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Integrated Concept Working Group (ICWG) Meeting

DRDC Toronto, 20 – 21 October 2009

*James W. Moore
DRDC Toronto*

Defence R&D Canada

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James W. Moore

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Table of contents

Table of contents	1
1 Introduction and Background	3
1.1 AGENDA	5
Day 2	6
2 ICWG Presentation.....	7
3 ICWG Syndicate 3 – Warfare in the Human Domain: Synopsis.....	23
Distribution list.....	31

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1 Introduction and Background

The Integrated Concept Working Group (ICWG) was established in April 2008 under the authority of the Chief of Force Development (CFD).¹ Its mandate is to provide a forum for L1 Force Developers to share, discuss, construct and review new concepts, as well as to serve as an advisory body to CFD on emerging issues prior to being presented at the Capability Development Board (CDB). The ICWG is intended to complement concept work currently ongoing in the CF, and, through its integrated and collaborative approach, to bring coherence to the process of developing high-level operational concepts within the Horizon 2-3 timeframe. More specifically, its primary focus areas are:

- “assisting CFD in the provision of oversight to L1s Force development prior to CDB on new concept initiative;
- assisting CFD in the development of concept document associated with joint capability initiatives/projects;
- the Future Security Environment [FSE] and Integrated Capstone Concept [ICC] documents;
- all force development initiatives are in keeping with Defence Policy, Defence strategic guidance, the Future Security Environment;
- joint, environmental, special operations and functional force development activities at the concept level are aligned and synchronized;
- strategic concept development activities are coordinated and synchronized with programme management activities.”²

The ICWG is composed of force developers at the senior working staff level, and operates under the chair of DFSA. The following organizations are represented in the Group:

- ICWG Membership

CFD DGFDA – DFSA ICDTs Team Leader
CFD – D Cap Dev
CFD – D Strat Coord
SJS - DGP
ADM(Pol) – DG Pol Plan
CMP – CMP Strat

¹ A.P. Bradfield, DG Force Development Analysis, *Initiating Directive – Integrated Concept Working Group*, Letter, 1901-1(DFSAs), April 2008.

² *TORs – CF Integrated Concept Working Group* (undated), email attachment received from L.Col. S. Kostner (DFSAs), 3 November 2009.

- ICWG Membership (cont.)

ADM(Mat) – DGMSP
CMS – DG Maritime Force Development – D MarStrat
CLS – DG Land Combat Development – DLCD
CAS – DG Air Force Development – D Air Strat Plan
Comd Canada COM – COS FD
Comd CEFCOM – COS FD
Comd CANSOFCOM – COS FD
Comd CANOSCOM – COS FD
CDI – D Int Cap
COS (ADM(IE))
COS (ADM(IM))
ADM(S&T) – DG CORA
CFEC – COS
(Others as appropriate, by invitation)

The ICWG normally convenes three times per year either in Ottawa or at locations outside the National Capital Region (NCR), the most recent meeting being held from 20-21 October 2009 at DRDC Toronto. (The meeting's Agenda is included in Annex 1 to this Section, found on p.3.)

This DRDC Toronto Technical Note (TN) provides a record of the author's participation in the October ICWG meeting. The next Section includes the presentation made to the Working Group on Day 1 of the conference, entitled "Understanding ANSAs: An Interim Knowledge Management Tool". It provides an overview of the Concept Map of an Irregular Adversary (Insurgent) [IA(I)] developed in the context of TIF Project 10ad08 "A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics". Section 3 includes a synopsis of the discussion in Syndicate 3 – Warfare in the Human Domain, held on Day 2 of the meeting, for which the author served as lead.

1.1 AGENDA

Day 1


<u>Time</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Presenter</u>
0800-0830	In processing	
0830-0845	Administration	LCdr Dabbagh
0845-0900	Opening address - Defence R&D for the Human Domain: Overview of DRDC Toronto	J. Baranski
0900-0930	DFSA Update	LCol Aubin
0930-1000	FSE II Presentation	LCol Pichette
1000-1015	Coffee Break	LCdr Dabbagh
1015-1030	ICC Sitrep	LCol Yee
1030-1045	Arctic IC Sitrep	CDR Henderson
1045-1115	Government Response to Major Terror Attack – IC	LCol Yee / Maj Setter
1115-1200	CFD remarks	MGen Beare
1200-1300	Lunch	
1300-1400	Shielding the Human: Psychosocial Considerations for the Military Context	Dr. D. McCreary
1400-1500	Collective Performance in the Human Domain: Interagency and Public Challenges in the Future Operational Space	Dr. M. Thompson
1500-1515	Coffee break	LCdr Dabbagh
1515-1645	Understanding ANSAs: An Interim Knowledge Management Tool	Dr. J. Moore
1645	End of Day 1	

Day 2

<u>Time</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Presenter</u>
0800-0945	Syndicate Work Syndicate 1 - FSE II or Arctic IC Syndicate 2 - Major Terror Event - IC Syndicate 3 - Warfare in the Human Domain	Syndicate Leads
945-1015	Coffee Break	
1015-1200	Syndicate Work (cont.)	
1200-1300	Lunch	
1300-1430	Syndicate Feedback	Syndicate Leads
1430-1500	Coffee Break	
1500-1600	Syndicate Feedback (cont.)	Syndicate Leads
1600-1615	Closing Remarks	LCol Aubin




2 ICWG Presentation

The slide features a dark blue background with a large, stylized logo in the center. The logo consists of the letters 'R', 'D', and '&' intertwined, with a maple leaf above the ampersand. The words 'DEFENCE' and 'DÉFENSE' are written in a serif font on either side of the logo. Below the logo, the title 'Understanding ANSAs: An Interim Knowledge Management Tool' is displayed in a bold, sans-serif font, followed by the subtitle '(ICWG Meeting, DRDC Toronto, 20 October 2009)'. The presenter's name, 'James W. Moore, LL.M., Ph.D.', and his affiliation, 'Adversarial Intent Section, Defence R&D Canada Toronto', are listed below. At the bottom left, there are logos for 'Defence Research and Development Canada' and 'Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada'. At the bottom right, the 'Canada' wordmark is visible.

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Understanding ANSAs: An Interim Knowledge Management Tool
(ICWG Meeting, DRDC Toronto, 20 October 2009)

James W. Moore, LL.M., Ph.D.
Adversarial Intent Section
Defence R&D Canada Toronto

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Though, as we've discussed thus far today, the ICWG's focus in the coming months will be with the occurrence of a major terrorist event in Canada, we need to recognize that the roots of such an event may lie beyond our borders. In one scenario, for instance, it may come as a response to the international activities of the CF in armed conflicts overseas, whether those activities are in the form of Peace Support Operations or COIN Operations.

The question we need to answer in this scenario – and, indeed, in all scenarios involving terrorist attacks on this country – is two-fold: First, who might engage in such attacks on Canadian targets; and, second, why might they resort to such tactics?


<p>TIF:10ad08 — A Conceptual Framework for Understanding ANSAs: Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics</p> 	<p>Objective</p> <p>To advance our understanding of (1) the strategic roles of Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs) in the context of chronic social conflict within fragile or failing states; (2) the operational dynamics – i.e., the structures and processes – of ANSAs in both their internal and external interrelations.</p>
<p>Status</p> <p>3-year program 2009-12</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partner Group 0 • Thrust 10a Strategic and Future Environment • Research team: Adversarial Intent Section/DRDC Toronto plus external contract support • Principal Investigator: James Moore Tel: (416) 635-2000 Ext.3035 Email: james.moore@drdc-rddc.gc.ca 	<p>Approach</p> <p>3 phases:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conceptual Development (Yr.1) • Data Collection and Analysis (Yr.2) • Support Tool Verification and Refinement (Yr.3) <p style="text-align: right;">Defence R&D Canada • R & D pour la défense Canada</p>

In this, there’s an overlap between the work of the ICWG in developing the Major Terrorist Event (MTE) Integrating Concept and the work we’re doing here at DRDC Toronto on ANSA or Armed Non-state Actor intent and behaviour.

On April 1st of this year, we stood up a Technology Investment Fund or TIF Project entitled “A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics.” The overall aim of the Project is to broaden and deepen our understanding of, firstly, the strategic roles of ANSAs in the context of chronic social conflict within fragile or failing states, and, secondly, to understand the operational dynamics – that is, the structures and processes – of ANSAs in both their internal and external interrelations, this in light of recent theoretical advances made in the social sciences and the practical experience gained on the battlefield in the past eight years of irregular warfare.

We’re not starting from ‘square one’ in this investigation. The Land Forces already have a detailed conception of an Irregular Adversary (Insurgent) [IA(I)]. This is set out in two doctrinal publications: *Land Operations* and *Counter-Insurgency Operations*, both produced by the Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD) and published on the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff (CLS) in 2008. In *Land Operations*, we have a combined total of 16 pages, found in one section and one annex, focusing on irregular adversaries in general. In *Counter-Insurgency Operations*, we have some 36 pages, spread across three chapters, describing the characteristics

and activities of insurgents in particular. In addition, numerous references to irregular adversaries and insurgents are found scattered throughout the bodies of these field manuals. Can we draw together these disparate strands and create a consolidated picture of an IA(I) to serve as the starting point for our investigation? Can we distill these extensive writings down to the essentials of the concept?




To help us in this endeavour, we’ve developed a knowledge management tool using a modeling technique known as **concept mapping**. (As a brief aside, this concept map was created using the *CmapTools Knowledge Modeling Kit*, a software toolkit produced by the Institute for Human and Machine Cognition (IHMC), a non-profit research institute affiliated with the Florida University System. The toolkit is available for free download from the Institute’s website at <http://cmap.ihmc.us/conceptmap.html>.) Briefly, a concept map is a visual model for organizing and representing knowledge, and consists of a semi-hierarchical arrangement of concepts and propositions. Typically, a **concept** – the nodes in a concept map – is an event or object designated by a label, most often a word or phrase. For example, in the IA(I) Concept Map, “a complex social environment”, “a local populace” and “a failed or failing state” are all concepts. A **proposition**, on the other hand, uses linking words or phrases to connect two or more concepts to form a meaningful statement. Again, incorporating the linking phrases, we have the proposition (P12): “An Irregular Adversary (Insurgent) lives and operates in a complex social environment

amongst a local populace in a failed or failing state.” Each concept map is constructed with reference to a **focus question**, the specific question the map is intended to address. The focus question that interests us here is “What is the Land Force’s manifest concept of an Irregular Adversary (Insurgent) [IA(I)]?”

As a brief aside, what do we mean when we refer to the manifest concept of an IA(I)? A **manifest concept** is simply the conditions or criteria that an object must meet for membership in the category or group to which the concept label is applied. In other words, it’s the concept that we believe to be guiding us and that we see ourselves as attempting to apply. It’s important to note that this isn’t necessarily the concept that we actually apply in our day-to-day lives, what’s termed the **operative concept**. Indeed, problems can arise when gaps emerge between our manifest and operative concepts. But that’s a discussion for another time. For the moment, all we need to remember is that a manifest concept is our theoretical or abstract conception of an object, in this case, of an IA(I). And, as I mentioned earlier, the formal statement of this manifest concept is found in the Land Force’s *Land Ops* and *Counter-Insurgency Ops* field manuals.

As you can see from the concept map, the Land Force conception of an IA(I) is quite extensive. Indeed, according to my analysis of the relevant sections in the field manuals, there are some 29 key propositions that define an IA(I). For ease of understanding, we can divide these propositions into four major blocks, each of which is embedded as a sub-map within the overall Concept Map: (1) Group Structure; (2) The Ideational Core; (3) The Context – Chronic Social Conflict; and (4) Strategic Decision Processes [see also the following three slides].



Group Structure Block

Proposition 1a: An IA(I) is a non-state movement.

Proposition 1b: A non-state movement is not directly linked to an external country or government.


Proposition 2: An IA(I) consists of primary, ancillary and transitory actors.

Proposition 3: Primary and transitory actors are recruited from a local populace and/or ancillary actors.

Proposition 4: Primary and ancillary actors are attracted, motivated, empowered and legitimized by a core idea, a narrative, an ideology and a founding cause.

Proposition 5: Primary actors under a charismatic leader are organized into cells that cooperate with ancillary and transitory actors.

Proposition 6: Ancillary actors include an external country or government.



Ideational Core Block


Proposition 7: An IA(I) has at its basis a narrative.

Proposition 8: A core idea is central to a narrative and is formalized as an ideology.

Proposition 9: An ideology envisions a desired endstate.

Proposition 10: A narrative articulates a founding cause and a desired endstate.

Proposition 11: A narrative exploits and illustrates racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences, and political and/or socio-economic grievances.



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The Context – Chronic Social Conflict Block

Proposition 12: An IA(I) lives and operates in a complex social environment amongst a local populace in a failed or failing state.

Proposition 13: A failed or failing state has a weak established authority that fails to address political and/or socio-economic grievances.

Proposition 14a: A failed or failing state has a local populace that is separated by racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences.

Proposition 14b: A failed or failing state has a local populace that perceives political and/or socio-economic grievances.


Proposition 14c: A failed or failing state has a local populace that lacks confidence in a weak established authority that fails to address political and/or socio-economic grievances.

Proposition 15a: An IA(I) establishes sanctuaries in a failed or failing state.

Proposition 15b: An IA(I) establishes sanctuaries in an external country.

Proposition 16: An external country or government may agitate or intervene within a failed or failing state.

Proposition 17: Supporting nations may assist a weak established authority.



Strategic Decision Processes Block

Proposition 18: An IA(I) is a learning, adaptive organization that relies upon non-linear decision processes to produce an asymmetric strategic approach.

Proposition 19: Racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences; political and/or socio-economic grievances; and a weak established authority provides opportunity.

Proposition 20: Opportunity, a founding cause, and a desired endstate feed into non-linear decision processes to produce an asymmetric strategic approach.

Proposition 21: An asymmetric strategic approach directs operations employing adaptive and cunning tactics, techniques and procedures operating on the physical and cognitive planes.

Proposition 22: An external country or government may support operations.

Proposition 23a: Adaptive and cunning tactics, techniques and procedures create strategic effects to achieve a desired endstate.


Proposition 23b: Adaptive and cunning tactics, techniques and procedures create strategic effects to undermine a weak established authority and supporting nations.

Proposition 23c: Adaptive and cunning tactics, techniques and procedures create strategic effects to gain control of a local populace.



Mouse Over Information

TIF:10ad08 — A Conceptual Framework for Understanding ANSAs: Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics



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Unfortunately, we don't have the time to delve into the specific propositions that fall within these blocks – maybe we can discuss some of them in the context of the syndicates later today and tomorrow. Rather, I'd like to spend the remainder of my time highlighting some of the features of this knowledge management tool.


One of the useful features of the concept map is the ability to add or attach information to a concept. For example, we can add **mouse over information**. This allows us to quickly review key information and keywords related to a specific concept. For example, if we want to remind ourselves of the meaning of the term manifest concept, we can mouse-over the "Focus Question" node, and the definition appears.



Links to Resources


TIF:10ad08 — A Conceptual Framework for Understanding ANSAs: Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics

Focus Question: What is the Land Force's *manifest concept* of an Irregular Adversary (Insurgent) [IA(I)]?




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We can also add **links to resources**. These resources can be anything from Word files, PDF files and Power Point files to Web resources and other concept maps. For example, linked to the “Focus Question” node, we have a PDF file briefly describing “What is a Concept Map?”, along with a link to a website with an article that explains in more detail the theory and construction of concept maps as well as a link to the *CmapTools* modeling toolkit that was used to create this Concept Map. We also have a link to a PDF file summarizing the 29 propositions of the Concept Map. Finally, we have links to the PDF files of the complete *Land Operations* and *Counter-Insurgency Operations* field manuals, should the analyst need to refer quickly to these publications.




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We can also add information and links to propositions. You'll notice in this sub-map these little coloured boxes with the letter "P" and a number inside them. These refer to the propositions that form the Concept Map. For example, the green box "P14a" refers to Proposition 14a. We can mouse-over this box and the proposition itself appears. This helps us to follow the path of the proposition along the branches of the Concept Map: "A failed or failing state has a local populace that is separated by racial, cultural, religious or ideological differences."



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As with a concept node, we can also add links to resources to the proposition boxes. Here, we have links to PDF files detailing the sections of the field manuals that are relevant (at least in my judgment) to the proposition. We can also add a link to a Word-format working file. This can be used by the analyst to record notes, preliminary thoughts and reflections, and anchor them to the particular proposition.



To summarize, for our work in the TIF, the Concept Map will provide a means to structure and organize our theoretical investigation of the assumptions and theories underlying the propositions that make up the Land Force’s current manifest concept of an IA(I). It will help us to identify those elements of the concept that need to be revised in light of recent advances in social science theory and hard-won practical experience from our Afghanistan mission.

This tool can also have a more immediate practical application: it could be used to help structure and organize information related to the development of the Major Terrorist Event Integrating Concept. For example, the scenario I mentioned at the start of this talk – a terrorist attack on a Canadian target coming in response to the international operations of the CF – is captured in Proposition 23b: “Adaptive and cunning tactics, techniques and procedures [in this instance, a terrorist attack] create strategic effects to undermine a weak established authority and supporting nations [here, Canada].” The usefulness of this tool from a conceptual standpoint is that it grounds this act – this major terrorist event – in a comprehensive framework of ANSA intent and behaviour.

It's important to bear in mind that this Concept Map is not the end product of our Project. After all, we've only just gotten started. Rather, it's the starting point or launching pad for our investigation. As such, over the three-year life of the project, we'll undoubtedly rework and revise this Concept Map in light of our theoretical, experimental and field work.

For instance, one revision that immediately comes to mind concerns terminology. My preference would be to substitute the term "Armed Non-state Actor" for "Irregular Adversary (Insurgent)". I believe that "ANSA", defined as "an autonomously operating planned group that uses violence [possibly including terrorist tactics] as one among a panoply of strategies to achieve its desired endstate", is a broader, more encompassing – and, more importantly, analytically neutral – term than Irregular Adversary (Insurgent). I would certainly want to avoid the use of such a politically loaded term as "terrorist" or "terrorist group".

This is only one example of possible improvements that can and will be made to this tool as our TIF Project progresses. But, from the standpoint of the ICWG's task in developing the MTE Integrating Concept, this tool may be of immediate use. To paraphrase Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, "you develop your concepts with the tools you have, not the tools you might want or wish to have at a later time". If the ICWG sees some potential for use of a knowledge management tool such as this, we here at DRDC Toronto would be more than happy to share it with you.

3 ICWG Syndicate 3 – Warfare in the Human Domain: Synopsis

Author’s Note: The following is a synopsis of the discussion in the syndicate, not a verbatim transcript. Nor is it an exhaustive record of all comments or ideas expressed in the discussion. As the syndicate lead, I have taken the liberty of clustering together remarks (without attribution) on related major themes in an effort to craft a coherent general narrative of the discussion. (In some instances, I have incorporated additional information which I believe might usefully expand upon the point(s) referred to in the narrative; this additional information is presented in yellow boxes in the text.) The following narrative is based upon my personal recollections of the discussion and the extensive notes taken by the syndicate’s notetaker, Sofi Blazeski (AIS/DRDC Toronto). Thus, what follows is my interpretation of the essence of the syndicate’s discussion, an interpretation for which I am solely responsible. If I have misunderstood or (unintentionally) misrepresented any points that were made, I apologize in advance and ask that clarifications and corrections be emailed to me and to L.Col. S. Kostner (DFSA) for circulation to the ICWG.

The Syndicate Discussion

To help orient the discussion, L.Col. F. Aubin (DFSA) provided the syndicate with the following question to consider:

What are the elements of national power and influence in the Human Domain?

The syndicate moved very quickly to an expansive discussion of the nature of conflict in the human domain, and the actions and effects (in a very general sense) that could be taken within this domain.

Leading off the discussion, it was suggested that there are three battles being fought in the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT): (1) the battle of ideas, (2) the battle of wills, and (3) the battle of identities. All three could be subsumed under the rubric of “competing legitimacies”, that is, in circumstances of chronic social conflict, the competition between groups to persuade a target populace (or segment thereof) that they are to be entrusted with – or, for those groups with a more authoritarian bent, that they are entitled to – the authoritative exercise of power on behalf of a community. Moreover, the belligerents are not necessarily identical, or of equal importance, in each of these battles. For example, the fight between the West and jihadi extremists – the external battle, if you will – is more a battle of wills than of ideas: there is very little danger that al Qaeda’s propaganda will convert Western populations *en masse* to their radical jihadist ideology. (Indeed, to the extent there is an external battle of ideas, it is very much an asymmetric one heavily weighted in favour of the West: while jihadist ideology has very little traction among the majority non-Muslim populations of North America and Europe, jihadists themselves are apprehensive of the mass appeal of what they see as the corrosive and corrupting culture and ideas of the West within the *ummah*.) Within the world Muslim community, on the other hand,

the internal battle is very much one of ideas: radical jihadism vs. moderate (non-violent) Islamic fundamentalism vs. modernist trends, etc. The West is a secondary participant in this latter internal struggle. Indeed, its open intervention in this battle on behalf of more moderate trends of Muslim thought may actually discredit these trends in the eyes of the Islamic community. At a minimum, it gives the more radical trends potent ammunition with which to discredit their opponents. Assuming this is the nature of conflict in the human domain, the question becomes what are the elements of national power and influence that can affect the belligerents in these distinct but overlapping battles?

Box 1. What is Takfirism?

"The doctrine of *takfir* disobeys the Qur'anic injunction against compulsion in religion (Sûrah al-Baqarah: 256) and instead holds that Muslims whose beliefs differ from the *takfiri*'s are infidels who must be killed. Takfirism is a heresy within Islam...Al Qa'ida is *takfiri*, and its members are universally so described by other Muslims, whom they routinely terrorize. In my [Kilcullen's] view, and (compellingly for me) in the daily vocabulary of most ordinary local people, religious leaders, and tribal leaders with whom I have worked in the field, "takfirism" best describes the ideology currently threatening the Islamic world. I prefer it to the terms *jihad*, *jihadist*, *jihadi*, or *mujahidin* (literally "holy war" or "holy warrior"), which cede to the enemy the sacred status they crave, and to *irhabi* (terrorist) or *hiraba* (terrorism), which address AQ's violence but not its ideology. *Takfiri* is also preferable to the terms *salafi* or *salafist*, which refer to the belief that true Muslims should live like the first four generations of Muslims, the "pious ancestors" (*as-salaf as-salih*). Most extremists are *salafi*, but few *salafi* believers are *takfiri*, and even fewer are terrorists: most, although fundamentalist conservatives, have no direct association with terrorism." (Excerpt from David Kilcullen, **The Accidental Guerrilla** (2009), pp.xviii-xix)

In response to these opening thoughts, it was rightly pointed out that the word "jihad" is incorrectly used in the literature, and that we should avoid using the term because of the negative connotations associated with it. The alternative term *takfiri* was suggested to describe this violent radical ideology, but the hesitation in using this term was that most people would be unfamiliar with its meaning (see Box 1). Concern was also expressed with the use of the term "belligerent"; it was felt that we should steer away from such "us vs. them" terminology, and use more inclusive language that emphasizes the common "human" dimension of all peoples.

Stepping back from a focus specifically on the GWOT, it was observed that social conflict takes place in a multi-polar system of systems, and that its roots lie not only in the battles of ideas, values and identity, but in the battle of multi-actor interests. In complex conflicts, such as Afghanistan, there are many different interest groups. We must understand the value sets of these people if we are to connect with them. For example, humans have an association with geographic space

– "this is my home town" – and we must appreciate the way different cultures value their geographic space and environment. We must, in effect, put ourselves "in the shoes" of these multiple actors.

One problem, however, is determining with whom in these complex multi-actor conflicts we should be connecting. Which "side" do we choose? It was remarked that we should identify the commonalities of interests and build upon these mutual interests with local partners. Indeed, this is seen as the doorway to the collaborative approach.

As a prerequisite to developing such collaboration, we must effectively communicate our own interests and intentions to the local population. We must help them to perceive and understand that our actions are moving towards an endstate. They must come to see us as part of the solution and not the problem. (Not only must we assure local partners of this, but we must convince non-CF partners such as the Red Cross, NGOs, and DFAIT that we are all there for the same reason.) For this, however, we must have clarity of intent and unity of effort. When operating in complex environments, the concept of the “strategic corporal” – the notion that actions taken at the tactical level can have significant strategic impact – has particular relevance for the CF. If CF members do not understand the fundamental objectives of the operation – our own interests and intent – then we risk failure in the mission, because this evident lack of understanding on our part will influence the perceptions of local people on the ground.

A caution was sounded, however, that clarity of intent and unity of effort may not be enough to achieve collaboration with local peoples. They may doubt our long-term commitment, no matter how sincerely asserted, because they realize the historical truth that foreigners never stay. They know that, at some point, the foreigners are going to go home. Thus, they are reluctant to collaborate with foreign forces, preferring to “sit on the fence” and not commit to either side, so as to avoid bringing harm to their families and jeopardizing their future.

It was further observed that interests – both our own and those of the local population – extend to the physiological. It is not just a battle for hearts and minds but for the interests or needs of the physical self, e.g., the need for water or the need for physical security. [The CF responds to natural disasters such as the Manitoba floods, for example, because people are losing their homes and property, that is, their physical security is being threatened.] This emphasized a theme that emerged throughout the syndicate discussion: that the human domain must be considered from the standpoint of the *whole human*, from a holistic perspective that integrates the physiological as well as the psychosocial (more on this below).

The discussion shifted focus to consider actions, effectors and effects. Ultimately, the goal of the exercise is to affect behaviour. It was observed that the list of strategic effects that the CF hopes to achieve in the human domain (as in the other five battlespaces) – the “3ds” of destroy, disrupt and dislocate – is missing a fourth “d”: *defuse*, that is, to dissipate the pressures pushing a society towards armed conflict in the first place. In a sense, the “3ds” are *reactive* effects: they become salient only after conflict has already broken out. It was also pointed out that the “3ds” lack a post-conflict strategic effect: *rebuild*. The West cannot intervene in a conflict – cannot go in and “destroy, disrupt, and dislocate” – and then simply walk away, leaving nothing behind. It was observed that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is grounded on the triad of *Prevent – Act – Rebuild*. This, it was thought, might be a better way to frame action and effects in the context of social conflict in the human domain.

The notion of *rebuild* was thought to mean, in one interpretation, constructing an environment where communities can have a competition of ideas and where alternatives are respected. This does not mean, though, that we should go out and try to impose our ideas or culture upon others, on the assumption that “our way” is correct. Indeed, this is contrary to the intent of R2P. At the same time, it was noted that we ourselves have some non-negotiable interests or conditions of success, e.g., with respect to security and human rights, which we must communicate to our local partners.

A warning was sounded that we must be careful not to restrict our thinking simply to the elements of national power at the CF's disposal (i.e., the "military" element of DIME). Under a comprehensive approach (see Box 2), there are other elements of national power such as overseas development assistance and public diplomacy – what political scientist Joe Nye has referred to as "soft power" – that can be brought to bear for the purposes of peace building and stabilization that might not reside exclusively, if at all, with the CF.

It was pointed out that our very presence, posture and profile in a conflict space will have an effect. Thus, an understanding of the social and cultural layer in that space is important because we cannot assume that certain kinds of actions will have the same effect in, say, Afghanistan as they would in the West. We have to improve our cultural understanding of other peoples so that we may understand *their* interpretation of *our* actions.

As the morning discussion drew to a close, the Syndicate began to tackle the question of the "human domain". What is the human domain? What are the bounds of the problem space that we believe this concept encompasses? And how do we exert influence in this domain?

It was pointed out that a people's value systems – the values they learn in the home, the value system of their culture, the value system formed for their society through legislation – are key elements of the human domain. If we want to influence how people behave – which is, ultimately, the goal – we must look at all elements of the value systems that affect their lives. Following on to this, it was observed that, in universalist theories, such as Maslow's individualist model, the assumption is made that basic values and needs are the same for all people. Are there, though, differences in priorities in terms of values and needs between cultures? Psychological studies in this area are conducted primarily with North American participants. Replication studies carried out in other cultures, however, have shown alternative results.

It was suggested that the human domain has to do very broadly with "things of the mind", e.g., perceptions, interests, values, etc. The importance of the physiological dimension was not denied: certainly, we must appreciate the human holistically. But in order to address the problem space practically in terms of an immediate research agenda, the ICWG must narrow its focus and shift the balance to the psychosocial, all the while acknowledging the integrity of the human being as a

Box 2. What is the Comprehensive Approach?

"The comprehensive approach is defined as: "the application of commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular environment"...

The comprehensive approach is an overarching philosophy for the conduct of a campaign. It recognises that crisis situations and their surrounding environments are complicated and that an enduring solution cannot be reached by military forces alone, but requires the use of a wide range of powers exercised through a variety of departments and agencies in order to solve the root causes and aggravating grievances that led to the crisis. A comprehensive approach seeks to incorporate all the elements of power and agencies, and harmonize them, their capabilities, and their activities, in order to work to address the elements and complexities present in an environment, and reach enduring strategic and operational end states. Thus, it brings together **all elements of power and applies them to engage all systems within the environment.**"

Source: DAD/DND (2008), **Land Operations**, p.5-14.

psychosocial-physiological whole. We must draw boundaries (however artificial) around the problem space in order to progress with future research work.

Moreover, it was maintained, the ICWG should concentrate its thinking at the collective level. Again, this is not to deny the importance of the individual, but a recognition that the collective is greater than simply the sum of its individual parts. It is this social dimension of our existence that is the relevant aspect of the human domain for the ICWG's purposes.

The syndicate again took up the quest to define the human domain in the afternoon session. At a fundamental level, the characterization of the human domain as a separate "battlespace" was called into question. As technology progressed over time, the three traditional spaces – maritime, air, and land – became "battlespaces" (see the Integrated Capstone Concept (ICC) description of "battlespace" in Box 3). As these battlespaces and the elements therein were defined, we developed concepts describing what the CF/DND can do and the effects that can be projected into these environments. This is characterized in terms of the six separate functions: Command, Sense, Act, Sustain, Shield, Generate.

Box 3. What is a "Battlespace"?

"Although maritime, land, and air are referred to as the traditional battlespaces, these three did not always exist, nor is this number necessitated (or likely) to remain at three in the future. Access to each of the traditional battlespaces within the strategic environment can be traced to technological developments. With the creation of sailing vessels, military forces could then carry out warfare on both land and sea. The advent of flight and subsequent technological improvements meant that conflict was extended there as well.

As these technological developments evolved, military forces were able to devise strategic uses for the technology and then exercise power and influence from ships and aircraft. The sea and air battlespaces became part of the strategic environment when the ability to generate national power and influence by accessing these battlespaces occurred.

Recent developments of spacecraft, communications, computing technologies, media, and behavioural sciences are expanding the strategic environment and creating new battlespaces: space, cyberspace, human. State and non-state actors are already demonstrating that elements of power and influence can, and will, be exerted by them in the evolving battlespaces."

Source: CFD (2009), **Integrated Capstone Concept** (30 Jun 09 draft), pp.31-32.

Is this conception of a "battlespace" an appropriate way to depict the human domain? The argument was put forward that it is not. The human domain is not a separate battlespace; as evidence, consider the difficulty we have in defining the domain. Disagreement was voiced with ICC's "stovepiping" of the "human" in this manner. The "human" should be thought of in horizontal terms – i.e., as cutting across all other battlespaces – because it is simply too big an issue.

The view was expressed that trying to define the human problem space from a broad academic perspective is a "dead end". Such an approach underestimates what the tactical soldier does on the ground. Soldiers do understand why "they're there" and their commonality with the local people. It is a matter of common sense; a soldier is not put into an operation without understanding it. Others agreed that, from an operational and tactical perspective, soldiers do understand this because they are faced with influence issues on a daily basis. However, understanding becomes a problem when this is

elevated to the strategic level.

A caution was sounded, however, that actions taken based on a soldier's "Western common sense" may not have the desired or intended effects within alien cultures, as evidenced by the serious mistakes made in the early days of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The counter-argument was made that we have learned from these mistakes and are doing better in terms of cultural sensitivity in the theatres in which we operate. The doubt was expressed, however, whether we are "there" yet.


It was astutely observed that two dimensions together define the human domain: the individual v. the collective [the Agent dimension] and the psychosocial v. physiological [the Attribute dimension]. Following up on this line of thought, it was noted that these dimensions could be represented visually in terms of a Venn Diagram (such a diagram has been constructed here and is found in Figure 1, p.27). The Diagram *in its totality* represents "the human domain", while the interior squares represent possible *research spaces* within this broad domain. For example, one investigator may explore the physiological dimension of the individual (square "H" in the Diagram), while another researcher may focus on the psychosocial aspect of the individual and the collective (square "K").

Visualizing the human domain and the feasible research spaces in that domain in this way helps to highlight the two main tendencies that emerged over the course of discussing the definition of the problem space. One tendency emphasized the holistic approach. The human being must be considered in his/her totality. One cannot "disaggregate" the individual and separate the psychosocial from the physiological. Individuals are complex integrated psychosocial-physiological entities and must be approached as such. This research tendency is represented in green-coloured square "M" in the Venn Diagram.

To demonstrate the inseparability of the psychosocial and physiological in a holistic approach, the example of engagement was given. Trust and engagement are very important for a CF member to engage fully. Fear – a psychological state – is paralyzing, but to manage this we use drugs affecting the physiology of the human. In the future, we will use more physiological tools to engage the human. Engagement is connected to the body, so the physical cannot be disentangled when speaking about will.

Others echoed this argument. It was noted, for example, that the instinct to survive is basic; it is difficult to think of an organism whose basic goal is to kill itself (apart from certain radical groups that see martyrdom as an act of self-actualization; this individual behaviour, however, is thought to be irrational). But this basic drive is physiological and will impact behaviour. Thus, one has no choice but to consider the physiological. Other examples were cited showing the interconnection of the physiological and the psychosocial at both the individual and the collective levels: the spread of the H1N1 virus, for instance, has a fear effect; mass rape impacts a community as a whole. For advocates of this tendency, the psychosocial and physiological are intertwined and cannot be separated.

Those advocating the second tendency acknowledged the integrity of human beings as whole psychosocial-physiological entities, but argued that, *from the standpoint of the setting the ICWG's research agenda for the immediate future*, a boundary must be set around the "feasible research



1 only	A	Individual (Agent)
2 only	B	Collective (Agent)
3 only	C	Psychosocial (Attribute)
4 only	D	Physiological (Attribute)
1,2	E	Individual/Collective
1,3	F	Individual/Psychosocial
2,3	G	Collective/Psychosocial
1,4	H	Individual/Physiological
2,4	I	Collective/Physiological
3,4	J	Psychosocial/Physiological
1,2,3	K	Individual/Collective/Psychosocial
1,2,4	L	Individual/Collective/Physiological
1,3,4	M	Individual/Psychosocial/Physiological
2,3,4	N	Collective/Psychosocial/Physiological
1,2,3,4	O	Individual/Collective/Psychosocial/Physiological

Explanatory Note: It is assumed here that an *Agent/Attribute combination* defines a *feasible research space*. In other words, one cannot investigate “the psychosocial” or “the physiological” in the abstract without referring to the agent level of analysis, i.e., whether the investigator is concerned with these attributes at the individual- or the collective-agent level. Hence, the unidimensional squares in the

Venn Diagram (and the corresponding cells in the Table) have been excluded as infeasible, as indicated by the red-coloured strikethroughs. This leaves nine feasible research spaces in the human domain: the seven yellow-coloured squares along with the blue and green squares (the colouring of these latter two squares is explained in the text).

space”, however artificial this might be. They tended to set the boundary around the collective/psychosocial – blue-coloured square “G” in the Diagram.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The discussion question assigned to the syndicate provoked a wide-ranging and stimulating exchange of ideas. Yet, as the preceding narrative demonstrates, the group did not reach the point where it was ready to propose a research question. Much foundational work needs to be done, it was agreed. This syndicate meeting was a good starting point. But, as was pointed out, this was an unscientific brainstorming session. Further study is needed in a scientific way to define the problem space. Moreover, we must approach the development of this concept in a horizontal manner, i.e., across agencies and across other domains, not just from the psychosocial perspective.

This must also be a forward-looking effort. We must set our sights 20 years down the road. We understand what “boots on the ground” means in 2009: effectively desert boots in Afghanistan (essentially a metaphor for holding ground). But what does “boots on the ground” mean in 2028 in the human domain, especially as there may no longer be a geographic “footprint” as conflict becomes, with greater interconnectivity, increasingly virtual and complex? What are the elements that can be influenced, from both an offensive and defensive standpoint, in a world increasing freed from land-space restrictions? What can the CF/DND do strategically within the human domain to neutralize, defuse and eliminate future threats, bearing in mind that the CF/DND may not necessarily have the lead role in this; other departments and agencies may have the ability to take actions at the strategic level in which DND can play a supporting role before it moves on to the operational and tactical.

One way to approach this, it was suggested, may be to come at it from the perspective of the adversary. How can the enemy attack us? If someone were to attack us in the human domain, what would it look like? Where would it be and what elements of national power would be affected? (Recognizing, as well, that in the future the opposing factors may not be “bad guys”; they could include environmental, technological, and economic factors.)

Thus, the overriding recommendation that emerged from the syndicate discussion is:

That, as a first step, the ICWG convoke a small group of experts to prepare a paper defining the concept of the human domain.

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- "assisting CFD in the provision of oversight to L1s Force development prior to CDB on new concept initiative
- assisting CFD in the development of concept document associated with joint capability initiatives/projects
- the Future Security Environment [FSE] and Integrated Capstone Concept [ICC] documents
- all force development initiatives are in keeping with Defence Policy, Defence strategic guidance, the Future Security Environment
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