


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Pt. 1

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HISTORY OF AFHQ

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Allied forces

HISTORY

OF

ALLIED FORCE

HEADQUARTERS

PREFACE

From the very beginning of World War II both the British War Office and American War Department have been interested in the compilation of detailed military histories of their respective forces. Nor was it their intention to limit the histories entirely to combat and supply operations. History of command and administration at the level of theater headquarters was considered an essential part of the whole historical program. On the British side the specific directives concerning the keeping of war diaries by commands and appointments as well as by staff branches and services was evidence of this interest.¹ On the American side the impetus came from the President of the UNITED STATES himself, when, in a letter to the Director of the Budget, he wrote:

I am very much interested in the steps that you have been taking to keep a current record of war administration. I suggest that you carry the program further by covering the field more intensively, drawing on whatever scholarly talent may be necessary. ...I hope that officials in war agencies will bear in mind the importance of systematic records, and to the extent commensurate with their heavy duties, co-operate in this undertaking.²

This interest was reflected also in a directive of the War Department which included among the responsibilities of its newly established Historical Branch that of supervising the preparation of administrative histories of World War II.³

The Mediterranean Theater, in complying with these established programs of the War Office and War Department, not only took steps to encourage the writing of administrative histories of lower echelons⁴ but also, more specifically, issued a directive providing that a

1. FSR, 13 Dec 39, vol I, ch XVIII, sect 174.

2. Quoted from WD Office of the Chief of Transportation, Cir No 56, 28 Sep 42, par 2.

3. WD memo No W 345-21-43, 3 Aug 43, par 1.a. and 1.d.

4. On the American side see Annex 1, par 4, appended to AG NATOUSA ltr No 314.7/322 B-0 to All Concerned, 8 Jan 44.

history of its own Allied Force Headquarters should be compiled and kept up to date. In comparison with other administrative histories this project would have a special significance, according to the Directive, because AFHQ was the first military headquarters ever to be organized by combining and integrating the personnel of two different nationalities. The way command was exercised over the forces of two nationalities (later many more than two) and over the three distinct services of each, the methods used for integrating or teaming together the staff sections, branches, and services of these two nationalities, as well as the command and staff difficulties encountered and their procedural solutions--these were all to be included in historical accounts of both the Headquarters as a whole and of its component staff sections and organizations.⁵

The project, undertaken as a joint effort of the AFHQ Historical Section and the NATOUSA (later MTOUSA) Historical Section, has been approached principally on the side of an over-all history of AFHQ, relating it to the major campaigns in the Theater. Consequently this over-all history has been divided chronologically into three parts: (1) the pre-invasion and invasion periods (August to December 1942), (2) the period of the Tunisian, Sicilian, and South Italian Campaigns (December 1942 to December 1943), and (3) the period from the union with GHQ Middle East to the move to CASERTA (December 1943 to 30 June 1944). After the completion of these three parts, it is planned to keep the History up to date by the addition of supplementary parts or chapters.

Within these time divisions the History's subject-matter has been logically delimited. This is not a complete history of all events and developments in the North African (Mediterranean) Theater of Operations, for that more comprehensive history can only be written later, from the many specialized histories still being compiled in the

5. AFHQ Staff Memo No 55, 5 June 44, sect II, par 4.c.

Theater. No field operations, including strategy and tactics, are included; supply operations are likewise excluded for the most part. These subjects have in many cases already been treated in such historical studies as the Allied C-in-C and SAC Dispatches, History of the U. S. Seventh Army in the Sicilian Campaign, the History of the U. S. Fifth Army, the History of the Communications Zone NATOUSA (MTOUSA), histories of ABS, MBS, EBS, PBS, and Adriatic Depot, as well as the Salerno, Volturno, Winter-Line, Anzio, and other historical pamphlets. On the British side the campaign dispatches of Field Marshal Alexander and the histories of the Sicilian Campaign, the British Eighth Army, the Directorate of Supply and Transport Services (AFHQ), and the operations in GREECE are being compiled. The history of Navy and Air operations and administration is also omitted, since those services, both American and British, have their own historical projects and organizations.

Therefore this History of Allied Force Headquarters is limited to the subjects of command, administration, and organization at the headquarters level. It discusses the command relations between the Allied Commander-in-Chief (Supreme Allied Commander) on the one hand and the Air and Naval commanders, the combat and supply commanders of the next lower echelon, and the commanders of troops of other nationalities, such as the French, Canadians, Brazilians, Italians, etc. In the treatment of the staff sections, in contrast to command, a due regard has been given to proper proportion in this over-all history. Therefore only brief historical accounts of the staff sections are included, leaving their detailed histories to be undertaken separately--projects which are already being written or planned.

Although the History of AFHQ is written with a particular emphasis on the features of combined Anglo-American efforts in the Headquarters, such a combination of effort cannot be fully appreciated without the inclusion of the purely American organization of Headquarters NATOUSA (MTOUSA). Many of its staff sections were the American

components of AFHQ staff sections; in other instances its separate staff sections were the counterparts of purely British staff branches (general staff sections) and services (special staff sections) at AFHQ. Consequently, to obtain the fullest possible picture of the Anglo-American co-operative military enterprise, the history of Headquarters NATOUSA (MTOUSA) has to be presented in as much detail as the rest of AFHQ's history.

The information on the administrative and organizational history of AFHQ comes primarily from four principal sources: (1) official publications of AFHQ and Hq NATOUSA (MTOUSA); (2) official cables, correspondence, and reports; (3) histories of staff sections and of subordinate commands; and (4) oral statements of officers assigned to these headquarters. The bulk of the material has been found in the files of AG Records, SGS Records, G-1 (British), G-1 (American), G-2 (AFHQ), G-3 (AFHQ), and CAO.

Since the facts in the historical narrative are based upon thousands of separate documents and hundreds of interviews, it is practically impossible to furnish any bibliography with this History. A policy has been adopted, however, of including footnotes to document and substantiate each important group of facts. This practice has been followed in order to:

- (1) Serve in the place of a bibliography (whose inclusion would have been impracticable).

- (2) Furnish the reader with a knowledge of the source authority for the information in the narrative.

- (3) Furnish later researchers, concerned with more long-range definitive military histories of World War II, with guides to source collections.

- (4) Identify, for the benefit of later research, collections and files of documents which may later be destroyed or misplaced.

Some comments should be made about the editorial policy of this joint historical effort. Since the American staff system had been adopted at AFHQ and a majority of the collaborators were Americans, it was agreed to use the American spelling where differences in spelling might arise. The British spelling is preserved, however, in titles of British services or units, such as "Royal Armoured Corps." In general the abbreviations as indicated in the Dictionary of U. S. Army Terms (TM 20-205) were adopted. When American and British personnel are listed in the same table, the British personnel are shown under the corresponding American rank (i.e., Pfc for L/Cpl). British abbreviations, however, are used on purely British topics and in purely British personnel tables.

Considerable thought was given to the matter of handling significant quotations from important documents. Should they be included in the text of the History, or should the full document containing the quotations be placed in a documentary annex to the History? It was decided to include quotations in the text but limit them to just that part of a document which was pertinent to the current narrative. This decision was made for the following reasons:

- (1) To avoid objectionable interruptions in reading involved in referring to appended annexes.
- (2) To have a smooth-running narrative and at the same time the benefit of the exact words of an important document.
- (3) To avoid attaching a bulky annex to every copy of the History.

The discussion of Headquarters personnel in this History is restricted to a general high-level approach. The over-all problems and policies of the Headquarters concerning personnel and the statistics by ranks and staff sections of both the Americans and British are included. Accurate personnel statistics, however, were very difficult to obtain. Such information was considered so voluminous and varied

that many of the records were destroyed by the sections after their current usefulness was passed. Both Allied armies, of course, retain certain sets of personnel statistics, but their preservation is determined more from the administrative than from the historical point of view. Consequently rosters or data of personnel present for duty on certain dates, to be used for historical comparisons, cannot be obtained in their entirety. Incomplete data cannot be used for the purposes of making any significant comparisons. Therefore, in general, the statistics of authorized personnel, as shown by the American tables of organization and the British war establishments, have formed the basis for the treatment of personnel. In one period (1942), however, complete tables of actual personnel present were found in an obscure file, and these were used in Part I of the History. But for the rest of the History the table of authorized personnel had to be used instead.

The actual names of the personnel have also had to be omitted with the exception of those holding the highest key appointments. There was such a constant shifting of officers and enlisted men and women as a result of decisions concerning expansion, contraction, substitution, transfer, and rotation that no one complete roster even at an important date would yield any absolute or comparative significance. On the other hand, care has been taken to mention the names of the commanders and deputy commanders; chiefs, deputy chiefs, and assistant chiefs of staff; and chiefs of special staff sections and services. These are men responsible for policy and operations whose personalities and abilities are related to the history of the Headquarters as a whole.

In closing this Preface we wish to remind the readers that this work has had to be a factual rather than an interpretative history. In the first place, for two subsections of the Headquarters to sit in judgment on the Headquarters as a whole, on their superiors, and on fellow staff sections, would be an act of presumption. Furthermore,

a requisite perspective does not exist to make final evaluations on such a large organization and enterprise. Interpretative studies should properly be deferred until "all the returns are in from all the precincts"--to use a common expression of political analysts. That undertaking might well be reserved for future historians working on a higher level and using histories such as this for their points of departure. Here we set down the facts--as clearly, as dispassionately, and in as orderly a fashion as we know how. It is hoped that such a history of AFHQ may not only contribute to a fuller history of World War II but also bear testimony of a significant experiment in the combined command and staff work of two Allied nationalities, with differing staff procedures, striving together in one small corner of the globe to do their share in a world-wide struggle of new freedoms against the forces of ancient tyrannies.

Allied Force Headquarters

2 April 1945



General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

In 1942, Lieutenant General

Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force

PART I

PERIOD

of the

NORTH AFRICAN INVASION

(August to December 1942)

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Chapter I

THE ALLIED COMMAND AND HEADQUARTERS

1. Decisions on TORCH

When General George C. Marshall and Admiral E. J. King visited GREAT BRITAIN in July 1942, meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were held in LONDON with Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, General Sir Alan Brooke, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal representing the British Staffs. During these meetings important decisions were made concerning plans of operations against the Axis Powers for the coming two years of the War.

At the meeting of 24 July 1942 the following conditional decisions were made:

(1) That, if the situation on the Russian Front by September 15th indicates such a collapse or weakening of Russian resistance as to make ROUNDUP (cross-channel invasion of the Continent) appear impracticable of successful solution, the decision should be taken to launch a combined operation against the North and Northwest Coast of AFRICA at the earliest possible date before December 1942.

(2) That the combined plans for this African operation should immediately be developed.

(3) That a task force commander for the entire African operation should be appointed forthwith.

(4) That it be understood that a commitment to this operation renders ROUNDUP in all probability impracticable of successful execution in 1943, but that organization, planning, and training, for eventual entry in the Continent should continue...¹

During the discussions in the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the following day (25 July 1942) it was brought out that the African expedition would be American, at least in appearance, and that the Prime Minister was going to propose that the Supreme Commander should be an American. They were abandoning the use of the term task force commander in favor of Supreme Commander after Admiral King observed that there would no doubt be two task force commanders (one for

1. Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject: "Operations in 1942/43," 24 July 42 (SGS AFHQ file: 337.21).

the west coast and one for the north coast) whose operations would have to be co-ordinated by a Supreme Commander. General Marshall wished to avoid competition for resources between ROUNDUP and the African expedition, and General Brooke suggested that initially the Supreme Commander should be responsible for both so that he could shift resources from one to the other in line with later decisions.

They finally agreed:

(1) That the code name for the operation in North and Northwest AFRICA would be TORCH.

(2) That the command arrangement for TORCH, ROUNDUP, and SLEDGEHAMMER should be... (that the Supreme Commander will be responsible for the planning of all three operations in the initial stages).²

(3) That a detachment of the U. S. Joint Planners should proceed to LONDON as early as possible to combine with the British Joint Planners and carry forward the production of an outline plan for TORCH. This combined Planning Team to be placed under the control of the Supreme Commander as soon as he is available in LONDON.

(4) That the Supreme Commander should present his outline plan to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval as early as possible.

(5) That a British Deputy Supreme Commander be appointed for TORCH, details of the Staff being primarily for the Supreme Commander.³

2. Appointment of the Commander-in-Chief

The Operations Division of the War Department General Staff had for a long time been engaged in the preparation of tentative plans for operations in the European Theater. General Marshall, therefore, selected the Chief of this Operations Division, Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, as Commanding General of the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (usually referred to as ETOUSA) with headquarters in LONDON. General Eisenhower arrived in LONDON on 24 June 1942 and took over the command from Major General James S. Chaney.⁴

2. The words in the parentheses are the writer's paraphrase of the command as indicated by a diagram annexed to the Minutes.

3. Minutes of the 33d meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 25 July 42. Points (1) to (5) are quotations from the Minutes.

4. Report of the AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43 (AG AFHQ file: 312 AG).



General Mark W. Clark

In 1942, Lieutenant General

Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force

Although the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 24 and 25 July 1942 had not indicated a choice of a Supreme Commander for TORCH, General Eisenhower (promoted to Lieutenant General on 7 July 1942) was tentatively designated for this additional responsibility before General Marshall's departure for the UNITED STATES. It was not until 14 August 1942, however, that the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the British War Cabinet, on behalf of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, officially informed General Eisenhower of his appointment. The directive read:

The President and the Prime Minister have agreed that combined military operations be directed against AFRICA....

You are appointed Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, to undertake the above-mentioned operation.⁵

Nearly another month elapsed before General Eisenhower officially announced his assumption of command on 12 September 1942.⁶

3. Appointment of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief

The intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, at the time of their initial decision on TORCH, was that the Deputy Supreme Commander should be British.⁷ The British Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, in their conference with General Eisenhower on 2 August 1942, expressed their preference for an American as Deputy Supreme Commander in order to preserve the continuity of nationality of the Supreme Commander, in the event of his disability, and the fiction of a purely American enterprise.⁸ General Eisenhower, thereupon, recommended Major General Mark W. Clark

5. Annex I to the Minutes of the Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Cabinet, 14 Aug 42. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (British) had objected to the title of Supreme Commander in the conference of 2 Aug 42. As a result the official designation in the directive of 14 Aug 42 became "Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force." See cable No 835, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Aug 42 on his appointment; also Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 1.

6. AFHQ Memo, 12 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 322.98-2). "The undersigned hereby assumes command as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, European Theater of Operations." Signed: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Lt Gen U. S. Army.

7. See Minutes of the 33d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 25 July 42.

8. Cable No 835, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Aug 42. Minutes of C-in-C Meeting, 18 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 337-95).

as his Deputy Supreme Commander with the special responsibility of being in direct charge of all TORCH planning. The British Chiefs of Staff were in complete accord with these recommendations,⁹ and General Marshall cabled the approval of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on 11 August 1942.¹⁰ With the change in General Eisenhower's title that of General Clark became Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, and this designation was officially announced on 15 September 1942.¹¹ General Clark was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General on 1 November 1942.¹²

4. Naval and Air Commands

The plans for Operation TORCH naturally provided for very important participation by the American and British Navies and Air Forces. The commanders of these services, therefore, were responsible to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

For the Air Command, Air Commodore A.P.M. Sanders (B) was appointed Air Officer at AFHQ, and Brigadier General Louis A. Craig, formerly of G-3 ETOUSA, was assigned as Assistant Air Officer as the American opposite number of Air Commodore Sanders.¹³ The Air Officer and the Assistant Air Officer were to co-ordinate all air planning and advise the Commander-in-Chief on all Air matters. At first Air Commodore Sanders' office was referred to as the Air Section;¹⁴ but just before the invasion took place, the Air Section was redesignated the Air Staff, AFHQ, with the two highest ranking officers designated respectively the Assistant Chief of Staff for Air, AFHQ, (B) and the Deputy Assistant Chief for Air, AFHQ, (A). The headquarters organization for Air was thus

9. Cable No 1027, Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 Aug 42.

10. Cable from Marshall to Eisenhower, 11 Aug 42.

11. Ltr Col T. J. Davis (AG) to all concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5). For other references to the appointment of Gen Clark as Deputy Commander-in-Chief, see Commander-in-Chief's Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 1; Report of the AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 42, p 3.

12. WD SO No 310, 1 Nov 42.

13. Minutes of C-in-C Conference, 7 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 337-95).

14. Cable No 1213, Eisenhower to Marshall, 16 Aug 42.

elevated from a mere staff section to the position of a separate staff of the Air Services.¹⁵ Brigadier General James H. Doolittle was to command the American Air Forces of the expedition, while Air Marshal Sir William L. Welsh commanded the corresponding RAF units. The two air force commanders were directly responsible to General Eisenhower for their operations and not to Air Commodore Sanders.¹⁶

Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham (B) was the Naval Commander-in-Chief, responsible to the Allied Commander-in-Chief for the sea security of Operation TORCH and for naval support to the amphibious operations in the western MEDITERRANEAN. For operations other than TORCH in the western MEDITERRANEAN and the North ATLANTIC, however, Admiral Cunningham was directly responsible to the British Admiralty.¹⁷

The command arrangements for the American Naval Forces to be used in support of the Western Task Force in the invasion of French MOROCCO differed from those for the landings on the Mediterranean coasts of French NORTH AFRICA. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, was responsible for planning for the Western Naval Task Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Henry K. Hewitt,¹⁸ which was to be used in the attack, from the Atlantic side, on the French Moroccan coast. Admiral Hewitt's Western Naval Task Force was, however, to remain under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, until it crossed the Meridian of 40° West Longitude at which time it came under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force, or under the command of his Naval Commander, if the Allied Commander-in-Chief so preferred. When the assault operations were completed and when the Allied Commander-in-Chief decided to release them, the U. S. Naval Forces were again to revert to the command of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, who would continue to be responsible for the protection of

15. AFHQ GO No 12, 1 Nov 42.

16. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 2. AFHQ Operation Memo No 1, 21 Sep 42, Annex I, Subject: "Outline Air Plan," par 2.

17. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 2.

18. Rear Admiral Hewitt was promoted to Vice Admiral on 26 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ Ex Div file: 201 Hewitt, Henry K.).

convoys moving between the UNITED STATES and NORTH AFRICA. The Sea Frontier Forces of the U. S. Navy along the Atlantic Moroccan Coast were to come under the command of the Commanding General of the Western Task Force, while the U. S. Naval operating base at ORAN was to come under the command of the Commanding General, Center Task Force.¹⁹

5. Command Responsibilities

On his arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM General Eisenhower's responsibilities were those of the Commanding General, ETOUSA. In that capacity he had the responsibility, as far as the American forces were concerned, of their administration and supply, the preparation of plans for their operations against the Axis forces, and the maintenance of liaison with the British Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry.²⁰

Even before his official appointment as Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Eisenhower had been tentatively designated by General Marshall to carry out the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 25 July 1942. Thus, in addition to his responsibilities as Commanding General, ETOUSA, he was to be in charge of planning for both TORCH and SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP, furnish an American detachment for a combined planning team, control such a team once it was established, and present as soon as possible an outline plan for TORCH to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval.²¹ The Joint Staff Mission in WASHINGTON authorized General Eisenhower to assume "immediate executive authority" for TORCH planning on about 1 August 1942, and the British approved the authorization.²²

Not until a fortnight later, however, did he receive a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff defining his duties and appointing him

19. Memo by the Joint U. S. Staff Planners, 13 Oct 42, Annex A. Joint Army and Navy Plan for U. S. participation in Operation "TORCH," Short Title "ROOFTREE," sect 7 (SGS AFHQ file: 337.27). Cable No R 1740, Marshall to Eisenhower, 9 Oct 42.

20. Report of the AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p. 3; Cable No 1120, Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 June 42.

21. Minutes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 33d Meeting, 25 July 42.

22. Cable No 329, Joint Staff Mission to Joint Planning Staff (British), c. 1 Aug 42. Cable No 835, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Aug 42.

officially as Allied Commander-in-Chief. The passages defining his command responsibilities were brief:

(1)²³ You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and you will receive from that body all directives for the operation. Whenever feasible and appropriate, matters pertaining to and affecting the operation with which you are charged will be referred to you for advance consideration and recommendations prior to formal promulgation.

(2) In the interests of speeding preparation of plans you are authorized to communicate direct with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff or the British Chiefs of Staff.

(3) In consonance with the above (Concept of Operations: omitted here) you are to submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible your outline plan together with an estimate of resources required to implement it.²⁴

Realizing the magnitude of the task assigned to him by his new orders and desiring to concentrate upon the problem of preparations for TORCH, General Eisenhower sought relief from some of the details of his responsibilities and the delegation of others. The first responsibility from which he wished to be relieved was that of directing plans for SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP operations. The original idea of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was to have the same commander in charge of both TORCH and SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP in the initial stages in order to prevent competition between them for troops, equipment, and supplies.²⁵ At first his suggestion, on 4 August 1942, was to delegate the SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP planning to Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.²⁶ On 12 August 1942 he requested definite relief from that responsibility in his discussions with the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, and they concurred in his views, promising to settle the question in consultation with him as soon as planning and preparations for TORCH were well underway.²⁷ By 19 August the way had been cleared, and General Eisenhower was relieved henceforth of responsibility for SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP.²⁸

23. The numbers used here are the writer's and not those of the Directive. The paragraphs are direct quotations from the Directive.

24. Minutes of the 90th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Cabinet, 14 Aug 42, Annex I.

25. Minutes of the 133d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 25 July 1942. See also accompanying diagram.

26. Cable of Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Aug 42.

27. Minutes of the 188th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Cabinet, 12 Aug 42.

28. Cable No 1293, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Aug 42.

Even the planning for TORCH was too much for one man to supervise. With the designation of General Clark as Deputy Allied Commander-in-Chief on 10 August also went the responsibility of being in direct charge of all TORCH planning.²⁹ Likewise, while retaining the command of ETOUSA, General Eisenhower designated Major General Russell P. Hartle as Deputy Theater Commander, ETOUSA, in order to insure the smooth operation of ETOUSA's functions before and after his departure for the new theater of operations.³⁰

Of course it was understood from the beginning that the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Force would have supreme command over the naval and air as well as ground forces in the TORCH Theater of Operations. The fact that the term "Supreme Commander" had first been used carried that implication, and the term "Force" in the finally accepted title was intended to cover all the services employed.³¹ But the Directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff of 14 August 1942 did not specifically state such an authority. The directive contained in the memorandum of the Joint U. S. Staff Planners of 13 October 1942, however, was specific and gave verbal confirmation to the generally accepted principle: "The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, will command all forces assigned to Operation TORCH, under the principle of unity of command."³²

In one instance, when draft instructions were being prepared by the British Joint Chiefs of Staff for the placing of Lieutenant General K.A.N. Anderson (B) and his 1st Army under General Eisenhower's command, an exchange of views arose which actually resulted in a clarification of the Allied Commander-in-Chief's command authority. While definitely

29. Cable No 1027, Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 Aug 42.

30. Report of AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 9.

31. General Eisenhower, in his Dispatch on the North African Campaign, p 11, stated that: "The shape and scope of Allied Force Headquarters developed naturally from the fact... that the operation it was planning would be amphibious throughout, that Air would play a vital part... ."

32. Memo of Joint U. S. Staff Planners, Enclosure "A" ("ROOFTREE"), 13 Oct 42, par 7.a. (SGS AFHQ file: 337.27). See also AFHQ Operation Memo No 30, 24 Oct 42, par 5.a., for naval responsibility to the Allied C-in-C.

placing the 1st Army "under the supreme command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief," the British Joint Chiefs of Staff's draft directive likewise stipulated that

At the same time, if any order given by him (the Allied C-in-C) appears to you (Gen Anderson) to imperil any British troops in the Allied force even though they may not be under your direct command, it is agreed between the British and United States governments that you will be at liberty to appeal to the War Office before the order is executed.³³

This draft directive was submitted to General Eisenhower for his comments and elicited this objection:

I anticipate that as fighting develops in the new theater there will be many times that detachments of both the United States and British forces are definitely imperilled. ...But I have constantly endeavored to maintain in all my relationships with the British Government and Armed Services, with the American War Department, and with my staff and subordinate commanders, that we are undertaking a single, unified effort in pursuit of a common object stated by the two governments; and that for the attainment of this object our sole endeavor must be to use every resource and asset for the common good. I think this view is correct and that our best interests will be served if all concerned are imbued with a similar purpose. Consequently, departures from normal practices of command should be tolerated only in cases of urgent necessity.

In view of the above, I believe that this directive should be written in the form of a short statement of principles, emphasizing unity of the whole, and stressing the great desirability of keeping the integrity of national forces. I should give to General Anderson the right, in what he may consider to be grave and exceptional circumstances, to appeal to his home government, but he should be instructed first to notify the Allied Commander-in-Chief that he intends so to appeal, giving his reasons therefor.

As a final word, I should like to say that I do not present the above from any personal viewpoint whatsoever, since any order issued directly by the War Office to General Anderson could have no other effect than to relieve me of a portion of a very heavy burden of responsibility. I am speaking solely from conviction, and, while I believe that the British Chiefs of Staff probably see this matter exactly as I do, I think the wording of their directive is such as to weaken rather than to support the spirit that should be developed and sustained among all ranks participating in this great enterprise.³⁴

By their revised directive we see that the British Chiefs of Staff were in complete agreement with General Eisenhower's views on this point. Paragraphs 2. and 3. of the revision read as follows:

33. Annex to ltr, Stirling to Eisenhower, 7 Oct 42 (SGS AFHQ file: 381-2).

34. Ltr, Eisenhower to Ismay, 10 Oct 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 381-2).

His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States have agreed that singleness of purpose and unified direction are essential to the speedy success of these operations. To this end, the First Army has been placed under the Supreme command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, United States Army. In the exercise of his command, the national forces at his disposal will be used towards the benefit of the United Nations and in pursuit of the common object. You will carry out any orders issued by him.

In the unlikely event of your receiving an order which, in your view, will give rise to a grave and exceptional situation, you have the right to appeal to the War Office, provided that by so doing an opportunity is not lost, nor any part of the Allied Force endangered. You will, however, first inform the Allied Commander-in-Chief that you intend so to appeal, and you will give him your reasons.³⁵

General Eisenhower endorsed this revision with keen satisfaction.

Please assure the Chiefs of Staff, he wrote Brigadier Hollis, that I consider its terms completely satisfactory. In fact it so definitely expresses the views I hold with respect to appropriate instructions to a National Commander under the conditions prevailing in this case, that I am forwarding a copy to the United States War Department in the hope that it will serve as a model in future cases of this kind.³⁶

Thus it was hoped that the unified command adopted at AFHQ would become a precedent in Allied military collaboration.

As it turned out, it never became necessary for General Anderson to make such an appeal to the War Office, but the clear and frank definition of command relations contributed greatly to the success of Allied operations and achieved a harmony unique in the history of Allied campaigns.

In conclusion it should be noted that the Allied Commander-in-Chief was directly responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which included representatives of both the British and American air and naval services.

35. Revised Draft Directive to Gen Anderson, 21 Oct 42 (SGS AFHQ file: 381-2). These paragraphs appeared unchanged in the actual directive sent to Gen Anderson, 23 Oct 42 (SGS AFHQ file: 381-2). Identical paragraphs were contained in the British Chiefs of Staff directives to Lt Gen Mason MacFarlane (B) and Lt Gen Morgan (B). Ltr, Director of Military Operations (WO) to Eisenhower, 28 Oct 42 (SGS AFHQ file: 381-2).

36. Ltr, Eisenhower to Hollis, 21 Oct 42 (SGS AFHQ file: 381-2).

6. Principles of the Combined Headquarters

In modern warfare the setting up of a headquarters and its command is complicated by the need of integrating the three services of ground, navy, and air, all of which must be used together for the quickest and surest results. For an international headquarters and its command the difficulties are even greater because, in addition to integrating the three distinct services, the need arises of fusing into a smooth-functioning unit the same three services of two or more nationalities with differing habits of organization and operation, with divergent national outlooks, and with personnel prompted by their understandably human prejudices. The leaders who had the responsibility for erecting the structure of an Allied headquarters had to face this two-fold problem as a part of their military undertaking.

Fortunately, in the case of AFHQ, the task was made easier by several circumstances. In the first place the minimum of two nationalities undertook this international enterprise. Moreover, they spoke the same language, albeit with differing accents. Indeed, the good-natured banter exchanged regarding each other's speech peculiarities often served to ease tensions rather than create them. But more than all else the American and British people and fighting men were inspired by the same ideals of democracy, freedom, human decency, and fair play, which made them more akin in spirit than in the material aspects of blood and customs.

In spite of these favorable factors, however, the atmosphere of the new combined headquarters still needed to be cleared of its fog of mutual doubts and misgivings by a straightforward recognition of certain common principles upon which the joint effort would be based. One of these principles was UNITY OF COMMAND. Within each nation machinery had already been set up to assure national unity of command in the form of a joint committee of the Chiefs of Staff of the army, navy, and air services. From the point of view of Allied effort the next logical step was the combining of representatives of their two joint staffs in a

great Allied staff for the determination of grand strategy for all the fronts of the world and the intervening seas. This higher level of unified command took form in the Combined Chiefs of Staff on which were represented the staffs of the American and British armies, navies, and air forces.

When at last it came to the question of choosing one man to take command of joint operations in the newly designated theater, the problem became more difficult, because one nationality and one particular service had finally to be given preference. That an American army commander was eventually designated by the two governments and the Combined Chiefs of Staff is explained largely by the following circumstances:

(1) The initial invasion had to have the appearance of being an American enterprise because of French bitterness (however unjustifiable) toward the British after DUNKIRK and MERS-el-KEBIR.³⁷

(2) In the planning stage there was even the anticipation that the British would leave NORTH AFRICA largely to the Americans once the campaign had gotten well under way.³⁸

(3) More men and materials would be furnished, either directly or indirectly, by the UNITED STATES.

(4) Once the landings were made, the rest of the campaign would be largely an army function with strong air support.

(5) The preponderance of personnel and material would also be largely with the ground forces.

37. Minutes of the 33d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 25 July 42. "Sir Alan Brooke said that in view of the necessity of the African expedition being American, at least in appearance, the Prime Minister had agreed to propose to the President that the Supreme Commander should be an American."

38. Gen Clark in a memo to the Chief of Staff on 26 Aug 42 stated: "One of the reasons I gave for this (adoption of the American system) was the ultimate indication the British troops may eventually be withdrawn from the North African Theater, leaving the enterprise principally American." (AG AFHQ file: 322.991-97).

Practical necessity and traditional American and British military policy dictated that, once a Commander-in-Chief had been chosen for this theater of joint operations, unity of command must be accepted and observed.

Alliances in the past, declared General Eisenhower, have often done no more than to name the common foe, and "unity of command" has been a pious aspiration thinly disguising the national jealousies, ambitions and recriminations of high-ranking officers, unwilling to subordinate themselves or their forces to a commander of different nationality or different service... . I was determined, from the first, to do all in my power to make this a truly Allied Force, with real unity of command and centralization of administrative responsibility.³⁹

From their agreement on united command and centralized administration both parties advanced to the tacit acceptance of the principle of BALANCED PERSONNEL in integrated staff sections. Brigadier Whiteley (B) in a letter to Major General Kennedy (B) stated: "Here again the balance of American and British officers has been watched."⁴⁰ On the American side we find the recognition of the same principle: "The CG, NATOUSA, has determined a policy of providing equal U. S. personnel to that being furnished by the British in all strictly Allied Force activities."⁴¹

Balanced personnel did not apply, however, to most administrative and supply staff sections. In these cases, because of differences in organization, procedure, and channels of communication, separate and parallel American and British staff sections were established with their own personnel.

...In these sections, explained General Eisenhower, it was my principal concern to insure that no international facade should be built, which would prejudice the administration and maintenance of the armies upon which the success of my operations would depend.⁴²

But the operational staff sections, as distinguished from those of administration and supply, were integrated, and the principle of balanced personnel was observed as far as possible.⁴³ Whenever the

39. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 1.

40. Whiteley to Kennedy, 12 Feb 43 (SGS AFHQ file: 312-15).

41. Routing Slip G-1 NATOUSA to CofS NATOUSA, 2 Aug 44 (G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O Petroleum Sect AFHQ Old).

42. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 2. See also Cable No W6285, AFHQ to WD, 1 Aug 43, sect D.

43. Cable No FX 69391, AFHQ to WO, 7 July 44: "...on the operational side the headquarters is integrated."

Assistant Chief of Staff or Chief of section was of one nationality, there was usually in the section an officer of the other nationality of equal or nearly equal rank as his "opposite number" who was often called the deputy ACofS or deputy chief. This practice was almost general enough to be dignified by the term "principle of the OPPOSITE NUMBER" and often extended down to subsections within the staff sections. Below these heads of sections the rest of the personnel was recruited as equally as possible from American and British sources.

Another principle adopted by the new headquarters was a deviation from the balanced-personnel principle: that is, the principle of the BEST MAN FOR THE JOB regardless of his nationality. In a cable from AFHQ to the War Department it was explained that:

In those subsections where specialized knowledge of organization, technique, and procedure is necessary, the selection of personnel, British and American, is made from the best qualified source, without regard to nationality or rank and without regard to maintaining an equal division of nationalities.⁴⁴

Since the Commander-in-Chief, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and the Chief of Staff were all Americans, it was decided that the headquarters organization and staff procedure would be along American lines. "I discussed this question with General Gale (B) this morning," wrote General Clark, "and told him that our organization would be modeled generally after the American system."⁴⁵

As AFHQ began to operate, many problems arose on the co-ordination of American and British activities. An example of the manner in which co-ordination was achieved in headquarters procedure may be found in the handling of routine instructions. On 23 October 1942 an administrative memorandum was issued which provided that the American Adjutant General, AFHQ, would publish and distribute routine instructions to the U. S.

44. Cable No W6285, AFHQ to WD, 1 Aug 43. This same principle was enunciated by General Eisenhower in his C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 2: "As far as practicable the best man was assigned to each job, irrespective of nationality."

45. Memo, Gen Clark to CofS, 26 Aug 42 (AG AFHQ file: 322.991-97). In cable No W6285, AFHQ to WD, 1 Aug 43, it was again stated that: "The WD General Staff organization and procedure is the basis for the organization and procedure used in AFHQ." See also C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 1; and Memo from AG AFHQ to GOC-in-C MEF, 23 Oct 43 (AG AFHQ file: 311.5-5).

Forces on matters affecting American forces alone or on those affecting both British and American forces. The British Chief Administrative Officer would do the same for the British forces on matters affecting the British forces alone or those affecting both American and British forces.⁴⁶

In all the early stages of organizing the headquarters the Commander-in-Chief had the full co-operation of both the American and British staffs in achieving the principles of a united command and an integrated headquarters. As has already been mentioned, the British staffs not only approved the selection of an American Commander-in-Chief but also insisted that an American hold the position of Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Having put General Anderson (B) under General Eisenhower's command, they limited his direct contacts with the War Office to occasions of the gravest emergency and then only after fully informing the Commander-in-Chief of his reasons.⁴⁷ The British staff officers went to work with a will to acquaint themselves with American staff procedures,⁴⁸ and their planning efforts matched those of the Americans. Likewise, General Marshall assured the Allied Commander-in-Chief:

It is the desire of the War Department that you as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces should have the maximum feasible degree of authority and responsibility, and that you should operate at all times under as broad a directive as possible.⁴⁹

On the eve of the invasion at his last staff conference in LONDON General Eisenhower expressed appreciation "from the bottom of his heart" for the fine team work of all those concerned in the headquarters. The principles of unity and integration had evidently gotten off to a good start.⁵⁰

7. Headquarters Precursor: The Combined Planning Staff

The headquarters which was to serve the newly designated command for the TORCH operation began merely as a combined planning staff. As a

46. AFHQ Adm Memo No 14, 23 Oct 42.

47. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, pp 1-2.

48. Report of the AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 5 (AG AFHQ file: 321.AG).

49. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, pp 1-2.

50. Minutes of the C-in-C Staff Conference, 28 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 337-95).

matter of fact much work had already been done by British planners on a projected North African invasion. The British Future Operational Planning Staff had drawn up a first draft Appreciation for an invasion of NORTH AFRICA between 18 and 25 July and had presented it to the British Director of Plans. After a careful examination, he, in turn, had submitted the Appreciation to the British Executive Planning Section for a study of ways and means to put the plan in operation.

At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 25 July 1942 decided on the TORCH Operation and directed that U. S. Joint Planners should join the British Joint Planners to work on the plans of operations under the new "Supreme Commander." General Eisenhower chose the American delegation from among his planning officers at ETOUSA. These officers proceeded to acquaint themselves with their British "opposite numbers" in the Admiralty, War Office, and Air Ministry (all members of the Executive Planning Staff) and to study the British Appreciation and plans already developed.

Finally on 4 August 1942 they all, British and American planners, moved over to Norfolk House on St. James's Square to begin their combined deliberations under the direction of Brigadier General Alfred W. Gruenther (A). This small group of British and Americans numbering about twelve in all, which was eventually to become a part of the G-3 Section, was for the moment the nucleus about which was soon to be formed the headquarters as a whole. On 10 August General Clark (A) was put in charge of the Combined Planning Staff as one of his duties as Deputy Commander-in-Chief.⁵¹

8. Activation of AFHQ

While the Combined Planning Staff was working feverishly on the future plans of operations, other officers set to work on the problem of organizing a combined and integrated headquarters.

51. The information on the establishment of the Combined Planning Staff at Norfolk House may be found in the following sources: Instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 33d Meeting, 25 July 42; C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, pp 1-2; Report of the AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, pp 4-5 (AG AFHQ file: 321 AG); Cable No 1027, Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 Aug 42; Cable, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Aug 42; Cable No W6285, AFHQ to WD, 1 Aug 43.

Among the important and far-reaching decisions taken by me during this campaign, General Eisenhower stated in his report, were those which concerned the administrative side of the organization of my headquarters. There was no historical precedent upon which to base them. A close theoretical study of all the problems involved was undertaken during the planning period in LONDON, and a plan was prepared upon which I built up my organization.⁵²

This plan, which was drawn up in the form of an organizational and functional chart, was largely the work of Colonel Ben M. Sawbridge (A), ACofS G-1.⁵³

The actual recruiting of personnel for the headquarters and their reporting for duty were going on, however, while the operations and organizations were still in the early planning stage. American personnel in this period were drawn largely from the ETOUSA headquarters and other headquarters under its command. As no table of organization or allotment had yet been authorized for these American officers and enlisted men, they had to be administered as personnel on detached service from their former units scattered throughout the UNITED KINGDOM.⁵⁴ On the British side similar procurement of personnel was taking place, through the War Office, from British headquarters, offices, and units in the same area.⁵⁵ Although official activation did not come until later, most of the original staff officers are agreed that the headquarters, as distinguished from the command and planning staff, began on 11 August 1942.⁵⁶

The name of the headquarters, like the organization which it designated, underwent an evolution. At first it was called "Headquarters ETOUSA (Norfolk Group)"⁵⁷ for purposes of deception. For a combined headquarters, however, such a name carried too much the implication of

52. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 2.

53. Organizational and Functional Chart, AFHQ, 26 Aug 42. Prepared by the ACofS G-1 (AG AFHQ file: 232.35-1).

54. Report of the AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, pp 4-5.

55. DO Ltr, Maj D. Morley to Lt Col R.N.M. Perceval, Room 421, Norfolk House, 22 Aug 42. (G-2 AFHQ file: 106/4B.)

56. The commemorative pamphlet distributed on the first anniversary of AFHQ is dated 11 Aug 43. Maj W. S. Richards (A) and Lt W. W. Leary (B) both date the beginning of AFHQ at 11 Aug 42.

57. AFHQ Staff Memo No 1, Sect I, 16 Aug 42. The British usually referred to it as "R" Headquarters.



Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith

In 1942, Major General
Chief of Staff, Allied Force

being American. Consequently, General Clark suggested that the headquarters be named "Allied Force Headquarters" without mention of the word "Expeditionary," again for security reasons. The Chiefs of Staff Committee concurred on 24 August 1942.⁵⁸

Although Headquarters ETOUSA had issued the Staff Memorandum which prescribed the earlier denomination, objection was raised by Colonel Sawbridge to the same procedure when the name was changed.

As to activation, he argued, it appears doubtful that Hq ETO is the proper authority for the purpose, though it is admitted that an activation order will not be questioned, regardless of source. However, since British personnel is involved and the authority for the name Allied Force Headquarters is that of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it is suggested that General Eisenhower activate AFHQ over his own signature as C-in-C Allied Forces, ETO.⁵⁹

Thus it came about that on the following day, 12 September 1942, the headquarters published its own birth certificate with the words: "Allied Force Headquarters and Headquarters Command, Allied Force, are hereby constituted and activated."⁶⁰

9. Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff

In the beginning Major General Mark W. Clark served as Chief of Staff of AFHQ in addition to his duties as Deputy Commander-in-Chief. This dual assignment naturally became too heavy as plans developed for TORCH, and he was therefore relieved of his Chief of Staff duties upon the appointment of Brigadier General Walter Bedell Smith (A) on 15 September 1942.⁶¹ But General Smith likewise performed dual functions as Chief of Staff of both ETOUSA and AFHQ.⁶² He was promoted to the rank of Major General on 3 December 1942.⁶³

58. Minutes of the 98th Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Cabinet, 24 Aug 42.

59. Routing Slip, G-1 to CofS, 11 Sep 42.

60. AFHQ GO No 1, sect I, 12 Sep 42.

61. Ltr, subject: "Designation of DC-in-C, CofS, DC'sofS, CAO, and Chiefs of General and Special Staff Sections," Col Davis to all concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5). See also Minutes of C-in-C Meeting, 18 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 337-95).

62. Report of the AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 9.

63. WD SO No 337, 11 Dec 42.

Since AFHQ was based upon American staff organization and procedures, the regular duties of the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, were:

- (1) To act as the executive of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
- (2) To direct and co-ordinate the General and Special Staff Sections of AFHQ.
- (3) To exercise general supervision of planning and of the operations in the field.⁶⁴

In addition to these usual duties the Chief of Staff in the early period also had the following responsibilities:

- (1) To co-ordinate Allied Army, Naval, and Air Staffs of AFHQ.⁶⁵
- (2) To approve, along with G-1, all additional requests to the War Department for personnel.⁶⁶
- (3) To be the normal channel by which AC's of S and chiefs of sections communicate with the Commander-in-Chief.⁶⁷

In this period there were two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one American and one British: General A. W. Gruenther (A) and Brigadier J.F.M. Whiteley (B).⁶⁸ Their principal duties were those prescribed by American staff procedure:⁶⁹

- (1) To act for the Chief of Staff in his absence.
- (2) To assist the Chief of Staff in matters delegated to them. In this case the British Deputy Chief of Staff usually assisted in purely British

64. AR 10-15, 13 July 42, sect I, par 1.a., b., c.; 4.; and 7.c.; and sect II, par 13. Also Memo, Gen Clark to CofS, 26 Aug 42 (AG AFHQ file: 322.991-97).

65. Memo, Gen Clark to AFHQ Staff, 10 Sep 42.

66. AFHQ Staff Memo No 37, sect I, 2 Nov 42.

67. Memo, Gen Clark to CofS, 26 Aug 42 (AG AFHQ file: 322.001-97).

68. Ltr, Col Davis to all concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5). Report of AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 6. From 15 to 22 Oct 42 Brig C. S. Sugden was designated DCofS vice Brig Whiteley, but the latter was again redesignated as DCofS after 22 Oct (AFHQ GO No 7 and 9 of 15 and 22 Oct 42 respectively).

69. AR 10-15, 13 July 42, sect I, par 1,5,7.

matters and organizations of an operational nature, and the American Deputy Chief of Staff performed the same functions for purely American matters and organizations.

The usual duties of a Deputy Chief of Staff to determine questions of maintenance, supply, and administration were performed by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) whose functions will be discussed later in another part of this history.⁷⁰

10. General Organization of AFHQ

During the second and third weeks of August 1942 General Eisenhower had a careful study made of a plan for his future headquarters organization.⁷¹ Before the plans were completed, however, he was able to give to General Marshall a rough outline of his ideas, which were not greatly altered in the final organization. The American and British Army, Naval and Air commanders and staffs would be directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. Administration and supply would be under a British officer, General Gale, with Colonel E. S. Hughes as his deputy. G-2 and Air would also be directed by the British. But personnel (G-1), operations (G-3), and a number of technical services would come under American direction.⁷² The completed plan, as prepared by Colonel Sawbridge (G-1) for the Chief of Staff, presented the organization as conceived by 26 August 1942 (see chart on next page).⁷³ It was decided not to set up the sections for the Inspector General, Chaplain, Provost Marshal, and Army Exchange Service until the headquarters had moved to NORTH AFRICA. In the meantime the functions of a Provost Marshal section would be


70. The CAO was to co-ordinate American and British G-1 and G-4 matters. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, pp 2-3. Memo, Gen Clark to CofS, 26 Aug 42 and appended chart (AG AFHQ file: 322.991-97). Organizational and Functional Chart, AFHQ, 26 Aug 42 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-1).

71. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 2.

72. Cable No 1213, Eisenhower to Marshall, 16 Aug 42.

73. Organizational and Functional Chart, AFHQ, 26 Aug 42. Prepared by ACofS, G-1 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-1).

ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL CHART, AFHQ
26 August 1942



1. (Writer's note: The functions indicated on the chart have been omitted. Statements 2-4 below are quotations from the original chart.)

2. "All of the functions listed for the General and Special Staff sections will not necessarily be performed at this time."

3. "Under the Special Staff Section blocks are shown the General Staff Sections primarily concerned..."

4. "Prepared by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1. Approved by command of Lt Gen Eisenhower." Signed by Col T. J. Davis, AG AFHQ.

* These designations had already been changed to Allied C-in-C and Deputy Allied C-in-C.

cared for by the Headquarters Commandant, while those of the Army Exchange, Chaplain, and Inspector General services would be performed by the corresponding sections in the respective task forces.⁷⁴

While the above special sections were temporarily omitted in the early headquarters organization, the following special sections and offices were added before November 1942 to those shown in the chart of 26 August:

- a. Public Relations Office (15 Sep 42).⁷⁵
- b. Special Service Section (15 Sep 42).⁷⁵
- c. Claims Section (3 Oct 42).⁷⁶
- d. Judge Advocate General Section (13 Oct 42).⁷⁷
- e. Civil Affairs Section (18 Oct 42) which replaced and combined the Political and Civil Administration Sections and also included a Psychological Warfare Branch.⁷⁸
- f. A British Civil Liaison Officer (Mr. W.H.B. Mack).⁷⁹
- g. A pool of military and naval liaison officers.⁸⁰
- h. A War Shipping Administration Representative on the AFHQ Staff.⁸¹
- i. A North African Shipping Board (NASBO) (20 Oct 42).⁸¹
- j. A North African Economic Board (NAEB) (21 Nov 42).⁸¹

In its initial stages the Headquarters organization of AFHQ may seem to be overbalanced in favor of the American side, but actually this American predominance existed only in outward appearance. During the early planning period daily conferences with officials of the War Office

74. AFHQ Memo to CG's EAF, ETF, CTF, WTF, 12th Air Force, and Hq Comdt, 3 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 321-10).

75. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

76. AG Ltr to Task and Assault Forces, 12th Air Force, and Hq Comd, 3 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 150-10).

77. Cable No 998, AFHQ to ETOUSA, 13 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 321.41-19).

78. AFHQ Adm Memo No 11, 18 Oct 42. Cable No 3633, Eisenhower to AGWAR, 15 Oct 42.

79. Ibid.

80. AG Memo, subject: "Roster of Officers," 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8).

81. Annex 2. to Incl to AFHQ Adm Memo No 13, 20 Oct 42. Note on NAEB 21 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 336.1-51).

and other Ministries provided the British representation in what was from the start an Allied enterprise. At this time, too, the staff of British First Army participated fully in the organization of Allied Force and in the planning for the forthcoming operation. Later, many of the same members of AFHQ Staff with First Army, previously ear-marked for the staff sections of AFHQ, came back to their proper assignments, thus giving continuity to the British component of the Allied Staff. Such transfers and the creation of new staff sections in many cases took place in the period covered by Part II of this History.

The final organization of AFHQ before its removal to the theater of operations is indicated on the chart on the next page.⁸²

11. Personnel of AFHQ

During the first month of AFHQ's existence there was no table of allotment authorized, and the personnel had to be administered as on detached service from other units in GREAT BRITAIN.⁸³ On 3 September, however, General Eisenhower requested a separate allotment for AFHQ.⁸⁴ The reply to this request gave approval to a separate allotment on condition that the personnel "be taken from units and headquarters originally set up on the basis of ROUNDUP." "As AFHQ is built up, the others should be reduced accordingly."⁸⁵ Colonel Sawbridge objected to these restrictions because the total allotment required for ROUNDUP had not yet actually been allotted. The War Department was therefore requested to make allotments to AFHQ without any specific proviso for corresponding reductions in other headquarters, such as ETOUSA and SOS ETOUSA.⁸⁶ In reply the War Department agreed to withdraw the limiting proviso but urged that as much personnel as possible be taken from the units

82. In addition to the references in the footnotes 74-81 (above), the chart is based on AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).


83. Report of AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 5.

84. Cable No 1776, Eisenhower to WD, 3 Sep 42.

85. Cable No R602, WD to Eisenhower, 10 Sep 42.

86. Cable No 2070, AFHQ to WD, 11 Sep 42. See also Routing Slip, G-1 to CofS, 11 Sep 42, in G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, AFHQ
1 November 1942



LEGEND:

----- Line of General Supervision
 _____ Line of Command

NOTE: The letters in the lower right of each box indicate the nationality of the chief officer and not that of the personnel as a whole.

originally destined for ROUNDUP, since ROUNDUP and TORCH would not be executed at the same time and since additional officer personnel was scarce in the UNITED STATES.⁸⁷

Freed from the earlier restriction, AFHQ went ahead with plans for the development of its sections. By November 1942, when part of the Headquarters was already on its way to the new theater of operations, it had obtained personnel, or the authorization for personnel, from American and British sources as indicated in the table on the next page.

87. Cable No R304, Marshall to Eisenhower, 15 Sep 42 (G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old).

TABLE OF AFHQ PERSONNEL
November 1942

Ranks	Am* Auth	Br# Auth	Am* Actual	Br ^x Actual	Combined Auth	Combined Actual
Lt Gen	1		2	1	1	3
Maj Gen	1	1			2	
Brig Gen	2	15	5	8	17	13
Col	48	21	45	7	69	52
Lt Col	41	48	42	18	89	60
Maj	48	98	62	31	146	93
Capt	53	85	54	22	138	76
1st Lt	21	20	42	3	41	45
2d Lt	2	2	61		4	61
Total Officers	217	290	313	90	507	403
<hr/>						
CWO	4	23		7	27	7
WOJG	13	31	11	8	44	19
Total WO's	17	54	11	15	71	26
<hr/>						
M/Sgt	29		13		29	13
T/Sgt	31		18		31	18
S/Sgt	25	23	16	5	48	21
Tec 3	43		36		43	36
Sgt	17	89	14	14	106	28
Tec 4	62		39		62	39
Cpl	2	88	8	24	90	32
Tec 5	50		37		50	37
Pfc	86	71	76	21	157	97
Pvt		452		33	452	33
Total EM	345	723	257	97	1068	354
<hr/>						
Combined Totals of Personnel	579	1067	581	202	1646	783

* Statistics taken from a Table of American Personnel in AFHQ, 19 Nov 42, in G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old, contained in envelope at end of file.

Statistics taken from British War Establishment, "R" Hq (VIII/374/1), 12 Oct 42.

x Statistics for British officers taken from two different rosters: that of 19 Oct 42 or 1 Nov 42, whichever was more complete, since some sections had more complete rosters as of 19 Oct than in their lists of 1 Nov. Roster of AFHQ Officers, c. 19 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8). Statistics for British warrant officers and other ranks who were actually on duty at AFHQ were obtained from statements by individuals who were with the various sections in Nov 42.

NOTE: The reason for the large discrepancy between the British authorized and actual personnel is found in the fact that some of the British AFHQ personnel served as an increment to 1st Army (B) in the invasion period.

Chapter II

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTIONS AND OFFICES

Those charged with the responsibility of setting up the administrative side of AFHQ during the early days at Norfolk House realized that their task was complicated by two factors: (1) that they were dealing with a combined American and British undertaking, and (2) that the new theater of operations was likely to expand from French NORTH AFRICA to the entire western MEDITERRANEAN.¹ To meet these difficulties they distributed most of the administrative functions between five different sections and offices of the Headquarters: the Office of Secretary, General Staff, the Adjutant General's Section, the Chief Administrative Officer, the Headquarters Commandant (A), and the Camp Commandant (B).

In this chapter the brief historical accounts of these particular sections and offices have been segregated from those of the other staff sections in order to give a clearer administrative picture of the Headquarters as distinguished from its operational side.

1. Secretary, General Staff

a. Activation and Appointment. The official activation of the Office of Secretary, General Staff and the designation of the Secretary was announced on 15 September 1942.²

b. Secretary, General Staff AFHQ. The Secretary, General Staff AFHQ was Colonel Lecount H. Slocum (A) from 15 September to 8 December 1942.³

c. Functions. The functions of the Secretary, General Staff AFHQ were:⁴

1. There were discussions and tentative plans, in the early months at Norfolk House, of possible subsequent operations against SICILY, SARDINIA, CORSICA, SPAIN, and SPANISH MOROCCO.

2. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

3. Ibid. See also cable, AGWAR to AFHQ, 5 Dec 42; AFHQ SO No 1, 15 Sep 42.

4. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 13.

- (1) To act as executive officer to the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chiefs of Staff.
- (2) To maintain an office of temporary record.
- (3) To receive and record all proposals of new policies or changes in existing policies, directives, and operational plans. To do the same with all such approved and completed papers.⁵
- (4) To route papers received in the office of the CofS to their proper destinations and to insure prompt action and return of papers.
- (5) To receive official visitors to the C-in-C, CofS, and DC's of S.
- (6) To collect statistical data for the C-in-C, CofS, and DC's of S.

d. Personnel. The actual personnel on duty, as indicated for 19 November 1942, including that of the Chief of Staff's office as well as that of the Office of the Secretary, General Staff, consisted of the following ranks and grades:⁶

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>	
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am</u>	<u>Br*</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am</u>
Brig Gen	2	1	WOJG	1	S/Sgt	3
Col	2				Tec 3	8
Lt Col	1	1			Tec 4	5
Maj	5				Tec 5	5
Capt	3				Pfc	2
1st Lt	2					
2d Lt	3					
Totals:	18	2		1		23

Total Americans: 42
 Total British: 2
 COMBINED TOTAL: 44

* The British officers were the DCofS (B) and a Lt Col on duty with the Office of SGS, although not assigned to it.

5. Memo, Col Slocum to All Sections, 11 Oct 42. (AG AFHQ file: OOS-17.)

6. Table of American Personnel, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at back of G-1 NATCJSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

2. The Adjutant General Section

a. Activation. The Adjutant General Section was activated on 15 August 1942, but the official announcement of its creation did not come until 15 September 1942.⁷

b. Adjutant General AFHQ. The Adjutant General of AFHQ for the period through 8 November 1942 was Colonel Thomas J. Davis (A). He served also as Adjutant General of Headquarters ETOUSA, although heading entirely separate staffs in each headquarters.⁸

c. Functions. The primary functions of the AG Section AFHQ, as defined by AR 15-5, were:⁹

(1) Execution of all administrative functions and all properly determined policies relating to American personnel.

(2) Reception, dispatch, distribution, authentication, and publication of all official correspondence, cables, orders, and instructions of the headquarters; and custody of all permanent records of the headquarters.

(3) Direction and supervision of the U. S. Army postal service and U. S. Army courier service of the Theater.

In addition to these normal functions the AG Section of AFHQ, during the formative period, had to serve as Headquarters Command, dispatch motor transportation, issue typewriters and office equipment, furnish clerical assistance to other staff sections, arrange quartering and rationing of enlisted men, and instruct enlisted men in security requirements.¹⁰

7. Report of AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 4 (AG AFHQ file: 321 AG).
AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

8. Ibid.

9. AR 15-5, 15 June 42, sect I, par 2 and sect III, par 8.

10. Report of AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43, p 4.

d. Organization. The organization of AG Section as it was projected by 24 September 1942 is shown on the approved chart on the next page.¹¹

e. Personnel. The actual personnel strength of the AG Section before the invasion of NORTH AFRICA is shown in a table prepared on 19 November 1942:¹²

<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>	
<u>Rank</u>		<u>Rank</u>		<u>Rank</u>	
Col	4	WOJG	1	M/Sgt	3
Lt Col	1			T/Sgt	5
Maj	2			S/Sgt	5
Capt	2			Tec 3	4
1st Lt	5			Sgt	5
2d Lt	2			Tec 4	9
				Cpl	3
				Tec 5	13
				Pfc	10
Totals:	16		1		57

Total American: 74

3. Chief Administrative Officer

a. Activation. The arrival at Norfolk House on 11 August 1942 of its designated chief was the commencement of the office of Chief Administrative Officer.¹³ Major General H. M. Gale's (B) official designation as Chief Administrative Officer was announced on 15 September 1942, and he continued in that office throughout the North African Campaign.¹⁴

b. Functions. The administrative systems of both the American and British forces were preserved, essentially undisturbed, but for purposes of liaison and decision they were co-ordinated in the heads of the two principal staff sections concerned.


11. For the original chart of AG Section AFHQ see AG AFHQ file: 321 AG immediately after the Report of AG AFHQ, c. 1 May 43.

12. In envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

13. Statement from Maj Gen Lewis (B), DQMG G-4 (B), 3 Nov 44.

14. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

Based on
 ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONAL CHART,
 OFFICE OF ADJUTANT GENERAL AFHQ



Approved 24 Sep 42

W. B. Smith, GSC, USA
 Chief of Staff, AFHQ

As a final safeguard, and in order to insure the fullest use of common stocks, reported General Eisenhower, I appointed Major General H. M. (now Lieutenant General Sir Humphrey) Gale as Chief Administrative Officer--a post unique in the history of war.¹⁵

The responsibilities of the Chief Administrative Officer were:¹⁶

(1) The co-ordination of all operational logistical matters (British and American) in the theater.

(2) The co-ordination of American and British Army, Naval, and Air administrative staffs.

(3) Convocation of CAO Conferences to facilitate the exchange of information, and to expedite co-ordination, between Navy, Air, Civil Affairs Section, and all general and special staff sections in matters concerning British and American administration, supply, and transport.

(4) Control of the British activities in the normal "A" and "Q" Branches of the Staff and the appropriate British Services.

(5) Discipline of all British personnel of the Allied Force who were not under the command of GOC 1st Army.

(6) The publication and distribution for all British Forces of:

a. All matter affecting both United States and British Forces of the Allied Force.

b. All matter affecting British Forces only.


c. Organization. A chart of the organization in December 1942 is shown on the following page.¹⁷

15. C-in-C Dispatch, North African Campaign, p 2.

16. See footnote 13; Memo, Gen Clark to AFHQ Staff, 10 Sep 42; AFHQ Adm Memo No 14, 23 Oct 42; AFHQ Staff Memo No 49, 8 Dec 42.

17. Organization Chart G-4 (B & A), 21 Dec 42 (G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O G-4 AFHQ Old).

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AFHQ
December 1942



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d. Personnel. In November 1942 the personnel of the office was:

<u>OFFICERS</u> ^x		<u>ENLISTED MEN</u> [#]	
<u>Rank</u>		<u>Rank</u>	
Maj Gen	- 1	S/Sgt	1
Capt	1		
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Totals:	2		1

Total British: 3

4. Headquarters Command (American)

a. Activation. Although preliminary organization of Headquarters Command was undertaken about 20 August 1942 at Norfolk House by its future commander, on verbal instructions of CG ETOUSA, activation orders for the Command were not published until 12 September 1942.¹⁸

b. Headquarters Commandant. The appointment of Lieutenant Colonel John W. Ramsey, Jr. (A) as Headquarters Commandant followed on 15 September 1942.¹⁹ He also assumed command of Headquarters Command on 17 September 1942, the date of activation of subordinate units within the Command.²⁰ For a short period of time, the Headquarters Commandant served as the Provost Marshal for AFHQ and Headquarters Command, Allied Force.²¹ Lieutenant Colonel Ramsey was promoted to the rank of full Colonel with effect from 2 October 1942.²²

c. Functions. Headquarters Command was designed to expedite the administration of duties assigned the Headquarters Commandant for Allied Force Headquarters, namely:

- (1) Local security of the headquarters.

x Roster of Officers, 1 Nov 42. (AG AFHQ file: 300.31-8).
Statement by SQMS Grant, Chief Clerk of CAO office, 25 Sep 44.
18. AFHQ GO No 1, sect I, 12 Sep 42.
19. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).
20. Hq Comd AF GO No 1, 20 Sep 42, as amended by Hq Comd AF GO No 2, 23 Sep 42 (AG Hq Comd AF file: 320).
21. AFHQ Memo, par 3, 3 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 321-10).
22. MRU Roster of Hq Hq Comd AF, 30 Nov 44.

(2) Internal administration and arrangements for moving headquarters.

(3) Detail of orderlies and messengers.

(4) Supervision of headquarters mess.

(5) Messing and quartering of casuals.

(6) Reception of visitors at headquarters.²³

To this general list were added, for AFHQ more specifically:

(1) Procurement and allocation of office space and shelter.

(2) Supply of office equipment, furnishings, and stationery.

(3) Supervision of firewatchers and firefighters, including supply and maintenance of fire-fighting equipment.²⁴

d. Organization for a Theater of Operations. To a working nucleus of ten component units in mid-September 1942,²⁵ other units, detachments, and organizations were added within the outer shell of Headquarters Command as the need or contemplated use of these special units was foreseen. After several echelons of AFHQ had been moved from the UNITED KINGDOM to NORTH AFRICA from October to December 1942, the organization chart (shown on the next page) was drawn up to indicate all the units of the Command on 18 December 1942.²⁶ It was this organization that administered and provided necessary security for AFHQ when it first operated in ALGIERS.

e. Personnel. It was not as difficult for early planners to design the organization, discussed above, as it was to obtain ample and able personnel. During September and October 1942, however, Headquarters


23. FM 101-5, ch 1, sect III, par 27. Organizational and Functional Chart AFHQ, 26 Aug 42, prepared by the ACofS, G-1.

24. AFHQ Staff Memo No 10, 7 Sep 42, par 23.

25. Hq Comd AF GO No 1, sect I, 20 Sep 42 (AG Hq Comd AF file: 320) as amended by Hq Comd GO No 2, 23 Sep 42 (AG Hq Comd AF file: 320).

26. Organization Chart, Hq Comd AF, 18 Dec 42.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF HEADQUARTERS COMMAND ALLIED FORCE
December 1942



NOTE: During this period Special Troops was the administrative channel for the Security Command on S-1/4 matters.

ETOUSA furnished whole battalions, companies, detachments, and individuals from American units in the UNITED KINGDOM, assigning these to Headquarters Command. By the end of November, the following thirteen component units amassed a total strength of 771 officers and enlisted men.²⁷

Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops
Headquarters Company, AF
Engineer Detachment (Utilities)
Finance Detachment
105th Ordnance Company
Provisional Transportation Battalion
8th General Dispensary
63d Signal Battalion
Company A, Signal Service Battalion
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Security Command
2d Battalion, 133d Infantry
2d Squadron, 102d Cavalry
805th Tank Destroyer Battalion

By mid-December, the addition of personnel to existing units listed above and the assignment of six more components to Headquarters Command resulted in an over-all strength of 2102 officers and enlisted men. The six additional organizations included:²⁸

205th Military Police Company
Ammunition Detachment
296th Signal Installation Company
Detachment No 3, 162d Signal Phone Company
Detachment 845th Signal Service Battalion
Company F, 112th Engineers

To administer this ever-increasing aggregate, Colonel Ramsey formed a staff of advisors, some members serving in command capacities within

27. Weekly Strength Report, Hq Comd AF, 30 Nov 42.
28. Weekly Strength Report, Hq Comd AF, 15 Dec 42.

Headquarters Command. This was based on operational necessity, rather than on a War Department Table of Organization, as may be seen below:²⁹

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Col	3	2	M/Sgt	0	1
Lt Col	4	5	1st Sgt	0	1
Maj	7	7	Tec 3	0	2
Capt	10	3	Tec 4	0	3
1st Lt	9	2	Tec 5	0	6
2d Lt	1	2	Pfc	0	10
Totals:	34	21		0	23

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>ACTUAL</u>
Officers	34	21
Enlisted Men	0	23
Total Americans:	34	44

For liaison between the Americans and the British, the Camp Commandant (B) and an assistant officer (B) worked closely with Headquarters Commandant (A) in matters of mutual interest at AFHQ.³⁰

5. Camp Commandant (British)

a. Activation. The office of Camp Commandant was activated with the posting of Major J. E. Gilkes (B) to that position on 24 August 1942.³¹ Major Gilkes was replaced by the assignment of Major A. L. Gracie (B) on 7 November 1942.³²

b. Functions. The Camp Commandant was responsible for British personnel assigned and attached to AFHQ and the co-ordination of British requirements with Headquarters Command (A). The duties and responsibilities of this office in relation to British personnel of AFHQ were:³³

29. G-1 NATCUSA file, T/O AFHQ Old (envelope at end of file), 19 Nov 42.

30. AG AFHQ, File No 330.31-20, Roster of Officer Personnel (AFHQ).

31. DMS AFHQ Records: WO Auth cc/1160/MS 2 (d) d, 22 Aug 42.

32. DMS AFHQ Records: WO Auth cc/1204/MS 20, 6 Nov 42.

33. Statement from RSM Lagan, Camp Commandant's Office, 12 Oct 44; FSR, 13 Dec 39, vol I, ch VIII, sect 42.

- (1) Disciplinary matters.
- (2) Local Administration.
- (3) Preparation of Nominal Rolls and Strength

Returns.

- (4) Billeting.
- (5) Pay of other ranks.

c. Organization. The office of the Camp Commandant in November 1942 was organized as shown in the following chart on the next page.³⁴


d. Personnel. The personnel of the Camp Commandant's office in November 1942 was:


<u>OFFICERS</u> ^x		<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u> [#]		<u>OTHER RANKS</u> [#]	
<u>Rank</u>		<u>Rank</u>		<u>Rank</u>	
Maj	1	WO I	1	Sgt	1
1st Lt	1	WO II	1	Cpl	1
				L/Cpl	4
				Pte	7
Totals:	2		2		13

Total British: 17

34. Statement from RSM Lagan, Camp Commandant's Office, 12 Oct 44.
 x Roster of Officers, 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8).
 # War Establishment (B) of AFHQ, VIII/374/1, 12 Oct 42.

OFFICE OF THE CAMP COMMANDANT (BRITISH) AFHQ
November 1942





Air Marshal Sir William L. Welsh
K. C. B., D. S. C., A. F. C., Retired.
In 1942, Air Officer Commanding
Royal Air Force in NORTH AFRICA

Chapter III

GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS

In approaching an historical treatment of the staff sections two factors must be considered: first, the staff sections are the very meat and bone of a headquarters; and, secondly, in a part of a history which is devoted to the headquarters as a whole the woods must not be obscured by the trees. For these reasons a compromise has been made in this chapter between a mere list of the staff sections and a detailed history of each. The result is a brief historical account of each in turn, relating them to the over-all operations and growth of the headquarters. The sections and offices which performed primarily administrative services for AFHQ have already been similarly treated in Chapter II.

1. G-1 Section (Personnel)

a. Activation. G-1 Section AFHQ began to function on 16 August 1942 upon the arrival of its future ACofS. Its official activation was announced on 15 September.¹

b. Assistant Chief of Staff G-1. Colonel Ben M. Sawbridge (A), ACofS G-1 ETOUSA, also served as ACofS G-1 AFHQ beginning 16 August 1942. He was relieved of duty as ACofS G-1 ETOUSA on 26 September, and was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General on 3 December 1942.¹

Brigadier V.J.E. Westropp (B), who had been appointed by the War Office as Deputy Adjutant General (DAG) Allied Force on 19 August 1942, was the officer responsible for British G-1 matters.²

c. Functions. The functions of G-1 Section AFHQ were:³

- (1) Planning, policy formulation, and supervision of personnel under command of the Allied C-in-C.

1. Information Sheet filled out by Col Sawbridge for Hq ETOUSA, 24 Aug 42. An AG Memo of AFHQ to All Staff Sections, 18 Aug 42, also showed a penciled reply by Col Sawbridge which showed he and the section were functioning by that date. For official activation see AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5). See ETOUSA SO No 44, 26 Sep 42, for Col Sawbridge's relief from duty as ACofS G-1 ETOUSA. WD SC No 337, 11 Dec 42.

2. WO Auth MS1/1/347, 27 Aug 42.

3. AR 10-15, 13 July 42, par 7 b.

The personnel concerned included Allied military personnel, civilians under the control of the Allied C-in-C, enemy prisoners of war in Allied hands, matters concerning Allied prisoners of war from the theater under AFHQ who were in enemy hands.

(2) Policy formulation and supervision of sanitation in the theater.

d. Organization. The G-1 Section in the period prior to the establishment of AFHQ at ALGIERS was a joint American and British section, but the form of its organization was parallel rather than integrated. The separate American and British divisions came under the supervision of the ACoFS G-1. For a chart of the initial organization, see the next page.⁴

e. Personnel. The American and British personnel of G-1 Section for the period up to the completion of the move of AFHQ to ALGIERS was as follows:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br^x</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br[#]</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br[#]</u>
Brig Gen		1	WOJG	0	2	M/Sgt	1	
Col	3	2				S/Sgt		1
Lt Col		3				Tec 3	1	
Maj	4	6				Sgt		1
Capt		10				Cpl		2
2d Lt	2					Pfc	1	1
						Pvt		4
Totals:	9	22		0	2		3	9

Total Americans: 12

Total British : 33

COMBINED TOTAL : 45


4. There were no official or approved charts of the G-1 Section in this period. The information was obtained from Lt Col G. G. Baker (G-1 B) and from the chief clerk (G-1 A), who were with the sections from the beginning.

* Taken from the Table of American Personnel in AFHQ, 19 Nov 42 (G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old, in envelope at back of file).

x Taken from WE's VIII/374/1 and VIII/19/2. Statement by Lt Col G. G. Baker (G-1 B), 12 Nov 44, that the British section had filled its establishment of officers by 13 Nov 42.

Information from a statement by WO I Pritchard, Chief Clerk of G-1 (A-1) British, on 16 Oct 44.

ORGANIZATION OF G-1 SECTION AFHQ
 c 1 November 1942



AMERICAN

BRITISH

2. G-2 Section (Intelligence)

a. Activation. G-2 Section, AFHQ, began unofficially with the arrival at Norfolk House on 11 August 1942 of the future ACofS (B), another British officer, and one British warrant officer.⁵ Its official activation came on 15 September.⁶

b. Assistant Chief of Staff G-2. The ACofS G-2 for this period (Aug-Nov 42) was Brigadier E. E. Mockler-Ferryman (B).⁶

c. Functions. The functions of G-2 Section were of two types: operational and security. Among the operational (combat) intelligence functions were the following:

(1) To plan and direct intelligence operations, from AFHQ down to the lowest echelon of command in the theater, for the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and distribution of information of the enemy regarding size, identification, and location of his forces; his methods, procedures, and equipment; and his internal conditions and economic activity.

(2) To supervise and direct all means for obtaining such information, which also included monitoring of enemy military radio communication and aerial photographic reconnaissance.

(3) To maintain intelligence liaison with subordinate, higher, and neighboring Allied services, headquarters, and units as well as with Allied Governments.

(4) To plan and direct intelligence training in the theater.

5. Statement by Lt W. W. Leary, the former warrant officer mentioned above, 26 May 44.

6. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

(5) To provide topographical and engineer terrain intelligence on enemy held territory and, in conjunction with the Naval Staff, to collect, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence on coastlines and beaches in order to assist in the selection of areas suitable for amphibious operations.⁷

The security (counter-intelligence) functions were the following:

- (1) To preserve the secrecy of all Allied plans, operations, communications, and records.
- (2) To assure the security of Allied personnel, equipment, and premises.
- (3) To censor communications, press, and radio for purposes of military security.
- (4) To direct the activities of counter-espionage and counter-sabotage.
- (5) To disseminate demoralizing or false information to the enemy.
- (6) To supervise the interception, obstruction, and refutation of enemy propaganda.⁸

d. Organization. G-2 Section AFHQ is an example of an integrated section as distinguished from a purely national section (AG), or a section with parallel divisions (G-1). Its organization for the period prior to the invasion of NORTH AFRICA is shown on the chart appearing on the next page.⁹


e. Personnel. The personnel present in G-2 Section during the period prior to the invasion is shown in the following table:

7. Route Slip, G-2 to G-3 Hist, 25 Nov 44.

8. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 15. Also chart of Headquarters, Allied Forces (NORTH AFRICA), G-2 Section (Organization and Functions), Aug-Sep 42.

9. The chart reproduced here does not include the personnel and functional data appearing on the original. The chart was entitled "Headquarters, Allied Force (NORTH AFRICA), G-2 Section" with the approximate date, Aug-Sep 42.

ORGANIZATION OF G-2 SECTION AFHQ
August-September 1942



NOTE: The letter opposite the name of a subsection or branch indicates the nationality of the head of the unit and not the nationality of all the personnel.

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br^x</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br[#]</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br[#]</u>
Brig Gen		1	CWO		1	M/Sgt	1	
Col	1		WOJG	1	1	T/Sgt	3	
Lt Col	4	3				S/Sgt		1
Maj	3	6				Tec 3	4	
Capt	12	15				Sgt	3	3
1st Lt	15	2				Tec 4	3	
2d Lt	6					Cpl	1	7
						Tec 5	4	
						Pfc	14	4
						Pvt		3
<hr/>			<hr/>			<hr/>		
Totals:	41	27		1	2		33	18

Total Americans: 75

Total British : 47

COMBINED TOTAL : 122

3. G-3 Section (Operations and Training)

a. Activation. The planning activities of G-3 Section began as early as 4 August 1942 with the assembling of the Combined Planning Staff at Norfolk House.¹⁰ The ACoFS G-3 arrived on 15 August, but served principally as Deputy Chief of Staff until 15 September.¹¹ The Section was officially activated on 15 September 1942.¹²

b. Assistant Chief of Staff G-3. Brigadier General L. L. Lemnitzer (A), who arrived at AFHQ on 15 August 1942 and served as Deputy Chief of Staff until 15 September, was officially appointed ACoFS G-3 on 15 September and remained in that assignment until 13 December 1942.¹³

c. Functions. G-3 Section was to perform the staff functions of AFHQ relating to headquarters and field organization, plans, operations, and training.

* From Table of American Personnel, 18 Nov 42, in G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old, in envelope at back of file.

x Taken from a roster of American and British officers of 1 Nov 42. (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8.)

Information furnished by the Chief Clerk, G-2 Sect, 7 June 44.

10. Cable, Eisenhower to Marshall, 4 Aug 42.

11. Memo, Brig Gen Lemnitzer to Col Daley, 23 Dec 42, Lemnitzer file, AG Personnel, AFHQ.

12. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

13. Ibid. See also Memo, Brig Gen Lemnitzer to Col Daley, 23 Dec 42, Lemnitzer file, AG Personnel AFHQ, and AFHQ SO No 73, 13 Dec 42.

The organization functions were as follows:

- (1) Mobilization of the command.
- (2) Determination of the organization and equipment of headquarters and field units.
- (3) Recommendations of priorities for assignment of personnel and equipment.

The functions of planning of G-3 were:

- (1) Conduct of the arrangements for the Joint Planning Staff.
- (2) Preparation of plans for:
 - (a) Tactical employment of units.
 - (b) Tactical defense of administrative installations and lines of communication.
 - (c) Troop movements.
 - (d) Reconnaissance and security measures.
- (3) Continual review of the military situation with regard to past and future planning.

The operations functions of G-3 were:

- (1) Preparation of studies and estimates of strategical and tactical situations.
- (2) Preparation and authentication of orders and maps to units.
- (3) Observation and supervision of movements and tactical operations.
- (4) Co-ordination of operations of the three task forces, Western, Center, and Eastern.
- (5) Supervision of the activities of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and Special Operations EUROPE (SOE) in the Theater.
- (6) Responsibility for a G-3 Section War Room.
- (7) Liaison with adjacent, higher, and subordinate units on operations.
- (8) Conduct of relations with French authorities on military matters, especially priorities on rearmament.

The training functions of G-3 were principally these:

- (1) Preparation of training plans for units.
- (2) General supervision of the training of units.
- (3) Organization and conduct of training schools.¹⁴

d. Organization. The G-3 Section's organization was on the basis of an integrated section with both American and British personnel found in each of its subsections. A chart representing its organization right after the arrival of its last echelon in ALGIERS is shown on the next page.¹⁵

e. Personnel. At this period very few of the complement of British other ranks had been assigned to duty with the Section. The personnel on duty toward the middle of November 1942 is shown in the following table:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br^x</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br[#]</u>
Brig Gen	1	1	M/Sgt	1	
Col	5	1	T/Sgt	2	
Lt Col	3	3	S/Sgt	2	
Maj	3	7	Tec 3	1	
Capt	2	1	Sgt	3	1
2d Lt	1		Tec 4	2	
			Tec 5	2	
			Pfc	2	2
Totals:	15	13		15	3

Total Americans: 30

Total British : 16

COMBINED TOTAL : 46

14. The basic functions were defined in FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 16. Others were added as indicated in the following references: Organizations and Operations Plans, c. Nov 42; G-3 Operations Subsection, Officers' Duties and Office Instructions, 14 Oct 42 (G-3 AFHQ file: 38/10). Cable No 3633, Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Oct 42. Minutes of the C-in-C Staff Conference, 9 Oct 42. (AG AFHQ file: 337-95.)


15. The chart is based upon the 1st, 2d, and 3d references in the preceding footnote.

* G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old, see table of 19 Nov 42 in envelope at end of file.

x Roster of Officers of AFHQ, 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8).

Statement of Chief Clerk of G-3 (Org B) as to other ranks on duty toward the end of Nov 42.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF G-3 SECTION AFHQ
21 December 1942



NOTE: The letter at the bottom of each box indicates the nationality of the chief and not of all the personnel.

* G-3 Training had not been subdivided before the move to ALGIERS.

4. G-4 Section (Supply and Evacuation)

a. Activation. The G-4 Section of AFHQ began to function with the arrival of its Assistant Chief of Staff on 12 August 1942 and was officially activated on 15 September.¹⁶

b. Assistant Chief of Staff G-4. Colonel Archelaus L. Hamblen (A) served as Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 at AFHQ from 12 August 1942 to 20 March 1943.¹⁷ He was promoted to Brigadier General on 1 December 1942.¹⁸ Brigadier R. G. Lewis (B), who had been appointed by the War Office as Deputy Quartermaster General (DQMG) Allied Force on 11 August 1942, was the officer responsible for British "Q" matters.¹⁹

c. Functions. Because the administrative systems of the British "Q" Staff Branches and Services differed considerably from that of the American G-4 Section, Brigadier Lewis had the responsibility of coordinating Allied logistical matters with Colonel Hamblen. The British side of the Section was not fully formed until the subordinate staff branches and services came under it on 1 January 1943.²⁰

The functions of G-4 (Supply and Evacuation) at AFHQ did not include those concerning railways, roads, and waterways, which are usually cared for by an American G-4 Section. To parallel these allotted functions with the British system of Movements, it was decided to put them all together under a separate Movements and Transportation Section. G-4 (Supply and Evacuation), however, had the responsibility for the rest of the G-4 functions customarily delegated to that Section by American staff procedure, which were the planning, policy formulation, and supervision of the following activities:²¹

16. Form filled out by Col Hamblen in AG Personnel Division file: 201 A. L. Hamblen.

17. Ibid. See also AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5); NATOUSA SO No 43, 20 Nov 42.

18. NATOUSA SO No 337, 11 Dec 42.

19. WO Auth, MS1/1/347, 27 Aug 42.

20. Statement from Maj Gen Lewis, DQMG G-4 (B) AFHQ, 3 Nov 44.


21. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 17.

- (1) The procurement, storage, and distribution of all supplies, including animals and vehicles.
- (2) Recommendations of new types of equipment.
- (3) Maintenance of equipment.
- (4) Collection, salvage, and distribution of captured enemy equipment.
- (5) The location and protection of supply, evacuation, and maintenance establishments.
- (6) Procurement of, and responsibility for, real estate, property, shelter, and facilities including their leasing, repair, maintenance, and disposal.
- (7) Construction, operation, and maintenance of utilities relating to military supply, shelter, and hospitalization, exclusive of fortifications.
- (8) Acquisition and improvement of airfields and bases.
- (9) Funds and priority of expenditure.
- (10) Evacuation and hospitalization of men and animals.
- (11) Assignment and movement of supply, medical, technical, and labor troops not employed as combat troops.
- (12) Recommendations as to the location of rear boundaries and headquarters.
- (13) Preparation, authentication, and distribution of administrative orders.

d. Organization. A chart of the organization of the G-4 Section in December 1942 is shown on the next page.²²

22. British side from ibid., footnote 20 above. American side from statement by Col J. J. Donahue, G-4 (A) AFHQ, Sep 44.

ORGANIZATION OF G-4 SECTION AFHQ
December 1942



AMERICAN

BRITISH

LEGEND:

— Command

- - - - Co-ordination

e. Personnel. The personnel of the G-4 Section in November 1942

was:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am^x</u>	<u>Br[@]</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am[#]</u>	<u>Br[*]</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am[#]</u>	<u>Br[*]</u>
Brig		1	CWO		1	S/Sgt	1	
Col	3		WOJG	1	1	Tec 3	1	
Lt Col		4				Sgt	1	
Maj		6				Tec 4	1	
Capt	1	1				Cpl		1
1st Lt	1					Pfc	1	
						Pvt		2
Totals:	5	12		1	2		5	3

Total Americans: 11

Total British : 17

COMBINED TOTAL : 28

5. Movements and Transportation Section

a. Activation. The Movements and Transportation Section began to function on the arrival at AFHQ of the Chief of the Section on 10 August 1942. Its activation was officially announced on 15 September 1942.²³

b. Chief of Section. Colonel A. T. de Rhe Philippe (B), as senior Allied officer in the Movements and Transportation Section, began his

x Roster of Officers, 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8).

@ Ibid. These figures include British officers in Movements, Services of Supply, and Planning who did not form part of G-4. Those concerned with planning supplied data to the CAO but the later Log Plans Section was not officially constituted until 19 Dec 42. (Memo D/320 issued by CAO, 19 Dec 42.) A breakdown of this British personnel is shown in the table below:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Movements</u>	<u>Supply</u>	<u>Log Plans</u>	<u>Total</u>
Lt Col		2	1	3
Maj	1	2	2	5
Capt	1			1
	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>9</u>

This roster has been used to obtain the official details for both American and British officers in all sections of AFHQ on 1 Nov 42.

Strength Return, 19 Nov 42 (G-1 NATCUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old, in envelope at end of file).

* Statement from SQMS Russell, Chief Clerk G-4 (E) AFHQ, 2 Oct 44.

23. WO file: MS 1/1/347, dated 27 Aug 42. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

duties as Chief of Section on 10 August 1942. He was promoted to Brigadier on 12 October 1942.²⁴

c. Functions. The Movements and Transportation Section assumed those functions of a normal American G-4 section which dealt with planning, policy formulation, and supervision of activities concerning:

- (1) Transportation of military personnel and supplies by railroad, road, waterways, sea, and air.
- (2) Construction and maintenance of military roads, trails, railroads, waterways, and docks, as well as facilities and utilities related thereto.
- (3) The control of traffic on all military railroads, highways, and inland waterways.²⁵

In the pre-invasion period the functions were limited largely to planning, policy formulation, allocation of facilities, and co-ordination of all executive action by the United States Transportation Corps, the British Movements and Traffic Control, and the British Transportation Service. While the two national services were kept distinct, they normally had to make common use of the same transportation lines and facilities. Consequently it was the practice at the Headquarters that the corresponding American and British officers work side by side at adjoining desks.

The actual control and supervision of transportation before the transfer of AFHQ to ALGIERS was carried out by the movement and transportation sections and services of the individual task forces.²⁶

d. Organization. The transportation problems in a combined headquarters were so numerous and complex that it was thought more advisable to follow the British system and separate the transportation functions

24. Ibid. See also WO file: MS 1/1/747.

25. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 17.

26. Historical Record, Office of the Chief of Transportation, U. S. Army, AFHQ-NATOUSA, 31 Oct 43, sect I, par 2. AFHQ Adm Memo No 13, 20 Oct 42, Movement and Transportation Instructions, sect I, par 2.

from those of a normal American G-4 section.²⁷ The resulting Movements and Transportation Section consisted of the American Transportation Corps, the British "Q" Movements, and the British Transportation Services. In the pre-invasion period the American side of the Section was not broken down into subsections but remained a single group of planning officers. The British organization, however, was elaborated in the initial period and is shown on the chart on the next page.²⁸

e. Personnel. In addition to the personnel regularly assigned to the Movements and Transportation Section there were 19 other American officers from SOS ETOUSA (4 Colonels, 11 Majors, and 4 Captains) who participated temporarily in the planning activities at Norfolk House. Some of these were later assigned to the Section or went to serve with the task forces and MBS.²⁹ The regularly assigned personnel in November 1942 were:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br[#]</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br^x</u>
Brig Gen		1	Tec 3	1	
Col	1		Sgt		1
Lt Col	2		Tec 4	1	
Maj	3	3	Cpl		1
Capt		1	Pfc		1
			Pvt		2
Totals:	6	5		2	5

Total Americans: 8
Total British : 10

COMBINED TOTAL : 18

27. The British staff organization had two sections, "Q" Maintenance and "Q" Movements. In addition to "Q" Movements there was also the British Transportation Service. "Q" Movements was concerned primarily with the items or units to be moved, while the Transportation Service dealt with the services which moved them. See last reference in footnote 26 above, sect I, par 1.

28. AFHQ Adm Memo No 13, 20 Oct 42, Movement and Transportation Instructions, Annexures 1 (a) and 1 (b).


29. Historical Record... Transportation U. S. Army, 31 Oct 43, sect I, par 4.

* From Personnel Table, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

From Roster of AFHQ Officers, 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8).

x Statement by QMS Grossman, Chief Clerk to DQMG (Movements and Transportation), 1 Oct 44.

ORGANIZATION OF MOVEMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION SECTION AFHQ
October 1942



6. Antiaircraft Section

a. Activation. The activities of the Antiaircraft Section began with the arrival at AFHQ of its designated Chief on 11 September 1942.³⁰ The official announcement of its activation occurred on 15 September 1942.³¹

b. Antiaircraft Officer. The Antiaircraft Section was headed by Colonel Aaron Bradshaw, Jr. (A) beginning 11 September 1942 until 16 February 1943.³²

c. Functions. The functions of the Antiaircraft Officer and his Section were:


(1) Adviser to the C-in-C and his staff on all antiaircraft matters, including passive defense matters.

(2) Determination of requirements and recommendations for the apportionment of antiaircraft artillery.

(3) Planning for co-ordination of all means of active defense against air operations.

(4) Recommendations as to missions for antiaircraft artillery.

d. Organization. The organization of the Antiaircraft Section in December 1942 was as shown in the chart below:³³



30. Form filled out by Col Bradshaw on 11 Sep 42 in AG AFHQ Personnel Division file: 201 A. Bradshaw, Jr.

31. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

32. See footnote 30 above and also ltr, Maj Gen Pargiter to Camp Commandant AFHQ, 22 Mar 43 (AA&CD AFHQ file: 210.604 Casualties (British)).

33. Statement by Lt Col Swallow, AA&CD Section AFHQ, 28 Sep 44. The nationality denoted by the letter in each box refers to the head of the section and not to all the personnel of the section.

e. Personnel. The personnel of the Antiaircraft Section in late November 1942 is indicated in the following table:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>
Col	2		M/Sgt	1	0
Lt Col		1	Tec 3	1	0
Ma		1			
Totals:	2	2		2	0

Total Americans: 4

Total British : 2

COMBINED TOTAL : 6

7. Chemical Warfare Section

a. Activation. The activities of the Chemical Warfare Section (CWS) began with the arrival at AFHQ of its designated chief on 13 August 1942.³⁴ The official announcement of its activation occurred on 15 September 1942.³⁵

b. Chief Chemical Warfare Officer. The CWS was headed by a Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, Colonel Charles S. Shadle (A), who served, beginning on 13 August 1942, during this entire period.³⁶

c. Functions. The functions of the Chief Chemical Warfare Officer and his Section were:³⁷

- (1) Advise the C-in-C and his staff on all chemical matters.
- (2) Plan the use and allotment of chemical troops.

* From personnel table of AFHQ, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

Statement by Lt Col Swallow, AA&CD Sect, 28 Sep 44.

34. Form filled out by Col Shadle on 15 Sep 42 in AG AFHQ Personnel Division file: 201, Charles S. Shadle.

35. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

36. See two preceding footnotes.

37. FM 105-5, 19 Aug 40, par 25.

(3) Supervise the chemical operations, gas-proofing, decontaminations, and filling of chemical munitions in the Theater.

(4) Supervise chemical training.


(5) Perform duties of chemical technical intelligence concerning our own and enemy chemical operations and equipment.

(6) Determine and supervise the requirements, procurement, storage, distribution, maintenance, and repair of chemical supplies, equipment, salvage, ammunition, and facilities.

(7) Estimate the requirements and recommend the apportionment of chemical supplies, equipment, and munitions to chemical troops.

(8) Inspect all supplies, equipment, and munitions stored and issued by CWS.

d. Organization. The organization of the CWS in November 1942 was as shown in the chart below.³⁸



e. Personnel. The personnel of the CWS in late November 1942 is indicated in the following table:

³⁸. Statement of Lt Kowal, Chief Clerk of CWS, 26 Sep 44. The nationality in each box indicated by the letter refers to the head of the subsection or office and not to all the personnel.

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>
Col	1		M/Sgt	1	
Lt Col	1	1	S/Sgt	1	
Maj		1	Tec 4	1	
			Cpl		1
			Pvt		1
<hr/>			<hr/>		
Totals:	2	2		3	2

Total Americans: 5

Total British : 4

COMBINED TOTAL : 9

8. Engineer Section

a. Activation. The Engineer Section began to function on 28 August 1942 with the arrival of the future Engineer Officer.³⁹ Its activation was officially announced on 15 September 1942.⁴⁰

b. Engineer Officer. The first Engineer Officer of AFHQ was Colonel Frank O. Bowman (A) who served in that capacity from 28 August to 6 December 1942, at which time he was succeeded by Brigadier General Donald A. Davison (A).⁴¹

c. Functions. The Engineer Section had the following functions:⁴²

- (1) To advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief and his staff on engineer matters.
- (2) To prepare plans for the use of engineer troops, including recommendations for their apportionment to smaller units.
- (3) To determine requirements, procurement, storage, and distribution of engineer equipment and

* From personnel table of AFHQ, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at back of G-1 NATCUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

From statement of Lt Kowal, Chief Clerk of CWS, 26 Sep 44.

39. AG AFHQ Personnel Division file: 201, Frank O. Bowman.

40. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

41. AFHQ GO No 24, 6 Dec 42.

42. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 26.

supplies, as well as camouflage and fortification materials.

(4) To advise on construction matters including: erection, maintenance and repair of camps, cantonments, warehouses, hospitals, roads, railways, trails, docks, defenses not assigned to other troops, water supply systems, fixed and portable electric light plants, other utilities of general service not assigned, obstacles (and their removal), airfields, military demolitions and mining, and all means of river crossings.

(5) To recommend traffic regulations on roads and bridges required by their physical condition and to have signs prepared and posted for marking of routes.

(6) To prepare instructions for, and to supervise the use of, camouflage technique and materials, including protective coloration of equipment (except aircraft) for all units.

(7) To perform engineer reconnaissance.

(8) To examine captured engineer equipment.


(9) To co-ordinate surveys and mapping and to procure, produce, and distribute maps.

d. Organization. Because the Engineer Section had no operational duty in this early period, the organization remained simple. Both British and Americans were represented to make the Section an integrated unit. This is shown in the organization chart on the next page.⁴³

e. Personnel. The British personnel of the Engineer Section about 19 November 1942 was over three times that of the American, the most

43. AFHQ Engr Hq Int, Ops, and Tng Sect, Sect Memo No 1, 16 Nov 42 (Engr Sect file (A): 320.31). Statement of WO I Whitehead (B), Chief Clerk, Engr Sect AFHQ, 3 Oct 44.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF ENGINEER SECTION AFHQ
November 1942



LEGEND:

- Command
- - - - - Advisory

noticeable difference being among the enlisted personnel and other ranks. However, the Section as a whole was small during this early period, as is shown by the following table:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>
Col	1	1	CWO		1	S/Sgt		1
Lt Col	1		WOJG		2	Tec 3	2	
Maj		4				Sgt		5
Capt	2	3				Tec 4	2	
						Cpl		7
						Pvt		12
Totals:	4	8			3		4	25

Total Americans: 8
Total British : 36

COMBINED TOTAL : 44

9. Finance Section (American)

a. Activation. The Finance Section, which served principally the American forces in the Theater, began its activities with the arrival of its Chief of Section at AFHQ on 25 August 1942. Its official activation was announced on 15 September 1942.⁴⁴

b. Chief of Section. Colonel Leonard H. Sims, who was designated as the Chief Finance Officer, began to serve in that capacity on 25 August 1942 and continued in that assignment after his arrival in ALGIERS.⁴⁵

c. Functions. The functions of the Chief Finance Officer and his section were:⁴⁶

* In envelope at end of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

WE Engr Sect AFHQ, Nov 42, drawn up by WO I Whitehead (B), Chief Clerk of Engr Sect, AFHQ, 3 Oct 44. Also consolidated in this total is the WE for Survey Directorate (B) in Nov 42, as reproduced by Cpl D. S. Kenward (B) of Survey Directorate, 29 Dec 44.

44. Personal data on Col Sims from AG AFHQ Personnel Division file: 201, L. H. Sims. See also AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

45. Ibid.

46. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 35.

(1) To advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief and his staff on fiscal matters.

(2) To provide for the payment of the American troops in the Theater and the civilian labor serving the American forces.

(3) To provide for the payment for supplies obtained from local sources by American authorities and the payment of claims or damages arising from American needs or action in the Theater.

(4) To supervise the custody and disbursement of United States Government funds in the Theater, including such special funds as the Commander-in-Chief should direct, and the custody of United States financial records.

(5) To prepare plans for the execution of the above functions.

d. Organization. The preparation of plans for the provision of the American task forces with finance and pay personnel and facilities were the principal activities of the Finance Section in the pre-invasion period. There was not, therefore, sufficient personnel nor duties to require a functional subdivision of the Section at that time.

e. Personnel. The personnel of the Finance Section in the pre-invasion period was:⁴⁷

<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>	
Col	1	M/Sgt	1
1st Lt	1	T/Sgt	1
		Tec 5	1
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Totals:	2		3

Total Americans: 5

⁴⁷. Statement by Capt Archer of the Fiscal Directorate of AFHQ, 29 Sep 44.

10. Medical Section

a. Activation. The Medical Section of AFHQ began to function upon the arrival of the newly designated Director of Medical Services (DMS) on about 14 August 1942. It was officially activated on 15 September 1942.⁴⁸

b. Director of Medical Services. The Director of Medical Services (Chief of the Medical Section) at AFHQ was Brigadier E. M. Cowell (B) who served in that capacity during and after the pre-invasion period, beginning on 14 August 1942.⁴⁹ He was promoted to the rank of Major General on 11 November 1942.⁵⁰

c. Functions. The functions of the Medical Section at AFHQ were to advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief and his staff, prepare plans, formulate policies, co-ordinate American and British activities, and supervise matters concerning the following:

- (1) The health and sanitation of Allied troops and American military animals.
- (2) The evacuation of the wounded and sick.
- (3) The location and operation of hospitals and other medical and American veterinary establishments.
- (4) The operation of Allied medical and American veterinary units.
- (5) The requirements, procurement, storage, and distribution of medical, dental, and American veterinary equipment and supplies.
- (6) The training of troops in sanitation and first aid.
- (7) The training of medical troops.
- (8) Medical inspection of troops and establishments.

48. WO file: 112/Med/4405 (AMD 1), 4 Sep 42. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 530.31-5).

49. Ibid.

50. WO file: 79/WE/5562 (SD 3), 30 Nov 42.

(9) The preparation of reports and the custody of medical records and casualties.

(10) The examination of captured enemy medical equipment.⁵¹

d. Organization. In the pre-invasion period the organization of the Medical Section was tentative and not fully elaborated, especially on the American side. Like the G-1 Section, this Section was organized along parallel rather than integrated lines, as is shown on the chart on the next page.⁵²

e. Personnel. The personnel of the Medical Section prior to its reorganization and expansion after the invasion of NORTH AFRICA is shown in the following table:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>
Maj Gen.		1	CWO		1	S/Sgt	1	
Brig Gen		2				Sgt		2
Col	2	4				Tec 4	1	
Lt Col	2	3 ^x				Cpl	2	2
Maj		2				Pvt		6
Totals:	4	12			1		4	10

Total Americans: 8

Total British : 23

COMBINED TOTAL : 31

11. Ordnance Section

a. Activation. The Ordnance Section began to function at AFHQ with the arrival of its Chief of Section on 18 August 1942. Its activation

51. AR 40-5, 15 Jan 26, par 2 and 3. FSR (B) 1930, I, sect 68.


52. Statement by QMS Green, Asst Chief Clerk of Medical Section (B), 2 Oct 44. Memo, Col John F. Corby to G-1 AFHQ, 25 Oct 42.

* Personnel Table of AFHQ, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

Statement of QMS Green, Asst Chief Clerk of Medical Section (B), 2 Oct 44.

x This includes the Principal Matron (Nurse) with the rank of Lt Col.

ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL SECTION AFHQ
November 1942



AMERICAN

BRITISH

was officially announced on 15 September 1942.⁵³

b. Chief of Section. The Chief of the Ordnance Section was Colonel Elbert L. Ford (A) who served in this assignment from 18 August 1942 to 1 February 1943.⁵⁴

c. Functions. The functions of the Ordnance Section were:⁵⁵

(1) To advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief and his staff on ordnance matters.

(2) To prepare plans for use of ordnance troops not assigned to subordinate units.

(3) To collect and evaluate information on Allied and enemy materiel and ammunition and its utilization.⁵⁶

(4) To supervise ordnance activities in subordinate units.

(5) To supervise the procurement, storage, maintenance, repair, salvage, and distribution of ordnance materiel.

(6) To provide for the technical inspection of ordnance equipment.

d. Organization. The organization of the Ordnance Section was not fully elaborated in the pre-invasion period. It was, however, parallel in form with the American and British sides set up separately within the Section. The early organization is shown on the chart on the next page.⁵⁷

e. Personnel. The personnel of the Ordnance Section is shown in the following table:

53. Information Sheet, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ Personnel Division file: 201 Elbert L. Ford). AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).


54. Ibid. See also AFHQ SO No 20, 20 Jan 43, par 7.

55. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 28.

56. Only the American side of ordnance intelligence was performed in the Ordnance Section. On the British side this function was performed by Technical Intelligence of G-2 Section.

57. Based upon statement of Lt Col W. H. Connert, Chief Ordnance Officer (A), 3 Oct 44, and also on a chart of the British organization by Major H. Bullard, 6 Oct 44.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ORDNANCE SECTION AFHQ
November 1942



BRITISH

AMERICAN

NOTE: Most of the British part of the Section accompanied the British First Army into the Theater under temporary assignment until AFHQ arrived in ALGIERS.

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br^x</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am</u>	<u>Br^x</u>
Brig Gen		2	WOJG		1	S/Sgt	1	
Col	1	1				Tec 3	1	
Lt Col		2				Sgt		1
Maj	2					Cpl	1	
Capt	2					Tec 5	1	
						Pvt		1
Totals:	5	5			1		4	2

Total Americans: 9
Total British : 8

COMBINED TOTAL : 17

12. Public Relations Section

a. Activation. The Public Relations Section was activated on 15 September 1942.⁵⁸ On the same date, its future chief was assigned to the Section and started its activity.⁵⁹

b. Public Relations Officer. Major Joseph B. Phillips (A), who had already been serving with the Section for a month and a half, was officially appointed its first Public Relations Officer on 31 October 1942.⁶⁰ He was promoted on 10 November 1942 to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel.⁶¹

c. Functions. The general functions of the Public Relations Section were:

- (1) To assist the Allied C-in-C in determining public relations policies for AFHQ.
- (2) To draw up directives for the Theater based upon approved public relations policies.⁶²

* From personnel table of AFHQ in envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

Roster of AFHQ Officers, 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8).

x Statement by S/Sgt Hartley, Chief Clerk of "A" Vehicles Subsection, Ordnance (B), AFHQ, 4 Oct 44.

58. AFHQ Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

59. AFHQ SO No 1, 15 Sep 42.

60. AFHQ SO No 11, 31 Oct 42.

61. AG AFHQ Personnel Division file: 201, Joseph B. Phillips.

62. AFHQ Staff Routing Slip, PRO to CofS, 5 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 008-12).

(3) To supervise the execution of these policies.⁶³

(4) To supervise the transmission to the proper destination of all material intended for publication after it had been censored by the Field Press Censor. This material included articles from accredited war correspondents, press handouts, scripts, and records for local and foreign broadcasts, photographs, films, and drawings as well as material from troops such as unit publications and letters to newspapers.⁶⁴

More specific functions were added to the Public Relations Section for the Operation TORCH:

(1) To assign all correspondents to the task forces.⁶⁵

(2) To limit the initial publicity emanating from the Theater of Operations.⁶⁶

(3) To supervise the initial pooling of stories by correspondents and to assure balanced news coverage of the operations as a whole.⁶⁷

(4) To assist in the preparation of the daily communique and to assure its most expeditious transmittal to the proper authorities in LONDON for the early weeks of the campaign and, when possible thereafter, to WASHINGTON as well.⁶⁸

(5) After AFHQ had been set up in NORTH AFRICA, to assign conducting officers to correspondents within the Theater, assuring the latter maximum use of transport and communication facilities, as far as military operational requirements would allow.⁶⁹

63. AFHQ Ltr to CGs All Forces, 9 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 008-12).

64. AFHQ Int Instr No 8, 1 Oct 42. AFHQ Oper Memo No 24, 18 Oct 42.

65. See footnote 63.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. AFHQ Oper Memo No 28, 22 Oct 42.

69. Statement of Lt Col Clark (A) of PRO on 7 Oct 44.

(6) To gather all data concerning the death, injury, or capture of any war correspondents.⁷⁰

d. Organization. Throughout the invasion period of NORTH AFRICA, the Public Relations Section was a special staff section of AFHQ. Its organization may be seen on the following page.⁷¹

e. Personnel. The list of personnel present during November 1942 in the Public Relations Section is shown by nationality and rank below:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>
Lt Col	1	1	CWO		1	S/Sgt	1	
Maj	3	4				Tec 3	1	
Capt	4	2				Cpl	1	1
1st Lt	2					Tec 5	1	
2d Lt	1					Pvt		1
Totals:	11	7			1		4	2

Total Americans: 15

Total British : 10

COMBINED TOTAL : 25

13. Quartermaster Section

a. Activation. The Quartermaster Section of AFHQ began to function in early August 1942 with the arrival of its Chief Quartermaster. The Section was officially activated on 15 September 1942.⁷²

b. The Chief Quartermaster. The AFHQ Quartermaster and Chief of Quartermaster Section was Colonel Thomas H. Ramsey (A) who began to serve on this assignment on 15 September 1942.⁷³

70. See footnote 63.

71. Statements of Lt Col Clark (A) and Capt Stahl (A) of PRO, 7 Oct 44.


* Personnel chart in G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at end of file.

See footnote 71 above.

72. Draft of Brief Outline History of Quartermaster Section AFHQ, compiled by QM Sect, 6 Oct 44, p 1. ETOUSA SO No 95, 15 Sep 42, par 7. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

73. ETOUSA SO No 95, 15 Sep 42, par 7. NATOUSA GO No 122, 2 Nov 43.

ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION AFHQ
November 1942



NOTE: (A) and (B) following titles above indicate nationality of the head of the subsection concerned and not the nationality of the whole unit. If nationality is not indicated, the unit concerned contained both American and British personnel and operated as a pool.

c. Functions. The functions of the Quartermaster AFHQ and his section were to:⁷⁴

(1) Advise the Allied C-in-C and his staff on quartermaster matters.

(2) Determine the requirements, procurement, storage, and distribution of quartermaster equipment, supplies, and vehicles.

(3) Procure, operate, and dispose of real estate, utilities, and storage, maintenance, and repair facilities (including leasing) for quartermaster use.

(4) Transport troops and supplies, except those whose transportation has been allocated to other services.

(5) Inspect and supervise motor and animal transportation and quartermaster activities in subordinate units of the command.

(6) Operate and train the services of remount, labor pool, salvage, graves registrations, and motor transport and maintenance.

(7) Examine captured quartermaster equipment.


d. Organization. The organization of the Quartermaster Section was integrated rather than parallel in form. In the pre-invasion period it included personnel responsible for petroleum products, supply, and transport. The chart of the organization as it was on 22 October 1942 is shown on the next page.⁷⁵

e. Personnel. The Quartermaster Section AFHQ, being integrated, included both American and British personnel as shown in the following table:

74. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 39. An Outline of the functions of the Quartermaster at AFHQ, 22 Oct 42, approved by the Chief Quartermaster.

75. An Outline of the Functions of the Quartermaster at AFHQ, 22 Oct 42, approved by the Chief Quartermaster.

ORGANIZATION OF QUARTERMASTER SECTION AFHQ
22 October 1942



NOTE: The letter in the lower right of each box in the chart indicates the nationality of the head of the office and not that of all personnel.

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br#</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br^x</u>
Brig Gen		1	S/Sgt	1	
Col	2	1	Tec 3	1	
Lt Col	1		Sgt		1
Maj	2	3	Cpl	1	2
			Tec 5	1	
			Pvt		2
Totals:	5	5		4	5

Total Americans: 9
Total British : 10

COMBINED TOTAL : 19

14. Signal Section

a. Activation. The Signal Section became activated with the arrival of the Chief Signal Officer at Norfolk House on 11 August 1942.⁷⁶

b. Chief Signal Officer. Brigadier General Jerry V. Matejka (A), having acted as CSO from 11 August 1942, was officially designated head of the Signal Section on 15 September 1942.⁷⁷ He had as Deputy Chief Signal Officer Brigadier W. A. Scott (B), who was appointed CSO (British) on 11 August 1942.⁷⁸

c. Functions. The duties and responsibilities of the CSO and his section were:⁷⁹

(1) Acting as advisor to the Allied C-in-C on all signal matters and co-ordinating signal policy throughout the Theater.

(2) Exercising technical supervision of signal

* Personnel Table of 19 Nov 42 in envelope at back of G-1. NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

Roster of Officers at AFHQ, 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8).

x Statement of WO George Page (A), Chief Clerk of Quartermaster Section, 7 Oct 44.

76. AG AFHQ Personnel Division File: 201 J. V. Matejka. Card filled in by Brig Gen Matejka on arrival at AFHQ.

77. Ibid. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

78. D/MS AFHQ Records: WO Auth, MS 1/1/347, 27 Aug 42.

79. FSR vol I, par 37.2, 13 Dec 39. FM 101-5, par 30, 19 Aug 40.

work through the senior signal officer of formations and communicating directly with these officers on all technical and administrative matters connected with signals.

(3) Estimating the requirements and coordinating the demands for technical signal stores other than those necessary for the maintenance of unit equipment.

(4) Supervising the installation, maintenance, and operation of the signal system, including that of the message center of AFHQ.

(5) Ensuring the safety and security of all ciphers, codes, and signals.

(6) Examining captured enemy signal equipment and supervising intelligence matters relative to signals.⁸⁰

d. Organization. The Section was fully integrated and, in order to ensure co-ordination, daily meetings were held by an informal Combined Signal Board. This Board consisted of the CSO, DCSO, and members of the subsections, when required, together with representatives of the Allied air forces and navies.⁸¹ A chart of the organization in November 1942 is shown on the next page.⁸²


e. Personnel. The personnel on duty with the Section in November 1942 was as follows:

80. American only. G-2 Signal Intelligence dealt with the British side.

81. AFHQ GO No 22, 28 Feb 43.

82. Chart supplied by Maj E. Nicholson, SIS, Signals Section AFHQ, 7 Oct 44.

ORGANIZATION OF SIGNAL SECTION AFHQ
November 1942



LEGEND:

————— Command

- - - - - Co-ordination

A, B Indicate the nationality of the head of the subsection and not that of all the personnel in the subsection.

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am#</u>	<u>Br*</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am#</u>	<u>Br^x</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am#</u>	<u>Br^x</u>
Brig Gen	1	1	CWO		1	M/Sgt	2	
Col	2					T/Sgt	5	
Lt Col	3	2				S/Sgt	1	1
Maj	6	5				Tec 3	3	
Capt	10	2				Sgt	1	
1st Lt	7					Tec 4	3	
2d Lt	13					Cpl	1	
						Tec 5	3	
						Pfc	6	2
						Pvt		2
Totals:	42	10			1		25	5

Total Americans: 67

Total British : 16

COMBINED TOTAL : 83

15. Special Service Section (American)

a. Activation. The Special Service Section AFHQ was officially activated on 15 September 1942.⁸³

b. Chief of Section. Colonel George E. Ramey (A) was Chief of the Special Service Section from 24 October to 13 November 1942.⁸⁴ He was succeeded by Colonel Maurice J. Meyer (A) on 18 November 1942.⁸⁵

c. Functions. The functions of the Special Service Section were:

(1) To advise the Allied C-in-C on morale matters involving American troops.

(2) To prepare plans, formulate policies, and supervise activities concerning (for American troops):⁸⁶

Table of American Personnel, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

* Roster of Officers, 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8).

x Statement from Maj E. Nicholson, SIS, Signal Section AFHQ, 7 Oct 44.

83. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

84. AFHQ GO No 10, 24 Oct 42. AFHQ SO No 34, 23 Oct 42. ETOUSA SO No 152, 11 Nov 42.

85. AFHQ GO No 17, 18 Nov 42.

86. MR 1-10, 5 Mar 43, par 6. (2) b. AFHQ Organization and Function Charts, 10 Nov 43, Chart No 60.

(a) Recreation and athletics.

(b) Welfare, including co-ordination with the American Red Cross, USO, and other welfare agencies.

(c) Informational services, including army newspapers and magazines, discussion forums, educational programs, radio broadcasts, and libraries.

(d) Entertainment services (also co-ordinated with welfare agencies), including motion pictures, theatrical productions, and musical programs.

d. Organization and Personnel. There was no elaboration of this Section's organization in the pre-invasion period, since it consisted of only one Colonel and one Private First Class (all American).⁸⁷

16. Claims Section (American)

a. Activation. The Claims Section of AFHQ began to function on 23 September 1942 with the arrival of its future Chief of Section. It was officially activated on 3 October 1942.⁸⁸

b. Chief of Claims Section. Major Mastin G. White, who first began his duties in the Claims Section at AFHQ on 23 September 1942, was designated as Chief of the Section on 31 October 1942.⁸⁹ He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on 10 November 1942.⁹⁰

c. Functions. The functions of the Claims Section were:⁹¹

87. Personnel Table of AFHQ, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

88. AFHQ Information Sheet filled out by Major White on 30 Sep 42 in AG AFHQ Personnel Division file: 201 Mastin G. White. AG Ltr to CG's of all American task, assault, and air forces under AFHQ and to the AFHQ Commandant, 3 Oct 42.

89. AFHQ GO No 11, 31 Oct 42.

90. ETOUSA SO No 151, 10 Nov 42.

91. See footnote 88 above.

(1) To advise and assist the Allied C-in-C and his subordinate American commanders in matters relating to claims.

(2) To supervise and co-ordinate, under the authority of the Allied C-in-C, the work of the Claims Service and Claims Commission serving with the separate United States forces.

(3) To devise plans for appropriate collaboration with the British Claims Commission with a view to joint action where feasible, and in order to achieve uniformity of policies with respect to the settlement of claims.

d. Organization. Since the personnel authorized for the Claims Section at AFHQ (as distinguished from the personnel sent forward with the task forces) consisted of only three officers and five enlisted men, there was not a subdivision of the Section in the pre-invasion period.⁹²

e. Personnel. The personnel of the Claims Section AFHQ in November 1942 was:

<u>OFFICERS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>			<u>Rank</u>		
Col		1#	T/Sgt	1*	
Lt Col	2'	1	Sgt	1	
Maj	2		Tec 3		1#
Capt	7	1	Tec 4	2	1
1st Lt	5		Tec 5	2	
2d Lt	3		Pfc	21	3
Totals:	19	3		27	5

Total Americans : 46

Total Americans authorized
for Claims Section at AFHQ: 8

92. AFHQ T/O for Claims Service, 2 Oct 42 (G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O Claims Sect AFHQ Old).

* Personnel Table of AFHQ, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old. These figures represent the total personnel actually present with AFHQ and the task forces.

These figures represent the personnel authorized only for the Claims Section at AFHQ. See T/O for Claims Service, 2 Oct 42 (G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O Claims Sect AFHQ Old).

17. Judge Advocate General Section (American)

a. Activation. The Judge Advocate General Section AFHQ was officially activated on 15 September 1942.⁹³

b. The Judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate General and Chief of the Section at AFHQ, beginning 26 October 1942, was Colonel Adam Richmond (A).⁹⁴


c. Functions. The functions of the Judge Advocate General at AFHQ and his section were:⁹⁵

(1) To advise the Allied C-in-C, his staff, and other American members of his command in proper cases, on questions of law.

(2) To supervise the administration of American military justice within the command.

(3) To review, and recommend the action to be taken upon, charges preferred for trial by American military courts of the command and to keep the records of such courts.

d. Organization. The JAG Section did not have an elaborate organization in the pre-invasion period, as may be seen in the following chart.⁹⁶



93. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

94. AFHQ SO No 36, 26 Oct 42. AFHQ GO No 11, 31 Oct 42.

95. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 37.

96. Routing Slip, JAG Sect to G-3 Hist Subsect, 8 Oct 44.

e. Personnel. A table of organization for JAG Section, approved by General Eisenhower before Colonel Richmond's arrival,⁹⁷ was entirely filled with assigned American personnel by 19 November 1942 as indicated in the following table:⁹⁸

<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>	
<u>Rank</u>		<u>Rank</u>	
Col	1	S/Sgt	1
Lt Col	1	Tec 4	1
Capt	1	Cpl	2
Totals:	3		4

Total Americans: 7

18. Civil Affairs Section

a. Activation. Plans for the Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ had been initiated as early as 21 August 1942,⁹⁹ and it was officially activated on 15 September 1942.¹⁰⁰

b. Chief of the Civil Affairs Section. The Chief of the Civil Affairs Section was Mr. Robert D. Murphy (A). Since he was American Consul General in French NORTH AFRICA and would not be publicly associated with the project for reasons of secrecy until after the invasion, the Section was headed by Mr. H. Freeman Matthews (A) as Acting Chief while AFHQ was located in ENGLAND.¹⁰¹

c. Functions. The functions of the Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ in the pre-invasion period included also those of psychological warfare. Altogether the Section was:¹⁰²

97. Cable No 998, AFHQ to ETOUSA, 13 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 321.41-19).

98. Personnel Table, 19 Nov 42, at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

99. Cable No 1381, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Aug 42.

100. AG Ltr to All Concerned, 15 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-5).

101. Cable, Marshall to Eisenhower, 9 Sep 42.

102. FM 101-5, 19 Aug 40, par 38. Cable No 2551, Eisenhower to Marshall, 22 Sep 42.

(1) To advise the Allied C-in-C on matters pertaining to the administration of civil affairs in the Theater.

(2) To prepare plans, formulate policies, and supervise the activities of the administrative, economic, fiscal, and political affairs in the Theater.

(3) To prepare plans, formulate policies, and supervise the activities of psychological warfare, which determines the psychological approach to enemy public opinion in proclamations, newspapers, and radio broadcasts.

d. Organization. In the early period this Section was sometimes referred to as the Civil Administration Section, which was distinct from the Political Affairs Section. However, on 18 October 1942 these two sections were combined into the Civil Affairs Section, which also took over the duties of psychological warfare control. On the next page appears a chart of its subsequent organization.¹⁰³

e. Personnel. The personnel of the Civil Affairs Section at AFHQ in the pre-invasion period, as distinguished from that attached to the task forces, is shown in the following table:

<u>OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS</u>			<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>		
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Am*</u>	<u>Br</u>
Col	5		Tec 4	3	
Lt Col	9		Pfc	3	
Maj	8				
1st Lt	1				
2d Lt	3				
Civilians	15	2 ^x			
	26			6	
Totals:	and				
	15	2			

Total Americans: 47

Total British : 2


COMBINED TOTAL : 49

103. Cable No 3633, Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Oct 42; AFHQ Adm Memo No 11, 18 Oct 42. AG AFHQ Ltr to All Concerned, 18 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 322.92/019-A); Organization Requirements of the Civil Affairs Section, 23 Oct 42 (G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O Civil Affairs and NAEB AFHQ Old).

* From Personnel Table of AFHQ, 19 Nov 42, in envelope at back of G-1 NATOUSA file: T/O AFHQ Old.

x From Roster of Officers at AFHQ, 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 330.31-8).

ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION AFHQ
 October 1942



NOTE: Letters in boxes indicate the nationality of the head of the office or subdivision but not necessarily that of all the personnel.
 Boxes without nationality letters were positions not yet filled.

19. North African Shipping Board

a. Activation. An early example of a co-ordinated Anglo-American board in AFHQ, as distinguished from a combined staff section, was the North African Shipping Board (NASBO) which was activated on 20 October 1942.¹⁰⁴ Its first official meeting was held on 6 November at GIBRALTAR just prior to the North African invasion.¹⁰⁵

b. Chairmen. During this early period there were two chairmen, both civilians. The first was a representative of the Ministry of War Transport (MWT) at GIBRALTAR, Sir Douglas Thomson (B), who served from 6 November 1942 until c. 2 December, when NASBO was moved from GIBRALTAR to ALGIERS.¹⁰⁶ His successor from that date throughout the balance of this early period was Mr. J. Gibson Graham (B), also a representative of MWT.¹⁰⁷

c. Functions. In general NASBO was to serve the dual purpose of co-ordinating Allied shipping activities and acting as a communications center on these matters within the Theater and between it, LONDON, and WASHINGTON. The advisory capacity of this agency and the executive power of the members themselves is brought out in NASBO's more detailed functions which were:¹⁰⁸

- (1) To advise its members on shipping allocation in the area.
- (2) To be responsible for the disposal arrangements of ocean-going shipping after discharge.
- (3) To nominate ships, indicate their priority, and determine the composition of convoys in the Theater for the Naval C-in-C.
- (4) To assure the quickest turnaround of shipping.

104. AFHQ Adm Memo No 13, Annex 2, 20 Oct 42.

105. Minutes of NASBO Meeting, 6 Nov 42 (filed with MWT records).

106. See footnote 105 above. Statement of Mr. W. E. Fereday (B), Secy of MEDBO, 16 Oct 44.

107. Statement of Mr. Fereday, 16 Oct 44.

108. See footnote 104 above.

(5) To be responsible for organizing the best use of repair facilities available, including Gibraltar Naval Drydock, for merchant vessels (A and B) and Army vessels (A).

(6) To arrange civil export and import programs and to assure that the use of ports by neutral shipping is in accordance with existing policies.

(7) To co-ordinate tanker and collier movements.

(8) To organize arrangements for the welfare of merchant seamen.

d. Organization. The organization of NASBO in December 1942 was very simple. Besides the actual Board, there were two subcommittees and the Secretariat. The Board consisted of representatives of Allied shipping agencies and certain military sections of AFHQ.¹⁰⁹ A chart showing these relationships appears on the next page.

e. Personnel. Since the Board consisted of representatives of civilian and military agencies whose executive duties were with the other agencies, NASBO had only the Secretary, a British civilian, with full-time status during this period.¹¹⁰

20. North African Economic Board

a. Activation. A joint military and civil committee at GIBRALTAR outlined the preliminary organization of a unit it designated as the North African Economic Board or NAEB, on 21 November 1942.¹¹¹ The NAEB was officially announced to exist and its functions set forth on 19 December 1942.¹¹²


109. Minutes of Tech Subcom, NASBO, 26 Dec 42. Statement of Mr. Fereday, 16 Oct 44. See footnote 104 above: sect IV (b).

110. AFHQ Adm Memo No 13, Annex 2, sect IV (b), 20 Oct 42. Statement of Mr. Fereday, 16 Oct 44.

111. Note on NAEB, 21 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 336.1-51).

112. AFHQ Ltr to All Concerned, 19 Dec 42 (AG AFHQ file: 336.1-51).

ORGANIZATION CHART OF NORTH AFRICAN SHIPPING BOARD
December 1942



NOTE: The above information came from:
AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No 13, Annexure 2, 20 Oct 42 and
Statements of Mr. Fereday (B), Secretary of MEDEB, 16 Oct 44.

LEGEND:

* Started to function c. 11 Dec 42

Started to function 26 Dec 42

b. The Joint Chairmen. The Chief Administrative Officer of AFHQ, Major General H. M. Gale (B), was designated in the preliminary discussion on 21 November 1942 the sole chairman of NAEB.¹¹³ However, since the Secretary of State (A) had been empowered by the President (A) to conduct civil affairs in NORTH AFRICA¹¹⁴ and since General Eisenhower felt NAEB should be a co-ordinating section,¹¹⁵ the first official Board of 19 December 1942 contained both General Gale (B), to represent the military, and Mr. Robert D. Murphy (A), the civil, as Joint Chairmen of the Board.¹¹⁶

c. Functions. In order to carry out its program of economic cooperation with NORTH AFRICA and its intention "as a means of co-ordinating the civilian supply requirements with the supply and transport requirements of military operations,"¹¹⁷ NAEB had several general functions set forth:¹¹⁸

(1) The supply of essential materials to the civil population and to vital utilities and industries... .

(2) The purchase both of strategic materials which are immediately required in the United Nations war effort and in reasonable quantities of other products, the production and normal markets for which have been disturbed...

(3) The handling of currency and financial problems... .

(4) Initially in accordance with military requirements the maintenance, repair, and expansion of vital transportation facilities, including railroads, port facilities and automotive equipment... .

(5) The maintenance of public health... .

(6) Expansion of the production of finished articles, foodstuffs, and other materials needed by the civil population, by our armed forces, or elsewhere in the United Nations... .

In addition to these general functions NAEB was further responsible for these specific functions:¹¹⁹

113. See footnote 111 above.

114. Cable R-3441, WD to AFHQ, 23 Nov 42.

115. Cable R-2725, Eisenhower and Murphy to Marshall and Hull, 22 Dec 42 (AG AFHQ file: 336.1-51).

116. See footnote 112 above.

117. See footnote 115.

118. See footnote 111.

119. See footnote 112.

(1) To review, record, and co-ordinate the local resources in that part of NORTH AFRICA placed within its purview and to maintain such statistics necessary for this purpose.

(2) To make recommendations to military authorities regarding local production, stocks, and their distribution.

(3) To estimate the balance of essential requirements for military and civil use which must be imported and to advise the appropriate authorities accordingly with emphasis on military needs and the best possible use of shipping. This latter is to be done in concurrence with the North African Shipping Board.

(4) To constitute and arrange for holding of reserved stocks other than military.

(5) To supervise the distribution arrangements on imported or released commodities meeting essential minimum needs of civilians.

(6) To set area price levels for military and civil purchases for consumption therein.

(7) To supervise and to direct through AFHQ the activities of local purchasing agencies.

(8) To collate and to provide information on economic matters as directed from WASHINGTON and LONDON.

(9) To deal with other matters as the Allied C-in-C may direct.

d. Organization and Personnel. During this early period NAEB dealt with policy formulation, and it was not actually until early 1943 that either personnel or organization took any definite shape. A very elementary organization chart of the Board as it existed in December 1942


appears on the next page.¹²⁰ Personnel consisted of Mr. Murphy (A) and General Gale (B) as assigned members of the Board. In addition another civilian, Mr. Matthews (A), acted temporarily as Deputy Chairman¹²¹ (Executive Vice-Chairman). Other members of the Board varied with different meetings, as directed by the Joint Chairmen, but principally consisted of representatives of the G-1, G-4, Civil Affairs Sections of AFHQ, and the British Civil Liaison Officer.¹²²

120. See footnotes 111 and 112.

121. Cable No 1056, Eisenhower to Somervell, 21 Nov 42; see also footnote 111.

122. See footnotes 111 and 112.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF NORTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC BOARD
December 1942



NOTE: Letters (A) and (B) in boxes above indicate nationality of the heads of the offices or subdivisions and not necessarily that of all the personnel within them.



Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham

Bart., G. C. B., D. S. O.

In 1942, Admiral, Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief

Western Mediterranean

Chapter IV

THE MOVE OF AFHQ TO NORTH AFRICA

Four months (August 1942 to January 1943) were required to plan and execute the AFHQ move to NORTH AFRICA. The move, both by sea and air from the UNITED KINGDOM, consisted of the following stages:

- (1) Adoption of procedure for the move.
- (2) Preparation for the move.
- (3) The move to GIBRALTAR.
- (4) The move to ALGIERS.

1. Adoption of Procedure for the Move

The supervision of the move of AFHQ personnel and equipment from the UNITED KINGDOM to NORTH AFRICA was the responsibility of the Headquarters Commandant.¹ Convoy sailing and arrival dates were published by G-4 for both destinations, GIBRALTAR (code name, TUXFORD) and ALGIERS (code name, HAMBLE).² Air transport to both destinations was furnished by the Twelfth Air Force. Keeping in mind the necessity for moving combat troops into NORTH AFRICA first, all sections of AFHQ made minimum bids for space on the many different convoys (see last page of this chapter). Thus at no time would the total shipped on a particular convoy seriously interfere with the operation requirements in the new theater. General staff sections approved and consolidated bids of designated special staff sections, covering number of personnel, vehicles, and stores, before forwarding them to the Headquarters Commandant. These bids then went to G-3 for collation and finally to the respective task force commanders for their consideration. In exceptional cases the latter could lodge written protests with G-3 regarding any AFHQ bids, who would forward these in turn to the Chief of Staff for a command decision made, when required, in

1. Organizational and Functional Chart AFHQ, 26 Aug 42, prepared by CofS G-1 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-1).

2. AFHQ, "Convoy Programme," 11 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 370.091-74).

consultation with the CAO. After agreement had been reached on the bids, the task forces informed the Department of Movements in the War Office, while G-3 informed the Headquarters Commandant. The latter then became responsible for obtaining the necessary data direct from the Department of Movements concerning any AFHQ moves, for distributing and clarifying movement orders, and for physically assisting the embarkation of the staff sections.³

For personnel destined initially for GIBRALTAR the general staff sections consolidated the bids of the special staff sections, this information going direct to G-3 for assessing priorities and for forwarding to G-4 (Movements and Transportation). G-3 then informed the general staff sections of their allocations. The Headquarters Commandant was responsible for arranging physical movements prior to embarkation,⁴ and rosters of AFHQ personnel leaving permanent stations in the UNITED KINGDOM for a move overseas were submitted by the Headquarters Commandant to the machine records units.⁵ At the same time supply requests were consolidated for AFHQ units through the S-4 Section, Headquarters Command. As materials became available, issues were made, on requisition, from SCS ETOUSA depot stocks to Headquarters Command S-4, which in turn supervised the distribution to the sections.⁶ Task force shipment numbers and markings, determined by G-3, were published through the Headquarters Commandant.⁷

2. Preparation for the Move

a. GIBRALTAR. Before any official activation orders had ever been drawn up for AFHQ in LONDON, Lieutenant Colonel Ramsey, Headquarters Commandant (A), and Captain Hodges, RN, Chief Signal Officer of Combined

3. AFHQ Memo to General and Special Staff Sections, 11 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 008-19).

4. Ibid.

5. Hq Comd AF, Ltr to 91st MRU, 3 Nov 42, subj: "Personnel Movement."

6. Requisitions Hq Comd AF, Sep and Oct 42.

7. Memo Hq Comd AF, 28 Sep 42, file: 400.16, Ser No 9.

Operations, were directed by Major General Clark (A) to:

Initiate the best possible arrangements for the provision of the necessary headquarters, communication, and accommodation facilities at GIBRALTAR for the conduct of the Operation TORCH.⁸

On completion of the inspection trip by these two officers, several weeks of active preparation ensued, in which period an air-conditioned group of offices deep under the Rock was being prepared for the Commander-in-Chief, his staff, commanders of all three services, their operational staffs, and their communications.⁹

b. ALGIERS. Preparations for the ALGIERS move were underway by 28 September 1942. At this time, the Headquarters Commandant announced that the St. George Hotel would be a suitable location for AFHQ in ALGIERS and indicated that a further expansion of the Headquarters into other sections of the town would be probable.¹⁰ General Clark (A) followed this early bid with a letter to CG ETF stating the St. George Hotel would be needed by AFHQ by D + 7 or sooner and the premises would be vacated accordingly by assault forces.¹¹ To complete the ALGIERS office accommodation plans and facilitate future assignments,¹² a chart was drawn up in LONDON listing the required office space by sections. Thus the ultimate size of AFHQ at ALGIERS was taken into account as later suggested by General Clark (A).¹³

c. LONDON. Announcement was made 7 September 1942 of the decision for an AFHQ advance CP at GIBRALTAR to be followed, as the tactical situation permitted, by a more permanent location of AFHQ at ALGIERS.¹⁴ This meant that, as the Operation TORCH developed, one and possibly two other echelons of AFHQ sections would be functioning simultaneously. The

8. AFHQ Ltr, 31 Aug 42, subj: "Directive."

9. Report of the AG, c. 1 May 43 (AG AFHQ file: 321-1). Report of Maj Gen J. C. Haydon (B), c. Jan 43, "Impressions gained from the Assault Phase in the Operations in NORTH AFRICA" (Period 5-23 Nov 42).

10. Minutes of the CAO's Meeting of 28 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 337-1).

11. Ltr, Clark to CG ETF, 15 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 631-16).

12. Plans for Full Office Accommodation of AFHQ, c. 18 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 680.341-66).

13. Cable, Clark to Eisenhower, 19 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-1).

14. Memo, Gruenther to Clark, 7 Sep 42 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-1).

co-ordination and separation of functions of each staff section echelon had to be developed and outlined as a step preparatory to any move of AFHQ. Rear Echelon AFHQ LONDON began to function on 2 November,¹⁵ although the scope of its activity listed below had previously been defined on 18 October 1942:¹⁶

- (1) To co-ordinate action in accordance with instructions received from the Command Post or with the actual development of operations.
- (2) To continue planning.
- (3) To form the normal channel of communication between the Command Post and the authorities in LONDON and WASHINGTON.
- (4) To co-ordinate action arising from the requirements of Navy, Army, and Air commanders in the Theater.

3. The Move to GIBRALTAR

a. Functions of Gibraltar CP. The Command Post AFHQ Gibraltar had two important over-all functions outlined by 18 October 1942:¹⁷

- (1) To direct the operation in closer physical touch with subordinate Army, Navy, and Air Commanders than is possible from LONDON.
- (2) To instruct rear echelon AFHQ LONDON as to the lines on which action is required for the furtherance of the plan.

These over-all functions were augmented by two more specific functions:¹⁸

- (1) Decision to carry out the original TORCH plan by D-1, after checking military and political situations as well as weather conditions.
- (2) News dissemination about the invasion to the rest of the world, following preconceived plans formulated in LONDON.


b. Arrival of AFHQ Personnel. Offices and communication facilities were set up by AFHQ personnel arriving at GIBRALTAR by sea and air from

15. AFHQ Memo to All Concerned, 1 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-23).

16. AFHQ Opn Memo No 22, 18 Oct 42.

17. Ibid.

18. AFHQ Memo, G-3 to CofS, 31 Oct 42 (AG file: 381.16).



Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle
In 1942, Brigadier General Commanding
United States Army Air Force in NORTH AFRICA

the UNITED KINGDOM during the latter part of October and early November 1942.¹⁹ General Eisenhower (A), General Clark (A), General Doolittle (A), and many other high-ranking officers had arrived by 5 November 1942,²⁰ on which date the Command Post began to function officially.²¹

c. Difficulties of the Move. In the transit of personnel to GIBRALTAR difficulties were few, and the original programs were largely followed. The plane in which General Doolittle was a passenger was attacked enroute by Nazi planes. Because the American pilot became injured, the General took over the control of the ship.²² The difficulties with the Rock centered in the limited physical space for all the required offices and accommodations. This disadvantage was somewhat offset, however, by the convenient centralization of the offices and communications of the CP.

4. The Move to ALGIERS

a. Functions of AFHQ Algiers. The central location and the many accommodations of ALGIERS made the city ideally suited as the site for the Advanced Echelon of AFHQ right after the initial invasion. The functions of this Echelon would be:

(1) Operational and administrative headquarters for the Allied forces in the western MEDITERRANEAN.

(2) A diplomatic center for the Allied nations in the western MEDITERRANEAN.

b. The Actual Move. The first AFHQ personnel to arrive in ALGIERS were those attached to the Eastern Task Force on 8 November 1942.²³ Flying from GIBRALTAR the following day, General Clark (A) brought with

19. AFHQ, "Convoy Programme," 11 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 370.091-74).
AFHQ Memo to All Concerned, 17 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 373.012).

20. AG AFHQ, Report of the AG, c. 1 May 43 (AG AFHQ file: 321-1).

21. Cable No 60, AFHQ to AFHQ LONDON, 5 Nov 42.

22. See footnote 20 above.

23. AFHQ Ltr to CSO, Pol Sect, Cl Sect, CA Sect, PR Sect, 17 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 541.1-17).

him a small nucleus of the Advance Echelon AFHQ²⁴ to perform the initial functions outlined by General Eisenhower:²⁵

(1) To facilitate operations in the direction of TUNIS.

(2) To carry on anticipated negotiations with French officials.

General Giraud was informed of the establishment of the Advance Echelon AFHQ Algiers the day it arrived.²⁶

Other AFHQ personnel arrived from both GIBRALTAR and the UNITED KINGDOM on the many convoys of November and December.²⁷ The Command Post AFHQ Gibraltar ceased to exist when its functions were merged with those of Advance Echelon AFHQ to form AFHQ Algiers on 25 November 1942.²⁸ The Rear Echelon AFHQ London gradually dissolved during December. The SGS offices closed on 11 December preceding the move to ALGIERS,²⁹ and the final echelon of the remaining AFHQ sections left the UNITED KINGDOM on the KMF 6 convoy, 25 December 1942, which arrived in ALGIERS on 3 January 1943.³⁰

c. Office Space and Accommodations. Announcement was made on 24 November 1942 that the AFHQ in ALGIERS was located in the St. George Hotel.³¹ This followed the early plans formulated in the UNITED KINGDOM. Other buildings were requisitioned by AFHQ for additional required office space and accommodations. An inventory of these properties was made on 13 and 15 December 1942 which revealed that eleven buildings contained 388 offices and eighty buildings housed 468 officer billets.³² Coordination with French officials on requisitioning properties resulted in reasonably few complaints.³³

24. See footnote 20.

25. Memo, Eisenhower to Anderson, 7 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-1).

26. Ltr, Eisenhower to Giraud, 9 Nov 42 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-63).

27. AFHQ, "Convoy Programme," 11 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 370.091-94).

28. Cable No 1210, AFHQ to WD, ABFOR, AFHQ Algiers, 24 Nov 42.

29. AFHQ Memo to All Concerned, 11 Dec 42 (AG AFHQ file: 323.35-1).

30. Oral statement of Lt Horst (A), 26 Sep 44, who was a member of this last echelon.

31. See footnote 28.

32. Hq Comd AF, Memos to Gen Sawbridge 13 and 14 Dec 42, filed under "Office Space," Hq Comd AF.

33. Ltr, Chatel to Eisenhower, 4 Dec 42 (AG AFHQ file: 680.35-58). Ltr, Giraud to Eisenhower, c. 25 Dec 42.

d. Difficulties with the Move to ALGIERS. The problems of moving AFHQ from the UNITED KINGDOM to ALGIERS were generally those summarized below:

- (1) Available shipping space on requested convoys.
- (2) Suitable personnel to run the three echelons of the Headquarters.
- (3) Definition of functions of each echelon.
- (4) Communications.
- (5) Accommodations and office space at ALGIERS.
- (6) Safe passage of convoy.
- (7) Making the move without interference with the current operations.

Problems (1), (3), (5), and (7) have been discussed above. Problem (2) was a function of command, each section chief delegating responsible personnel in his section to certain tasks and performing other specific duties himself. The commanders of the services remained in constant contact with the Commander-in-Chief. Problem (4), communications, involved the transfer of signal personnel and equipment from naval vessels to shore installations. Time and a lack of ample facilities were the limiting factors in the rapid establishment of land-based communications. Problem (6) involved the dangers from enemy submarines and air attacks,³⁴ and elaborate precautions were taken by the naval forces to assure the safe arrival of personnel and cargoes at their destinations. However, the war at sea was carried to the Algiers doorstep when, on 7 November 1942, the S. S. Thomas Stone, whose passengers included AFHQ personnel, was hit by an aerial torpedo.³⁵ The loss of cargoes on K-57 and K-58 occurred about 12 December.³⁶ Between two and three hundred officers and men of AFHQ were involved in another incident at sea near ORAN when their ship, HMT Strathallan, was torpedoed early on the morning of 21 December

34. Cable, AFHQ to WD, 10 Dec 42 (AG AFHQ file: 560.35).

35. Statement by Maj Gen Lewis (B) in memo, G-4 (B) to DCofS, 12 Dec 44.

36. Cable, Lee in LONDON to AFHQ Algiers, 12 Dec 42 (AG AFHQ file: 400.34-42).

1942. Fires broke out on the ship, and its passengers, who were forced to abandon her during the day, were subsequently disembarked at ORAN.³⁷ The AFHQ losses in the move to NORTH AFRICA were light, however, and did not seriously retard the establishment of AFHQ at ALGIERS.

³⁷. Statement of Col C. C. Sloane, Jr. (A), DACofS G-2, in memo, G-2 to G-3 Hist Sect, 25 Nov 44. Statement of Col G. G. Baker (B) (G-1 B), 12 Dec 44.

CONVOY SCHEDULE - 1942

CONVOY	DATE SAILING UNITED KINGDOM	GIBRALTAR		ARR. ALGIERS
		ARR.	DEPT.	
KX 2	18 Oct	31 Oct		
KX 3	18 Oct	27 Oct		
*Cruiser	21 Oct	29 Oct		
*Air	2 Nov	2 Nov		
*Air	3 Nov	3 Nov		
KX 4	21 Oct	3 Nov		
*Air	4 Nov	4 Nov		
KMS 1	22 Oct			8 Nov (D-Day)
KMF 1	26 Oct			8 Nov (D-Day)
*Air			9 Nov	9 Nov
TE 1			8 Nov	11 Nov
TE 2			9 Nov	12 Nov
KMS 2	24 Oct			12 Nov
KMF 2	1 Nov			12 Nov
KX 5	30 Oct	10 Nov		
TE 3			13 Nov	16 Nov
KX 6	8 Nov	21 Nov		
TE 4			18 Nov	21 Nov
*Air			21 Nov	21 Nov
KMF 3	13 Nov			22 Nov
KMS 3	7 Nov			26 Nov
TE 5			28 Nov	1 Dec
KMF 4	27 Nov			6 Dec
TE 6			3 Dec	6 Dec
KMS 4	23 Nov			10 Dec
KMF 5	11 Dec#			21 Dec®
KMS 5	7 Dec			24 Dec
zKMF 6	25 Dec			3 Jan

NOTE: Dates not otherwise authenticated come from AFHQ "Convoy Programme," 11 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 370.091-74).

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- * Report of the AG, c. 1 May 43 (AG AFHQ file: 321-1).
 - x AFHQ Memo to All Concerned, 17 Oct 42 (AG AFHQ file: 373/012).
 - # Statement of Capt Leary, G-2, on 1 Oct 44, who was on AFHQ ship torpedoed near ORAN, 21 Dec; the AFHQ party arrived at ALGIERS 23 Dec 42.
 - ® Statement of Col C. C. Sloane, Jr., DACofS G-2, in memo G-2 to G-3 Hist Sect, 25 Nov 44.
 - z Statement of Lt Horst (A), 26 Sep 44, member of G-2 Sect AFHQ.

Part I of the History of AFHQ was prepared, under the joint direction of Lt Col E. Dwight Salmon (MTOUSA Historical Section of G-3 Division) and of Lt Col Paul Birdsall (AFHQ Historical Section of SAC Secretariat), by Capt Lynn M. Case (Editor-in-Chief), Capt Wayne H. Byrne, Capt Colin P. Gormley, and 1st Lt Herbert J. Vogt with the assistance of Tec 3 Robert H. Vines and Tec 4 Elizabeth C. Farwell. The charts were drafted by Tec 4 Raymond F. Burgess; the final copy typed by S/Sgt Marjorie A. Duffy; and the cover designed by Cpl Charles E. Hardy.

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