

ECONOMIC THINKING FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ECONOMIC THINKING FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

by

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ABSTRACT

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Military senior leaders today operate within increasingly volatile environments characterized by greater information-processing demands and a need to solve ill-defined, novel, and complex problems. To ensure their organizations adapt for long-term success, strategic-level leaders require the cognitive skills to make sense of and successfully navigate within these complex environments and anticipate the future. To enhance the skills required to think strategically, the U.S. Army has taken a multidisciplinary perspective to educating its future leaders. Various thinking lenses are introduced to teach various thinking skills, with the exception of the discipline of economics. The U.S. Army should include Economic Thinking in any properly developed multidisciplinary framework for cognitive skills required of sound strategic thinkers. Failure to include this specific thinking skill could result in future Army leaders unprepared to analyze certain complex, ambiguous issues and craft informed decisions.

ECONOMIC THINKING FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS

Traditionally “strategic” refers to the highest level of war, that is, above the operational and tactical level. Increasingly, however, “strategic” is associated with a specific way of thinking and leading required at colonel and general officer ranks.¹ The problems faced by such strategic leaders tend to involve ambiguity and complexity and higher levels of risk. Lesser problems tend to be remedied at lower levels. To ensure their organizations adapt and achieve long-term success, strategic-level leaders require the cognitive skills that help them to make sense of and successfully navigate complex environments and anticipate the future. To enhance the cognitive skills required to apply strategic thinking effectively, the U.S. Army War College has adopted a multidisciplinary approach to educating its future leaders. Various thinking lenses from various disciplines are introduced to demonstrate different ways to approach a problem or read a situation, with the exception of the discipline of economics. To properly develop the cognitive skills required of sound strategic thinkers, the U.S. Army must include Economic Thinking in its multidisciplinary approach. Failure to include this specific thinking skill could yield Army leaders who are unprepared to analyze certain complex and ambiguous strategic-level issues and craft or implement informed decisions. To understand what economics can contribute to strategic thinking, this paper will review the U.S. Army War College’s current approach to developing strategic thinking. The paper will introduce the discipline of economics and the criticality of economic thinking to strategic leaders. The paper will further offer examples of recent strategic decisions that failed to achieve desired effects due, in part, to improperly applying economic thinking to the problem will be highlighted. The examples span the

four broad categories of expertise required by the Army: Military-Technical, Human Development, Moral-Ethical, and Political -Cultural. The paper will draw on various economic fields, including Identity Economics, Neoclassical Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Public Choice Economics. Finally, it provides recommendations for including economics thinking in the development of strategic leaders.

The Analytical Skills of Strategic Thinking

In preparing its students for the challenges of leadership at the strategic level, the Army War College strives to teach them the cognitive skills needed by senior leaders. While this is a constant theme throughout the 10-month curriculum, it is most explicitly addressed in the 11-day core course “Strategic Thinking” which the college defines as “the ability to make creative and holistic synthesis of key factors affecting an organization and its environment in order to obtain sustainable competitive advantage and long-term success.”² The course is focused on “how” and not “what” to think about challenges at the strategic level. This emphasis embraces flexibility of mind and diversity intellectual disciplines.

The multidisciplinary approach to providing thinking skills is based on “The Strategic Thinking Framework.”³ This framework delineates specific thinking skills, both analytical and creative, required for addressing complex issues in a balanced, synthesized manner. A preliminary to strategic and major analytical thinking is “Critical Thinking.”⁴ As noted by Elder and Paul, the advancement of society and quality of life is dependent upon the quality of our thought. Yet left on our own our thinking is fraught with biases, assumptions and downright ignorance. Critical thinking aims to improve the quality of thought through purposeful thinking that is structured and supported by intellectual standards.⁵

Since the threat of terrorism took center stage post 9-11, defense academics and thinkers have focused more on social and cultural knowledge. While cross-cultural skills have long been a desirable strategic leadership competency in the Army, the institution was slow to grasp its criticality to the new security environment.

Shortcomings during planning and execution of recent operations reveal a large gap existed between the cultural awareness needed and that which was applied. The War College's "Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy" (ACFSP) is designed to make meaningful improvement in senior leaders' ability to comprehend the impact of culture on both our own and our adversaries' strategy and policy.⁶ By developing the "Cultural Thinking" skill of strategic leaders, they can more fully appreciate the major cultural elements that influence strategic actions and behavior.

Ethical thinking aims to develop disciplined application of ethical habits of the mind this block of instruction focuses on the importance to strategic leaders of applying sound, ethical reasoning to complex strategic issues. While ethical reasoning skills may have a moral underpinning, they are taught at the Army War College through the application of an analytical methodology to aid strategic thinking.⁷

"Thinking in Time" is the strategic thinking framework's final form of analytical thinking addressed during the core course. Thinking in time is a skill vital to strategic thinking since it enables one to use the past to provide a context for current strategic challenges. The discipline of History supports this cognitive skill. According to Eliot, what the military strategist should gain from this method of thinking is an "historical mind- that is, a way of thinking that uses history as a mode of inquiry."⁸

The multidisciplinary approach to the analytical skills of strategic thinking covers many useful ways of thinking, but omits economics despite its relevance to many strategic problems since strategic-level problems are often also economic problems. Economics largely deal with how actors, be they individuals, groups, organizations, or states, make calculated decisions with respect to their interests and environment, construct social institutions and rules to further these goals, and compete for goods allocated in ways influenced by all the above.⁹ It would be difficult to find a more cogent description of many of the most pressing challenges facing both current and future army leaders.

Economics and Economic Thinking

Most contemporary definitions of economics involve the notions of choice and scarcity. Perhaps the earliest of these was provided by Lionell Robbins in 1932 when he stated: "Economics is the science which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses."¹⁰ However defined, economics seeks to uncover an agreed-upon set of fundamental commonalities that underlie behavior and events. Economic thinking, which is grounded in a few core assumptions, provides a mode of analysis for understanding certain aspects of individual action and interaction. Economists assume that individuals act purposefully in that they have specific goals that they seek to achieve. "The ability to attain these goals is constrained by a number of factors, including time, imperfect information, and formal and informal rules including laws. Given their goals and constraints, individuals pursue their desired end using the best means known to them at the time of action. Further, actors adjust their behavior as their goals and constraints change."¹¹ The underpinning

of economics is then the analysis of decision making hence, strategic thinking and leadership are amenable to economic analysis.

Most people view economics as dry and built on highly technical mathematical formulas but the discipline has expanded immensely since it was first coined the “dismal science.”¹² However, in the past few decades the field has made important developments in the tools, models, and methods used. Much of the knowledge developed can be translated into useful decision making tools in the real world. Economics now illuminates human decision-making from a variety of perspectives and has integrated biology, psychology, sociology, political science, complexity science and neuroscience into its calculations.¹³

The Military Profession and Negative Perceptions of Economics

In recent years, many defense academics and thinkers have called on military leaders to gain an increased understanding of the economic element of national power and its interrelationship with the other elements, especially sustainable military power. This knowledge they claim is crucial toward developing military strategy. Moreover, the severity of the recent financial crisis and recession made it even more imperative to understand the national security implications of global economic trends and include these trends “as a core element of their analysis” when formulating strategy.¹⁴ As an element of power to be grasped, economics has rightfully received more attention but as a social science discipline to aid in strategic thinking, its theories have been given short shrift.

Past failed experiments with economic theory are partly to blame for this current neglect of the dismal science. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara came into his role with the brash assumption that economic theories and efficient business models not

only reflected the real world, but could change them as well. One of these theories he sought to apply at the political-strategic level in Vietnam was Thomas Schelling's contribution to game-theory.¹⁵ This theory is based on an adversarial mindset that seeks to influence an opponent's behavior through a graduated series of punitive measures that are designed to achieve a specific and desired outcome. McNamara believed he, and his Pentagon "Whiz Kids," could compel the North Vietnamese to their demands since they would be able to predict the North's responses to U.S strikes. McNamara's strategy was an utter failure. The theory did not translate into real-world results since American attacks did not alter the enemy's behavior.¹⁶ The improper application of economic theory to armed conflict has a continuing lasting impact on generations of Army officers' perception of the discipline. Clear disdain for the application of theory to the human nature of war is evident in a book provided to all newly appointed officers. In *The Armed Forces Officer*, a section is titled "Notions of economics and expediency can cause needless death."¹⁷ The unrealistic, unverifiable, or highly simplified assumptions of the discipline may lend themselves to elegant mathematics but are not seen as congruent with an Army ethic that demands selfless service.

The aspect of economics that studies rational self interest in one's own welfare has been assumed not to apply to the Army profession since "the notion of subordination is fundamental to military service."¹⁸ Regrettably behaviors that are guided by "self-interest" are misinterpreted as "selfish" acts. Often the self-interested acts of individuals do not contradict the larger goals of the profession and the society it serves. If a gap is evident however, the goals of the larger cause must be supreme or

run the risk of violating the Army ethic and trust of the Nation. Indeed it is self-interest that underlies America's international relations. In his Nobel prize acceptance speech President Obama "has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest -- because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity."¹⁹ This notion though goes back even farther in our nation's history and is deeply imbedded in society itself. It was the enlightened self-interest of 19th century America that impressed Alex De Tocqueville.²⁰

The Expert Knowledge of the Army Profession

The Army, as an agent of American society, has established four broad categories of expertise to meet the demands of defense and security for the Nation.²¹ In order to apply their expertise properly and effectively, strategic leaders must be competent in broad categories of expert knowledge:

Military-Technical. This is the Army's core expertise, since this category includes how it prepares for and applies landpower to a full spectrum of military operations. This skill requires mastery of applying kinetic and nonkinetic means to accomplish the political objectives of policy makers.

Human Development. This skill entails the Army's management of its human resources. To thrive and grow as a profession, the Army must use this expertise to maximize the effectiveness of its people. Moreover, Army leaders, especially those at the strategic level, must develop subordinates to be to be leaders of and future stewards of the profession.

Political-Cultural. Army leaders require the expertise to manage cultures across organizational and national boundaries. A critical component of this expertise is domestic civil-military relations since the Army serves the American people through interactions with elected and appointed officials as well as other government organizations. This domain also includes the need for leaders who are cross-cultural savvy due to the growing frequency of coalition warfare and expeditionary nature of the Army.

Moral-Ethical. This expertise deals with the moral nature of professional duties to both fellow members of the institution and to society at large. As stated by Snider and Watkins, “The nature of the profession is such that only moral soldiers can discharge their professional duties, and the Army’s strategic leaders are morally obligated to the client to maintain a profession of both competence and character.”²² Additionally, members of the profession are to employ combat power morally and within the confines of domestic and international law.

Examples of Strategic-Level Issues where Economic Thinking would have made a Difference

CPA Orders #1 De-Baathification and #2 Disbanding the Iraqi Army (Military-Technical). The Army’s core area of expertise is “how the profession prepares for and conducts land operations combining Army soldiers with organizations, doctrine, and technology.”²³ Practitioners and scholars have long emphasized the military’s primary role as the “management of violence” for deterring and, when necessary, defeating other armed forces through kinetic means.²⁴ However, military violence is always the most effective means of attaining political policy ends.

U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates that winning today's wars , in the sense of achieving political objectives through military means, requires that military means include the ability to conduct stability operations. Stability operations are the tasks and activities "necessary for the restoration of political order and stability for winning the peace."²⁵ Since violent responses to these conflicts may not be the proper means to attain peace, it is imperative that strategic leaders develop their competence in economics in general and the analytical insights of economic thinking in particular.²⁶ General Petraeus, for one, claims his economic classes at Princeton were invaluable in conducting successful stability operations activities in Mosul during 2003.²⁷ The volatile environments in which stability operations take place are filled with various NGO and humanitarian, actors, development experts, opportunists, and "entrepreneurs" seeking to advance ends which may or may not mesh with the broader U.S. policy objectives. Economic thinking can provide the analytical skills to ensure strategic leaders establish incentives that make the various players and the population at large in the affected area the same goals with the U.S. The reconstruction of Iraq is a clear case where economic thinking would have served well.

There is a growing amount of literature available faulting U.S. for lack of foresight, planning, and execution in Iraq.²⁸ After eight years it is clear that many of the assumptions underlying the invasion of Iraq both in terms of justification and how it would transpire have been proven wrong. Many errors were the result of self-delusion and honest mistakes. Duplicity is also a factor in some errors. The Iraqi defector and CIA informant, whose claims of a secret biological weapons program provided the administration with justification for the invasion, recently admitted for the first time that

he had lied about the program in order to advance his exile status. Moreover, in a recent interview he expressed his pride in having had the “chance to fabricate something to topple the regime.”²⁹

Duplicity also played a role in the May of 2003 decision to exclude Baath Party members from the new government in Iraq and to disband the Iraqi Army. Bremer issued Coalition Provisional Authority Order #1 “De-Baathification” on 16 May 2003 and Order #2 “Disbanding of the Iraqi Army” on 23 May 2003. The decisions had been approved only by the Secretary of Defense and senior White House policy officials prior to implementation. State, intelligence agencies and military leaders on the ground warned that widespread unrest would ensue, and studies conducted prior to the invasion had highlighted the critical role that former Baath Party government officials and the Iraqi Army would be expected to play toward maintaining public order and stability after major combat operations. The measures had been adopted largely at the strong urging of the exiled leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), Ahmed Chalabi. He and his fellow exiles saw themselves as the likeliest beneficiaries of the dissolution of these institutions and offered advice and information to their supporters in the US government calculated to yield that result.^{30 31} These decisions created a sudden and catastrophic vacuum in the remaining Iraqi security apparatus and resulted in the breakdown of security as had been predicted.

What followed is well known. For the most part, the military reacted to the security situation with a kinetic focus which only reinforced the violence and resentment against U.S. personnel in Iraq. Economic thinking would have helped these decision makers to see from the earliest stages that what was required not the total dismantling

of the Iraqi government, but a comprehensive reconstruction effort that included all elements of national power. This policy was not adopted until much later and only after the security situation had deteriorated into an insurgency inhospitable to full scale reconstruction.³² Amongst other errors, strategic leaders on the ground and in Washington failed to properly apply strategic economic thinking.

US policy makers thought issuing CPA decrees #1 and #2 would support their overall strategic goal of establishing a secular democracy in Iraq. But if the CPA wanted Iraqis to engage in activities that would build a democracy, they should have created opportunities and preferences that would have encouraged this. Economic thinking stresses that the decision “to engage in cooperation, civic activities, crime, terror, or insurgency is influenced by preferences and opportunities.”³³ While the decrees and reconstruction efforts may have enlarged the opportunities available to and suiting the preferences of some exiles and certain other members of Kurdish and Shia communities, the constraints imposed by the ensuing breakdown in security placed severe limits on the opportunities of most Iraqis to carry on a normal life let alone chose activities that supported the establishment of liberal democracy.

For most Iraqis the decrees not only failed to create an incentive to prefer the result we favored, it virtually ensured that there would be no opportunity to do so. By alienating hundreds of thousands of well armed and trained men who could no longer support themselves or their families, the decrees fueled an insurgency which made reconstruction almost impossible in many sectors.³⁴ This insurgency did not start to subside until Sunni insurgents changed their preferences. In this, the lack of economic thinking by our *al Qaeda in Iraq* adversaries helped support our objectives rather than

their own. Alienated by the actions of their former allies, al Qaeda, and provided a new opportunity to change sides by the surge and counterinsurgency efforts of U.S forces, the insurgents preferred to advance their interest through a more peaceful, cooperative process with the newly established Iraqi government.

The decrees also undercut U.S. interests since they undermined the institutions and infrastructure necessary for normal social and economic activity required for stability. Ironically the US essentially began by diminishing both Iraqi will and capacity to support our strategic goals. While the US could forcibly change law and regulations after toppling Saddam's political regime, it failed to shift the underlying Iraqi preferences to support U.S. goals and institutions. These new rules took no notice of Iraqi preferences in everyday practices or operations.³⁵ The U.S. may have had reasons for removing senior Baath members and holding them accountable, but the rank and file bureaucrats could still have been left to offer predictability and stability in government functions without undermining US objectives. The "De-Baathification" decree unleashed what the economist William Baumol terms "entrepreneurial corruption." Since entrepreneurs are defined simply as "persons who are ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power, and prestige" they are always present in society but may not always play a constructive role.³⁶ How entrepreneurs decide to exercise their ingenuity depends on the incentives, preferences and opportunities present in the economy. "Where the system rewards productive activity, they create start-ups; where violence or corruption offers the greatest opportunities, they prey on the rest of the citizenry."³⁷ The decrees rendered Iraq one of the worst environments to conduct business.³⁸ Newly appointed government officials competed with each other to

enact rules and receive bribes from businesses, discouraging private enterprise and generating a black market economy.

Our experience clearly shows that stability operations must be a part of the Army's military-technical expertise. Without competence in the requirements necessary to restore political and economic order in a state or territory in which deployed, strategic success will not be achieved. As the service with the mission to provide the Nation's land power, the Army will bear the most responsibility to execute the tasks associated with stability operations. Economic thinking is therefore a critical analytical method for strategic leaders as they plan and execute this domain of expertise.

Retention Bonuses for Captains (Human Development). While the Army must deal with technology, bureaucracies and organizational structure, its focus must remain the expertise of its people throughout their entire careers. To lead this entity effectively, strategic leaders must grasp that the Army is in essence a human institution. The 2007 decision to provide bonuses for Army captains was a decision that reveals a lack of understanding of basic economic thinking to a human development issue.

In FY 2007 the Army faced a shortage of seasoned captains. The root cause of this crisis was the addition of 6,000 captain and major authorizations from 2004 to 2007 coupled with an slight increased rate of attrition.³⁹ Worn down by repeated deployments, battle-hardened captains were leaving at a growing rate. Officers were receiving diminishing returns from these deployments; the enthusiasm and sense of mission they felt during their first deployment diminished with each subsequent deployment with no end in sight. To address this problem, the Army implemented the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) program for captains in the competitive category

career fields and the Medical Service Branch. The Army had long used cash bonuses to entice enlisted soldiers to remain in the service, but this was the first time it offered such a program to commissioned officers. The decision to implement the CSRB for captains however, did not take any sound economics into account and may actually hurt the future of the profession.⁴⁰

Based on the needs of an officer's branch, the CSRB traded bonuses of \$25,000, \$30,000, and \$35,000 for three more years of active duty service. This program cost the taxpayers \$500 million with no evidence that it actually improved retention. For the most part the bonus was given to captains who already intended to remain in the Army. Research by the Army G-1 and the Army Research Institute indicate that 77% of the bonus recipients had already indicated that they intended to remain in the Army beyond their initial service obligation.⁴¹ Moreover, most of the officers who intended to leave the Army did not find the bonus a sufficient inducement to stay. The amount of money offered (\$35,000 maximum) was the equivalent of four months base pay and benefits after taxes. These officers were leaving in order to earn more money in the private sector, start a family, or retain the family they already had. The opportunity cost of remaining in the service greatly exceeded four month's salary. The CSRB could, however have been persuasive only to those with less attractive employment opportunities outside the Army. Those who stayed were staying for reasons other than money, ranging from job satisfaction to lack of other alternatives. The Army was in effect paying bonuses to retain both officers who would have stayed without it and some who were not wanted elsewhere "thus producing a talent mismatches for the

increasingly complex jobs awaiting them.”⁴² The program also created a market mechanism within the profession which had not previously existed.⁴³

A key concept of economics is not *money but rather incentives*. Quite simply an incentive is anything that motivates human behavior, or encourages an individual to prefer one alternative over another. An incentive can be money but a fundamental economic insight is that not everything can be bought with money⁴⁴. In the private sector it has long been understood that money should be used when performance at a task is highly responsive to extra effort and there is little intrinsic satisfaction in the job.⁴⁵ This motivation is not appropriate in a profession such as the military. Individual members of the profession should be motivated by the intrinsic rewards of the job rather than extrinsic incentives like money. Money is an inappropriate replacement for the necessary internal motivation required for sustained and effective service as a military officer. The offer of retention bonuses can therefore be counterproductive by encouraging the wrong people to stay. .

The strategic leaders who decided to implement the CSRB failed to understand that “professionals are more motivated intrinsically by their expert knowledge and dedicated to its application than they are by the extrinsic motivators offered by the institution in which they serve.”⁴⁶ By offering the money to the captains it created a market relationship that could weaken their commitment to the profession. As volunteers, young officers are inherently sympathetic to the Army and its goals; bonus pay can degrade that relationship. In identity economics this is referred to as changing the social category of an employee. Akerlof and Kranton classify workers into two types: insiders and outsiders.⁴⁷ Insiders are the employees that identify with the

organization and maximize identity utility by exerting high effort and require no monetary incentive to induce hard work. Outsiders, in contrast, do not identify with the organization and are not motivated to work hard without an external incentive. It is vital for strategic leaders to ensure the Army remains an institution committed to respecting the contributions of and recognizing the specialized needs of its junior officers. This can only continue if Army professionals feel themselves to be true insiders, not outsiders swayed by extrinsic motivators. This dynamic was well captured by a brigade commander's response to the survey of field commanders about the adequacy of bonuses to improve retention. Unfortunately, Colonel J.B. Burton's economic thinking was not heeded:

The main message from our junior officers is that their service is not about financial gain. These officers want the Army to invest in the human capital that they represent for the future via educational opportunities and duty assignments that reflect their real world experience and contributions to their Nation's security...They have spent the past 4 years in a continuous cycle of fighting, training, deploying, fighting, etc. and they see no end in sight. They have seen their closest friends killed and maimed leaving young spouses and children as widows and single parent kids. They want time for themselves and time to raise families for awhile. When they look forward to a 15th month deployment, with 12 months in-between, they see their 'home station' time as being compressed, intensified training which means more time away from families and personal pursuits. It's not about the money, at least not \$20k. Increasing the incentive to \$50k or more might get their attention. What these warriors really want is for their Army to invest in them personally by giving them time back to invest in themselves and their families.⁴⁸

Officer Voting (Political-Cultural). For a democracy such as ours, control of the military by civilian officials elected by the people is fundamental. In U.S. civil-military relations, the Army serves the American people through a set of relationships with elected and appointed leaders and the other government agencies. Strategic military leaders primarily advise civilian leaders on matters of policy and strategy from a military

perspective and execute the decisions of those leaders in peace and in war.⁴⁹

Prominent scholars of civil-military relations contend that strategic leaders sometimes lack the political-cultural expertise required to understand their proper role in government and society, diminishing the professionalism of the armed forces as a whole. To ensure it continues to merit the trust and confidence of the American people and their elected officials, strategic leaders must be completely aloof from partisan politics. Economic thinking suggests that to ensure that this is so, today's strategic leaders should not only abstain from endorsing or supporting a party or its candidates, but perhaps even abstain from voting.

Throughout the history of the United States, military leaders firmly believed that they should remain outside of partisan politics to ensure they exerted no undue influence on the country's democratic institutions. Believing firmly that even the slightest degree of political participation could compromise their professional independence and judgment, William Tecumseh Sherman stated: "No Army officer should form or express an opinion" on party politics."⁵⁰ In the seminal work of civil-military relations, Samuel Huntington wrote in *The Soldier and the State*: "Politics is beyond the scope of the military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism. The military officer must remain neutral politically."⁵¹

Despite the value placed on this nonpartisan tradition by both military and civilian leaders, it appears to be unraveling in recent years.⁵² Many scholars and officers believe a military officer may have a private affiliation with a political party or preference for one candidate or without harm to civil-military relations. Indeed they deem voting to

be both a basic right and a duty of good citizens. They believe in joining a political party “they are in effect, the consumers, not the purveyors, of the party”’s political appeals and policies.”⁵³ Today, however, many retired senior officers now opine on matters of party politics publically and without hesitation and active duty officers vote overwhelmingly Republican.⁵⁴ They also vote in percentages that greatly exceed those of the general public. This, coupled with the fact one party enjoys far greater support among military voters than do the others, and far more than it enjoys among the public at large, and we are now looking at an issue very different from individual voting.⁵⁵ According to public choice theory this evident affiliation with one party means that the military has rendered itself an identifiable voting bloc, an identifiable interest group, with potentially significant consequences for the nature of civil-military relations. This is an issue that cries out for analysis as a problem for “public choice” theory.

“Public Choice” theory in essence transplants the general analytical framework of economics into political science.⁵⁶ The basic framework of politics, according to public choice theorists, includes four main groups; private voters, elected officials, bureaucrats, and special interest groups. Similar to the standard assumption that underlies economic analysis, it is assumed that members of these four groups have well-defined preferences and pursue their desired ends to the best of their ability within given constraints. Each group wants something that is possessed by one of the other groups whether it is money, certain policies or votes. For instance, individual voters and special interest groups trade votes for policies that will maximize their interests. Bureaucrats want elected officials to increase their budgets, benefits and influence, and

officials want bureaucrats to implement the policies or provide their constituents with goods and services they traded their votes for in the first place.⁵⁷

Interest groups are so politically powerful because an organized group whose members can be counted on to vote the same way can be lobbied by politicians more effectively than an equal number of random voters with no common interest to guide their voting. Moreover, individual voters tend to be relatively uninformed, since the effort required to inform themselves is perceived by them to exceed the impact of their individual votes. An unaffiliated individual voter may feel that their chance of determining an election is vanishingly small, whereas a voter who is part of an organized voting group may feel that, united, their group has a chance to influence the outcome of an election. In principle, therefore, members of special interest groups may have a greater incentive to vote than do unaffiliated voters. These observations are consistent with the predictions of public choice theory, which holds that special interest groups wield influence on the decisions of elected politicians greatly disproportionate to their numbers, enabling these groups to manipulate political outcomes, concentrating the benefits of their organizing efforts on themselves, while diffusing their costs among the public at large.⁵⁸

As an organized faction of society with much influence, military leaders have all the hallmarks of a well-informed special interest group that could concentrate benefits to its members while dispersing the costs along to uninformed taxpayers. By appearing as the leaders of the military voting bloc, they risk making themselves the target of party politicians. Eliot Cohen warned that “If the public becomes accustomed to thinking of the military as the uniformed equivalent of the National Education Association, it will

be treated as such by politicians -- romanced or paid off, marginalized or denounced as circumstances suggest.”⁵⁹ By openly identifying with one party and voting for its candidates in elections, the military also creates the notion it is a constituency rather than a neutral instrument of policy. Neither party will believe in the objectivity of its counsel. If the officer corps appears to be voting as member of a block, the strategic leaders must take some action to dispel that perception of risk the integrity of the electoral process and distortion of proper civil military relations.⁶⁰

Economic thinking can help by suggesting ways in which the military can step back from being, or being seen to be, a special interest group. Army strategic leaders could take the lead in properly maintaining the civil-military relationship not only by refraining from taking partisan political positions, but by registering to vote only as independents, not as adherents to any political party. Leaders could also set a good example in state and local elections by declining to vote in elections and on issues that do not affect them and their families directly.⁶¹ Any of these steps could help prevent advocacy by military members which only weakens the profession by creating a perception of self-interest at the expense of the national interest.

Active Duty Officer Careerism and Retired Officer Conflict of Interest (Moral-Ethical). The Army’s Moral-Ethical domain of expert knowledge concerns the moral nature of our professional obligations to members of both society and the institution.⁶² When the Army has to apply coercive force, American society expects it to adhere to both our nation’s laws and our moral values, as well as the set of professional military values that guide officer conduct. This internal professional military ethic is “the foundation for the trust the American people place in their military and the foundation for

the trust Army officers place in their profession.”⁶³ The Army’s strategic leaders are therefore obligated to ensure the profession is filled by persons of high character.⁶⁴

The Army ethic places a premium on selfless service and moral courage, yet active duty and retired military officers do not always live up to these standards. Many officers exhibit careerism instead of selfless service.⁶⁵ Retired general officers who serve, as paid or unpaid, mentors to the Army while taking lucrative positions in the defense industry risk both the appearance and the reality of a conflict of interests that may degrade the public’s trust in the profession. Through the lens of economic thinking, strategic leaders can formulate both incentives and constraints that will encourage the moral ethical behavior required of Army officers.

Field Manual (FM) 1, *The Army states*: “Professions create their own standards of performance and codes of ethics to maintain their effectiveness.”⁶⁶ Since its founding in 1775 the Army has developed an ethic that provides the objective norms and standards of behavior required of its members in order to effectively defend the Nation and the Constitution. The Army professional military ethic is one that “is cooperative and cohesive in spirit, selfless but meritocratic, and fundamentally anti-individualistic and anti-careerist.”⁶⁷ According to this ethic, military officers must subordinate their own personal welfare to the nation they serve and the soldiers they lead.

Recent moral deficiencies among the officer corps reveal a gap between the Army’s ideal and actual values. Both scholars and members of the profession attribute this discrepancy to careerism- “the pressure to conform, to stay silent, to go along, or to do what advances one” career.”⁶⁸ Careerism is corrosive of the Army ethic since it reflects self-interest, not selfless service. Careerism is in essence, “the desire to be

rather than to do. It is the desire to have rank, rather than to use it; the pursuit of promotion without a clear sense of what to do with a higher rank once one has attained it.”⁶⁹ Careerism leads to officers who prefer to do nothing that may damage their careers. These careerists deem even the honest mistakes of their subordinates as risks to their own careers progression so establish a zero-defects environment. This “in turn leads to risk aversion and sometimes cover-ups, avoidance of responsibility, and other behaviors that harm the ability to succeed in battle.”⁷⁰

Strategic leaders, as stewards of the Army profession, must set the standard for strong, ethical leadership and should hold accountable those who do not live the Army ethic, especially their fellow senior leaders. Economic thinking about aligning incentives and constraints to desired goals, is useful in addressing the careerism phenomenon. Leaders must channel self-interested behaviors, like competitiveness and ambition towards productive ends that build a winning organization dedicated to competence. To do this the current personnel system must be made more flexible and less hierarchical.

Evaluations where only superiors provide input should be supplanted with a 360 degree assessment that allows for inputs from peers. This would provide a more balanced view of the performance and ensure proper teamwork is fulfilled. To enhance the promotion system, one retired strategic leader has even called for the elimination the perfect “up or out” industrial-age promotion pyramid: enable officers to drop back year groups, or open up direct commissions for selected skills.”⁷¹ Flexibility is also needed in the assignment system which now encourages officers to “ticket punch.” Ticket punching entails “securing credentials for advancement as rapidly as possible while avoiding mistakes and risks that could blemish those credentials. This principle

emphasizes short-term high performance, then pursuit of the next credential needed for promotion, promotion itself, and then a new cycle of credential-seeking for the next rank.”⁷² A more personally adaptable assignment system that meets the need to fill the Army’s formations while providing for more non-traditional opportunities such as interagency assignments and civilian education can allow for more broadened, innovative officers. Finally, the army should flatten its bureaucratic organizational structure. With less top-heavy organizations, responsibilities can be pushed downward to the proper level. This will increase collaboration and job satisfaction among a junior and mid-grade officers accustomed to great responsibilities and teamwork on the battlefield. Such a flexible and non-prescriptive lock-step career path would prevent officers from taking assignments just to check the block in order to progress to the next rank. Officer will focus more on their efforts on both key assignments for their field and more broadening assignments needed for well rounded development.

Shortcomings in living up to the Army ethic was also evident in the Army’s decision to hire retired general officers as “senior mentors” while they were earning very generous salaries on the payrolls of major defense firms.⁷³ The Army strategic leaders who hired their former bosses failed to fully grasp the impropriety. As with several other cases of moral deficiencies exhibited by the profession, it took the efforts of military correspondents from major newspaper to highlight the issue.⁷⁴ The ensuing fallout from the public and congressional dissatisfaction with a gap in the values and practices of the profession is what forced the services to review the details of the program. 80% of the 158 retired general officer hired by DOD as “senior mentors” had financial ties to defense contractors, including 29 who were full time executives of

defense companies. Retired generals have for years taken jobs with defense firms so they can reap rewards for themselves and their employers through their contacts and insights. However, the trend has been rising sharply and the recent growth in the mentorship program “has created a new class of individuals who enjoy even more access than a typical retired officer, and they get paid by the military services while doing so. Most are compensated both by taxpayers and industry, with little to prevent their private employers from using knowledge they obtain as mentors in seeking government work.”⁷⁵ Moreover, since the senior mentors, who earn up to \$440 an hour, were hired by the military as independent contractors they are not subject to government ethics rules that would apply if they were hired as part-time federal employees. While these retired general officers claim they can they can be trusted not to abuse their positions, the current setup is too susceptible and does not meet the Army’s ethical standard.

Retired generals have every right to seek lucrative employment after decades of military services. Yet they should not risk even the appearance of a conflict of interest by look elsewhere than the military to reap financial gain. For years these officers were motivated by intrinsic rewards of their profession. Suddenly, within weeks of retirement in the cases of Army generals John Vines and Dan McNeill, they are motivated extrinsically and paid four times their active duty rate to apply their expert knowledge as “mentors” to their former colleagues. The Army leadership could have applied identity economics and appeal to their affinity with the profession. They could have also appealed to the true sense of mentorship which calls for individuals to selflessly share their expertise to those who would benefit. By not taking this approach it also calls into

question whether the decisions made by senior leaders on active duty were taken to improve their chances for financial gain in their post-Army career.

The Army sought to relax the constraints placed on the proper hiring of retired generals instead of increasing them.⁷⁶ In several cases the Army hired generals under questionable measure that appeared to undermine laws established to prevent conflicts of interest. Such actions cause a break in the Army's professional military ethic and in trust with the American public. Retired general officers can represent several organizations with conflicting loyalties as long as there is no possible perception of a conflict of interest. A novel proposal from Don Snider to attain transparency in the employment of retired three and four-star generals was through the use of a public, electronic registry.⁷⁷ This registry, according to Snider, should be established by the Chief of Staff of the Army. To uphold moral rather than legal obligations, the registry would be voluntarily updated by each retired officer listing each current affiliation. According to Snider, perceptions of conflicts of interest can be best avoided if all affiliations are well-known in advance of commitments and contracts.

Recent changes to the mentorship program revealed that some of these retired general officers may not have cherished their public roles as moral exemplars of the profession by volunteering to maintain the registry. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently pushed for changes in the military mentor program to guard against future potential conflicts of interest.⁷⁸ Within months of new compensation terms and rules to disclose assets and business ties as a condition of employment, seven of the 158 "senior mentors" ended their employment rather than comply.⁷⁹ How many more might have declined to maintain this information in a voluntary register?

Professional Ethics provide the primary means of acceptable norms and control over its members as they execute their expert knowledge. Because of the importance the Army's expertise to society it must maintain an ethic that ensures its effectiveness and moral obligations to the client it serves.⁸⁰ Although the Army's ethic calls for selfless service and moral courage not all members practice these virtues. Economic thinking, as a tool of analysis into decision making, can support the Army's strategic leaders as they set measures designed to promote appropriate social control and direction over the profession's members, both active duty and retired.

Recommendations for Enhancing Economic Thinking Skills

More than ever, economic thinking provides a critical framework for decisions that can affect us all. The importance of economics mandates that strategic leaders incorporate economic ideas into their analytical toolbox for proper complex, ambiguous issues. Of course with time being finite, adding economic thinking to the War College curriculum entails an opportunity cost. Indeed the USAWC emphasis on history and its cultural underpinnings is one of its strengths and should not be cut.⁸¹ However, failure to account for economic thinking in the strategic thinking framework can impede the full development of strategic leaders. While Army War college students do not a full mastery of economics, they should at least understand some of its basic tenants, such as behavioral economics and public choice to assist them make informed decisions. At minimum, readings could be added to recommended reading lists. Of the three recommended lists currently available at the War College, only the War College Commandant's includes a single book related to the topic -- Allison and Zelikow's *Essence of Decision* which deals with both the rational choice model of policy decision

making as well as public choice theory.⁸² As the Army expands its graduate school opportunities for its officers it should encourage more study of economics.

Conclusion

Strategic leaders face a global security environment filled with volatility and ambiguity. The internal problems they encounter when dealing with organizational and civil military relations are equally complex and challenging. To assist in developing the cognitive skills needed of its strategic leaders, the U.S. Army War College should expand its multidisciplinary approach to strategic thinking to include economic thinking. To remedy this, the Army War College should add economic thinking to its framework and to the strategic thinking curriculum. The examples throughout of decisions that would have been greatly enhanced by applying economic thinking should offer persuasive evidence of the cost to the US political, economic and security interests of the failure to think economics. These four examples have taken each of the Army's core areas of expertise to underscore the utility of economic thinking to the Army's future strategic leaders.

Endnotes

¹ Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, "Strategic leadership of the Army Profession," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 602.

² Charles D. Allen and Stephen J. Gerras, "Developing Creative and Critical Thinkers," *Military Review*, (December 2009): 78.

³ Douglas E. Waters, "The U.S. Army War College Approach to Strategic Thinking," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (July 2010) This article provides detailed information on development of Strategic Thinking from the works of leading management theorists as well as detailed review of the frameworks components and how it can be an aid to inform senior leader judgment when facing complex issues of the 21st century security environment.

⁴ For a comprehensive model, with examples for beneficial context, and terminology associated with this way of thinking see Stephen Gerras "Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking: A Fundamental Guide for Strategic Leaders," U.S. Army War College, (August 2008)

⁵ Richard W. Paul and Linda Elder, *Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking charge of Your Professional and Personal Life*, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), xx

⁶ Thomas Sheperd, "A Qualitative Difference – Navigating the Linkage of Culture and Strategy: A User's Guide to Understanding the Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, (July 2010)

⁷ Waters, "Approach to Strategic Thinking," 10.

⁸ Eliot A. Cohen, "The Historical Mind and Military Strategy." *Orbis*, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 305.

⁹ McCown, Margaret M. "The Social Sciences and Innovation in Gaming" *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 58 (3d Quarter 2010): 113.

¹⁰ Lionel Robbins, *Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science*, (1932)15.

¹¹ Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 30.

¹² D. Levy, *How the Dismal Science Got Its Name: Classical Economics and the Ur Text of Racial Politics*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 2003)

¹³ Eric D. Beinhocker, *The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity and the Radical Remaking of Economics*, (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2006), xi.

¹⁴ Frost Ellen, L. "What is Economic Power," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 53 2d Quarter 2009 p.11 see also Philip Y. Kao, "Future Approaches to the Economic Instrument of Power," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 43, (4th Quarter, 2006)

¹⁵ Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 1960

¹⁶ Milan Vego, "Is the Conduct of War a Business?" *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 59, (4th Quarter, 2010): 58.

¹⁷ Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2, "The Armed Forces Officer", 1 February 1988, 4. This is the most current and still issued version.

¹⁸ Richard Swain, "Reflection on an Ethic of Officership," *Parameters*, (Spring, 2007): 9.

¹⁹ A transcript of President Obama's Nobel Peace Prize speech can be accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize>

²⁰ Alexis De Tocqueville, Alexis, *Democracy in America*, 1835, Tocqueville identified enlightened self-interest in describing Americans civic participation He observed that Americans voluntarily join together in associations to further the interests of the group and, thereby, to serve their own interests.

²¹ Richard Lacquement, "Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice," *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 217.

²² Gayle L. Watkins and Don M. Snider, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 291, as quoted in Richard Lacquement, "Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice," *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 217.

²³ Lacquement, "Mapping Army Professional Expertise," 217.

²⁴ Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1957

²⁵ Nadia Schadlow and Richard A. Lacquement, "Winning Wars, Not Just Battles: Expanding the Military Profession to Incorporate Stability Operations," in *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and State in a New Era*, (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2009), 112.

²⁶ Carl J. Schramm, "Expeditionary Economics: Spurring Growth After Conflicts and Disasters," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010. In this article the author claims the military must add post-conflict economic reconstruction as a core competency and to more effectively utilize its reconstruction funds which are one-fifth of U.S. foreign aid.

²⁷ David H. Petraeus, "Beyond the Cloister," *The American Interest*, July-August 2007. In this article he states "Basic concepts from Econ 101 helped me plenty. Had I not remembered, for example, that injecting more money into an economy without increasing the amount of goods in the marketplace does nothing more than produce inflation, our early effort to get Iraqi government salaries paid would have been for naught. We would not have re-opened the border for trade with Syria as soon we did."

²⁸ James Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad," *The Atlantic Monthly*, January/February 2004; Ricks, Tom, *Fiasco*, New York: Penguin, 2006); Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*, New York: Vintage, 2007)

²⁹ James Risen, "Iraqi Says He Made up Tale of Biological Weapons Before War," *The New York Times*, February 15, 2011

³⁰ James P. Pfiffner, "U.S. Blunders In Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the Army", *Intelligence and National Security*, Issue 25, no. 1 (Spring 2010)

³¹ Conrad C. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, "Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario," Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, January 2003, see also the U.S. State Department's, 13 volume *The Future Of Iraq Project*

³² Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends*, Public Affairs: New York 2008; Cloud, David, Greg Jaffe, *The Fourth Star*, Crown Publishers: New York, 2009

³³ Coyne, *After War*, 27.

³⁴ Pfiffner, "Blunders in Iraq", 1.

³⁵ Coyne, *After War*, 28.

³⁶ William J. Baumol, "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive," *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 98, no. 5, part 1 (October 1990): 897.

³⁷ Megan McArdle, "When Freedom is Bad for Business," *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 2011

³⁸ See the World Bank Survey "Doing Business In", Iraq rates 166th out of 183 nations studied In Iraq <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/iraq/>

³⁹ Attrition is defined as the percentage of officers who voluntarily or involuntarily separate during a fiscal year before achieving retirement eligibility. One critical attrition point occurs when officers complete their initial service obligation of 3, 4, or 5 years (most of these officers will already be captains at this point) and choose to separate or continue on active duty. Higher than anticipated attrition at this point will, over time, result in shortages of senior captains and majors.

⁴⁰ Casey Warynski, David S. Lyle and Michael J. Colarusso "Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Retaining Talent," *Officer Corps Monograph Series*, Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2010

⁴¹ Ibid p. 26

⁴² Ibid p. 27

⁴³ Of course there is a labor market for military personnel and they are paid a salary. This is why renowned economists such as Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan were lead members of the committee to develop the implementation of the All Volunteer Force in 1973.

⁴⁴ Tyler Cowen, *Discover Your Inner Economist*, (New York: Penguin, 2007), 3.

⁴⁵ Car Salesman is the common occupation to fit this description for motivation see Cowen, *Inner Economist*, 16-22

⁴⁶ Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider "Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession" in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 602.

⁴⁷ George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol.19, no. 1(Winter 2005): 11.

⁴⁸ COL Burton's letter in response to the CSA inquiry to the CSRB can be reviewed in its entirety at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/07/the-officer-critical-skills-re-1/>

⁴⁹ Don M. Snider and Lloyd Matthews, "The Army Profession and Its Political-Cultural Expertise" in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 625.

⁵⁰ Cited Lance Betros, "Political Partisanship and the Military Ethic in America," *Armed Forces and Society*, no. 27 (Summer 2001): 502. Military personnel are permitted to vote and take part in political process as long it is within behaviors permitted by DOD Directive 1344.10 *Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces*

⁵¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1957), 71.

⁵² In one survey, nearly 35% of military officers agreed with the statement that, "Members of the military should be allowed to publically express their political views just like any other citizen." Nearly 65% believed strongly or somewhat strongly with the statement that, "It is proper for the military to advocate publically the military policies it believes are in the best interest of the United States." See John A. Nagl "Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America's Military Officer Corps," Center for a New American Security, February 2010.

⁵³ Betros, "Political Partisanship" 514. Also see John M. Shalikashvili, "Old Soldiers Don't Have to Fade Away," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 17 2004.

⁵⁴ Don M. Snider, "Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions," *Orbis*, (Spring 2008), 256.

⁵⁵ Richard H. Kohn, "Tarnished Brass: Is the U.S. Military Profession in Decline?," *World Affairs Journal* (Spring 2009)

⁵⁶ Gordon Tullock, Authur Seldon and Gordon L. Brady. *Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice*, Washington, DC: Cato Institute 2002. An important theory of public choice is that buttresses the need for officers to refrain from voting is that the act of voting itself is irrational. In an election, especially those with large voter turnout, each individual vote counts very little to the election's outcome. Economist often use the case of being hit by a car to support this point by noting "the probability of being run over by a car going to or returning from the polls is similar to the probability of casting the decisive vote. If being run over is worse than having one's preferred candidate lose, then this potential cost of voting alone would exceed the potential gain." Economists see the act of individual voter behavior in the same light as supporting a favorite sports team - it is a limited, low-cost means of expressing one's preferences. See Cecil E. Bohonan, and T. Norman Van Cott, "Now More Than Ever Your Vote Doesn't Matter" *The Independent Review*, no. 4, (Spring 2002): 591. According to public choice, voters chose to be "rationally ignorant" as a consequence of two facts - there are opportunity costs with gathering information while the chance of any individual's vote making an impact is nearly zero. Voter ignorance is rational since the cost of investing the time required to place an informed vote is high relative payoff of voting. This lack of incentive by individual voters to become informed opens up opportunities for of special interests groups who do have the incentives to actively seek information. Public choice theory further states that these groups wield key influence on the decisions of elected politicians.

⁵⁷ Coyne, *After War*, 86.

⁵⁸ Tullock, *Government Failure*, 38.

⁵⁹ Eliot A. Cohen, *General Malaise*, American Enterprise Institute Issue Paper, Washington DC, August 2004

⁶⁰ Kohn 2009

⁶¹ An example of this at a lower political level is when example, some states and localities have large numbers of members of the military who are official residents but who are actually posted elsewhere. Those absentee military voters have sometimes swayed the results of elections on local issues that do not affect them, since they do not actually live in the locality. Refraining from this practice would help to keep the military from being perceived as a political interest group.

⁶² Lacquement, "Mapping Army Professional Expertise", 217.

⁶³ Don M. Snider "The U.S. Army as a Profession" in *The Future of the Army Profession* ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, McGraw Hill, 25.

⁶⁴ Don M. Snider, "The Army Profession and the Army Ethos," In *The Future of the Army Profession* in *The Future of the Army Profession*, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 386.

⁶⁵ Careerism is neither a new phenomenon nor one that inflicts solely the U.S. Army. It has been present in Armies with overzealous leaders through the ages. For more modern accounts of this moral failing see B.H. Liddell Hart, *Why Don't We Learn from History*, (New York: Hawthorne, 1971); Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, (New York Simon and Schuster, 1986); Richard A. Gabriel, *To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983)

⁶⁶ *Field Manual 1 The Army*, June 2005 as quoted in Don M. Snider, Paul Oh, and Kevin Toner, "The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict," *Strategic Studies Institute*, (October 2009), ix.

⁶⁷ Snider, "*The U.S. Army as a Profession*", 25.

⁶⁸ Richard H. Kohn "Building Trust" in *American Civil Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, ed by Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2009), 277.

⁶⁹ James Fallows quoted in Forrest E. Waller, "Are Officers Incompetent?" *Air University Review*, September- October 1985.

⁷⁰ Kohn, "Tarnished Brass," 2009 Kohn listed a series of incidents where the Army failed to demonstrate the professional military ethic and included: "the misrepresentations of Private Jessica Lynch's battlefield experiences; the handling of the Corporal Pat Tillman death; the scandalous treatment of wounded soldiers at Walter Reed; Abu Graib Prison and the aborted career of Major General Anthony Taguba who investigated it; the Army's suppression its own studies of the Iraq war in fear the findings would anger the Donald Rumsfeld; Added to this list must be the Major Hassan's superior's decisions to recommend him for promotion and continued schooling despite blatant evidence of his unfitness for continued service as an officer is one of the most blatant and tragic examples of careerism.

⁷¹ See Dave Barno's Top 10 Task for General Dempsey, the New Army Chief of Staff http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/21/dave_barno_s_top_10_tasks_for_general_dempsey_the_new_army_chief_of_staff

⁷² Waller, "Are Officers Incompetent," 1985.

⁷³ Retired officers are nonpracticing professionals yet public perception deems they are still esteemed member of the profession and must abide by its ethics, see Don Snider's "The Army's Ethic Suffers Under Its Retired Generals" *Strategic Studies Institute* Op-Ed, January 2009. According to Richard Swain, retired officers should remain at least "ethically obliged to observe the limitations imposed by commissioned service, accepted by the oath they made and commission they still hold, see "Reflection on an Ethic of Officership," *Parameters*, Spring 2007 pgs 4-22.

⁷⁴ Tom V. Brook, Ken Dilanian and Ray Locker "How Some Retired Military Officers Became Well-Paid Consultants", *USA Today*, November 18, 2009

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ "Ethics Law Skipped in Army Mentoring Hires" December 8, 2009 United Press International accessed at http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2009/12/08/Ethics-law-skipped-in-Army-mentoring-hires/UPI-44021260293254

⁷⁷ Don M. Snider, "The Army's Ethic Suffers Under Its Retired Generals," *Strategic Studies Institute*, Carlisle Barracks, PA, (January 2009)

⁷⁸ Tom V. and Ken Dilanian, "Gates Orders Review of Military Mentor Program" *USA Today* December 16, 2009

⁷⁹ Tom V. Brook, "Military „Mentors“ Quit Over Disclosure Rules" *USA Today* January 20, 2011

⁸⁰ Snider, "The Army's Professional Military Ethic," ix.

⁸¹ Due to the curriculum, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces is the only senior service college with an economics department. The U.S. Army War College does not even have one Ph. D Economist on the faculty

⁸² Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd edition New York: Addison Wesley, 1999)

