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Pt. 2
Sec. 1



HISTORY OF AFHQ


PART
TWO

DECEMBER 1942 — DECEMBER 1943

SECTION 1



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"allied forces."

HISTORY OF

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

AND

HEADQUARTERS NATOUA

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PART II

PERIOD

of the

TUNISIAN, SICILIAN, AND SOUTH ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS

(December 1942 to December 1943)

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General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

In 1943, General

Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force

Commanding General NATOUSA

PREFACE TO PART II

Part II of the History of AFHQ continues the historical account of the Headquarters from where Part I ended (at 1 December 1942). In conformity with the program of the History as a whole, Part II does not attempt to give an account of field operations or supply activities. These subjects are being treated in other separate historical projects. Rather, this study is limited to an administrative, organizational, and functional account of the Headquarters in its relation to both the Combat and Communications zones.

While Part I and Part II have been concerned in a general way with the years 1942 and 1943 respectively, their periods have not been arbitrarily delimited by the calendar years. The account in Part I dealt primarily with the preparatory period of AFHQ which logically ended with the invasion of FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. The move of the Headquarters to NORTH AFRICA, however, required all of the last two months of 1942. Consequently, 1 December 1942 seemed a better dividing date than 8 November 1942 because by December a large part of AFHQ had already been installed at ALGIERS. The period, then, for Part II covers roughly from December 1942 to December 1943. Its account closes at the latter date because at that time there came a geographical extension of the Theater boundaries and plans for important command changes which would better characterize a distinct third period in the Headquarters' history.

Of all the periods in the History of AFHQ there is

little doubt that the year 1943 was the most important. While the year 1942 had been concerned with planning, preliminary preparations, and the establishment of skeleton staff organizations; the year 1943 brought with it a more comprehensive definition of command relations and a more complete organizational and functional development of the staff sections and other Headquarters agencies. These features, characteristic of the Theater's coming of age, were a natural accompaniment to the campaigns of TUNISIA, SICILY, and southern ITALY which expanded the Theater's territory, diversified its operations, and multiplied its problems. The operations of 1944 and 1945, while likewise of decided importance, nevertheless were designed and directed by the Headquarters organization little changed from what it had become in 1943.

The chapters of Part II are arranged in such a way as to deal with the three major emphases of the History: changes in command relations (chapters V and VI), changes in headquarters organization (chapter VII), and changes within the organizations of staff sections and other agencies (chapters VIII to XIX).

In the treatment of the history of command relations at the Headquarters level two principles have been used: (1) that the accounts should discuss only relations with the next lower echelon of command below the Allied Commander-in-Chief, and (2) that the accounts of command in the Combat Zone (chapter V) should be treated separately from those in the Communications Zone (chapter VI). The next lower echelon of combat commands was considered to

include the commands of the three services (army groups, navies, and air forces) and the command relations with the French, Italian, and British colonial forces serving on the Allied side in this Theater. In the Communications Zone (British: Line of Communication) the next lower echelon included the American Theater command, Hq NATOUSA, with its Hq SOS NATOUSA; the British Line of Communication with its districts, areas, and sub-areas; and AFHQ's Advanced Administrative Echelon in ITALY.

The first section of Chapter VI deals with two American base sections during the early period, before the activation of SOS NATOUSA, when they came directly under AFHQ. With these two exceptions American base sections are not discussed at length in this history, since they were usually at a second or third level of command below AFHQ and have had their own separate histories compiled. All the above commands have been treated in the approximate order of their time of establishment.

Chapter VII discusses the over-all development of AFHQ, showing changes in chiefs of staff and deputy chiefs of staff as well as the establishment, discontinuance, transfer, or reorganization of the staff sections and other Headquarters agencies. Although the Hq NATOUSA was an American Theater headquarters technically distinct from that of AFHQ, actually many of its staff sections were integral parts of the corresponding AFHQ staff sections. For that reason, as well as for the reason that the aim of this history is to show how the American and British elements worked together, Hq NATOUSA and its sections have had to be treated on the same basis as other

organizations of AFHQ. In order to furnish a clearer picture of AFHQ in 1943, a large chart of its organization (p241) and a comprehensive table of its over-all authorized personnel (p246) have been prepared. Chapter VII closes with discussions of certain personnel administration matters which were encountered in an inter-Allied headquarters.

In the treatment of the staff sections and other Headquarters agencies and organizations the same policy was followed in Part II as in Part I.¹ The compilers of the over-all history of AFHQ did not feel that the mere listing of staff sections (as in chapter VII) did justice to those very essential branches of the Headquarters. On the other hand, to attempt to give detailed histories of the staff sections in an over-all history would cause the trees to obscure the woods. Thus, as in Part I, a compromise practice has been followed of giving brief historical accounts of the staff sections and organizations in chapters VIII through XIX, including basic information on organization, functions, and authorized personnel as they existed in 1943. Even such a brief treatment, however, makes the space devoted to the eighty-six Headquarters organizations bulk large for Part II as a whole.

In conclusion two distinct differences should be noted in the treatment of Part II as compared with that of Part I: the arrangement of the staff section accounts and the statistics used for the discussions of personnel.

1. See History of AFHQ, I, 41.

In Part I the twenty-four staff sections and other organizations were divided into two chapters: administrative in the one and the remaining general and special staff sections in the other. In Part II, with eighty-six such organizations, a distribution of their accounts along functional lines into twelve chapters seemed to be the most feasible arrangement. Thus all sections, offices, and committees (British and American) dealing primarily with personnel have been put in Chapter VIII. All those dealing primarily with intelligence, operations, supply, transportation, finance, civil affairs, liaison, technical services, medicine, law, and morale have been placed in chapters devoted to those respective functions. In each chapter the general staff sections (if there are any) are treated first, while care has been taken to place a British staff section next to its corresponding American section.

The second difference concerns personnel statistics. In Part I the compilers were fortunate enough to find in an obscure file the statistics of the actual personnel present in the staff sections in November 1942. This made it possible to use the statistics of actual rather than authorized personnel. In 1943, however, no continuous body of statistics on actual American or British personnel existed. Statistics on actual personnel were not kept according to a uniform system by both the British and the Americans; and frequently, when the rosters had lost their administrative usefulness, they were destroyed or consolidated until comparative sectional breakdowns of two successive years could not be obtained. It was pos-

sible, however, to get the statistics on authorized personnel from approved American tables of organization and British war establishments. Since the number of actual personnel usually did not go too far out of line from that authorized, these figures were used to indicate the growth of the sections between 1942 and 1943.

Thus Part II, in continuing the History of AFHQ through most of 1943, tells a much longer and more significant story of a much larger and more active headquarters organization.

Allied Force Headquarters

Caserta, Italy

22 September 1945

PART II

PERIOD

of the

TUNISIAN, SICILIAN, AND SOUTH ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS

(December 1942 to December 1943)

SECTION I

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Chapter V

REORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIED COMMAND:

THE COMBAT ZONE

After the successful invasion of NORTH AFRICA a multitude of problems and situations arose which had their effects on command responsibilities. Command in the combat zone was affected by the move of the front to the borders of TUNISIA, by the buildup of our air and naval strength in the new Theater, by the rally of the French forces in NORTH AFRICA to the Allied side, and by the arrival of the 8th Army (B) at the Mareth Line in southern TUNISIA. Later in 1943 the invasion of SICILY and the consequent Italian change of sides also had their influence on command arrangements. This chapter deals solely with the command problem as it is related to the combat zone, leaving to the succeeding chapter the discussion of the command in its relation to the communications zone.

1. Command Relations with the French

The French about-face in NORTH AFRICA from active hostility against the Allies to enlistment in the Allied crusade against the Axis was only the first of a whole series of such shifts in EUROPE during the next two years of the War. In addition to ordering the cessation of hostilities against the Allies on 10 November 1942,¹ Admiral

1. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 16.

Darlan (F) signed an armistice agreement with General Mark W. Clark (A) on 22 November 1942 which declared that

...the French forces will aid and support the forces of the UNITED STATES and their allies to expel from the soil of AFRICA the common enemy, to liberate FRANCE, and to restore integrally the French Empire.²

Once it was evident, soon after 10 November, that the French forces would be fighting beside the Allies, the question arose concerning the relation of these troops to the Allied command. The French regime in NORTH AFRICA had not been proclaimed as one of the United Nations, and the command at AFHQ had been considered solely as an Anglo--American authority, taking its orders from the Anglo--American Combined Chiefs of Staff. With the limited forces at the command of the French High Commissioner and with metropolitan FRANCE still to be liberated, it seemed inadvisable to make AFHQ a tripartite enterprise.

The solution of this problem, however, appeared in the same Agreement of 22 November:

There shall be the closest co-operation between the Commanding General of the French land, sea, and air forces and the Commanding General United States Army and supporting forces to accomplish the purposes set forth above (Preamble).

The status, command, functions, employment, rights, and privileges of French land, sea, and air forces will remain under French direction. Such forces will continue in the service of internal security and will be employed, in co-operation with the forces of the UNITED STATES and its allies, in driving Axis forces from French African territory and in protecting it from further violation by them. All movement of French military, naval, or air forces from their normal stations will be notified to the

2. Preamble to Clark--Darlan Agreement, 22 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 387-64).

CG of the United States Army by the French command.³

French warships shall operate in close co-operation with the Commanding General, United States Army, or Allied representatives acting with his approval for the accomplishment of the purpose set forth in the preamble hereof.⁴

Likewise present or future French merchant vessels in North African harbors would be operated in co-operation with the Commanding General, US Army.⁵ Technically, therefore, General Eisenhower did not have command authority over the French forces. The command relationship was based upon consultation and co-operation.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief did have, however, command and control of "landing and other facilities for aircraft, harbor and port facilities, defenses, fortifications, and arsenals" as well as "harbor and naval installations and establishments, together with their records."⁶

The headquarters of General Giraud, the French Commander-in-Chief in NORTH AFRICA, was set up in close proximity to AFHQ, and co-ordination between the French and Allied forces was achieved by direct consultation or correspondence between commanders and staffs and by li-

3. Clark--Darlan Agreement, 22 Nov 42, clauses I and II (AG AFHQ file: 387-64). In this Agreement the Allied C-in-C was referred to as "Commanding General United States Army and supporting forces" in line with the policy of making the initial stages of the invasion appear to be primarily an American enterprise.

4. Ibid., clause VII.

5. Ibid., clause VIII.

6. Ibid., clauses IV and IX.

7
aision.

Nevertheless, when it came to the matter of tactical command in the field, it was more difficult to obtain a solution. General Anderson (B) was at first in command of Allied forces on the Tunisian front. On 12 December 1942 he wrote to AFHQ concerning the French:

It was further agreed that questions of command of Anglo--American and of French forces required for specific operations in the Eastern theatre would be settled mutually between General Juin (F) and General Anderson as they arose.⁸

Such questions did soon arise, as General Juin showed reluctance to submit to General Anderson's authority. The settlement of the impasse was the establishment of an AFHQ command post at CONSTANTINE as a superior command over separate British, American, and French units at the front.

...one of the main difficulties, wrote Brigadier Whiteley, has been that of command. General Anderson explained the French point of view in a cable to CIGS. The result is that AFHQ, with a command post at CONSTANTINE, will command Generals Fredendall, Juin, and Anderson direct. General Eisenhower does not regard it as an ideal solution but as the best solution in the circumstances.⁹

7. A paragraph from a staff study reveals some of the methods of consultation: "At present all important written communications are processed as letters through the Chief of Staff and the French Commander-in-Chief and his Chief of Staff. The use of these channels and the time required for translation involves a considerable time lag in obtaining a reply to a question by either side. Frequently agreement is not reached without further correspondence and further delay." From Staff Study by Gen Rooks, subject: "Communications with the French High Command," 29 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4).

8. Gen Anderson to AFHQ, 12 Dec 42 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4).

9. Ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 13 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15). See also C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, pp 20 and 29.

However, this arrangement meant that, once the Allied and French Commander-in-Chief were agreed on the strategy, the tactical command of the French troops passed into the chain of command under AFHQ. Likewise this became a precedent when the Allied Command Post at CONSTANTINE was replaced successively by 18th Army Group and 15th Army Group. In each of these cases, as well as in CORSICA, the French forces came tactically under commanders who obeyed instructions emanating from AFHQ.¹⁰ However, on 27 January 1943, because of the urgency of the situation, all British, American, and French forces on the Tunisian front were put under the operational command of General Anderson with the approval of General Giraud.¹¹

Another factor which reinforced the practice of unified tactical command over French troops was the circumstance of Allied rearmament of the French forces. At the Anfa Conference the Allied Commander-in-Chief was designated as "the final approving authority for French requisitions."¹² This gave General Eisenhower another bargaining point in winning French agreement on strategy and command decisions. Furthermore, it was agreed at ANFA that such rearmed French units were to be employed under

10. On the command in CORSICA see ltr, W. B. Smith to Giraud, 22 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4). On CORSICA Gen Smith wrote Gen Giraud (22 Nov 43): "The Commander-in-Chief...expresses his pleasure and satisfaction that you have generously concurred with his suggestion to place the French Commander in CORSICA directly under his command." (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4).

11. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 33.

12. Minutes of the CofS Conference No 19, 29 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: CofS Conference).

the Allied Commander-in-Chief's direction.

At least in one instance this rearmament authority had to be asserted to obtain French compliance with Allied plans. The French Committee of National Defense in December 1943 refused to send the 9th Colonial Infantry Division to the Italian front. Contrary to the wishes of the Allied Command and to the recommendation of General Giraud, it insisted instead on the use of the 1st Motorized Infantry Division. On this occasion General Eisenhower felt impelled to speak plainly:

In view of the action of the Committee of National Defense you (General Giraud) will, I am sure, understand that the rearmament program for the French forces cannot be continued unless there is definite assurance from the Committee of National Liberation that the use of these forces when re-equipped will be governed solely by military considerations and subject to the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff through their representative, the Allied Commander-in-Chief in this theater.¹⁴

In the case of the French, therefore, there was a de facto, if not a de jure, unity of Allied command. Once consideration had been given to national susceptibilities, their identical interests and aspirations led to a cordial Franco--Allied collaboration in the field, as especially exemplified by the relations between General Clark and General Juin.

2. AFHQ Command Post, CONSTANTINE

The difficulty of integrating the French forces under a unified command was the principal reason for having

13. Eisenhower to Giraud, 14 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 37/4).

14. Ibid.

a command post at CONSTANTINE. If it had not been for the French initial objection to serving under General Anderson, commander of the British 1st Army, he would have commanded all Allied land forces on the Tunisian front.

Since I was completely dependent on the goodwill of the French in order to maintain a secure base in NORTH AFRICA, explained General Eisenhower, I felt bound to take into account their sensibilities, and, as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, I took personal command of the battle area with a command post in the forward area at CONSTANTINE where I could maintain close touch with all commanders and insure co-ordination of all ground and air forces.¹⁵

The notice of the establishment of this Command Post was issued on 13 January 1943.¹⁶ From that date until about 20 February 1943 General Eisenhower made frequent trips to CONSTANTINE and to the front at which times the Command Post served, in effect, as a forward echelon of AFHQ.¹⁷

But from the beginning General Eisenhower had not considered the Command Post as an ideal solution of the French command problem.¹⁸ "The number and complexity of problems at ALGIERS and in the forward area," he complained, "simply did not permit of divided attention."¹⁹ Besides, there was arising a new problem of co-ordinating the operations of 8th Army (B) with the forces west

15. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 29. Ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 13 Jan 43 (SCS AFHQ file: 312-15).

16. DCofS Summaries of Decisions, 13 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 016-2).

17. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 33. Ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 12 Feb 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

18. Ltr Whiteley to Kennedy, 13 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

19. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 33.

of TUNIS when the former would have taken up positions south of TUNISIA.

General Eisenhower's solution, therefore, was the formation of an intermediate army group headquarters between AFHQ and the headquarters of armies in TUNISIA. When this plan was effected on 20 February 1943, the new group headquarters superseded the Command Post and actually took over its office accommodations in CONSTAN-
20
TINE.

21

3. Eighteenth Army Group and AFHQ

In December 1942 and January 1943 the 8th Army (B) in TRIPOLITANIA was coming ever closer to the southern border of TUNISIA. Its imminent entry into the Tunisian area immediately raised command problems concerning the co-ordination of ground, air, and sea forces of the MIDDLE EAST with those in NORTH AFRICA. A solution seemed to lie in the establishment of an army group headquarters, as the next lower level of command beneath AFHQ, and a reorganization of the sea and air command separately from the army group.

The situation was reviewed at the Anfa Conference in the middle of January 1943, and the decisions made there

20. Gen Rooks's instructions to Col Pidsley on "Reconnaissance of Group Headquarters," 23 Jan 43; Report of Col Pidsley to G-3 (B) AFHQ, c. 30 Jan 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 26/1). AFHQ GO No 21, 18 Feb 43. Memo, G-3 to CofS, subject: "Army Group Hq," 30 Jan 43, par 7, in which Gen Rooks stated: "AFHQ Command Post at CONSTANTINE will close on opening of 18th Army Group Hq on 12 Feb." (G-3 AFHQ file: 26/1.)

21. This section of Chapter V is not intended to be a history of 18th Army Group but rather the history of the Allied Command as affected by the establishment of 18th Army Group.

provided that:

a. An army group headquarters should be established to co-ordinate the command of 1st and 8th Armies.

b. General the Honorable Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander (B), the Commander-in-Chief of the MIDDLE EAST, should be appointed commander of the army group and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in NORTH AFRICA.²²

To prepare for the execution of these decisions Generals Eisenhower and Alexander held a meeting on 22 January 1943, and on the next day AFHQ gave provisional approval to the army group plan as submitted by G-3 Section,²³

AFHQ. Colonel W. Pidsley (B) was thereupon sent to CONSTANTINE on 24 January with a group of four other officers to make accommodation arrangements for the new headquarters, and his mission was completed on 29 January.²⁴

It was hoped at AFHQ that the new group headquarters could be set up by 10 February,²⁵ but delays in arrangements and transportation postponed its establishment until 20 February 1943. Several times General Eisenhower sent to General Alexander messages urging him to come as

22. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, pp 26, 40.

23. Note by Lt Col Finch on meeting, War Room 22 Jan 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 126/1). Note of "Command" (Army Group Hq) meeting in War Room, 23 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-4). DCofS Decisions Summaries, 25 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 016-2).

24. Instructions to Col Pidsley by Brig Sugden for Gen Rooks, 23 Jan 43. Reconnaissance Report by Col Pidsley, c. 30 Jan 43; both found in G-3 AFHQ file: 26/1.

25. Note of "Command" (Army Group Hq) meeting in War Room, 23 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-4).



Field Marshal The Hon. Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander

GCB, CSI, DSO, MC, ADC

In 1943, General

Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force

soon as possible because of the number and complexity of
the problems arising.²⁶ The latter was finally able to
return to AFHQ on 17 February and, after conferring fur-
ther with the Allied Commander-in-Chief, left for CON-
STANTINE on the 18th.²⁷ On the same day as his departure,
the following order was issued which activated the new
headquarters and explained the new status of General Alex-
ander:

General, the Honorable Sir Harold Alexan-
der...is designated as Deputy Commander-in-Chief,
Ground Forces, Allied Force, effective this date
and will assume command of the Eighteenth Army
Group, Allied Force, comprising the First and
Eighth British Armies and attached units, on 20
February 1943.²⁸

This general order, in addition to designating the
Commander of 18th Army Group, also indicated a change of
assignment of the Allied Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Orig-
inally the Combined Chiefs of Staff had planned to have a
British officer as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, only to
change their minds in favor of an American a few days lat-
er.²⁹ General Mark W. Clark (A), who had then been ap-
pointed to this position, was, however, relieved from du-
ty as Deputy Commander-in-Chief on 4 January 1943 in or-
der to assume command of 5th Army (A).³⁰ By assigning
General Alexander to this position, General Eisenhower
reverted to the original plan of having a British officer
as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief. This change was thought

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26. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 33.
27. Ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 12 Feb 43 (SGS AFHQ
file: 312-15); Cable No 1523, AFHQ to WC, 18 Feb 43 (AG
AFHQ file: 322.1-350).
28. AFHQ CO No 21, 18 Feb 43. See also Min of CofS
Conference, 12 Feb 43, par 4 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).
29. See History of AFHQ, I, 4.
30. AFHQ Ltr Order, 4 Jan 43.

particularly advisable because on the Tunisian front at that time the British had three army corps while the Americans and French each had one.

The establishment of 18th Army Group affected the Allied Command not only by being an additional link in the chain of command but also by assuming some of the functions hitherto performed by AFHQ. The 18th Army Group and its commander were given the following responsibilities:

- a. To develop tactical plans and issue directives for operations in the Tunisian area.
- b. To command all the Allied ground forces in the Tunisian area.
- c. To co-ordinate Army operations with Air and Navy through close liaison.
- d. To regroup the Allied forces then fighting in the Tunisian area.
- e. To form and train a general reserve.
- f. To co-ordinate all intelligence activities of 1st and 8th Armies to the following extent:
 - (1) Intelligence was not to be collected at 18th Army Group.
 - (2) The Group Headquarters dissem-

31. AFHQ Opn Memo No 30, 18 Feb 43. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 40.

32. Note of "Command" (Army Group Hq) Meeting in War Room, 23 Jan 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 26/1).

33. Ibid. See also C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 40; and AFHQ Opn Memo No 30, 18 Feb 43.

34. AFHQ Opn Memo No 30, 18 Feb 43.

35. 18th Army Group Opn Instn No 1, 20 Feb 43, par 1.

36. Ibid., par 4.

inated AFHQ intelligence to Armies and vice versa.

(3) It sent a daily intelligence situation report to AFHQ if necessary.

(4) Intelligence summaries and interrogation intelligence were to be sent directly to AFHQ, with copies to 18th Army Group.

(5) Signal intelligence of both 1st and 8th Armies was to be controlled and co-ordinated by 18th Army Group.³⁷

g. It prepared British training and performed the normal staff function for training British troops in the Tunisian area.³⁸

h. Administrative functions:

(1) To co-ordinate and supervise the operational administration of the two armies and issue operational instructions on administrative policy.³⁹

(2) Routine administrative matters were to be dealt with directly between AFHQ and 1st Army or II Corps;⁴⁰ and be-

37. G-2 AFHQ to BGSII 18th Army Group, subject: "Intelligence Procedure," 10 Feb 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 26/1). See also footnote 32 above.

38. AFHQ Staff Memo No 35, 17 Apr 43. The 5th Army (A), which was not in the Tunisian area, was responsible for establishing training schools for the whole US Expeditionary Force in the Theater. Whiteley to Kennedy, 26 Feb 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

39. AFHQ Opn Memo No 30, 18 Feb 43.

40. AFHQ Staff Memo No 32, 31 Mar 43.

tween GHQ MIDDLE EAST FORCES and 8th
41
Army.

i. Supply functions:

(1) Supplies for 1st Army were to
be administered by AFHQ; those of 8th
42
Army by GHQ MEF.

(2) 18th Army Group was to keep
itself informed on the logistical situ-
43
ation to and in the Tunisian area.

(3) It controlled the level of sup-
43
ply made available to each army.

(4) It established operational pri-
orities for supplies to its subordinate
44
units.

(5) Maintenance of air forces was
to be the responsibility of AFHQ and GHQ
MEF (for strategic) and armies (for imme-
45
diate air support units).

(6) The Ground Air Support Command-
er of 18th Army Group was to advise the
commander of 18th Army Group on air main-
45
tenance problems.

j. Eighteenth Army Group Headquarters
was not to issue executive orders for movement
46
(transportation in the American sense).

41. Col Finch's Note of Meeting in War Room, 22
Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 1312-15).

42. AFHQ Opn Memo No 30, 10 Feb 43.

43. Ibid.

44. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 40.

45. See footnote 32 above.

46. See footnote 32 above.

The command channels and relationships involving 18th Army Group in the new combat and supply organization of NORTH AFRICA and MIDDLE EAST, as it was developed by the end of February 1943, are shown by the chart on the following page.⁴⁷

Eighteenth Army Group Headquarters continued to function as an Allied intermediate forward command between AFHQ and the armies and army corps until the successful conclusion of the Tunisian campaign. On 15 May 1943, two days after the end of the last organized Axis resistance in TUNISIA, 18th Army Group Headquarters was closed. Thereafter, AFHQ communications were made directly to Headquarters, 1st Army.⁴⁸

4. Mediterranean Air Command

The command arrangement for air in the period of the North African invasion provided for separate American and RAF units under the unified command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.⁴⁹ There was, therefore, no united air command below the level of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. This situation was in itself unsatisfactory and, in view of the seriousness of the enemy's threat in TUNISIA, now required a remedy.


The first step was taken in a tentative way on 5 De-

47. From chart appended to Col Finch's Note of Meeting in War Room, 22 Jan 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 26/1); and from chart appended to AFHQ Opn Memo No 30, 18 Feb 43.

48. AG Ltr, AFHQ to Chiefs of General and Special Staff Sections, subject: "Closing of Hq, 18th Army Group," 13 May 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 26/1; AG AFHQ file: 322.1-1 (18 AG) C-M). (Min of the CofS Conference No 57, 14 May 43, par 4 (SGS AFHQ file: CofS Conferences).

49. See History of AFHQ, I, 5.

18TH ARMY GROUP COMMAND RELATIONS WITH OTHER HEADQUARTERS
February 1943



LEGEND:

— Command

- - - - - Liaison and co-ordination

..... Supply and maintenance

NOTE: Small initials in boxes indicate nationality of the commander; capital initials indicate nationality of the whole headquarters or unit.

cember 1942 when Major General Carl Spaatz (A) was appointed Acting Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Air, Allied Force, in addition to his other duties. ⁵⁰ In command, then, he stood between General Eisenhower and the separate air forces and unified the latter. The resulting Air Force organization is briefly described by Brigadier Whiteley on 21 December 1942:

You might like to know, he wrote, the 'air command' organization. Spaatz as DC-in-C controls Eastern Air Command (Welsh) and 12 Air Force (Doolittle). EAC Hq are in ALGIERS. Air Commodore Lawson (Hq with 5 Corps or 1st Army, depending on circumstances) commands the fighters in the forward area and such bombers as are allotted to him. The heavy bombers are controlled by Spaatz and there is a daily meeting with Army and Navy present to decide on bombing targets.⁵¹

On 5 January 1943 this new organization was officially constituted and activated with the name "Allied Air Force" composed of the 12th Air Force (A), the RAF Eastern Air Command (B), and "such French units as may be assigned or attached" with General Spaatz (A) as Air Com-⁵²mander-in-Chief. The new name lasted one month, after which it was changed to "Northwest African Air Command."⁵³

Names of headquarters are not important, but command and organization are. And at this point was injected a new element involving command and organization: the approach of 8th Army (B), with its air support (Western Desert Air Force), to the southern boundary of TUNISIA. Just as the 8th Army needed to be joined with the other

50. AFHQ GO No 23, 15 Dec 42.

51. DO ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 21 Dec 42 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

52. AFHQ GO No 3, 5 Jan 43.

53. Notes on CAO Conference No 55, 4 Feb 43, par 571 (AG AFHQ file: 337-302).

Allied forces in TUNISIA by the formation of the 18th Army Group, so now the Western Desert Air Force required command amalgamation with the new Northwest African Air Force. But that task gave rise to several questions:

a. Since, with the inclusion of the Western Desert Air Force, the Northwest African Air Force would become preponderantly British, should an American or British officer be in command?

b. Since the US Air Corps was a part of the US Army and the RAF was an independent service, how could these be amalgamated under one command without divorcing the American units from the US Army?

c. How could these be fitted in to the recently suggested reorganization of having separate strategical and tactical air forces?

d. How could they attain agreement between Air and Navy over coastal air defense?

e. What administrative and supply arrangements for the various air forces could be made?

These were questions which faced the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Anfa Conference and which led to their important decisions of 23 January 1943.⁵⁴ Three weeks later these decisions were put into effect by a General Order of AFHQ which provided:⁵⁵

54. CCS Directive No 163, 23 Jan 43.

55. AFHQ GO No 20, 17 Feb 43.

a. The Mediterranean Air Command is constituted and activated with Headquarters at Allied Headquarters, NORTH AFRICA. For operations in NORTHWEST AFRICA it is under the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces.

b. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, GCB, RAF has been designated Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. His command comprises the Middle East Air Command,⁵⁶ RAF Malta Air Command,⁵⁶ and Northwest African Air Forces.

c. Middle East Air Command is commanded by Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, KCB, MC, DFC.

d. RAF Malta Air Command is commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Sir Keith Park, KBE, MC, DFC.

e. Northwest African Air Forces are commanded by Major General Carl Spaatz, US Army.⁵⁷

f. All units, personnel and establishments formerly included in the Allied Air Force are transferred to the Northwest African Air Forces.⁵⁸

An examination of this General Order of 17 February 1943 reveals that the new command covered all the North African area from the RED SEA to the ATLANTIC as well as MALTA, thus the designation "Mediterranean Air Command" (MAC). Because of British air predominance in the area as a whole, a British officer, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, became the Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The RAF Malta Air Command was detached from the Middle East Air Command and brought directly under the Air C-in-C, while the Western Desert Air Force (with 8th Army) was likewise separated from Middle East Air Command and in-

56. In April these command designations were changed to RAF Middle East and RAF Malta respectively. (AFHQ GO No 29, 4 Apr 43).

57. Promoted to Lieut Gen on 12 Mar 43 (WD SO No 72, par 1, 13 Mar 43).

58. The above six paragraphs are quotations, but the letters used for designations are the writer's.

NOTE



Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur W. Tedder, GCB

In 1943, Air Chief Marshal

Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean

cluded in the Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF). It will be noted, too, that the Air C-in-C and his MAC came under the command of the Allied C-in-C only for operations in NORTHWEST AFRICA, otherwise (for TRIPOLITANIA and the MIDDLE EAST) the Air C-in-C was independent of General Eisenhower.⁵⁹ Yet at the same time the US Air Corps units in the NAAF, while under a British Air C-in-C, were still under an American Army commander, General Eisenhower, on a higher level.

The command organization of MAC as it existed in September 1943 is shown by the chart on the next page.⁶⁰

On 26 May 1943 the CAO at AFHQ raised the question of whether AFHQ should deal with MAC or NAAF on administrative matters.⁶¹ The procedure, as defined by the Deputy C-in-C (Air), was reported by Group Captain Jackman (B) at the next CAO Conference:

In respect of administrative policy and planning the AFHQ contact would be with MAC, but AFHQ were expected to deal direct with NAAF on all executive matters of administration. A-4 and A-5 (NAAF) would be the direct link with AFHQ on executive matters.

Group Captain Jackman pointed out that MAC dealt also with MIDDLE EAST and MALTA; it was desirable that air matters relating to MIDDLE EAST and MALTA which AFHQ required to raise should be raised through MAC. This did not apply to POL (Petrol, Oil, and Lubricants) for which a special board existed.⁶²


59. See also C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, pp 37-38.

60. Crane Report, Chart No 3, 28 Sep 43. AFHQ Organizational Charts, app III, 10 Nov 43. AFHQ Opn Memo No 30, 18 Feb 43.

61. Notes on the CAO Conference No 104, 24 May 43, par 1140 (Q (Maint) AFHQ file: 2560).

62. Ibid., No 105, 29 May 43, par 1150 (Q (Maint) AFHQ file: 2560).

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND CHART—MEDITERRANEAN AIR COMMAND
 October 1943



LEGEND:
 ———— Operational command
 - - - - - Liaison

One week after the invasion of SICILY, at a meeting of the Allied C-in-C with the Air C-in-C and the C-in-C Mediterranean (Naval), an attempt was made to have their three headquarters established at one place. This was found to be impossible because General Alexander, Deputy C-in-C, had to be located in SICILY where he was also General Commanding-in-Chief of 15th Army Group and Military Governor. For similar reasons the C-in-C Mediterranean (Naval) had to remain near his headquarters at MALTA or ALGIERS, and the Air C-in-C had to keep close to LA MARSА (near TUNIS). The solution finally reached was that there should be weekly meetings between the commanders of the three services, preferably at LA MARSА, beginning on 26 July 1943.

5. Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean

In the invasion period of Operation TORCH Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham (B) was the naval commander under the Allied Commander-in-Chief.⁶⁴ However, after the landings, with the regrouping of forces against the enemy in TUNISIA and the prospective approach of the forces of the MIDDLE EAST to the borders and waters of TUNISIA, a revision of the sea command was as necessary as those of ground and air. Such a step was foreseen as early as 16 August 1942 in Norfolk House whence General Eisenhower

63. Record of Meeting held at LA MARSА, 1430 hrs, 17 July 43 (SGS AFHQ file: Misc Opns).

64. See History of AFHQ, I, 5-6.

cabled the War Department:

After landings have been completed, it is foreseen that a single naval commander will be established over the naval, coastal, and supporting elements assigned to the Theater but normally national naval components will be maintained intact.⁶⁵

This intention of August was fortified by the situation in December and led to a discussion of naval command in January 1943 at the Anfa Conference where it was agreed in principle that the naval command should be coordinated in the MEDITERRANEAN when 8th Army neared the Tunisian area.⁶⁶ These decisions were put into effect on 20 February 1943 with the announcement that there would be two naval commands in the MEDITERRANEAN. In the western MEDITERRANEAN (including MALTA) the Allied naval forces came under Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham (B)⁶⁷ as Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean; in the eastern MEDITERRANEAN the Allied naval forces were to be commanded by Admiral Sir H. H. Harwood (B) as Commander-in-Chief Levant. Until the central MEDITERRANEAN could be fully under Allied control and the enemy air menace much reduced, MALTA should, however, continue to be supplied from the MIDDLE EAST.⁶⁸ For certain naval strategic responsibilities the C-in-C Mediterranean took his orders from the British Chiefs of Staff. Otherwise, for operations in the Northwest African Theater, he was

65. Cable No 1213, Eisenhower to WD, 16 Aug 42.

66. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 26.

67. Sir Andrew B. Cunningham was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet on 21 Jan 43 (Naval War Diary of AFHQ, 21 Jan 43).

68. Naval War Diary (C-in-C Med), 20 Feb 43; C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, pp 38-39.

under the command of General Eisenhower as Allied C-in-
C. ⁶⁹ Admiral Harwood, as C-in-C Levant, was directly
responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff. The American
naval forces serving under the C-in-C Mediterranean were
organized into the US Naval Forces Northwest African Wa-
ters with Vice-Admiral H. K. Hewitt (A) commanding (COM-
NAVNAW). He was responsible directly to the Navy Depart-
ment in WASHINGTON, however, for supply, administration,
and personnel. ⁷⁰

Two changes occurred in the Levant Command before
the Sicilian campaign when the following British naval
officers in turn succeeded Admiral Harwood: Acting Admi-
ral Sir Ralph Leatham (27 March 43) and Admiral Sir John
H. D. Cunningham (5 June 43). ⁷¹

One of the problems of AFHQ in the pre-Sicilian peri-
od was the co-ordination of the activities of the three
services, particularly those of navy and air. After Com-
modore R. Dick (B) had indicated in the Chief of Staff
Conference of 12 December 1942 that there was not a close
enough link between the Staffs of Navy and Air, the Chief
of Staff urged that they arrange better liaison. ⁷² Com-
modore Dick for the Navy and General Craig (A) for Air
soon improved the situation, and their services joined
with representatives of the ground forces in daily meet-
ings devoted principally to the selection of bombing tar-

69. Crane Report, Chart No 2, 28 Sep 43.

70. Naval War Diary (C-in-C Med), 16 Mar. 44. Crane
Report, Chart No 2, 28 Sep 43.

71. Naval War Diary (C-in-C Med) 27 Mar 43 and 7
June 43.

72. Min of CofS Conference, 12 Dec 42 (SGS AFHQ
file: CofS Conference).

73 gets. These meetings did not, however, solve the larger problem of co-ordination beyond the determination of targets. In January 1943 there were still complaints about disagreements between the British Navy and the RAF,⁷⁴ and in April we find a request from the Navy for admission to the Air Situation War Room.⁷⁵ The need from which this request arose was met by the establishment of Joint Navy-Coastal Operations Rooms at AFHQ and in the subcommands. Here agreement was reached on patrols, reconnaissance, anti-submarine hunts, anti-submarine convoy escorts, fighter protection of shipping, and anti-ship-⁷⁶ping attacks by our Coastal Air Force. Of course on the planning side the Naval Staff had representation on the Joint Planning Staff of AFHQ, especially when amphibious operations were involved as in the Sicilian and Italian campaigns.⁷⁷ And in the midst of the Sicilian campaign regular weekly meetings were arranged between the commanders of all three services.⁷⁸ In important periods of operational activity these C-in-C Conferences were⁷⁹ held daily.

73. Ibid., 24 Dec 42; and DO ltr Whiteley to Kennedy, 21 Dec 42 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

74. DO ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 13 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

75. Ltr, COMNAVNAW to Allied C-in-C, 10 Apr 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-10).

76. Memo, CofS to Admiral Lewis, 15 Apr 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-10); C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 38; Crane Report, Chart No 2, 28 Sep 43.

77. "Naval representatives have left to join the Army Planning Staff." Min of the CofS Conference No 50, 20 Apr 43 (SGS AFHQ file: CofS Conference). See also Crane Report, Chart No 2, 28 Sep 43.

78. Record of La Marsa Meeting, 17 July 43 (SGS AFHQ file: Misc Opns).

79. AFHQ Organizational Charts (booklet), par 19.

The excellent co-ordination between the three services under unified command brought such good results in the Sicilian campaign that not only the entire island was overrun in thirty-eight days, but also the conquest brought ITALY to sign an armistice (3 Sep 43) which led to the greatest naval coup of the war in European waters. On Saturday, 11 September 1943, two battleships, five cruisers, and eight destroyers of the Italian Battle Fleet steamed into MALTA's harbor and surrendered to the Allied C-in-C Mediterranean.

Be pleased to inform Their Lordships, he exultantly signaled the Admiralty, that the Italian Battle Fleet now lies at anchor under the guns of the Fortress of MALTA.⁸⁰

*- well shot
at 11.00 am
on 11.9.43*

This great event not only overthrew the delicate balancing of naval power in the MEDITERRANEAN in favor of the Allies, but it also opened to them the straits of the central MEDITERRANEAN for convoy traffic between GIBRALTAR and ALEXANDRIA.

Done

On the other hand this surrender raised a new problem of command, since the Allies had no intention of keeping all these captured ships idle and the Italians themselves were seeking a means of redemption by some arrangement to engage their surrendered ships in active combat against the Axis. To this end, although ITALY did not officially declare war on GERMANY until 13 October 1943,⁸¹ an important naval agreement was concluded (The Cunningham--De Courten Agreement) on 24 September 1943,

80. Naval War Diary (C-in-C Med), 11 Sep 43.
81. Ibid., 13 Oct 43.

the significant clauses of which are given here:

a. The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief will act as the agent of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in all matters concerning the employment of the Italian Fleet or merchant navy, their disposition and related matters.

b. Such ships as can be employed to assist actively in the Allied effort will be kept in commission and will be used under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, as may be arranged between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Italian Government.

c. ...The Flag Officer acting for these duties (Allied liaison with the Italian Ministry of Marine) will keep the Italian Ministry of Marine informed of all requirements of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean and will act in close co-operation as regard issue of all orders to the Italian Fleet.

d. ...Each ship will have on board a proportion of Italian Naval personnel to keep the ships in proper condition, and the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean will have the right of inspection at any time.

e. Under the modification of the Armistice terms, all Italian ships will continue to fly their flag. A large proportion of the Italian Navy will thus remain in active commission, operating their own ships and fighting alongside the forces of the United Nations against the Axis powers.

f. The requisite Liaison Officers will be supplied to facilitate the working of the Italian ships in co-operation with Allied Forces. A small Italian Liaison Mission will be attached to the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to deal with matters affecting the Italian Fleet.

g. It is the intention that the Italian mercantile marine should operate under the same conditions as the merchant ships of the Allied Nations. That is to say, all mercantile shipping of the United Nations is forged into a

82. Cunningham--De Courten Agreement in Cable No 570, Eisenhower (Fairfield Rear) to CCS, 24 Sep 43. See also P/109 (Final), Annex "A", subject: "Summary of the Agreement on the Employment and Disposition of the Italian Fleet and Mercantile Marine," 28 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/1).

pool which is employed as may be considered necessary for the benefit of all the United Nations. In this will naturally be included the requirements for the supply and maintenance of ITALY. The system will be analagous to that used in NORTH AFRICA, where the North African Shipping Board controls all United States, British, and French shipping under certain agreements which will have to be arranged in detail insofar as Italian ships are concerned. While it may be expected that a proportion of Italian ships will be working within the MEDITERRANEAN and to and from Italian ports, it must be appreciated that this will not always necessarily be the case, and ships flying the Italian flag may be expected to be used elsewhere, as is done with the merchant ships of all the United Nations. Italian ships employed as outlined in this paragraph will fly the Italian flag and will be manned by crews provided by the Italian Ministry of Marine.⁸³

Although this command arrangement had been negotiated with the Italian Government and despite the fact that it provided for liaison with the Italian Ministry of Marine for its execution, still no doubt remained that the operation, disposition, and inspection of the Italian Navy and Merchant Marine were under the control of the Allied Commander-in-Chief through his Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. A serious enemy naval menace had been removed, and a considerable addition to Allied sea power had been gained within two months after the invasion of SICILY.


The naval command organization as it had been developed by October 1943 is shown by the chart on the following page.⁸⁴

Before the command arrangement with the Italians had

83. The above passages are quotations from ibid., but the letter indications and underlinings are the writer's.

84. Crane Report, Chart No 2, 28 Sep 43.

CHART OF ALLIED NAVAL COMMAND MEDITERRANEAN
October 1943



LEGEND:
 ————— Command
 - - - - - Liaison and co-ordination

finally been crystalized, however, the man to whom the Italian Fleet had surrendered was called to a higher post of duty. On 6 October 1943 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham was appointed as Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty and Chief of the British Naval Staff in succession to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound.⁸⁵ As his flag was struck in the Maidstone at sunset of 17 October prior to his departure to the UNITED KINGDOM, he sent the following signal to the ships and crews under his old command:

I leave you all in the MEDITERRANEAN with keen regret but also with pride.

It has been my privilege for the last year to command a great fleet of ships of the Allied Nations of every category from battleships to the smallest craft. We may well look back with satisfaction to the work which has been performed. You have caused grievous discomfiture to the enemy. You have carried and protected hundreds of thousands of men and millions of tons of supplies. You have taken a vital part in throwing the enemy out of AFRICA, in the capture of SICILY, and, finally, in the invasion of ITALY and the re-entry of the United Nations to the mainland of EUROPE. It is a high achievement of which you may well be proud. To you all who have fought and endured with such courage, tenacity, and determination, I send my heartfelt thanks and appreciation. ...⁸⁶

A week later his cousin, Admiral Sir John Cunningham (B), the former Commander-in-Chief Levent, was appointed to succeed him as Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean to carry on the same combined Allied sea effort under the same great name.⁸⁷

85. Naval War Diary (C-in-C Med), 6 Oct 43.

86. Ibid., 17 Oct 43.

87. Ibid., 23 Oct 43.

6. Fifteenth Army Group and AFHQ

Although 15th Army Group was the successor to 18th Army Group in actual land operations against the Axis, their origins both go back to the Anfa Conference. There 18th Army Group was organized to co-ordinate immediately the operations of Allied Ground Forces in TUNISIA, while the 15th Army Group--originally but a planning staff for SICILY and known at first as Headquarters Force 141--was to direct ground operations in the Sicilian campaign. On 23 January 1943, four days after the CCS had decided to have a campaign for SICILY,⁸⁹ they furnished General Eisenhower a directive providing for its command and separate planning staff.⁹⁰

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved that an attack against SICILY will be launched in 1943, with the target date as the period of the favourable July...moon (Code designated HUSKY).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have further agreed that the following command set-up shall be established for the operation:

1. You are to be the Supreme Commander with General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, charged with the detailed planning and execution of the actual operation when launched.

2. Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham is to be Naval Commander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder the Air Commander.

You will submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your recommendations for the officers to

88. This section of Chapter V is not intended to be a history of 15th Army Group but rather a history of the Allied Command as affected by the existence of 15th Army Group in the chain of command.

89. C-in-C Draft Dispatch, Sicilian Operations, p 3.

90. CCS Directive to Allied C-in-C (CCS 171/2/D), 23 Jan 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 20/2, No 1).

be appointed Western and Eastern Task Force Commanders.

In consultation with General Alexander you will set up at once a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of Staff, for planning and preparing the operation including cover plans. ...

Acting on this directive without delay, a Chief of Staff Conference, held on 29 January at AFHQ, decided that the proposed planning staff would work at ALGIERS.⁹¹ However, since conditions were already crowded at AFHQ, the Ecole Normale in BOUZAREA, just outside ALGIERS, was selected as its headquarters by the new planning staff at its first meeting on 10 February. Room 141 of the St. George Hotel, where that meeting was held, suggested to the members the name for their staff, Headquarters Force 141,⁹² officially announced on 12 February 1943.⁹³

To head the planning staff, since the Commander-in-Chief and his Deputy already had great responsibilities in the current Tunisian campaign, General Eisenhower selected Major General C. H. Gairdner (B) and in early May⁹⁴ a successor, Major General A. A. Richardson (B).

At first, Headquarters Force 141 worked as a subsection of G-3 AFHQ and did not become an independent operational headquarters, as its name implied, until the end of the Tunisian campaign,⁹⁵ 15 May 1943. Within this period it was possible for Headquarters Force 141 to prepare an outline plan and to co-ordinate detailed plans of the

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91. C-in-C Draft Dispatch, Sicilian Operations, p 7.
92. Ibid.
93. Hq Force 141, Planning Instruction No 1, 12 Feb 43.
94. See footnote 91 above.
95. Ibid.

task forces for the Sicilian campaign while remaining free from responsibilities of the Tunisian operations.

Numerous problems, however, faced Headquarters Force 141. Since a G-2 representative was at first lacking in Headquarters Force 141, intelligence matters were co-ordinated with G-2 AFHQ, already occupied with current operations, through an arrangement not altogether satisfactory to Headquarters Force 141.⁹⁶ Besides the difficulty of obtaining the desired intelligence, Brigadier Whiteley pointed out another major problem facing members of Headquarters Force 141 on 26 February when he stated,

...They have an extremely difficult task in front of them, trying to deal with commanders in three continents. I think it is most important we all stick to the correct channels of communications.⁹⁷

These channels were clarified the following day by AFHQ and reaffirmed in mid-April through published charts similar to that on the following page.⁹⁸ General Eisenhower re-emphasized the problem of co-ordinating activities of several widely separated headquarters in the preparation of plans by Headquarters Force 141.⁹⁹ The problem of welding into an over-all plan elements affecting three services was facilitated through the close liaison between Headquarters Force 141 and the Joint Planning Staff¹⁰⁰ of AFHQ.

96. Ibid.


97. DO ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 26 Feb 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

98. Ltr, AFHQ to All Concerned, 27 Feb 43, HF/0/2 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/7 in AG AFHQ). Hq Force 141 Third Maintenance Project, appendix E, annex 1, 15 Apr 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/9 in AG AFHQ).

99. See footnote 93.

100. Min of 1st Commanders' Meeting at Hq Force 141, 13 Mar 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/3).

COMMAND RELATIONS OF HEADQUARTERS FORCE L41 WITH OTHER HEADQUARTERS
 April 1943



LEGEND:

- Chain of command
- - - - - Channels for details (within limits of policy and agreed priorities) of mounting operations.
- · - · - Channels for details (within limits of policy & agreed priorities) of mounting 45th Division in USA.
- Responsibility for mounting expeditions.

NOTES:

1. Relationship between ETF and WO LONDON regarding mounting of division coming from UK to be agreed between Hq Force L41 and CHQ MEF.
2. Communications along dotted lines to be repeated up the chain of command as far as AFHQ.

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Overcoming these and additional difficulties, the planning for HUSKY had progressed sufficiently by 13 March 1943 to warrant the holding of the first Commanders' Meeting at Headquarters Force 141. In addition to the official members--General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham, General Alexander, Air Marshal Tedder--other officers immediately concerned with this operation also attended to hear General Gairdner outline the tentative plan.¹⁰¹ Although this was considerably revised by the plan approved on 18 May 1943,¹⁰² both retained the same command relations outlined in January by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at ANFA and included the two additional appointments of the task force commanders indicated on 12 February 1943.¹⁰³ The complete command arrangement is listed below:

C-in-C Allied Forces	General Eisenhower (A)
C-in-C Naval Forces	Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham (B)
C-in-C Air Forces	Air Chief Marshal Tedder (B)
Deputy C-in-C Ground Forces in command of Force 141	General Alexander (B)
CG Force 343	Lieutenant General Patton (A)
CG Force 545	General Montgomery (B)

Having arrived at the fundamental command organization and the over-all plan for the Sicilian campaign,

101. Ibid.

102. Hq Force 141, Opn Instrn No 1, 19 May 43.

103. Ibid. Lt Gen George S. Patton, Jr. was promoted from the rank of Maj Gen to Lt Gen effective 12 Mar 1943 (AG AFHQ Personnel File: 201-G. S. Patton, Jr.). General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery held his rank of a full general throughout 1943.

11

Headquarters Force 141 moved during June from BOUZAREA to LA MARSA in TUNISIA to have closer control of its elements during the coming operation. Here last-minute adjustments were made for the planned attack. Among some of the fine points clarified was that of General Alexander's title. Of all the titles used at one time or another, as listed chronologically below, the last one became the final choice.

104

Commanding General, Force 141.

105

Commander of Force 141.

106

Commander-in-Chief, Force 141.

107

General Officer Commander-in-Chief, Force 141.

108

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15th Army Group.

The experience gained by both AFHQ and Headquarters 18th Army Group in solving the problem of command organization proved invaluable to Headquarters Force 141.

The Sicilian campaign, like that in TUNISIA, was commanded by a British general whose combined headquarters organization was based on the British staff system, just as AFHQ was based on the American staff system. Nor was the collaboration of British and Americans in staff sections headed by officers of the opposite nationality a new experience. Therefore this aspect of the prepara-

*Part in
Final*

104. G-3 AFHQ Memo to all G-3 Subjects, 21 June 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/7 in AG AFHQ).

105. AFHQ Staff Memo No 54, sect II, 26 June 43.

106. Ibid. Also see footnote 104 above.

107. AFHQ Staff Memo No 59, par 1, 5 July 43.

108. Ibid., No 68, 22 July 43.

109. C-in-C Draft Dispatch, Sicilian Operations,

tion for the Sicilian campaign did not present many of the difficulties encountered by those forming earlier combined organizations.

Obtaining necessary personnel presented a problem in the development of the staff of Headquarters Force 141. On 1 February 1943, G-1 AFHQ "requested that all staffs turn over qualified officers for the new planning staff."¹¹⁰ Brigadier Whiteley stated on 12 February, as a result of AFHQ experience, "Here again the balance of American and British officers has been watched."¹¹¹ As the Tunisian campaign progressed, more personnel were added to the staff. A special table of organization was developed for the American part of the staff, whereas the British establishment for Headquarters Force 141 had been designed to supersede that of 18th Army Group.¹¹² Staff personnel for the British side came principally from the UNITED KINGDOM, GHQ MEF, Hq 18th Army Group, and AFHQ; while American personnel came mainly from the UNITED STATES, Atlantic Base Section, Hq 5th Army, Hq I Armored Corps, Hq 18th Army Group, and AFHQ. Consequently many officers of both nationalities had worked previously with each other and had understood the practices of a combined headquarters before the end of the North African campaign.¹¹³ Gen-

110. Min of CofS Conference No 20, 1 Feb 43 (SGS AFHQ file: CofS Conferences).

111. DO ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 12 Feb 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

112. Min of Meeting No 18, WE Com, 4 May 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 58/5.18, in AG AFHQ). See footnote 104 above.

113. C-in-C Draft Dispatch, Sicilian Operations,
p 7.

eral Eisenhower stated, after TUNISIA had fallen, that "the most encouraging aspect" of the experience was that both American and British officers

...were quickly able to see the wisdom and necessity of recognizing and obeying a single directing head and of habitually acting accordingly throughout the chain of command.¹¹⁴

With this broad background of experience based on the interdependence of units within the Allied command, the preparations for HUSKY developed into the planned operations. Before any landing was actually made, Generals Eisenhower and Alexander had joined Admiral Cunningham at MALTA for the important days that lay ahead,¹¹⁵ and Tactical Headquarters (FINBAT) of Force 141 had also moved from NORTH AFRICA to MALTA by early July.¹¹⁶ General Eisenhower indicated satisfaction with this arrangement at the conclusion of HUSKY.

The command arrangements had worked well. Admiral Cunningham, General Alexander, and I had been together at MALTA during the naval phase of the operation; and our contact with Air Marshal Tedder's Air Headquarters at TUNIS, while not perfect, was entirely adequate.¹¹⁷

From their observation point at MALTA, these commanders watched the successful results of early landings on SICILY the morning of 10 July 1943. In accord with earlier arrangements, announcements were then made concerning the true designations of the forces involved. General Alexander's Headquarters Force 141, controlling

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114. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign,
p 52.
115. C-in-C Draft Dispatch, Sicilian Operations,
p 42.
116. Narrative of HUSKY Operations, 27 July 43
(G-3 AFHQ file: 58/5.18 in AG AFHQ).
117. See footnote 115 above.

the two task forces, was renamed Headquarters 15th Army Group; Force 343, formerly I Armored Corps, Reinforced (A), became 7th Army (A); while Force 545, formerly 118 12th Army (B), reassumed the title of 8th Army (B). Since the immediate direction of the land campaign of the Allied Forces now became the responsibility of General Alexander,¹¹⁹ he was designated "General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15th Army Group"¹²⁰ and, shortly thereafter, opened his headquarters in SICILY at CASSI-¹²¹ BILE.

In just thirty-eight days the combined operation to secure SICILY was concluded successfully. This remarkable accomplishment not only attained the three objectives outlined seven months previously by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but also directly contributed to the fall of Mussolini on 25 July 1943, a stinging blow to the prestige of GERMANY and to the structure of the Rome-Berlin Axis.¹²² Again General Eisenhower praised those engaged in the operation: "...Allied Forces of all services and of all arms had demonstrated even more perfect teamwork than in the closing stages of the Tunisian campaign."¹²³

The rapid success in SICILY did not find the Allies unprepared for the next step. In response to instructions issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Tri-

118. See footnote 116 above.

119. See footnote 115 above.

120. AFHQ Staff Memo No 68, 22 July 43.

121. Narrative of HUSKY Operations, 29 July 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 58/5.18 in AG AFHQ).

122. C-in-C Draft Dispatch, Sicilian Operations,

p 50.

123. Ibid.

124

dent Conference on 26 May 1943, General Eisenhower by 5 June had directed General Alexander and the Naval and Air Commanders "to prepare plans for the invasion of the mainland."

In a short period of time several planning groups were at work on a number of individual plans for the conquest of the mainland: BUTTRESS--along the GULF OF GIOIA on the Toe; GOBLET--at the Instep; MUSKET--at the Heel; BAYTOWN--at REGGIO in CALABRIA; and BARRACUDA and GANGWAY--at NAPLES.

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With the fall of Mussolini, General Clark (A) was ordered by General Eisenhower to prepare plans for AVALANCHE--near NAPLES, using 5th Army (A) and attached British units. With the exception only of 8th Army planners in SICILY, whose assignment was BAYTOWN, representatives of all the other planning groups assembled at BOUZAREA. This centralization facilitated the necessary co-ordination with AFHQ and its Executive Planning Section for the numerous decisions

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to be made in the future. General Eisenhower's early recommendation to carry the war to the Italian mainland, after the contemplated fall of SICILY,

127

was realized on 16 August when, from a number of plans considered, the decisions to proceed with BAYTOWN and AVA-

124. Draft C-in-C Dispatch, Italian Campaign, 3 Sep 43 to 8 Jan 44, p 1.

125. Ibid., p 39. Fifth Army History, part I, sect III, The Planning Phase.

126. Draft C-in-C Dispatch, Italian Operations, 3 Sep 43 to 8 Jan 44, p 13.

127. NAF Cable No 265, Eisenhower to WD and ETOUSA, 22 July 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/3).

LANCHE were rendered. ¹²⁸ Consequently on the following ¹²⁹
day 15th Army Group took command of 5th Army.

To co-ordinate this new undertaking, General Eisenhower capitalized on the experience gained before the Sicilian campaign and joined his other commanders in TUNISIA. He and Air Marshal Tedder were located just outside TUNIS, while General Alexander and Admiral Cunningham were at BIZERTA by the first week of September. This made possible daily meetings, emergency conferences, and direct communication for the commanders in the ¹³⁰
busy days before them.

While these commanders were convening for their meetings in TUNISIA, the troops of 15th Army Group destined for the mainland invasion had already started the next phase of operations. Forces of 8th Army crossed the STRAITS OF MESSINA from SICILY, landing in CALABRIA on 3 September, and on 9 September 5th Army units made ¹³¹
their way ashore near SALERNO. Since plans for the mainland excluded the active participation of the 7th Army, it reverted to the direct command of AFHQ from ¹³²
15th Army Group by 3 October 1943, the day before General Alexander opened his headquarters in ITALY at ¹³³
SANTO SPIRITO.

128. Cable No 2103, Eisenhower to C-in-C Med, 15th Army Group, MAC, 16 Aug 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/3).

129. Ibid.

130. Draft C-in-C Dispatch, Italian Campaign, 3 Sep 43 to 8 Jan 44, p 39.

131. Ibid., c. p 57.

132. Cable No 9602, C-in-C to 15th Army Group, 25 Sep 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.43-9).

133. Cable No 0.1194, 15th Army Group to All Concerned, 4 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/7).

A chart of 15th Army Group command during September 1943 is shown on the next page.

While 15th Army Group was driving its way across the whole of SICILY and on to the Italian mainland, the problem of controlled Italian local administration was naturally faced by General Alexander. However, he was equipped to meet the situation, for as early as the first of May an organization known as "Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory" (AMGOT)¹³⁴ had been established by AFHQ and placed "under the direct supervision" of General Alexander in his capacity as commander of ground forces (Headquarters Force 141). As Military Governor, he was made responsible only to the Commander-in-Chief for the conduct of military government. To advise General Alexander on such matters, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO) was designated the Chief of AMG.¹³⁵ This authority over the civilian population was established throughout SICILY as the armies advanced and thereafter was extended to the mainland.

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15th Army Group, will continue to act as Military Governor (SICILY) until the military government of the island is under control of this headquarters (AFHQ).¹³⁶


General Sir Harold Alexander, as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15 Army

134. It is not in the province of this account to deal with the history of AMG, which is an operational organization on a lower level of command. The designation of this organization was changed in October 1943 to "Allied Military Government" (AMG), and this later term will be used hereafter in this history.

135. AFHQ Adm Memo No 35, 1 May 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.9, No 1).

136. AFHQ Adm Memo No 66, 13 Oct 43.

COMMAND RELATIONS OF 15TH ARMY GROUP WITH OTHER HEADQUARTERS
September 1943



LEGEND:
 ————— Command channels
 - - - - - Liaison channels

NOTES:

Letters in squares indicate nationality of the GOC of the unit represented and not that of the whole unit.

Group, will remain Military Governor of all Italian territory under Allied Military Government.¹³⁷

The purpose of AMG was twofold under 15th Army Group:

a. To serve as a transition agency between an Italian Fascist local government and one suitable to the United Nations.

b. To co-ordinate civil and military requirements in a manner to further the success of the Allied operations against the enemy.

The necessity for co-ordinating incoming Naval and Air Force demands on the Italian mainland with those of the Army Group became particularly evident to AFHQ after the foothold on ITALY was secured. Accordingly, an organization was created by AFHQ to represent it on the mainland: AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAM-¹³⁸BO). Since 15th Army Group's primary role was that of an operational headquarters for the two Armies and not an administrative one for the whole mainland, this general responsibility was furnished by FLAMBO after 24¹³⁹ October 1943.

It can be seen that 15th Army Group in the various stages of development--Force 141 in ALGERIA or TUNISIA, 15th Army Group in SICILY or ITALY--would have a number of varied responsibilities in its relation to AFHQ: an intermediate body between AFHQ and AMG, between AFHQ

137. AFHQ Adm Memo No 69, 18 Oct 43.

138. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, 15 Oct 43. This discussion of FLAMBO is not intended to be a full account of its activity. Section 4 of the next chapter deals with FLAMBO in more detail.

139. Ibid.

and three different field armies, and later between FLAMBO and these organizations in ITALY. To complete this picture, the more specific functions of 15th Army Group have been included below:

a. To develop plans and issue directives for operations allocated by AFHQ. This included SICILY and the Italian mainland. ¹⁴⁰

b. To organize a combined Anglo--American headquarters staff along lines of the British staff system. ¹⁴¹

c. To command, for operational purposes, assigned ground forces in the field. ¹⁴²

d. To develop plans with AFHQ which would then co-ordinate details of mounting troops in the UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, MIDDLE EAST, and throughout NORTH AFRICA for the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. ¹⁴³

e. To direct generally the training of the task forces and to issue necessary instructions on such matters. ¹⁴⁴

f. To have operational command of such AMG and SOE units as are assigned it by AFHQ. ¹⁴⁵

140. See footnotes 93, 102, and 128 above, and AFHQ Directive to Commanders, 25 Sep 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 20/1, No 1).

141. See footnote 93 above.

142. See footnote 140 above. Cable No 559, Eisenhower to Alexander, 20 Sep 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5, No 1).

143. C-in-C Draft Dispatch, Sicilian Operations, pp 6-7. Draft C-in-C Dispatch, Italian Campaign, 3 Sep 43 to 8 Jan 44, pp 13-14.

144. AFHQ Directive to CG 5th Army, 5 Mar 43, par 6 and 8 (G-3 AFHQ file: 20/2, No 1).

145. Plan for Operation "HUSKY" pt II, Annex "C", 10 Apr 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 58/5 in AG AFHQ).

and, through the first, to govern such occupied territory as directed from time to time.
146

g. To collect intelligence matters for its operations.
147

h. To communicate with LONDON, WASHINGTON, and the MIDDLE EAST for details connected with pending operations.
148

i. To co-ordinate task force plans within over-all plans of appropriate naval and air commanders and under the supreme direction of the Commander-in-Chief.
149

j. To co-ordinate general administrative planning for the task forces and to draw attention to special needs of 15th Army Group as a whole to GHQ MIDDLE EAST and AFHQ.
150

k. To nominate co-ordinating representatives (force representatives) to appropriate formations and units destined to come under 15th Army Group control. These representatives would convey the necessary orders and directives to all such units.
151

l. To determine boundaries between armies

146. Min of AFHQ Meeting at AMILCAR, 12 Sep 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5, No 1). AFHQ Adm Memo No 69, sec II, 18 Oct 43. Cable No 691, 15 Army Group to AFHQ, 15 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5, No 2, in AG AFHQ).

147. See footnote 100 above.

148. See footnote 98 above.

149. See footnote 100 above.

150. Hq Force 141, Third Outline Maintenance Project, app "E" (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/9 in AG AFHQ).

151. G-3 AFHQ Memo to All Concerned, 24 Apr 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-4).

under its control and to recommend rear bound-
aries for armies to AFHQ.¹⁵²

m. To co-ordinate British administration,
all shipping requests, and through movements
of units in ITALY with FLAMBO.¹⁵³

n. To furnish the services of G-3 (Org)
subsection, the Chief Engineer, and the Chief
Signal Officer of the 15th Army Group to FLAM-
BO; which, in addition, would perform regular
duties with their own organization.¹⁵⁴

o. To establish operational maintenance
priorities for 15th Army Group units.¹⁵⁵

p. To release, parole, or detain in ITALY
at its discretion all Italian prisoners of war.¹⁵⁶

q. To limit the normal responsibilities
for administration and maintenance of its for-
ces within the bounds prescribed by its com-
mander or the Commander-in-Chief.¹⁵⁷

In discussing these plans made before the Sicilian
campaign General Eisenhower stated afterwards:

Special administrative arrangements were de-
vised to take care of this complicated system
of supply and in general to co-ordinate ship-

152. AFHQ Adm Memo No 63, 21 Sep 43, and revision
of 10 Nov 43.

153. Min of Conference "A" held at 15th Army
Group, 15 Oct 43 (See chart, app "A").

154. Ibid.

155. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, 15 Oct 43 (app "A").

156. Cable No 3474, CG NATOUSA to 5th Army, 20
Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/1, No 2 in AG AFHQ).

157. Draft C-in-C Dispatch, Sicilian Operations,
p 22. Memo CAO to CofS, 6 Aug 43 (SGS AFHQ file:
312-21). Draft C-in-C Dispatch, Italian Campaign, 3
Sep 43 to 8 Jan 44, pp 13-14. AFHQ Directive to All
Concerned, 19 Aug 43 (app "A") (SGS AFHQ file: 370.5-2).

ping demands and maintenance between 8th Army, 7th Army, and Air Forces in accordance with policy determined by 15th Army Group. Under ordinary conditions, and certainly under British Field Service Regulations, Army Group would have exercised direct control, but two factors caused a departure from the principle of administrative control; (a) the wide distances which separated headquarters and formations from the outset; and (b) the participation of a United States Field Army under an administration system totally different from the British. Under these special circumstances 15th Army Group decided to limit its own functions to those of operational command and administrative co-ordination.¹⁵⁸

Again, before the advance on to the mainland from SICILY, the ordinary functions of an army group were modified, this time by General Eisenhower, who decided that:

...the responsibility for the preliminary maintenance and mounting of Ground...Forces in NORTH AFRICA, earmarked for the initial attack, should be divided between AFHQ and MEF, according to the command area from which each unit would embark. Only the follow-up units from SICILY would be mounted by Force 141.¹⁵⁹

To summarize these arrangements discussed above for both campaigns, the following maintenance procedure was adopted by 15th Army Group:

(a) American forces were supplied by SOS NATOUSA through appropriate base sections.

(b) British forces were supplied in AFRICA by AFHQ and GHQ MEF; in SICILY by FORTBASE (B); in ITALY by No 2 District (FORTBASE),
160
No 2 District, and FLAMBO.

The success in carrying out these functions through-

158. Draft C-in-C Dispatch, Sicilian Operations,
p 22.

159. AFHQ Directive to All Concerned, 19 Aug 43
(app "A") (SGS AFHQ file: 370.5-2).

160. For difference between No 2 District and No 2 District (FORTBASE) see pp 178-183 below.

out one and well into another campaign meant that the Allies had realized, through 15th Army Group and associated air and naval forces, the ambitions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for 1943: SICILY had been conquered, the Italian Government had surrendered, Fascism in ITALY had fallen, the Italian Fleet was under Allied control, and a substantial number of German divisions were being contained on the Italian Front.

7. Allied Command of the Italian Army
and Air Force

In Section 5 of this chapter the Allied command relations with the Italian Navy were discussed. Here is treated separately the development of Allied command over the Italian Army, Air Force, and local government.

The Short Armistice Terms, signed by General Castellano (I) at CASSIBILE on 3 September 1943, ¹⁶¹ made no mention of surrender of the Italian Army. It provided only for transfer of the Fleet and aircraft to the Allies, the cessation of hostilities, and the Allied right to impose disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization. Neither was there any mention of Allied command authority over Italian troops which might be used against the Axis, because such possibilities had not proceeded beyond the stage of informal conversation. On the civilian side, however, the Allied Commander-in-Chief was guaranteed the same potential authority which he had exercised by right of conquest in

161. See SGS AFHQ file: 400-4.4.

SICILY:

...in particular the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.¹⁶²

Clause 12 of these Short Terms provided that ITALY would have to comply with additional "political, economic, and financial" conditions at a later date. There was no hint of further military terms.

Soon after the public announcement of ITALY's acceptance of the Short Terms (8 September 1944), however, General Eisenhower was directed by the Allied Governments to have ITALY sign the Long Terms (Comprehensive Instrument of Surrender) which would transfer the control of the Italian forces to the Allied Commander-in-Chief.¹⁶³ At the same time their use against GERMANY was being suggested by both Italian and Allied authorities.

You will encourage in all practicable ways, cabled President Roosevelt to General Eisenhower, the vigorous use under your direction of the Italian Armed Forces against GERMANY.¹⁶⁴

On the day following receipt of this cable (24 September 1943) was signed the Cunningham--De Courten Agreement which provided for Allied command of the surrendered Italian Fleet against the Axis.¹⁶⁵ Five days later the signature of the Long Terms (Instrument of Surrender

162. Ibid., clause 10.

163. Draft C-in-C Dispatch, Italian Campaign,
p 79.

164. Cable No 8432, Roosevelt to Eisenhower, 23 Sep 43 (SGS AFHQ file: Amendments to Long Terms). The italics are the writer's.

165. See History of AFHQ, II, 127-131.

of ITALY) took place at MALTA. These terms were much more specific concerning the degree of control assumed by the Allied command over the Italian Army and Air Force. Only those passages which are significant in clarifying the Allied command relation to the Italian Army and Air Force are quoted here:

The Italian Land, Sea, and Air Forces, wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally.¹⁶⁷

...Subject to such use of Italian troops for the above purposes (protection, law, and order), as may be sanctioned by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, all other Italian Land, Sea, and Air Forces will proceed to, and remain in, their barracks, camps, or ships pending directions from the United Nations as to their future status and disposal.

Italian aircraft of all kinds will not leave the ground or water or ships, except as directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

The Italian Government will send a delegation to the Headquarters of the Control Commission to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the Control Commission to the competent Italian authorities.

"The terms of the document just signed," General Eisenhower cabled to the CCS, "and the Armistice of September 3d give us full control and amount to complete capitulation by ITALY."¹⁶⁸

The signature of the Long Terms led to the preparation of a JPS study by G-3 AFHQ, called P/109, which

166. Instrument of Surrender of ITALY, 29 Sep 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 400-4.4).

167. In a protocol of revision signed on 9 Nov 43 the word "unconditional" was removed from this clause and inserted in the preamble where it then read that the conditions as a whole "have been accepted unconditionally by Marshal Pietro Badoglio." (SGS AFHQ file: 400-4.4).

168. NAF Cable No 426, Eisenhower to CCS, 30 Sep 43 (SGS AFHQ file: Amendments to Long Terms).

was subsequently approved. Article 19 of this approved study defined the command relations:

a. It is essential that Italian units or formations should be under operational command of the local Allied hq, and under Italian military authority for administration only. Owing to the probable dispersion of Italian forces in Allied areas, it is considered that only by this system of command can the necessary flexibility be obtained. On occasion exception may have to be made, however, where, as for example in SARDINIA, no suitable Allied hq exists.

b. Italian aircraft and crews should operate within the framework of the IAF, but under complete Allied control.¹⁷⁰

That this control was recognized in practice by the Italian Government is shown by two illustrations. On 13 November 1943 Marshal Badoglio sent the following message to the Allied Military Mission:

On orders from His Majesty the King I am considering effecting the following changes in the High Command.

...Before proceeding with the above appointments I wish to have the views of the Allied High Command on the proposals.¹⁷¹

Again on 3 November the Italian Government changed commanders on the Island of LEROS with the following comment:

...orders have been given to the Italian Navy to substitute forthwith Admiral Mascherpo by a more energetic commander who will consid-

169. "Attached is AFHQ paper P/109 (Final)... . This paper has been approved and the policy laid down in it is now to be implemented." Gen Whiteley to Allied Military Mission, 9 Oct 43; and CofS Memo to G-3 AFHQ, 28 Oct 43: "The attached paper (P/109 (Final)) ...is approved... .": both references taken from G-3 AFHQ file: 46/1.

170. JPS Study P/109 (Final), subject: "Employment of Italian Forces," (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/1.1).

171. FATIMA Cable No 921, Joyce to AFHQ, 13 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5.2).

er himself under the command of the British Governor of LEROS.¹⁷²

To implement the command channels two military missions were established: one, an Italian Mission to AFHQ; the other, an Allied Mission to the Italian Government. As early as 10 September 1943, two days after the public announcement of the Armistice, General Castellano was acting as head of an "Italian Military Mission" to the Allied Command.¹⁷³ The position of the Italian Mission was officially established about a month later in a memorandum from Brigadier Strong to the Chief of the Liaison Section, AFHQ:

- a. The Mission is under the control of the G-2 Section AFHQ.
- b. The Mission will be housed and administered by the Liaison Section.
- c. The head of the Mission is the representative of Marshal Badoglio at AFHQ. He will communicate to the Italian Government information as requested. The Mission will transmit situation reports to the Italian Government as required.
- d. All communications, other than intelligence information, concerning the Mission or for delivery to the Mission will be handled by the Liaison Section AFHQ.
- e. All cable communications to be transmitted by the Mission must be co-ordinated with the G-2 Section AFHQ before dispatch.
- f. All appointments for and with the Mission will be arranged by the Liaison Section. Whether a Mission member must be accompanied by an officer of the Liaison Sec-

172. FATIMA Cable No 732, MacFarlane to AFHQ, 3 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5.2).

173. Memo, Castellano to Allied CofS, 10 Sep 43; and Min of meeting at AFHQ Command Post, 12 Sep 43, 2100 hours (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5.1).

tion is left to your discretion.

A British colonel, responsible to G-2 Section, was put in charge of looking after all matters concerning the Mission.¹⁷⁵

On the other hand an Allied Military Mission was likewise sent to the Italian Government in BRINDISI. General Castellano had invited such an exchange of missions on the day following the invasion at SALERNO when he made the following proposal:

I believe the constitution of an Allied mission to the Italian Supreme Command to be necessary. This mission can be formed of four or five officials for the moment.

If this suggestion is considered acceptable, the following could be laid down: Any communication that the Allied C-in-C wishes to make to the Italian Supreme Command would be made by means of the Italian Military Mission. Correspondingly, any communication the Italian Supreme Command wishes to make to the Allied C-in-C would be made through the Allied mission.

I believe it to be useful, and even most necessary, to follow this method so as to keep the two heads of missions fully informed, to avoid any delay in replies and in any steps to be taken, and so as to define exactly responsibilities in the handling of the subjects.¹⁷⁶

Two days later, 12 September 1943, the Allied Mission was organized with Lieutenant General P. A. Mason MacFarlane (B) as its head. The initial instructions to

174. This is a full quotation of the memo, using letters instead of numbers to indicate the paragraphs. Memo, ACoFS G-2 to Liaison Sect, AFHQ, 8 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5.1).

175. Cable No 733, Eisenhower to WO, 14 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5.2).

176. Memo, Castellano to Allied CofS, 10 Sep 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5.1). Gen Badoglio cabled Gen Eisenhower on 12 Sep 43: "Gen Rossi informs me of the sending of an Anglo--American Mission to the Italian Command. I am very pleased with this decision of yours." (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/5.1).

General MacFarlane contained the following more important clauses:

The Commander-in-Chief has decided that a Military Mission shall be dispatched to the Italian Government.

The task of the Mission is to transmit the military instructions of the Commander-in-Chief to the Italian Government, collect and transmit intelligence, and arrange for such co-ordinated action as the Italian armed forces and people can be induced to take against the Germans.

In fulfilling this task you, and all members of your mission, will bear constantly in mind the extreme importance of inculcating in the Italian Government, armed forces, and people, the will to resist and hamper in every way the German forces in ITALY and the Italian possessions.

The Military Mission will consist of Naval, Ground Force, and Air sections. The heads of these sections will report to you on all matters of policy; on technical matters they may report direct to the appropriate service from which they are drawn.

The British Resident Minister in NORTH AFRICA (Rt. Hon. H. M. MacMillan) and the US Minister (Mr. Robert D. Murphy) or their representatives, will be associated with your Mission in order to make the necessary diplomatic contacts with the Italian Government. They will however report to you, and all instructions from the Allied Commander-in-Chief, on political as well as military questions, will be transmitted to them through you.

You will report to the Allied Commander-in-Chief. On matters affecting only one service you may communicate with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, GOC 15 Army Group, and Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, as appropriate, with copies to AFHQ.

You will not communicate direct with any agencies in WASHINGTON or LONDON (e.g. War Department, Admiralty).¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷. Instns, CofS AFHQ to Gen MacFarlane, 12 Sep 43.

The provisional organization of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Government is shown by the chart on the next page.¹⁷⁸ This organization was to be modified when the Allied Control Commission began to function in BRINDISI, but the account of that change is reserved for Part III of this history.

In addition to his powers of command over the Italian fighting forces the Allied Commander-in-Chief was given the power and responsibility for the civil government and administration of a large part of ITALY. The powers of government over SICILY and small areas of southern ITALY were acquired by conquest. Similar powers over other Italian territories were stipulated in the following articles of the Short Terms and Long Terms:

Short Terms

Article 6. Immediate surrender of CORSICA and of all Italian territory, both islands and mainland, to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.


Article 10. ...The Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander-in-Chief may require, and in particular the Commander-in-Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

Long Terms

Article 18. The forces of the United Nations will require to occupy certain parts of Italian territory. The territories or areas will from time to time be notified by the United Nations and all Italian Land, Sea,

178. Ibid.

PROVISIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIED MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
September 1943



and Air Forces will thereupon withdraw from such territories or areas in accordance with instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. ...

Article 20. Without prejudice to the provisions of the present instrument the United Nations will exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout the territories or areas referred to in Article 18, the administration of which will be provided for by the issue of proclamations, orders, or regulations. Personnel of the Italian administrative, judicial, and public services will carry out their functions under the control of the Allied Commander-in-Chief unless otherwise directed.

Article 22. The Italian Government and people will abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and will carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations.¹⁷⁹

The articles quoted above served two purposes.

First, they gave the Italian Government some reasons to hope that it would be able to salvage some governmental authority and territorial jurisdiction out of the unconditional surrender to which it had had to submit. And, secondly, what was more important, it reserved to the Allied Commander-in-Chief the right to assume (on orders from the Allied Governments) as much governmental power over as much Italian territory as he or his governments might determine.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief's governmental responsibility was performed through the advice and planning of a new special staff section, Military Government Section (MGS), which is discussed separately in Chapter XIV below, and through a field organization,

179. SGS AFHQ file: 400-4.4. The italics are the writer's, made to show the extent of control over Italian territory and government conceded to the United Nations and their Commander-in-Chief.

Allied Military Government (AMG), which was supervised by MGS. Toward the end of the period covered by Part II the above system was being modified by the establishment of an Allied Control Commission. Since, however, this new arrangement was more characteristic of the year 1944, it will be described later in Part III of this history.

The command relations of the Allied Commander-in-Chief with the Italian Government and Forces for both military operations and military government in October 1943 are represented in the chart on the next page.


8. Command of British Dominion
and Colonial Troops

Troops from the British dominions and colonies came under the command of General Eisenhower for the first time when the establishment of 18th Army Group brought 8th Army under the direct command of AFHQ. The latter army contained elements from the UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, WEST AFRICA, the High Commission Territories, CEYLON, and MAURITIUS. ¹⁸⁰ Canadian forces later came under the command of AFHQ as ¹⁸¹ part of 15th Army Group. This section is included for the purpose of describing very briefly the command relationship of these troops under General Eisenhower and is divided into three sections dealing with the British dominion, colonial and Indian troops.

180. Notes on 'A' Meeting AFHQ, 24 Sep 43 (G-1 (B) AFHQ file: CR/4366/G-1 (B)).

181. Ltr, Gen McNaughton to GOC, 15th Army Group, 19 June 43 (G-1 (B) AFHQ file: G-1/B/3023/3/A3).

CHART OF AFHQ COMMAND RELATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN FORCES AND GOVERNMENT
October 1943



a. Dominions. The authority to command dominion troops, when combined with forces raised in the UNITED KINGDOM, was governed by the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act 1933 and the equivalent dominion statutes or orders. The terms of these documents enabled the appropriate authorities to place their forces at the disposal of the British Army Council which had power to attach temporarily any member to another force and to declare the forces to be serving together and acting in combination. The above Act also provided that an officer appointed to command such force should have the powers of the equivalent rank in the United Kingdom forces holding the same command.

The legal processes necessary for the declaration that the dominion and United Kingdom forces were serving together and acting in combination were taken, and General Alexander, as an officer of the United Kingdom forces, was therefore the commander of the combined force with the full authority of his position as GOC-¹⁸² in-C 18th Army Group and later of 15th Army Group. General Eisenhower as the Allied C-in-C, with command over General Alexander, therefore exercised his command through him. The dominion forces were supplied and equipped by AFHQ in the same manner as the United King-

182. Canadian Order of Disposal, 10 Dec 42; Order in Council, PC 3464, 29 Apr 43; Order of the Army Council, 6 Jan 43; Ltr, McNaughton to Alexander, 19 June 43 (G-1 AFHQ file: G-1/B/3023/3/A3); New Zealand Visiting Forces Act 1939; Order in Council, 3 Apr 43; Order of the Army Council, 6 July 43; Union of South Africa Governor General's Proclamation 111/42; Order of the Army Council, 19 Aug 40; Report from G-1 (B) to UK and Union of SA Military Forces, 25 Nov 43 (AFHQ G-3 file: 52/22); Special Army Order No 5, 15 Jan 42.

dom forces.

The dominions, however, retained their powers of
self-government in the following matters: ¹⁸³

(1) The Canadian Order in Council P.C. 3464, 29 April 1943, gave the Canadian Service Authorities power to detail the troops under their command to act in combination until they directed otherwise. Lieutenant General A. L. McNaughton, Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Army Overseas, in his directives to the GO's C of the Canadian units in this theater included a clause which gave them the right to withdraw from acting in combination if in their opinion the orders issued by the commander of the combined forces were not practicable or were at variance with the policy of the Canadian Government, provided always that by so doing an opportunity was not lost nor any part of the Allied Force endangered.

(2) The commanding officers of dominion units had the right of direct approach to their service authorities and through them to their respective governments.

(3) Dominion personnel were subject to

183. Directives by Gen McNaughton to GOC 1st Cdn Div and Comd 1st Cdn Army Tank Bde, 19 June 43 (G-1 (B) AFHQ file: G-1/B/3023/3/A3); to GOC 1st Cdn Corps, 28 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 52/6); Memo DJAG UDF, ME to GOA, UDF, 9 Nov 43, (G-1(B) AFHQ file: G-1/B/3023/1/A3); Ltr CAO to HQ, NA District, 19 Oct 43 (G-1 (B) AFHQ file: G-1/B/3023/4/A3); Statement by Officer i/c Administration 2NZEF, 20 Dec 44.

their own military codes, except when they had been specifically attached to another force. In that case they came under the military laws of the force to which they were attached.

(4) All military secretary and adjutant general matters dealing with officers and other ranks' records, pay, promotions, honors and awards, leaves, terms of service abroad, war establishments, and war organizations.

(5) Reinforcements and replacements of personnel.

(6) Requests for return of troops and refusals to send additional troops.

(7) Restrictions on confirmation of the findings of certain sentences passed by courts-martial in terms of the respective dominion military laws and regulations.

The general administration of dominion troops was conducted by HQ 2d New Zealand Expeditionary Force, Union Defense Force Administrative HQ, and Canadian Section GHQ 1st Echelon. During 1943 the New Zealand and South African HQ's were situated in the MIDDLE EAST, but the Canadian GHQ 1st Echelon was attached to AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon.¹⁸⁴

b. Indian Army. Units of the Indian Army came

184. Statement by Officer i/c Admin 2NZEF, 20 Dec 44; memo from DJAG, UDF, ME to Gen Theron, 9 Nov 43 (G-1 (B) AFHQ file: G-1/B/3023/1/A3); publication by AG AFHQ to All Concerned, 2 Nov 43 (G-3 (B) AFHQ file: G-3/52/6).

under the command of AFHQ when 8th Army became part of 18th Army Group for the Tunisian campaign. General Alexander (B), the GOC-in-C 18th Army Group and later 15th Army Group, had full powers of command over all Indian troops forming part of these army groups under the Indian Army Act. This statute authorized an officer holding a commission from His Majesty and commanding an army or formation out of INDIA, not subject to Indian Central Government, to exercise on active service the powers of an army or formation commander under that law.¹⁸⁵

Decisions relating to the countries in which Indian troops should be used were made in consultation with the Viceroy and C-in-C India.¹⁸⁶

Personnel of the Indian Army were subject to their own military law, but General Alexander (B) had power to confirm all sentences passed by courts-martial.¹⁸⁷

The administration of Indian troops in the 8th Army had been directed by an Indian Army staff branch and a Deputy Director of Organization and Personal Services (Indian Army) at GHQ MEF and on 30 September 1943 a subsection, A-6 of G-1 (B), was established at AFHQ. The new subsection was composed of Indian Army personnel and dealt with personal service and organization matters for the Indian troops under the command of AFHQ.¹⁸⁸

185. Indian Army Act, sect 7, (B); Manual of Indian Military Law, p 141.

186. Cable No 92041 MO 6, WO to AFHQ, 19 Nov 43.

187. Ltr, CAO AFHQ to 15th AG, 11 Oct 43 (G-1 (B) AFHQ file: G-1/B/3023/2/A3).

188. Min of AFHQ WE Committee, No 42, 30 Sep 43. Memo from Brig McKay Forbes. 15 Jan 44 (G-3 AFHQ file: 52/10).

c. Colonies and Mandated Territories. Also serving under the command of AFHQ during 1943 were troops from the High Commission Territories of BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND, and SWAZILAND, from CEYLON, MAURITIUS, WEST AFRICA, and PALESTINE.¹⁸⁹ The personnel from CEYLON, MAURITIUS, and the High Commission Territories had volunteered for general service in any part of the world under the United Kingdom Army Act. They formed part of the British army and received pay and maintenance from Imperial funds. They were regarded as British troops¹⁹⁰ for all purposes except minor administrative matters.

Palestinian personnel were recruited under the same terms, but Jews and Arabs served in separate units.¹⁹¹

West African troops were subject to the Royal West African Frontier Force (Nigeria Regiment) Legislation and had been placed at the disposal of the Army Council by the RWAFF (Army Council Order) Order of 21 July 1941. They, therefore, came under the command of the senior officer of the British forces with which they were serving.¹⁹²

189. Min of "A" Meeting, AFHQ, 24 Sep 43 (G-1 (B) AFHQ file: CR/4366/G-1 (B)); Statement by Maj Dranesfield, AFHQ G-1 (B), 26 Nov 44.

190. MEF Publications, Notes on CEYLON, MAURITIUS. Statement by Lt Col Charnock, AFHQ G-1(B) on 23 Nov 44.

191. Regulations for Palestinian Personnel Joining HM Military Forces, July 1944.

192. The Royal West African Frontier Force (Nigeria Regiment) Legislation, amended to 30 Sep 44.

Chapter VI

REORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIED COMMAND: THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

Second only to the problem of the reorganization of Allied Command in the Combat Zone, after the Anglo-American invasion of NORTH AFRICA, was the problem of the reorganization of the command of defense and supply in the Communications Zone. To relieve the task forces of defense and supply duties in the rear areas and to free AFHQ from the responsibilities of detailed concern on those matters, it was necessary to constitute intermediate specialized commands throughout the Communications Zone. The account of their activations, their command relations to AFHQ, and the functions which they took over from AFHQ and other headquarters is the purpose of this chapter.

1. Atlantic Base Section and Mediterranean Base Section (American)

Until the invading task forces could establish themselves in NORTH AFRICA, they had to carry within themselves their own service of supply. These were considered, however, as the nuclei of future base sections, once the landings had been made and consolidated.¹

1. "The Services of Supply mission was to take over the Western Task Force line of communications (operating from CASABLANCA as a base) 40 days after the Task Force landed on the beaches of NORTH AFRICA." History of ABS, ch XIV, par 1. See also Cable No 4129, AFHQ to WD, 26 Oct 42; and AFHQ Opn Memo, No 30, 24 Oct 42, par 8. c. (1).

Thus the Atlantic Base Section began as SOS Task Force "A", later called Western Task Force; and the beginnings of SOS Task Force "A", itself, have been recounted rather vividly in the following passage from its history:

On a hot summer day early in September 1942, Col O. W. Hoop was sitting comfortably in his quarters at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, PENNSYLVANIA, waiting for the next convoy to leave for ENGLAND and wondering if he would be on it, when he was summoned to the telephone. A voice at the other end said 'Oscar, this is Art. I've got a job for you'--and the Office of the Headquarters Commandant, Headquarters, SOS Task Force 'A' was born.²

Just as this phone call produced the Headquarters Commandant, so other phone calls and communications soon created the whole staff of SOS Task Force "A". It was seven weeks after the arrival in MOROCCO of the first contingent of this SOS personnel with the early invasion forces³ that the SOS of the Western Task Force was officially redesignated as the Atlantic Base Section (ABS) (Brigadier General Arthur R. Wilson (A) commanding) and put directly under the command of AFHQ.⁴

Meanwhile in the UNITED KINGDOM parallel steps to organize an American SOS for the Center Task Force were being taken. Upon receipt of a War Department order on 11 September 1942, ETOUSA began the selection of officers to continue the work of building up this supply.

2. Ibid., ch XVI, par 1.

3. Statement of Col J. J. Donahue (formerly Chief of the Control Branch, Hq SOS Task Force "A"), 19 Nov 44.

4. AFHQ GO No 38, 30 Dec 42, par 2. For activation of ABS see ABS GO No 1, 12 Jan 43; and memo, Gen Wilson to AFHQ, 4 Jan 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 59/6).

organization all during the months of September and October.⁵ Finally, two days after the initial landings near ORAN, this Mediterranean Base Section (MBS) was activated under the command of Brigadier General Thomas B. Larkin (A)⁶ "to assume the functions of the Services of Supply within the area of the Center Task Force."⁷ MBS remained a part of CTF until 30 December 1942 when it and ABS were put directly under AFHQ.

Their command and operations relations to AFHQ and their broad initial functions were defined in the following paragraphs of AFHQ GO No 38 of 30 December 1942:

1. The Mediterranean Base Section and all service units attached thereto, are hereby detached from the II Corps and will operate under the direct control of this headquarters.

2. The "S.O.S. Task Force A" and all service units attached thereto are hereby detached from the Western Task Force. The "S.O.S. Task Force A" is constituted and redesignated "The Atlantic Base Section" and will operate under direct control of this headquarters. It will be duly activated by the Commanding General thereof.

3. The Mediterranean Base Section will serve all units of this command west of general line: ALGIERS excluded, BLIDA excluded, MEDIA excluded, BOGHARI excluded, and east of a general line: TAOURIRT included, MATARKA included, except units of the British First Army and such other units as may from time to time be designated by this headquarters to be served by British L of C. The facilities of the Port of ALGIERS are not available to the Mediterranean Base Section without prior approval of this headquarters in each instance. The Mediterranean Base Section is responsible

5. Cable, WD to ETOUSA, 11 Sep 42. Narrative History of MBS, p 1.

6. Constituted by AFHQ GO No 13, 2 Nov 42, and activated by MBS GO No 1, 10 Nov 42. Gen Larkin was promoted to the rank of Major General on 28 Apr 43 (WD SO No 132, 12 May 43).

7. CTF GO No 2, 3 Dec 42.

for the provision of stores and equipment of U.S. units in the area of the British First Army, except the Eastern Assault Force, on call from this headquarters.

4. The Atlantic Base Section will serve all units of this command west of a general line TAOURIRT excluded, MATARKA excluded except such units as may from time to time be designated by this headquarters.

5. All intelligence and counterintelligence matters pertaining to base sections will be governed by instructions issued by this headquarters.

6. Civil Affairs Section now attached to CTF and WTF are relieved from such attachment and attached to MBS and ABS respectively.

7. The Commanding General, Fifth Army, will review the present assignments and attachments of service units and will after consultation with appropriate base section commanders submit recommendations for reassignment and/or reattachment of these units.

8. All requisitions for supplies and replacements will be forwarded direct to the appropriate base section without reference to this headquarters. Priorities of supply will be by co-ordination between the Commanding General, Fifth Army, and the appropriate base section commander.

9. This headquarters will be the sole activity dealing directly with the War Department and Headquarters European Theater of Operations on matters concerning the Mediterranean and Atlantic Base sections.^B


A chart showing the channels of the American supply command before the activations of EBS (A) and SOS NATOUSA will be found on the next page.

The more detailed duties of the base sections were:

a. Acquisition and assignment of billets, buildings, real estate, and other facilities for all elements under command of the task

8. AFHQ GO No 38, 30 Dec 42. The writer has italicized the passages which pertain to relations with AFHQ.

CHART OF AMERICAN SUPPLY COMMAND
 December 1942--February 1943



*Chart
 ID*

force.

b. Responsibility for air raid precautions, fire protection, utilities, and any other base section installations.

c. Evacuation of casualties to the Zone of Interior, using for the purpose all fixed hospitals, and the evacuation of prisoners of war, released Allied prisoners of war, and internees.

d. Establishment and operation of replacement depots, including a casual camp, for the processing of replacements arriving in the Theater as well as for the return of casuals to their units.

e. Control of the base post office for the operation of all elements of Army Postal Service and censorship except those assigned to other forces. This included censorship of telegraph communication and civilian mail.

f. All duties relating to the US Claims Commission and Claims Service for the task force.

g. Establishment and maintenance of a central records office for all Army elements of the task force including establishment and operation of a prisoner of war information bureau.

h. Construction and operation of prison and internment camp facilities.

i. Formulation of purchasing and con-

tract policies and procedures relating to the procurement of supplies and services. This was to include procurement, receipt, storage and issue of equipment and supplies, except receipt and issue of certain supplies peculiar to the Army Air Forces. To this end, the base section would establish and operate the necessary base depots normal to the communication zone. All requisitions to the UNITED STATES and the UNITED KINGDOM for personnel and supplies for the task force were to be processed through the CG of the task force.

j. Submission of an estimate of funds required for the operation of the task force.

k. Control of transportation pertaining to the task force, except that under the control of other elements of the task force.

l. All construction except that delegated to other elements of the task force.

m. Acquisition and distribution of publications, training films, film strips, blank forms, and maps.

n. Installation, operation, and maintenance of signal facilities pertaining to base section installations.

o. Control and co-ordination of such activities and functions of the civil affairs section of the task force as were related to civilian labor, to surveys of supply requirements for civilian population and utilities,

and to requisitioning, receipt, and allocation of these supplies.⁹

The two base sections also had the following responsibilities in connection with parts, shipping, and co-operation with the US Navy in North African waters:

a. To assist as required with personnel and equipment in the clearing of harbor and pier obstructions, in clearing the naval area, and in construction and rehabilitation of naval installations.

b. To operate through a port commander those piers and moles allocated to the Army. Allocation of piers and moles to the Army and to the Navy are to be made by mutual agreement between the services.

c. To accomplish all unloading and loading of ships, whether at docks or in stream, including dump barges, and to distribute and store all cargo.

d. To control all transport (RR's, roads etc.) on docks and on shore.

e. To provide security and police guards for all naval and military installations.

f. To operate the ship fueling installations on shore under the direction of the Navy.¹⁰

On 17 January 1943 AES was also instructed to supply all troops of I Armored Corps (formerly Western Task Force) whether or not in the ABS area.¹¹

The direct connection of these two base sections with AFHQ came to an end on 15 February 1943 when an intermediate supply command, SOS NATOUSA, was activated to direct the American supply activities of the en-

9. CTF GO No 2, 3 Dec 42.

10. AFHQ AG ltr to MBS, 6 Jan 43 (AG AFHQ file: 045.9-311). The letter also stated that "responsibilities as shown on the attached list to be put into effect in the Atlantic Base Section."

11. I Armored Corps GO No 6, 17 Jan 43.

tire North African Theater and to comprise, as subordinate commands, the separate base sections in the Theater. General Larkin of MBS was elevated to the command of this larger organization.¹²

2. Line of Communication (British)

On the British side it was also necessary to re-group and develop its administration and supply in the Line of Communication area. The Line of Communication (B), with its subdivisions, is the system of communications, along which the requirements of the field army are transported, in a theater of operations up to the rear limits of administration by forward formation commanders.¹³

No 1 L of C Area, with Major General J. C. W. Clark (B) as GOC, was under the direct command of the CG Eastern Task Force during the early period of the invasion.¹⁴ Headquarters No 1 L of C Area was situated at SETIF with base sub-areas on the coast. GOC No 1 L of C Area and base sub-area commanders were responsible under 1st Army for the administration and defense of their areas in the rear of the army zone.¹⁵

AFHQ took over command of No 1 L of C Area from 1st Army effective 0001 hours, 1 January 1943, with the following division of responsibilities:¹⁶

12. NATOUSA GO No 6, 14 Feb 43.

13. FSR, vol I, 13 Dec 39, p XVII.

14. Ltr, Whiteley to CG Eastern Task Force, 13 Dec 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 300.4-3).

15. FSR, vol I, 13 Dec 39, ch II, sect 12. See also footnote 14 above.

16. AFHQ GO No 40, 31 Dec 42. CAO Conference No 23, 31 Dec 42 (G-4 (B) AFHQ file: 2560/Q Maint).

a. General administrative control of all sub-areas by AFHQ.

b. Defense and local administration by 1st Army: No 1 L of C Sub-Area (CONSTANTINE), No 2 L of C Sub-Area (SOUK AHRAS), and No 4 Base Sub-Area (BONE).

c. Under command of No 1 L of C Area for all purposes other than general administration: No 1 Base Sub-Area (ALGIERS), No 2 Base Sub-Area (BOUGIE), and No 3 Base Sub-Area (PHILIPPEVILLE).

d. No 1 L of C Area directly administered and protected the area west of 1st Army rear boundary excluding the base sub-areas.

In AFHQ the L of C Area came under the command of CAO as the senior officer responsible for the supply and administration of British troops. Heads of services at AFHQ dealt with their representatives at HQ L of C Area on technical matters.

The administration of the areas under British control was defined as follows:¹⁷

a. General administration.

(1) Control of movements of men, animals, and materials from ports or depots to the front and vice versa.

(2) Control of local sea transport, docks, railways, and inland waterways.

17. AFHQ Adm Memos No 11, 24 Jan 43; No 33, 24 Apr 43.

(3) Control of general reserves of all kinds, including transport, which are not allocated to subordinate commanders.

(4) Selection of sites for, and control of, all general administrative installations, including their construction.

b. Local administration.

(1) Interior economy.

(a) Quartering and accommodation.

(b) Provision of water, light, power, etc.

(c) Care and well-being of personnel and animals.

(d) Sanitation and hygiene.

(e) Fire protection.

(f) Maintenance of standing camps.

(2) Local railway or inland waterway movement of personnel, animals, and materials, subject to instructions from higher headquarters.

(3) Local road traffic control and movement.

(4) Guard and custody of unoccupied standing camps.

(5) Relations with local civilian population, subject to instructions from higher headquarters.

(6) Allocation of the local pool of labor and transport.

(7) Maintenance and inspection of roads (maintenance being carried out as far as possible through the medium of the French authorities).

As the rear boundaries of the combat zone moved east, L of C sub-areas and base sub-areas, which had been established under the command of 1st Army, were brought under the command of AFHQ. The base sub-areas in TUNISIA were formed into a Tunisia District, the command of which was transferred from 1st Army effective midnight 30/31 May 1943, with Major General Clark (B), formerly GOC L of C, in command.¹⁸ The L of C and Tunisia District were merged into a single North Africa District on 18 September 1943.¹⁹

HQ Tripbase, later renamed FORTBASE, was chosen to deal with the maintenance of British Troops in eastern SICILY during the combat period under the command of 15th Army Group.²⁰ When this area had ceased to be within the combat zone, HQ FORTBASE was made responsible for the maintenance of British Troops in the next phase of the invasion; and No 1 District was established to provide for the command and administrative control of

18. CAO Conference No 106, 28 May 43 (AG AFHQ file: 337-302). Cable, Eisenhower to 1st Army, 23 May 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.43-7).

19. Cable, Eisenhower to Troopers, 18 Sep 43; AG ltr to All Concerned, 19 Sep 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.43-7).

20. Force 141 Adm Instn No 18, 24 June 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.43-1).

eastern SICILY as part of the British L of C. The chain of command within the area allotted to 15th Army Group (Combat Zone plus portions of the L of C) was from AFHQ to 15th Army Group. In rear of that area North Africa District HQ came under the direct command of AFHQ. Finally No 1 District came directly under AFHQ on 27 September 1943.²¹

The responsibility for the maintenance of British troops during the early stages of the invasion of the Italian mainland was divided as follows:²²

a. A British increment attached to HQ 5th Army assisted in meeting the needs of British troops under the command of that HQ until No 2 District became fully operative.

b. HQ FORTBASE was responsible for supplies for operations in the STRAITS OF MESSINA and for troops in SICILY.

After the successful invasion of the toe of ITALY, HQ FORTBASE was established at TARANTO on 27 September 1943 as No 2 District (FORTBASE) with the following responsibilities:²³

a. British troops under the command of 15th Army Group.

b. Port of NAPLES (as far as British needs were concerned).

21. Memo, CofS to HQ 15 Army Gp, 14 Aug 43; cable, C-in-C to 15th Army Gp, 25 Sep 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.43-9).

22. AFHQ Adm Memo No 60, 24 Aug 43 (AG AFHQ file: 400-19 (Gen)). Memo, AG to CG 5th Army, 24 Aug 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.43-9).

23. AFHQ Adm Memos No 60, 24 Aug 43; No 63, 21 Sep 43.

c. General and local administration in rear of Army areas, subject to co-ordination with the American base section.

d. Local negotiations with Italian authorities.

e. Exercising its responsibilities for local administration through the subordinate headquarters of base sub-areas under its command.

NAPLES was organized to provide an American base section and a British base area, each being the controlling agency in its own area. From NAPLES the L of C was divided on a north-south line to give the Americans and British separate geographical areas. The area of ITALY was divided into²⁴

- a. Army Area (B)
- b. Combat Zone (A)
- c. Line of Communication (east coast to 8th Army and west coast to 10 Corps).
- d. Communications Zone (rear of 5th Army).

The co-ordination of control of the area in rear of Army Area (British) was exercised by District HQ under direct command and administration of AFHQ. Allotment of priorities into Army Area was the responsibility of 15th Army Group.

The administrative channels on the mainland of ITALY were altered on 24 October 1943 by the establish-

24. Ibid., and Adm Memo No 63 (Revised), 10 Nov 43.

ment in NAPLES of AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (short title: FLAMBO). Major General Sir B. H. Robertson, Bart. (B) was appointed head of FLAMBO with the title of Deputy Chief Administrative Officer FLAMBO (short title: DCAO).²⁵

The functions of FLAMBO were as follows:

(1) Co-ordinating general administration on the mainland of ITALY.

(2) Controlling and directing all British general administration, but heads of services at AFHQ dealt directly with their deputies at FLAMBO.

(3) Representing AFHQ in dealing with the Italian Government on military administrative matters.

(4) Arranging administrative matters for 15th Army Group. The DCAO was personal administrative advisor to the GO C-in-C 15th Army Group.


A chart of the command and administrative channels following the establishment of FLAMBO is shown on the next page.²⁶

Likewise No 2 District (FORTBASE) was discontinued on 24 October 1943, and another No 2 District was set up as a separate establishment at BARI for local administration of British military needs. The area for HQ No 2 District extended to the northern boundaries of

25. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, 15 Oct 43; 'A' Conference, 15th Army Gp HQ, 12 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/7).

26. Ibid.

CHART OF THE COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANNELS ON THE MAINLAND OF ITALY
November 1943



LEGEND:

- Command channels
- Channel for operational maintenance priorities
- - - - - Channel for co-ordination of inter-Allied maintenance
- Channel for local administration and liaison

Chart II

CAMPANIA and APULIA, including command of all British
sub-areas on the mainland of ITALY.²⁷

3. North African Theater of Operations,
United States Army (NATOUSA)²⁸

a. ETOUSA and AFHQ

In the preparatory period of Operation TORCH, ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations, US Army) bore the same relation to AFHQ as NATOUSA did in 1943 upon its activation. ETOUSA had the responsibility of administration and supply for the American troops being mounted in the UNITED KINGDOM for the TORCH Operation.²⁹ As AFHQ developed, however, it took over from ETOUSA the remaining American responsibilities of TORCH planning and operations and functioned for both the Americans and British. Therefore, for the purposes of TORCH, ETOUSA became an adjunct of AFHQ for American administration and supply.

Under this arrangement, the Adjutant General reported, three officers occupied dual positions: General Eisenhower, who commanded ETOUSA and the Allied Force; Brigadier General Smith, who was Chief of Staff ETOUSA and AFHQ; and Colonel Davis, who was Adjutant General ETOUSA and AFHQ. This permitted the issuance at AFHQ of such Theater matters³⁰ as

27. Ibid.; and No 2 District Adm Instn No 1, 4 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 61/1).

28. This section should not be considered as a full history of NATOUSA. Rather it is an account of command relations between NATOUSA and AFHQ. The staff relations of the two headquarters will be described in Chapter VII below.

29. Report of the AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 3 (AG AFHQ file: 321 AG); and Cable No 1120, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 June 42.

30. Americans were in the habit of speaking of matters concerning ETOUSA, NATOUSA, and MTOUSA (that is, American administration and supply) as "Theater matters".

were absolutely necessary... . In general, however, it was planned to send all Theater matters to the Theater Headquarters for completion of the necessary administrative steps.³¹

This arrangement was very convenient while the American troops and AFHQ were in the UNITED KINGDOM but would have to be modified once they had moved to NORTH AFRICA. This difficulty was foreseen within five days after the opening of AFHQ:

I believe, General Eisenhower cabled to the War Department, that the simple way to avoid additional orders, for a number of months to come, is for you merely to authorize me by radio to consider, for the present, that the southern boundary of this theater has been pushed down to include NORTH AFRICA, say to the Equator. Under this arrangement I will be free to act and to control events even should circumstances take me temporarily to the South before the assault. I would take care of everything here merely by appointing General Lee as my executive deputy for the European Sector to handle matters in his own name.³²

This suggestion was in general adopted by a return cable from the War Department:

Effective immediately the boundary of the European Theater of Operations is extended to the south to include all land and adjacent sea areas east of 20 degrees of west longitude, north of the Tropic of Cancer and west of 15 degrees east longitude.³³

Major General Russell P. Hartle, rather than General Lee,³⁴ was appointed as the Deputy Theater Commander ETCUSA.

Even this solution would not be satisfactory in the long run, because all matters involving personnel and supplies eventually would have to be processed

31. Report of AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 9.
32. Cable No 1213, Eisenhower to WD, 16 Aug 42.
33. Cable No 3497, WD to Eisenhower, 18 Aug 42.
34. Report of AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 9.

through the London Headquarters although General Eisenhower, his American troops, and supplies were in NORTH AFRICA. Another step in Theater reorganization was, therefore, already planned in advance.

When developments have reached the stage that the Combined Force is solidly established in the new theater, General Eisenhower suggested in August, I could then report to you (War Department) that the two sectors could be definitely separated, and General Lee or some other officer of your choosing could carry on independently.As a guess, I would say that the definite separation could take place about two months after initial landing.³⁵

And the idea was accepted by General Marshall before the invasion.

When present ETO is split, he cabled to General Eisenhower, and a new theater formed to fit combat areas, it is expected that CG of new theater will be given some powers of jurisdiction and confirmation that you now have as CG ETO.³⁶

In the interim between the landings and the activation of NATOUSA (8 Nov 42 to 4 Feb 43) AFHQ itself served as a sort of theater headquarters because the Commander-in-Chief was also CG ETOUSA. This conception is revealed by an AFHQ Operation Memo of 24 October 1942 which provided that

When AFHQ assumes full operational and administrative responsibility in the theater, task force commanders will be relieved of L of C and SOS functions. Eq L of C and Theater SOS will then operate directly under AFHQ.³⁷

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, of AFHQ likewise indi-

35. Cable No 1213, Eisenhower to WD, 16 Aug 42.

36. Cable No R304, Marshall to Eisenhower, 15 Sep 42.

37. AFHQ Opn Memo No 30, 24 Oct 42. Italics are the writer's.

cated such a role by AFHQ in November when he wrote:

...insofar as a theater such as TORCH is concerned there is no need for an SOS Headquarters and that control and co-ordination of administrative functions should properly rest in AFHQ. With your approval I will...set up AFHQ to perform functions otherwise performed by a headquarters SOS.³⁸

Here the conception seemed to be that AFHQ was not only to serve as an American theater headquarters but also even as an SOS headquarters.

b. The Anfa Conference

But this position of AFHQ was merely a transitory one and remained undeveloped because the original idea of a split of ETOUSA persisted. A fleeting notion at one moment of planning was that

the Patton Force Hq designated here as Task Force A would assume, as soon as initial stages of operation were completed, designation of 5th Army and, supported by its SOS, duties of command, supply, and administration of Southern Sub Theater of your European Theater.³⁹

It was on the eve of the Anfa Conference, however, that General Eisenhower gave the signal for the split of ETOUSA into two theaters when he cabled that "the assumption of detailed theater functions has now become necessary".⁴⁰ Consequently the question of a new American theater headquarters was one of the important subjects considered by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff at ANFA. At the meeting of 14 January 1943 the consen-

38. Staff Study by Col Sawbridge, ACoFS G-1, 2 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-66). Italics are the writer's.

39. Cable No R3255, Marshall to Eisenhower, 19 Nov 42.

40. Cable No 5562, Eisenhower to Marshall, 14 Jan 43 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-1).

sus of opinion was that it should be established at the end of the Tunisian campaign. But at the meeting held the next day, with President Roosevelt and General Marshall present,

General Marshall said that he felt the time had come when we should establish a separate UK Theater. He stated that he sent General Andrews to CAIRO to give him some experience in an active theater of operations and that he now proposed to put him in command of the American troops in the UK.⁴¹

At a meeting held five days later General Marshall announced that

he had received a draft plan for subdividing the North African and European Theaters, and that General Andrews was working on the proposal.⁴²

c. Activation of NATOUSA

Upon General Marshall's return to the War Department he had the first directive for the establishment of NATOUSA cabled to General Eisenhower:

Will issue orders to relieve you from assignment as Commanding General European Theater of Operations, effective upon date of arrival of General Andrews at HQ ETOUSA. By direction of the President you are designated as Commanding General, US Army Forces in the North African Theater of Operations. This radio is your authority to assume command pending receipt of orders SUPRA. General Andrews upon arrival in ENGLAND will be directed to assume command of the European Theater of Operations as delineated in annex 1 to follow. As Commanding General, US Army Forces in the North African Theater of Operations, all powers and authority heretofore conferred by directives, regulations, or orders to you as the CC of the European Theater of Operations insofar as applicable to the

41. Min of the Conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) at CASABLANCA, 14 and 15 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 337-2).

42. Ibid., 20 Jan 43.

geographical area of the North African Theater of Operations (see annex 1) and compatible with directives issued you from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces will hereafter be exercised by you within that Theater.⁴³

This cable likewise (in annex 1) defined the boundary between ETOUSA and NATOUSA as a line running from

the northwestern tip of the IBERIAN PENINSULA, thence along the northern coast of SPAIN and the Franco--Spanish boundary to the MEDITERRANEAN SEA, thence along the southeastern coast of FRANCE to the Franco--Italian boundary, thence along the northern boundary of ITALY to its junction with the Austrian--Jugoslavian boundary...⁴⁴

The complete NATOUSA boundaries, as defined by this cable, are shown on the map on the next page.⁴⁵

Having received this authorization, General Eisenhower established NATOUSA on 4 February 1943 in the following order:

Pursuant to authority contained in War Department Cable No 1771, dated 3 February 1943, the North African Theater of Operations, United States Army, is established effective 4 February 1943.


Effective 0001Z hours 4 February 1943, all troops, materiel, and installations located in the North African Theater of Operations, United States Army, pass from the control of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, to the control of the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, United States Army.

The undersigned having been designated by the President as Commanding General, North Af-

43. Cable No 1771, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Feb 43 (AG AFHQ file: 320-109).

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid. The south and east boundaries were indefinitely indicated in Cable No 1771. The more exact delineation shown on this map is taken from a photostatic copy of "Theater Boundary Chart as of 11 Feb 43" of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff (SGS AFHQ file: 060-3).



Boundary of North African Theater
of Operations U.S. Army
on 11 February, 1943

rican Theater of Operations, United States Army, hereby assumes Command.⁴⁶

He likewise informed the commanders of subordinate American formations of the establishment of NATOUSA and defined their command relations to it:

Theater Headquarters has been temporarily established at ALGIERS. Cable and post office address same as Allied Force Headquarters for time being except that CG NATOUSA will be used in lieu of CINC AFHQ. Until republication by Headquarters NATOUSA, all General Orders, Circulars, etc., of ETOUSA under which you are now operating are continued in effect as though issued by the CG NATOUSA. Reports and communications formerly rendered direct to CG ETOUSA will be submitted to this Headquarters. Notify all concerned your command.⁴⁷

Questions concerning General Eisenhower's title and position arose almost immediately. By War Department Cable Number 1771 he had been designated as "Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the North African Theater of Operations," but in his general order he had used the more familiar ETOUSA formula of "Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, United States Army."⁴⁸ Upon query to General Marshall⁴⁸ concerning the title General Eisenhower at first received replies that the title in cable 1771 was definitely intended,⁴⁹ but two weeks later the War Department had accepted General Eisenhower's announced title as CG,

46. Sects I, III and IV of NATOUSA GO No 1, 4 Feb 43. See also Cable No 9073, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Feb 43 (AG AFHQ file: 320-109).

47. Cable No 9018, Eisenhower to subordinate American commands, 5 Feb 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 323-1).

48. Cable No 8993, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Feb 43 (AG AFHQ file: 320-109).

49. Cables No 1901 and 1949, Marshall to Eisenhower, 6 Feb 43 (AG AFHQ files (respectively): 323-1 and 320-109).

Logically the transfer of his authority from CG ETOUSA to CG NATOUSA ought not to have made any difference with General Eisenhower's authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, but there was evidently some questioning as to whether this split of the ETOUSA areas had affected his authority as Allied Commander-in-Chief. On 6 February 1943 an American proposal had been submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to give General Eisenhower the additional title of Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in NATO.⁵¹ But in a later cable dispatched on the same day the War Department declared:

This is a clarification of your status resulting from the recent division of theaters in EUROPE and AFRICA. ...

This transfer of authority from the European Theater of Operations to the North African Theater of Operations as Commanding General US Forces does not affect your status as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in the North African Theater of Operations. Our proposal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff mentioned in our 1901 has been withdrawn.⁵²

The authorizing cable 1771 of 3 February was provisional. It was confirmed by final authorization on 6 February.⁵³ Two weeks later, on 20 February 1943, a cable from General Marshall defined in more detail Gen-

50. "By direction of the President, you are hereby designated as Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations." Cable No ZRH 2624, Marshall to Eisenhower, 20 Feb 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 322.98-1).

51. Cable No 1901, WWD to AFHQ, 6 Feb 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 323-1).

52. Cable No 1949, WWD to Eisenhower, 6 Feb 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 320-109).

53. Cable No 1937, WWD to AFHQ, 6 Feb 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 320-109).

eral Eisenhower's status and duties in relation to the American forces. The cable is here quoted in full because of its definitiveness and importance:

1. In order to further clarify your status with respect to the military forces of the United States within the North African Theater of Operations, the following directive is issued:

2. "Effective immediately, by direction of the President, you are hereby designated as Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations.

3. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, will command all United States Army Forces and personnel which are now in, or may hereafter be dispatched to, the North African Theater of Operations, including any part of the Marine Corps therein which may be detached for service with the Army.

4. By agreement between the US War and Navy Departments, the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, will exercise planning and operational control, under the principle of unity of command, over US Navy Forces Northwest African Waters. Military attaches and other personnel attached to embassies within the North African Theater of Operations are exempt from the control of the Theater Commander.

5. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, is charged with the strategical, tactical, territorial, and administrative duties of a theater commander. This authority and duties include those devolving by law, regulations, orders, and custom of the UNITED STATES upon the Commander of an army in the field in time of war and of a territorial department commander in peace and war.

6. The mission of the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, will be to prepare for, and carry on, military operations in the North African Theater against the Axis powers, including their allies, under the strategical directives of the Combined US--British Chiefs of Staff, as communicated to him by the Chief of Staff, US Army.

7. In military operations against the Axis powers, the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, is directed to

co-operate with the forces of all Allied Nations directed to the same mission, but in doing so the underlying purpose must be kept in view that the forces of the UNITED STATES are to be maintained as a separate and distinct component of the combined forces. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as the judgment of the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, may approve.

8. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, will establish all necessary bases, lines of communication, depots, and other administrative facilities and make all incidental arrangements essential to the reception, maintenance, administration, training, and operations of the US Army Forces in the North African Theater of Operations.

9. All authority to administer funds, supplies, and any and all other administrative and logistical matters, which were previously conferred upon the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations (or which were previously conferred upon any other office or officer of the US Army subordinate to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, within the present boundaries of the North African Theater of Operations) are hereby vested in the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations within such North African Theater of Operations' boundaries.

10. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, will keep the Chief of Staff, US Army, fully informed of all matters concerning his command and will also communicate his recommendations freely and directly to the War Department."

11. All previous directives issued to you in conflict with the foregoing are hereby rescinded.⁵⁴

d. The Deputy Theater Commander (DTC)

American army organization does not provide for a deputy theater commander. The need for such an assignment arose from the fact that General Eisenhower per-

54. Cable No ZRH 2624, Marshall to Eisenhower. 20 Feb 43 (AG AFHQ file: 322.98-1).

formed the dual functions of Theater Commander and Allied Commander-in-Chief. He therefore required the assistance of another general officer who could devote himself to the details of the Theater command. Consequently he had appointed Major General Russell P. Hattle (A) as Deputy Theater Commander in ETOUSA,⁵⁵ and now, with the establishment of NATOUSA, he designated Brigadier General Everett S. Hughes (A) as the DTC in the new Theater.⁵⁶

The duties of the DTC were succinctly described by General Hughes himself when he stated that as DTC he was "charged with the responsibility of relieving the Theater Commander of all possible details."⁵⁷ In fact the DTC (American) was to become in most respects the counterpart of the British CAO (Chief Administrative Officer) at AFHQ.

You may have wondered, wrote General Whiteley⁵⁸ to General Kennedy, how NATOUSA fits into the picture. ...The responsibilities of maintenance as between the CAO and DTC are very involved. The main point is that the two individuals work closely together and will evolve their own system. The object of establishing NATOUSA is to relieve General Eisenhower of administrative detail. The DTC is equivalent to our LGA (Lt Gen Adm).⁵⁹

In August 1943 an AFHQ cable to the War Department gave

55. Report of the AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 9.

56. Memo, Eisenhower to Hughes, 9 Feb 43, par 4 (AG NATOUSA file: 320-109); and NATOUSA GO No 4, 12 Feb 43, par VI. Gen Hughes was promoted to maj gen on 18 Mar 43 (WD SO No 92, 12 Apr 43).

57. Memo, Hughes to Hamblen, 17 Feb 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 320-109).

58. Promoted from brigadier to maj gen on 20 Feb 43 (AFHQ GRO No 157, 16 Apr 43, App A).

59. DO Ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 16 Mar 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).



Major General Everett S. Hughes
In 1943, Deputy Theater Commander
NATOUSA

this additional clarification of the position of the DTC:

The C-in-C exercises his functions as Theater Commander through the Deputy Theater Commander NATOUSA. NATOUSA handles purely American personnel, supply, and disciplinary matters and in this sense parallels the functions of the British CAO... 60

e. Communications Zone NATOUSA

The "strategical and tactical" functions of the CG NATOUSA in co-operation "with the forces of all the Allied Nations directed to the same mission" were carried out by General Eisenhower as Allied Commander-in-Chief through AFHQ and with the assistance of his DTC, General Hughes.

General Hughes, however, realizing that standard American army organization did not provide for the position of DTC, wished to have his position and duties clarified by being designated also as Commanding General, Communications Zone, whose duties as defined in US Army Field Service Regulations would coincide with those devolving upon the DTC, i.e. American territorial defense, administration, and supply in the rear of the Combat Zone. ⁶¹ Such a designation would not imply the activation of a headquarters distinct from those of NATOUSA, of the base sections, or of a possible future SOS NATOUSA. It would merely give to the DTC NATOUSA a more understandable definition of duties in traditional Army terms.

Consequently five days after the establishment of NATOUSA General Eisenhower designated his DTC as the CG

60. Cable No W6285, AFHQ to WD, 1 Aug 43.

61. Memo, Hughes to Eisenhower, 6 Feb 43 (CofS NATOUSA file: Organization).

of the Communications Zone.

1. You are directed to establish, operate, and command a US Communications Zone for NATOUSA. You will assume all possible US administrative and supply duties now being performed at AFHQ in order to relieve AFHQ to the maximum of supply and administrative matters applying to US forces. You will also be responsible for the detailed development of supply plans for American forces in future operations to conform to the broad plans of AFHQ.

2. You will establish close liaison with the Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ, in order to insure co-ordination between American and British supply operations.

3. Personnel for your organizations will be obtained by the transfer from this headquarters or other units in the Theater of individuals who are now performing functions which will be performed by the Communications Zone.

4. In addition to the duties indicated above you are designated as Deputy US Army Theater Commander.⁶²

Three days later, on 12 February, this directive was authenticated by a NATOUSA General Order with some added details:

1. Effective 0001Z hours, 15 February 1943, a Communications Zone, North African Theater of Operations, United States Army, is established.

2. Initially the forward (eastern) boundary of this Communications Zone is: LAGHOUAT C68 (excl)--AFLOU W91 (excl)--TIARET R15 (incl)--ORLEANSVILLE M18 (incl).

3. East of the boundary, all matters involving functions both of a Communications Zone and United States forces will be resolved on an Allied basis, in conjunction with the British organizations concerned.

4. Until further orders, the defense of the Communications Zone, except local defense

62. Memo, Eisenhower to Hughes, 9 Feb 43 (AG NATOUSA file: 320-109).

against sabotage, will be provided by the 5th Army.

5. Brigadier General EVERETT S. HUGHES, 02333, is designated to command the Communications Zone.

6. Brigadier General EVERETT S. HUGHES, 02333, is designated Deputy Commander, North African Theater of Operations, United States Army, in addition to his other duties.⁶³

Once the 5th Army had taken over the duties of Communications Zone defense (see par 4. above) and SOS NATOUSA had undertaken the supply functions (see sub-section f. below), the main responsibility of the CG of COM Z was largely to co-ordinate the work of SOS NATOUSA and 5th Army, and to carry on the Theater administration as DTC through the regular NATOUSA staff sections, such as G-1 NATOUSA and AG NATOUSA. Thus the Headquarters Communications Zone (A) was represented only by the CG of COM Z (at the same time DTC NATOUSA), working with the NATOUSA and SOS NATOUSA Staffs and with 5th Army.

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f. Services of Supply, NATOUSA

Having established an American Theater Command (NATOUSA), the War Department and General Eisenhower were next concerned with the problem of a theater supply command to function under NATOUSA. In the UNITED KINGDOM the chain of command had been set up in this order: ETOUSA--SOS ETOUSA--the base sections. It was natural that a similar American chain of supply command

63. NATOUSA GO No 4, 12 Feb 43.

64. This section is an account of the command relation of NATOUSA and SOS NATOUSA in 1943 and not the full history of SOS NATOUSA which has been compiled as a separate historical project: History of Communications Zone NATOUSA Nov 42--Nov 44.

should be envisaged for NORTH AFRICA. As early as 3 October 1942 a mention was made of a future "consolidated SOS for the TORCH Theater."⁶⁵ This was confirmed three weeks later when an operation memorandum stated:

When AFHQ assumes full operational and administrative responsibility in the Theater, task force commanders will be relieved of SOS functions. HQ...Theater SOS will then operate directly under AFHQ.⁶⁶

It was evident that such plans were not final because a cable from General Marshall on the following day (25 October) queried:

Clarification needed here on SOS Organization for special operations before and after merging task forces. ...is it contemplated that Hq's of Wilson and Larkin⁶⁷ will be merged also with that of ETF, thereby forming an Hq SOS for whole operation? If so, will this combined Hq include British personnel as does AFHQ...? By combining SOS personnel of all three forces, necessity for forming a Mediterranean Base Section as mentioned in your 3943, Oct 22, is NOT understood, unless you contemplate a total of 4 SOS Hq's, one for whole operation and one for each of 3 separate forces. This does not seem advisable.⁶⁸

The reply to this query from AFHQ indicated that just such a scheme was being contemplated but gave reassurances concerning the requirements of personnel.

Eventually, with date dependent on establishing contact and adequate communications, we hope to get up an SOS in TORCH by withdrawing personnel and ranks and grades from both Wilson and Larkin. That SOS Headquarters will be operating headquarters coordinating all SOS matters between the two

65. Memo AG AFHQ to CG's of American Task and Air Forces for TORCH, 3 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 321-10).

66. AFHQ Opn Memo No 30, 24 Oct 42.

67. Generals Wilson and Larkin were CG's of Atlantic Base Section and Mediterranean Base Section respectively.

68. Cable No R 2409, Marshall to AFHQ, 25 Oct 42.

base sections.⁶⁹

General Marshall's comments on this report again stressed the scarcity of personnel and suggested

...that you would take some driving personality and see what can be done quickly to build up SOS forces composed mostly of the natives of that region, with American or possibly even French commanders or chiefs for subpositions.⁷⁰

Colonel Sawbridge, the ACofS G-1, offered another suggestion for the solution of the organization and personnel problems:

The organization of Headquarters ETO and the Headquarters SOS in GREAT BRITAIN has proven so uneconomical in personnel and so unsatisfactory in co-ordination between the two headquarters that AF ought not to repeat the errors.

Although the SOS organization was dictated by the War Department and is sound in theory--i.e., 'to relieve the combat forces of all responsibilities as regards supply,' it has not proven satisfactory in practice, nor can such a system be operated without duplication of staffs and waste of personnel if it is set up relatively independent of the Theater headquarters.

...Heretofore we have accepted as an assumption that an SOS headquarters would be set up in the TORCH area when it became practicable to integrate the WTF and the CTF. If we set up such a headquarters, I am now convinced we will be well on the way to duplicating the errors of the organization in GREAT BRITAIN. Furthermore, it becomes more evident day by day that, if an SOS headquarters is set up in TORCH, there is no need whatever in AFHQ for a G-4 and the special staff sections primarily concerned with supply and transportation; and the CG SOS can take on all the functions of G-4, part of the functions of G-1 (prisoner of war and replacements), and part of the functions of the AG (postal and central records).

69. Cable No 4129, AFHQ to WD, 26 Oct 42.

70. Cable No R 2593, Marshall to Eisenhower, 31 Oct 42.

...It is my opinion that we should not set up a headquarters SOS in that area and that in place of such a headquarters we should expand our general and special staff sections moderately by withdrawing officers and men from similar sections in the two base sections. All co-ordination is then secured directly from AFHQ and the commander has at hand and in control his administrative organization. G-4 (Col Hamblen) is in thorough accord with me in this opinion.⁷¹

Generals Gale, Hamblen, and Whiteley, all three, wrote memoranda likewise opposing the establishment of an over-all Theater SOS between AFHQ and the base sections. Their main objections seemed to be that Theater supply decisions had to be made on the AFHQ level and that this had to be done by G-4. Even if SOS NATOUSA should be established, G-4 would still have so many responsibilities that its personnel could not be reduced. Furthermore, they argued, to have the CG SOS NATOUSA located elsewhere than at ALGIERS (probably ORAN) would create difficulties of co-ordination with G-4.⁷²

After four months of such discussions⁷³ the Chief of Staff's Conference of 29 January 1943, however, came to the following decision:

There will be an SOS (Gen Everett S. Hughes)⁷⁴ in NORTH AFRICA. G-1 will make a survey to determine what US administration can be transferred to the SOS. G-4 will direct the C-in-C policy to SOS. The Hq SOS will not be in ALGIERS.⁷⁵

71. Staff Study by Col Sawbridge, subject: "Organization of AFHQ and US SOS TORCH," 2 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-66).

72. Memo Gen Gale to CofS, 3 Jan 43; memo Gen Hamblen to CofS, 3 Jan 43; memo Gen Whiteley to CofS, 4 Jan 43; all found in AG AFHQ file: 400-366.

73. See footnote 72 above, first reference.

74. Actually, Gen Hughes was not made CG SOS but rather CG COM Z. Gen Larkin became CG SOS.

75. Min of the CofS Conference No 19, 29 Jan 43 (SGS AFHQ file: CofS Conf).

The constitution of SOS NATOUSA took place on 14
February 1943:

Effective at 0001Z hours, 15 February 1943, all supply activities and personnel pertaining thereto, assigned or attached to the Mediterranean Base Section, Atlantic Base Section, and Eastern Base Section, NATOUSA, are transferred to the control of the Services of Supply NATOUSA which is hereby constituted and will be activated by the Commanding General thereof on that date.

Announcement is made of the assignment of Brigadier General Thomas B. Larkin, USA, as Commanding General, Services of Supply NATOUSA effective 15 February 1943. He will assume command of all United States Army supply and maintenance activities in this Theater and such other functions as may be delegated to him from time to time.⁷⁶

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As directed above, General Larkin activated SOS NATOUSA
78
on 15 February "with headquarters located at ORAN."

The general functions of SOS NATOUSA and the normal channels of responsibility between it and its higher and lower echelons are explained briefly in a memorandum of the DTC to General Hamblen of G-4:

Incident to our conversation of this morning on the subject of the organization of the Theater and the method of handling the problems relating to supply, I think it well to outline formally my ideas and desires.

NATOUSA is divided territorially into three base sections for operational purposes. These sections are not sections of the SOS, but they are sections which the SOS operates, with the responsibility for supply. The commanding officers of the sections report to the Theater Commander. As Deputy Theater Commander, charged with the responsibility of relieving the Theater Commander of all possible details, my place in the picture is evident.

Under the Theater Commander, and hence under me because of the directive, are two

76. NATOUSA GO No 6, 14 Feb 43.

77. Gen Larkin was promoted to the rank of major general on 28 Apr 43 (WD SO No 132, 12 May 43, par 1).

78. SOS NATOUSA GO No 1, 15 Feb 43.

principal assistants: one General Larkin, who is charged with handling all phases of supply and maintenance; and the other General Sawbridge, charged with the duties outlined in General Order No 6.

Until you can divorce the operating functions of G-4 of the Theater, and assume the policy-making role of G-4 AFHQ, you must, as I see it, continue with your present responsibilities. However, there must be a change in procedure not only as the result of my role, but that of General Larkin. You must go through my office or General Larkin's office. Just what matters should be brought to my office and which go direct to General Larkin's office is a matter for study and subsequent decision.⁷⁹

In this period of the history of SOS NATOUSA any more detailed definition of functions or division of responsibility was lacking. The history of SOS NATOUSA states:

The Commanding General, SOS, was given 'command of all US Army supply and maintenance activities in the Theater,' but there was (no)⁸⁰ subsequent delegation of specific authority. Neither was there a definition of functions which remained for the base sections and those belonging entirely to SOS. There was a conference agreement on the latter covering: supply, construction, maintenance, and transportation; and a tentative guide was sent to the base sections, but nothing was ever made official. SOS, during the early part of its history, worked under the handicap of lack of specific authority and clear channels.⁸¹

As previously foreseen, the problem of co-ordination between G-4 AFHQ and SOS NATOUSA did arise. The latter complained that it was not receiving important

79. Memo, Gen Hughes to Gen Hamblen, 17 Feb 43 (AG AFHQ file: 320-109).

80. From an analysis of the context it is evident that the word "no" was omitted by error in the text of the quoted history.

81. History of Communications Zone NATOUSA, I, 12.

information concerning:

- a. Notification of conferences involving SOS matters.
- b. Agenda of such conferences before they were held.
- c. Minutes of such conferences after they were held.
- d. Modifications of planning memoranda and tables.

To correct this situation Colonel Samuel F. Walker was appointed as SOS representative at AFHQ "for conferences and for the transmission of information to the Command-⁸²ing General SOS."

In the late summer and autumn of 1943 there was considerable discussion of a reorganization of NATOUSA and SOS NATOUSA.⁸³ But the resulting reorganization did not come until 1944 and will be treated in Part III of this history. The relations of NATOUSA and SOS NATOUSA with AFHQ are shown by the chart on the next⁸⁴ page.

4. AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO)


The combined ground, air, and naval forces of the Allies had established a secure foothold on the Italian

82. NATOUSA memo to Gen Rooks, 17 May 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 4/12).

83. Memo, AG to CoFS, subject: "AFHQ Organization and its Relationship to NATOUSA and the British L of C," 8 Aug 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 320.2-2).

84. Crane Report, Chart No 17, 28 Sep 43. See also Booklet: AFHQ Organizational Charts, 10 Nov 43, app IX.

CHART OF COMMAND RELATIONS: AFHQ--NATOUSA--SOS NATOUSA
November 1943



LEGEND:
 ———— Command
 - - - - - Co-ordination

mainland by 1 October 1943 with the seizure of the FOGGIA region and the capture of the great port of NAPLES. It then became apparent that the co-ordination of the administration and the supply for the Allied forces of the different services on the mainland would greatly facilitate further operations against GERMANY.

During the first week of October 15th Army Group arranged for a conference to be held at its headquarters in SANTO SPIRITO, ITALY on 12 October 1943.⁸⁵

Here representatives of AFHQ, Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, 15th Army Group, and NAAF, and others, discussed the administrative reorganization of the Allied forces in ITALY. Definite action on this subject was taken when they drafted a plan for a new combined organization to be known as AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO). At the same time they nominated Major General Sir Brian H. Robertson (B), GOC No 2 District (FORTBASE), to head this new organization and to take the title of Deputy Chief Administrative Officer FLAMBO (DCAO).⁸⁶ This proposed arrangement was approved three days later when AFHQ published an order establishing the new organization.⁸⁷

The formation of FLAMBO progressed rapidly from that date. General Robertson officially assumed his new duties as DCAO FLAMBO on 18 October.⁸⁸ The name of

85. Cable No CGS 76, Richardson to Whiteley, 5 Oct 43. Cable No SD 1771, 15th Army Group to 5th Army, AFHQ, NAAF, MAC, 6 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/7 in AG AFHQ).

86. Min of Conference "A" held at Hq 15th Army Group, 12 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 31/7 in AG AFHQ).

87. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, 15 Oct 43.

88. D/MS AFHQ file: Record of Officers (B. H. Robertson).

his former organization, No 2 District (FORTBASE), hitherto associated with General Robertson and his large nucleus of British personnel accompanying him from TARANTO, was discontinued when FLAMBO started to function in NAPLES on 24 October 1943.⁸⁹ A new British organization taking a similar name, No 2 District, was constituted to deal only with problems of local administration of British troops in ITALY.⁹⁰

The internal organization of FLAMBO has several interesting features. As was customary, both British and American representatives were furnished to provide a combined administrative staff for FLAMBO analogous to that of AFHQ. Special staff sections (A) and heads of services (B) at AFHQ sent necessary personnel as required by the DCAO. The Chief Engineer and the Chief Signal Officer of 15th Army Group were appointed deputies in ITALY for the CE and CSO respectively at AFHQ. Consequently, they were to supervise these activities in FLAMBO as well.⁹¹ Another arrangement with 15th Army Group required it to furnish FLAMBO a section of G-3 Org.⁹² Summarizing its relations with 15th Army Group, FLAMBO described the association as that "obtaining between the operational and administrative portions of a single headquarters."⁹³ However, the conference of

89. AFHQ Adv Adm Ech Adm Instn No 1, 24 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2). Cable No 0751, No 2 Dist to All Concerned, 18 Oct 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.43-7).

90. Ibid.

91. See footnote 86 above and first reference of footnote 89.

92. See footnote 87 above.

93. FLAMBO Adm Instn No 1, 24 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

12 October was emphatic in drawing the distinction between these two headquarters on the mainland. FLAMBO was to be an "administrative advanced AFHQ and NOT a rear HQ of 15 Army Group."⁹⁴

The relationship of FLAMBO to many other military organizations and agencies in NORTH AFRICA as well as the principal ones in ITALY is shown graphically on the next page. Channels of command, administration, and co-ordination with both higher and lower echelons are indicated.⁹⁵

The many varied functions of FLAMBO are classified below into two groups. The main functions are general in scope and are underlined. Each of these includes in its presentation several specific functions as indicated.

These were:

a. To co-ordinate and control military administrative matters in ITALY.

(1) To define relative responsibilities of base sections (A) and districts (B) for local administration.⁹⁶

(2) To co-ordinate demands, imports, and distribution of coal and petroleum products on the Italian mainland.⁹⁷

(3) To publish instructions to L

94. See footnote 86 above.


95. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, app "A", 15 Oct 43.

AFHQ Adm Memo No 60 (Revised Copy), app "A", 29 Oct 43.

96. FLAMBO Adm Instn No 1, 24 Oct 43, and No 3, 18 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

97. AFHQ Adm Memo No 60 (Revised Copy), 29 Oct 43.

AFHQ ADVANCED ADMINISTRATIVE ECHELON (FLAMBO)
 Command and Maintenance Channels
 October 1943



LEGEND:

- Operational command
- General administration (B)
- Co-ordination of inter-Allied Maintenance
- Channel for common items for air and ground forces in west ITALY.
- - - - - Liaison
- ==== Operational maintenance priorities
- Channel for common items for air and ground forces in east ITALY.

of C (COM Z) areas concerning railroad repair, development, and operation; road construction and repair; traffic control and through movements.⁹⁸

(4) To determine the use of port and railroad premises and their associated materials.⁹⁹

(5) To co-ordinate logistics in the forward areas for both American and British forces.¹⁰⁰

b. To supervise movements.¹⁰¹

(1) To control movements within the Italian mainland and from SICILY according to 15th Army Group policy.¹⁰²

(2) To determine road movements and traffic control of vehicles behind army areas.¹⁰³

(3) To determine procedure for civilian passenger and freight movements.¹⁰⁴

(4) To determine channels for air movements of ground force personnel in

98. See footnote 96 above.

99. FLAMBO Adm Instn No 15, 11 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

100. AFHQ Memo, Gilmer to CAO, DTC, and gen staff sects, 29 Oct 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 320.2-2).

101. See footnotes 87 and 93 above.

102. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, app "E", 22 Oct 43.

103. See footnote 96 above. FLAMBO Adm Instn No 17, 24 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

104. FLAMBO Adm Instn No 14, 6 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

105
ITALY.

(5) To call forward to Italian ports
all ships loaded for discharge in ITALY
from either NORTH AFRICA or the UNITED
106
STATES.

c. To supervise Italian ports.

(1) To supervise the control of the
107
port of NAPLES and its subsidiary ports.

(2) To decide at what ports in ITALY
108
ships will be received.

d. To determine allocation of tonnage. 109

(1) To determine daily tonnage avail-
110
able at the railheads in ITALY.

(2) To determine civil allocation of
111
tonnage as well as that for the military.

e. To control and direct all British gen-
eral military administration on the mainland of
112
ITALY.

(1) To advise General Alexander on
British disciplinary matters when request-
113
ed.

105. FLAMBO Adm Instn No 7, Amend No 2, 28 Dec 43
(G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).

106. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, app "H", 15 Oct 43.

107. See footnote 93 above. FLAMBO Adm Instn No
4, 31 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2). AFHQ Adm Memo No
63 (Revised Copy), app "B", 10 Nov 43.

108. See the second reference of footnote 107 above.

109. See footnotes 87 and 93 above.

110. See footnote 93 above.

111. See footnote 93 and 97 above.

112. See footnote 87 above.

113. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, app "C", 15 Oct 43.

(2) To forward to AFHQ requests from lower British echelons for the formation and disbandment of units. 114

(3) To supervise the following matters concerning British units: graves registration, medical, provost, POW, welfare, recreation, education, and reinforcements. 115

(4) To refer to AFHQ in British MS matters which affect the staff of FLAMBO. 116

(5) To determine the British troops' accommodation policy. 117

(6) To recommend to AFHQ changes in order of battle for British administrative units. 118

(7) To arrange through AFHQ for British requirements of vehicles and controlled stores. 119

(8) To determine siting and erection of British (GHQ) installations. 120

f. To establish policies for Allied forces in their relations with Italians in accordance with instructions from AFHQ. 121

(1) To represent AFHQ on military and

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114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, app "D", 15 Oct 43.
117. FLAMBO Adm Instn No 2, 28 Oct 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).
118. See footnote 102 above.
119. Ibid.
120. FLAMBO Adm Instn No 16, 12 Dec 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 2/2).
121. See footnote 87 above.

administrative matters in dealing with the
122
Italian Government.

(2) To supervise relations of Allied
123
forces with Italian petroleum companies.

(3) To control issues of petroleum
124
products to civilians.

(4) To receive from AMG phased lists
showing minimum essential civilian sup-
plies, to co-ordinate these demands, and
to allot the priority for the movement of
125
these supplies.

(5) To receive demands from organi-
zations for the employment of Italian
126
administrative troops.

g. To support administratively operations
of 15th Army Group and NAAF on the Italian main-
127
land.

(1) To keep itself (FLAMBO) informed
of 15th Army Group's operational require-
128
ments.

(2) To advise General Alexander on
129
the logistical situation.

122. Ibid. See footnote 87 above. Hq No 2 Dist
Gen Staff Instn No 2, 12 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/1,
No 2).

123. FLAMBO Adm Instn No 6, 10 Nov 43 (G-3 AFHQ
file: 2/2).

124. Ibid., No 12, 1 Dec 43.

125. See footnote 106 above.

126. Cable No 9569, C-in-C to SOS NATOUSA, 4 Dec
43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 46/1, No 2).

127. See footnote 87 above.

128. See footnote 100 above.

129. Ibid.

(3) To render emergency decisions ¹³⁰
concerning the use of engineer services.

¹³¹
h. Specific functions of the DCAO:

(1) To serve as "personal administrative advisor" to GOC-in-C 15th Army Group.

(2) To appoint necessary American and British representatives to 15th Army Group for that purpose.

5. Summary of Commands of AFHQ, L of C (B), and NATOUSA (Nov 42-Dec 43)¹³²

a. Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces. Lieutenant General DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (A) continued as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces during all this period covered by Part II and until 8 January 1944.¹³³ His promotion to the rank of general was announced on 12 February 1943.¹³⁴ General Eisenhower assumed command of NATOUSA on 4 February 1943 and likewise retained that command until 8 January 1944.¹³⁵

b. Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces. Lieutenant General MARK W. CLARK (A) was Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces from 11 August 1942 until 4 Jan-

130. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, app "F", 15 Oct 43.

131. See footnote 100 above.

132. The commands listed here are limited to those at AFHQ and those immediately subordinate to AFHQ. The commands of armies, army corps, and American base sections are not included.

133. AFHQ GO No 1, 8 Jan 44.

134. AFHQ Staff Memo No 14, 12 Feb 43.

135. NATOUSA GO No 1, 4 Feb 43, sect IV. AFHQ Staff Memo No 2, 8 Jan 44, sect I.

136
uary 1943.

General the Honorable Sir HAROLD R. L. G. ALEXANDER (B) was Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Ground Forces, Allied Force from 18 February 1943 to 8 January 1944.¹³⁷ At the same time he was designated as General Officer Commanding 18th Army Group in which post he served from 20 February to 15 May 1943.¹³⁸ Having already been designated as General Officer Commanding Force 141 (later called 15th Army Group),¹³⁹ General Alexander actively assumed those duties on 17 May 1943 after the closing of Headquarters 18th Army Group.¹⁴⁰ His eventual title in this command, announced on 22 July 1943, was "General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15th Army Group."¹⁴¹ Included in this assignment after 1 May 1943 was the responsibility of being Allied Military Governor of SICILY.¹⁴² This authority was extended on 18 October 1943 to all Italian territory occupied by the Allies.¹⁴³

c. Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. Until 20 February 1943 Admiral Sir ANDREW B. CUNNINGHAM (B) was the Naval Commander-in-Chief under General Eisenhower

136. Cable from Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 42. AFHQ Ltr Order, 4 Jan 43. General Clark was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general on 1 Nov 42 (WD SO No 310, 1 Nov 42, par 1).

137. AFHQ GO No 21, 18 Feb 43. AFHQ GO No 2, 8 Jan 44, sect I.

138. AG ltr; AFHQ to chiefs of general and special staff sections, subject: "Closing of Hq 18th Army Group," 13 May 43 (AG AFHQ file: 322.1-1 (18 AG) C-M).

139. CCS Directive to Allied C-in-C (CCS 171/2/D), 23 Jan 43 (G-3 AFHQ file: 120/2.1).

140. O2E (B) AFHQ Officers Records, Army Form B199A, Gen Alexander.

141. AFHQ Staff Memo No 68, 22 July 43.

142. AFHQ Adm Memo No 35, 1 May 43.

143. AFHQ Adm Memo No 69, 18 Oct 43, sect II.

144
for the North African operations. He was promoted
to the rank of Admiral of the Fleet on 21 January
1943.¹⁴⁵ On 20 February his position was made more
definite, with the reorganization of command, and he
was designated as Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean,¹⁴⁶
which command he held until 17 October 1943.¹⁴⁷

Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham was succeeded as C-
in-C Mediterranean by his cousin, Admiral Sir JOHN CUN-
NINGHAM (B) who continued in this command during the
rest of 1943.¹⁴⁸

d. Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean. Until 5
December 1942 there was no united air command except at
the level of the Allied C-in-C himself. But on that
date Major General CARL SPAATZ (A) was appointed Acting
Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Air, Allied Force.¹⁴⁹ On
5 January 1943 his title was changed to Air Commander-
in-Chief¹⁵⁰ in which assignment he served until 17 Feb-
ruary.¹⁵¹

On that date Air Chief Marshal Sir ARTHUR TEDDER
(B) was designated as Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterra-
nean and continued in that command during the rest of
1943.¹⁵²

e. General Officer Commanding 18th Army Group.

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144. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 2.
145. Naval War Diary (B) AFHQ, 21 Jan 43.
146. Ibid., 20 Feb 43.
147. Ibid., 6 and 17 Oct 43.
148. Ibid., 23 Oct 43.
149. AFHQ GO No 23, 15 Dec 42.
150. Ibid., No 3, 5 Jan 43.
151. Ibid., No 20, 17 Feb 43.
152. Ibid.

See above, pp 212-213.

f. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of 15th Army Group. See above, pp 212-213.

g. General Officer Commanding Line of Communication (British). Major General J. C. W. CLARK (B) was GOC L of C (B) and served in this assignment upon his arrival in NORTH AFRICA (13 November 1942) until 31 May 153
43.

He was succeeded by Major General E. P. NARES (B) who continued in this command until its discontinuance on 18 September 1943. On that date L of C was reorganized as North Africa District (B) with General Nares in command of the new supply and administrative organization. 154

h. Tunisia District (British). 155 Major General J. C. W. CLARK (B) was GOC Tunisia District from 31 May to 18 September 1943 when TUNISIA came under North Africa District. 156

i. No 1 District (British). Major General J. C. W. CLARK (B) was GOC No 1 District in eastern SICILY from

153. Temporary Army Form (B), B199A, J. C. W. Clark in O2E AFHQ Officers' Records. 85H10/MS(WO), 1 June 43.

154. Note in D/MS AFHQ file: 8831/MS. Cable, Eisenhower to WO, 18 Sept 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.43-7). DO ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 25 Sep 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

155. Several British L of C district supply organizations operated directly under the CAO of AFHQ during 1943. Their commands are therefore listed here in their relatively chronological order of establishment.

156. 85410/MS (WO), 1 June 43. Ltr, AG to All Concerned, 14 Sep 43 (AG AFHQ file: 370.43-7).

18 September to 9 December 1943. He was succeeded
in this command by Major General C. A. HEYDEMAN (B) who
continued to serve as GOC No 1 District during the rest
of the year.

158

j. No 2 District (British). No 2 District, which
took over the supply function for British troops in
southern ITALY on 24 October 1943, replaced No 2 Dis-
trict (FORTBASE) which was dissolved as of that date.
The latter had been established by GHQ MEF; the former
would now operate under AFHQ through the AFHQ Advanced
Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO). Major General A. A. B.
DOWLER (B) took command of No 2 District on 24 October
1943 and continued in this command for the remainder of
1943.

k. Commanding General, North African Theater of
Operations, US Army. See above, p 212.

l. Deputy Theater Commander, North African Theater
of Operations, US Army. Brigadier General EVERETT S.
HUGHES (A) served as DTC NATOUSA from 12 February 1943
throughout the rest of the year. He was promoted to
the rank of major general on 18 March 1943. General
Hughes also was CG of Communications Zone NATOUSA during
the same period.

160

161

162

157. Ltr, Whiteley to Kennedy, 25 Sep 43 (SGS AFHQ
file: 312-15); 6257/MS (WO), 28 Nov 43.

158. Cable No 92339MS1, WO to AFHQ, 24 Nov 43
(D/MS AFHQ file: 326).

159. Cable No 77353, WO to AFHQ, 9 Oct 43 (D/MS
AFHQ file: 940).

160. NATOUSA GO No 4, 12 Feb 43.

161. WD SO No 92, 2 Apr 43.

162. NATOUSA GO No 4, 12 Feb 43.

m. Commanding General, Services of Supply, North African Theater of Operations, US Army. Brigadier General THOMAS B. LARKIN (A) served as CG SOS NATOUSA from 15 February 1943 throughout the rest of the year. 163

He was promoted to the rank of major general on 28 April 1943. 164

n. Deputy Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ Advanced Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO). Major General Sir BRIAN H. ROBERTSON (B) was appointed as the general officer commanding FLAMBO on 15 October 1943 with the title of Deputy Chief Administrative Officer FLAMBO. 165

He continued in this assignment throughout the rest of 1943. 166

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- 163. NATOUSA GO No 6, 14 Feb 43.
 - 164. WD SO No 132, 12 May 43, par 1.
 - 165. AFHQ Adm Memo No 67, 15 Oct 43.
 - 166. AAI, 8803/MS, 15 June 44.