groups, as well as restrictions on religious rights provide the rationale for jihad as an individual duty. One could argue that Muslim governments have been complicit in the heightening of these views. For instance, the oil companies have maintained large blocs of Western expatriate employees (and other nationalities) in Saudi Arabia for many years. But the idea that Westerners should not be present on the Arabian Peninsula was primarily preached in response to the first Gulf war when Westerners were stationed in Saudi Arabia. By adopting the idea that it is better for Western military presence to retreat from Saudi Arabia, the government may have inadvertently strengthened the public impression that Western presence constitutes ‘occupation’.

Since the nineteenth century, Western colonialism and imperialism did indeed confront Muslims with direct and indirect forms of oppression, occupation, expropriation and exploitation. The extremists deny

the Western supremacy of civilization that is asserted by Samuel Huntington, or Bernard Lewis. They are not trying to conquer the world or defeat Western civilization, but to prevent Muslims from falling prey more thoroughly to its “sicknesses”, particularly its social aspects in their own society.

In Iraq, the fact is that there was a military seizure of power, and a military occupation. No-one convinced Iraqi or Saudi extremists otherwise. Rather, they came to see their militant resistance as counterproductive in the short term, not that jihad is wrong. This is similar to the Gama`at Islamiyya’s views as expressed in books of recantation: that jihad is not sinful, but cannot be undertaken at the expense of the broader population [12].

The presence of Western military operations and troops in Afghanistan and the air campaigns in Pakistan likewise provide a focus for jihad.

12.5 MARTYRDOM

In the new jihad, the linkage of jihad to martyrdom is key. In the classical treatises on jihad, Muslims are exhorted to not set out to deliberately become martyrs, but rather to fight jihad as avidly as possible. However, in the movements of new jihad, the reverence for martyrdom has been emphasized through recruiting videos, speech, poetry, songs, and Internet-posted histories of ‘martyrs’ so that fighting and martyrdom are equated at a new level. This has helped to rationalize suicide operations, even though suicide is anathema, and forbidden to Muslims.

Many have blamed Sayyid Qutb for his ideological motivations of extremism. But in his case, he shifted from a focus on gradual Islamization to an acceptance of martyrdom which – like his own – was experienced at the hands of the state, not by choice, not in suicide bombings. He only came to see martyrdom as inevitable because of the Egyptian government’s brutality at the time, and determination to execute, those like him, whose voices and writings were influential.

When recruits believe they will be martyrs, a powerful psychological component is operating, for even in today’s non-extremist *salafi* thought, one is constantly reminded that this world (*dunya*) is not the abode of Muslims, their true life begins only at the grave. The doubts and fears of the recruit drop away when he is assured of martyrdom by the organization.

12.6 TAKFIR

Because Muslims are embroiled in a global conflict, the ‘New Jihad’ has correctly identified local Muslim governments as being influenced, and subservient to Western powers [13] They also believe these rulers to have acted against Islam, in their national programs, actions such as the peace treaties with Israel (for Egypt and Jordan), by promoting legal reforms not in accord with *shari`ah*, or because of their corruption. *Takfir* is the action of calling a Muslim an infidel, or non-believer and as such he may be the object of jihad; i.e., he may be killed for offenses to Islam. Most of the ‘new jihads’ identify the local Muslim governments as made up of apostates through the process of takfir, thus legitimizing violence on these authorities and their police, judges, or other agents. The Sunni extremists in Iraq also use *takfirideologies* to claim the Shi’a Muslims in Iraq as infidels as well drawing on historical arguments against them, which are rooted in contemporary fears of their dominance in the new Iraqi government. The Shi’a were called apostates, or renegade-apostates (because apostates are subject to death) and their specific religious characteristics were mocked and identified as un-Islamic.

Paradoxically, attacks in the West are not the primary aim of extremists; these are engaged in as terrorism usually is, to demonstrate a capability that could not be sustained. However, the extremists primarily focus on their “near enemies” and targeting and enraging the “far enemy” was a secondary aim.

12.7 NON-MUSLIMS

Although Jews and Christians are Peoples of the Book as defined in the Qur'ān, meaning they have special rights, are fellow monotheists, and can reside in an Islamic state so long as they pay the jizya, a variant of a poll tax, extremist groups have emphasized the ideas that Jews and Christians seek to trick Muslims into not following their faith; that they themselves rejected their Message after believing (Qur'ān 3: 105, 106) or will betray them (as the Jews of Madina did to the Prophet Muhammad). These scriptural and historical suspicions and enmities are complicated by modern-day arguments put forward by Western figures who vilify Islam utilizing arguments derived from their Christian beliefs, and claim that the West is a Judeo-Christian culture inimically opposed to (and by) Islam.

One can argue that Muslim governments or schools must teach more tolerance toward Christians, Jews, or other Muslim sects; indeed such a program was already underway in Saudi Arabia prior to 9/11 [14] however the prejudices stirred up by ignorant or intolerant figures are difficult to dispel where people have little or no contact with the other groups, and when it is reasonable for them to believe that Israel oppresses Palestinians, or that Western Christians hate Muslims.

12.8 IMPLICATIONS FOR IDEOLOGICAL RESPONSES

Policymakers could grant too much importance to religious figures in the hopes that they will influence those who might be attracted to extremist ideology. The most effective speakers in this process are those who have been part of movements and recanted as opposed to governmental *`ulama* (clerics). The downside is that religious figures, parties and powers will retain dominance wherever they can (as in Iraq) if they are primary intermediaries, and perhaps this is a permanent fixture of the region since non-religious non-sectarian opposition parties are tiny and weak.

Clerics or other religiously legitimate speakers can play an important role in backing the state to urge truces, or an end to violence or in deradicalizing movements, but their appeal varies. Where the opposition to a local Muslim government is strong, the state needs to involve the voices of clerics and/or former movement leaders to deradicalize [15] and the opposite is true where the opposition has less popular support. Governments may be tempted to instead use force through the military or security services resulting in either an upswing in violence [16],[17] or a broader underground or exile movement.

One can extend Taylor's paradigm to a more general one about religious discourse, which can still serve as an important source of legitimacy. However, a government-backed message cannot remain legitimate if it simply argues the opposite of all of the above aspects of ideological radicalism, because in many cases, these overlap with mainstream principles and the devil is in the detail of these arguments.

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Chapter 13 – A HOLISTIC VIEW OF RADICALIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR MODELING

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Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but the emergence of increasing numbers of violent non-state actors who employ terrorism as a mechanism to meet their social and political objectives is a growing concern for analysts and decision makers. One of the key priorities is the development of an understanding of the mechanism behind the radicalization of individuals, their characteristics, their motivations, what separates them from those who share the same grievances but do not join radical groups and choose to employ violence. Key in understanding terrorism is a better understanding of radicalization. Radicalization is the result of a complex set of interactions between individuals, groups and their environment. There are a variety of analytical methods and models that can assist in providing insight into these interactions, assessing the importance of factors, assessing the impact of uncertainty and forecasting vulnerable individuals and populations. This paper will discuss many of the factors underlying radicalization and highlight appropriate classes of models that can enable these insights. References to specific model will be made only to illustrate representative capabilities, not as an endorsement or to confer exclusiveness. Attention will be given not only to computational social science models, but also to verbal conceptual models. A basic description of the models mentioned in the paper is found in Appendix 13-1.

Numerous research efforts have identified and/or theorized about factors and mechanisms that underlie terrorism and radicalization. Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” and radicalization is defined alternatively as “internalization of a set of beliefs, militant mindset that embraces violent jihad” [1] or “the active pursuit of and/or support for fundamental changes in society that may endanger the continued existence of the democratic order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the function of the democratic order (effect) [2]. It is important to remember that radicalization is the process and terrorism is one of many possible results of radicalization.

A large body of research regarding radicalization and terrorism has focused on identifying various putative root causes such as: poverty, structural inequalities, political grievance and dislocations accompanying rapid modernization. It is hypothesized that the combination of a disaffected individual, a complicit community and a legitimizing ideology make for a causal “lethal cocktail” [3]. These root causes are necessary, but not sufficient, for explaining how and why individuals join, become increasingly radical and ultimately employ terrorism as a tactic, sometimes primary strategy to achieve their social and political objectives. These root causes act, along with direct or indirect experience of trauma, discrimination and alienation to create openings, psychological vulnerabilities that then resonate with key messages, leading to becoming involved in a radical group by self-recruitment or recruitment by others. Recent research has highlighted the importance of small group dynamics [4] in the process of radicalization, organic behaviors that result from the “actual and evolving cliques, cells, bridges and networks ... individuals form” [5]. A frequent theme emerging from research is the importance of charismatic leaders or “spiritual sanctioners” in the mobilization of a (terrorist) social movement by transforming “widespread grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle” [6]. Frequently, the mechanism employed by these leaders is the conscious or unconscious framing of grievances in terms of a larger narrative (e.g., the narrative of a “just war”).

What is needed is a more holistic view of these, akin to understanding fire. To understand fire, one cannot focus on the flame or on the often destructive result, but on the precipitating causes, the initiating cause and the sustaining forces. Likewise, the root causes of terrorism are the environmental conditions that

predispose individuals toward radicalization, toward joining a group involved in terrorism or supporting terrorism, much like dryness and fuel/kindling. The dynamic factors, including significant events, internal/external pressures, leaders and organization/group dynamics provide the spark and oxygen to start the fire and keep it burning. These factors interact to maintain a radical movement much like fuel and oxygen interact to maintain a fire. For example, recruitment is directly impacted by the continued presence of socio-economic and/or political grievances. Radicalization, like forest fires, is also relatively rare. There are thousands every year, but only a few are very destructive and widespread. When radicalization occurs it is because the landscape was ripe – little rain, dry woods, poor/ill-equipped fire-fighting capability [7].

There certainly is no silver bullet – a single method or model that will magically provide answers for all the related questions one would ask about radicalization or terrorism. There are, however, a number of useful methods and models that can, for answering a variety of questions related to the radicalization trajectory, stages, factors, etc., provide useful insights. Because radicalization is a process and not a single state, any method and/or model(s) of radicalization needs to be iterative, interactive and adaptive to capture the inherent dynamic complexity. One way to do that is to use several levels of models. A recent National Research Council study entitled, ‘Behavior Modeling and Simulation: From Individuals to Societies’ categorized “formal” (as opposed to verbal conceptual models, models that are not instantiated in algorithms or software) models as either macro (involving macro-level variables such as education, poverty, unemployment), micro (modeling cognitive or affective processes) and meso (the level between macro and micro, for example a social network) models [8]. A more holistic analysis of radicalization (related to terrorism) would consider, at a minimum, the environment, Violent Non-State Actor (VNSA)/radical group systems and sub-systems (e.g., supporters, financing, logistics) over the life cycle of the VNSA. This analytical framework would consider not only the interactions between the system elements but also the interaction between the system and its environment [9]. The foundation for this analytical framework and the constituent models comes from across the spectrum of social (and in some cases physical) sciences.

13.1 FUEL/KINDLING: UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH TERRORISM EMERGES

Previous research has established that terrorism can and does occur anywhere, but is more commonly found in developing societies. It is especially likely in societies characterized by rapid modernization and lack of political rights. Poverty contributes **indirectly** to potential for political violence in that failure to create viable economy has been asserted to be a root cause of civil war. More fundamentally, low levels of development create lots of young people with few alternatives – natural recruits for terrorist groups [10]. In the Congo, low-level income and low growth rate “reduced the cost of organizing rebellions...and the government’s ability to fight a counterinsurgency” [11].

More direct contributors are structural inequities, frequently cited by militants/radicals who claim to act on behalf of repressed or marginalized population segments. “Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence.” [10] The relative deprivation theory of political violence posits that if people perceive they are deprived of economic and political advantages, they become resentful and motivated to act. David Wright-Neville writes, “to the extent that violence is almost always an extension of frustration, and that frustration in turn results from the failure to receive expected rewards, terrorism and the ideologies that underpin it can be viewed as a “politics of dashed expectations” [12]. Examples of groups who have been or are motivated by socioeconomic marginalization are the FARC, IRA, Hezbollah, Shi’a in Lebanon, and the Tamil Tigers [13]. Some have contended that ethnic or religious discrimination is the root cause of ethnonationalist terrorism (e.g., Tamil Tigers, PKK) [6]. The notion of inequities is based on perceptions and expectations. This is supported by research efforts that concluded that leaders of political sectarian and ethnic movements are, in general, better educated and of higher status than the general population, with personal

experiences of barriers to upward mobility [14]. A study highlighting the impact of the resentment of inequalities by results showed that the more educated Palestinians are, the more they support armed attacks against civilians inside Israel [15]. Hamas takes advantage of environments with poor governance, using its da'wa system to buy support, goodwill and grass roots level support for their agenda [16]. Neuroscience research has identified some mechanisms related to perceptions of inequality, specifically the presence of characteristic brain activity associated with the resulting feelings of humiliation and loss of honor [17].

Another putative root cause highlighted in previous research is rapid socioeconomic change. This is bolstered by the fact that terrorism is most common in countries in mid-range of economic development. The explanation is that economic change creates conditions for instability and the emergence of a militant movement. Based on the work of sociologists Scheuch and Kingemann [18], the theory postulates that people in fast growing modernizing countries cannot cope with rapid economic and cultural developments and react to the pressures with rigidity and “closed-mindedness” which some radical movements can mobilize [19]. If one group gains faster than another and inequalities are along pre-existing lines of class or cleavage, incentives for revolutionary or separatist movements increase [13]. Other relevant factors are the social trauma accompanying rapid change. The disruption due to rapid modernization increases the potential for political violence and terrorism by making traditional norms and social patterns irrelevant and increasing susceptibility to radical ideologies, especially those that provide an encompassing explanation and prescription for all aspects of life (e.g., Islam shar'ia). Blocked or distorted modernization manifests in terrorism. This is due to traditional societies coping with both external stresses and internal stresses (e.g., urbanization, literacy, social mobility). This pluralizes societies to various degrees and strains established ways of thinking and behaving. Endogamous social organizations, in which greater loyalty is given to a family/tribe versus an ideology, respond to threats to their collective identity (e.g., importing of western materialism) by returning to convention (e.g., becoming more religious) and sometimes with “chiliastic” violence [20].

Political grievances have also been identified as root causes of terrorism. The dynamics between individuals and groups and the government are key – good governance, in terms of services provided and policies, can substantially serve to mitigate grievances, but “bad” governance can exacerbate them. Repression and torture are two catalysts for conflict and violence. Oscillations between reform and repression may actually be greater contributors to political conflicts in that the prospect of reform increases incentives for action, while the repressive actions of the government reduce the opportunity costs of violence, including terrorism. Government inconsistency is often interpreted as regime weakness [14], [21]. This is consistent with the “J Curve” hypothesis of rebellions and revolutions in which “revolutions occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal” [22]. A reinforcing loop (Figure 13-1) has been identified in which an increase in terror tactics increases the repressive tactics employed by the government, which then decreases public support for the government and shifts it to the terrorist cause (resulting, in part, in increased recruitment). An example of this was the “Bloody Sunday Massacre” in Londonderry in 1972 [13].




Figure 13-1: Repression Reinforcing Loop (Stohl, 2006).

Diaspora populations, with large, unassimilated and often marginalized immigrant populations, are exceptionally vulnerable to radical ideas and terrorism. The juxtaposition of the environmental predisposing factors discussed previously and psychological susceptibility to radical ideas and sub-cultures is real and dangerous. Diaspora communities exacerbate the tendency for emergent enclaves of radical thought due to feelings of isolation and tolerance for extremist sub-cultures. Within these areas individuals seeking an identity, looking for approval, searching for cause that can be religiously and culturally justified, and a clear call for action are vulnerable to radical ideas. This is the case with many European communities with marginalized Muslim populations [23].

13.2 FUEL/KINDLING: IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODS AND MODELS

The entities, factors, relationships and processes related as root causes of radicalization and terrorism in the narrative above are verbal conceptual models stemming from seminal research in the area of socio-cultural-political factors related to conflict, terrorism and instability. Verbal conceptual models are quite useful for understanding the factors, and their importance, that underpin psychological vulnerabilities – particularly in expressing critical differences between the vulnerabilities and associated motivations of individuals (e.g., between individuals in conflict zones versus non-conflict zones) [23]. In addition, other models can provide important insights. For example, system dynamic modeling and econometric modeling, macro-structural models designed to forecast instability and conflict (e.g., ACTOR) can provide insight about the environment and its impact on the susceptibility of individuals and/or groups to become radicalized and pursue terrorist tactics. System dynamic models (macro-level non-linear feedback models) are helpful for looking at the impact of environmental factors on behaviors (group(s), government) and identifying tipping points. This is hugely useful since many of these outcomes are non-intuitive and do not fit with extrapolative thinking [24]. Agent-based models, since agents can be defined as macro level entities (e.g., government, military, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), can also be used to assess the probability of state failure. Rules can be written describing the behaviors, goals and characteristics of agents (e.g., tension and social comparison and social pressure) and then simulations can be conducted to assess the probability of various outcomes (e.g., inter-group conflict) [25]. Agent-based models could also be employed to provide insight about the both the cause and impact of reinforcing loops in System Dynamic Models or serve as cognitive models for individuals and groups, highlighting psychological vulnerabilities and susceptibility for recruiting by a terrorist group.

Modeling based on identifying risk-taking behaviors on the basis of relative deprivation (using sigmoid-utility theory) can potentially predict vulnerability to recruitment, provide insights on the evolution of radicalization and risk-taking preferences and the effects of “small world network” group dynamics. [21]

Grievances need to be considered in terms of how they're interpreted by the group [26]. Statistical models (e.g., regression analysis), which explore the relationship between environmental variables and behaviors using empirical data, are also quite useful. For example, this approach can be used to explore the relationship between government features or policies and group behaviors (e.g., violent actions) [27] or to explore the relationship between economic and political capacity variables and nation-state instability [25]. Other variants of statistical modeling (Bayesian Networks and Hidden Markov Models) are useful for tracking and fusing indicators of instability [25], with the notion that instability creates the perfect breeding ground for radicalization and terrorism [28].

13.3 SPARKS: FACTORS THAT TRIGGER RADICALIZATION AND TERRORISM

While environmental conditions can create the right conditions and impact individuals so as to increase susceptibility for recruitment and group mobilization, there must be a transformation for mobilization to take place (see Figure 13-2). The system elements interact with one another in a causative and highly dynamic fashion to form and support VNSAs [9]. Terrorism and radicalization is a process (or some would say a continuum) “inculcated through social processes and internalized over time” [12]. Radicalization can take months to years. The trigger or catalyst is often a cognitive event or crisis that causes the questioning of beliefs. These events or crises could take a variety of forms, for example economic (losing a job or blocked mobility), social (alienation, discrimination, racism, either real or perceived), political (international or local conflicts) or personal (death of a friend or family member) [29]. The process often starts with incitement, a message that commands and legitimizes a cause and provokes outrage, leading to the decision that political activity is the solution.




Figure 13-2: Systems View of Violence (Thomas, 2004).

Quintan Wiktorowicz suggested that activists emerge through a personal crisis, experienced discrimination or chance encounters with a charismatic recruiter who creates a “cognitive opening”, followed by a search for new ideas, followed by a frame alignment in which a movement’s message increasingly “rings true”. Once the key tenets of a movement’s message are accepted, intensive socialization takes place in study groups and one-on-one interaction. Emotive appeals are underpinned by ideological teachings, leading the

individual to the conclusion that he or she is personally responsible and obligated to join and become active. Peer pressure and group bonding reinforce the commitment of the member [30]. This is consistent with the concept of “moral shocks” as the frequent first step in participation in a social movement [31]. Affective dimensions are pervasive in social networks, often causing individuals to participate in activism [32].

Radicalization is a process with distinct phases working at the individual, group and social psychological levels (which are symbiotic). The individual interpretation of and response to socio-political conditions is influenced by personal psychology as well as group dynamics (family, peer group) [33]. One assumption that needs to be questioned is that of the rational actor, in which it is presumed that a well-ordered and transitive utility function exists that enables rational decisions based on full/perfect information with no time limits. Some radical actors may take cognitive “shortcuts”, a tendency identified through research on heuristics and biases [34] or use “fast and frugal heuristics” like “take the best” (mechanisms of inference developed under time constraints) [35]. Individuals may filter and interpret information based on storytelling narratives they’ve created and/or been exposed to (e.g., Jihad versus McWorld) [36]. Neurobiologists postulated that emotional and affective considerations operate subconsciously and affect reasoning more than explicit arguments/premises.

The “hot mind” may be critical in explaining deviations from rational decision making. Both emotion and identity have been identified as critical resources in and provide different motives for initial and continued participation in crowds and social movements [37]. Emotion is the basis for commitment processes to bind actors into social systems and sustain activism over the long haul. When mixed with a positive evaluation of an ideology, this sense of commitment is strengthened (“moral commitment”) [38]. Also, dynamic approaches to reasoning have highlighted the importance of diachronic cognition (time dependent reasoning, e.g., using historical events to filter/interpret current events) [39]. Work by Scott Atran has reinforced the notion that radical groups/VNSA’s employ non-instrumental reasoning in which “sacred values” trump rational thinking; for example, greater support for an apology versus financial incentives [40]. Not falling prey to inappropriate (rational actor assumptions), and considering organizational and cultural narratives, diachronic cognition and emotional and affective considerations are all important.

Existing research does not support the hypothesis of a specific terrorist personality or mental pathology, but identifies group dynamics to explain behaviors. Small dense networks promote the confluence of in-group love and out-group hate and enable the transformation of self-interest to self-sacrifice for a cause. “Small world” networks enable the rapid diffusion of terrorist innovation through social hubs and flexible communication in all directions, often in contrast to the doctrine espoused in terrorist manuals [41].

Individuals are both self-selected and recruited either directly or indirectly by a charismatic leader. In some countries (e.g., Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Chechnya), recruits are members of locally dominant culture, involved in on-going conflict. In this case, membership and participation in the conflict is part of tradition with a sympathetic local population and families often having a history of resistance. In these conflict zones, the motivation for recruitment and radicalization is revenge in reaction to pain over personal loss/trauma, to gain a feeling of control over negative events [23]. There are often economic incentives to join as well, since the families of “martyrs” are compensated.

In non-conflict zones (including areas with diaspora populations), ideology is broadcast (in the internet, TV, radio and in sermons) to foster resonance. These messages are, in many cases, a tonic for disillusionment and spread via contagion. Friends or relatives affected by a death (e.g., a suicide) are motivated to act similarly [23]. Alternatively, the motivation can be a sense of collective grievance (e.g., genocide in Bosnia or the invasion of Iraq as a collective grievance of the Muslim community). A study of Italian and German terrorist groups resulted in the observation that radicalization is “encouraged less by direct experiences of violence than by the sense of being violently rejected by mainstream society.” [42] The resulting promise of a sense of belonging and adventure, positive identity and empowerment are compelling reasons to join and actively participate in radical groups [23]. New converts to an ideology are more susceptible to radical ideas (political

or religious) and, once recruited, are “overachievers ... overcompensating for the fact that they did not see the light before.” [43]

Another trigger and reinforcer of radicalization that needs mention is that of being detained or imprisoned. Incarceration creates grievances against the government and an opportunity for key physical contacts [16]. Prisons are an isolated environment with a “captive” audience, a large population of disaffected young men. Several examples of individuals who became significantly more radical in prison include Ahmidan (leader of Madrid bombing group) and Hamman (leader of the militant wing of Islamic Group, responsible for the murders of Egyptians and foreigners). Ayman Zawahiri, second in command to Osama bin Laden, was jailed after the Sadat assassination and said, “after Sadat’s assassination the torture started again ... was brutal this time.” A radical English version of the Qur’ān (containing an appendix entitled, “The Call to Jihad”) is widely available in prisons. Prisoners are vulnerable to recruitment into radical organizations after parole due to their financial and social vulnerability. Providing for prisoners after their release can engender their loyalty [44]. The use of torture, and other forms of individual rights violations, is linked to increased radicalization [16].

Social Movement Theory (SMT) can provide a mechanism to understand the mobilization of radical groups, the relationship between resonance and recruiting and the impact of societal mechanisms (government policies, countermeasures, coverage of media) on the radicalization process. The focus is not just on small group dynamics but a holistic look at larger groups and the relationships between individuals, group and society. SMT provides a framework to link structural factors, group processes and individual motivation including the feedback from the surrounding environment to the movement.

Three major SMT approaches include Strain Theory, Resource Mobilization Theory and Framing Theory. Strain theory focuses on the external strains on society that degrade institutional efficacy and lead to instability and mass mobilization. Strain, a common factor stated as causative of conflict, is the “existence of ambiguities, deprivations, tensions, conflicts and discrepancies in the social order.” [45] The strain can be economic (relative deprivation), but also strains in values [46]. However, strain may be necessary but not sufficient and movements are purposeful, not just coping mechanisms. Resource Mobilization Theory focuses on how movements engage in garnering support and enlarging their constituency and how social networks, churches, schools and charities define and disseminate grievances, seeking to exploit openings or closures in the political space and calculate the action based on the greatest chance of success. However, the extent to which a movement’s cause resonates with a constituency often matters more than resource availability and political opportunity. Framing Theory focuses on how individuals come to conceptualize themselves as a collectivity by the social production and dissemination of meaning.

A “frame” refers to an individual’s worldview and includes values, beliefs, attributes and mechanisms of causation as an organizing construct for experience and guide for action [47]. According to framing theory, social mobilization depends on whether a movement’s version of “reality” resonates with its potential constituency (known as “frame alignment”, congruence between the interests, values and beliefs of an individual and an organization). This can be facile, with “sentiment pools” of individuals sharing a grievance with the organization, or the result of value, belief manipulation by a movement entrepreneur. Key factors include the degree of compatibility between the movement’s message and a broader cultural context, risk and cost associated with movement membership, the extent of internal coherence of messages, the existence or absence of competing frames/movements and the status and reputation of key messengers [48].

Framing Theory explains violent radicalization and terrorism in terms of the distinct constructed reality shared by group members who frame problems as injustices, attribute responsibility for injustices and construct an argument for the moral justification and efficacy of using violence against civilians to right the perceived wrong. In contrast to psychological approaches, Framing Theory focuses on relational position rather than innate characteristics. Frames aid in mobilization by identifying a grievance, calling for corrective action and attributing blame. They offer reasonable, attainable solutions for ameliorating grievance and

provide the motivation for collective action by aligning individual values and orientations with movement goals, providing a rationale for participation and a vocabulary for accounting for actions [49]. The resonance between the objectives of a radical group and a potential recruit occurs on multiple levels. The ideology is spread by word of mouth, sermons, films/videos, songs. Inside conflict zones the framing emphasizes trauma, hardship and humiliation resulting from occupation, loss of homes and struggle over territory, ethnicity, and independence. In non-conflict zones, the framing focuses on fostering collective grievance (e.g., claims about Islam under attack illustrated, often graphically, with images from conflict zones) [23].

Representative frames used to recruit new members by militant jihadi radicals are: the Islamic community faces assault, military attack from infidels, the potential for cultural corruption and/or social disintegration, and glorification of jihad as an adventure, noble cause which provides a sense of direction and meaning and jihad as not only a spiritual quest, but also armed defence [29].

In Indonesia, Laskar Jihad, a militant Salafi organization, used a series of frames to mobilize fighters during the Moluccan conflict, which began as a clash between two youth groups and evolved into a collective conflict between Muslims and Christians. The first was a statement of grievance that stated in sweeping terms of the thousands of Muslims killed and hundreds of others expelled in the Moluccan conflict during Wahid's presidency. The second frame was about Muslim "cleansing", conjuring imaging of a Muslim genocide at the hands of Moluccan Christians. The third was an accusation that Moluccan Christians were Zionists – essentially a "guilt by association" frame. By emphasizing a "spiral of conflict" and linking it to other key issues for Indonesian Muslims, they effectively used "frame bridging" which combines elements of separate public opinion sectors, merging them in the process. They also employed "frame amplification", a dichotomized articulation of the world in stark "us" and "them" terms, and "frame extension", in which the issue was extended from the Moluccan conflict to a more general conflict involving Muslims [50].

13.4 SPARKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODS AND MODELS

Models can help provide an understanding of where conditions exist that would foster and resonate with psychological vulnerabilities (the existence of ethnic fissures, socio-economic grievance, discrimination, alienation, opportunities for recruitment (either direct or indirect via Internet, etc.)). Appropriate models, in addition to the verbal conceptual models developed by Speckhard and others include rule-based models (another form of expert models) or Bayesian Belief Networks, discourse analysis and agent-based models. For example, Tom Pyszczynski [51] found that mortality primes (e.g., images related to mortality) resulted in an increase in individuals' support for terrorism. These relationships could be expressed by rules in a model or by probabilities in a Bayesian Belief Network.

Understanding the frames a group uses, how they reflect and foster group identity and alignment with frames in the environment is important. Group identity is crucial for recruitment into a radical group and continued participation in the social movement by fostering identities that resonate within a larger culture [52]. Frames inspire and legitimate collective action by identifying grievance, highlighting a solution and rationale for participation. Discourse analysis, an analytical method enabling the formation of a verbal conceptual model, can provide a window into the hidden agenda of the speaker, providing cues about resonance with ideology, expressions of grievances and, through discursive mechanisms related to in-group/out-group polarization, a sense of the salience of social characterization which is a correlate of inter-group violence or conflict [53]. Critical discourse analysis can be used to analyze the frames used by a group [54]. Agent-based models can enable an examination of social movement mobilization, the impact of messages, etc. Agent-based models can also serve as cognitive models for key individuals and groups, providing insights into psychological vulnerabilities, and susceptibility to recruitment, as well as forecasting plausible behaviors. One particular form of agent-based models, Cellular Automata, can be useful for looking at the spread of a message and movement. Finally, Social Network Analysis can

identify influential individuals and enable an understanding of the network structure and dynamics. Social Network Analysis is a useful tool for assessing organizational structure and information flow.

13.5 OXYGEN AND WIND: FANNING THE FLAMES OF RADICALIZATION AND TERRORISM

As an individual becomes more radicalized, they often begin a process of gradual alienation from society at large based on feelings of rejection/lack of acceptance, concomitant with a growing sense of disempowerment (ability to change the circumstances). One characterization of terrorists stated that 84% were cut off from their culture and social origins...” they were marginalized, underemployed and generally excluded from the highest status” Dirk Laabs, a documentary filmmaker and reporter, said the Hamburg (9/11) cell was “not integration into the community but withdrew from it to live in a parallel universe of Jihad.” [5]

As the level of radicalization increases, the detachment increases. This is evident in the behavior of the 9/11 hijackers, the London and Madrid bombers and others. The withdrawal is accompanied by increasing polarization in the way the events of the world and “others” or out-groups are viewed. For example, in the case of the London bombers the external events in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq “encroached into ... perceptions and ... fomented a steady disengagement with the world” [12]. This is exacerbated by tendencies for individuals in small cohesive groups to find it difficult to voice dissent when a majority of the members agree on something, even when it is objectively false [23]. As the level of radicalization increases, the detachment increases. This is evident in the behavior of the 9/11 hijackers, the London and Madrid bombers and others.

Once the “Alienation Threshold” is crossed (see Figure 13-3), radical group members have an increasing need to be with like-minded individuals who affirm their sense of alienation and anger and collectively replace feelings with confidence and the inclination to act against those responsible for past injustices and slights. Irrelevance and helplessness is replaced by a sense of control and importance at being part of a collective effort against an adversary. The “bunch of guys” dynamic transforms resentment into hatred and rejection of society [41]. The polarization is echoed in the group’s discourse, with increased euphemism expressed about the in-group and increased derogation (e.g., hostile, corrupt) expression of the out-group. This is a standard psychological tactic, dehumanization of the “other” in order to justify conflict/violent action. Studies have shown that individuals act more cruelly if the responsibility is collective versus individual [55]. This effectively rationalizes future behavior, shifting the group/sub-culture norm. An example of this is a parable shared by an imam from one of the mosques attended by the 9/11 in which there are two rams, one with horns and one without. In the next world “Allah switched the horns from one ram to the other, so justice could prevail.” [5] At this point, a “Violence Threshold” is crossed by some or all of the members of the group.




Figure 13-3: Evolution of a Terrorist (Wright-Neville, 2006).

Social contagion, networks and mechanisms of information cascades provide important clues about some of the mechanisms underlying this transitional phase related to increasing radicalization between the “Alienation Threshold” and the “Violence Threshold”. Social contagion is defined as the “social transmission by contact, of sociocultural artifacts or states” [56] or as a process and form of collective excitement “in which emotions and behavioral patterns spread rapidly and are accepted uncritically by the members of a collective” [57]. Research has focused on two major types: emotional (spread of mood and affect) contagion and behavioural (spread of behaviours) contagion. Examples are waves of suicides, rule breaking behavior (e.g., teenage smoking, speeding) and contagions of aggression (e.g., angry crowds).

Two types of theories have emerged to explain social contagion. Emergent Norm theory [58] and Social Learning Theory [53],[59] posit that behaviors spread not by contagion/contact, but due to deliberate attempts to adhere to collective norms or deliberate imitation resulting as a strategy to deal with uncertainty, respectively. Alternatively, Convergence Theory [60], Disinhibition Theory [61] and Deindividuation Theory [62] posit that homogeneity and clustering are not due to contagion, but are due to emergent collectives due to prior shared motivations, imitation mediated by restraint release “due to observing another perform an action that the individual is in conflict about performing himself” [63] and restraint reduction due to the anonymous nature of collectivities, respectively. Environmental macro-social factors that affect social contagion and information transfer are population density, ethnic heterogeneity and the concentration of social interactions. This, in turn, impacts the temporal change or spatial spread of crime [64]. Contagion is evidenced in the behaviors of friends or family members of a suicide bomber who are affected by the act and decide to act similarly.

There are some critical lessons from studying social contagion and information cascades that are important here. The nature of a network that fosters global cascades of social influence is one that is connected, but not too connected (exhibiting two phase transitions). Below a certain level of connections, a network will not experience cascades and above a certain level of connections the impact of any single person is too small to trigger a cascade. Information cascades leverage “small world networks”, networks with high

connectedness (high degree of clustering) and a low average path length between one person and any other enabled by “weak” or “bridge” links to otherwise remote parts of the network [65].

Early in the radicalization process, prior to the gradual alienation, individuals are connected in a network. Cascades are more often triggered by an individual with an average amount of connections or neighbors, not necessarily a “hub” (highly connected “influentials”); thus, the key is the connectivity of the vulnerable (“early adopter”) cluster to which the initial innovator/instigator (e.g., charismatic leader or “spiritual sanctioner”) is connected. Early adopters are the individuals who seize upon an idea, including apostles and followers of revolutionaries. They are the first to be influenced by an external stimulus. The larger the cluster of early adopters, the farther an idea will spread [65]. Said another way, the success of a trend (e.g. radicalization based on some ideology) depends on how susceptible overall society is to the trend, not on the person who starts it. This is not to say that some people aren’t more instrumental than others, but they aren’t simply the ones that are more connected [7]. So, for recruitment into a radical group, a large cluster of individuals vulnerable to a particular idea is a gold mine.

Small dense networks promote the confluence of in-group love and out-group hate and enable the transformation of self-interest to self-sacrifice for a cause. “Small world” networks enable the rapid diffusion of terrorist innovation through social hubs and flexible, informal communication in all directions, often in contrast to the doctrine espoused in terrorist manuals [41]. It is interesting to note that while “hubs” are less important at this stage, accident and circumstance can play a role here. For example, in the case of the Madrid bombing the two main cells merged after a chance meeting in prison and marriage. Researchers designing a viral marketing scheme married two concepts: small network effects (using dense connectivity to connect locally through word-of-mouth and “weak links” to spread to other parts of a network), along with aiming the ad at as broad a market as possible since the person who triggers it is virtually impossible to predict [7].

However, as individuals (and groups) become increasingly radicalized, the process for influence/information cascades becomes that for sparsely or poorly connected networks (reflecting the extreme alienation from society). Below a certain threshold (the other tipping point or phase transition), cascades can’t spread because the network is too poorly connected and fragmented into “islands”. As groups become more radicalized (associated with greater risk preference) they become progressively insular and pressure increases to conform with the in-group [66]. With less exposure to different influences/ideas, in a poorly connected/insular group certain individuals can be highly influential (e.g., charismatic leaders). This explains how the Branch Davidians, a religious cult, could maintain implausible beliefs because of their isolation, continual reinforcement of each other and lack of interaction with the outside world [64]. A network analysis of the links in the “global Salafi jihad” reflects dense clusters with few links spanning the clusters [41]. This is consistent with observed behaviors of increasingly radicalized individuals prior to a violent action/event who engage both in person and through the internet in “self-imposed brainwashing” forming, in part, a “virtual network of like-minded individuals that serves to reinforce beliefs, commitment and further legitimize them.” [29]

13.6 SUSTAINMENT OF RADICALIZATION

The ability to sustain a radical/terrorist group is related to the level of organizational maturity and complexity. Organizational maturity can be assessed by examining the inputs, transformations and outputs of the organization. In the initial radicalization stages, a VNSA is focused primarily on scanning the environment, determining the state’s response to environmental grievances and the prospects for violent action to address the unspecified goals of the organization (e.g., survival, profit, vengeance, power). As it grows, it is heavily focused on recruitment and developing resources, specifies its goals, takes initial form (including potentially a formal military organization and infrastructure) and manifest basic functions (e.g., develop leadership, recruit). A more mature organization will exhibit progressive differentiation (e.g., intelligence and military logistics divisions, special combat teams, multiple town chapters) and

clarified goals (e.g., the Al Aqsa Martyr Brigades goal of creating a sovereign Palestinian state and ending Israeli occupation) [9].

Another measure of the ability of a radicalized organization to sustain itself is organizational congruence, the relationship between internal system components and between organizations and their environment. A VNSA with good congruence has its sub-systems functioning in a reinforcing manner and optimizing coordination and information exchanges to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency. These sub-systems can be categorized as support (which includes recruiting, resource acquisition, stakeholder associations, competitive learning and operational employment), maintenance (preserving equilibrium and maintaining stability through socialization, as well as rewards/sanctions), authority/leadership (fostering learning, developing strategy and providing organizational control) and conversion (conversion of inputs to product, for example non-violent (e.g., reconnaissance)/violent operations, training, production (conversion of resources into materials, for example drugs/weapons, social services and messaging (e.g., ideology, fatwas)). The importance of these sub-systems varies with organizational maturity; for example, during initial stages support (e.g., recruiting, resource acquisition and stakeholder associations) is at the forefront, whereas maintenance and conversion functions become more important as the organization grows and matures. Congruence is also manifested by a good match between environmental opportunities/constraints and system functions. Al Qaeda's adaptive strategy of shifting from hardened targets in the US to soft targets in Africa is an example. Conversely, poor congruence can lead to organizational failure (e.g., ETA recruitment of undisciplined youth to execute complex attacks) [9]. Resources (e.g., capital and people) are very important for sustainment of terrorist organizations [67]. In the case of the Madrid bombers, there was a financial pipeline for operations in Iraq and elsewhere originating in Tetuan, Morocco, fed by reputable businessmen who give zakat (charity) to local groups. The cost of funding a Tetuan suicide bomber bound for Iraq was estimated to be 6,000 Euros [5].

Interestingly, the level of events/casualties can allow us to infer the level of fragmentation in the organization and thus make some inferences about the organizational structure and maturity.

A study of the current wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, global terrorism in non-G7 countries and guerrilla warfare in Columbia resulted in the conclusion that the dynamic evolution of asymmetric conflict is correlated less with the geography, ideology, ethnicity of religion and more to the day-to-day mechanics of insurgency. The assertion is that the same mechanism of continual coalescence and fragmentation of "attack units" underlies modern insurgent wars. The number of casualties per terrorist attack (for non-G7 countries) and the number of casualties within a given war exhibit the power law distribution with $\alpha = 2.5$. Since the frequency of events on all scales is produced by the same exponent, the network is called "scale free". In Columbia and Iraq (insurgencies) α is evolving toward 2.5, in conventional conflicts $\alpha \sim 1.7$; thus, the value of α may actually be useful for characterizing conflicts. A model was developed to explain this behavior, representing an insurgent force as an evolving population of relatively self-contained loosely organized units which coalesce to pool resources and increase capability and fragment when the threat of capture increases. This process of coalescence (with associated greater destructive power) and fragmentation reaches a dynamic steady-state with a fixed distribution of groups of different sizes and a power law distribution with $\alpha = 2.5$ [68].

Charismatic leaders or "spiritual sanctioners" [29] play a role in maintenance of commitment and increasing radicalization. For example, in the case of Mohammed Nasir Abas, formerly of Jemaah Islamiyah, was encouraged to attend an Afghanistan training camp by a charismatic mentor and become an arms instructor and religious teacher and Abu Bakar Bashir's (the "emir of JI") anointing of him as one of JI's regional leaders [69]. Leaders are responsible for developing "Us-versus-Them / War on Islam" group worldview, with global events perceived through the extremist ideological lens and providing moral justification for jihad. Key behavior indicators at this stage are withdrawal from mosque and politicization of new beliefs. Other mechanisms to foster continued commitment and affirm the acceptance of one's "duty" include "bonding" experiences and tests, including training camps, Outward Bound-like activities,

religious retreats, websites and blogs to reinforce beliefs and rationale for action, and making a last will and testament [29].

13.7 OXYGEN AND WIND: IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODS AND MODELS

The role of models for understanding the spread and maintenance/sustainment of a radical organization that engages in terrorism includes enabling an understanding of the impact of a variety of factors on the behaviors of a terrorist group, including relationship/competition with other groups, government reactions/counterterrorism policies, perceived legitimacy of the salient groups (including the government). Models can provide insights on triggers for a group to employ terrorism tactics or change tactics, targets and/or the intensity of attacks. Models are also useful for assessing changes in organizational structures, since organizational structures are related to capability. Models can also help track and identify changes in behaviors, goals and motivations of VNSAs, providing insights in changes in a terrorist group over time – increasing or decreasing radicalization, fissures in the group, likelihood of fragmentation, changes in political grievance or socio-economic grievance.

As stated previously, understanding the group identity is crucial for explaining continued participation in the social movement and key to gaining that understanding is analyzing the frames used to inspire and legitimate action. Discourse analysis is certainly one method that can be used to develop verbal conceptual models of the salient frames. In addition to Discourse Analysis, Self Organizing Maps, a variant of Artificial Neural Networks, can be used to characterize communications and identify discursive patterns characteristic of a significant shift in behaviors or attitudes toward behaviors. Statistical modeling is useful for providing insights into ongoing dynamics between Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) and other competing groups and the government, critical for forecasting the propensity to continue to pursue collective violence/terrorism as a tactic or change tactics (e.g., this method has been used to forecast changes in tactics from overt to covert in response to government policies [70]). System Dynamic Modeling can also provide useful insights on the spread or maintenance of terrorist groups based on their ability to represent a complex system-of-systems (VNSA, supporters, logistics, the environment) as well as highlight environmental changes that relate to political or socio-economic grievance (e.g., quality of life, infant mortality, security). Agent-based models are useful for understanding the potential for social contagion and information cascades [65], modeling fragmentation and defragmentation of groups [71] and forecasting changes in behaviors (including identifying emergent behaviors). Social Network Analysis can provide information on organizational structures and capability.

13.8 MODELING AND THE NEED FOR DYNAMIC ADAPTATION

Complex phenomena, like radicalization and terrorism, and complex systems, like VNSAs, embody “a network of relations that are spatial, temporal and causal. The new complex is sustained – i.e., stabilized – because the energetic bonds within it have established a particular equilibrium, one that will sustain this thing’s integrity until some greater energy is used to destroy it, or until energy within the system dissipates” [72]. The energetic bonds are the organizational connectivity (both internal and to the environment), the energy in the system is related to the resources, including new recruits. The energy to destroy it could be government interventions/policies, as well as threats from other organizations. Any analytic methods and models used need to continually assess the inputs and outputs of the organization, as well as the state/health of its constituent sub-systems, its connectivity. Interactions between the environment and the organization need to be periodically assessed since “... every dynamic relation to things outside a system is mediated by its material properties and architecture, or by that interpretation of the outside created by this agent’s synthesis of the available information” [72]. For example, perception of grievance drives recruitment, so government policies/behaviors can modulate this sub-system. All of this needs to be done with an informed psychological lens which takes into account “fast and frugal” decision-making heuristics, diachronic cognition, organizationally and culturally appropriate narratives and emotional and affective considerations.

A single model will not suffice to represent such a complex system. Any model of radicalization should consider, at a minimum, the group, the individual actors and their motivations and goals, the sympathizers and the environmental factors that impact their support and the group/individuals and the ideology that ties these together. A variety of types of models exist that can provide useful insights on various aspects of radicalization. It is important to understand what question is being addressed by a model, what type of data is available to determine the appropriate level and type of model.

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Appendix 13-1

13A.1 AGENT-BASED MODELS (ABM)

ABM is a class of models (containing elements of game theory, computational sociology, complex systems, emergence) useful for simulation of actions and interactions among autonomous agents or entities for the purpose of assessing system level effects, recreating and forecasting complex phenomena. These entities can be at multiple levels; that is, they can represent an individual, a group, a country, an institution, physical systems (e.g., weather) etc. Characteristics of the entities and the way they interact are defined (by theory, by rules from experts, by relationships derived from data, etc.) and then typically multiple simulations are run to identify plausible futures. Agent-based modeling is a general purpose technology because of the inherent malleability in the definition of agents and their interactions. A modeler can make certain assumptions which may or may not be based strongly on data. Simulation with Agent-based models can generate data suitable for analysis by induction and can enable testing and refinement of theories as well as a deeper understanding of causal mechanisms. Agent-based models are very appropriate for answering “what if” questions and are powerful in that they can help identify unexpected consequences (through the generation of emergent behavior(s) from the micro-level systems level to the macro-level). Monte Carlo methods and evolutionary programming are incorporated to introduce randomness into the model(s).

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13A.2 BAYESIAN NETWORKS

Bayesian Networks are probabilistic graphical models that represent a set of random variables (or “nodes”) and their conditional interdependencies. Formally, Bayesian networks are directed (“parent to child”) graphs whose nodes represent random variables in the Bayesian sense; that is, observed or inferred or unknown variables, or hypotheses. Graph edges represent conditional dependencies; nodes which are not connected represent variables which are conditionally independent of each other. Each node has an associated function that transforms input (values from a “parent” node) into a variable probability of the “child” node.

However, many implementations do not use Bayesian mathematics in the strictest sense but rather estimates, but are called “Bayesian” because they use Bayes rule for probabilistic inference. **Bayesian Belief Nets** are networks of connected nodes (e.g., groups, organizations, institutions) with each connection having an associated probability (commonly one assigned by one or more Subject Matter Experts). They are compact networks of probabilities (or causal graphs) that capture the probabilistic relationship between variables, as well as historical information about their relationships. Bayesian belief networks are very effective for modeling situations where some information is already known and incoming data is uncertain or partially unavailable (unlike rule-based or “expert” systems, where uncertain or unavailable data results in ineffective or inaccurate reasoning). In this form, it is more an **Expert System** than a Statistical Model in the purest sense. Bayesian Belief Networks are useful for managing

uncertainty; that is, understanding the impact of what is unknown. By changing the connection probabilities, one can ascertain the relationship with outcomes, essentially a sensitivity analysis. This model is very useful for supporting “what if” questions as well for assessing influence (“influence diagrams”).




Figure 13A-1: Bayesian Networks.

This is a simple example of a Bayesian Belief Network. The “wet grass” child node has two parent nodes: “sprinkler” and “rain”, both of which can cause “wet grass” (Charles River Analytics, 2005).

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13A.3 CELLULAR AUTOMATA

A Cellular Automaton (plural cellular automata (CA)) is a model that has been applied in a variety of fields including mathematics, computational theory, epidemiology, biology and physics. The model consists of a grid of cells. Each cell is in one of a finite number of states (“on” or “off”, “yellow”, “infected”, etc.). The neighborhood of a cell is defined (e.g., the set of cells a distance of 2 or less from the cell). At each time increment, the values of a cell are compared the state values of its neighbor and the state is changed (or kept the same) based on a transition rule. For example, the rule might be that the cell is “On” in the next generation if exactly two of the cells in the neighborhood are “On” in the current

generation, otherwise the cell is “Off” in the next generation. Typically, the rule for updating the state of cells is the same for each cell and does not change over time, and is applied to the whole grid simultaneously, though exceptions are known.

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13A.4 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Discourse Analysis is a variant of a **Verbal Conceptual Model** can be characterized as a way of approaching and thinking about a problem and question basic assumptions of various research methods. Since a person’s discourse choices are never neutral, but based on the way they see the world and the way they want others to see the world, discourse Analysis can help reveal the hidden motivations behind a text or the hidden agenda of the speaker or writer. Critical Discourse Analysis is a methodology that enables studying and analyzing discourse (both text and spoken words) to attempt to identify discursive sources of power, dominance inequality and bias and how these sources are initiated and maintained or changed within various social, political or historical contexts. The objective is to uncover ideological assumptions hidden in the text or speech and understand inherent relationships between discursive practices and cultural or social structures and processes.

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13A.5 EXPERT SYSTEMS

Some models are what are called expert systems. Expert systems attempt to provide answers or clarify uncertainties in situations typically calling for one or more human experts to be consulted. The model can represent the performance of the expert, or some aspect of their expertise, in a variety of ways (e.g., a knowledge base, a rule-based system, a Bayesian Belief Network). Expert systems may or may not have learning components but a third common element is that once the system is developed it is proven by being placed in the same real-world problem solving situation as the human Subject Matter Expert (SME), typically as an aid to human workers or a supplement to some information system.

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13A.6 HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS

Hidden Markov Models model a sequence as a discrete Markov chain in which the probability of a current state is only reliant on the previous state (hence the name “hidden”). The model is developed by calculating the observation probabilities of each state and the transition probabilities between each state. Typically the Viterbi algorithm is used to compute the optimum (most probable) state sequence for a given input sequence. So for example, if a person is outside a room and only sees the result of the coin tosses of three coins, those are the “observation sequence”. The bias of the coins and the order in which they are tossed is unknown (or “hidden”). The challenge is to find the state sequence (e.g., THHTTHHT), with T representing “tails” and H representing “heads”, for which the probability of the observation/input sequence is greatest. This model can be applied for forecasting an event such as a rebellion or coup or the probability of nation-state instability.

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13A.7 SELF ORGANIZING MAP MODELS

A Self-Organizing Map (SOM) or Self-Organizing Feature Map (SOFM) is a type of Artificial Neural Network that is trained using unsupervised learning (that is, it “learns” the pattern based on the data). It produces a low-dimensional representation or “map” of the training samples. This map is useful for elucidating patterns (e.g., voting patterns in Congress). The procedure for placing a vector from data space onto the map is to find the node with the closest weight vector to the vector taken from data space and to assign the map coordinates of this node to our vector. After creating the map in training, the “test” or new data is classified based on its closeness or similarity to regions on the training “map”.

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13A.8 SOCIAL NETWORK MODELING



Figure 13A-2: Social Network Modeling.

A **social network** model represents social structures (based on network theory) made of individuals or organizations (called “nodes”) in order to explore individual, social, organizational, political or cultural issues. The nodes are connected or tied. The ties can represent the type of relationship (e.g., kinship, friendship, knowledge, relationships of beliefs or knowledge or influence), the flow of information or resources, etc. The resulting graph structures can be very complex. Social networks operate on many levels, from small groups (e.g., families) up to the level of nations and their analysis provides key insights on problem solving, decision making, organizational performance, etc. The position of a node in the network (e.g., central, highly connected) is related to opportunities or constraints on its actions. Likewise, the network structure is related to group performance, capabilities or outcomes.

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13A.9 STATISTICAL MODELS

Statistical modeling involves the application of various statistical analysis techniques. To choose the appropriate technique, a useful first step is to evaluate the data, identifying possible outliers and assumption violations and forming preliminary hypotheses on variable relationships based on an examination of descriptive statistics, graphs, and relational plots of the data.

One class of statistical techniques is **Regression Analysis**. Regression analysis, often used for forecasting or prediction, includes techniques for modeling and analyzing several variables, when the focus is on the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. Regression analysis enables an understanding of how the typical value of the dependent variable changes when any one of the independent variables is varied, while the other independent variables are held fixed. Often regression analysis estimates the conditional expectation, or the average value, of the dependent variable given the independent variables (i.e., the independent variables are held fixed). Regression analysis is also used to understand which among the independent variables are related to the dependent variable, and to explore the forms of these relationships, including inference of causal relationships between the independent and dependent variables.

Logistic regression (sometimes called the **logistic model** or **logit model**) is used for prediction by computing the probability of occurrence of an event by fitting data to a logistic curve. It is used with either numerical or categorical predictor variables. For example, the probability that a rebellion will occur might be predicted from a variety of variables representing group behaviors (e.g., attacks, riots) and government behaviors (e.g., policies, strategies).

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13A.10 SYSTEM DYNAMIC MODELS (SDM)

System Dynamic Model represent the dynamic behavior of complex systems. The model elements (called “stocks”) are connected (with “flows”) unidirectionally (the output of A is an input to B) or bidirectionally (including feedback), as appropriate. Each element is defined by associated variables and the dynamics of the relationship between two elements is represented by a differential equation related to those variables.




Figure 13A-3: Causal Diagram for a Simple Population Model (Burns, 2003).

The model above is a causal model for Population (P). The “flows” can indicate increases in the Birth Rate (BR) and Death Rate (DR) based on the Birth Rate Normal (BRN) and Death Rate Normal (DRN) (Burns, 2003).

System dynamic models can represent non-linear behavior, including tipping points. This is quite useful as humans are not terribly adept at forecasting tipping points. SDMs enable the representation of complex system behaviors over time, including connectivity and feedback – thus enabling emergent behavior. The elements or stocks can, themselves, represent other sub-elements or stocks and so the model can be multi-resolution.

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Chapter 14 – AFFECT AND RISK PERCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM: TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF ITS PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS

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14.1 INTRODUCTION

The immediate consequences of terrorism are evident in the graphic news images of mayhem that quickly follow such events. But terrorism is like a stone tossed into a still pond. It triggers waves of consequence that ripple out over multiple timescales from the micro-level of the individual to the macro-level of international relations. The socio-political dynamics that terrorism triggers are undoubtedly complex and still not well understood [1]. Nor can the rippling effects of terrorism be attributed to the sheer magnitude of threat posed. As Mueller [2] points out, the statistical risk of terrorism in the U.S. is comparable to that of being killed by lightning or an allergic reaction to peanuts. Thus concern about terrorism as a form of threat, both by government officials and members of the public, reflects much about its psychosocial nature. The threat of terrorism, unlike the threat of lightning, seems to stem in large measure from the signal it sends, and from our own ability to imagine terrorists increasing the frequency and magnitude of their mayhem unless counter-terrorism measures are taken to stop them. As Slovic [3] proposed some time ago, the perception of risk would seem to have much to do with its signal value – what a particular type of threat portends for the future – and terrorism is a good example of risk as signal.

In some sense, terrorists use the signal value of a terrorist act to initiate a longer-term game that holds nations as captive players. Governments that do not respond aggressively enough to terrorist attacks may be perceived as weak and ineffective by their attackers and citizens alike. Conversely, too vigorous a response may strain a nation's economic resources, undermining its long-term military power and capabilities to achieve other objectives. When the response is military in nature, it can embroil a nation in deadly conflicts that may have waning public support, particularly if casualties mount without clear signs of movement towards victory. Moreover, when the counter-terrorism measures that are invoked limit human rights and freedoms or violate international laws based on ethical principles, terrorists can gain a strategic advantage by undermining their opponents' moral authority and diplomatic influence on the world stage. All games that involve strategy have a psychosocial dimension. The terrorism game, particularly when played out on an interconnected world stage, as is common today, is an extreme and high-stakes example of this. For this reason, the game metaphor may be particularly apt for the terrorism-counterterrorism cycle and should be considered alongside and contrasted with the four popular metaphors of counterterrorism – war, law enforcement, social epidemic, and prejudice reduction (namely, overcoming inter-group prejudices that, according to this metaphor, are thought to underlie terrorism) – recently discussed by Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, and Victoroff [4].

In the present chapter, I examine some recent research that examines one aspect of the psychosocial dimension: the role of affect or emotion in shaping risk perceptions concerning terrorist attacks and anticipated resilience in the face of such attacks. The public's perception of risk can have important implications for the effectiveness of government plans to respond to disasters, including terrorist attacks. For instance, in one study that I conducted in collaboration with a group of Carnegie Mellon University researchers [5], Canadian participants were presented with a scenario of a nuclear blast in their region (all cities in the province of Ontario) caused by a terrorist attack. Participants were asked to decide how long it would take them to relocate back to their home after a mandatory period of relocation away from

their home had ended and to rate the importance of factors that might influence their decision. Risk of cancer was rated very highly but, even more importantly, the importance of cancer risk to participants was the strongest predictor of the time they would take to return home ($\beta = .42, p < .01$). Indeed, the only other factor that significantly predicted time to return home was the importance they placed on missing their home ($\beta = .29, p < .01$) – itself an affectively-laden assessment. The study clearly indicates that risk perceptions in times of real crisis, such as during a terrorist attack, are likely to be an important determinant of personal decision-making.

14.2 AFFECT AND RISK PERCEPTION

It has long been known that perceptions of risk or threat among the general public are influenced by a multi-dimensional array of psychosocial factors that, among others, include feelings of dread and outrage [6],[7],[3]. Leaders of terrorist organizations are acutely aware of the psychological bases of risk perception and attempt to use those bases to their strategic advantage, seeking to prompt fear and perceived risk that is disproportionate to the statistical risk yet highly representative of the iconic images of terror that acts of terrorism so easily evoke [8]. Sunstein [9] refers to this process as *probability neglect*, where individuals attend to the *possibility* of catastrophic harm caused by terrorism while ignoring the fact that the probability of such harm-based historical evidence is low. Mueller [10] describes the process as akin to a reverse lottery in which one's chance of losing (namely, being a victim of terrorism) is extremely low, yet just as good as for anyone else by virtue of the unpredictable, uncontrollable, and seemingly random nature of their infrequent occurrences. Most theorists acknowledge the importance of emotions such as fear, worry, and dread play an important role in keeping the threat of terrorism highly salient, and how terrorists, unscrupulous politicians, and profiteers in the terrorism industry may attempt to exploit such emotions for their own advantage [10],[11].

Much research on the effect of affect on risk perceptions has emphasized the importance of an individual's affective state at the time of judgment [12],[13]. According to these “affective valence” theories, one's current affective state is used as a cue to gauge the level of threat associated with various types of events or scenarios. For this reason, Schwarz and Clore [14] refer to “feelings as information”, and Slovic et al. [13] refer to this process of using feelings as information in order to arrive at judgments (including those about threat) as the “affect heuristic”.

Support for affective valence theories comes from a number of different sources. For instance, Johnson and Tversky [15] demonstrated that participants who were experimentally put in a positive mood tended to be more optimistic about risks than their counterparts who were put in a negative mood, even when the risks assessed were semantically unrelated to the mood stimuli. Other examples of support come from studies indicating that the inverse relationship observed between perceived risks and perceived benefits is mediated by affective assessments [16],[17]. In the terrorism domain, Shiloh, Güvenç, and Önköl [18] found that negativity of affect was directly related to perceived costs of terrorism and inversely related to perceived control in both Turkish and Israeli samples. Moreover, in the Turkish (but not the Israeli) sample, there was a significant positive correlation between negative affect and perceived vulnerability to terrorism – a composite measure comprised mainly of perceived risk items.

Whereas affective valence theories stress the effect of the “good-bad” quality of one's affective state on judgment, emotion-specific theories have proposed that different emotions that share the same valence may nevertheless lead to different, even opposing, effects on judgment. The basis for this claim is that different emotions are not only the consequence of distinct cognitive appraisals [19], but that they also give rise to distinct appraisals that form an important part of the basis for emotion's influence on judgment [20],[21],[22],[23]. Moreover, according to this view, the appraisal tendencies generated by specific emotions can persist, spilling over to influence judgments even when the target of judgment differs from the emotion-eliciting stimulus [24],[25].

In terms of risk perception, two emotions that have received research attention are fear and anger. Although both are negative emotions, fear arises from and gives rise to appraisals of uncertainty and situational control, whereas anger is associated with appraisals of certainty and personal control [26],[19]. Given that perceived risk is inversely related to perceived certainty and personal control [27],[3] and stimulus familiarity [28], there is reason to hypothesize that perceived risk or threat might be amplified by feelings of fear and attenuated by feelings of anger. This is precisely what some experimental research has found [21],[26].

Of particular relevance to the present context, Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff [29] examined the effect of fear and anger on terrorism risk perceptions in a representative U.S. sample drawn in 2001. In the fear condition, participants were asked to write about what aspects of 9/11 made them the most afraid and then saw a picture and heard an audio clip about terrorism that had in pre-tests been shown to induce fear. In the anger condition, participants were asked to write about what aspects of 9/11 made them the angriest and then saw a picture and heard an audio clip about terrorism that had in pre-tests been shown to induce anger. Compared to anger-induced participants, fear-induced participants perceived greater risk of terrorism-related threats to the U.S. as well as greater risk of terrorism-related and terrorism-unrelated events to both self and average others. Moreover, when current fear and anger were controlled, the manipulated effect of emotion was no longer significant, demonstrating that the causal effect of the emotion manipulation was mediated by experienced emotion. When a sub-sample was examined a year later, not only did a new experimental induction of fear and anger once again have the predicted effects on perceived terrorism risk for the future (namely, replicating the effects just described), it also influenced retrospective assessments of risk perceived a year earlier in the predicted direction [30].

14.3 A RECENT INVESTIGATION IN THE CANADA-US CONTEXT

More recently, the predictive effect of fear and anger on risk perceptions was examined in a study commissioned by Defence R&D Canada – Toronto. I along with a Carnegie Mellon University research team comprised of Wandu Bruine de Bruin, Keith Florig, Baruch Fischhoff, Julie Downs, and Eric Stone [5] collected data from slightly over 200 members of the public in the Toronto and Pittsburgh regions. Participants provided baseline measures of their trait and state emotions prior to being presented with the first of two disaster scenarios. One scenario presented a risk communication about an ongoing avian flu pandemic that had affected the participant's region and provided risk-mitigating advice that focused on the use of N-95 surgical masks as a barrier method. The other scenario (see Box 1) presented a risk communication about a dirty bomb attack that had affected the participant's region and provided risk-mitigating advice that focused on sheltering at home or work until radiation levels decreased.

Box 1: Dirty Bomb Scenario.

Imagine that, about one hour ago, a truck bomb exploded in your area. It is suspected to be an act of terrorism. At least a dozen people have been reported dead and more than thirty others have already been taken to hospitals to be treated for injuries.

The truck bomb was a “dirty bomb” meaning it was laced with radioactive materials that were dispersed by the blast. The explosion created a cloud of radioactive dust that rose hundreds of feet into the air and was carried downwind in an easterly direction. Radioactive dust within this cloud can expose people to radiation, both while they are in the air and after the dust has fallen back to the ground. By now, one hour after the blast, most of this radioactive dust has settled onto the ground. Although the greatest concentration of radioactivity is found within a block or two of the point of the explosion, hazardous levels of contamination may occur as far as 5 kilometers (or 3 miles) downwind.

Health officials do not expect levels of radiological contamination to be high enough to cause radiation sickness, except perhaps among people who were within a few hundred meters (or yards) of the explosion location. Beyond that distance, the main health effect of exposure to the radioactive dust spread by this explosion is an increased risk of cancer. Exposure to the radioactive dust can occur in three ways. First, radiation can come from dust that is lying on the ground or on other surfaces. Second, radiation exposure can come from dust that settles on peoples’ skin, hair, or clothing. Finally, if radioactive dust is inhaled, they can lodge in the lungs and expose lung tissue to radiation. Cancer risk can be reduced by reducing all three types of radiation exposure.

Until authorities are able to identify where the areas of significant radiation are located, citizens within 5 kilometers (or 3 miles) of the explosion are advised by government health officials to go indoors and remain indoors. The walls of buildings will shield people from radiation emitted by radioactive dust on the ground. You are advised that if you have spent any time out of doors since the time of the explosion, you should remove your outer layer of clothing because it might be contaminated with radioactive dust. In addition, those who were outdoors should wash hair and exposed skin to flush away any radioactive dust that might have settled on them.

Imagine that you are within 5 kilometers (or 3 miles) of the explosion. You are advised by the officials to immediately seek shelter in the safest room in the building, whether you are at home or at your place of work. The safest room is the one that is best protected from radiation coming in from outside. This would be against an earth-backed basement wall or, if in a tall building, anywhere on the upper floors, but not on the three top floors.

You are also advised to make sure that it is hard for radiation dust to get into your “safest room” by closing doors and windows, and by shutting off air conditioning and closing vents. When you go into the “safest room”, you should bring food, water and other necessities with you. Once you are in your “safest room”, you are advised to stay there as much as is possible to minimize your radiation exposure. You will be notified through broadcast announcements when it is safe to leave your shelter area. Citizens are strongly advised not to attempt to flee the area because this is likely to result in even greater radiation exposure than remaining indoors. You will be given more information as soon as it becomes available.

The order of scenario presentation was counterbalanced across participants. After reading the first scenario, participants were asked about a number of their anticipated behavioural and psychological responses to the information they had received. Among these measures, we examined their perceived mortality and morbidity risk. For example, one item asked participants “What is the chance that you would be hurt in the explosion and die from your wounds?” and they were asked to respond on a 0 = *no chance* to 100 = *certainty* 101-point scale. We also elicited assessments of participants’ anticipated physical and psychological resilience. For example, one item asked participants “How hard or easy would it be for you to cope *psychologically* with the consequences of this dirty bomb attack?” and they were asked to respond

on a 1 = *very hard* to 7 = *very easy* 7-point scale. Before we presented participants with the second scenario, we re-assessed their emotional state. After reading the second scenario, we once again asked participants about perceived risk, anticipated resilience, and re-assessed their emotional state.

Based on the earlier findings by Lerner et al. [29] and Fischhoff et al. [30], we hypothesized that participants' fear linked to a given disaster scenario would be a direct predictor of their risk perceptions regarding that scenario and an inverse predictor of their anticipated resilience. First, as shown in Figure 14-1, we observed that compared to baseline, reading the dirty bomb scenario caused an increase in reported fear ($F[1, 204] = 6.58, p < .05$), while the bird flu scenario showed a marginally significant increase ($F[1, 198] = 3.24, p = .07$). Similarly, compared to baseline, anger increased after participants read the dirty bomb scenario ($F[1, 204] = 6.34, p < .05$) and the bird flu scenario ($F[1, 198] = 4.05, p < .05$). Thus, the scenarios, hypothetical as they were, nevertheless produced an increase in both fear and anger. Fear and anger were significantly positively correlated in both the avian flu pandemic scenario ($r = .75, p < .001$) and the dirty bomb scenario ($r = .81, p < .001$).




Figure 14-1: Mean Fear and Anger (from [5]).

As emotion-specific accounts would predict, we found that when trait emotions and scenario-related anger were statistically controlled, participants' scenario-related fear was directly predictive of perceived risk in the avian flu pandemic scenario ($\beta = .33, p < .01$) and in the dirty bomb scenario ($\beta = .35, p < .01$). Moreover, as hypothesized, fear was an inverse predictor of anticipated resilience in dealing with the dirty bomb scenario ($\beta = -.38, p < .01$), however the coefficient did not reach the level of statistical significance in the avian flu pandemic scenario ($\beta = -.17, p > .10$). In other words, increases in reported fear were associated with increases in perceived risk and (in the dirty bomb scenario only) decreases in anticipated resilience.

We also conducted a comparable analysis of the predictive effect of anger on perceived risk and anticipated resilience. In this case, however, contrary to the prediction of emotion-specific accounts that anger would attenuate perceived risk, scenario-related anger was unrelated to either perceived risk or anticipated resilience in both scenarios (all $ps > .10$). Thus, overall, we found only partial support for the predictions of emotion-specific accounts. That is, we replicated the predictive effect of fear on perceived risk and extended that to anticipated resilience. However, we found no support in this study for the idea that anger either reduces perceived risk or augments anticipated resilience.

It is noteworthy that the predictive effects of fear on perceived risk and anticipated resilience were not restricted to state measures linked to the relevant scenario. We also found that trait fear was a direct predictor of perceived risk ($\beta = .20, p < .01$) and an inverse predictor of anticipated resilience ($\beta = -.28, p < .001$). Once again, though, the analyses we conducted using a trait measure of anger showed no significant predictive effects. Thus, the findings of the current research lend further support to the idea that fear can amplify perceptions of risk, although the study's findings also call into question the robustness of earlier findings [29],[30] which indicate that anger, conversely, attenuates perceived risk.

14.4 AFFECT AND RISK PERCEPTIONS ABOUT AGENTS IN THE TERRORISM GAME

A recent study by Oshin Vartanian and I [31] examined whether people's emotion towards either al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden (OBL) or former U.S. president George W. Bush (GWB) mediated the relationship between their state emotion (i.e., their emotional state right at the start of the experiment) and the level of threat they perceived the threat agent (i.e., OBL or GWB) to pose. In contrast to other studies examining the effect of emotion on risk perception [5],[26],[29], the threat measures we used pertained not to specific types of event, such as dying in a terrorist attack, but to two broad categories of consequence attributable to the actions of either OBL or GWB – namely, dangers to national security and dangers to individual rights. These categories of threat reflect a central value trade-off that underlies most terrorism games and certainly 9/11. In part, we were interested in examining how participants perceived the threats to national security posed by OBL and GWB. Moreover, we asked participants to evaluate these threats in both the Canadian and global contexts, anticipating that they would perceive greater threat overall in the international domain.

A 2006 EKOS poll [32] conducted at about the same time as the present research found that Canadians regarded former U.S. president George W. Bush as the third greatest danger to the world after Osama bin Laden and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, but ahead of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. This is a remarkable finding given that the U.S. is Canada's closest ally. GWB antipathy, therefore, unlike OBL antipathy, is highly counter-normative. Stated differently, while it normal for terrorist leaders to threaten our security, it is abnormal for leaders of our closest allied democratic states to do so.

We anticipated that this key difference would have an impact on the relationship between emotion and threat perception. Specifically, we hypothesized that participants' state emotion would be more influential on perceived threat among those participants evaluating GWB than among those evaluating OBL. By asking 120 participants (namely, University of Toronto undergraduates) to rate their emotions toward the relevant agent, we were also able to test a moderated mediation hypothesis in which the predictive effect of state emotion on threat perception would be mediated by emotion toward the threat agent when that agent was GWB but not when the agent was OBL. Given the measures we collected, we were able to test both emotion-specific and valence-based variants of this hypothesis.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions in a 3 (Emotion: anger, neutral, fear) \times 2 (Threat Agent: OBL, GWB) factorial design. Fear, anger, and neutral emotions were elicited using brief (2 – 5 min) film segments following Gross and Levenson's [33] procedure. Participants completed an emotion manipulation check once the film segment had elapsed. The manipulation check instructed subjects to rate the extent to which they felt 18 different emotions (amusement, embarrassment, love, anger, fear, pride, anxiety, guilt, sadness, confusion, happiness, shame, contempt, interest, surprise, disgust, joy, and unhappiness) while watching the movie on a 9-point scale (0 = *none at all*, 8 = *extremely*). These measures were also used to construct positive and negative state measures of emotion for subsequent analyses.

After completing the first phase of the study, participants were instructed to begin "a second study". Participants were presented with a color image of either GWB or OBL and were asked to indicate the extent

to which the target made them feel the emotions of anger, anxiety, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, fear, moral outrage, sadness, amusement, calm, happiness, interest, pride, and surprise using 9-point scales (0 = *none at all*, 8 = *extremely*). These items were similarly collapsed into positive and negative emotion scales of agent-related emotion. Finally, participants were instructed to assess how much of a threat they thought the target posed to Canada's national security, the security of nations worldwide, the rights and freedoms of Canadian citizens, and the rights and freedoms of citizens worldwide using 7-point scales (1 = *none at all*, 7 = *extremely*).

Our manipulation of emotion was effective. Participants in the anger condition reported feeling significantly angrier than participants in either the neutral or fear condition, and participants in the fear condition reported feeling significantly more fearful than participants in either the neutral or anger condition. We began our analysis of perceived threat by subjecting participants' responses to the four threat items (excluding the world peace item, which did not fit into this design) to a 2 (Region: Canada, international) \times 2 (Threat Type: national security, individual rights) \times 2 (Threat Agent: GWB, OBL) \times 3 (Emotion: anger, neutral, fear) mixed Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA). A significant main effect of region was found such that participants perceived greater threat posed by our target agents in the international context than in the Canadian context. A significant main effect of threat type was also observed such that participants perceived greater threat to national security than to individual rights. None of the other main or interaction effects were statistically significant. Thus, we did not find any significant effect of manipulated emotion on threat perceptions, contrary to the predictions of Lerner and Keltner's (2000) emotion-specific account. And, echoing the earlier EKOS poll, the null effect of agent indicates that participants in our sample regarded OBL and GWB as posing threats of roughly the same magnitude – a finding whose strategic implications for “winning hearts and minds” (even of citizens of closely allied states) is likely not to be lost on the present readership.

Although our manipulation of specific emotions (i.e., fear and anger) did not influence perceived threat, we did find that a composite measure of threat was predicted by the negativity of participants' state emotion. That is, the more negative participants felt at the start of the experiment, the more threat they perceived. Moreover, we found that this predictive effect was fully mediated by the negative emotion that participants felt toward the threat agent. Figure 14-2 shows the details of this mediational effect.




Figure 14-2: Mediator Model Showing Effect of Negative State Emotion (NEG-STATE) on Threat Mediated by Negative Emotion Towards the Threat Agent (from [31]).

Our findings clearly demonstrated that the nature of the relationship between negative state emotion and perceived threat was mediated by the negative emotion evoked by the threat agent being evaluated. This result suggests a two-stage affective process: First, a person's current level of negative emotion unrelated to a subsequent target of evaluation can “spill over” to affect emotional responses to that target. And, secondly, the negative emotion thus evoked by the target of evaluation (i.e., the threat agent, in this experiment) can subsequently serve as a cue to (or proxy measure of) the degree of perceived threat posed by the target.

The findings of this study point to the strategic importance of being able to manipulate people's emotions, particularly their negative emotion, in terrorism games. There is widespread agreement that strategic success in terrorism games requires winning over public opinion – or, to use a hackneyed phrase, people's "hearts and minds". The present findings indicate that the link between the heart and the mind is a strong one, at least when it comes to evaluations of the threat posed by iconic actors in terrorism games. Regardless of whether participants evaluated Bush or bin Laden as a potential source of threat, we found that the degree of negative emotion evoked in participants by the threat agent was predictive of the degree of threat that they perceived the agent to pose. In other words, the more negative Bush or bin Laden made participants feel, the more threatening they appeared.

These findings are particularly relevant in the terrorism context because terrorists often try to get the leaders of victimized states to respond in ways that compromise their moral and ethical values. Doing so often triggers moral outrage in public constituencies, resulting in a pool of negative emotion directed at the victim whose transgressions, unlike the terrorists, are likely to be perceived as counter-normative. The consequence of this process is that the victimized state may end up being seen as the aggressor, especially if that state is also perceived to be a powerful entity (the U.S. and Israel offer good examples). These socio-cognitive factors are of strategic importance in terrorism games and need to be better understood. The research summarized in this chapter contributes to fulfilling that requirement, but is of course only one small step. One hardly needs to state that more research along these lines is sorely needed.

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Chapter 15 – MODELING PSYCHO-SOCIAL RESILIENCE TO TERRORISM

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15.1 INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a psychological weapon waged upon society by non-state actors who attack civilian populations using various unconventional means in order to create the most horror, fear and panic possible in order to move the political process in the way the terror groups desires. In this type of psychological warfare, civilians are targeted for political purposes usually in a campaign of targeted attacks rather than one isolated attack, unless it is a horrific one, in order to continually create and reinforce in civilian perceptions an ongoing sense of threat and dread – that anyone and anyplace, at anytime can be a victim. By achieving this aim the terrorist can force concessions, withdrawals and win their way on their deadly battleground. In nearly every case the terrorists' main goal is to hit the largest possible target (symbolically or in the number of casualties) in the most horrifying manner and by doing so use the media to amplify its horror driven message which is some variant of “make your government give in to our concessions or suffer more threats to civilian security”. Terrorism is a tool and it is used to create states of fear, horror and dread not only in its immediate victims but in its wider witnessing audience.

Increasingly western populations and governments are finding themselves the targets of terrorist plots and need to take into account the best measures for protecting themselves. Defense against terrorism involves numerous measures: from hardening targets, strengthening police and intelligence functions, winning hearts and minds to fight against terrorists, diminishing popular support for terrorism, reducing the root causes as well as preparing civil populations to be resilient in the face of terrorist attacks. While counter-terrorism measures are important to fight terrorism, resilience to terrorism is also an important deterrent to terrorists. A population that is resilient in the face of terrorism and remains steadfast and cohesive in the face of attacks on the civilian population refusing to be moved by fear into political concessions is one of the most overlooked and perhaps best tools in the fight against terrorism.

This chapter examines the concept of psycho-social resilience to terrorism and is based upon the author's research on the topic with both military and civilian populations working in both combat and noncombat zones. It provides a model for defining and measuring the concept on both a societal and individual level.

In discussing this model of resilience to terrorism the author discusses challenges that governments and civil society faces in preparing their civilian population to be resilient in the face of terrorist attacks and the variables that are important to consider in enhancing resilience to terrorism. It discusses the challenges of reporting terrorism in the media, the psycho-social responses that are likely and how to deal with them. It examines the psychological dimensions of terrorist attacks on the civil population and how government responses and communications via mass media can greatly modulate stress responses and increase societal resilience to terrorism.

15.2 TERRORISM

Terrorism (defined as violent attacks carried out by non-state actors against civilians for the purpose of influencing the political process) has become a looming threat in the 21st century and appears for Western nations to be more of a security threat than modern warfare. Terrorism, by definition, is always intended to influence and intimidate a far larger group of people than the actual number of persons who

actually become victims. It is literally aimed at striking terror in the hearts and minds of a far wider witnessing audience who identify with the victims plight and become fearful that they too can become the next victims – if the terrorist is not either stopped or appeased. Terrorism is thus a pervasive type of psychological warfare and governments that wish to fight terrorism must understand the psychological responses to terrorism and how to enhance resilience in the face of terrorist attacks.

15.3 MASS MEDIA AND TERRORISM

Terrorists operating nowadays make full use of the mass media to either intentionally or unwittingly amplify its effects by broadcasting the terrorists' actions far beyond the immediate reaches of a terror attack. The psychological warfare carried out by terrorists is thus conducted largely through the mass media with terrorists plotting their actions in order to maximize media coverage with gory explosions, spectacular attacks, maximum civilian carnage and using suicide attacks in particular to strike terror into the civilian population. At times children in particular are targeted as in the Beslan school suicide/hostage-taking attack to gain full media coverage, or by using women suicide terrorists to maximize questioning about why a woman would willingly suicide for the cause. Media is essentially the stage upon which the terrorists conduct their actions. Nowhere was this phenomenon of terrorism played out on the "mass media stage" more clearly than in the Moscow Dubrovka theater in which forty terrorists overtook a Moscow audience of eight hundred theater goers, holding them hostage for three days while the world looked on in horror. By using twenty female terrorists to help carry out this act, all of them dressed in black with suicide belts strapped to their bodies, the terrorists effectively brought once again the media suppressed situation in Chechnya front and center for the world media.

By making use of media amplification terrorists manage to reach civilians far removed from the actual attack who are then psychologically victimized by it – suffering from anxiety and terror that they too can become victims. When considering the psychological repercussions of terrorism and to measure how successful terrorists are in their attempts to pressure public opinion through terrorism it is important to realize that terrorism nowadays is essentially a media experienced phenomena versus actual experience. Relatively few victims are killed but the spectacular manner in which they are killed terrorizes millions who fear they could be the next victims. Following the attacks of 9/11 the discussion of terrorism has dominated the international western media. Horrific images of the attacks in the US were broadcast repeatedly inside the United States and worldwide. Likewise horrific images from ensuing suicide terror attacks in Russia and later in the UK, terror attacks in Madrid, and the spate of suicide attacks that sprang up in Iraq and elsewhere following the US led invasion there have dominated the collective unconscious of the western media, so much so that for many westerners, particularly Americans, the myth of invulnerability has been torn apart. Americans much more than Europeans had to grapple post 9/11 with why terrorists and their supporters may hate them and with an increased perception of risk particularly when boarding airplanes and in public transportation.

Perception of the risk of being injured or dying from terrorist attack is largely media driven, a fact which places governments and civil society in the position of having to not only manage the actual threat and its psychological repercussions but the imagined threat created via the media by terrorists as well. This can only be done making clever use of the media in a manner that directly combats terrorists' impact upon the psychology of an entire nation. Likewise, media amplification may not be the only thing contributing to increasing perceptions of risk following a terror attack. Amplification can also originate with politicians as it occurred in the United States post 9/11 when politicians who stood to gain by repeatedly emphasizing the threat continually did so, thereby ratcheting up the perceived threat level and creating generalized anxiety throughout society where it had not existed beforehand. To promote resilience in society political leaders must not only understand how terrorists achieve their media borne goal but also use the media responsibly themselves to serve society.

15.4 MODELING RESILIENCE TO TERRORISM

In all models of resilience, the concept of resilience implies adaptability and a certain ability to “bounce back” in the face of a challenge or stressor. In this model resilience is likewise defined as dynamic variable, one that is influenced by many co-variables and that exists on a continuum of adaptability. To be resilient an individual or society must in the face of a challenge, retain flexibility, adaptability, functionality and empathy. To lose any of these is to lose resilience. Conversely for these traits to be present, or even to develop or to increase in the face of a stressor is to show positive resilience. Likewise, a loss of resilience is indicated by the appearance of pathological symptoms: of posttraumatic stress (including flashbacks, high arousal states, loss of concentration, irritability, etc.), dissociation (a separation of normal cognitive functions, emotional numbing, inability to think, etc.), anxiety, depression, and panic, all of which interfere with and create a loss of normal functioning.

According to this model the variables that affect resilience to terrorism on both a societal and individual level include ten main variables which both affect resilience to a stressor and may also be affected in turn by a traumatic stressor event. These ten variables are each discussed in turn below with implications for governments to consider steps for promoting and enhancing resilience rather than contributing to a reduction in resilience to terrorism.

- 1) **Posttraumatic Stress (PTSD)** – In the face of life threatening events individuals are at risk for developing posttraumatic stress, anxiety responses, depression, panic and dissociative responses. These responses all relate negatively to resilience in that they relate to a loss of functioning and a decrease in adaptability to a stressor. Acute stress reactions are also serious short-term posttraumatic effects. However, they often resolve on their own and do not negatively affect long-term resilience, whereas depression, posttraumatic stress, dissociative and anxiety responses can go on for months after a terrorist event and interfere with normal functioning. These more often require intervention. Governments are wise to train their first responders, help line operators, physicians and social workers to recognize and refer for appropriate treatment those they encounter after a terrorist attack and in the case of first responders, even themselves when they are experiencing traumatic flashbacks, dissociative responses, anxiety, avoidance, bodily arousal, depression, panic and loss of function that involves long-term losses in significant areas of life functioning. Often education about these issues is useful to help normalize acute and posttraumatic responses and reassure people that these normal responses will often pass on their own, but those in whom they don’t may benefit from professional caring help [1].
- 2) **Social Buffering** – When facing a terrorist event social buffering can do a lot to increase resilience provided the communications are positive and comforting. The social network one has a great deal to do with positively or negatively influencing perceptions of a terrorist event. When one looks at social buffering the sub-variables are comforting, information sharing, attachment style and communication network:
 - a) **Attachment Style** – There is considerable research that shows that there are distinct attachment styles (secure, anxious, avoidant, and chaotic/disorganized) present in adults that relate to their previous life experiences and that may predict how well they will be able to cope and calm themselves when under stress. We know from the work of Bowlby [2],[3], Main and Ainsworth [4] and many other attachment researchers that strange, fearful and anxiety provoking situations generally provoke attachment behaviors which are characteristic to the individual. Of the main attachment styles so far identified by researchers it is clear that those with more secure attachment styles are most likely to be able to make use of others to help dampen their anxiety, to calm anxiety and arousal states, and to increase their ability to cope in the face of a traumatic stressor.
 - b) **Comforting** – The expectation is that when an individual has others to turn to for comfort in the face of a traumatic stressor that its negative effect is ameliorated to a certain extent.

In Schuster et al. [5] and Cantor et al. [6] talking to others and discussing your feelings about terrorist attacks (mostly as seen on television) proves to be a significant coping strategy, especially with those who experienced substantial stress reactions.

- c) **Information Sharing** – This variable relates to the ability of individuals to share information that is useful for coping in a positive way. In the negative sense we know from the study of psychological contagion that emotions and even psychogenic illnesses can be transmitted quickly across a cohesive population [7],[8],[9],[10] meaning that when individuals share rumors and anxiety producing information they can induce panic and even psychogenic illness in one another. To promote resilience information should be shared in positive ways that influence a positive sense of coping rather than fear or panic.
 - d) **Communication Network** – This relates to the ability to communicate adequately with others in order to receive information that is calming and that is useful for coping. In many cases it is as simple as being able to reach loved ones on the phone or via the Internet and be reassured that they are okay. Receiving reassurances and being able to be in touch with loved ones relates positively to resilience.
- 3) **World Assumptions** – In the western world it is generally believed that most individuals function with three basic world assumptions: that the world is predictable, that personal safety exists, and in the goodness of the world [11]. While one could argue with this premise for those who have grown up with child abuse or other traumatic stressors, it may be applicable to most. A feature of traumatic stress is that it often shatters world assumptions leading to a sense of unpredictability, lack of safety and disbelief in the goodness of the world. When world assumptions remain intact an essential optimism remains. This is related to positive resilience. Shattered world assumptions on the other hand are more likely to relate to negative resilience, although if one works through shattered world assumptions there is often a new sense of resilience that emerges. If political leaders are aware of world assumptions they can speak directly to this aspect and reassure the public that predictability will be restored, as will safety, and that despite a terrorist attack the majority of society can still be deemed benevolent, in fact encouraging just these things to be restored in society and in the minds of those victimized directly and through the media by a terrorist attack.
- 4) **Mastery** – A sense of mastery is that which conveys to the individual and his society that the stressor event is something that can be adequately dealt with (i.e., mastered) and that neither the individual nor society will ultimately fail in the face of the stressor. In the case of terrorism this means that the terror event is not experienced as insurmountable and that he and the society can adapt not only to this event but to threats and actualities of further terrorism events. A large body of research makes clear that previous positive experiences of mastering stressful experiences as well as a positive attitude toward new situations fosters resilience. When it comes to terrorism, Israeli society is perhaps the best example of a society learning to habituate and carry on with daily life undaunted. This came as a result of government and civil society taking measures to prevent and defeat terrorism while at the same time weathering two successive waves of terrorism campaigns. Israelis have a deep belief that they can achieve mastery in the face of terrorism, knowing that they may never completely defeat terrorism and may continue to expect terrorist attacks at some baseline level. UK citizens have also shown a great deal of mastery in the face of the UK metro bombings. In the case of Israel part of the Israeli civilians' sense of mastery may have come from measures that the media voluntarily took after numerous suicide attacks. Israeli media made a conscious decision not to sensationalize attacks nor give them over much media attention, thereby decreasing the media amplification of horror and terror that usually accompanies suicide attacks. They in effect decided to curb media attention to terrorism and reduced the media effect of aiding the terror organization in spreading societal fear. Likewise, Israeli bars, dining establishments and shopping malls installed armed guards to search everyone entering the establishments preventing bombs from being exploded inside where many persons

had gathered. Israelis learned to adapt to these arrangements and many made their own adaptations as well such as carrying mobile phones and frequently checking in with family members and loved ones and avoiding crowded places. This is not to say that many of these citizens did not also suffer a loss of resilience in terms of posttraumatic stress responses and increased anxiety, but many did not suffer enough to cause them to lose their ability to function well. The point is thus that when one has a sense of control which can be instituted by taking useful protective and preventive measures distress is reduced and resilience enhanced. UK citizens likewise responded to the metro bombings without a lot of panic or fear. Most returned to full metro use within a week. This is likely due to previous mastery experiences in dealing with IRA terrorism in the preceding decades and confidence that the phenomena will eventually be defeated. Within the variable of mastery there are three components – previous mastery experiences, locus of control and religiosity/spirituality each of which can enhance the sense of mastery:

- a) **Previous Positive Experiences of Mastery** – These should lead to enhanced coping, positive expectations and be related to increased mastery and increased resilience.
 - b) **Locus of Control** – Individuals and societies that have a high sense of locus of control will generally believe they can do something to affect the situation and cope better with it. We can expect locus of control to relate positively to mastery and to resilience.
 - c) **Religiosity/Spirituality** – Often individuals do believe in some type of positive or loving higher power cope better with stressors because they do not feel alone in the face of it and they expect that the higher power will make some good come out of it. Thus this aspect Religiosity/Spirituality (of believing in a benevolent higher power) should be related to increased mastery and resilience.
- 5) **History** – Individual and societal history relate strongly to resilience. Israelis for example are often extremely sensitive about Holocaust imagery and language, whereas Arabs are about crusaders and crusades. On the positive side invoking images of the kibbutzim and the wars won by the Israeli Defense Force can restore a sense of confidence, as will invoking images of the caliphate and previous scientific achievements and glory of past Arab days to Arabs. On an individual level we judge history from three aspects: age, previous trauma exposure and major life stressors experienced:
- a) **Major Life Stressors** – Major life stressors can lead to stress pile up and the inability to remain resilient. Thus more life stressors are likely to lead to decreased resilience in the face of terrorism.
 - b) **Age** – Youth is likely to relate to many of the other variables, less sense of mastery, lowered locus of control, etc., and young are more likely to be less resilient although this variable may be curvilinear with advanced age also reflecting a loss of resilience.
 - c) **Previous Trauma Exposure** – Previous trauma exposure may indirectly relate to pre-existing PTSD symptoms and relate negatively to positive resilience.
- 6) **Social Capabilities** – This variable is made up of two aspects being a problem solver and self esteem:
- a) Those individuals with high self esteem generally can reach out to others for help more effectively and expect positive help and as a result often obtain the resources they need to cope effectively. Thus positive self esteem should relate positively to resilience.
 - b) **Problem Solving** – Similarly to master a problem solving attitude is likely to contribute to being able to cope with a stressor positively and it should relate to increase resilience.

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- 7) **Perceived Risk and Fear** – This variable is broken into two sub-variables:
- a) **Perceived Risk for Local Attacks** – Terrorists win when they convince individuals that what they view on the media, the attack and harm to relatively few is likely to happen to them also. The more an individual begins to believe that he is at great risk, the more likely his significant life functions, psychology and relationships are to be negatively affected and his positive resilience reduced.
 - b) **Mental Distance** – Likewise feeling extreme empathy for the victims of an attack and overly identifying with them can create a short mental distance from the attacks increasing the probability of PTSD type symptoms, anxiety and lack of functioning, thereby relating negatively to resilience.
- 8) **Personal Preoccupation** – When it comes to terrorism individuals maybe become overly preoccupied with terrorist events and lose resilience as a result of focusing overmuch on preparedness and searching the media anxiously about terrorism. The two variables measuring this feature are:
- a) **Media Searching Behavior** – Spending a long time and a lot of effort trying to learn everything about a terror attack likely relates negatively to positive resilience as it is likely to increase anxiety, interfere with normal life functioning and increase PTSD type symptoms.
 - b) **Preoccupation Behavior/Preparation** – Those who spend a lot of time preoccupied with terrorism, preparing for a possible attack by stockpiling food, medicines, etc., often do a disservice to society by creating scarcities in needed items and are functioning in an anxious mode. This variable relates negatively to positive resilience.
- 9) **Attitude toward Government** – The public and an individual's disposition toward his government can have a huge impact on how resilient he will be. On a societal level political leaders must understand that at times of traumatic stress they may become attachment figures functioning through the media. Citizens look to their political leaders for comfort and reassurance that the attacks will be stopped, safety will be restored and the victims cared for. When they feel connected to their government and that the government is acting effectively in their behalf this can reduce levels of anxiety and negative psychological effects. Political leaders that use the media effectively can thus function as strong attachment figures and tamp down the society wide anxiety. Perhaps one of the best positive examples of such a figure was Rudy Giuliani, mayor of New York City after the 9/11 attacks who continuously appeared on the television to reassure the citizens of New York that he was acting in their behalf. Governments communicate with their citizenry through the media, as do terrorists. The images that terrorists manage to put out on the media are experiential and create strong negative emotional associations (fear, anger, sadness). Politicians must be effectively equipped to communicate about these images that link to strong negative emotions in order to modulate them and to keep a population resilient. The variables regarding attitude toward government includes four aspects:
- a) **Perceived Preparedness** – The perception that government is adequately prepared leads to a sense of confidence and mastery that despite the terrorist attack government is prepared to respond well. This variable relates positively to resilience.
 - b) **Quality of Government Information** – The ability of government to produce high quality information and to use the mass media effectively so that citizens so that they can understand a terrorist attack(s) and know how to respond is a crucial aspect in predicting resilience. When citizens trust that the quality of government information is reliable and useful they are likely to be more resilient in the face of terrorist attacks.
 - c) **Quantity of Government Information** – The outputs of the government must be adequate and to the point. An overabundance of information will only cause anxiety and make it

impossible for citizens to understand as will a lack of information or silence cause anxiety. The perception that there is an adequate amount of government information provided about the terrorist attack and responses to it relates positively to resilience.

- d) **Need for Information** – Related to the above variable when citizens feel they need information and it is not being provided they become more anxious and less resilient. They may become preoccupied with the terrorist event(s) and spend inordinate resources and time searching the media and in preparation for an attack. This variable relates negatively to resilience.
- 10) **Xenophobia** – A fortunate after affect of a terrorist attack is in the first days there is often an increase in societal cohesion and in attachment and helping behaviors. This is common in disasters and after group experienced traumas. An unfortunate after affect of terrorist attack however can be a negative increase in group behavior resulting in negative expressions of nationalism, or in xenophobia. After the 9/11 attacks and following many other militant jihadi attacks in Europe, Muslims as a group became wrongly targeted as potential terrorists and hate crimes were directed to many. Likewise hate speech appeared targeting Islam and its believers. This is an unfortunate negative aspect and relates negatively to resilience to terrorism.

15.5 CONCLUSIONS

In summary psycho-social resilience to terrorism is presented in this model as a dynamic variable (influenced by many covariates) and resilience is defined along a continuum, along which an individual retains his or her flexibility, adaptability, functionality and empathy in the face of terrorism this equaling a resilient individual, or even makes gains in resilience. The loss of resilience is indicated by the appearance of posttraumatic, dissociative, anxiety, depressive and loss of functioning symptoms in direct response to the stressor as well as an increase in perceived risk and fear, personal preoccupation with terrorism and increased xenophobia. Figure 15-1 provides a schematic of how the variables discussed above relate to resilience. This model is useful for political leaders to think ahead and anticipate civilian responses to terrorism, to design prevention strategies and promote resilience through communication – in the media and through governmental and nongovernmental channels. In this way society can be prepared to defend against terrorism when and if it does strike.

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Resilience is defined as a dynamic variable (influenced by many covariates) which moves between an area in which an individual retains his or her flexibility, adaptability, functionality and empathy in the face of distress (including traumatic stress) this equaling a resilient individual, with the loss of resilience being clearly indicated by the appearance of posttraumatic, dissociative, anxiety, depressive and loss of functioning symptoms in direct response to the stressor.




Figure 15-1: Model of Psycho-Social Resilience to Terrorism.

The model presented here was developed for the use of the NATO Research and Technology Group (140) Psycho-Social, Organizational and Cultural Aspects of Terrorism which was an international group tasked with studying terrorism over a three year period. A survey instrument was developed by the author to measure and test all of the variables for consistency and reliability. This survey instrument was used in a preliminary research study in four countries that faced terrorist attacks: Morocco, Chechnya, Jordan and Iraq. In the first three cases the sample consisted of civilian members exposed to one or more terrorist attack(s) in their city (i.e., the Casa Blanca bombings in Morocco, the Amman hotel attacks in Amman and repeated attacks b Chechen terrorists in Grozny). In the fourth case the sample was civilians and military members of the US forces serving in Iraq facing mortar and suicide attacks by local terrorist and insurgent groups. The results of these first attempts of members of the RTG-140 to test the Psycho-Social Resilience to Terrorism Model are presently under analysis and will be published in academic articles as well. It is the author's hope that the results of this research will develop the model and survey instrument further and make it useful for understanding and combating the largely media driven effects of terrorism as it relates to resilience on an individual and societal level.

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Chapter 16 – PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS AND RESILIENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE AMMAN TERRORIST ATTACKS

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Jordan has been the target of intended and actual terrorist attacks multiple times in the past fifteen years. Terrorist acts and their consequences represent one of the main challenges for Jordan as well for the wider world community which is also facing terrorism. The objective of terrorists is to strike fear into the community and thereby change the political process. Terrorists only gain their advantage when a community is harmed and gives in to fear. Therefore it is very important to understand what makes a community resilient to terrorism and for government and civil society to do everything possible to promote resilience to terrorism. In this paper resilience to terrorism is defined as the ability to cope with terrorism, remain adaptable and not lose significant life functioning (i.e., the ability to perform work, family, and other roles).

In November of 2005, three simultaneous suicide terrorist attacks carried out by al Qaeda occurred in three separate hotels in Amman immediately killing sixty victims and injuring another one hundred fifteen, many of them seriously. In one hotel a wedding was taking place and the parents of the bride as well as many guests were killed. These attacks, although preceded by other attacks in Jordan, shocked the entire nation. The shock was that the targets were purely innocent civilians, unconnected to the government and the Muslim perpetrators felt justified to kill other Muslims. Jordanian civilians did not understand why al Qaeda would target them.

Emergency services were provided and within three months of the accident, a time when acute stress responses should be calming in those who make a good adaption, a study of psycho-social responses among the victims was carried out. The objectives of this study were to:

- Identify the psychosocial, and health impacts of terror acts on victims;
- Identify the presence of post traumatic stress disorder and co morbidity disorders among victims;
- Compare severity of (PTSD) symptoms among victims in two different periods of time (three months and six months after the event); and
- Identify the types and sources of resilience among Jordanian citizens.

16.1 METHODS

The sample consisted of thirty-seven Jordanian families exposed to the terrorist event(s) who were recruited to the study based on availability and willingness to participate. The methodology was to conduct a semi-structured interview and to administer a validated Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) scale with at least one adult family member survivor from each family. The sample included forty respondents. They were of both Jordanian and Palestinian descent, all Jordanian passport holders. Their age range was seventeen to fifty-two years. There was also a control group of forty-seven officers, twenty-seven from civil defence (fire fighters) and twenty-one police officers who had been emergency responders at the scene of the terrorist attacks. This group was selected since their exposure was the same, but they were exposed in a professional

capacity and with training which may have equipped them for greater resilience in the face of a terror attack, as compared to the civilian sample.

16.2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The data was collected via a semi-structured interview developed specifically for this purpose. It was carried out by the author and his assistants, all of them trained social workers and psychologists. There was also a focus group of the interviewers as they collected data to gather feedback from them about the interviews and to improve the method of data collection as the interviews carried on. The interviews included administration of an Arabic version of the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Questionnaire, which had its face validity established beforehand and which was based on the PTSD criteria outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (Revised) Criteria of the American Psychiatric Association [1].

16.3 RESULTS

The results of the interviews were thus both quantitative and qualitative. We report first the quantitative results below.

16.3.1 Negative Social Consequences

For some victims there were serious negative social and economic consequences initiated by the terrorist attacks. For instance, four victims lost their homes due to losing the main breadwinner or as a result of a reconstituted family structure. In this latter case, a widow was demanded by her husband's family members to leave with her children after her husband was killed. Another family began serious conflicts because a family member had attended the wedding party and been seriously injured but her father did not even know she was going out and he blamed the mother for the tragedy. Likewise, there were many losses in families of parents and siblings, with one family losing five members. In these cases psychosocial and financial support was offered to the families by the Jordanian Association of Family Protection Against Violence (see Table 16-1).

Table 16-1: Number of Family Members Who Faced Negative Social Consequences.

Negative Social Consequences	Number of Families 37
Loss of home	4
Family conflict	2
Loss of father or mother	12
Loss of brother or sister	12

Family members also faced severe negative economic consequences as a result of the terrorist acts. For instance twelve lost their jobs due to physical disabilities, although with the support of the JSPFV ten of them found jobs after some time. Even a staff nurse confined to a wheelchair as a result of paralysis and inabilities to perform her duties. However, she was supported to become a teacher in a nursing college in King Hussein Medical Center. Some families also lost their primary breadwinner and others did not lose their jobs but couldn't work for a period of time. With the support of the NGOs and the government there was a significant reduction in these consequences over time.

Table 16-2: Number of Family Members Who Faced Negative Economical Consequences.

Negative Economical Consequences	No. of Families 37 After Two Months	No. of Families After One Year
Loss of job	12	2
Loss of financial support	18	5
Loss of ability to continue work due to physical problems	5	2

Number of Family Members Who Suffered from Health and Psychological Problems

Health and psychological problems were also significant factors. Paraplegia, loss of eyes, bodily injury, loss of limb, and psychiatric disorders were all present. In Jordan psychological disorders are stigmatized and therefore some cases were hidden and family members refused to receive help from psychologists and psychiatrists.

Educational problems also occurred. Students were unable to resume their studies due to health and financial problems but overtime donations and school support diminished this result. In one case an eight year old boy who lost his mother could not function in school and developed separation anxiety, clinging to his father. After one year of treatment, he did resume school.

Table 16-3: Number of Family Members Who Suffered from Health and Psychological Problems.

Health and Psychological Problems	Number of Families 37
Paraplegia	2
Loss of eye	2
Body injury	16
Loss of limb	2
Psychiatric disorders	22

Number of Family Members Who Faced Educational Problems After Two Months, and One Year

There were also psychological effects from the terrorist attacks. All of these were clinically diagnosed by psychiatrists and psychotherapists. The diagnoses included generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, depressive reaction, conversion disorder, somatization, PTSD, and specific phobias. All of these fall under the umbrellas of posttraumatic responses and are to be expected. Re-experiencing the trauma, avoiding stimuli (e.g., returning to any parties), and hyper- arousal were common.

Table 16-4: Number of Family Members Who Faced Educational Problems After One Year.

Student Unable to Resume Their Studies in Universities	No. of Subjects 37 After Two Months	No. of Subjects 37 After One Year
Student unable to resume their studies in universities and to school due to financial Students unable to get back to school due to financial problems	9	0
Student unable to resume school (school refusal)	1	0

Table 16-5: Psychological Effects of Terrorist Attacks.

Psychiatric Disorders	No. of Subjects 40	Percentage
Generalized anxiety disorder	12	30%
Panic disorder	1	2.5%
Depressive disorder	3	7.5%
Conversion disorder	1	2.5%
Somatization disorder	8	20%
PTSD ¹	16	40%
Specific phobia	5	12%

Table 16-6: Comparison Between Victims and Control Group in Severity of PTSD Symptoms.

Symptoms of PTSD	Victims Groups (#40) Mean-(sd)	Control Groups (#47) Mean-(sd)	F-value p
Re-experience	13 (3.4)	8.7 (3.0)	34.1 <.001
Avoidance (PTSD)	15.8 (4.6)	10.7 (2.9)	20.2 <.001
Arousal (PTSD)	14.6 (2.7)	8.9 (2.5)	27.0 <.001

¹ The criteria for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder included the traumatic event and measured for re-experience, avoidance and hyperarousal.

Table 16-7: Number of Victims Who Suffered from PTSD During Two Different Periods of Time – Severity of Symptoms Among Victims After One Year of Traumatic Event on PTSD.

Symptoms of PTSD	#40 (Two Months) Mean – (sds)	#47 (One Year) Mean (sd)	F- value p
Re experience (PTSD)	13 (3.4)	11.25	2.66 <.01
Avoidance (PTSD)	15.8 (4.6)	13.8	1.75 <.08
Arousal (PTSD)	14.6 (2.7)	10.3	5.22 <.001

Consequences of the Traumatic Event on the Jordanian Community

Comparison of posttraumatic stress responses of the victims to the control group was also interesting. In general the controls (officers and rescue workers) had less negative responses, although both groups evidenced classic posttraumatic stress symptoms for some of the respondents. Using t-tests it was shown that the resulting differences between the two groups were significant. In the second assessment twelve months after the events the severity of symptoms among victims was on average decreased in all cases with the most significant decrease in arousal symptoms. Re-experiencing also was significantly decreased and avoidance moderately so.

Qualitative results were collected as well in the interviews – some general conclusions about the society's wide effects are included here based upon observations of the Jordanian society in the aftermath of the attacks.

As with all terrorism, the victims were relatively few, but the consequences spread quickly throughout the Jordanian society in multiple ways, of course magnified by the media exposure to the explosions. It was shown on – television for weeks and the events dominated news and magazines as well.

Observed effects of the terrorist attacks on Jordanian society included that Jordanian citizens felt threatened and unsafe, especially children. This observation has occurred in many other terror attacks, as well with adults and children far – from the attacks observing it on television and developing acute and posttraumatic responses [1],[3],[4],[5]. Unfortunately rumors focused on new terrorist targets – the city mall, the shopping centers, American businesses (i.e., McDonalds) – were spread, causing fear and avoidance as well. As a consequence many people started avoiding hotels and parties in public places, an effect that has now diminished given no more serious terror attacks in Amman. Thus this traumatic event has temporarily disrupted the life of citizens and negatively influenced the Jordanian economy.

Looking at the victim families some, approximately twenty percent, blame the government for not taking precautionary measures at hotels. After this time the Jordanian government and the hotels all have serious security measures.

Some victims who survived the event exhibited guilt feelings, which are typical to posttraumatic stress. For instance one father whose daughters died expressed guilt and regret for allowing them to attend to the wedding where they were killed. Another injured woman wished she had died instead of her daughter.

16.3.2 Psychological Challenges of the Traumatic Event

There were many challenges of the traumatic event on a psychological level. For instance the psychological management of the traumatized victims lacked adequate experience by psychologists and psychiatrists. There was a lack of proper coordination between the team members of the mental health profession.

Although the number of traumatized citizens was high we had difficulty in determining the exact number of those who suffered from psychological disorders. This was due to the following factors: many victims and their families as well as some medical staff exhibited lack of knowledge about what are normal and abnormal reactions to crisis. Likewise many victims and their families who manifested psychological and psychosomatic symptoms, showed a lack of awareness about the role of psychologists and psychiatrists. Eight cases refused to be referred to psychiatrists or psychologists in order to avoid stigmatization despite serious symptoms. Four cases totally denied any psychological problems although they were clearly exhibiting serious psychological symptoms. Four cases who agreed to receive psychotherapy showed a lack of cooperation and commitment. They came just once and wanted medication only.

Our study was aimed at examining the psychological disorders that resulted but also examining the types and sources of resilience in Jordanian families. It is very important to understand what sources of resilience the civilian population turns to in times of traumatic events so that government and civil society can take actions to support these sources and thereby enhance resilience to terrorism.

16.3.3 Resilience to Terrorism

It is necessary to define resilience to terrorism in order to study it. For our purposes we defined resilience as a dynamic process of adaptation and development while simultaneously facing a significant amount of adversity [6] (Luther and Becker, 2000). For an individual to be resilient he should not demonstrate significant negative symptoms nor lose significant life functions (the ability to work, perform family roles, etc.) and he should find a positive adaptation in the face of distress.

The sources of resilience that were identified in this study include: family support, community resilience, friends and professional support, and religious beliefs. Each of these are discussed below:

- **Family Support** – The nature of Jordanian families is common to the Arab world in that they exist and function as extended families which are characterized by strong family ties, providing many types of support to family members. In the case of terrorist attack we found that Jordanian families provided the following important functions to victims: empathy; reassurance; help in debriefing from the events; and most importantly financial donations, health care and childcare support during the aftermath of the attacks. The family support socially and financially in some cases was so strong for their traumatized relatives that some even refused offers of help from the government.
- **Community Resilience** – There was also a great deal of community support for victims of terrorism and a strong sense of community resilience. This started from the top down with a great deal of compassion and support being offered to victims by His Majesty King Abdullah and Queen Rania. Likewise Jordanian citizens, similar to UK citizens after the London metro bombings were not newly acquainted to terrorism and insurgent violence, and therefore had some degree of established immunity. They were already united against terrorist acts and this event strengthened the sense of community outrage at terrorism and community cohesion because Jordanians felt the attacks humiliated their dignity and existence. There was a strong increase in cohesion and solidarity between all sectors of the national community and there was also an outpouring of altruism by a large number of volunteers who gave a variety of social, emotional and financial support. There was also an increase in the level of awareness among citizens regarding terrorism and its motivations. Lastly there was an initiation of collaboration and continuous dialogue between government and NGOs to fight terrorism and to work together successfully to increase resilience to terrorism among Jordanians.
- **Friend and Professional Support** – Friendships and team members provided all types of support. There was a positive role for NGOs especially the Jordanian Society for Protection Against Family

Violence which established- peer supportive groups and a hot line. Mental health professional support and spiritual support by religious figures also played an important role in supporting resilience.

- **Religious Beliefs as a Source of Resilience** – It was noticed that victims and their families who are religious proved to have less psychological disorders and high resilience. Religious Muslims often believe that innocent victims of terrorism are considered martyrs. Likewise, there is a strong belief in the benevolence and goodness of Allah and the destiny provided by Allah. Therefore, there is a strong religious and cultural value that encourages trust, patience and tolerance in adversity and trust that Allah will provide. Two Qur’ān [7] verses in particular encourage resilience:

Surah 1. Al Bakarah (The Albaqura) 156 – Which says, when afflicted with calamity: “To Allah we belong, and to him is our return.”

Surah 9. Al Tawba (Repentance) 51 – Says: “Nothing will happen to us except that Allah has decreed for us: he is our protector”: and on Allah let, the believers put their trust.”

16.4 DISCUSSION

The results of this study were many. First of all it was clear that it’s possible to study victims of terrorism in Jordan and that they will participate in interviews and even posttraumatic measures. Clearly they had many negative effects and civilians suffered more than the controls but Jordanian citizens also showed high resilience, likely due to the society’s wide support offered to the victims on multiple levels as discussed in the result section.

There were many lessons learned from this traumatic event. For instance the Jordanian government established new strategies which were aimed at focusing more on pre incidence and preparation for psychosocial support from all different sectors in the event of another terrorist attack. They also provided more security procedures for hotels and public gatherings. They also established a national strategy for humanitarian support network for crisis consisting of both government and NGOs. There was also more focus on raising awareness of terrorism and its effects by using various sources such as media, mosques, schools and establishing society wide terrorism prevention programs. Crisis intervention centers were also established in the police, civil defence, army and other sectors that deal with crisis. Lastly support training courses in advanced psychological intervention for victims of crisis were developed.

A recognition that occurred as a result of these attacks was also that Jordan can benefit as well as give a lot in cooperation with other countries and organizations such as (NATO) in order to exchange experiences in prevention and psychosocial intervention.

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Chapter 17 – ASSESSING PSYCHO-SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN DIPLOMATIC, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL SERVING IN A HIGH THREAT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: COUNTER INSURGENCY AND COUNTER TERRORISM OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

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17.1 INTRODUCTION

Currently thousands of military, diplomatic and civilian personnel are deployed under NATO, UN, and other multi-national, as well as national auspices in high security threat environments, including active conflict zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Soldiers are generally well trained and prepared psychologically to face armed conflict. Civilian contractors and diplomats on the other hand often are not. Moreover in today's high threat security environments terrorists, insurgents and even child soldiers may be the opposing force, creating a more uncertain and anxiety provoking environment and more difficult to identify security threat. These facts have serious implications for the psycho-social resilience of diplomatic, civilian and military personnel deployed in such environments. This paper investigates psycho-social resilience in a small exploratory sample of US embassy staff, contractors and US forces serving in Iraq during 2007, a time when IEDs, roadside bombings, mortar attacks, kidnaps, murders and sniper fire were an everyday occurrence in Iraq.

17.2 PSYCHO-SOCIAL RAMIFICATION OF US DIPLOMATIC, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STAFF SERVING IN HIGH THREAT SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS

During the time period 2005 – 2007, the US Embassy in Iraq was responsible for a staff of approximately five thousand; the majority being civilian contractors supporting diplomats and military staffed there. At the time the US State Department was just beginning to consider the psycho-social ramifications of deploying a large share of its personnel in high threat security zones where they would be separated from family members and work long hours on a daily basis. Training at that time for deployment to Iraq for US State Department personnel included security and first aid training and a brief introduction to handling the psychological stress of dealing with serving in a war zone and facing terrorist threats (including car bombs, mortar attacks, and suicide bombers). In a similar fashion, United States Department of Defense contractors underwent pre-deployment training; however their training units had no briefing on handling psychological stress responses to a high threat environment. In 2007 State Department had no mandatory debriefing for those coming out of high threat security environments and no study had been done to assess if diplomatic and civilian personnel were resilient working in active conflict zones or becoming psychologically traumatized during their service in Iraq. There was no good data collection on psycho-social resilience in civilian and diplomatic personnel serving in Iraq (the military was conducting studies) and consequently no way of assessing if civilian and diplomatic personnel were suffering from negative psychological and social responses to being deployed in a high threat security environment combined with

the additional stresses of working long hours and being deployed for long periods of time away from family members and social support networks. This study was a first attempt to remedy that situation.

Two of the authors (Speckhard and Verleye) were at the time serving on the NATO Human Factors and Medicine, Research and Technology Task Group (140) – Psychosocial, Organisational, and Cultural Aspects of Terrorism which had as one of its mandates to study civilian and military resilience to terrorist and insurgent threats. Moreover the lead author's spouse (Speckhard) was serving as the US Deputy Chief of Mission in Iraq at the time, and she was going in and out of Iraq herself as a military contractor (designing and pilot testing the US Department of Defense's Detainee Rehabilitation Program). The confluence of these circumstances created an attractive possibility for carrying out an exploratory pilot study of the psycho-social resilience of US civilian, diplomatic and military personnel serving in Iraq in that time period. The current paper describes the authors' attempts to make a high tech, low budget exploratory study of the psycho-social resilience of US diplomats, civilians and military service personnel working in a high threat security environment (facing terrorism and insurgency operations).

17.3 ASSESSING PSYCHO-SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN PERSONNEL DEPLOYED IN A HIGH THREAT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Assessing psycho-social resilience to deployment in a high threat security environment is a challenging endeavor and requires creativity and the willingness to potentially confront danger in order to learn. In this case the researchers decided that there were two important areas to explore: the first being how resilient are our civilian and military personnel while serving in Iraq, and what variables influence positive and negative resilience? And the second being is it possible to carry out a study of resilience to a high threat security environment using available high technology (Internet and web-based technology) without having themselves to enter the high threat security environment to carry out the survey?

The lead researcher (Speckhard), a psychologist who had traveled to and been working inside Iraq on three different occasions and had a fair idea of the challenges faced by those serving there. She was thus able to build upon previous work of the team in studying and modeling psycho-social resilience to terrorism to design a resilience survey to reflect the "boots on the ground" experiences while the other team members were able to turn this survey into a high tech tool that could provide an assessment from afar. The steps in carrying this out included: theoretically defining resilience in a manner that applied to the high threat security environment, designing a survey tool that reflected the variables, and doing so in a manner that appealed to very busy professionals, turning this survey into a web-based design, identifying a sample, inviting participants, collecting results and analyzing them. This paper describes the process of this exploratory study and its outcomes.

17.3.1 Theoretically Defining Psycho-Social Resilience

The concept of resilience implies adaptability and a certain ability to "bounce back" in the face of a challenge or stressor. In this study the resilience model builds upon previous work of the authors studying societal resilience to terrorism in Belgium with the concept of resilience defined as a dynamic variable, influenced by many co-variables (defined below), and existing on a continuum of adaptability¹. According to this definition an individual who is resilient to serving in a high threat security environment must retain, or in the best case scenario even show gains in flexibility, adaptability, functionality and empathy. To show any losses in function, flexibility, adaptability or empathy is to show a loss in resilience. A loss of resilience likewise is indicated by the appearance of pathological symptoms interfering with normal

¹ See also Verleye, Gino; Maesele, Pieter; Stevens, Isabelle and Speckhard, Anne. Resilience in an Age of Terrorism: Psychology, Media and Communication in which an earlier jointly authored model of resilience was presented and tested in Belgium. The current model developed as a result of that earlier work and owes much to the previous authors contributions.

functioning including symptoms of posttraumatic stress (including flashbacks, high arousal states, loss of concentration, irritability, etc.), dissociation (a separation of normal cognitive functions, emotional numbing, inability to think, etc.), anxiety, depression, and panic, all of which interfere with and create a loss of normal functioning. Likewise a gain in xenophobia (hatred of outsiders such as Muslims or Arabs in this case) is also assessed in this model as contributing to a loss of resilience.

According to the model of resiliency used here, there are ten main covariates of resiliency. These include the following main categories: Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), World Assumptions, Perceived Risk and Fear, Personal Preoccupation, Attitude towards Government Communications, Social Buffering, Social Capabilities, Life History, Sense of Mastery and Xenophobia. These concepts and the entire model of resilience is elucidated further in other publications [1],[2],[3] and space here does not allow for a lengthy explanation. However it is important to note that PTSD, a challenge to world assumptions, perceived risk and fear, and personal preoccupation all relate to how the individual may lose functions in the face of a high threat security environment, and become fearful and preoccupied by it. The life history, sense of mastery and social capabilities variables relate to previous challenges the individual has encountered (for good or for bad) and skills and losses that occurred as a result. Social buffering and Attitude towards Government Communications has to do with how well social ties and government communications aid in coping with a high security threat environment. Lastly xenophobia is included because it can be an ill effect of experiencing or witnessing terrorism that has been linked with Islam or other “outsider” groups, as in the case of the US and 9/11 for instance and this too is related to a loss of resilience (i.e., beginning to hate an ethnic or religious group as a result of exposure to terrorism). These ten variables both affect resilience to a stressor and may also be affected in turn by a traumatic stress event. They are defined at length in another paper [2] and the statistical clusters of variables that were examined are also discussed further in the results section of this paper. This paper focuses on the acute, posttraumatic and other psycho-social sequelae that occurred in response to serving in a high threat security environment and being exposed to terrorist event(s) all of which demonstrated a loss of resilience among significant portions of the sample.

17.4 METHOD

The design of the present study was to explore the concept the concept of psycho-social resilience to a high threat security environment for civilian and military personnel while working in theater while also exploring the assessment possibilities of carrying out the study via a web-based assessment tool served over the Internet. The use of high technology might prove a method to reach as large and varied a sample as possible while in theater, thereby keeping the costs low and bypassing the necessity to send survey researchers into a high threat environment while also exploring.

17.4.1 Web-Based Survey

The survey instrument was constructed from previous work by the authors building upon their multi-dimensional model of resilience to terrorism. In this case the questionnaire was designed to query about exposure to terrorist and insurgent acts as well as multiple questions covering the ten main categories of interactive variables. Where ever possible questions were closely matched to already existing items from previously validated tests (i.e., items for assessing posttraumatic stress disorder) in order for the present items to have validity. However, the researchers rejected the use of whole scale batteries of standardized assessment tools because the idea was to have a coherent questionnaire that would appeal to respondents and flow smoothly as it questioned them about their responses to serving in a high threat security environment. Offering a battery of psycho-social “tests” was judged as unlikely to garner a good response rate as it is an unappealing way to approach respondents who were already dealing with a great deal of stress. While the researchers had clusters of variables predefined at the outset of the study they were also interested to learn which variables would statistically cluster once the data was collected.

17.4.2 Sampling

The resulting questionnaire was then put into a web-based design to function as a high technology web page questionnaire. A website was designated and a letter was sent out by e-mail through contacts that the first author had in both civilian and military circles inviting participants to log onto the website and take part in the study. The letter outlined the study's rationale, risks of taking part and ways of making contact with the researchers in order to receive help for any adverse reactions to participating as well as simply to give further feedback or to ask for help in dealing with the high threat security environment. Likewise it requested potential subjects not only to take part in the survey but to e-mail the invitation to participate to their circle of contacts serving in Iraq. As a result the sample design followed a snowball method. The letter also made clear to the participants that the study was being conducted by a multi-national university team (Belgian and United States) that was completely independent of both the US Department of Defense and the State Department and the results would be reported in aggregate, thus the participants could take part in the survey without any worries of negative reporting of individual results inside the work place.

17.5 RESULTS

The high technology aspect of the study design turned out to be a double edged sword. While the web-based design was attractive and allowed for automatic scoring of the results it turned out the Internet speeds provided by the multi-national forces in Iraq were too slow to support this aspect of the study design. Within the first days of inviting study participants over one hundred potential participants had logged on to the website and completed two to three pages indicating interest in the study was high. However, only twenty percent of these participants finished the entire survey, most abandoning it because the web pages were too slow in opening for the subjects to complete the survey (some subjects told us that the pages took up to ten minutes to open at times). When this problem was discovered the survey was immediately repackaged as a word file and resent to all the original invitees asking them to please give the survey another try in a new easier electronic format and to mail it to their contacts as well. This design worked, although many potential subjects were lost with the first high technology failure resulting in a smaller sample size.

The final result was a sample size of fifty-three participants who took part in the survey during the time period of March 15 to April 1, 2007. This was enough for an exploratory study of the psychosocial responses of individuals serving in a high threat environment and large enough to receive feedback on the survey design as well as the high tech methodology used to conduct it but it lacked the size to make regression analysis of the results. The participants not only filled out the survey but over half also took the opportunity to provide detailed feedback to the research team, often in long letters explaining why certain items did not capture the full impact of what they were experiencing, nuances that they wanted to give to their answers, or how the study needed to be expanded to cover the additional stresses caused by separation from family for long periods of time and the long hours and weeks without breaks that many of the participants were working. It was clear that the participants trusted the researchers as independent as they made many intimate comments about their work places, colleagues and the challenges of working inside Iraq.

17.5.1 Sample

The final sample resulted in fifty-three participants, between the ages of twenty-seven and sixty-three. Nine were in active combat duty, the rest were diplomats and civilian support personnel. Thirty-eight were male, fifteen female. Eighteen were single, twenty-eight married and seven divorced.

17.5.2 Exposure to High Threat Events

By virtue of serving in Iraq everyone in the sample had exposure to multiple high threats including: mortar fire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs – vehicular and human borne); bombings of buildings; roadside

bombings and sniper fire in some areas. Exposure varied from witnessing on television, to learning from a witness, to witnessing a high threat event in person or being personally involved in the event. With IEDs, mortar and sniper fire and explosions occurring near the workplace at least weekly, and sometimes daily, all of the respondents had multiple exposures to high threats. For instance US embassy workers lived in trailers nearby to the embassy, one of which received a direct hit and was burned up during the time period of the study. Small cement bunkers for sheltering from incoming mortar attacks were located along the walkways to and from work and alarms were sounded frequently to alert of incoming mortar. Respondents also said they could feel the impact of bomb explosions in their trailers at night and in the mornings. Workers traveled in convoys with heavy protection and still suffered roadside bombing and IED attacks.

17.5.3 Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Responses to the High Threat Security Environment

After indicating the high threat events they had some level of exposure to, the respondents were asked to think of the one event that had impacted them most and to which they had the strongest response and to answer all of the acute and posttraumatic stress response questions keeping that event in mind. Regarding reference to their exposure to the high threat event, seventy percent said they felt fear, horror and a sense of helplessness (with forty-six percent endorsing these emotions on the sometimes, often and always level). This indicates that the majority of the sample experienced a stressor capable of causing Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Moreover, forty-seven percent of the respondents endorsed that they felt detached from the traumatic event as it occurred, even as if watching from outside of themselves. This type of response is known as peritraumatic dissociation, and is often a predictor of PTSD.

To learn about their acute and posttraumatic stress responses, the respondents were asked to reply to questions closely matched to items from standardized measurements of acute and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) The six main axes of PTSD include: exposure to a traumatic stressor as defined by the PTSD criteria; psychological numbing and avoidance; flashbacks, intrusions and nightmares; hyperarousal and loss of concentration; inability to function in a significant aspect of life and duration of symptoms lasting beyond one month.

17.5.4 Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Symptoms

A significant portion of the sample evidenced posttraumatic and acute stress symptoms in the first month following exposure to the traumatic event. All of the PTSD diagnostic criteria were endorsed as present by at least some portion of the sample and in some cases items were endorsed by as high as forty-seven percent of the sample for the first month after exposure. (See Table 17-1) All of the responses in this section relate to the first month after exposure.

**Table 17-1: Endorsement of Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Symptoms in the First Month
Following Exposure to a Traumatic Event(s) in the High Threat Security Environment.**

Posttraumatic and Acute Stress Symptoms	Sometimes	Often	Always	Total Endorsement as Present
Criterion A: Traumatic Event				
Fear, horror and sense of helplessness	22.6	13.2	1	45.9 (with rarely 70.1)
Peritraumatic Dissociation				
Became detached from it, even as if watching from outside of myself	20.8	18.9	7.5	47.2
Criterion B: Re-experiencing				
Nervous in my body upon reminders (B-5)	20.8	5.7	1.9	28.4
Criterion C: Avoidance				
Avoided reminders of it (C-1)	22.6	1.9	1.9	26.4
Tried not to think of it (C-1)	19.2	13.5	7.7	37.4
Tried not to talk about it (C-1)	26.4	9.4	1.9	37.7
Changed behaviors trying to avoid danger of this type	17.0	17.0	3.8	37.8
Avoided work assignments that could place me in a similar situation (C-2)	15.1	1.9	3.8	20.8
I had trouble remembering all of what had happened (C-3)	11.3	1.9	0	13.2
I felt alienated or isolated from others (C-5)	15.1	1.9	0	17.0
I felt emotionally numb (C-6)	26.4	15.1	5.7	47.2
Unease and uncertainty about the future (C-7)	15.1	17.0	0	22.1
Criterion D: Increased Arousal				
Hard time concentrating (D-3)	15.9	10.1	1.4	27.4
Criterion F: Clinically Significant Distress or Impairment in Functioning				
Trouble working or doing normal tasks	18.9	1.9	1.9	22.7
Social life affected negatively	1.9	5.7	0	7.6
Physical health problems	7.5	3.8	1.9	13.2

17.5.4.1 Re-experiencing

Twenty-eight percent of the respondents felt physiological responses (sweaty palms, heart racing or irregular breathing) upon re-exposure to reminders of the event.

17.5.4.2 Avoidance

In regard to the traumatic event(s) thirty-seven percent of the sample said in the first month after exposure they tried not to think about it; thirty-eight percent avoided talking about it; and twenty-six percent avoided reminders of it. Thirty-eight percent changed their behaviors to avoid similar danger and twenty-one percent avoided work assignments that could place them in such danger. This latter type of avoidance is likely positive coping but it could also evidence impairment in ability to function well as a worker in the high threat security environment. Thirteen percent of the sample had trouble recalling the whole event; seventeen percent felt isolated or alienated from others; and forty-seven percent felt emotionally numb. Twenty-two percent felt unease and uncertainty about the future in response to the event.

17.5.4.3 Increased Arousal

Twenty-seven percent had trouble concentrating in the first month following the event.

17.5.4.4 Clinically Significant Distress or Impairment in Functioning

Twenty-two percent of the sample had trouble working or doing normal tasks in response to the event; eight percent said their social life had been negatively affected; and thirteen percent reported physical health problems as a result.

17.5.5 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms

As could be expected the acute and posttraumatic stress responses damped down in the months following the event and less of the respondents endorsed symptoms in the present time for when they were filling out the survey (i.e., more than one month out from the attack and still in the high threat security environment when answering the survey – i.e., anywhere from two to twelve or more months following exposure). Despite the decrease in numbers of respondents reporting symptoms of posttraumatic distress a significant portion of the sample evidenced PTSD symptoms enduring beyond a month in response to the traumatic event(s) they had been exposed to while working in a high threat security environment. While most of the sample did well, all of the PTSD diagnostic criteria were endorsed at the level of present beyond one month after exposure frequently in ranges as high as thirty percent of the sample. (See Table 17-2) All of the responses in this section relate to responses enduring beyond one month following exposure.

**Table 17-2: Endorsement of PTSD Symptoms More than One Month After Exposure
to a Traumatic Event(s) in a High Threat Security Environment.**

PTSD Symptoms	Sometimes	Often	Always	Total Endorsement as Present
Criterion A: Traumatic Event				
Fear, horror and sense of helplessness	22.6	3.8	0	26.4
Peritraumatic Dissociation				
I became detached from it, even as if watching from outside myself	11.5	15.4	7.7	34.6
Criterion B: Re-experiencing				
Thoughts of it kept intruding in my mind (B-1)	15.4	3.8	1.9	21.1
I had nightmares about it (B-2)	3.8	0	0	3.8
Nervous in my body upon reminders (B-5)	7.5	1.9	0	9.4
Criterion C: Avoidance				
Avoided reminders of it (C-1)	15.1	1.9	3.8	20.8
Tried not to think of it (C-1)	9.4	9.4	7.5	26.3
Tried not to talk about it (C-1)	13.5	7.7	5.8	27.0
Avoided work assignments that could place me in a similar situation (C-2)	7.7	1.9	3.8	13.4
I felt alienated or isolated from others (C-5)	3.8	1.9	0	5.7
Became emotionally numb	18.9	7.5	5.7	32.1
Unease and uncertainty about the future (C-7)	13.2	5.7	1.9	20.8
Criterion D: Increased Arousal				
Difficulty falling asleep (D-1)	5.7	11.3	1.9	18.9
Sleep patterns disturbed (D-1)	15.1	13.2	1.9	30.2
Hard time concentrating (D-3)	9.4	3.8	1.9	15.1
Jumpy or easily startled (D-5)	20.8	7.5	1.9	30.2
Easily agitated or angry	15.1	1.9	1.9	18.9
Criterion F: Clinically Significant Distress or Impairment in Functioning				
Trouble working or doing normal tasks	1.9	0	0	1.9
Social life affected negatively	1.9	5.8	0	6.7
Physical health problems as a Result	7.7	1.9	1.9	11.5

17.5.5.1 Re-experiencing

Twenty-one percent of the respondents evidenced thoughts of the traumatic event intruding in their minds, and nine percent felt physiological responses (sweaty palms, heart racing or irregular breathing) upon re-exposure to reminders of the event. Interestingly only four percent had nightmares, although we must keep in mind that as the respondents continued to be serving in the high threat environment they may have kept nightmares at bay until returning to safety. Likewise the author learned from conversations with many embassy workers and contractors that due to working long hours and their high arousal states which made it difficult to fall and stay asleep many made use of psychotropics to sleep. When one looks to arousal issues it's clear that sleep was disturbed.

17.5.5.2 Avoidance

In regard to the traumatic event(s) twenty-six percent of the sample said they tried not to think about it; twenty-seven percent avoided talking about it; and twenty-one percent avoided reminders of it. Thirteen percent of the sample avoided work that could place them in similar danger; six percent felt isolated or alienated from others; and thirty-two percent felt emotionally numb. Twenty-one percent felt unease and uncertainty about the future in response to the event.

17.5.5.3 Increased Arousal

Thirty percent of the sample said their sleep patterns were disturbed in response to the event; nineteen percent had difficulty falling asleep; fifteen percent had trouble concentrating; thirty percent were jumpy or easily startled; and nineteen percent were easily agitated or angered in the months enduring beyond one month following exposure to the traumatic event.

17.5.5.4 Peritraumatic Dissociation

Peritraumatic dissociation was reported even beyond one month following the traumatic exposure with thirty-five percent of the subjects still reporting feeling detached as if viewing it from outside of themselves. This effect perhaps persisted given that the subjects continued to be exposed to the high threat security environment and dissociation continued to be a useful defence mechanism.

17.5.5.5 Clinically Significant Distress or Impairment in Functioning

Twenty-two percent of the sample reporting having trouble working or doing normal tasks in the month immediately after the event, this decreased to only two percent who reported such trouble in the months after the exposure. A constant seven percent continued to report that their social life had been negatively affected; and eleven percent continued to report physical health problems that occurred in response to traumatic exposure.

17.5.6 Other Posttraumatic Responses

17.5.6.1 Fear

Additional posttraumatic responses were reported by the sample with the most reported symptom being fear that it could happen again; reported by fifty-seven percent of the sample in the first month after exposure, with that diminishing to twenty percent beyond one month after exposure.

17.5.6.2 Psychosomatic Symptoms

Psychosomatic symptoms included more than normal fatigue (thirty-eight percent diminishing to twenty three percent); stomach distress or nausea (twenty one diminishing to ten percent); general aches in the

body (fifteen diminishing to eight percent); headaches (twelve diminishing to nine percent) dizziness or difficulty breathing (six diminishing to four percent); and panic attacks (seven diminishing to three percent).

17.5.6.3 Depression

General depression was reported by twenty-two percent of the sample which diminished to four percent after the first month, and participants reported feeling sad for whole days (twenty-one diminishing to four percent) and feeling worthless (six diminishing to four percent) after exposure.

17.5.6.4 Obsessive Need to Talk about It

Obsession in the sense of feeling the need to talk obsessively about the event is a posttraumatic response that is sometimes overlooked. In this sample twenty-five percent endorsed the item, “I couldn’t stop talking about it” for the month immediately after exposure diminishing to eight percent for the months after the first month.

17.5.6.5 Fearlessness and Danger Seeking

An effect often noted in youth exposed to conflict and gang violence is increased fearlessness and danger seeking. This seems to be a way to gain control over high arousal states – if one seeks out danger the bodily arousal matches what one has chosen to confront by his or her own volition [4]. Becoming fearless was endorsed by twenty-nine percent of the sample in the first month after exposure diminishing to twenty-five percent of the sample in the months following. Likewise twenty percent of the respondents said they became excited by danger and sought it out more following the exposure in the first month with this diminishing to seventeen percent for the months following beyond one month. (See Table 17-3 for a Complete List of Other Posttraumatic Responses).

Table 17-3: Other Types of Posttraumatic Responses.

Other Types of Posttraumatic Responses	Sometimes	Often	Always	Total Endorsement as Present
Depression				
Depression	22.6 (4.3)	0	0	22.6 (4.3)
I felt sad for whole days	11.3 (2.0)	7.5 (2.0)	1.9 (0)	20.7 (4.0)
I felt worthless	3.8 (3.8)	1.9 (0)	1.9 (0)	5.7 (3.8)
Psychosomatic Responses				
Panic attacks	7.5 (2.9)	0	0	7.5 (2.9)
Psycho-somatic responses	7.5 (7.7)	3.8 (1.9)	1.9 (1.9)	2.9 (11.5)
More than normal fatigue	11.3 (15.1)	22.6 (5.7)	3.8 (1.9)	37.7 (22.7)
Headaches	9.4 (7.5)	3.8 (1.9)	0	12.2 (9.4)
Stomach distress or nausea	15.4 (5.9)	5.8 (3.9)	0	21.2 (9.8)
General aches in my body	11.5 (5.8)	3.8 (1.9)	0	15.3 (7.7)
Dizziness or difficulty breathing	3.9 (4.0)	2.0 (0)	0	5.9 (4.0)
Fear and Obsessive Responses				
Fear that it could happen again	26.4 (14.5)	15.1	15.1 (5.8)	56.6 (20.3)
Couldn't stop talking about it	13.2 (3.8)	5.7 (1.9)	5.7 (1.9)	24.8 (7.6)
Increased Fearlessness and Danger Seeking				
I became more fearless	22.6 (17)	3.8 (3.8)	1.9 (3.8)	28.3 (24.6)
I became excited by danger and sometimes sought it out more than before	13.7 (9.6)	5.9 (5.8)	0 (1.9)	19.6 (17.3)
*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.				

17.5.6.6 Shattered World Assumptions

A common effect of traumatic exposure is to have one's world view deeply shaken. This generally occurs in regard to one's sense of predictability, safety in the world and sense of the goodness of others and is referred to as a shattering of world assumptions [5]. In this sample forty-five percent endorsed feeling that the world is less safe in reference to the month immediately after the trauma with this effect persisting in thirty-nine percent of the respondents for the months following that; twenty-six percent said it made them trust others less for the first month after exposure with this effect persisting for twenty percent of the respondents. Forty three percent disagreed with the statement that their world is relatively safe for the month after exposure with this persisting and increasing to fifty-four percent of the respondents for the following months. Thirty-six percent disagreed with the statement that life is fairly predictable and this also increased to forty-five percent of the respondents in the months following. Four percent of the sample disagreed with the statement that people are basically good in the month immediately following exposure and this increased to thirteen percent in the longer time period. Clearly traumatic exposure(s) within the high threat security environment shook many of the respondents world views and continued exposure to threats and traumatic events appears to have shattered these world assumptions were even more as time went on. (See Table 17-4).

Table 17-4: Shattered World Assumptions Following Traumatic Exposure*.

Shattered World Assumptions	Sometimes	Often	Always	Total Endorsement as Present
It made me feel that the world is less safe	26.4 (23.5)	13.2 (11.8)	5.7 (3.9)	45.1 (39.1)
It made me trust people less	15.1 (15.7)	5.7 (2.0)	5.7 (2.0)	26.3 (19.7)
	Totally Disagree	Disagree		
My world is relatively safe	3.8 (11.3)	39.6 (43.4)		43.4 (54.7)
Life is fairly predictable	9.6 (18.9)	26.9 (26.4)		36.5 (45.3)
People are generally good	0 (1.9)	3.8 (11.5)		3.8 (13.4)
*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.				

17.5.6.7 Suicidal Ideation and Self Harm

Suicide out of despair and inflicting harm to oneself in order to be sent home has been a large concern for military leadership but has not been something State Department or contractors have had to consider up to now. In this sample one person endorsed seriously considering suicide, inflicting self harm and thought that it would be better to die than to continue to face the high threat security environment. Likewise eight percent of the respondents entertained thoughts that it might be better to get injured and sent home than to continue to face the high threat security environment. State Department's protocol is to medically evacuate those who present themselves as deeply distressed and it appears that more medical evacuations for PTSD related effects occur in the posting following the high threat environment posting than during it. This is perhaps because once out of the high threat environment the dissociative defences relax allowing the person to feel the full impact of what he has witnessed. Likewise, once in a "normal" setting high arousal states, flashbacks, traumatic nightmares avoidance, etc., can suddenly appear very abnormal where when working long hours, using psychotropics to sleep, working among others who feel the same way, etc., may mask these effects. (See Table 17-5 for a Listing of Suicidal Ideation and Self Harm Effects).

Table 17-5: Suicidal Ideation and Self Harm Responses to the High Threat Security Environment*.

Suicidal Ideation and Self Harm Items	Sometimes	Often	Always	Total Endorsement as Present
I sometimes thought it might be better to get injured and go home than continue to face this	3.8 (3.8)	3.8 (1.9)	0	7.6 (5.7)
I sometimes thought it might be better to die than to continue to face this	1.9	0 (1.9)	0	1.9 (1.9)
I sometimes considered hurting myself or putting myself in a situation where I would surely be hurt to be sent home	1.9 (1.9)	0	0	1.9 (1.9)
I seriously thought about suicide	1.9 (1.9)	0	0	1.9 (1.9)
I sometimes thought it might be better to get injured and go home than continue to face this	3.8 (3.8)	3.8 (1.9)	0	7.6 (5.7)
I sometimes thought it might be better to die than to continue to face this	1.9	0 (1.9)	0	1.9 (1.9)
*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.				

17.5.6.8 Posttraumatic Growth

Traumatic events also present opportunities for growth or positive resilience. In this sample sixty-four percent reported a sense of increased love and appreciation for those close to them in the first month after exposure with this persisting in months following for fifty-seven percent of the respondents. This follows closely with observations of increased community confusion after many varied traumatic events ranging from 9/11 to earthquakes and fires. Forty-five percent felt a sense of hope for a good outcome in the future and forty-seven-six percent tried to look for positive meanings and what they could learn from the traumatic event, with these effects persisting for the respondents beyond the first month following exposure. (See Table 17-6).

Table 17-6: Positive Posttraumatic Growth*.

Positive Posttraumatic Growth	Sometimes	Often	Always	Total Endorsement as Present
Sense of increased love and appreciation for those close to me	26.4 (21.2)	22.6 (11.5)	17 (25.0)	64.0 (57.2)
Felt a sense of hope for a good outcome	17 (17.3)	17 (11.5)	11.3 (17.3)	45.3 (45.8)
I tried to look for the positive meanings in it, for what I could learn from it	9.4 (7.5)	18.9 (15.1)	18.9 (18.9)	47.2 (41.5)
*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.				

17.5.7 Coping Mechanisms

The sample respondents were queried on a range of both positive and negative coping mechanisms. In terms of using positive coping mechanisms, fifty-seven percent reported using humor when talking or

thinking about the traumatic event; thirty-two percent reported working out more; thirty-eight percent used television or unrelated reading to distract themselves; thirty percent sought out more information to understand what had occurred and eleven percent watched or participated in sports more. In terms of negative coping twenty-two percent (diminishing to eleven percent in following months) reported eating more than usual and nineteen percent (diminishing to fifteen percent in following months) drank more alcohol than usual. A constant six percent reported increased sexual activities in all the time periods following traumatic exposure (see Table 17-7).

**Table 17-7: Positive and Negative Coping Mechanisms for
Dealing with a High Threat Security Environment*.**

Coping Mechanisms	Sometimes	Often	Always	Total Endorsement as Present
Used humor when talking/thinking about it	30.2 (26.4)	17 (15.1)	9.4 (9.4)	56.6 (50.9)
Working out more	18.9 (13.5)	5.7 (1.9)	7.5 (11.5)	32.1 (26.9)
Watching or participating in sports more than before	5.7 (7.7)	3.8 (1.9)	1.9	11.4 (9.6)
Cope by distracting myself with TV or unrelated reading	11.5 (13.7)	19.2 (7.8)	7.7 (3.9)	38.4 (25.4)
Engaged in sexual activities more than usual	3.9 (3.9)	2.0 (2.0)		5.9 (5.9)
Sought out information to understand	18.9 (17.0)	5.7 (3.8)	5.7 (5.7)	30.3 (25.5)
Ate more than usual	13.2 (5.7)	7.5 (3.8)	1.9 (1.9)	22.6 (11.4)
Drank more alcohol than usual	9.6 (9.6)	7.7 (3.8)	1.9 (1.9)	19.1 (15.3)
Talked to chaplain, counselor or doctor to cope	7.5 (3.8)	1.9 (1.9)	0	9.4 (5.7)

*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.

17.5.8 Attachment Relationships

Attachment relationships offer form a buffer for traumatic stress, although they can also be a source of distress as well. In this sample forty-five percent of the respondents agreed that it was very important for them to get in touch with loved ones following exposure to the traumatic event. Twenty-four percent said that discussion with loved ones calmed them while another thirty-four percent disagreed with this statement making it clear that for some discussion is useful whereas for others it is not. Likewise talking about the attack was helpful for twenty-nine percent of the respondents, whereas twenty-seven percent found it unhelpful to talk about it. It may be that the type and emotional tenor of the discussion is the deciding factor here or that individuals vary in whether or not talking after traumatic exposure is useful for them. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents felt it very important to reassure themselves that loved ones had not become victims of the attack. Seventeen percent of the sample said that distress from their loved ones was hard to detach from and that it transferred to distress for them. (See Table 17-8).

Table 17-8: Attachment Relationships Effect on Coping with a High Threat Security Environment.

Items about Attachment Relationships	Totally Agree	Agree	Totally Disagree	Disagree	Total Presence
Important to get in touch with loved ones after	22.6	22.6			45.2
Discussion with loved ones calmed me	2.6	21.2	23.1	11.5	23.8 agree 34.6 disagree
Talking about the attack was helpful for calming myself	13.5	25.0	5.8	21.2	28.5 agree 26.8 disagree
It is very important to me to reassure myself that loved ones are not victims	34	34			68.0
Distress from loved ones transferred to me	3.8	13.2			17
*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.					

17.5.9 Posttraumatic Interventions

The sample was queried about potential and actual post traumatic interventions. Seventeen percent reported they would have liked someone to have explained to them the normalcy of their posttraumatic responses; twenty-three percent endorsed that they would have liked if their unit had some group discussion about such thoughts, feelings and responses. Eight percent endorsed that they would have liked individual counseling to help with posttraumatic responses. These figures remained steady over time. (See Table 17-9).

Table 17-9: Preferences for Posttraumatic Stress Interventions to Aid in Coping*.

Intervention	Sometimes	Often	Always	Present
I would have liked someone to explain these symptoms as normal	5.7 (7.5)	3.8 (5.7)	7.5 (5.7)	17.0 (18.9)
I would have liked if our unit had some discussion about such thoughts, feelings and responses	11.3 (9.4)	3.8 (7.5)	7.5 (5.7)	22.6 (22.6)
I would have liked individual counseling to help me with my responses	0 (3.8)	1.9 (3.8)	5.7 (3.8)	7.6 (8.4)
*All values in parenthesis signify symptoms occurring at the present time period for the respondent which in all cases was more than one month beyond exposure to the traumatic event.				

17.5.10 Correlational Analysis

Correlational analysis was made for all of the variables in relationship to having been personally involved in a terrorist event; witnessed it in person, heard about it from the actual victims and witnessed it on television. There were seventeen variables that turned up with significant correlations at the $p < .05$ level of significance. Personal involvement in a terrorist event correlated to depression (.34); coping by engaging in sexual activities more often (.39); becoming excited by danger and sometimes seeking it (.39), feeling it better if one was injured and sent back home (.57); feeling it might be better to die than continue to face the high threat security environment (.53); and strongly endorsing feelings of horror, helplessness and

terror (.45). Personally witnessing events had strong correlations to family distress with reports of children having many posttraumatic symptoms (.56); with spouse or significant other having many posttraumatic symptoms (.64) and reporting that the spouse or significant other copes so differently that it caused distress (.63). These relationships likely reflect that when an individual in a high security threat environment personally witnesses violence his family is also likely to be traumatized when they learn of it and their distress can cause more stress for the individual in the high security threat environment. These same relationships were reported at similar levels for having learned of the trauma from another witness or watched on television. Having personally witnessed the traumatic event was also correlated to being afraid the self or loved ones would be hurt in such an incident (.29). (See Table 17-10 for a complete list of all the correlations with these four variables at the $p < .05$ level of significance.

Table 17-10: Correlation Table: Significant at $p < .05000$. Personally Involved (PI); Witnessed in Person (WP); Heard about from Actual Victims (HAV); Witnessed on TV (WOTV).

	PI	WP	HAV	WOTV
I became detached from it		0.33		
I couldn't stop talking about it to the others	0.28			
I became depressed	0.34			
I engaged in sexual activities more often	0.39			
I became excited by danger and sometimes...	0.39		0.38	
I sometimes thought it might be better if...	0.57			
I sometimes thought it might be better if I...	0.53			
For me being exposed to these events was...	0.45			
My children back home had many of these...		0.56	0.64	0.56
My spouse or significant other had...		0.64	0.67	0.65
My spouse or significant other copes so...	0.38	0.63	0.63	0.56
People are generally good				0.28
I'm afraid I or those I care for will...		0.29		
I'm afraid I or those I care for will be...	0.34			

17.5.11 Composite Variables

Analysis of the clusters among variables revealed four potential composite variables. Dimension One consisted of the following variables:

Thoughts of it keep intruding into my mind.

I found it hard to go to sleep.

My sleep patterns were disturbed.

I was jumpy or startled easily.

I felt afraid it could happen again.

I drank more alcohol than usual.

I tried to cope by distracting myself.

Clearly this dimension is made up of hyperarousal, avoidance and re-experiencing all symptoms of PTSD.

The second dimension that emerged was made up of the following items:

- For me being exposed to these events was traumatic.
- I avoided work assignments that could place me in a similar situation.
- I had panic attacks.
- It made me feel the world is less safe.

This dimension appears to reflect a shattering of the world assumption that the world is a fairly safe place with panic, avoidance and fear clustering in this dimension.

The third dimension was made up of the following items:

- I engaged in sexual activities more often than usual.
- I had headaches after.
- I had general aches in my body after.
- I had dizziness or difficulty breathing.

These are all psychosomatic responses.

The fourth dimension was made up of the following items:

- I felt sad for whole days.
- It made me trust people less.
- I changed some of my behaviors to try to avoid danger of this type.

This appears to be some level of depression and avoidance with alienation.

The fifth dimension concerns suicide ideation and self harm and consisted of the following items:

- I seriously considered hurting myself.
- I seriously thought about suicide.

17.6 CONCLUSIONS

The exploratory study revealed that it is possible to design and conduct a useful study administered from afar using high technology. The web-based automatically scored survey did not work given the slow internet speeds in Iraq necessitating tooling down to a word document that was e-mailed to participants and then hand scored when received. This made assuring anonymity impossible since participant's e-mail addresses were linked to the return of their survey but confidentiality still was assured. It was clear that many individuals were willing and tried hard to participate. Over one hundred respondents tried to use the web-based survey in the first days.

Even with the difficulties it was clear that the participants appreciated that an independent research group was interested to study their psycho-social welfare and that they trusted in the confidentiality of the study and gave honest and reliable answers. Many participants took the time to write detailed letters about their responses to the high threat security environment and gave comments on how to improve the survey. Many stated that it was not only the high threat environment but the posting away from family and long hours with few, if any weekends free, that also caused them significant distress. Some responded to the

questions about increased xenophobia stating their response was opposite: they had watched their Iraqi counterparts suffer and some had deaths among their staff that distressed them greatly and as a result they had come to greatly admire the Iraqi people they worked among. It was clear that the researchers had tried to ask too many questions and the questionnaire needed to be shortened. With analysis of the composite dimensions its possible to omit some questions and tighten up the survey to better model psycho-social resilience in a high security threat environment.

The reality of military, diplomatic and civilian government service today is that it often involves serving in high threat security environments. While military members have more training to deal with these threats, diplomats and civilian contractors have less pre and post deployment training and lack as much experience with high threat environments. Individuals cope with the rigors of working in high threat security environments in different ways and the hope is that few suffer major psychological consequences. However this study reveals that under the conditions of today's often high-tempo operations, with long separations from family and loved ones potentially significant numbers of diplomats, military personnel and the civilian contractors that serve them are subject to acute and posttraumatic responses and other psychological and behavioral health issues brought on by the high security threat environment. From our exploratory study it is clear that significant numbers of diplomats, contractors and even military personnel in high threat security environments likely suffer acute and posttraumatic responses to traumatic events in theater as well as psychosomatic responses; depression; anxiety and fear responses; shattered world assumptions; the obsessive need to talk; and even suicidal ideation and self harm responses. Coping methods vary from positive to negative and significant numbers stated that simple tools like learning that acute and posttraumatic responses are normal; group and individual counseling would be helpful.

On the whole, from this exploratory study it's possible to conclude that the present resilience model and preliminary survey is a useful one for measuring such effects and the high technology approach to studying psycho-social resilience in the high security threat environment works. People participate and appear to appreciate the effort the care put into the survey that asks them how they are doing while serving in a high threat security environment. Improvement needs to include shortening it; obtaining a larger more representative sample; and including items that take into account other factors that also cause significant distress other than the high threat environment (i.e., family separation and long work hours).

It is our recommendation to construct a tighter version of this resilience survey based on the tested questions in this model to be used in Iraq as well as other similar high threat security theaters (Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc.) where diplomats, civilian contractors and soldiers are serving. It could then be used to sample larger populations and used on a yearly basis for monitoring, comparing and benchmarking responses to working in such environments. Such a tool would be useful for designing improved services pre-, during deployment and post-deployment.

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